UPDATED: Boeing says it still will deliver up to 450 737s this year

Boeing Co. photo

By Bryan Corliss

April 26, 2023, © Leeham News — Boeing says it will increase rates on the 737 line in Renton to 38 a month to maintain its plan to deliver between 400 and 450 737 MAX jets to airlines this year.

That was the first line of the company’s first-quarter earnings release, which showed Boeing lost $149 million on the quarter, on revenues of $17.9 billion.

Boeing had optimistically aimed for jumping MAX rates from the current 31 a month, as soon as June. However plans for the 737 line had been in question, after recent revelations that manufacturing problems and a software issue would cause delays in deliveries.

  • ‘Gnarly’ 737 defect to take weeks to fix
  • Boeing commits to MAX increases
  • Improving numbers at BCA
  • Supply chain issues continue, Boeing says

‘Gnarly’ 737 defect to take weeks to fix

In its earnings release, Boeing acknowledged that Spirit AeroSystems had notified it that a “non-standard manufacturing process was used on two fittings in the aft fuselage section of certain 737 airplanes.” 

Boeing said the error was “not an immediate safety-of-flight issue and the in-service fleet can continue operating safely.”

However, it will require the removal of at least some of the vertical fins on the tails of affected aircraft, CEO Dave Calhoun told analysts on the earnings call. The re-work will take “a few weeks, not measured in months,” he said.

Calhoun described it as a “gnarly defect” that’s almost impossible for inspectors to spot with the naked eye, given its location and the fact that the fittings are covered with a sealant.

“I will celebrate the fact that an employee witnessed the procedure, raised his hand and said ‘that doesn’t look right,’” Calhoun said. 

CFO Brian West said about 75% of the 225 finished but undelivered MAXes in inventory will need rework. “The number of inventoried airplanes will likely increase in (the second quarter) and we still expect most to be delivered by the end of 2024,” he said.

The rework “will impact summer capacity for some of our customers and we feel terrible about that,” Calhoun said.

Boeing commits to MAX increases

Near-term 737 deliveries and production “will be impacted as the program performs necessary inspections and rework,” the company said. However, “the program still expects to deliver 400 to 450 airplanes this year” and “the supplier master schedule remains unchanged including anticipated production rate increases.”

Boeing said the 737 program will increase rates to 38 per month “later this year” and 50 per month “in the 2025-2026 time frame.” 

Additionally, Boeing said the 787 program is now producing at a rate of three per month, with plans to go up to five per month by the end of this year. Boeing plans to raise that to 10 per month, also in the 2025-2026 time frame.

Spirit will report to shareholders next week. 

Boeing has restarted its third 737 line in Renton and remains committed to opening a fourth line inside its massive Everett plant, the executives said.

Improving numbers for Boeing Commercial Airplanes

There was some good news for Boeing came on its commercial side, where deliveries jumped 37% to 130 airliners, compared to last year’s first quarter, and revenues climbed 60% to $6.7 billion. 

However, BCA still reported an operating loss of $615 million and a margin of minus 9.2%. Still, that was an improvement over 1Q 2022, when BCA’s margin was more than minus 21%.

Profits were impacted by “customer considerations” on the 787 program, Boeing said.

BCA has more than 4,500 planes in backlog, worth some $334 billion (at list prices). This points out the need for Boeing to increase rates, so it can unlock that money and potentially pay down its debt. Boeing reported paying $649 million for debt servicing during the first quarter.

Boeing did pay a little down on its debt in the first quarter. It reported owing $55.4 billion to creditors, down from $1.6 billion in the previous quarter.  However, its cash on hand (and cash equivalents) fell $2.4 billion during the same period, to $14.8 billion. 

Boeing lost $212 million on its Defense and Space business, largely due to taking another $245 million charge on the KC-40 tanker program, related to the need to rework center fuel tanks provided by Triumph. The issue has affected deliveries of commercial 767 freighters as well.

Boeing Global Services turned an $847 million profit. Calhoun said Services had “fully returned to pre-pandemic levels.” 

Wall Street shrugged at the losses.

“We’ve seen worse,” wrote Robert Stoddard at Vertical Research, in a note to his clients after the release came out. “Boeing doesn’t really have much choice but to stay the course on its planned production ramp, even if the latest 737 MAX issues will hold up deliveries, add to working capital, and leave the company with a lot to do in the second half.”

Supply chain issues continue, Boeing says

In prepared remarks, West noted that “when we set out our 2023 framework last November, we predicted the supply chain instability would likely continue.”

That hasn’t changed, he said. “There’s progress in many areas of the supply base, but we will likely face pockets of variability through the rest of this year.”

Calhoun seconded that. “We described an environment that would continue to be strained through 2023 and through most of 2024,” he said. “We still see the world exactly that way.”

Boeing continues to spend money on the problem, keeping higher inventory buffers and teams deployed to help suppliers, West said.

One specific supply-chain issue is Spirit’s talks with Machinists Union District Lodge 70 in Wichita, which represents its hourly workers. Their contract expires June 23.

Calhoun said he is “optimistic about the labor contract.”

“I suspect their workers know the situation they’re in,” he said. “They know that they’ve got to deliver for Boeing, and my guess is they’ll all get to a palatable answer. It’s not in my control.”

Calhoun declined to discuss what would happen should the Machinists at Spirit strike, and whether Boeing has contingency plans.

“I’m going to assume that our supplier and the workforce at our supplier are good enough and smart enough and can plan far enough ahead to not worry about that.”

278 Comments on “UPDATED: Boeing says it still will deliver up to 450 737s this year

  1. “Up to..” eh? Nice qualifier from that company. I’m gonna make
    “up to” a trillion dollars in 2023, myself.

    • To be fair, the “up to” part is Leeham’s as far as I can see.

      Boeing says it still expects to deliver 400-450 737s this year. That’s still quite a large amount of wiggle room to be able to say “We hit our target!”

  2. Here’s an interesting calculation.

    First, let’s convert BCA’s loss of $615B into a rudimentary EBIT, by adding back on the $649M paid in loan interest. That yields a positive “EBIT” of $34M, which was generated from deliveries of 130 aircraft. The revenue from the same deliveries was $6.704B. This yields:
    – Revenue of $51.5M per plane.
    – “EBIT” of $261.6k per plane.
    – Earnings *loss* of $4.73M per plane.

    Now, let’s take Airbus’s 2022 revenue (€41.428B) and earnings (€4.800B) from 661 commercial aircraft deliveries and we get:
    – Revenue of €62.67M per plane ($68.94M).
    – Earnings of €7.26M per plane ($7.99M).

    Proof of what I’ve been saying about unsustainable pricing:
    – AB has 33.8% more revenue per plane than BA.
    – AB’s earnings per plane are 30.5 *times* higher than BA — and that’s before BA’s debt interest payments are factored in.

    In Q1, about 35% of BA’s deliveries came from inventory — and we know that those deliveries had small / zero / negative unit margins. This effect should diminish as inventory clears — but we’ll then see the effect of over-discounting on recent sales. The pot will merely be replaced by the kettle.

    https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2023-04-26-Boeing-Reports-First-Quarter-Results

    https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2023-02-airbus-reports-full-year-fy-2022-results

    • Whats the Market Cap of Airbus compared to Boeing?
      Is that “EBIT’ that you have baked up reflected in Airbus being 2x more than Boeing, or is it 3x
      Let us know…without any diversions to alternate airports or ‘cooking shows’

      • You evidently don’t know what EBIT is…

        Still going on about market cap?
        Think BA’S market cap is somehow going to save it?

        • Don’t complain. Last quarter it was customer deposits. This quarter it’s market cap. At least it’s something different…

          Speaking of which:

          Advances and progress billings 54,498 53,081

          $1.4 billion increase.

          • Yes, I saw the $1.4B increase — thanks to Air India / Saudi Arabia.
            And yet, despite that increase, there was still a $3.8B cash burn.
            Impressive.

          • Not sure how many from AI/Saudi have firmed up, see this thread (https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1480171&start=50). Can’t find a good source that reports BA’s O&D of Feb 2023. AI’s BA order is L/I. There are conflicting reports about Saudi’s order, but BA may not consider it firmed yet in its O&D.

            OTOH from yesterday’s earnings call, it mentioned “an advanced payment tied to lot 9 on the [KC-46] tanker program and “$1 billion tanker advance”.

            Nothing is new under the sun. Wink wink.

          • @ Pedro
            Very good points: I also can’t find any clear info as to how firm the Indian/Saudi orders currently are.
            I went back and checked the data on the Scramble website — they’re not yet listed as BA orders.

            Don’t forget that BA also had 64 (penalty-free) cancellations in Q1 — technically, the deposits on those orders have to be repaid.

        • The market knows more than your good self… a stock trader are you ?

          Stick to cakes and stroopwafels as you dont have any link that agrees with you

          • Check out what “the market” did to First National’s market cap earlier this week — shaved off 40% in 10 minutes.
            That’s how behind the curve “the market” can be.

            Still struggling with the basics on Investopedia…?

          • Typo: First Republic, not First National.

            And the market cap has imploded even further: currently down 61.5% relative to where it was at on April 24.

            Nice illustration of the concept of “overvaluation” 😉

          • “The market knows more than your good self …”

            What are you talking about?? Explain why the market mid-priced FRC for soooo long?

            It is practically worthless when Monday opens (unless you want some to cover your short position).

  3. So,in Q1:
    – BA paid down $1.6 B in debt.
    – Cash burn was $3.8B.
    – BCA made the expected loss of $615M — it’s becoming a predictable pattern.
    – The EPS loss (1$1.27) was worse than analyst consensus (-$1.07).

    That’s 14 straight quarters of loss at BA.

  4. “CFO Brian West said about 75% of the 225 finished but undelivered MAXes in inventory will need rework.”

    And what about the MAXs that have already been delivered?
    The problem existed for four years before it was finally discovered…

  5. Nice bowl of word salad: “[t]he 737 fitting fix is expected to take “days” per airplane”

    More clarity on 737 tail fitting “airplane by airplane” evaluation:

    -> “We know barrel by barrel what needs to be done. If the unit is not too far in our production cycle, it is a matter of days. If you have to lift the vertical fin off the airplane it obviously becomes more complicated and takes more time,” said West. This is expected to take weeks.

  6. -> Production of the 737/MAX has fluctuated in recent months as supply chain issues continue, but West is confident that the monthly output will reach thirty aircraft on average over HY1. This will likely result in an increase in the number of aircraft in inventory as time is needed for the rework.

    -> [MAX] production is now pretty much sold out through the end of the decade.

    -> 225 MAX in inventory

    -> By the end of March, Boeing had 95 Dreamliners in inventory

    https://airinsight.com/tailfin-issues-wont-affect-total-boeing-737-and-max-deliveries/

    • “will reach thirty aircraft”, per Mr. West. Does this mean Boeing are not yet currently producing 31 MAXes per month, contrary to their PR for the last year?

      “Does this mean Ann-Marget is *not* coming?”

      😉

      • I’m currently interested in Boeing’s recent claim that they will be producing 40 MAXes per month in the second half of this year..

        show me, don’t tell me.

  7. Still no earnings, and 25.9% of available cash burned in just one quarter.
    $3.3B in debt paydowns coming up in Q2 — so, lot’s more cash burn on the way.
    Only $10.8B left in the purse.

    At this rate, the company will flirt with Chapter 11 within a year.

    • hahahaha … strange how your cooking of the books isnt reflected by all those hard bitten Wall St analysts?

      never mind , Airbus Q1 numbers in a few days and you switch to toeing the company line

      • No “cooking” — the figures come straight from BA’s earnings release today.
        Not my fault that you’re unable to interpret that earnings release 😏

        • if AI came up with the same un baked ‘analysis’ of Boeings Q1 it would be sent back for a code rewrite.

          Wheres the analysts – who do this for a living- who you have quoted/guided your claims ?
          I think we know the answer

          • Translation: a certain somebody appears to have problems with basic arithmetic — in addition to problems reading financial reports 🙈

  8. Bloomberg:

    “Potentially hundreds of 737 jets built since 2019 are affected and will need to be repaired, according to analysts”

    “Fixing a completed jet is likely to take “a few weeks,” Calhoun said. For aircraft that are at the start of the manufacturing process, repairs will take only days.”

    “Boeing’s free cash flow will take a hit in the second quarter, breaking even or declining slightly, Chief Financial Officer Brian West said. He estimates monthly 737 deliveries will be around 30 during the first half of the year, rising to a 40-jet average pace in the second half as the bottlenecks ease.”

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-26/boeing-says-170-stored-max-jets-need-repairs-for-gnarly-defect

    • • A $245 million pre-tax charge on the KC-46 tanker program

      Earlier Bloomberg reports:
      -> The potential costs of the 737 issue and defense overruns pose a “considerable risk” to its 2023 results, said Nick Cunningham, an analyst with Agency Partners. “Boeing’s runaway train of calamities may have slowed down, but it is still trundling on despite the brakeman’s best efforts,” Cunningham said in a report before first-quarter results were announced.

      • From AP:
        -> Analysts expressed some skepticism about Boeing’s outlook while problems persist in its supply chain. Seth Seifman of JPMorgan wondered whether Boeing can increase 737 production given issues at Spirit.

        “You can only go as fast as they can go, and … I don’t think anybody has had a more challenging three or four years than Spirit, other than maybe you guys,” Seifman told executives.

        • And don’t forget CFM: who says that it can further increase output this year so as to accommodate BA’s new planning?

          • Not forgetting that CFM also trying to increase output for Airbus as well!

    • Wow! Brian West really said 40 per month average in the second half.

      That is ludicrous in my humble opinion.

      Someone obviously does not know Boeing’s history.

      May want to read up on Ron Woodard and his experience in the Nineties.

  9. Still $14Bn of 787 deferred production costs at the end of Q1!
    Let us suppose they recover 28mn each time they invoice a 787 (quite optimistic)
    they need to ship 500 frames!

  10. -> FAA proposes a new AD for all 787–8, 787–9, and 787–10s. “This proposed AD was prompted by reports of undetected water leaks from the faucet control module (FCM) migrating below the pax floor in multiple lavatory locations during flight, and into the electronic equipment bay(s).”

    The FAA notes the “manufacturer is currently developing a redesigned FCM that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this FCM is developed, approved, and available, the FAA might consider additional rulemaking.”

    https://twitter.com/WandrMe/status/1651214929200906240

  11. Some other thoughts, after reading the 10-Q:

    ‘Commercial aircraft programs inventory includes approximately 225 737 aircraft and 95 787 aircraft at March 31, 2023 as compared with
    approximately 250 737 MAX aircraft and 100 787 aircraft at December 31, 2022.’

    They only moved 5 – 787’s from inventory during the quarter. Are the repairs taking that long? At that rate, it’ll take 5 years to move them all.

    ———————————————————————

    Deliveries
    Commercial Airplanes 2023 2022
    737 113 86
    747 1 1
    767 1 5
    777 4 3
    787 11
    Total 130 95

    11 total 787’s delivered. 5 from Inventory.
    So 6 Dreamliners were produced & delivered over the quarter.
    2 a month.

    —————————————————————————-

    ‘Abnormal production costs for the three months ended March 31, 2023 were $505 million including $379 million related to the 787
    program and $126 million related to the 777X program. Abnormal production costs for the three months ended March 31, 2022 were $500
    million, including $312 million related to the 787 program and $188 million related to the 737 program.’

    Rinse. Repeat.

    —————————————————————————-

    More on the 787 Program

    ‘Cumulative abnormal costs recorded through March 31, 2023 totaled $2.1 billion, and we continue to expect to incur up to $2.8 billion with most being incurred by the end of 2023.’

    So another $700 million to be incurred.

    ———————————————————————-

    I don’t think I am going too far out on a limb here to say that 2023 won’t be a profitable year.

      • Cashflow was negative in Q1 — a stinging $3.8B in the red.
        Do you need me to point out the location of that information in the earnings release?
        Here’s a hint: table 3.

        If you want to include “marketable securities”, then the dent in the purse was “only” $2.4B. Then again, the SVB debacle showed us that “marketable securities” aren’t always as “marketable” as one might like…

        • Funny for @DoU to draw attention to CF when BA has a huge cash burn for the quarter.

          • Perhaps he’s still clinging to the “guidance” given by the BA board for the rest of 2023…?

          • Profitability is what is left over when expenses are subtracted from revenues. Boeing might be able to limp along for awhile, getting deposits from one customer to cover the losses incurred by selling aircraft for less than it costs them to make them, but eventually they better turn that around.

    • @ Frank
      Regarding inventory: if you look at the Planespotters data for April, you’ll see that shipments from inventory have now zeroed out. The decline was already visible in March.

      • Game of “Mensch ärgere Dich nicht”. 🙂
        All the pegs back to Start.

        787 deliveries:
        Mid March was the paperwork “unlock”.
        Readied frames should have been available earlier.

    • “11 total 787’s delivered. 5 from Inventory.
      So 6 Dreamliners were produced & delivered over the quarter.
      2 a month.”

      To be completely fair, 787 deliveries only restated in mid-March.

      • On the other hand: it was only a delivery stop — not a production stop.
        As soon as the stop lifted, a number of already-manufactured 787s went out the door in relatively quick succession.

    • “So another $700 million to be incurred” regarding 787 abnormal production costs.

      Not enough to cover two more quarters. 🤔

  12. “Boeing Losses From Building KC-46 Tanker Now Top $7 Billion”

    “Technical and quality control problems have bedeviled Boeing’s KC-46 since 2011, when the Air Force chose the company over rival Airbus to begin replacing its Cold War fleet of tankers. At the time, the company claimed the “tankers will be built using a low-risk approach to manufacturing by a trained and experienced U.S. work force at existing Boeing facilities.””

    https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/04/boeing-losses-building-kc-46-tanker-now-top-7-billion/385685/

    ““We have to get the tanker [to be] more predictable,” Boeing CFO Brian West said at a Bank of America investors conference last month.”

    Gosh, Brian, that’s an amazing and truly insightful utterance!
    Here’s a tip for you: merely articulating goals doesn’t actually cause those goals to be achieved! So, the next question is: who at BA is *actually doing something* to *ensure* that the tanker becomes “more predictable”? Any names? Any actual actions? Or just waffle?

      • An outside board member doesnt ‘do’ the company manufacturing operations.

        They only know what the CEO/Chairman tells them

        Compared to Airbus loses on the A400M, where they still went back and forced the customers to pay more and still lost Eu8bill.

        The A380 loses would far exceed that , pity how the France and Germany were working on different pages during development which cost heaps because of basic stupidity. Then there was the ‘overdesign’ for a possible stretched version, the wrong generation engines, the constant faults when in service.
        In many ways it was a great mid 90s plane built 10 years too late, should have done this rather than A340 …another flop.

          • Probably in a temper because he hadn’t noticed that BA had negative cash flow in Q1.
            Somehow, venting on AB — which has positive cash flow quarter after quarter — seems to make him feel better (sort of) 😉

        • BA was clearly overconfident and underbid. All these bidding decisions have to go through the board. Calhoun is a numbers guy. He should know better.

    • Keeping score:

      $7 billion loss on the tanker
      $6.5 billion write off on the 777X
      $3.5 billion write off on the 787
      $2.8 billion abnormal production costs on the 787.
      $1 billion loss on the 747-8 program
      $20 billion (at least) on the Max
      ————————————–
      $40.8 billion
      ————————————–

      I know there are other losses (Space, trainer) – feel free to add them in and keep the cumulative total going.

      How can a company sustain this?

      • “How can a company sustain this?”

        It can’t.

        It can try to postpone the inevitable — as long as there’s some cash in the kitty and a trickle of PDPs coming in, it can continue to limp along for a while. But, as long as there’s no sign of substantial positive earnings on the cards, the whole exercise is just a corporate sham. Debt servicing costs are simply unsustainable.

  13. Pedro

    New Boeing VP Commercial Marketing Darren Hulst statement

    “For us, we’ve gone from 2018 levels of production to a third of that. Between now and 2025/26 our goal is to get back to those levels…We’re going to need to grow above pre-pandemic levels by the middle of this decade”…
    —-
    This is very close to what CEO D. Calhoun told investors in the Q4 2022.

    One talks about cash flow and the other talks about delivery…

    Thks

  14. “Southwest Airlines Cuts 2023 Boeing 737 MAX Delivery Estimate By 20 Planes”

    “Due to delivery delays, Southwest has lowered its expectations as it anticipates receiving 70 MAX 8s instead of 90 this year.”

    “The airline has placed an order for 189 737-7s. Upon placing the order, the airline was optimistic in expecting to receive 31 MAX 7s throughout 2023. Unfortunately for Southwest and Boeing, the MAX 7 has yet to receive FAA certification. Despite Boeing’s best efforts, it is still unclear when the MAX 7 will be fully certified.”

    https://simpleflying.com/southwest-airlines-cuts-boeing-737-max-delivery-estimation/

  15. The 737MAX inventory is expected to GROW:

    “75% of inventoried 737 MAXs will require rework: Boeing”

    “Brian West, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Vice President of Finance of Boeing, revealed that out of the 225 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft sitting in the inventory, “roughly 75% will require the fuselage rework **and the number of inventoried airplanes will likely increase” in Q2 2023.**”

    “In its United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing for Q1 2023, the OEM highlighted that there is “uncertainty” regarding the deliveries to China despite the CAAC’s report and that it continues “to work with a small number of customers who **have requested to defer deliveries or to cancel orders for 737 MAX aircraft**, and we are remarketing and/or delaying deliveries of certain aircraft included within inventory”.

    https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/75-of-inventoried-737-maxs-will-require-rework-boeing

    We know that:
    – 13 MAXs were canceled by Chinese carrier Donghai Airlines in Dec., 2022.
    – 2 MAXs were canceled by Chinese carrier Okay Airlines in Aug., 2022.

    In addition:
    – 1 787 was cancelled by Air China in Mar., 2022.

  16. *New* customer. Wink wink.

    -> Korean Air will introduce its first A321neo on May 1. First route: Seoul-Ho Chi Minh City.

  17. “I will celebrate the fact that an employee witnessed the procedure, raised his hand and said ‘that doesn’t look right,’” Calhoun said.

    Interesting comment. He’s celebrating. Does that mean it is such a rare, extraordinary occasion, that one of their employees actually warned them about some problems, that he has to celebrate it?

    One would believe that this is the normal procedure in a company that puts safety above all.

    • It was work done by a Tier 1 supplier who have their own employees ( around 15,000) and supervision
      It just came to the notice of a Boeing employee for some reason

      It will cost Spirit dearly for the fix

      • It didn’t come to the notice of a BA employee — it was spotted by a Spirit employee.
        And it won’t cost Spirit a penny if the issue is due to bad spec provided by BA.

        • It cannot possibly be a bad spec provided by Boeing. It was an error in the installation procedure that was introduced by Spirit, who have candidly admitted the error.

          Boeing has extended cash advances and technical expertise to Spirit, to help them deal with their own inventory of affected fuselages, before they are delivered to Boeing.

          This is an example of just culture, and the safety culture Boeing is working to instill on the assembly lines, both at Boeing and within the supply chain. It’s better to raise your hand and question things, than to leave them unaddressed.

          Boeing and Spirit will work together to address this issue, sharing costs and workload.

          • It can most certainly be an error in spec — or absence of spec — provided by BA.

            Quite possible that BA’s act is being cleaned up by observant employees at suppliers — who are noticing inconsistencies/omissions in designs submitted by BA.

          • Except that the problem appeared in the latter half of 2019, after hundreds of MAX had been manufactured. So clearly was not a Boeing spec issue.

            It was a change made at Spirit that went unnoticed, and was too buried in the fuselage to be caught by inspection.

          • Actually its a supplier to Spirit that had the problem and made out of spec parts. Three suppliers if I track it right.

            At that level is should be Spirit that finds it.

            Boeing is responsible in the end, so Spirit has an issue and will pay for it via whatever the contract with Boeing stipulates.

            How a Boeing employee spotted an issue is stunning but well done.

            An interesting aspect of the outsourcing Boeing (and many others) have done.

            And Boeing has no options if Spirit strikes (other than built fuselages). Its the cost of outsourcing (or the benefit of keeping in house, you control the process.

          • @ Rob
            None of that demonstrates that BA provided correct spec.
            If the changes made by Spirit aren’t covered by the spec, then Spirit is blameless — and BA’s spec was inadequate.

          • @Transworld – it’s been pointed out several times that it was Spirit that found the issue and notified Boeing.

  18. Interesting — still no Chinese cake for Boeing:

    “HNA signed a contract for 60 of Comac’s C919 single-aisle passenger jet and 40 of the ARJ21 regional jetliners yesterday in Shanghai
    By the end of last year, Comac received orders for 1,035 C919 airliners, its flagship product to rival Boeing’s 737 and Airbus’ A320”

    https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3218713/hna-aviation-buys-100-planes-comac-giving-chinas-home-grown-aircraft-builder-leg-its-bid-catch

    • Bryce

      …”Interesting — still no Chinese cake for Boeing:..”
      —-
      Interesting ?

      I thought China had resumed 737MAX deliveries a few weeks ago with your great satisfaction?…

      • No resumption of MAX deliveries to China yet…you’re confused (again).

      • No resumption of MAX deliveries to China yet…you’re getting confused (again)

        • Bryce

          “Still confused”? Lol you are very pretentious.

          Yet there were articles on that you must remember for such a bad memory?

          • Surely you can provide us with a link regarding this imaginary resumption of deliveries…?

            Hint: it seems that you’re confusing resumption of “flights” with resumption of “deliveries” 😅

          • @ DoU

            Reading skills!
            The issuance of a report “which Boeing sees as being key” to re-commencement of MAX deliveries is not the same thing as the actual re-commencement of deliveries.

            It’s a bit like the cert of the MAX-7, MAX-10 and 777X, isn’t it? How often have we been told that “progress” is being made — but the planes still aren’t certified, are they?

            The world must be a very confusing place for people who don’t take the trouble to read accurately…

  19. Despite the problems with PW engines and premium interior fittings, AB has still managed to deliver 40 A320s/A321s so far in April — in addition to 3 A220s and 3 A330neo/A350. Three days still to go.

    BA is currently at 21 MAXs and 5 787s. Two of the 787s are from inventory — so three are from the line.

    A rather tepid start to Q2.

  20. Reuters:

    -> Air Algerie has announced provisional winners of a tender to expand its fleet, saying it has selected eight new Boeing 737-9 aircraft, five new Airbus A330-900 aircraft and two new Airbus A350-1000 aircraft …

  21. Just to clarify on some of the comments above on the KC-46, Boeing has generated about $27B in revenue, after roughly 60% of the initial production run. That run has already been extended by 25 aircraft, and more are likely in the pipeline.

    Further that does not include the services and upgrade contracts.

    Thus Boeing has losses on the development contract, but has profit on all the other aspects of the program. Which will likely total around $60B, over the aircraft life.

    • Just to clarify:

      Boeing needs *earnings* — not just *revenue*.
      For beginners: earnings = revenue minus costs.
      The same beginners regularly make a similar mistake in pointing out the *revenue* value of BA’s backlog — which is of subordinate importance to its *earnings* value.

      An conjectured value of $60B in program profit for the KC-46 is an example of total fantasy 😉

      • If you have evidence that Boeing’s KC-46 operations outside of the development contract are not profitable, you are welcome to provide it here.

        The evidence we have, is that it will be a lucrative program once the development overruns are retired. All the other contracts are profitable, according to Boeing.

        • Apparently it is *not* a development problem, it’s a manufacturing problem. The current “midas” touch of BA: 737 MAX problems;
          767 freight/tanker problems;
          787 problems;
          777X problems;
          T-7 problems;
          KC-46A problems.

          • If you are referring to the fuel tank issue, that was a supplier defect, as most of the recent issues have been.

            You are correct that this is not a design or development issue, and should not be charged against the development loss. However virtually every media outlet has done so.

            I was just pointing out that the program overall remains lucrative over it’s lifetime, by any measure.

            This is why the market and investors don’t react very much to the KC-46 charges. It’s more fodder for media coverage, than anything else.

          • Alternatively:

            If you are referring to the fuel tank issue, that appears to have been a BA spec/QC defect, as most of the recent issues have been.

            This reeks of a design or development issue, and should thus be charged against the development loss. Accordingly, virtually every media outlet has done so.

            I was just fantasizing that the program overall remains lucrative over it’s lifetime, by a personal, otherworldly measure.

            This is why the market and investors react sensitively to the KC-46 charges. It’s a matter for BA damage control, like everything else.

        • Alternatively:

          If you have evidence that Boeing’s KC-46 operations outside of the development contract are profitable, you are welcome to provide it here.

          The evidence we have, is that it will not be a lucrative program even outside of the development overruns. None of the other contracts are profitable, according to financial evidence.

          • @ Rob

            Yes, indeed — LOL!
            We’re all rolling around on the floor thanks to the little show that you’ve put on here w.r.t. the KC-46 😉

    • Rob,

      They have generated $27 billion in revenue. That’s an impressive number. Given the numbers, this is what a simple I/S would look like so far, for the program:

      Revenues………………………$27,000,000,000

      Expenses……………………….$34,000.000.000

      Earnings (loss)……………….($7.000,000,000)

      ——————————————————————–

      But to your second point, let’s have at look at what the future holds, from a financial perspective.

      You expect revenues to top $60 billion from the program. So that’s another $33 billion in revenue, correct?

      Well – what kind of profit margin would you expect Defense to generate, off of that figure? Lucky for us, there is historical precedent;

      https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual/2019/Boeing-2018AR-Final.pdf

      These are the financials from 2018, Boeings banner year, before the Max crashes, before covid, when they had record revenues, margins and profits. The company sold $101 billion and made $12 billion in profit.

      Defense had $23 billion in revenues that year. It made $1.6 billion in earnings.

      It’s right here on page 30:

      2018
      Revenues $23,195
      % of total company revenues 23%
      Earnings from operations $1,594
      Operating margins 6.9%

      Now, in previous years, they have had a better operating margin. 10.7% in 2017, 8.3% in 2016.

      So let’s be really, really generous to BA and say that they will have margins of 10% on that extra $33 billion in revenue that you say they will earn.

      That means that they will have earnings of $3.3 billion on the program. Minus what they have already lost. They are still down almost $4 billion.

      Operating margins (15.3) % 5.8 % 5.9 %

      https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2022/ar/boeing-2022-annual-reportvF.pdf

      These are the margins from 2022, 2021 & 2020. Do you see 10% in their future, any time soon?

      In order for Boeing to BREAK EVEN on the program, they have to have another $70 billion in revenues (above the $27 billion you’ve quoted) and earn a margin of 10% on those revenues.

      Do you think those numbers are realistic?

      • Frank, your assumption for costs is incorrect.

        Boeing has a development contract for $5B, against which they have accrued $7B in charges. So keeping things simple, that’s $12B in development costs. That number will grow larger with the RVS upgrade to the fleet, over several years. But notably, they are taking those losses as annual charges, which means they are retired against future revenue.

        The production contract is on a per lot basis, and Boeing negotiates that separately with the USAF. We can assume they have a healthy margin there. So $22B thus far at around 60% of the original contract. And they have another 40 orders beyond that contract, for USAF, Israel, Japan, and Italy. That puts them probably near $40B in revenue for aircraft alone. With a likely margin of between 10% and 15%, since it’s military sales.

        Then we have further orders that are likely, since the USAF is not pursuing the KC-Y competition. Those could be 150 or so, not determined yet.

        Then we also have parts, services, and updates, which if we add the current contracts thus far, including support of foreign sales, is around $3B. That will continue to grow with time. And all of that too, has a healthy margin. The Japanese have allocated $1B for contractual maintenance on their fleet of 6 aircraft, as they emerge from warranty. The USAF has their own maintainers, so it won’t be as much for them, but their fleet is much larger.

        Thus we can easily get to $60B, even for the existing orders alone, probably much more, and all of that has a margin. It should be more than enough to offset the development contract losses, and since those losses are retired, this will appear on the balance sheet as profit, in future years.

        • Hang on….my assumptions for costs?

          Let’s keep things even simpler, than talking about dev contracts and accrued charges;

          Boeing is down $7 billion on the program, correct? Doesn’t matter what those costs are called, they’re down $7 billion.

          I’ve provided you with links to historical data showing the margins that Defense generates, please provide me something tangible beyond:

          ‘With a likely margin of between 10% and 15%, since it’s military sales.’

          Have Boeing ‘military sales’ generated 10-15% in previous years?

          Get to $60 billion? Sure. Another $33 billion in revenues are feasible.

          But what do the financial margins say? What do the indisputable numbers in black and white, that are reported in their 10-Q’s say?

          You’d LIKE them to be 10-15%, but they simply AREN’T 10-15%. Just because you wish or say something, doesn’t make it true.

          • No, they are down $7B on the development contract, not on the program, as I tried to explain. All other activities within the program generate profit.

            The military markup is in the range of other acquisition programs. You are quoting the margin of BDS, which is not the same thing, as it includes many other costs unrelated to the program.

          • @Rob

            ‘All other activities within the program generate profit.’

            Really?

            Is that what it is saying in the financials? Is that what a loss from operations is?

            And unless the burden of the $7 billion loss on the development contract is going taken on by some other company beside Boeing, it is THEIR loss. The Programs loss.

            When the final bill comes due, and all the numbers are totaled, that $7 billion still counts as a loss.

            Are you an NFL football fan? Ever hear of Bill Parcells, he of the Super Bowl winning NY Giants? He has a favorite expression:

            “You are, what your record….SAYS YOU ARE.”

          • Frank, all I can say is that you haven’t understood the principles at work here. No one is claiming that Boeing doesn’t have development losses. But the losses will be made up over time, due profitability in other aspects of the program.

            Your analysis assumes no profit anywhere, only loss. That is simply not the case. And it also disregards the impact of retirement of loss, instead of carrying it against future revenue. There are reasons why companies choose that method.

          • @Rob

            ‘Your analysis assumes no profit anywhere, only loss.’

            My analysis?

            I’ve been posting information with links to the Boeing financial statements.

            My analysis has been using YOUR FIGURES of another $33 billion in revenue on the program, not mine.

            YOUR FIGURES of a 10-15% margin (which, and here is my opinion, is very high) still leave Boeing losing money on the program.

            Nice word salad, btw…

          • Losses are “retired” but profits are carried forward!

        • @Rob

          My assumptions for costs, huh?

          How about from Boeing’s lips – right off the 10-Q, Q4/2022:

          ‘During the year ended December 31, 2022, we increased the reach-forward loss on the KC-46A Tanker program by $1,374 primarily reflecting higher production and supply chain costs.’

          Production and supply chain. Doesn’t sound like development costs to me, does it?

          From the most recent 10-Q:

          ‘The reach-forward loss on the KC-46A Tanker program increased by $245 million during the first quarter of 2023 primarily
          due to the cost of rework that was identified as a result of supplier quality issues.’

          Rework. Quality issues.

          From 2021 Year End.

          ‘Earnings From Operations

          During the fourth quarter of 2021, BDS increased the reach-forward loss on the KC-46A Tanker program by $402 million primarily due to continued disruption in the factory and in the supply chain, including impacts of COVID-19, and an increase in costs to complete the new Remote Vision System as the customer’s requirements definition has evolved. In 2020, we recorded an additional reach-forward loss of $1,320 million on the KC46A Tanker program’

          ***Earning from operations.***

          A loss, is a loss, is a loss – you can classify it however you want and call it whatever you like, but the numbers don’t change. Fancy accounting footwork is what got BA into this trouble, in the first place.

          • Exactly. If you want to attribute those losses to production, then you have to subtract them ftom development losses. You can’t double-count them.

            The argument that is made here, is derived from the media, with the claim that Boeing’s losses exceed the $5B development contract. So I have characterized it in that form.

            The bottom line remains, that charges count against the program, while profits count for it. As time goes on, the charges will end but the profits will continue for decades.

            Boeing knows this, investors know this. It’s a common business principle.

          • @Rob

            Yes, I know. I have no common business principles. I haven’t understood them. When you are finished running me down, could you please answer the following questions:

            1) Including dev costs, Boeing is down $7 billion on the entire Tanker program, yes or no? Doesn’t matter what it’s called, they’re down $7 billion.

            (here’s defense news: Boeing’s tanker losses top $7 billion)
            https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/04/27/boeings-tanker-losses-top-7-billion/

            2) That $7 billion will have to be made up, over the course of the program, if they want to break even, yes or no?

            3) Nobody else is going to pay, or has paid, or will pay – for that $7 billion shortfall, yes or no? It’s Boeing’s to pay.

            4) Historically, financial results from operations in Defense DO NOT SHOW (save 2017) a 10-15% margin. Correct?

            5) Can you PROVE that Boeing does in fact, have a 10-15% margin on the tanker program? Tangible, readable, reliable, trustworthy proof.

            6) Boeing has so far received $27 billion in revenue on the program, which is what you said. Yes or no?

            7) You expect there to be another $33 billion in revenue. Yes or no?

            Let’s start there…

          • @Rob

            …and by the way, for the record – this is what you said:

            ‘No, they are down $7B on the development contract, not on the program, as I tried to explain. All other activities within the program generate profit.’

            The financials CLEARLY indicate that they are NOT generating positive earnings on the KC-46 program.

            All other activities with the program DO NOT generate profit.

          • Looks like the ROB has been caught with his pants down.

            Seems he didn’t bother to subject his otherworldly assertions to any form of check or balance before trying to float them here.

          • Finally Rob,

            Let’s just say you are 100% correct.

            Boeing is going to make between 10 to 15% on the rest of the program.

            They are going to sell for another $33 billion, totaling $60 billion.

            All your numbers.

            Well, a 10 to 15% margin on $33 billion gives a range of between a $3.3 and $4.95 billion in earnings.

            How much are they down on the entire shebang? Oh yah…

            …$7 billion.

            So, even by your rosy predictions of a great and successful program, they’re going to eat between a $2.05 and $3.7 billion LOSS.

            These are your numbers.

          • Frank, you have a choice. You can continue to insist that Boeing cannot survive financially and every program will end in a loss, including the KC-46.

            Or you can recognize what everyone already has, that while there are losses, they aren’t fatal, Boeing will survive, and they have positive margins outside of development.

            It’s up to you. But I know from long experience here, you will prefer your own analysis to what is generally understood to be valid and true.

            I’ve been here now for 4 years. During that entire time, you have predicted that Boeing cannot possibly survive. At what point do you reconcile with reality?

            First step is to recognize the facts. I’ve given them to you accurately here. But we don’t seem to be able to surmount that step.

            Which as I said, is really nothing new here. I made these posts for the benefit of others, so that they have the opportunity to understand. I don’t expect you to take that opportunity.

          • Rob, it’s funny how you keep shifting the goal posts on and on. I failed to find where Frank mentioned anything about Boeing going under. He was posting about the KC46A program.

          • @ Matth
            That’s the ROB’s standard MO when he’s losing an argument.
            Also, accurate reading skills seem to be a bit of a challenge — that catches him out a lot.

          • @ Rob

            Alternatively:

            You have a choice. You can continue to insist that Boeing is doing okay financially and every program will end in a profit, including the KC-46.

            Or you can recognize what everyone already has, that while there are miniscule improvements here and there, they aren’t enough, Boeing is flirting with oblivion, and they have negative margins outside of BCS.

            It’s up to you. But I know from long experience here, you will prefer your own analysis to what is generally understood to be valid and true.

            I’ve been here now for 4 years. During that entire time, you have preached that Boeing is just fine. At what point do you reconcile with reality?

            First step is to recognize the facts. Frank and I have given them to you accurately here. But you don’t seem to be able to surmount that step.

            Which as I said, is really nothing new here. I made these posts for the benefit of others, so that they have the opportunity to understand. I don’t expect you to take that opportunity.

          • @Rob

            Thank you Matth, Stealth and Bryce.

            Indeed, I have focused solely on the KC-46 program.

            —————————————————

            ‘Or you can recognize what everyone already has, that while there are losses, they aren’t fatal, Boeing will survive, and they have positive margins outside of development.’

            Excellent. Rob – please direct me to these positive margins, if you’d be so kind. A link to the financials & page number would be great!

            ———————————————————-

            ‘It’s up to you. But I know from long experience here, you will prefer your own analysis to what is generally understood to be valid and true.’

            I have taken your numbers – but hey, maybe I made a mistake. Please tell me what you estimate Boeing will make on the KC-46 program, with total sales of $60 billion and a margin of 10-15%, having already sold for $27 billion in revenue with a $7 billion loss.

            ———————————————————–

            ‘I’ve been here now for 4 years.’

            Yes – and I’m still waiting for you to answer these questions. Hope spring eternal.

            ————————————————————

            ‘At what point do you reconcile with reality?’

            I know Rob, I’m just so difficult. It’s annoying when people use facts and numbers from financials, with Boeing’s own wording. I’m really sorry to use pesky information like that, I know it’s really inconvenient to you. Please find it in your heart to forgive me.

            —————————————————————-

            ‘ I made these posts for the benefit of others, so that they have the opportunity to understand.’

            YOU are just the nicest guy ever, helping those of us who are so obtuse to understand your ‘facts’. We really deserve all those comments directed by you, letting us know how dense we are when we don’t agree with these ‘facts’.

            ——————————————————-

            It would be really, really nice – if you would just for once, put aside the personal attacks and point out, with figures and backed up with financial data, links and all…

            …how the KC-46 program will generate enough margin to cover the $7 billion hole they are in. (that hole being ANY money spent and not recovered on the program, be it in development, production…whatever. Money spent is money spent)

            Could you do that, please?

          • @Frank

            The ROB’s ramblings are actually even more amusing than you indicated, because his original post above referred to a PROFIT of $60B on the KC-46 — not a TURNOVER of $60B.

            I quote:
            “..profit on all the other aspects of the program. Which will likely total around $60B, over the aircraft life.”

            Now, in the five years up to and including the stellar year 2018, the ENTIRE BOEING COMPANY made a cumulative profit of $34.5B — $10.5B of which was in 2018. So, what the ROB is asserting is that a single defense program is going to generate as much profit as 10 years of operations of the entire Boeing company prior to the MAX debacle.
            Isn’t that just astounding?

            https://www.statista.com/statistics/268990/annual-results-of-the-boeing-company/

  22. Bryce

    …”Hint: it seems that you’re confusing resumption of “flights” with resumption of “deliveries”…
    —–
    Lol …
    Hint,

    Resumption of flight is an open door to deliveries.

    Also, I remind you that you had a pious wish which was that you NEVER thought that the 737MAX was going to revolve in China right?

    The C919 not equal to the 737MAX in 2023 and certainly for years to come…

    We can bet if you want…

    • Oh, so above you said:
      “…had resumed 737MAX deliveries a few weeks ago…” (past tense)

      but that has now morphed into:
      “Resumption of flight is an open door to deliveries.” (future conditional tense)

      Strange how fluid tenses seem to be in North Africa…;-)

      • Bryce, Bryce, Bryce…

        Instead of looking for your neighbors’ little mistakes, look at yours,
        You will appear more humble and more credible

        You were wrong when you publicly stated your wishful thinking that China would drop the 737MAX.

        It was just a dream, now it’s time to wake up…

        • “…when you publicly stated your wishful thinking that China would drop the 737MAX.”

          Got a link for that (again)?
          Presumably you know how to search the LNA archives?

          • How did you never say that? It was one of your dearest pious wishes here,
            Recognize it…

          • Still no link?
            So — another personal fantasy, it seems. Just like those concocted “deliveries” to China 😅

    • Calhoun said that Boeing has not included any Chinese deliveries in their projections, but are optimistic they will begin based on statements of the Chinese airlines.

      Thus if they don’t materialize, Boeing is not any worse off. If they do materialize, that will be a boon that will boost revenue.

      Boeing has de-risked the situation appropriately. If the deliveries don’t happen, Boeing will make the aircraft available. They have already had some success in that.

      Bryce has long tried to represent the Chinese lethargy with the MAX as a problem in the program. I pointed out years ago that this was an incorrect conclusion. Events have since vindicated that position, and continue to do so.

      • “Hopefully” orders from Saudi and AI are more than enough to compensate.

        /s

      • Alternatively:

        Calhoun said that Boeing has not included any Chinese deliveries in their projections, but are (desperately) hopeful they will begin based on vague documents from the Chinese airlines.

        Thus if they don’t materialize, Boeing will be substantially worse off. If they do materialize, that will be a boon that may boost revenue — but not earnings.

        Boeing has not de-risked the situation sufficiently. If the deliveries don’t happen, Boeing will try to make the unloved whitetails available. They have, to date, had very limited success in that.

        Bryce has long pointed to official statements from the CAAC indicating that the Chinese lethargy with the MAX is a problem in the program. The ROB fantacized years ago that this was an incorrect conclusion. Events have since disproved that fantasy, and continue to do so.

    • Here’a a CNN article on that gross dysfunctionality / capture at the FAA:

      “While awaiting additional data in March 2019, FAA officials issued an official notice backing up their decision to allow the Max to continue flying. An engineer drafted an analysis which showed the risk of fatalities to be 13 times higher than the relevant FAA standard. “However,” the inspector general’s report said, “this document was not completed and did not go through managerial review due to lack of detailed flight data.””

      https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/faa-boeing-737-max-inspector-general/index.html

      • Yes, and that is why the FAA requested the flight data, before making their decision. As their charter requires them to do. And is why they were commended in testimony before Congress, by the chair of the JTAR, for making a data driven decision.

        • Alternatively:

          Yes, and that is why the FAA requested the flight data, before ultimately being forced to make their decision. As their regulatory capture required them to do. And it is why they were lambasted worldwide, for clinging to a pedantic, out-of-touch delaying tactic while Rome burned.

          • Bryce, you have a severe allergy to facts and truth, which always triggers the repetitive response, instead of answering with facts and data, as a normal person would.

            It’s an evasive tactic, but it’s still useful, as I use it as a gauge for how accurate I am. If the repetition comes back, I know you have no other response.

          • Rob, you have a severe allergy to facts and truth, which always triggers the PR hot air response, instead of answering with facts and data, as a normal person would.

            It’s an evasive tactic, but it’s still useful, as I use it as a gauge for how accurate I am. If the waffle comes back, I know you have no other response.

  23. -> Five Hawaiian Airlines A321neos grounded, due to engine supply chain issues

    -> Air New Zealand has been forced to ground two of its Airbus aircraft due to a shortage of maintenance supplies from its engine manufacturer P&W

  24. Rob

    That’s exactly it, I couldn’t have said it better.

    It’s the same feeling each time he doesn’t recognize his wrong or his wishful thinking of wanting to see the 737MAX not fly in China for example…

    Damage…

    • You should have been here for the “Great 737 MAX Battle of 2020-2021”. That was really something.

      The fact that some here are anti-Boeing is fine, there is certainly room for criticism. But the constant implications of imminent doom have become ridiculous and tiring. Boeing is not going to fail, and Boeing is going to improve. It’s that simple, and fairly obvious as well.

      If people stuck to accurate criticisms, there could be good discussions. But they are so focused on twisting the knife, and misrepresenting things, that it becomes futile. Most discussions wind up in the same place, especially with Bryce.

      Really a shame, because there are some good commenters here. But I think people looking for a reasonable discussion can go elsewhere.

      • ‘But I think people looking for a reasonable discussion can go elsewhere.’

        Yet you are here. Begs the question why, since you think that there are more reasonable discussions elsewhere?

        • I check in from time to time to see what the excesses in the anti-Boeing narrative will be. Usually after some event that I know will trigger them. There is always the off chance that a reasonable commenter will respond.

          But then there is the inevitable attack that results from making any kind of positive statement about Boeing. As well as the devolution to childish antics in response to facts.

          So I don’t rely on the comment section here for information or discussion, there are better places to do that. There are very few pro-Boeing people here, I suspect for the same reason.

          Lastly, Bjorn is still one of the best technical aviation journalists around, and I continue to enjoy and learn from his articles.

          • Alternatively

            You check in from time to time to see what the realistic narrative will be. Usually after some event where you attempt to do some damage control. There is always the off chance that an uninformed commenter might be swayed.

            But then there is the inevitable reality check that results from making any kind of artificial statement about Boeing. As well as the use of countering in response to concocted “facts”.

            So you don’t rely on the comment section here for PR promulgation — there are better places to do that. There are very few non-realist people here, you suspect for the same reason.

            Lastly, Bjorn is still one of the best technical aviation journalists around, and you continue to enjoy and learn from his articles.

        • We can well remember recently the incredulity of a few when evidence of Mongolian Airways Max flights over China, or when evidence of the first 1 or 2 Max flights by Chinese airlines who bought them out of storage ( much larger numbers now).
          Then there are whole facts about Boeings accounts that were dismissed – that they have $55 bill on customer deposits, that the unit and program numbers are presented in accounts.
          Its almost like its a pre arranged talking points.
          As time goes by their falsity its revealed….but no doubt even saying the obvious will result in another round of chicken little comments

          • Oh dear…looks like someone has forgotton once again how shaky those deposits are. They’re booked as liabilities — remember why?

        • “Yet you are here.”

          Hehe.

          reasonably factual/neutral information must be diluted at all cost.
          IMU the reason why there are some other rather strange posters around saturating the comments section.
          a jobs programme?

      • Alternatively

        You should have been here for the “Great 737 MAX Battle of 2020-2021”. That was really something.

        The fact that some here are pro-reality is fine, there is certainly room for criticism. But the constant implications of a downward spiral have proved very accurate. Boeing is slipping further down the drain, and Boeing is not improving at all. It’s that simple, and fairly obvious as well.

        If people avoided fantasy-driven “alternative facts” there could be good discussions. But the BA back office is so focused on twisting the truth and misrepresenting things, that it becomes futile. Most discussions wind up in the same place, especially with the ROB.

        Really a shame, because, apart from them, there are some good commenters here. But I think people looking for an alternate reality discussion can go elsewhere.

  25. Wow the Boeing stock price at the close of Friday April 28, 2023,
    demonstrates shareholder and Wall Street confidence in Boeing

    -> $206.78 +0.79 (0.38%)

    Airbus doesn’t seem bad either, it’s slowly increasing for both but the first one is still very far…

    -> EUR127.14 +1.60 (1.27%)

    • But our self appointed and amateur analysts claim differently.

      Who to believe ( never mind their diversion that manufacturing is similar to having deposits on call at a bank, yeah right , its soooo similar

    • Did you check out how nicely First Republic’s shares were rising in January — just a few weeks before the meltdown on April 24th? 😏

    • “Wow the Boeing stock price at the close of Friday April 28, 2023,
      demonstrates shareholder and Wall Street confidence in Boeing”

      BA is down 38.17% in the last five years. It’s still 38% below pre-pandemic (February 2020) levels. I agree it shows the confidence levels of Wall Street.

      Airbus is up 28.83% in the past five years and is back to the level it was in February 2020.

  26. I’m glad that Bryce has begun to use the term “alternatively” in his repetitive responses to my posts. That term is correct, he presents an “alternative” version of facts and reality. As KellyAnne Conway made famous, and has now become a staple of Internet discussions. Any claim is valid, on the basis of being an “alternative” version of the truth.

    Unfortunately that doesn’t satisfy the rules of logic or debate. But then again, those don’t apply here

    • Very apt that Bryce has begun to use the term “alternatively” in his repetitive responses to the ROB’s posts. That term is correct, since the ROB presents an “alternative” version of facts and reality. As KellyAnne Conway made famous, and has now become a staple of Internet discussions. Any claim is valid, on the basis of being an “alternative” version of the truth.

      Unfortunately that doesn’t satisfy the rules of logic or debate. But then again, those don’t apply in ROB-land.

  27. The news wires are buzzing this morning with details of the remarkable bureaucracy, dysfunction and regulatory capture that characterized the FAA’s initial response to the MAX crashes.

    From AP:
    “An FAA official said the analysis “suggested that there was a 25% chance of an accident in 60 days” if no changes were made to the planes.
    “However, this document was not completed and did not go through managerial review due to lack of detailed flight data,” the report said.”

    https://apnews.com/article/boeing-max-crashes-faa-ea8fac0ad2758b08c58d2d64756fbf37

    Fumbling while Rome burned.

    • “And FAA officials said ‘no’ and “expressed frustration” that other regulators were grounding it. This is a bad look.”

      https://twitter.com/ICTBiz_dmccoy/status/1652065177834070019

      ***

      “…the watchdog recommended that FAA document how key and urgent safety decisions are made and make several other changes in how it analyzes crashes.”

      “The FAA said in a response attached to the inspector general’s report that it is committed to measures that will improve safety and has started to update procedures based on the Max tragedies.”

      https://www.seattletimes.com/business/report-faa-overruled-engineers-let-boeing-max-keep-flying/

      • This is the same article being released via different outlets.

        Here is the authoritative source, which explains that FAA and Boeing appropriately followed the established evidentiary procedures.

        “Following the March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines accident, FAA initiated its risk
        assessment process and had a staff engineer draft a TARAM analysis, per its
        policy. According to FAA officials, the Agency did not immediately ground the
        MAX following the accident because they wanted more detailed data before they
        could make an informed decision. FAA received the preliminary
        flight data on March 11 and began to evaluate it. However, FAA faced challenges
        when trying to interpret the initial raw data, which lacked enough specifics to compare with the more detailed information that had been compiled from the
        Lion Air accident. In addition, FAA officials were receiving information regarding
        the configuration of the airplane at the time of the accident, which indicated that
        the accident might not be related to MCAS. This affected understanding of the
        accident’s cause and analysis. Incomplete data delayed decision making within the Agency, as it was difficult to compute data without reliable information.

        FAA officials maintained their decision to not immediately ground the aircraft
        despite some internal and international concerns. Our review of emails and interviews of FAA officials revealed that individual engineers recommended grounding the airplane while the accident was being investigated,
        based on what they perceived as similarities between the accidents. Yet Agency
        officials at Headquarters and the Seattle ACO opted not to do so; instead, they
        waited for more detailed data to arrive. However, FAA officials did draft an order
        that would ground the MAX fleet if incoming data showed an association
        between the accidents.

        In addition, Agency officials expressed frustration that foreign civil aviation
        authorities were grounding the aircraft before they had data that linked the two
        accidents. FAA officials were standing by their previous assessments of the
        airworthiness of the airplane until the Agency completed its analysis. For
        example, one FAA aircraft certification executive emailed other aircraft
        certification executives and managers on March 11: “We want to work with any
        authority that has concerns with continued operation. It is early with regard to
        the Ethiopian accident investigation so it likely will be several days before we get
        better information. In the meantime we have no reason to question the safety of
        continued operations.” On March 11, 2019, FAA issued a Continued Airworthiness
        Notification to the International Community (CANIC), which stated that the
        Agency did not yet have any data on which it could “draw any conclusions or take
        any action” and explained FAA’s ongoing oversight of Boeing’s development of a
        permanent fix for MCAS.

        Once FAA received more detailed information, the Acting Federal Aviation
        Administrator took action. Specifically, by March 13, 2019, Boeing was able to
        interpret and plot the more detailed aircraft data following a discussion with the
        company that provided the data. Boeing’s analysis indicated a potential link
        between the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents. Boeing then notified FAA
        and held a presentation about the more detailed data and its analysis on the
        morning on March 13. Following this meeting, at the direction of the Acting
        Federal Aviation Administrator, the Agency prepared to ground the airplane,
        using the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. Sections 40113(a) and 46105(c).”

        https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Return%20to%20Service%20Final%20Report%5E4.26.2023_revised.pdf

        • Interesting that “the appropriate evidentiary procedures” were followed — but that those procedures are now being modified. Not that you can pick up on ironies like that, of course.

          And the FAA finally decided to ground after consultation with BA — it’s in your link above. Now there’s regulatory capture!

          Trying to put out multiple fires at the same time must be tiring for you 😏

          • grounding is “potential threat” controlled.
            ( and you err on the safe side! )

            What the FAA tried to insert as decision path
            was legal judgement style “guaranteed threat”

            They wouldn’t have hemmed and hawed like that if it had been a foreign type ( forex Airbus, Embraer ). “grounded, subito!”

          • To clarify once again with the truth from the authoritative source:

            1. “FAA’s Risk Assessment Process Relies in Part on Engineering
            Judgment That May Lack Relevant Supporting Data”

            In other words, better data is needed and the decision should be less subjective (why the FAA sought the additional data).

            2. “The TARAM Guidance and Underlying Order Are Outdated, and Risk
            Guidelines Include Only U.S.-Based Airplanes”

            In other words, the statistics used by FAA are from the US airlines, and don’t include risks in foreign airlines, which can be much greater (as they were in this case).

            3. “FAA Faces Challenges When Including Human Factors in Its
            Risk Analysis”

            In other words, the FAA lacks sufficient data on how crews will react when faced with unexpected problems (as ocurred in this case).

            Bottom line is that the FAA may have underestimated the risk of an accident happening outside the US. And that better data was needed to make the decision less subjective.

          • Bryce, it is not “regulatory capture” to ask Boeing to consult with Aireon and assist in the data analysis, to provide needed clarification. That statement is completely ridiculous.

            Your allergy to the truth is showing again. There is nothing you won’t twist or alter in pursuit of a lie.

          • Alternatively:

            To clarify once again with the truth from the authoritative source:

            – The “lead regulator” became the ” lag regulator”.
            – Dusty bureaucrats hid behind “procedure” rather than taking action.
            – Action was taken only after “green light” was sought from “master OEM”.
            – Regulator was embarrassed into acting by presidential intervention.

            In other words, the FAA lacked sufficient balls to actually do something when faced with unexpected problems (as occurred in this case).

            Bottom line is that the FAA grossly underestimated the risk of an accident happening with the MAX. Hiding behind procedure was an attempt to stick one’s head in the sand..

          • Rob

            It certainly is “regulatory capture” to wait on a green light from Boeing before finally doing something — despite having internal reports that showed an alarmingly high accident risk. That statement is completely plausible.

            Your allergy to the truth is showing again. There is nothing you won’t twist or alter in pursuit of a lie.

          • Bryce, there was no green light, nor is there any allegation that such a thing occurred. That is purely your invention, as most of your comments are.

            As stated, the IG found that the FAA process was appropriate. But that process should be updated with more diverse data, to include what are now known risks outside the US.

          • Rob

            Reading skills: I didn’t say there was a green light — I said that a green light was sought. Presidential intervention rendered it moot to wait further for the green light.

            The events concerning the green light are clearly referenced in the link that you posted — but, of course, that doesn’t suit your narrative.

            As stated, the rest of the world — and the President of the United States — found that the FAA process was bureaucratic and out of touch. But too late now to undo the damage to its reputation.

        • Wow. How come European and Canadian grounded the MAX ahead of FAA? I wonder how much additional time FAA would take if CAAC was not a couple steps ahead?

          • Pedro, the IG document I posted contains a flowchart of events. As FAA noted, China grounded the MAX before any data was available, hence they were first. Which makes them the poster child for a bad process. And has since been ratified by their approach to recertification. They lag far behind the rest of the world.

            In contrast, EASA based their grounding on the preliminary NTSB data. They choose not to wait for the enhanced data from Aireon, which was delivered a few hours, and required 8 hours more for analysis.

            Within about 16 hours of EASA, FAA made the decision to ground. It took about 8 hours more to legally implement the grounding.

            So the whole notion of some massive delay is ridiculous.

          • Also Canada grounded several hours after the EASA decision, so even closer to the FAA decision.

          • “So the whole notion of some massive delay is ridiculous.”

            Nobody referred to a “massive delay” — that’s your concoction.

            We — and the world’s press — are talking about the *reasons for and nature of* the delay. It would appear to have been born out of a mixture of panic, incompetence, and fawning deference to an OEM.

          • ROB: “As FAA noted, China grounded the MAX before any data was available, ”

            China had enough relevant data available:

            TWO catastrophic crashes similar enough to hint at commonality linked by type.

            All others where waiting on FAA to act but that did not happen. grace period went by and EASA and co acted on their own.

            Looking further back FAA grounding US types on their own only happens with crashes in the US. Foreign death is of no interest.

          • @Rob

            -> “Canada had been one of the last holdouts on temporarily banning the Max 8s in the wake of the recent Ethiopian Airlines crash that killed all 157 people on board, including 18 Canadians. The U.K., the European Union, Australia and other countries had moved already to ban the jet from their airspace in response to growing safety concerns.”

            In fact, after China, Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia and UK all grounded Boeing 737 MAX ahead of FAA. They were reckless and made the decision without sufficient analysis??

      • There was about 24 hours between the EASA grounding and the FAA grounding. The EASA grounding was based on the preliminary data provided by NTSB. The FAA sought further data from Aireon, which Boeing analyzed overnight, meeting with FAA the next morning to recommend grounding.

        • Translation: the FAA dragged its feet and indulged in denialistic bureaucracy in the middle of an emergency. It only acted once the rest of the world had left it behind.

          • Trump seems to have gone ballistic when the FAA remained as sole nongrounder.

            https://www.google.com/search?q=trump+737max+grounding

            FAA was forced to ground not from that data introspection path but from the “TopBoss stamps foot” path.
            i.e. ROBs endearing story about a responsible institution taking excessive care is just so much tripe.

          • No Uwe, that story has been repeatedly debunked, including in sworn testimony before Congress, and in the present IG document as well.

            The part about Trump melting down is true, the part about that altering the grounding decision is false

          • No, Rob — you’re indulging in more alternate reality:

            “President Donald Trump issues order to ground Boeing 737 Max 8 after crashes”

            “”WASHINGTON – President Donald Trump announced Wednesday that his administration had grounded the Boeing 737 Max 8 planes involved in two catastrophic crashes, hours after the United States became the last country to do so.

            “Those planes are grounded effective immediately,” Trump told reporters at the White House. “The safety of the American people, of all people, is our paramount concern.””

            “Mike Slack, a pilot and lawyer who has represented passengers and family members in crash cases, said Trump had little choice. Allowing the planes to fly would have gambled jobs – and American lives – and raised questions for the administration and Boeing.

            “Is this about protecting Boeing competitively against Airbus, its primary competitor? And why would Boeing’s CEO be calling the president of the United States?” said Slack, a former NASA engineer. “That’s not good form when the background story is already that the FAA is not acting.””

            https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/13/donald-trump-says-he-signed-order-ground-boeing-737-max-8/3152157002/

            P.s. Those of us in the real world know that the trouble with “testimony” is that is often includes lots of ” ass covering” 😉

          • “… why would Boeing’s CEO be calling the president of the United States?”

            Exactly. Why is there no transcript released to the public to clear the air?

          • Bryce, as I said, Trump made those statements but they were refuted by the FAA in sworn testimony, and by the Inspector General investigations.

            Posting an article of Trump’s statements is not evidence, when Trump is known to be untruthful.

            But is representative of your allergy to the truth, and preference for conspiracy theory.

          • Alternatively:

            Rob, as I said, Trump made those statements. You *alleged* that they were refuted by the FAA in sworn testimony, and by the Inspector General investigations — but, as usual, provided no link to this.

            Asserting that we should trust the ROB’s assertions is not evidence, when the ROB is known to be untruthful.

            But is representative of your allergy to the truth, and preference for evasive tactics.

        • @ROB
          color me unimpressed.
          I will continue to go with observed reality
          and not what mealy mouthed flappers
          make of it.

          • Uwe, you share Bryce’s preference for conspiracy theory over truth. In this case the truth was long ago established.

          • Alternatively:

            Rob, you share BA’s preference for hot air over truth. In this case the truth was long ago established.

  28. Rob must be very relieved to switch topics to the MAX, after being
    checkmated on the KC-46A financials *via Boeing’s own numbers* provided by Frank..

    a hoot

    • Frank will be wrong on the KC-46, as he has been on everything else he has predicted about Boeing. The program will end up in the black, for the reasons I explained. This is why the market and investors shrug off the charges.

      Also for the record, people here have consistently been wrong about the MAX as well, as has been borne out by events.

      The amazing thing, is that there is no evidence from the real world that will daunt them from these pursuits. Their comments don’t actually have to do with that world. As I pointed out, it’s just about misrepresenting things so they can twist the knife. That seems to be a purpose unto itself. But it continuously distances them from reality.

      • Alternatively:

        The ROB is already wrong on the KC-46, as he has been on everything else he has predicted about Boeing. The program will continue in the red, for the reasons Frank explained. This is why the market and investors still pin BA stock price at pre-2020 levels.

        Also for the record, realistic people here have consistently been correct about the MAX as well, as has been borne out by events.

        The amazing thing, is that there is no evidence from the real world that will daunt the ROB from his pursuits. His comments don’t actually have to do with that world. As the rest of us pointed out, it’s just about misrepresenting things so he can twist the narrative. That seems to be a purpose unto itself (damage control). But it continuously distances the ROB from reality.

        • Bryce,

          Do be cross with Rob. He’s obviously upset with the wrong people.

          The CFO and those people in accounting are undoubtedly publishing the incorrect results. The numbers are all wrong.

          How’s he supposed to steer the conversation about Boeing into a positive light when he’s fighting the proof in black and white, with nothing but imagined figures and insults to back up his claims?

          He’s doing the best he can, under the circumstances. Poor guy.

          • Dear Frank, I’m not cross with the ROB at all! As I said above, he has some of us rolling on the floor with laughter!
            It’s always entertaining when he “clarifies” matters for us 😉

            ***

            He didn’t comment at all on my calculation above of margin per commercial aircraft. Maybe he couldn’t follow the steps? Anything is possible: for example, another very self-assured commenter here didn’t realize that BA had a big cash burn in Q1.

  29. Poor [oddly evidence-free] Rob, whose argument is “trust me”

    pass.. 😉

  30. I especially enjoyed the use of the future-tense ”..will be wrong..” in that commenter’s desperate diatribe re: the Boing KC-46A.
    A man’s gotta work for a livin’..

    what a fact-free hoot

    • You are free to present contravening arguments or evidence. Notably, you never do.

      • No never present any links to back up your “claims”.
        Then again, we know why, don’t we? It’s hard to present something that doesn’t actually exist 😉

        • Defense, Space & Security

          Operating Results
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2013 2012 2011
          Revenues……………….. $33,197 $32,607 $31,976
          % of total company revenues 38% 40% 47%
          Earnings from operations $3,235 $3,068 $3,158
          Operating margins……….. 9.7% 9.4% 9.9%

          Boeing Military Aircraft
          Operating Results
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2013 2012 2011
          Revenues ………………$15,936 $16,019 $14,585
          % of total company revenues 18% 20% 21%
          Earnings from operations $1,465 $1,489 $1,431
          Operating margins………… 9.2% 9.3% 9.8%

          https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual/2013/2013_annual_report.pdf

          ————————————————————-

          Results of Operations
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2016 2015 2014
          Revenues …………….$29,498 $30,388 $30,881
          % of total company revenues 31% 32% 34%
          Earnings from operations $3,008 $3,274 $3,133
          Operating margins ………….10.2% 10.8% 10.1%

          Boeing Military Aircraft
          Results of Operations
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2016 2015 2014
          Revenues…………… $12,515 $13,424 $13,410
          % of total company revenues 13% 14% 15%
          Earnings from operations $1,231 $1,311 $1,294
          Operating margins ……………..9.8% 9.8% 9.6%

          https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual/2016/2016-Annual-Report.pdf

          —————————————————————

          Results of Operations
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2019 2018 2017
          Revenues ……………..$26,227 $26,392 $23,938
          % of total company revenues 34% 26% 25%
          Earnings from operations $2,608 $1,657 $2,383
          Operating margins …………….9.9% 6.3% 10.0%

          (In 2019 they didn’t break out military aircraft)

          They started delivering KC-46’s in 2019, with 28 delivered. They also had this to say:

          “During 2017, we recorded reach-forward losses of $445 million related to this program, primarily reflecting
          higher estimated costs associated with certification and incorporating changes into LRIP aircraft. During
          2018, we recorded additional reach-forward losses of $736 million primarily reflecting higher estimated
          costs associated with certification, flight testing and change incorporation on aircraft, as well as higher
          than expected effort to meet customer requirements in order to support delivery of the initial aircraft. During
          2019, we recorded additional reach-forward losses of $148 million reflecting higher manufacturing costs”

          https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2019/ar/2019_Boeing_Annual_Report.pdf

          ———————————————————-

          Results of Operations
          (Dollars in millions)
          Years ended December 31, 2022 2021 2020
          Revenues ……………$23,162 $26,540 $26,257
          % of total company revenues 35 % 43 % 45 %
          (Loss)/earnings from operations ($3,544) $1,544 $1,539
          Operating margins……………… (15.3) % 5.8 % 5.9 %

          (Once again, no breakout of the margins for military aircraft)

          https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2022/ar/boeing-2022-annual-reportvF.pdf

          —————————————————–

          So, what do the financials show?

          BDS Margins from operations

          2011 9.9%
          2012 9.4%
          2013 9.7%
          2014 10.1%
          2015 10.8%
          2016 10.2%
          2017 10%
          2018 6.3%
          2019 9.9%
          2020 5.9%
          2021 5.8%
          2022 (15.3)%

          Military Aircraft Margins

          2011 9.8%
          2012 9.3%
          2013 9.2%
          2014 9.6%
          2015 9.8%
          2016 9.8%

          And then suddenly in 2017 they stopped showing how much of a margin they made on their military aircraft, as a part of BDS.

          ——————————————————-

          BEST EVER BDS YEAR

          2017 – 10% margin, as a whole unit

          2011, 2015, 2016 – 9.8% margin on military aircraft

          ————————————————————

          If someone wants to determine the averages, since 2011 – please go ahead. When things are moving along properly, it looks like a 10% game; for both BDS as a whole AND military aircraft.

          This is all copy and past from the BA financials. No ambiguity here.

  31. Rob, we’re still waiting for you to answer the questions that @Frank asked above about the KC-46.
    And don’t try to claim that you already answered them, because all you’ve done up to now is provide evasive word salads (as usual). Up you go now to his last question and give him the requested data — point by point — with supporting links.

    You’re wasting your energy on the FAA debacle (though, as @Vincent pointed out, it is a convenient distraction for you). Acting FAA chief Billy Nolen abandoned ship a few days ago — he evidently saw the flak coming. The organization’s reputation is totally flushed at this stage.

  32. A discussion with Boeing PR people is never productive. However, I am happy to take the information from Bryce and Frank with me. Thanks

    The ARJ21 and C919 begin to infiltrate the first all-Boeing airlines.

      • Bringing the order book for the C919 up to 1075.

        One of these days, there’ll be an announcement that the Chinese CJ-1000A turbofan is going into production. Presumably, the rest of the plane is already being purged of western components — to the extent that that hasn’t already happened.

        30 of the C919s in the referenced order will be going to HNA daughter Urumqi Air:
        https://airwaysmag.com/comac-c919-order-from-urumqi-air/

        • For production ramp up on the C919, one can assume Chinese firms will manufacture the production equipment/FAL tooling and not buy additional western mfg. equipment/tooling. Going back 2017, the ARJ 21 second production line had western bids but it was awarded to a Chinese company (moving line concept with robots)

          • On the other hand, AB is intensifying and diversifying its involvement in China:

            “Airbus, Tarmac Aerosave and Chengdu to create first aircraft lifecycle services centre in China”

            “Airbus, Tarmac Aerosave and the City of Chengdu have established a Joint Venture for the first aircraft “lifecycle” services centre in China. The new facility will cover a range of activities from aircraft parking and storage, to maintenance, upgrades, conversions, dismantling and recycling services for various aircraft types. The announcement follows an initial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in January 2022. Entry into service of the new centre is scheduled around the turn of this year.”

            https://asianaviation.com/airbus-tarmac-aerosave-and-chengdu-to-create-first-aircraft-lifecycle-services-centre-in-china/

    • “A discussion with Boeing PR people is never productive. However, I am happy to take the information from Bryce and Frank with me. Thanks”

      Very kind of you, but in defense of Rob, I gotta say that he’s trying his best, given the tools and circumstances he’s been handed.

      And at the end of the day, imagine how boring it would be in here, if we didn’t have him (and others) trying to contradict facts? He’s a blessing, I say.

      Imagine the conversations Bryce and I would have to have, if he wasn’t here:

      Frank: Another losing quarter for BA. That’s a bad 3 years…
      Bryce: Actually Frank, it’s been losses since 2019. That 4 years.
      F: Four years??? Are you sure?
      B: Yah, here:
      https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/4Q19-Press-Release.pdf
      Over a $3 billion loss in 2019. We know about ’20, ’21 & ’22.
      F: Well, at least cash flow is good now, right?
      B: Not really. They had another negative quarter in ’23 and interest expense is killing them.
      F: But what about deliveries? Those aircraft in Inventory must be gone and turned into piles of money by now, right?
      B: Not really. They still have 225 Max’s and 95 Dreamliners sitting there.
      F: But they have lots of deposits, right?
      B: Yah, but all that money is spent. $54.5 billion – and what do they have to show for it? Every aircraft that is being delivered is a loss…
      F: Ohhhhhhhhh
      .
      .
      F: Soooooo….how’s the weather where you are?

      • Good Lord! We’d have very short comment sections if that were the case 😉

        p.s. You forgot our calculations of the earnings value of inventory — which isn’t enough to cover current debt.

      • @ Frank
        Serious question:
        Have you ever found any info on internal allocation of debt servicing costs within BA? One could make an argument that the debt is predominantly due to the ongoing mayhem at BCA — though one could also see some of it as being assigned to cover the string of screw-ups at BDS. I think something like a 90-10 allocation might be reasonable.
        In what I’ve seen to date, debt servicing costs are only subtracted at the consolidated level. Does that also match your observations?

        This would become particularly relevant if a division were to be spun off — the question then being how much debt does that particular division carry with it.

        • Bryce,

          I think that it would give away too much information. People would get scared. If you look at the BDS reporting I posted above, they stopped putting out the breakdown on what military aircraft brings in and the margins it creates.

          If things are a little more opaque, it’s easier to explain things away. It raises less questions.

          For instance:

          If you had to allocate a dollar amount to the KC-46 program and how much it was costing them, at what point in time, when people see that it has cost the company $7 billion, the debt balance isn’t going down – would you have calls to cut the program?

          Or the 777X?

          Remember – as long as they can push stuff into a DPB and hide it in Inventory, it’ll only come fully due way down the road. Look at the 747-8, launched in 2005. The final bill came in the 2020’s, when everyone who was there back in the day – is gone.

          You start putting out detailed info about specific programs and too many questions get raised. This way, you can put out a narrative like “Development costs” as if that money spent doesn’t count.

          If there was a running amount of debt attributed to a program, let’s say the 787 had a balance; what would people say and think of the company? People would freak.

          They say the market is forward looking. You’ve heard that one, right?

          Well, once a company has a reach forward loss on the program, within a year or two, everyone seems to forget about it. You see this Long Term Debt number on the balance sheet and that’s where the loss really resides, now (if the company doesn’t have cash reserves from other programs to pay for it).

          Why would you continually remind people of your previous gaffes?

          • All very true, Frank.
            So, looks like any division spin-offs that might occur would have to be done in the form of a continuation of operations after bankruptcy (to purge the convoluted web of debt) — at least where BCA and BDS are concerned.
            This need not apply to a spin-off of BGS, of course.

  33. This is amusing to read.
    One wonders if there was any contact with BA beforehand (or afterward): can’t be very beneficial to China-US relations…

    “Rubio, Scott Question Commerce’s Failure to Include Chinese State-Owned Aerospace Manufacturer on MEU List”

    “The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a hostile power, and we must curtail its ability to steal American innovations and intellectual property in aviation. This includes adding the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) onto the Military End User (MEU) List.

    “U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Rick Scott (R-FL) sent a letter to Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Alan Estevez, expressing their concern regarding the U.S. Commerce Department’s failure to include COMAC on the MEU List and urging the under secretary to immediately address the problem. ”

    https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=8285B08C-5734-4D87-A237-75A3B4C7805F

    • So the airBaltic Ceo has 80 small models of the A220 in his office (saw this on a video). Every time they add one to their fleet, he moves it into the ‘pile’.

      They have firm orders for 50, plus options for another 30. He wants a fleet of 80.

      I wonder when they will exercise the option?

      Side note:

      Bryce – that’s 4 A220’s (or six, depending if those two on the 5th were not counted in March deliveries) for April.

          • @Frank
            Planespotters puts the most recent Jetblue frame in May.
            However, production lists vary in the dates that they assign, depending on the exact definitions that they use for handover.

          • @Bryce

            The only “definition” that matters is when the OEM says it was delivered. Contractual delivery date is often before fly-away delivery date of the plane.

          • @Stealth

            ‘The only “definition” that matters is when the OEM says it was delivered.’

            I might add:

            The only definition that really matters, is when the check clears, accounting runs the figures and tells you good job, this delivery was in the black – now get back to work!

          • @Frank In an ideal World, yes. Boeing is currently not living in that World.

  34. -> A total of 17.831 million passenger trips and 11,353 passenger trains were made through China’s railways on Sunday, the 2nd day of the May Day holidays. On Monday, 16 million passenger trips are expected to be made with 10,815 trains scheduled to run.

    • The Chinese railway network is more developed than that of the United States.

      We can easily understand that the American airlines are more developed than the Chinese when we saw United Airlines, American and Delta Airlines buying a lot of A32Xneo and 737MAX compared to the Chinese market

      It’s also no wonder that stockpiled Chinese planes are effectively going in large quantities for United Airlines as seen recently. Chinese airlines have adjusted their fleet in quantity of 737MAX (Lucky Airlines 3 MAX instead of 4 MAX for exemple) to go to United Airlines.

      The Chinese companies took advantage that they can cancel the 737MAX not like the Airbus A32Xneo because they are obliged to honor their contract with Airbus while Boeing had a grounding problem because of the faulty first MCAS version while after the Corona- Circus aircraft travel has been deeply affected out there.

      I don’t think for a second here that the Chinese Airlines don’t want the 737MAX, it would still be a demonstration of the absurdity of thinking otherwise.

      No evidence against that…

      Thks

  35. By Rich Smith – May 1, 2023 at 9:55AM

    “..The good news is that Boeing reported its first-quarter financial results on Wednesday, its sales came in ahead of expectations at $17.9 billion, and its stock inched up 0.4% in response. The bad news is… well, pretty much everything else, really.

    Let’s start with earnings. There weren’t any. In fact, Boeing lost $1.27 per share in its first fiscal quarter of the year — $0.20 more than what Wall Street thought it would lose.

    And it wasn’t only just earnings as calculated according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) we’re talking about, either. Boeing’s free cash flow (FCF) for the quarter was pretty miserable, too. Cash generated from operations came in at negative $318 million. Subtract another $468 million for capital spending, and FCF came to negative $786 million — nearly twice the reported $425 million net loss.

    For those keeping track, this was Boeing’s third straight money-losing quarter (and Boeing has lost money in eight of its last 10 quarters). It also marked a reversion to negative FCF after Boeing had put together back-to-back positive FCF quarters in last year’s second half. (Boeing generated negative FCF in seven of its last 10 quarters, according to data from S&P Global Market Intelligence)..”

    https://www.fool.com/investing/2023/05/01/boeing-burns-cash-loses-money-but-investors-buy/

    So Boing really is a “Cash Gusher!”- but the cash is going the wrong way, it seems. I love the “we’ll really show ’em.. later on” rhetoric from the author, too.

    show me, don’t tell me, because talk is cheap.

    • Some other commenter here summed it up a few weeks ago by saying:

      “At Boeing, we make a loss on every plane…but we make up for it in volume”
      🙈

      • Was it the same commenter who had previously said that that
        makes sense; i.e., he was not speaking tongue in cheek?

        😉

        • As I recall, it was @Bilbo who said it — and he appears to be a realist.
          But you may be correct: perhaps a gullible BA Back Office agent also put out the same message 😉

          • I think it was one of the more fanciful BDCT folks, if I’m remembering correctly.

  36. “The Motley Fool” Analysis is only to fill the lines in the manner of journalists

    It is ridiculous to mock Boeing investors that they would actually be fooled by Boeing executives

    As I said last Time,
    we are not in a movie thriller

    Historically, Boeing has handed out a huge amount of cash to shareholders. Besides, it was the main argument of the Boeing haters on the forums.

    Boeing’s shareholder value at closing last Friday was $205…

    Thanks,

    • Motley Fool is a very respected investor site.
      Shareholders are interested in the future — not the past.
      Share price is meaningless when a company has over-bloated PE and PB ratios.

      Ask the investors in First Republic bank about that 😉

      • You cannot compare a bank with Boeing. The latter has products in his portfolio from the present but also for the future.

        The 737MAX crossed the desert for almost 3 years, the most difficult is behind. There’s a lot of delivery out there, The 787 Dreamliner also has a huuuuge backlog for the future.

        For the portfolio they also have for the future Wizz the heavy and autonomous taxi that can transport up to 4 people.

        There is also in the portfolio the Next Demonstrator for a potential replacement of the 737MAX which should if all goes well fly around 2028.

        There have also been EcoDemonstrators for 10 years and this year another “Explorer”, for the very first time, this will join the program.
        This intensification demonstrates the Boeing BCA desire
        to want to contribute to innovating for fuel economy and reducing the carbon footprint when the time comes on existing aircraft (737MAX, 787 or 777X) or even on potential all new program aircraft during the 2030s.

        The Cascade App assisted by A.I. to reduce the carbon footprint was also presented during the Paris Air Show ’22.

        The Motley Fool perhaps should have taken this into account and that there It’s no coincidence that investors and shareholders are still so interested in Boeing today.
        Let’s say that the situation is no more alarming than in 2020, it is clearly much better and will have been a temporary crisis.

        No really the shareholders are very careful where they put their money, contrary to what we hear it’s not a thriller movie where the villains of the C-suite and the CEO would be like Emperor Palpatine in Star Wars movie.

        No, I really think that today the challenge is to offer products in the portfolio whose shareholders are the catalysts. It should also be noted that all these products are the result of an obvious strategic repositioning after the cancellation of any new program that would come into service between 2028-2030 (New development effort and NMA).

        When a new environmental and technological context will be there for a new aircraft to be enter into service around 2035, it would certainly be launched.

        A new program could be supported as when former CEO J. Mc Nerney (2005-2015) distributed a lot of money to shareholders between 2012 and 2014 and also encouraged shareholders to invest and then started to talk about NMA from 2014, because the context was still favorable long before the failure of the 737MAX and all the negative fallout,
        the launch of the A321XLR,
        RR engines which comes out of the competition for propelling the NMA, the Corona Circus and Ukrainian crisis…

        Thanks

        • “You cannot compare a bank with Boeing”

          Of course you can.
          Both are/were publicly traded companies with distressed financials, attendantly over-priced shares, and a following of investors who are/were uninformed and/or gullible w.r.t. future potential.

          • Let’s say that the First Republic Bank situation is a godsend to assert a certain pious wish by a “straw man” argument to announce “Armageddon”..
            We have already heard that one…

            I’ve argued before that a US export economic player like Boeing simply couldn’t fall. If you have fun playing the new prophets of modern times, then treat yourself..

  37. David Pritchard wrote:

    “April 28, 2023
    and who said Airbus didn’t “win” this tanker competition
    Boeing’s tanker losses top $7 billion
    https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/04/27/boeings-tanker-losses-top-7-billion/

    I’ve always maintained that given that AB & BA are locked into a duopoly, it’s pretty close to a zero sum game. No, I’m not claiming to be a game theory expert, but in this scenario it’s sometimes better to walk away from a deal and let the other guy struggle to make a buck off of it, than putting yourself at risk.

    We’ve seen this with the KC-46. We’re also seeing this with the A330Neo vs the 787.

    Boeing have some 1,500 total orders on the program. About 1,000 have been delivered and it has cost the company dearly. Airbus reported spent $2 billion developing the A330Neo. Boeing wrote off $3.5 billion a couple of years ago, has had abnormal production costs of another couple of billion and have a huge deferred production balance sitting in inventory.

    If Airbus sold ZERO A330Neo’s, they are still in a better position in the niche, than Boeing is. They would lose $2 billion, while Boeing is working on $6 billion and counting. Airbus have ~300 orders, which translates to having to cover about $7 million in margin per airframe, to cover development costs.

    ——————————————————-

    I don’t want to crowd this post with subjects, but this raises an interesting engineering point, of which other are better placed to comment on;

    Boeing engineers are not stupid. Neither are the Airbus guys. But how far do you push the design envelope before it becomes too much?

    Look at recent history.

    737 Max. Pushed the design too far. Cost billions.

    787. Tried to do too much in one go. Cost billions.

    777X. Development pushed back after a series of missteps. Cost billions.

    KC-46. Severely underbid the program to get it. Cost billions.

    Sometimes you gotta know where the edge is, go right up to it – without crossing over and walk away, when the other guy jumps with both feet.

    • Same probably applies to the recent Saudi deal, which isn’t finalized yet.

      Can you imagine the bargaining that’s going on? BA urgently needs to receive the order deposits so as to dress up Q2 cashflow, so the Saudis can just sit back, relax, and watch BA continually jack up the discounts. 60.8% is a given (has become a sort of floor in recent deals), but the Saudis are probably aiming for much more — Ryanair got 69%, for example.

      Not so sure that AB is “missing out”.

      • 1) This is just seems surreal, 69% off for Rayan Air?

        There is absolutely nothing that obliges Boeing to do it at this point. Ryan Air is a long-time customer.

        They have an economic model that destroys competition. To do this, they bet on a single fleet through a single “platform”(737NG/MAX) to save even more.

        Boeing knows very well that Ryan Air so badly needs 737MAX.

        Without sources,
        i cannot accept this one.
        Sorry.

        2) The 787 Dreamliner clearly outsells the A350. Although there is (perhaps) a possibility of negotiation between the Saudi Kingdom and Boeing,
        It remains impossible to order such a substantial A350.

        In all circumstances, the 787 Dreamliner wins the battle…

        (!) Saudi airlines set to benefit economically from single pilot hub for most fuel-efficient and one of the most advanced aircraft
        introduced more than a decade ago…

        • “The 787 Dreamliner clearly outsells the A350. Although there is (perhaps) a possibility of negotiation between the Saudi Kingdom and Boeing,
          It remains impossible to order such a substantial A350.

          In all circumstances, the 787 Dreamliner wins the battle…”

          While there is some overlap between the A350 and 787 families, the lower end of the 787 doesn’t compete directly with the A350. See the growing number of airlines operating both 787 and A350s.

          What does “order such a substantial A350” even mean?

          If the 787 beats the A350 “in all circumstances”, one can only wonder how good is Airbus sales team to sell nearly a thousand and make a profit doing it.

          • Yah,

            Checklist entirely missed the point.

            Once again, let’s head to the financials:

            During the fourth quarter of 2021, we determined that estimated costs to complete the 787 program plus costs already included in 787 inventory exceed estimated revenues from the program. The resulting reach-forward loss of $3,460 was recorded as a reduction to deferred production costs”

            “$9,881 of 787 deferred production costs, unamortized tooling and other non-recurring costs are expected to be recovered from units included in the program accounting quantity that have firm orders, and $4,530 is expected to be recovered from units included in the program accounting quantity that represent expected future orders. ”

            “We expensed abnormal production costs of $1,240 and $468 during the years ended December 31, 2022 and 2021.”

            “Cumulative abnormal costs recorded through March 31, 2023 totaled $2.1 billion, and we continue to expect to incur up to $2.8 billion with most being incurred by the end of 2023.”

            Every 787 that Boeing sells is at a loss, plain and simple. Outsell the A350? Sure. Great. It’s costing them billions to do so. About $7 billion in write offs, in recent years.

            They’re also hoping for a bunch of new orders, sometime in the future, to avoid another $4.5 billion write off.

            So the 787 is beating the A330Neo in that niche. Great!

            It’s killing the company to do so…

          • @ Frank
            You don’t actually believe that it reads other peoples’ comments here, do you?

            It merely pounces on trigger words — missing the point is a foregone conclusion 🙈

  38. Frank

    …”Look at recent history.

    737 Max. Pushed the design too far. Cost billions.

    787. Tried to do too much in one go. Cost billions.

    777X. Development pushed back after a series of missteps. Cost billions…”

    ——

    Pretty interesting quote but you’re only looking at part, Frank (Boeing) story, NOT the whole (Airbus) story and that’s the problem.

    1. Airbus had also pushed the A320 cockpit design/New piloting philosophy too far too far, at the end of the 1980s. Results, 3 consecutive crashes in 6 years (1988-1990-1992). Strangely, it cost Airbus nothing. We had also seen the A380 pushed too far into gigantism. An Airbus executive in 1999 claimed “Making it bigger than the A3XX made no sense”, when already the size itself was meaningless. While at Airbus they had fun saying that they had a “bigger” one than their competitor, Boeing was already thinking about efficient twin engines after the EIS of the 777, which will give birth to the Sonic Cruiser then the 787 Dreamliner.

    Even the 767-400ERX /-300LRX, (767LR program)
    an “aNiMAl” / “NMA proxy – 7E7” even went into the wind tunnel in 2000 and were planned to be powered by Alliance Engine, the same engine of the A3XX, to fly further than the 767-400ER/-300ER

    So factually Boeing were very active for efficient twin engines animals compared to the Airbus vision.

    10 years after the launch of the 787,
    the NMA/797 was on its way to flying efficiently over distances of 4,200-5,200 Nm in a period when the 747 and A380 were retiring today (2020 decade).

    2. The error of the 787 was to want to outsource too much since the beginning of the program (2003). It cost Boeing dearly and it’s also a reason that they don’t want to take too many risks yet with the NMA/797.
    I think the 787 has frustrated Boeing a lot and now Arlington wants to see things forward for the future.

    I am convinced that when the rear section problems of the 737MAX are solved things will be better.
    We had seen an event 4 weeks ago where Boeing had delivered more aircraft than Airbus (its closest competitor) since 2018.
    So I think the best will be in next months.

    Thanks

    • “We had seen an event 4 weeks ago where Boeing had delivered more aircraft than Airbus (its closest competitor) since 2018.”

      Pity BA didn’t make a profit from that, isn’t it? The company lost $4.73M for each plane delivered.

      Meanwhile, AB has overtaken BA again where April deliveries are concerned.

      • Sonic Cruiser? NMA? 7E7? 797? Alliance Engine? Wind tunnels?

        Word salad deflection and obfuscation.

        Who cares? I deal in RESULTS.

        ————————————————————————-

        “We had seen an event 4 weeks ago where Boeing had delivered more aircraft than Airbus (its closest competitor) since 2018.”

        The only factual thing he said. He is correct. 130 to 127. Bravo. Well done.

        “So I think the best will be in next months.”

        OK. I guess we’ll see next quarter.

        • Word salad?

          Many may overlook the two philosophies between Boeing and Airbus. Back to the context please, Airbus has bet everything on the A380 and its competitor on other things in the making since the end of the 90s until the launch of the 7E7 in 2003, which was the conclusion of all that and beyond

          No problem with the facts I hope?

          • Maybe you should stick to posting on VV where that kind of nonsense is appreciated?

      • It was a twist to Boeing’s disadvantage. The Boeing haters can keep spitting on it indeed.

        But I think that for the theatrics this will suffice…

        Time will tell

        • Do you ever put the bottle down?
          Even for just a few minutes?

      • As we saw in the case of BA’s brief increase in deliveries in Q1 😏

      • I agree with you…

        However, it is quite symbolic that since 2018 there have not been so many deliveries for the 737MAX. And since the worst is behind us and there are problems in the supply chain at Airbus, nothing is decided yet.
        If the problem of the rear fuselage section of the 737MAX is resolved then why shouldn’t the prospects be better for Boeing? There was my point.

        Thanks

        • “…since the worst is behind us…”

          Really?
          121 BA cancellations since Dec 1 — most of them MAXs — all cancelled penalty-free.
          Including 3 Chinese carriers.

          • That is a boon!

            they can now sell them to fairer customers 🙂

          • @UWE

            Since Boeing loses money on every delivery, the fewer planes they have to deliver, the less money they lose.

            I think I can see the plan!

    • “1. Airbus had also pushed the A320 cockpit design/New piloting philosophy too far too far, at the end of the 1980s. Results, consecutive crashes in 6 years (1988-1990-1992). Strangely, it cost Airbus nothing. ”

      Repeating that tired old set of stories doesn’t increase its truth levels.

  39. ‘Boeing T-7A Red Hawk Trainer Jet Delayed Again, Now Targeting IOC In 2027’:

    “The troubled saga of the Boeing T-7A Red Hawk, the aircraft expected to replace the obsolete T-38C, continues with yet another delay. In fact, according to U.S. Air Force’s Service Acquisition Executive Andrew Hunter, the new advanced trainer jet won’t achieve the Initial Operational Capability until early 2027, a year later than the latest projection after the milestone was first moved from the original 2024 target.

    The delay is caused by the postponement of the Milestone C decision, as the beginning of the low-rate initial production had to be delayed because of issues discovered in early flight testing, now solved, and others discovered during testing of the ejection seat. Because of the latter, flight testing by Air Force pilots had to be delayed too, as the jet did not qualify for the Military Flight Release yet.

    “Due to issues discovered in the early development and test phase of the program, the Air Force is delaying its Milestone C decision to initiate the buy of T-7A production aircraft”, said Hunter in April. “By extension, this will shift the T-7A program’s initial operational capability (IOC) into the spring of 2027. We are pursuing risk reduction activities to mitigate some of these schedule challenges.”..”

    https://theaviationist.com/2023/05/02/boeing-t-7a-red-hawk-delayed-again/

    stellar

    • Amazing!
      So that means that 50 Chinese MAXs are back in the air.
      That’s half the number of ARJ-21s in service.

  40. @Stealth66

    “…Maybe you should stick to posting on VV where that kind of nonsense is appreciated?..”
    —-

    Lol !

    Take my word for it. VV, has neither the monopoly of the analysis and even less the monopoly of the failure of the A380. Lol!!! Boeing took care of doing it for him long before VV.

    So see the factual reminders that I make are not word salads.

    But many are just ignorant of the past or have selective memory unfortunately. Know sir that my analyzes belong to me alone.

    In the end, no one has any influence on me…

  41. Stealth66

    …”While there is some overlap between the A350 and 787 families, the lower end of the 787 doesn’t compete directly with the A350…”
    —-

    The lower end of the 787 certainly,
    But the share of 787-8 (~350 orders) and 787-10 (~200 orders)
    are lower than 787-9 orders
    which the latter dominates and defies all competition.
    But I pretty much agree with you.

    …”See the growing number of airlines operating both 787 and A350s…”
    —–
    Alas I fear that this is not an argument. Operating two aircraft does not indicate the same amount in the fleet. Otherwise the 777-X would have sold as much as the A350?
    (If I understood your point correctly…)
    —-
    …”If the 787 beats the A350 “in all circumstances”, one can only wonder how good is Airbus sales team to sell nearly a thousand and make a profit doing it…”
    —-
    The A350 is great too.
    I relativized compared to the arguments of Bryce who seems to argue that the won order of the 787 did not depend (exclusively?) on the agreement between Boeing and the Saudi Kingdom.
    I agree with this possibility but the order could have been a majority of 787 if there was the A350 as many companies operating a lot of 787.

    That was my point…

    —-

    Frank

    …”Once again, let’s head to the financials:..”

    …”It’s killing the company to do so…”

    Boeing was killed that’s it?
    I didn’t know Armageddon was in the papers,

    Seriously, what I’m saying to Bryce means just as much to you.
    Boeing will not disappear as I explained…

    Thanks

    • Getting your tenses mixed up again?
      Frank said “is killing”…that’s not the same as “was killed”.

    • you.
      “Boeing will not disappear as I explained…”

      Which
      That survival will not be due to commercial success but to intervention.

  42. Patrick Smith- Ode to the 757:

    “WHAT BOEING NEEDS to build isn’t a fancy new long-range widebody. What it needs to build is a replacement for the 757. (…)

    ..With the 737, Boeing took what essentially was a regional jet — the original 737-100 first flew in 1967, and was intended to carry a hundred or so passengers on flights of around 400 miles — and has pushed, pushed, pushed, pushed, and pushed the thing to the edge of its envelope, over and over, through a long series of derivatives, from the -200 through the -900 and now onward to the 737 MAX. In other words, it has been continuously squeezed into missions it was never really intended for.

    The 737’s range allows cross-country pairings, but transoceanic markets are mostly out of the question. It carries fewer passengers and less cargo than a 757, and at heavy weights it is often altitude-restricted. For a jet of its size, it uses huge amounts of runway and has startlingly high takeoff and landing speeds. The cockpit, architecturally unchanged from the 707, is incredibly cramped and noisy. The “Frankenplane,” I call it. I don’t care how many changes and updates the plane has undergone; at heart, it’s still a blasted 737 — a 55 year-old design trying to pass itself off as a modern jetliner.

    I was jammed into the cockpit jumpseat — more of a jump-bench, actually — on an American Airlines 737-800 not long ago, flying from Los Angeles to Boston. Man, if we didn’t need every foot of LAX’s runway 25R, at last getting off the ground at a nearly supersonic 165 knots, then slowly step-climbing our way to cruise altitude. What would it have been like in the opposite direction, I wondered — a longer flight, from a shorter runway, in the face of winter headwinds?

    By contrast, I recently piloted a 757 on a flight from Boston to San Francisco. At flaps 20, and even with a de-rated thirst setting, we lifted off at a docile 130 knots from Logan’s stubby, 7000-foot runway 9, with nearly half the runway still remaining! With every seat full and seven hours’ worth of fuel, we climbed directly to 36,000 feet and flew all the way to California. That’s performance..”

    https://askthepilot.com/ode-to-the-757/

    • “Boeing has gone through the reworking procedures, including the captured fuselages in its factory and finished airplanes which need the fins removed, the CEO said.”

      • “The manufacturer has since defined all the work scopes needed, and now aims to “get more efficient in the process of doing that reworking.”

        “The additional work will affect Boeing’s 737 aircraft delivery timelines over the next several months, as production is contingent on fuselage availability. The company expects lower production levels in the near-term, before increasing its rate to 38 deliveries per month later this year. ”

        ***

        Would BA be sending cash and resources to Spirit if the issue were Spirit’s fault…?

  43. I wonder how many 737MAXs will need the vertical stabilizer removed to effect this repair.

    winning

    • Good point, do they need to do a “recall” for those aircraft delivered to airlines or do the airlines make the repair?

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