Odds and Ends: Dominating Wide-Bodies; Trying to save the 747-8; Delta waits; China OKs 787

Dominating Wide-Bodies: Boeing claimed at its investors’ day yesterday it will dominate the wide-body sector. This, predictably, caused some mirth among our Reader Comments.

We agree with Boeing–for the next several years.

The 777-9X will have a monopoly in its seat size, just as the 777-300ER does today. Boeing’s greater production plans, both announced and with figures bandied about for some time, also support this.

Below is our chart, based on announced production numbers, anticipated 787 production and our own prognostications.

Production rate is per month.

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
A380 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
A350 2 4 6 8 10 10 10
A330 10 10 10 10 8 8 8
Total 15 17 19 21 21 21 21
777X 2
777 Today 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 6 6
787 10 10 10 12 14 14 14
747 1.75 1.75 1 ย 1 1 1 1
Total 20.05 20.05 19.3 21.3 23.3 21 21

What do you think?

Saving the 747-8: The Puget Sound Business Journal has this article about Boeing’s latest effort to improve sales prospects for the 747-8, particularly the passenger model. Only 31 Intercontinentals have been ordered by airlines (vs 262 Airbus A380s). This is only a 10.5% market share for Boeing.

Delta Waits: Delta Air Lines hasn’t ordered the Boeing 787, the Airbus A350 or the re-engined aircraft. The 787s it inherited from Northwest Airlines’ order and merger have been pushed out to 2020 and, for all intents and purposes, may as well be considered canceled, though they are still on the books. Why no orders for the new or re-engined airplanes? This article explains.

China OKs 787: Chinese authorities have at long last certified the 787 for operation by its airlines. China Southern was one of the early launch customers but swapped delivery slots to avoid the so-called Terrible Teens (overweight, highly re-worked models). Chinese carriers hoped to have the 787 in service in time for the 2008 Summer Olympics in China, and when the 787 was named, the number “8” was said to be a good number in China (thought there was never really any doubt about the name since 8 was next in sequence).

But certification was delayed and delayed. We’ll probably never truly know why, but market rumor reported a nexus between the Chinese certifying the 787 and the FAA’s dawdling on certification procedures for the COMAC C919. Not that the Chinese would ever play politics with airplane deals, mind you….

89 Comments on “Odds and Ends: Dominating Wide-Bodies; Trying to save the 747-8; Delta waits; China OKs 787

  1. 21 A280 models to 2020? Is that all? What a total financial sink-hole. Many of us even as far back as 2004-2005 stated the A380 program was going to be at the very least a financial sinkhole (my comments can be found on a.net regarding this). Fortunately Airbus has some great selling models to fall back on.

    When is the RLA for the A380 program due? Isn’t it sometime around 2016?

    The B748 program has been a bit of a drain as well-but certainly not as bad as the A380 program. The B748F has some life in it once the freighter market picks up.

    As I exactly mentioned yesterday, as more slots for the B787 and A350 open up, B777 and A330 sales/deliveries will start to slow down-possibly even considerably.

    • A380 production at 3 units per month through 2020 would mean that by that time Airbus will have delivered around 350 A380-800 passenger aircraft, or about the same number of aircraft deliveries the infamous Shadow Critical Project Appraisal (CPA) report projected that Airbus would deliver of both passenger and freight versions. Not bad, not bad at all considering all of the production difficulties the program had to overcome. ๐Ÿ˜‰

      The Shadow CPA estimates the demand for the A380, both passenger and freight versions, over the first 20 years of deliveries. In January, 2001, Airbus could reasonably have projected 496 A380 deliveries over the first 20 years. (The study team itself holds the view that a more realistic expectation is about 350 A380 deliveries).

      http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/flightblogger/050416-shadow.pdf

      As for financial sinkholes, I would not be too surprised if Boeing internally viewed the 787 as the greatest financial fiasco in the history of the company.

      • Addendum

        May I add that CPA’s projection apparently was for deliveries
        from 2006 through 2025.

      • I remember that document many moons ago.
        Regarding deliveries, that is based on orders. There are only 264 firm orders and 29 options (per wikipedia) and I don’t expect VS to take their 6 rather convert them to something different-such as the A351XWB. To 2020, that’s 7 years of delivery. 7*36(=3/month)=252 potential deliveries by and including 2020. 103 have been delivered. That leaves up to 190 frames left if options are taken.

        Bottom line, “where are the orders”?

        Regarding the RLI-per the article:

        ” These costs do not reflect Airbusโ€™ obligation to repay direct development state aid of at least $2,200,000 over the aircraft delivered through 2017. ”

        Regarding the B787 sinkhole-yes its bad, but given the number of current orders and the potential of the B787-10X, it will almost certainly become profitable by the end of the decade. Again, unlike the A380 program which will be a continual financial drag.

      • Well, to maintain production through 2020 at 3 per month, Airbus only needs to sell another 100 airframes, or around 15 airframes per year. That should be pretty doable IMO. Also, if I were to hazard a guess, Airbus will at that time already have launched a next generation streched A380-900. By the end of the next decade, I could easily see EK operating more than 100 A380-800s and 100 A380-900s. By that time, global air traffic should have doubled from todays levels and it’s not unreasonable to assume that there will be a corresponding increase in demand for VLAs.

        Regarding the RLI-per the article: โ€These costs do not reflect Airbusโ€™ obligation to repay direct development state aid of at least $2,200,000 over the aircraft delivered through 2017.โ€

        I wouldn’t put too much credence in that Boeing-sponsored report. Even with the slower than expected A380 production ramp-up, the total number of A380 deliveries over the first 20 years should IMO quite easily exceed 500 units (October 2007 – October 2027). In addition, the authors of the report estimated the marginal production costs in a rather bizzare way. They used narrow-bodies as the datum and assumed that marginal cost is linearly proportional to increse in OEW; or that an aircraft that weighs 10 times more than a smaller aircraft has a marginal production cost 10 times higher. For example, if we are assuming that both the small and the large aircraft are of a similar generation of technology; the larger aircraft will have a cockpit and onboard systems of similar complexity — and similar costs — to that of the smaller one. Hence, the profit margin on wide-bodies will be greater than that of the profit margin on single-aisle aircraft. Also, the autors speculated that early customers had been given unprecedented discounts and that the general discount level was bigget than the industry standard.

        Regarding RLI; that’s been dealt with in an earlier thread: ๐Ÿ™‚

        Member State governments advance money to Airbus up to the limit agreed with the US, namely 33% of the total development costs of a new aircraft model.

        This advance is then repaid by means of a levy on the sale of each aircraft. The levy is set so that, once an agreed sales target is reached, the whole amount should be repaid with a rate of return, i.e. with interest, over a repayment period of 17 years (i.e. 11-12 years from the first delivery).

        The sales target is based on a conservative forecast of future sales, which is established when the investment is made.

        The interest rate reflects the investing governmentโ€™s objective to earn a good return on its money. It is always in excess of the governmentโ€™s borrowing rate (i.e. typically 6-8% nominal) and may be considerably higher, depending, for instance, on the anticipated commercial success of the project and on the Member State (Some Member States insist on a higher return).

        Once the actual sales exceed the target, as has happened, investing governments continue to collect โ€œroyaltiesโ€ or โ€œupsideโ€ on the additional sales, which will further increase
        their rate of return.

        http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/september/tradoc_146485.pdf

        “Regarding the B787 sinkhole-yes its bad, but given the number of current orders and the potential of the B787-10X, it will almost certainly become profitable by the end of the decade. Again, unlike the A380 program which will be a continual financial drag.”

        Well, “profitable by the end of the decade” seems to me to be overly optimistic. By the end of the 2020s, or if ever, sounds more reasonable. ๐Ÿ˜‰

        We are now already 9 years past the official launch of the 787. By early next decade, the 787-8 will be vulnerable to newer state-of-the-art aerofoil and engine technologies in addition to smaller airframes fully optimised for intermediate range (i.e. same way as the A330-300 was originally optimised). Hence, the 787-10X will IMO be vulnerable to a smaller 6000nm-ranged, fully optimised airframe (i.e. think A350 derivative with the same length as that of the A350-800, having an all new and significantly smaller wing and optimised to fly the same sector length as that of the original A330-200. Same thing for A350 derivative with the same length as that of the A350-900 and with range about the same as that of the current A330-300 — fully optimised).

    • I think they meant 7 Years x 12 Month x 3 planes in the A 380 section; that quit a big flock of whales!

      • Should be 7 Years x 11 Months x 3 planes (Production-stop for the August holiday). ๐Ÿ™‚

    • That’s monthly production rates: 3×11 (Airbus operates on an 11-month year), or 33 per year. In theory.

      • I believe you are VASTLY over optimistic in your assessment.

  2. In the 1980s Boeing “dominated” the entire LCA business with around 80 percent total market share. Using the word “dominate” when your wide-body market share will only peak at around the 60 percent level — before going down — is OK if you want to let loose some โ€œfeel-goodโ€ vibes, while trying to influence short term investors that everything is hunky-dory. In the real world, you don’t dominate when your competitor has more than 40 percent market share.

    AFAIK, the Airbus numbers are based on an “Airbus year” (10.5 to 11 months of production), while the Boeing numbers are for 12 full months of production. Hence annual output would be a more accurate differentiation.

    As for the A350, I wouldn’t be too surprised if Airbus would hike up production from 10 units per month to more than 15 units per month — sooner rather than later.

  3. There is only one reason Boeing has a widebody lead on airbus and that is the 777-300ER, a big expensive plane with fantastic profit margins, is selling like hotcakes. Without that, Boeing would be in quite a bit of trouble. There is no reason to be comfortable.
    To me the big question is how much the A330 volume will go down and how much will the A350 volume go up? I believe for the end of this decade, this table is too positive for the A330 and to conservative for the A350.
    For the 787, I still don’t know what the true production rate is, because planes coming off the manufacturing line are not delivered in a consistent way. Until this happens, the production volumes are meaningless.

    It seems a lot of people forget that this is a manufacturing business and the manufacturing determines a lot of the profits. While CASM and other factors drive sales, the manufacturing process is the driver of corporate profitability. Have the CASM king and sell it at a loss (in high volume) and you are in deep trouble.

    • “To me the big question is how much the A330 volume will go down and how much will the A350 volume go up.”

      Well, the difference between the A330 vs. the 787 and the 777-300ER vs. the A350-1000 is the fact that the percentagewise costs for fuel and oil of the Direct Operating Costs (DOC), on short and intermediate ranged routes flown by the A330-300, is substantially less than what’s the case for the 777-300ER flying long range. In addition, it’s generally understood in the industry that the 777-300ER is a very expensive airframe to make — thanks mainly to the colossal engines. Hence, it’s no reason to assume that Boeing will have an easier time selling 777s against A350s than with Airbus selling A330s against 787s.

      • Addendum:

        Hence, itโ€™s no reason to assume that Boeing will have an easier time selling 77Ws against A350s than with Airbus selling A330s against 787s.

    • “.. 777-300ER, a big expensive plane with fantastic profit margins …”

      AFAICS the 777 sales flood (in ~2011/2012) mostly filled the just expanded void to A350-1000 EIS. ( probably helped on by slightly pain reduced pricing ). i.e. in a way replicating the A330 sales history.
      The A350-1000 will probably put the 777 models into a bit of shadow ( bracketing in B-speak;-). Boeing needs a significant remake for the 777 where Airbus got away with detail improvements on the A330 ( engine pips, weight, MTOW++ )
      What kind of improvements did the 777-300ER and GE90-115 receive from subtype EIS onwards? Recently saw an article about perceived lack of (engine) maintainance cost improvements.

      • Correct, Airbus has gotten away with cheap upgrades to the A330 because an increase in engine-efficiencies and a decrease in operating empty weight (OEW) are not so critical for an airframe flying short to intermediate distances. For a legacy airframe flying mid and long range distances, reductions in both TSFC and OEW is of paramount importance if it is to compete with an all new same-sized airframe having an equal, or slightly better range capability.

    • That one reason, the 777-300ER, was a deliberate play by Boeing, which, already in 1999/2000, was more concerned with getting launch orders for the GE90-powered longer-range 777’s. It’s been a long time coming.

      Flight International 22 December (1999) – 3 January 2000, page 27, Forecasts 2000 (one of my favourite single aviation magazines – a must read, as much for those forecasts, as for the writings on the A3XX as it was then known, and Boeing’s proposed 747-400X/400X Stretch proposals):

      “The company still seeks launch orders for the long-range/high-capacity General Electric GE90-powered 777-200X/300X, which must get a green light early in 2000 to allow deliveries to begin in 2003.”

      I’ve always viewed Boeing’s position in the 350-400 seat market as a single line since. The 777-300ER replaced the 747-400. The writing was on the wall as the flight test programme progressed.

  4. The 777 order book is about 350 and will be empty by late 2016 at current production rates.

    Next year the A350 starts entering service with UA, SQ, CX, BA, QR, EK, AF/KL, Air China, US, Thai etc. The A350-1000 in 2017 with BA, CX, EK and probably some more.

    Who is going to buy those 350 777-300ER’s produced after 2016, before the 777X is available?

    Same for the A330, however those slots are sold until well after the A350s enters service. There is overlap.

    2020 just is late for the 777X. McNerney is selling the future to his stockholders.

    A 767->787, 747-400->747-8 like idle production line is looming.

    Unless they want to move the line.

    • You seem to ask the same question and fail to see that the scales are the same on both sides of the pond. The 777-300ER and the A330 are at the end of their life cycles. Both will continue to have sales for some time, but the days of making hay are coming to an end.

      • Airbus would have to try and keep the A330 alive as long as they don’t have a true replacement for the sub-300 seat market and that depends on what they do with the A358. The 77W is in a different position since it will be replaced by both Boeing and Airbus.

  5. The 777 has 3.5 years of orders, which will put its backlog to the start of 2017. Then they would be theoretically at the end.
    However, it is likely that they will sell more because:
    1. There is no freighter counterpart from Airbus
    2. There is no way for Airbus to produce the 350-1000 in any significant numbers until 2018-19 or later.
    3. Presumably Boeing would consider discounting and availability arguments ala the a330.

    The total 350 production from 2014 until through 2017 will be 220 a 350-9s (see above). They will then need to split the FAL between the two aircraft or dedicate the second (proposed) line to the 1000. In any event, they are looking at producing small numbers of 1000s for 2 to 3 years, likely until late 2018 (say 22 for a new FAL in 2017, 44 for 2018, 55 for 2019, 2020). This presumes everything goes perfectly right…which it never does it seems for either manufacturer. They also have to launch the 800 at the same time.

    At the same time, lets say the 777x comes on board and flies by early 2020 and enters production in 2021. Assuming (perhaps a big assumption) it has a significant backlog and is not a turkey and no glitches etc, I would guess it would have a similar ramp up to the 777 or 350 over 3 years. That will give Airbus a space to produce the a350-1000 of 2017-2020 for around 175 aircraft before the 777-x begins to arrive. The 777-300 will naturally decline some in the gap from 2017-2020. But I don’t think either manufacturer can produce enough planes to pull way ahead from the other in this segment. However…

    The tough prognostication is what will a330 sales/production do? They have around 2 1/2 years backlog at 10/m (less at 11/m). (274/110 = 2.49). They will market on price and early availability. At some point the demand will drop off as it is an older aircraft with inferior economics versus its competition which is ramping up production to huge numbers (14/m! for the 787) and has more room for improvement over time.

    I would guess the next project for AIrbus would be either a 330 replacement or a craft to fill the 200-325 gap with a debut in 2025…

    • No one seems to buy that the Airbus hole in the 200-325 gap is really large. All seem to think the A330 has far more life than that [edited] -300ER. Customers will always buy a A330 over a 787 and don’t worry about the A350-800 because no one will want/need the smaller widebodies. Mike, you seem to know, why is that the theory?

    • Mike, agree on most. Could Anyone put Mike’s scenario in a table? Airbus has the A330F too, but I expect the A330/340, 777 conversion market to pick at some point. Not helping the 777F and A330F.

      I can see a big cargo operator launching a A330-200F or -300F NEO. They like to use their aircraft at night in populated areas, use them for 30-40 years and demand a better noise/ fuel consumption profile. An order for 60-80 can justify the investment. E.g Fedex has a huge A300/DC10 fleet and LD3 based logistics.

  6. Many years ago, before Mr Mc showed up on the scene, Boeing asked whether they could find a way to back out of the narrow body segment, because the pricing and competitive nature of the segment was more than they wanted. They wanted to move toward a widebody offering and place their products in places where they could price and produce products cost effectively. Airbus had gotten on their nerves and they wanted to produce cost effective products single grouping and not multiple grouping. McDonnell Douglas had shown the industry that no one could make money in the narrow body business. Boeing also believed that because air travel was increasing, the demand for a variation of widebodies would produce ample demand to justfiy being exclusive. They developed the 777 with that in mind, going to 2 engines, using a platform that could increase in size as the market demanded. The 767 had done very well and they saw that the larger aircraft produced barriers to entry that the narrow bodies failed to provide.

    Then the got caught up in the narrow body fight, and tried some other stupid strategy moves that caused sigificant strategy loss. maybe that came from buying McDonnell Douglas, but its documented. The 787 came as a result of major trial and error. The approach made sense to the market, but the internal folks were still trying to get their arms around things the public never understood, unions. But the 787 might be a true outgrowth of that long ago strategy. Some may say that some of the older platforms may have an impact on the strategy (747-8 and now the 777), but we are seeing an attemplt to get as much mileage as possible out of them before ending the platforms. From comments I have seen, the concern of producing a larger 787 past -9 was whether the current composite design had the ability to withstand the weight. Were they getting to the limits of the design and were the savings over the current 777 configs justified to use composites were the concerns I have researched. There has been nothing I have read to indicate that the research has shown that large composites are more efficient than the Al designs of today.

    If Al ends up being as cost effective as composites, then the 777-9X becomes a game changer that will be hard for Airbus to address. Al manufacturers have taken composites very seriiously and they are developing much lighter and stronger materials. If a -300ER or a A330-300 has the ability to be equal in performance to their composite counterpart the game changes. If Airbus has to go back to Al because of design concerns with the current composite design, Airbus has a challenge past the A350-1000. But, if Airbus can leverage the A330 with lighter Al then they can really extend the life of the A330 and have less of a challenge on the bottom end. The two could offset eachother and we’re back at 50%

    This is why the widebody world is so exciting. Both companies face challenges with their long term strategies.

  7. Doing a 777-x process on the a330 would require a lot: new engines, new wing, changing fuselage to AlLi. Why not go for a new 330 lite to go slightly above the 200 mark and center at 240 to beat the 787-8 and pick up the 757/767 market and the transcon/TATL market? Not sure there is enough demand tho.
    The two manufacturers have carefully avoided placing craft directly on each other. Now the lineup is getting crowded, so there is likely going to be some toes stepped on…

  8. 8-10 A330 a month to 2020? Who will buy those aircraft? The current A330 backlog is 306 (some to disfunction airline), just enought for this year and two more year (to 2015) with 10 per month (10*12*2+7*10 = 310). To have fill the product lot from 2016-2020, Airbus have to sell 528 (10*12*2+8*12*3 = 528) in next four years (132 per year). Even new A350 didn’t sellt that many in 4 years period, the A330 only sold more than a 100 A330 in few year (these order include some now disfunction airline or to paied for the delay of the A380), let alone four year in the row with >100 A330 orders.

    • There is nothing else available in that category until 2019/20. If you want lift in the 250-300 seat capacity, it is called A330. ๐Ÿ™‚
      As far as the numbers are concerned, both A and B predict a big market for twin aisle aircraft, so the orders will follow, just wait till Paris Air Show.
      On the production side, Airbus works on a 10.5 working months, so we are looking at roughly 105-110 deliveries/year, at full rate.

  9. Rudy Hillinga Why is filling out these two lines a new equirement every time I write somethingScott?

    RE: Jacobin777 “Again, unlike the A380 program which will be a continual
    financial drag.”
    Wishfull thinking, bias thinking and way too partial a comment my friend!
    The 350+ number of A380s sold so far in about 12 years after launch,
    roughly equal 500 747s in total capacity. That’s far more than the number
    of 747 sold in its first 12 years after it’s launch!
    Furthermore, the stretched 747-8 came too late to be able to challenge the
    A380 and is , therefore, already “A DEAD DUCK,” and NO match for the
    A380 and in particular the A380STR, which will be launched ASA the market
    is ready for it and expected within the next two years, to initially cater for
    the demand for VL a/ps in the Pacific Basin!
    Unless, ofcourse, Boeing launches BWB configured 250+ capacity a/ps in
    the 2020-2030 time period, as has been strongly speculated, which is, in my
    opinion, THE ONLY WAY for Boeing to defend itself against the A380STR!
    .

    • Rudy, you forgot to mention what Phil Condit told you prior to the A380 launch ๐Ÿ™‚

  10. Why would the A380 still be a financial drag by 2020, if the programme is expected to become profitable by 2015 (and even if it were just per-frame breakeven, it would by definition cease to be a drag). Sorry, sometimes my inner accountant can’t be contained.

  11. Presuming the ramp up goes well to 10/m by the end of the year, then by end 2018 the 787 lines will have produced roughly 720 aircraft (120 through 2013, then 120 x 5 years). If the line increases to 14 by say 2016, then the entire backlog of 787 orders could be filled by the end of 2018 (144 more).
    It is likely many of the orders will be strung out over time as most airlines cannot take a Big Gulp of aircraft all at the same time. So I would hazard a guess that 787 slots will be available for new orders beginning in the 2015 to 2017 range as the jump to 14 is made.

    The 787-8 and 9 are in the 210-290 capacity slot. The 787-10 will be in the 290-310 slot. They will compete directly with the a330 family.

    The a380 will start making money in 2015 unless something bad happens. It just won’t be making a lot of money as the volume of aircraft is relatively small, unless they are making n enormous profit on each one (unlikely).

  12. OV-099 Thanks for taking the time to respond. I truly appreciate it.

    Regarding selling another 100 airframes-possible but right now, the past 2 1/2 years, there has been a total of 28 sales. That certainly doesn’t bode well if this continues. I’m not so sure where Airbus will be selling 15 per year for the next 5-7 years.

    I also don’t see Airbus going with the A389 even remotely soon. It will take cost billions more and sales are already stagnating. I also do not see EK flying 200 A380’s, 50+ A350’s and 100+ B777’s. There comes a “saturation point’ and I believe EK’s saturation point is only a few years away-if that.

    I can’t say about their margins extrapolation, however Airbus has a number of times during the past few years stated that the A380 program has “dragged earnings” .

    The prices given are actually not completely out of the ball park at all. In fact, the prices carriers paid were practically what other launch customers paid for other types of planes (such as NH/JL for the B787, LH for the B748i). Don’t forget, Airbus/Leahy really wanted to break into the VLA market.

    I don’t see how the B787 program won’t be able to break even by around 2020. Maybe others can chime in here.

    Whether or not the B788 and B787-10X are “vulnerable” is to be seen. We don’t see anything out there yet coming in the next 10-12-15 years..;-)

    p..s-Govt collecting royalties on the A380 program? I say “hiiiiiiiiiiiigh hopes” only because I dont’ see enough sales coming. At this point the various governments should be happy to get their investment back on the A380 program.

    • รธ“Iโ€™m not so sure where Airbus will be selling 15 per year for the next 5-7 years”

      EK another 30+; 20, or so for TK; 15, or so for ANA; 10+ for QR; 10+ for BA; 5+ for LH.

      “I also donโ€™t see Airbus going with the A389 even remotely soon. It will take cost billions more and sales are already stagnating”.

      AFAIR, the development, flight testing and certification of the A330-200 cost around $500 million (1998 dollar value). Like the A332. the A380 stretch variant will not require modifications to the wing, except perhaps for new wing tip devices, will have a modest increase percentagewise in MTOW, and will not require modifications to the aircraft systems architecture, apart from greater airflow from the ECS etc. If it is to use new generation engine technologies, the existing Trent XWB is the obvious choice.

      In contrast, in terms of consumables and expendables parts (C&E), the 747-400 and the 747-8 have a commonality of about 50 percent, while the 747-8 only retained the wing sweep and basic structure of the original center wing box, but required:

      Advanced technology airfoils for improved overall performance and greater fuel capacity.

      Fly-by-wire spoilers and outboard ailerons to save weight.

      Double-slotted inboard and single-slotted outboard flaps to improve low-speed performance and noise.

      Advanced-technology raked tip to reduce cruise drag.

      Aileron droop to reduce noise and provide improved low-speed performance.

      Redesigned flap tracks with optimized flap-track fairings to improve low-speed performance and noise.

      Redesigned Krueger flaps with gapped configuration to improve low-speed performance.

      http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2010_q3/2/

      The 747-8 required all new derivative engines unique to the dash-8. AFAIK, the original R&D costs were supposed to be in the neighbourhood of 3 billion dollars. In comparison, the R&D for the A345/A346 was AFAIR around $3.5 billion (including development costs for the Trent-500 engine).

      Assuming, therefore, that an A380 stretch version will “only” require a beefed-up structure and 2 fuselage plugs, changes to the flight control system similar to what the A332 required, how come an A380-900 stretch version require “billions” in development and certification?

      “I also do not see EK flying 200 A380โ€ฒs, 50+ A350โ€ฒs and 100+ B777โ€ฒs. There comes a โ€œsaturation pointโ€™ and I believe EKโ€™s saturation point is only a few years away-if that.”

      Well, perhaps the Kangaroo route will be starting to reach the saturation point come the end of this decade, but traffic flows, trade and commerce from for example Asia to Africa/South-America — routed though Dubai โ€“ is really just still in its infancy.

      Traffic has doubled at DXB in less than seven years while seat capacity has almost tripled since 2004. The airport is projecting traffic of 65.4 million passengers for 2013, an addition of 7.7 million passengers over last year. Traffic at the airport has already outstripped Dubai Airportโ€™s 2010 projections and is now close to 10 months ahead of estimates.

      DXB is the fastest growing airport for international passenger traffic and capacity, and the ambition of Dubai is to keep it that way. While the hubs of Europe struggle with capacity constraints and the Asian hubs lag in terms of international traffic growth, DXB remains ahead of the curve.

      Dubai is investing USD7.8 billion to keep it that way, ensuring its air and ground infrastructure are matched to the growth. By 2015, the airport plans to handle 85 million passengers, more international traffic than London Heathrow, making it the worldโ€™s largest airport for international passenger traffic. By 2021 it expects to handle 100 million passengers.

      Just 15km away from Dubai International Airport is one eventual threat to its supremacy: Al Maktoum International Airport. The airport is a part of the massive Dubai World Central airport city and self-sustained economic zone project, aimed at meeting Dubaiโ€™s aviation, tourism, commercial and logistics needs all the way through to 2050. Upon completion, Dubai World Central will become the worldโ€™s largest airport, boasting five runways and an ultimate capacity of 160 million passengers and 12 million tonnes of cargo p/a

      โ€ I canโ€™t say about their margins extrapolation, however Airbus has a number of times during the past few years stated that the A380 program has โ€œdragged earningsโ€ .โ€

      We were talking about the false estimates of the marginal production costs per the Boeing sponsored CPA FUD-report, not the added costs to the program due to the production snafus. ๐Ÿ˜‰

      โ€ I donโ€™t see how the B787 program wonโ€™t be able to break even by around 2020. Maybe others can chime in here.โ€

      Straight from the horse’s mouth: ๐Ÿ™‚

      By CM:

      Itโ€™s a great analysis, confirming everything we already knew, as well as what Boeing told us this week at the earnings call.

      1. The delay was brutally costly to Boeing and erased any potential for the 787 business to be a blockbuster.

      2. 787 pricing discounts, including early frames were in-line with industry norms

      3. Cashflow will go positive around 2015

      3. Break-even for the program will happen in the middle of the next decade, provided Boeing can reduce unit cost according to plan,. If they canโ€™t, break-even could be as much as a decade further outโ€ฆ or never.

      4. To achieve projected unit cost reductions, Boeing has to move down the production learning curve more aggressively than actuals for the 777, but not out of line with non-Boeing assumptions used for planning in aerospace.

      http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2011/10/29/more-analysis-on-787-accounting-block-break-even/

      โ€ Whether or not the B788 and B787-10X are โ€œvulnerableโ€ is to be seen. We donโ€™t see anything out there yet coming in the next 10-12-15 years.โ€

      Well, either by others or of your own making, youโ€™ve got to play the hand that’s dealt ya.

      Both the 787-8 and the 787-9 were optimised to fly around 8000nm. The 787-10X will have the same MTOW as the dash-9, but it will have significantly shorter range. It will be a difficult undertaking to substantially increase MTOW โ€“ just take a look at the significantly larger footprint of the MLG of the A350-900 as an indication of what it would take to do that. Hence, from Boeingโ€™s point of view it makes sense to claim that the 787-10X will be sitting in the โ€œsweet spotโ€. Whatever Boeing says though, about the 787-10X doesnโ€™t have to be the truth regarding the intermediate ranged wide-body market. IMHO, intermediate ranges wide-bodies donโ€™t necessarily need to be that big. Again, Airbus could put a new smaller wing on a new family of wide-body derived from the A350 (i.e. same fuselage, new lighter MLG etc.). One model could have the same overall length as that of the A350-900, but optimised to have the same range as that of the original A330-200, while the larger model would be of the same size as that of the A350-900, but optimised to have the same range as the existing A330-300. MTOW for both version should be the same (like the A332/A333), and could be as low as 200 metric tonnes; or about 50 tonnes less than the MTOW of that of the 787-10X. Having the same engine technology as that of the 777X and a new state-of-the-art aerofoil, the 787-10X would be rendered uncompetitive, sooner rather than later.

    • Considering Airbus themselves say they currently can’t fill 2015 on A380, and it’s essentially lead time away on production, tells you that 3/mo is a crack pipe dream; especially when you consider that Airbus still carries dead orders like Kingfisher, Hong Kong Air, and Air Austral in their books. Similar story for the A330, 2015 is pretty dire for everything but the A320 and A350. Heck, even Bregier said we’d more likely see a rate cut than increase on the A330. Of course the A350 will be fine, but ramp up is not as easy as the pompom squad here would have you believe… I’m looking at you Keesje. I find his comments about 10+ airlines all getting their deliveries in the same year a laugh riot. You can tell he has ZERO clue how an actual airplane program works.

      The 777 does a bit better, but with some trouble in the later part of the decade. I think with the 777X things aren’t near as dire doom and gloom as the Airbus fanbo… er Cheerleaders here would have you believe, but of course All Hail Airbus, Emperor of the World… reality be damned.

      • Hmm, that’s what I get for writing a comment before reading all of the existing comments. An analysis from Howard.

        You must be a star at fleetbuzzeditorial or whatever blog that character is currently running for his private playmates.

        So you are saying that AIrbus should already have reduced the production rate of the A380?

        Why are the Hong Kong Air and Air Austral orders dead?

        You say that delivering to 10 airlines in the first year is a โ€œlaugh riotโ€ but Boeing delivered to 8 in the first year of the 787 production. If Airbus puts some effort into it and doesnโ€™t have the same production problems Boeing had with the 787, it is possible.

        At the end, you seem to run out of reasons why the 777x situation is not near as bad as some see it and resort to your usual cheerleader chant.

        But at least you have tried to do something besides heap scorn and be sarcastic. Well, sort of anyway.

      • A330 production rate:
        You are probably referencing this from late summer 2012:
        ” Bregier recently travelled to China with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to speak with customers there and drum up business amid a spat over the European Union’s emissions t
        If the dispute is not resolved, Airbus will have to cut its production target for the A330 “pretty soon”, Bregier said.

        Airbus earlier this year warned that it could only increase production of the A330 to 11 a month in the second quarter of 2014 if opposition from China and others to the ETS did not derail aircraft orders.”

        I would interprete this as deferring the 2014 increase to 11/month. i.e. staying with 10/m.
        Then, these contested orders have started to materialise in recent month.

        I’d really be interested in what kind of performance improvements the 777-300ER received since its EIS.

  13. Howard :I believe you are VASTLY over optimistic in your assessment.

    Yes Howard, we should all yield to the estimates and assessments resulting from your superior logic and analyical skills.

    Uhm, where are they?

  14. Scott, your total for Boeing in 2020 is not totaling down appropriately. It should read 23.

    Overall I think the projections are relatively close with the following exceptions:
    A330 – Your values assume that over 430 new frames will sell and will be delivered before the end of 2020 or over 62/year of new sales (which they have not done in awhile) meanwhile your values for the 787 should mean the current backlog will be zero by then. That means that the A330 would be selling very well even when 787 delivery slots a very available? Not sure that is realistic. I think A350/A330 deliveries at 16/month is a fair upper limit.

    777 – similar comments. I am not sure they will keep up the 8.3 deliveries through 2018 but they are selling those positions a year from now so if we see large sales in 2013 you may be right but I suspect we will see a drop around then. Selling 300 additional frames or 42/year now until 2020 sounds a bit aggressive.

    In regard to the spirit of your comments, I agree. Boeing should continue to lead in wide body production for a number of years to come. A change may occur during the 777/777X changeover but not before then.

  15. I would agree with most predicting a more conservative forecast for the 777-300ER and A330 later this decade.

  16. “Iโ€™d really be interested in what kind of performance improvements the 777-300ER received since its EIS.”

    Uwe Here is your info: “Indeed, Boeing has a proven track record in continuously improving the 777-300ER, from its fuel-burning figure at 2.9 L of fuel per passenger per 100 km at EIS (Entry Into Service) back in 2004 being reduced by 3.6% to 2.8 L, and with this latest PIP, should it be launched, its fuel-burn can reach an awesome 2.6 L, matching that of the 787-8 and 747-8.” Quote from http://www.aspireaviation.com/2010/03/01/777-pip-further-negates-a350-1000s-business-case/

    • Thanks for the link.
      Though in my experience info from Aspire that references Saj Ahmad invariably tends to take the reader for a ride.
      Do the improvements actually reference the same seating arrangement or is the too good to believe set of data pimped by “representatively” increasing seatcount over time.?

      Do you have some neutral reporting on this?

      • Why do I think that it does not matter what evidence I provide? With all due respect, you are the one making the claim that the frame is not improving, do you have evidence to support that? I think the quote I provided was from Daniel not Saj (but I agree with you that Saj appears to lack objectivity.) I also agree that the A330 has done some remarkable improvements over the years that are nearly without parallel.

        Regardless more evidence of 77W, here you go:
        “However, competition has come from improvements to the Boeing 777-300ER, which is benefiting from a recent engine and aerodynamics improvement package that cuts both drag and weight….
        Other increments have included a 2,270kg (5,000lb) increase in maximum zero fuel weight that will give an equivalent payload increase of 20-25 passengers, while the GE90-115B1 will improve thrust by 1-2.5% as part of an enhanced thrust management package to increase take-off weight at higher-altitude airports.”
        http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/world-airliners-order-trickle-continues-for-in-production-349052/

      • To be fair though, Aspire seems to have been going through some sort of a metamorphosis since 2010. ๐Ÿ˜‰

  17. Regarding the efforts to save the 747-8i: What the article Scott linked to describes really only sounds like they are working to get the 747-8 up to spec so it can fulfil the guarantees customers (cargo and pax) were given originally.
    Namely the re-activation of the rear fuel tank, as well as PIPs for the engines.
    I don’t think this is going to help them sell the plane, because they have all along been selling the plane promising the specs that they’re now trying to achieve.

  18. Whats being missed is the A350 has not even flown, nor has the static tests been done.

    The early build A350s will be 70% different structurally by the 20th aircraft. Those mods will not be static tested (they do the first test and then computer model as was the wing fix on the A380 when it broke before it should have).

    So, we have rush aircraft with rush technology as Airbus did not have the investment in composite fuselage as Boeing did.

    There will be issues. How bad? I suspect far worse than the 787 structurally as it was rushed and they are scrambling to make it work. There will be issues both in test and they will find them out in service as the

    I also think the 787 is being underestimated. As it stands Boeing can run 4 produciton lines for it. Its early at build rate 7, 10 by the end of the year on 3 lines and Charleston is not fully up to sped yet. Add another line at Charleston which is already space for and keep the surge or the new Hangar at Boeing go with 2 lines and you are at 20.

    the Upside for the 787-10 is huge as is the -9 (the -8 will continue to sell but not be the big mover.

    A330 will hold on and if they do an NEO it will hold at 5.

    A380 is a slow dog and will dwindles the way the 747 will. Can Boeing keep up the 747 with just a cargo offering? Not a clue.

    Long term the A350 is boxed in and limited and unless its a magical wonder it will not only be delays, the -800 orders will go away and Boeing will grab canceled slots on the 900 and 1000. The 900 is the only offering there is not a direct competitor for. And keep in mind the -1000 economics are bogus, the 777-8 will be as good or better (NEO with new wing and fuselage).

  19. Here is my estimated annual WB production through 2019.

    2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
    a380 25 33 33 33 33 (36) 33(36) 33(36)
    a350 0 22 44 66 88 110 110(134)
    a330 110 110 110 110 (88?) 110 (55?) 88 (33?) 88 (33?)

    Totals 135 165 187 209 231 231 231
    Worst case 187 176 176 176
    Best case 209 234 234 258
    767 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
    777 100 100 100 100 100 (80?) 100 (50?) 100 (30?)
    787 70 120 120 120(144?)120(168?)120(168?)120(168?)
    747-8i/f 21 21 21 12 (21) 12 (21) 12(21) 12 (21)

    Totals 169 265 265 256 256 256 256
    Worst case 236 202 186
    Best case 169 265 265 289 313 313 313

    For Airbus, assumes best case 380 goes to 36 per year, 350 rampsup and adds second FAL, 330 stays at Scotts levels. Worst case has 380 stays the same, 330 starts to drop in 2016 (its current backlog is 2.5 years) and follows a 20%, 50%, 70% curve.

    For Boeing, assumes best case 787 rampsup to 14/m beginning in 2016 and hits target in 2017. Assumes 747-8 production stays stable at 21/y (freighter heavy). Assumes 777 stays at 100/y. Worst case presumes 777 production drops off in 2017 (did the same 20, 50, 70% as the 330). Assumes the 747 drops to 12 a year. Assumes the 787 stops at 10/m production.

    Likliest numbers (pure guessing of course!) is:

    Airbus 2019 380 36, 350 134, 330 33 for a total of around 200 WB aircraft (I am pessimistic the 330 will sell once the 787 floods the market).

    Boeing 2019 767 24, 777 30-50, 787 168, 747 18 for a total of 240-260 WB aircraft (I am uncertain what the 777 will do but at least there is a freighter version available.

  20. Sorry, the formatting did not carry over… I hate computers sometimes…

    • try putting the data in an excel format and then copy-and-paste. Maybe that will work? That’s what I do for the original posts.

  21. Aero Ninja :

    You say that delivering to 10 airlines in the first year is a โ€œlaugh riotโ€ but Boeing delivered to 8 in the first year of the 787 production. If Airbus puts some effort into it and doesnโ€™t have the same production problems Boeing had with the 787, it is possible.

    Not 10 AIRPLANES, but first deliveries for 10 DIFFERENT CUSTOMERS. Customer Introductions are quite difficult and time consuming. See this is the difference between being a fanbo… Cheerleader, and someone who actually knows something about the industry. There is no way Airbus could do 10 customer introductions in a single year on A350, in ANY year of production. Oh, I forgot, Airbus can do miracles, as common as grains of sand on the beach… All Hail Airbus, Emperor of the World.

      • Interesting that Boeing expects to achieve growth in a sensitive environment by squeezing workforce, suppliers and other squeezables. With a competing sink for produced materials on the A side of things I would expect turnover in suppliers to increase on the B side , probably an escalating process due to supplier quality available to Boeing going down.
        More suppliers will require aid ( finacial, organisational) from their new partner.

        But it certainly has pimping effects on “shareholder value”.

      • Here’s an interesting comment from “robert the bruce”:

        http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/reader_feedback/public/profile.php?user=17545883

        My memories of the 787 disaster are rather anti-boeing.

        1. We didn’t get paid until the first plane flew. Even though the problems were either Boeing’s fault or another supplier, we didn’t get paid – for 2 years.

        2. With the delays, our production line was stalled, yet we were forced to maintain the capability of starting back up at a moment’s notice.

        3. Boeing’s CATIA software problems were legendary. Design work was stalled over and over again because of Boeing internal software snafus. The average engineer put in less than 8 hours per week actual work while waiting for Boeing to get their ducks in line.

        4. Redesign was constant because this plane gained weight as the design progressed. Boeing designs traditionally become lighter as the design progresses. It was amateur hour every week watching Boeing mismanage the design.

        Hopefully, Boeing has cured their engineering woes, but it is awful for the management to blame suppliers for Boeing’s errors.

        Perhaps some Boeing suppliers just don’t have the same rose-colored view of the 777X business case as that of Howard, and since the 777Xโ€™s ATO comes right after the 787โ€™s series of program disasters, which has badly strained the companyโ€™s credibility with suppliers, quite a few Boeing suppliers will, in all likelihood, have serious doubts about Boeingโ€™s ability to execute a new program on schedule. Hence McNerney’s tough guy appearance: โ€œWe remind them: Donโ€™t bet against Boeing.โ€

        McNerney said Boeingโ€™s initiative to squeeze costs out of suppliers โ€” a corporate effort dubbed โ€œPartnering for Successโ€ โ€” has already been applied in choosing suppliers for the 737 MAX program.

        It will be used again in selecting partners for the upcoming 787-10 and 777X programs, he said.

        And the no-fly list is already in effect.

        โ€œWe have sent out a lot of letters to folks that weโ€™ve told not to bother to bid on those programs,โ€ McNerney said. โ€œWe remind them: Donโ€™t bet against Boeing.โ€

    • Howard, the 787 is doing a similar number of customer intros to what Aero Ninja states in both 2013 and 2014. It is very possible to do it, and no I’m not an A fanbo.

      As far as rate increases go AFAIR there has never been a wide body built above 10/m (please correct if I’m wrong). Ramping up to higher rates quickly isn’t just final assembly lines, it strains the production systems all the way back to the foundries and fiber spinners.

  22. 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
    380 25 33 33 33 33 33 33
    350 0 22 44 66 88 110 110
    330 110 110 110 110 110 88 88

    Total 135 165 187 203 231 231 231
    Best 168 190 206 234 234 255
    Worst 198 198 176

    Same assumptions as above. Best assumes 380 to 36, 350 second FAL with smooth ramp, 330 decline as Scott forecasts. Worst assumes 380 at 33, no second FAL, 330 declines more rapidly beginning in 2016 using 20, 50, 70% dropoffs.

    2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
    767 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
    777 100 100 100 100 100 100 72
    747 21 21 21 12 12 12 12
    787 70 120 120 120 120 120 120

    Total 215 265 265 256 256 256 228
    Best 220 265 265 289 313 313 313
    Worst 220 265 265 256 256 226 206

    Same assumptions as above. Best assumes 777 stays at 100, 747 stays at 21, 787 with successful ramp to 14. Worst assumes 777 drops in 2017 with same percentages, 747 drops to 12, 787 stays at 10/m.

    This is the best I can do. Can’t make the bars around it and stuff. Sorry guys, I’m not as good as Scott at this excel stuff.

  23. The 787 did not have 70% of its strucutre changed before flight. I the A350 a wing and a prayer. Even with a stable A380 design they had one major wing issue after in service.

    Boeing can command price on the 777-9X that there is no competitor for. Ditto the -8 and -9 787. Airbus will have to offer massive discount with A350s and has done so to sell the A380 (Boeing on 747).

    And again, Airbus will be well into flight test before the old A350 fuselage is tested and then trying to do fixes for old and new structure as they are ultimately two completely different aircraft with Tranches in between. Recipee for a major mess and in service surprises. Boeing proved how possible that was and what it took to fix on a stable structure.

    • Yes Boeing wins. Airbus is going out of business soon. Move along now.

    • Meanwhile, Richard Aboulafia has just written a piece on how the 787 delays continue to boost Airbus.

      http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardaboulafia/2013/05/24/787-delays-continue-to-boost-airbus/

      Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if the 787โ€™s problems have been fixed, in a few months airline passengers will have absolutely no qualms about flying on the type. Unfortunately for Boeing, airline executives have longer memories. As the high-stakes battle for the 350/400-seat long-range jetliner market heats up, Boeing faces significant challenges to its credibility.

      Boeingโ€™s troubles in this segment started last summer, when the 350-seat A350-1000, whose order book had been dormant for years, won a prestigious Cathay Pacific win. In April of this year, International Airlines Group and British Airways ordered 18 -1000s, a major event since BA, like Cathay, is a key 777 customer. For decades, British Airways has stuck with Boeing for its twin aisle fleet.

      The development most threatening to Boeing emerged in May, with press reports of advanced A350-1000 sales negotiations with ANA and Japan Airlines. Given Boeingโ€™s longstanding alliance with Japanese industry and its near-complete dominance of Japanโ€™s twin-aisle jetliner market, an A350XWB sale to either or both of Japanโ€™s two big airlines would represent a serious disaster for Boeing.

  24. The number of A330s in the out years looks sporty at best. That will likely taper off in my humble opinion. The pax market will dry up and there are not too many carriers dumb enough to buy the freighter.

    Also, I doubt Airbus can support 10 mo. on A350 given they don’t appear to have much of a family. My guess is they are looking to dump the A350-800 since it is clearly not competitive.

    • zachwal :
      Also, I doubt Airbus can support 10 mo. on A350 given they donโ€™t appear to have much of a family.

      The two-variant A330 has held up pretty well against the “family” of 767s, 777s, and 787s and it’s at 10/mo at this stage. Why do you doubt that the A350 cannot do the same or even better?

  25. tortugamon :
    777 โ€“ similar comments. I am not sure they will keep up the 8.3 deliveries through 2018 but they are selling those positions a year from now so if we see large sales in 2013 you may be right but I suspect we will see a drop around then. Selling 300 additional frames or 42/year now until 2020 sounds a bit aggressive.
    In regard to the spirit of your comments, I agree. Boeing should continue to lead in wide body production for a number of years to come. A change may occur during the 777/777X changeover but not before then.

    Check out the interview with Tim Clark. The last 777-300ERs currently on order will only arrive in 2022/2023; or some two years after the likely EIS of the 777-9X. There’s no way, IMO, that EK will take delivery of 777-300ERs once the 777-9X has entered into service, meaning that the current 777 backlog is actually smaller than what’s booked.

    http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2013/05/24/video-interviews-with-emirates-clark-deltas-anderson/#comments

  26. B has the edge in WBs and Airbus in NBs, why is this so controversial to so many here? [Edited]

    • Just curious, but didn’t you say farewell, in a somewhat hasty manner, to this blog some time ago? ๐Ÿ˜‰

      • Yes to you ๐Ÿ™‚ Others that might contribute get the thumbs up.

        [Editor: Given 590’s gross violation of Reader Comment rules with his Dec. 2012 comment (which we missed at the time) he has now been banned.]

  27. Howard :
    All Hail Airbus, Emperor of the Worldโ€ฆ reality be damned.

    [edited] I am slowly beginning to see the entertainment value you bring to this site.

    leehamnet :
    Aspire saw the light about our UK friend.

    There is not near enough balance in his articles to be an impartial commentator. One day perhaps…
    Leeham by far outstrips its competitors in the quality of reporting.

    Smokerr :
    Whats being missed is the A350 has not even flown, nor has the static tests been done.

    Not yet flown but the static test required for the first flight has been successfully done – Limit Load x 1.25. I am sorry to hear that you were not personally informed.

    Smokerr :
    The early build A350s will be 70% different structurally by the 20th aircraft. Those mods will not be static tested (they do the first test and then computer model as was the wing fix on the A380 when it broke before it should have).

    First off, no idea where you go 70% figure from, pure fantasy. Secondly, as the aircraft evolves you do not test specific mods, because the first static test + GVT + Flight Tests are used to adjust your models. This helps to avoid testing in the future, which is quite an expensive business.
    As far as the A380 comment is concerned, I seem to remember Boeing had been doing a bit of fixing of their own on their static frame, correct me if I am wrong.

    Smokerr :
    There will be issues. How bad? I suspect far worse than the 787 structurally as it was rushed and they are scrambling to make it work. There will be issues both in test and they will find them out in service as the

    Forgot to finish the sentence?
    Have you forgotten how many structural issues 787 had prior to first flight? Now compare to the situation on the A350. Airbus has been working with composites far longer than some people give them credit for.

    Smokerr :
    Long term the A350 is boxed in and limited and unless its a magical wonder it will not only be delays, the -800 orders will go away and Boeing will grab canceled slots on the 900 and 1000. The 900 is the only offering there is not a direct competitor for. And keep in mind the -1000 economics are bogus, the 777-8 will be as good or better (NEO with new wing and fuselage).

    The above is just a random collection of words, lacking any coherence or meaning, I am afraid.

  28. en590swe :
    Yes to you Others that might contribute get the thumbs up.

    Hmm, let’s google leehamnet en590swe.

    First page, first line:

    https://www.google.com/#gs_rn=14&gs_ri=psy-ab&cp=19&gs_id=o2&xhr=t&q=leehamnet+en590swe&es_nrs=true&pf=p&sclient=psy-ab&oq=leehamnet+en590swe+&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.47008514,d.bGE&fp=f8ae84e4668ab080&biw=956&bih=738

    http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2012/12/07/airbus-v-boeing-another-round-of-what-the-customers-tell-us/

    Last comment in the thread:

    By: en590swe December 12, 2012 at 9:39 am | #81

    [Edited as a violation of Reader Comment rules, by en590swe, who has now been banned.]

    Just curious, but why did you return? Is it perhaps that what you have really wanted to do all of the time, was only to provide quality contributions to this blog of similar quality to the one above. Okay, now I get it.

    ๐Ÿ™‚

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NdzoDhzLOM

  29. I have 747 question.

    This blog, in September 2011 (More on Cargolux: weights and fuel burn), sort of concluded that the 747-8(F) was off targeted SFC by around 2.5%. Boeing says that the aircraft is now 1.5% better than when it first started out, and a further PIP adds another 1.8%, taking total improvements to 3.3%.

    Where is the aircraft actually? Horizontal tail fuel tank is about to be reactivated, so where is the 747-8i’s range post 1.8% PIP approval?

    • We’ll be at Boeing briefings next week in advance of the air show. The 747 briefing is embargoed until June 14 (as are all except 737 MAX and 777 (today’s version)), so look for an update around June 14.

      • There’s an unmistakable just-in-time for Paris element in that story – makes for aggressive sales campaigns at the world’s largest aviation event.

        Of course, that will be trumped by Emirates+777X, probably.

        747-8 where for art thou…*

        *(Small market, I know)

      • Does anyone know if parts of that PIPs for the 747-8 are refittable to aircrafts already delivered ? E.g. the proposed software change.

  30. Everybody, Listen Up:

    Once again I need to remind you that personalized comments toward other readers (and back again) are not permitted. This series of posts includes a lot of remarks, some of which I’ve edited, that border on and sometimes cross the line of snide. Airbus partisans and Boeing partisans are equally guilty.

    I’m not going to stand for it. Shape or I will close comments.

    Hamilton

      • Yes, for Aspire, the London-based “expert” is seemingly history.

    • Aspire puts a lot of energy in their analyses. Making them as complete as possible. I often don’t entirely agree with the conclusions but that’s where the forum is for.

      • Aspire sure does. However, if the astoundly long analyses presented had been shorter on Boeing marketing material and longer on in-depth objective analysis of the industry, I’m sure Aspire would be a much more interesting place to visit.

      • Correction: Astoundingly instead of “astoundly”. ๐Ÿ™‚

      • That door modification should definitly help the 737 max competing for airlines using a hd seat layout. Like other modifications airbus made to their model before.

        But does it increase the seat count for lower density configurations, too?
        Otherwise its only good for easyjet & co plus for use in marketing comparisons ๐Ÿ˜‰

  31. nofly :Does anyone know if parts of that PIPs for the 747-8 are refittable to aircrafts already delivered ? E.g. the proposed software change.

    Software upgrades, like those available for your smartphone, are for the 747-8 – and also for the 747-400, which has very similar systems. Those upgrades deal with automatic fuel flow control at various stages of flight — the engines of all in-production airliners today are digitally controlled via FADEC. I’d like to know what the engine enhancements for the GEnx-2B are..

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *