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By Dan Catchpole
Updated 2:35 p.m., March 4, 2024
March 1, 2024 © Leeham News: When representatives from Boeing and the Seattle-area machinists union start formal negotiations on Friday, the context will be a world apart from when they bargained the existing contract 10 years ago. Back then, Boeing management had a new airplane program (777X) as leverage and exploited an internal fight in the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers to push through a concession-laden contract.
Now, Boeing is battered after years of self-inflicted crises, a pandemic and problem-riddled supply chain, and, after decades of defeats, labor has scored major victories around the country, especially in aerospace.
Head of District Lodge 751 Jon Holden told Leeham News & Analysis during a recent interview that he is determined to get back what was taken from the roughly 31,000 members he represents in the Puget Sound area.
The union wants better work-life balance, better pay and retirement benefits, and guarantees that will keep it healthy for years to come.
Given its ongoing struggles, Boeing can little afford to alienate the union representing the vast majority of people assembling its commercial jetliners, industry analysts say.
However, Boeing management and the IAM have had a rocky relationship since workers at the company organized in 1935. In the past 20 years, company leadership has taken a hard line against organized labor and repeatedly pushed for concessions despite banking substantial profits and spending billions on share buybacks.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
February 29, 2024, © Leeham News: Boeing published the results for 2023 on the 1st of February. It reported a loss of $2.2bn, compared with a loss of $5.0bn for 2022.
Experienced industry analysts know these results do not reflect the company’s state, neither for 2023 nor for 2022. The reason is Boeing uses so-called program accounting for the production costs of its Commercial Aircraft programs. Based on Boeing data, the loss for 2023 would have been at least $3bn higher using classical accounting methods.
The program accounting idea is to average the high initial cost per produced unit of a new aircraft program with the lower production costs of units later in the program. Thus it smooths the reported profits for a new aircraft program.
It has recently been used to “smooth” reported results of troubled aircraft programs, like the 737 MAX. The drawback is that once the troubles are gone, the negative effects on the company’s future profits are not. We will use the 737 MAX troubles to show the effect of this variant of program accounting.
Editor’s Note: This story was written before the release yesterday of an independent Expert Panel appointed by Congressional mandate to review Boeing’s safety culture. The report may be downloaded here: Boeing Safety Study by FAA Panel 2-26-24
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 27, 2024, © Leeham News: The safety culture at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) came under fire again following the Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident in which an emergency exit door plug separated from the plane on climb out from the Portland (OR) airport.
The plane, a 10-week-old 737-9 MAX, fully depressurized at about 16,000 ft. Nobody died and injuries were slight. Damage throughout the cabin and into the cockpit occurred when the door plug, at row 26, blew out. Pilots landed the plane safely at Portland 14 minutes after the decompression.
Within days, quality “escapes” were determined to have occurred at Spirit AeroSystems, which built the fuselage and door plug, and at Boeing during final assembly. Since Boeing had the fuselage last and its employees completed the final assembly, Boeing’s ultimately responsible for the quality escapes.
Boeing Co. CEO David Calhoun was quick to accept responsibility for the company. Such life-threatening escapes should never happen, he said. Calhoun appointed an independent safety committee headed by a retired Admiral, Kirkland Donald, with a nuclear submarine safety background.
The appointment of a special safety committee is reminiscent of a board-level safety committee appointed in September 2019 by then-chairman and CEO Dennis Muilenburg in the aftermath of the MAX crisis following the October 2018 and March 2019 fatal accidents of two 737-8 MAXes. These accidents killed 348 people and led to a 21-month grounding of the global MAX fleet from March 13, 2019.
Jon Holden, the president of Boeing’s largest union, the IAM 751, said neither he nor others from the union had any contact from the 2019 committee. Boeing’s engineering and technicians union, SPEEA, declined comment. But a source familiar with the situation said the union didn’t see any changes implemented from the 2019 committee at its level.
Feb. 26, 2024, © Leeham News: A Congressionally-mandated safety review study of Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) dropped this morning. The 50-page report of a committee appointed by the Federal Aviation Administration found serious flaws in Boeing’s safety culture despite years of attempts to improve.
LNA is still absorbing the study, which may be downloaded here: Boeing Safety Study by FAA Panel 2-26-24
The Executive Summary is synopsized below.
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Editor’s note: Mondays are ordinarily paywall days. Because of the nature of this topic, today’s article is a freewall post.
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
Feb. 26, 2024, © Leeham News: There’s no getting around the culpability of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Spirit AeroSystems in the current 737 MAX mess. Nor was there any doubt about the culpability of the FAA and Boeing in the first MAX crisis in 2018-2019.
But let’s face it: Ultimately, Congress is where the buck stops. Because Congress for decades failed to appropriate the bucks needed for the FAA to do its job without overreliance on Boeing or Spirit.
Shifting oversight responsibilities and diminishing the FAA’s role may well have been the result of effective lobbying by Boeing and others in the aerospace industry. Congress could have rejected changes to laws governing the FAA’s oversight authority in favor of Boeing and other aerospace companies.
So, it’s Congress, once again, that is ultimately culpable.
Let’s not be naïve. There is no way Congress or Members of Congress will step up to assume responsibility for the mess the US commercial aviation industry sees itself in today.
By the Leeham News Team
Commentary
Feb. 20, 2024, © Leeham News: Four missing bolts on an emergency exit door plug leg to the in-flight decompression of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 of this year.
It’s not yet clear why the four locking bolts were not installed in the incident aircraft, a Boeing 737-9.
Information revealed to date by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) discovered that Boeing removed the door plug in an unplanned process when some defects were discovered with some rivets. When Boeing line workers reinstalled the plug, for reasons as yet unknown, the four retaining bolts were not reinstalled. The bolts became separated from the plug during the removal. So far as is known, the four bolts never have been found in the factory. The NTSB’s investigation continues.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the MAX 9s for three weeks while inspection and repair procedures were prepared, approved, and implemented. Inspections were expanded to the MAX 9’s predecessor, the 737-900ER, which had the same door plug. No grounding was required of the -900ER.
Although the processes solved the concerns over all MAX 9s produced to date, the question arises whether the procedures are sufficiently fail-safe going forward.
The inspection of the fleet to verify the correct installation of the lock bolts appears to leave a gap for future production, unplanned plug removals, and reinstallation.
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 16, 2024, © Leeham News: When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) put a freeze on Boeing 737 production rates at the currently approved 38/mo level, LNA revealed that hundreds of orders will face delivery delays. Boeing faces even greater delays than the 38/mo production level suggests, however.
As LNA reported, and confirmed by several aerospace analysts, Boeing’s true production rate for the 737 was 31 per month and even lower—as little as around 20 per month in some periods. The balance of deliveries came from its large inventory of 737 MAXes built during the first nine months of the 21-month grounding of the aircraft.
With Boeing’s full year 2023 delivery data now available, LNA looked at 2024 deliveries that were planned before the Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines 737-9 MAX emergency door plug blew off Flight 1282 on climb out from Portland (OR).
The incident was characterized as an accident due to the nature of the event and damage to the airplane. Nobody died and there were only minor injuries. The decompression at about 16,000 ft. damaged the door surround at row 26 on the left side. The door plug separated from the airplane and was found in a wooded area a few days later. There was damage throughout the 737’s cabin and the cockpit door was ripped off its mountings.
The pilots landed the airplane a few minutes later in Portland.
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By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may have told Boeing it won’t allow product rate increases on the 737 MAX lines, or the addition of the North Line at Everett (WA) until it’s satisfied production quality is under control.
But as LNA first wrote upon this news, Boeing’s production is well below the currently approved 38 per month. We pointed out that Boeing was consistently struggling last year to roll 31 MAXes out of the factory—and often, the number was substantially below 31.
Sometimes the number of newly produced 737s was less than 20 a month, reports one consultant who tracks the production.
Technically, the FAA can’t stop Boeing from producing more 737s than the 38 per month cap. It doesn’t have this authority, reports Aviation Week. But the FAA is the responsible party for issuing individual aircraft airworthy certificates as the 737s are ready for delivery to airlines and lessors. And, according to AvWeek, the FAA won’t issue more than 38 certificates a month.
The FAA suspended Boeing’s so-called ticketing authority for the MAX before the airplane was recertified following the 21 month grounding beginning in March 2019. This suspension was extended to the 787 when production and quality control problems were discovered at the Charleston (SC) assembly plant.
Several aerospace analysts following Boeing pointed out that Boeing hasn’t produced 38 MAXes a month and, like LNA reported, it’s struggled to meet even the previously advertised rate of 31/mo.
The consultancy Cirium charted the actual deliveries by Boeing (and by Airbus) for their respective single-aisle aircraft.