Exhibit	Description	ECF Pages
1	Proposed Amended Complaint	2-47
2	Redline of Proposed Amended Complaint Against Original Complaint, Dkt. 1	48-100

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF EXHIBITS

Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3720 Page 2 of 100

Exhibit 1

С	ase 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/2	2/21 PageID.3721 Page 3 of 100
1 2 3 4 5	Alan K. Brubaker (SBN 70298) Ian R. Friedman (SBN 292390) WINGERT GREBING BRUBAKER & JUSKIE One American Plaza, Suite 1200 600 West Broadway San Diego, CA 92101 (619) 232-8151	LLP
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14	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
15 16	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
17 18	WAGNER AERONAUTICAL, INC.; MAMMOTH FREIGHTERS LLC; WILLIAM WAGNER; and WILLIAM TARPLEY,	Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS
19	Plaintiffs,	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
20 21	v. DAVID DOTZENROTH; SEQUOIA AIRCRAFT	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
22	CONVERSIONS, LLC; CAI CONSULTING LTD.; CHARLES WILEY DOTZENROTH;	
23	JOHN TOMBLIN, in his official capacity as	
24	Executive Director of NIAR; DAVID JONES, in his official capacity as Director of NIAR WERX;	
24 25	Executive Director of NIAR; DAVID JONES, in his official capacity as Director of NIAR WERX; RONALD TOWRY, in his official capacity as Chief Engineer of NIAR; ERIC KIVETT, in his	
24	Executive Director of NIAR; DAVID JONES, in his official capacity as Director of NIAR WERX; RONALD TOWRY, in his official capacity as	

Plaintiffs Wagner Aeronautical, Inc.; Mammoth Freighters LLC; William Wagner; and William Tarpley allege:

NATURE OF ACTION

1. This case concerns theft, deception, and the unjust profiting through the skill, knowledge, and hard labor of others. Defendants David Dotzenroth; Sequoia Aircraft Conversions, LLC; CAI Consulting Ltd.; and Charles Wiley Dotzenroth (collectively, "Dotzenroth Defendants") stole valuable, confidential and proprietary information belonging to Plaintiffs. Dotzenroth Defendants gave that information to Defendants John Tomblin, David Jones, Ronald Towry, Eric Kivett, and John Does 1-99 (collectively, "NIAR Defendants") – all employees of the National Institute for Aviation Research ("NIAR") at Wichita State University. The information pertained to a program for converting large passenger aircraft into cargo freighters. NIAR Defendants knew that information was stolen. As NIAR Defendants were aware, David and Wiley Dotzenroth had no engineering expertise or prior experience developing conversion programs.¹ Wagner and Tarpley had shared information about their conversion program with Dotzenroth, who had promised to secure funding and investment for the program. But Dotzenroth requested an outsized ownership stake in Plaintiffs' program relative to his minimal (if any) contributions. When Plaintiffs refused that request, Dotzenroth and Wiley stole Plaintiffs' work and gave it to NIAR Defendants. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants then partnered with the Kansas Modification Center ("KMC") to launch a competing conversion program.

2. The misappropriated information includes a detailed business plan, a budget and schedule roadmap, an engineering strategy, a preliminary engineering design, and a marketing strategy that required an investment of thousands of hours of time and over a million dollars in resources to prepare. Plaintiffs have filed this suit to right Defendants'

¹ As used in this Complaint, "Dotzenroth" refers to David Dotzenroth. Charles Wiley Dotzenroth is referred to as "Wiley Dotzenroth" or "Wiley."

wrong and ask that this Court enjoin all Defendants' direct and indirect use of the stolen
 information. Plaintiffs also request that the Court award compensatory damages in an
 amount to be determined and punitive damages in excess of \$50 million against Dotzenroth
 Defendants based on Defendants' outrageous conduct.

3. Plaintiff Mammoth Freighters LLC ("Mammoth" or "Mammoth Freighters") is developing a passenger aircraft conversion program – designed by Plaintiff Wagner Aeronautical, Inc. ("Wagner Aeronautical") – that takes passenger aircraft and modifies them to carry cargo for the world's leading air freight companies. The co-CEOs of Mammoth are Plaintiffs William Wagner ("Wagner") and William Tarpley ("Tarpley"), two pioneers in the passenger-to-freighter aircraft conversion industry. Wagner – the founder and president of Wagner Aeronautical – has decades of engineering experience crafting successful conversion programs that have received the requisite Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") certifications. Likewise, Tarpley – the business lead for Mammoth's conversion program – has managed numerous aircraft conversion programs during his multi-decade career.

4. When Wagner and Tarpley began work on the conversion program, they asked Defendant David Dotzenroth – a long-time friend with connections in the financial industry but who had little or no aircraft conversion engineering expertise or project management experience – if he would be interested in exploring the possibility of a collaboration whereby Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical would contribute the engineering expertise; Tarpley would contribute project management expertise and marketing expertise to attract potential clients; and Dotzenroth would secure investment capital to fund the development of the conversion program.

5. For years, Dotzenroth learned the most confidential, proprietary, and critical details and strategies that Wagner and Tarpley were formulating to make the conversion program a market leader and success. This included a business plan, a budget and schedule roadmap, an engineering strategy, and a marketing strategy. Wagner and Tarpley – not Dotzenroth – created these materials, in which they and the Wagner Aeronautical

engineering team invested thousands of hours and over a million dollars in resources.
 These materials were derived in part from more detailed engineering schematics and
 analyses prepared by Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical – again, without contribution from
 Dotzenroth, who is not an engineer and who lacked the technical know-how to develop a
 conversion program.

6. Wagner and Tarpley took steps to ensure that the business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and other materials they prepared remained confidential. When they shared those documents and that information with Dotzenroth, they did so with the understanding – shared by Dotzenroth – that the information was proprietary and would remain confidential. Dotzenroth encouraged Tarpley to add a "copyright insignia" and a "proprietary" label to some of the documents. Dotzenroth also insisted on signed non-disclosure agreements ("NDAs") before disclosure of the materials to other third parties.

7. While Wagner and Tarpley produced a plan for a best-in-class conversion program, Dotzenroth failed to secure funding for the conversion program or contribute in any meaningful way to the conversion program itself.

8. Instead of formalizing their collaboration, the trio broke apart when Wagner and Tarpley refused – because of Dotzenroth's meager contributions – to grant Dotzenroth the sizeable ownership stake in the conversion program that he had demanded.

9. Almost immediately, Dotzenroth began searching for new partners under the banner of his own entity, Sequoia Aircraft Conversions ("Sequoia"). Rather than approach new partners with his own program and business plan – which would have cost millions of dollars to develop, would have required engineering expertise and project management experience that Dotzenroth lacked, and would have taken several years to complete – Dotzenroth simply pitched to potential partners the confidential and proprietary business plan and materials developed by Wagner and Tarpley. One such partner was NIAR. NIAR became the willing recipient of the proprietary information that Dotzenroth had stolen from Plaintiffs. That confidential, proprietary information included technical information, such

as estimated build schedules, estimated specifications, and manhour labor estimates. It
 also included financial information, such as cost and revenue estimates.

10. Rather than working to develop their own business plan, Defendants used Wagner and Tarpley's confidential and proprietary information to accelerate the development of their program and speed their market entry. In a matter of months, NIAR Defendants and Dotzenroth Defendants – who had never before developed a conversion program – put together materials and a plan that had taken Wagner and Tarpley – who had decades of conversion know-how and expertise – over a year to create. Defendants then used those materials to secure investment for their competing conversion program through a new entity that would own that program.

11. In September 2020, Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR publicly launched their conversion program as a venture among NIAR, Sequoia, and Kansas Modification Center ("KMC"). NIAR's role is to design the program, handle the engineering, and perform the conversions, while Sequoia would market the program to potential customers. In doing so, NIAR, NIAR Defendants, and Dotzenroth Defendants are wrongfully using trade secrets and proprietary information that belong to Plaintiffs.

12. Defendants and NIAR are, at a critical time, unfairly competing against Plaintiffs for deals with potential business partners and potential customers for their conversion program, including some of the biggest names in air cargo. All the while, Dotzenroth and Sequoia are falsely representing that they own the intellectual property that comprises the conversion program and that Dotzenroth developed the program through his own expertise and knowledge.

13. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer both damages and irreparable harm due to Defendants' wrongful conduct. Specifically, Defendants have benefitted from the valuable work they have stolen, wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs of their competitive edge, and harmed Plaintiffs' relationships in the conversion industry, including with potential customers.

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14. This seven-count Complaint alleges claims against the Dotzenroth
 Defendants for: misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act,
 misappropriation of trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, false
 advertising under the Lanham Act, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil
 conspiracy. It alleges a claim against NIAR Defendants for misappropriation of trade
 secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act.

PARTIES

15. Plaintiff Wagner Aeronautical is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Escondido, California. Wagner Aeronautical is an aerospace engineering company that was established in 1993 and specializes in developing aircraft conversion programs. For over 20 years, Wagner Aeronautical has been one of the key players in the aircraft conversion industry. Wagner Aeronautical has completed numerous successful conversion programs, all certified by the FAA. It handled the complete conversion for two of the most successful and longest-running passenger jets in aviation history and developed significant portions of the conversion programs for nearly a dozen other aircraft.

16. Plaintiff Mammoth Freighters is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York, New York. Mammoth is developing one of the leading passenger-to-freighter conversion programs. Mammoth is the present owner and/or licensee of the trade secrets and intellectual property at issue in this lawsuit.

17. Plaintiff William Wagner is a resident of California. He is the founder and president of Wagner Aeronautical and a co-CEO of Mammoth Freighters. Wagner is a pioneer of the aircraft conversion industry and is one of the foremost experts on aircraft conversions in the world. Wagner led the team that created the first FAA-approved conversion program for one popular airplane model. He is also a Designated Engineering Representative for the FAA, a certification that permits Wagner to make findings – for the FAA – that engineering data complies with the appropriate airworthiness standards. He developed his know-how and expertise for aircraft conversion through the creation of

numerous conversion programs, including programs for some of the most commercially
 successful passenger aircraft.

18. Plaintiff William Tarpley is a resident of Florida. He is a co-CEO of
Mammoth Freighters and is also the CEO of Creative Conversion Management LLC.
Tarpley is the business lead for Mammoth's conversion program. He has been managing
aircraft conversions for over 30 years. With a degree in aerospace engineering from the
Georgia Institute of Technology, he worked for 20 years at Boeing as a design engineer
and as a program manager for conversion programs. Before partnering with Wagner to
develop Plaintiffs' conversion program, Tarpley had managed several conversion
programs.

19. Defendant David Dotzenroth is a resident of Minnesota. Dotzenroth is the CEO of Sequoia Aircraft Conversions, LLC and the President and CEO of CAI Consulting Ltd. Dotzenroth is also the father of Defendant Charles Wiley Dotzenroth.

20. Defendant Sequoia is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, Sequoia's principal place of business is in Watertown, Minnesota.

21. Defendant CAI Consulting Ltd. ("CAI Consulting") is a Minnesota corporation. On information and belief, CAI Consulting's principal place of business is in Watertown, Minnesota.

22. On information and belief, Defendant Charles Wiley Dotzenroth, also known as Wiley Dotzenroth, is a resident of Minnesota. Wiley Dotzenroth is the son of Defendant David Dotzenroth.

23. Defendant John Tomblin is a resident of Kansas. Tomblin is the Senior Vice President for Industry and Defense Programs at Wichita State University and the Executive Director of NIAR. As described below, Tomblin is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Tomblin, as the Executive Director of NIAR, has the authority to discontinue NIAR's work on any particular program and to order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. 24. Defendant David Jones is a resident of Kansas. Jones is the Director of NIAR WERX at Wichita State University. NIAR WERX is a department within NIAR that provides engineering and other services for aviation companies. NIAR WERX is responsible for designing and implementing NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Jones is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Jones, as the Director of NIAR WERX, has the authority to discontinue and to order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

25. Defendant Ronald Towry is a resident of Kansas. Towry is the chief engineer at NIAR. As NIAR's chief engineer, Towry is responsible for the technical design and development of NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Towry is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Towry supervises and oversees the various engineers and student workers who are responsible for the engineering and technical components of the conversion program. In that capacity, Towry has the authority to discontinue and order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

26. Defendant Eric Kivett is a resident of Kansas. Kivett is a program manager at NIAR with responsibility for NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Kivett is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

27. On information and belief, John Does 1 through 99 are employees of NIAR and students of Wichita State University, whose specific identities are presently unknown to Plaintiffs. John Does 1 through 99 are involved in managing, developing, and implementing NIAR's program. As described below, John Does 1 through 99 are personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets by NIAR.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

28. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, the trade secrets laws of the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 and 1839), and the false advertising laws of the United States (15 U.S.C. §1125). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the asserted state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the federal and state law claims are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy.

29. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they have purposefully directed their activities at the State of California and have purposefully availed themselves of the rights and benefits of the laws of this State and this District. Regarding the allegations in this Complaint, Defendants' one or more acts of misappropriation of trade secrets, false advertising, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy were intentional, were expressly aimed at a company and individual in California (Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner), and caused harm that Defendants knew would be suffered by Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner in California. Dotzenroth met with Wagner and Tarpley in California to begin planning their development of Plaintiffs' conversion program. Jones and Towry also met with Wagner at Wagner Aeronautical's office in California. Throughout the relevant time, Defendants were dealing directly with Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical in California. Additionally, on information and belief, Defendants are competing directly with Plaintiffs

30. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District, a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated in this District, and the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this District. Some of the critical interactions that are the subject of this First Amended Complaint involved Defendants dealing directly with Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner, who are both located in this District. Further,

many of the misappropriated trade secrets were located at Wagner Aeronautical in
 Escondido, California.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. THE PASSENGER-TO-FREIGHTER CONVERSION INDUSTRY

31. The passenger-to-freighter ("P2F") conversion industry converts commercial passenger aircraft into cargo freighters that can be used for shipping and carrying large loads by the world's leading air freight companies. The goal is to engineer modified aircraft that are as spacious, light, and efficient as possible through a detailed, complex process that is quick and cost-effective.

32. A P2F conversion demands extensive know-how and expertise. It requires identification of the specific aircraft model best suited for freighter conversion, creation of a methodology for converting the aircraft, calculation of the most efficient and cost-effective engineering strategy for the conversion, obtaining certification of the conversion from the FAA, and marketing the conversion to potential investors, partners, and customers. This collection of information and know-how is packaged into a "conversion program."

33. Aircraft conversion programs are regulated by the FAA and other international regulatory agencies. Each conversion program must receive a "supplemental type certificate" ("STC") from the FAA, which constitutes FAA approval to modify an aeronautical product from its original design. The STC standards are extremely rigorous and require meticulous planning.

34. Because of the nature and scope of the undertaking, development of an FAAcertified conversion program is labor- and capital-intensive. Conversion companies must spend over 100,000 engineering hours and invest tens of millions of dollars to develop a conversion program that will meet the FAA's requirements. A conversion program begins with years of intense planning to identify the engineering and design modifications necessary to achieve a freighter that maximizes payload and efficiency. Those modifications cover a "nose-to-tail" reconfiguration of the airplane – everything from

modifying the placement of cargo doors and the structure of the floor beams to re-wiring the electrical and other systems. Development of a conversion program entails over 100,000 engineering hours, hundreds of analyses and reports, and hundreds of drawings and schematics. And because the purchase and conversion of a passenger aircraft requires an intensive capital investment, all costs and logistics must be precisely calculated upfront and reflected in the conversion program. Development of the conversion program thus requires extensive financial and cost-modeling expertise as well as deep project management experience.

II. PLAINTIFFS' P2F CONVERSION PROGRAM

A. The Genesis of Plaintiffs' Conversion Program

35. Because P2F conversions are highly-specialized, the aircraft conversion industry has only a few key players with the know-how and expertise to develop and operate conversion programs. Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley are among that handful of players.

36. In or around 2017 or 2018, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth decided to start a conversion program for a specific model of jumbo jet (the "Jumbo Jet") made by one of the world's largest airplane manufacturers (the "Major Manufacturer"). The Jumbo Jet has been highly successful and popular with airlines for over 25 years. Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth met in southern California to discuss their plans. They emphasized the need to keep their business plan and engineering strategy confidential, and all agreed to do so.

37. Each person was to contribute something specific to the effort. Wagner, personally and through Wagner Aeronautical, would provide the engineering expertise for designing and developing the technical aspects of the Jumbo Jet conversion program, drawing on his vast knowledge of the FAA's STC requirements and his experience obtaining STCs for prior conversion programs. Tarpley would provide project management and financial expertise as well as marketing and customer relations. He was responsible for the financial and logistical aspects of the program. With their combined know-how and expertise, Tarpley and Wagner were confident that they could develop the

logistical, engineering, and marketing strategy needed to attract investors, secure
 certification from the FAA, and sell converted aircraft to customers that include the world's
 leading air freight companies. Wagner had done this numerous times over the past 20 years
 and had a unique model to accomplish that objective efficiently and reliably.

38. Meanwhile, Dotzenroth – who lacked expertise and experience with conversion programs – was to secure funding and investment for the conversion program based on Wagner and Tarpley's business plan and experience. Dotzenroth acted individually, and through his company, CAI Consulting.

B.

Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley Develop the Business Plan, the Engineering Strategy, and the Roadmap to Success

39. Wagner, working through Wagner Aeronautical, and Tarpley set to work constructing, detail-by-detail, the foundational plans and strategy for the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including their official business plan as well as a budget and schedule roadmap.

40. The business plan was reflected in PowerPoint slide decks that described the conversion process, outlined a customized development schedule, and delineated a plan for achieving FAA certification. The business plan included specific engineering details about the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including the specific design features, costs, logistics, and planning that would be utilized. The plan also detailed the business case for the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including detailed material costs and labor estimates to convert the aircraft. It detailed the business and marketing strategy and included a plan for contacting potential investors and customers. It described both the financial and functional benefits of the Jumbo Jet conversion program that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley had developed, highlighting unique aspects of their design that provided competitive advantages over other conversion programs. The business plan had multiple iterations, and Wagner and Tarpley customized the plan for meetings with different potential investors or customers.

1 41. The budget and schedule roadmap – at that time, a 15-tab Microsoft Excel spreadsheet – provided a more comprehensive version of the data in the PowerPoints. The 2 roadmap details the building blocks for the conversion program, including revenue 3 4 projections, month-by-month cost estimates, development costs, schedule estimates, the 5 rate of return, program input financing, and staffing inputs. To generate the data in the roadmap (which was ultimately used in the business plan, too), Wagner Aeronautical 6 completed the preliminary design work for the Jumbo Jet conversion, including a 7 specification, drawing tree, main deck cargo pallet layout, a weight analysis, and other 8 9 analyses and feasibility studies. This information is confidential, proprietary, and highly valuable. 10

42. The costs and resources required to create the business plan and roadmap were enormous. Even with over 50 years of combined experience in the conversion industry, Wagner and Tarpley still needed over a year to create the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap for the Jumbo Jet program. Creation of the PowerPoint slide deck and 15-tab Excel spreadsheet required thousands of hours and over a million dollars in resources, which included work by the engineering team at Wagner Aeronautical. Without the advantage of Wagner's and Tarpley's know-how and expertise with previous conversion programs, the costs for compiling this information would have been far greater.

43. Dotzenroth had access to the proprietary information created by Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley. Dotzenroth received emails containing drafts of the business plan, information used for the roadmap, and other important documents and communications related to the business strategy, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy for the conversion program. Dotzenroth also had access to shared folders, including Tarpley's cloud storage folder, that contained copies of those documents and that information. In addition to sharing the business plan and roadmap with Dotzenroth, Wagner and Tarpley also discussed other strategies for the conversion program, including how they intended to approach, and negotiate with specific investors and customers.

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Dotzenroth never had a license or permission to use any of that proprietary information
 outside of his work with Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley.

44. Although Dotzenroth had access to the documents, his contributions to the development of the business plan, the budget and schedule roadmap, and the conversion program were minimal. Dotzenroth lacked any engineering and technical expertise and was not capable of contributing meaningfully on that front. Dotzenroth tried to offer comments on the PowerPoint slide deck and spreadsheets but did so with obsolete versions rather than the most current drafts that Tarpley and Wagner were editing, revising, and updating.

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C. Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley Take Numerous Steps To Protect Their Valuable Proprietary Information

45. The confidential and proprietary information reflected in Plaintiffs' business plan and roadmap is absolutely critical to a successful conversion program – and, for that reason, highly valuable. Those documents prove the commercial viability of the program, pave the way toward FAA certification, and convince investors, commercial partners, and customers that the conversion program is viable. Because conversion programs are extremely capital-intensive and time-intensive, investors, partners, and customers will only commit to provide funding or to purchase aircraft if they are convinced of the economic and engineering feasibility of the program. In that way, the tens of millions of dollars of investment needed to operate a conversion program depends directly on the ability to demonstrate the viability of a program through a business plan and the budgeting and scheduling information contained in the roadmap. Developing the business plan and the budget and schedule roadmap thus permit a particular conversion program to compete with other programs for investment and business and provide a competitive advantage.

46. Given the extraordinary value of their confidential and proprietary
information, Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley implemented numerous
confidentiality protocols. For the information developed at Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner
required his employees to sign NDAs as a condition of their employment. Wagner

Aeronautical computers were locked, such that external devices could not be attached to
 prevent the unauthorized download of information. Wagner Aeronautical's information
 technology personnel also monitor the transfer of information on the company's computer
 system to ensure that information is used properly.

47. Wagner and Tarpley also took individual actions to ensure that the business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and underlying data and work-product remained confidential. Those actions included placing "PROPRIETARY" legends on the materials and only sharing those materials with third parties on a need-to-know basis. The budget and schedule roadmap, in particular, was closely held and was not shared with anyone other than Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, Tarpley, Dotzenroth, and individuals working on their behalf.

48. Potential investors, partners, and customers were routinely required to sign NDAs before receiving access to any of the proprietary and confidential information about the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including the business plan, or otherwise understood and agreed that the information was confidential. The NDAs prohibited the signatories from disclosing or using "Confidential Information," and broadly defined that term to include "know-how, methods, ideas, creations, improvements, works of authorship, materials, processes, inventions, techniques, data, programs, prototypes, source code, tools, patentable materials, trade secrets, sales information, business and marketing plans and strategies, financial information and cost and pricing information." The NDAs further provided that the disclosing parties "would be irreparably damaged and may have no adequate remedy at law" for any unauthorized disclosure.

49. Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth all understood that the Jumbo Jet conversion program work-product – particularly, the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap – were proprietary and confidential information that could not be disclosed outside their group without adequate protections. Indeed, Dotzenroth was one of the most vocal advocates for these protective measures. He repeatedly emphasized to Wagner and Tarpley the need for NDAs before meetings with potential investors and other

third parties. And, in one text message that Dotzenroth sent to Tarpley, he encouraged
 Tarpley to "put a copyright insignia on the bottom" of certain charts "as well as
 proprietary." Thus, Dotzenroth knew and understood that the Jumbo Jet conversion
 program work-product was proprietary and confidential.

D.

Wagner and Tarpley Part Ways with Dotzenroth

50. Toward the end of 2018, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth turned their attention to identifying potential sources of funding for the conversion program. Securing funding for the contemplated conversion program was Dotzenroth's responsibility and his anticipated contribution to the collaboration.

51. Beginning in late 2018, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth began meeting with potential investors and customers. As explained above, participants in such meetings signed NDAs. The business plan slide decks, which were shared with meeting participants, also had a "PROPRIETARY" legend. Dotzenroth, in particular, insisted on such protective measures, and he personally signed these NDAs.

52. Despite several meetings with investors, by the middle of 2019, Dotzenroth had been unsuccessful in securing funding for the Jumbo Jet conversion program. Dotzenroth's fundraising efforts floundered for months. By the middle of 2019, Dotzenroth still had not obtained financing for the program. In May 2019, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth considered ways to formalize their relationship. Up to that point, the three had collaborated in their individual capacities or through the companies that each man owned. In May 2019, Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth and Wagner a draft LLC agreement for a company that would be owned by Tarpley, Wagner, and Dotzenroth to carry out their conversion program through a wholly-owned subsidiary.

53. Tarpley, however, struggled to find a role for Dotzenroth that would justify the one-third ownership interest in the LLC that Dotzenroth had requested. Because Dotzenroth lacked P2F conversion experience and expertise, there were few roles he could fill. And, when Tarpley would suggest certain roles for Dotzenroth, Dotzenroth would

Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3737 Page 19 of 100

1	express hesitancy or reluctance to accept the full scope of responsibilities that Tarpley had
2	proposed.

Group, an aircraft leasing company, but had not yet joined Split Rock Aviation. Welo

Mansell had recently left his job at Aviation Capital

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signed the standard NDA

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55. After the meeting, Dotzenroth hosted dinner at his home for Tarpley, Mansell, and Welo. After Welo left, Tarpley remained to visit with Dotzenroth and Dotzenroth's wife. Dotzenroth and his wife questioned Tarpley about the ownership stake that Dotzenroth would be given in the conversion program. They demanded a full one-third of the ownership, even though Dotzenroth was unwilling to accept significant responsibility and had made only minor contributions – if any, at all – to the development of the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap.

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56. After the meeting,

Notwithstanding Dotzenroth's

failure – yet again – to secure funding, Dotzenroth continued to demand a one-third ownership interest in the LLC. When it became clear Dotzenroth would not receive a one-third share, he stopped collaborating with Tarpley and Wagner around the summer of 2019.

III. DEFENDANTS' SCHEME TO STEAL PLAINTIFFS' PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, COMPETITIVE EDGE, AND CUSTOMERS

A. Dotzenroth Approaches NIAR About a Jumbo Jet Conversion Program Using Plaintiffs' Work

57. After failing to receive the one-third stake in the conversion program that he desired, Dotzenroth set to work pursuing his own Jumbo Jet conversion program. Recognizing that he lacked the technical expertise and means to establish such a program himself, Dotzenroth instead stole the extensive work-product of Wagner and Tarpley, borne of their experience, know-how, and ingenuity as well as thousands of hours of work by them and the Wagner Aeronautical engineering team. Dotzenroth ultimately devised and executed a scheme to use Tarpley's and Wagner's proprietary information for his own advantage and benefit.

58. Dotzenroth began searching for a new partner to pursue his own Jumbo Jet conversion program. He found that partner in NIAR, which, through NIAR Defendants, willingly and knowingly accepted the work that Dotzenroth had stolen from Plaintiffs and which eagerly used that work to develop, launch, and implement a competing conversion program in concert with Dotzenroth Defendants. At no time did Plaintiffs consent to the Dotzenroth Defendants' disclosure of, or the NIAR Defendants' receipt or use of, Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential information.

59. In or around late October or early November 2019, Dotzenroth approached NIAR about establishing a Jumbo Jet conversion program. Almost immediately, Dotzenroth began sending NIAR information that he had stolen from Plaintiffs. On November 6, 2019, Dotzenroth emailed Defendant David Jones, telling Jones: "I'm going to piece meal some educational data to you while we pull financial investor slides from our presentations before sending technical data." Dotzenroth's email forwarded a prior email that included a line graph comparing the payload-range capability for a Jumbo Jet freighter and two other common aircraft that also serve as freighters. Commentary in the email associated with the line graph explained that the Jumbo Jet converted freighter could

function as a replacement for one of the other common aircraft identified on the graph.
 That email, and the associated commentary, was not Dotzenroth's work. In truth, Tarpley
 had sent that email to Dotzenroth and Wagner, about a year earlier, on November 8, 2018.

60. A few minutes later, Dotzenroth sent Jones another email. This email – which contained no text – simply forwarded an email that included another payload-range line graph entitled "Freighter Analysis: Payload-Range Capability." Like the chart in Dotzenroth's earlier email, this "Freighter Analysis" depicted payload-range curves for a Jumbo Jet freighter and another popular aircraft. It also depicted estimated payload-range curves for different models of a Jumbo Jet that had been converted into a freighter. Dotzenroth had not prepared this chart and did not do the "Freighter Analysis" depicted in the chart. In truth, that analysis was the product of Wagner and Tarpley's efforts. Tarpley had created that chart and then emailed it to Wagner, Dotzenroth, and Wiley Dotzenroth in January 2019.

61. Dotzenroth sent Jones a third email containing Plaintiffs' work on November 6, 2019. That email contained a "build schedule" for the first six converted Jumbo Jet freighters. For each aircraft, the schedule displayed the months within the program during which the conversion would occur, breaking down the build by both in-hanger and out-ofhanger build time. Dotzenroth did not create the build schedule. Wagner and Tarpley had, in fact, done that work in 2018. Drawing on their experience, expertise, and know-how, Wagner and Tarpley estimated the schedule for converting the first six aircraft and used that estimate to produce the build schedule. Tarpley had emailed the build schedule to Dotzenroth on November 2, 2018.

62. Dotzenroth knew this information would be useful to Jones. Dotzenroth did not have the expertise and experience to competently prepare a build schedule for a Jumbo Jet conversion program like the schedule that Dotzenroth emailed to Jones on November
6, 2019. Moreover, Jones knew that Dotzenroth lacked that experience and expertise.

63. Jones knew, or at least had reason to know, that Dotzenroth was not authorized to provide NIAR with that information. The emails had indications that they were

forwarded from someone else and the metadata, for some of the documents, revealed the
 author to be "Bill."

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B.

David and Wiley Dotzenroth Present Wagner and Tarpley's Business Plan to NIAR

64. On November 18, 2019, Dotzenroth sent Jones another email with the "financial investor slides" that Dotzenroth had previously promised to send Jones. Dotzenroth attached a presentation, dated November 16, 2019, entitled "[Jumbo Jet] Converted Freighter Project." The title page of the presentation also included the NIAR logo, and the subsequent slides included information about the competitive viability of the proposed Jumbo Jet conversion program, target weights and specifications for the proposed converted freighter, information about the payload and cargo capacity of the proposed converted freighter, a schematic of the proposed cargo pallet layout for the converted freighter, and a proposed build schedule for the first six converted freighters, among other information.

65. Those slides and that information were Plaintiffs' work. Many of the slides were exact duplicates of slides from versions of Plaintiffs' business plan that Plaintiffs had used when engaging potential investors in 2018 and 2019. One slide even referenced "Mammoth" by name, providing the anticipated cargo capacity for different versions of the "Mammoth" converted freighter.

66.

67. Dotzenroth not only divulged Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information through emails but also through numerous in-person meetings at NIAR. In November 2019, Dotzenroth organized a meeting with NIAR in Kansas to give a presentation about a "new project" that he was working on with his son, Wiley Dotzenroth. Wiley Dotzenroth, at that time, was a 24-year-old recent college graduate. He did not have the experience, expertise, and know-how of Wagner and Tarpley. Interested in harnessing
Wagner's expertise in P2F conversions, and in piggy-backing on the credibility and
reputation of Wagner Aeronautical, Dotzenroth invited Wagner to the meeting in Kansas.
The meeting attendees included executives from NIAR, including Jones and Towry, and
several Kansas state officials. Dotzenroth did not tell Wagner that he had provided Wagner
and Tarpley's work to Jones and others at NIAR.

68. In December 2019, Dotzenroth organized and NIAR hosted another meeting – attended by Tomblin, Jones, Towry, and numerous NIAR engineers – to brief potential partners and investors about Defendants' efforts to develop a conversion program. During the course of that meeting, Dotzenroth and Wiley made a presentation that included confidential, proprietary information of Wagner and Tarpley. On information and belief, Dotzenroth and Wiley falsely represented that they had developed their own conversion program when, in reality, they were simply presenting the conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had developed.

15	69.
16	That slide deck was nearly
17	an exact duplicate of the business plan that Wagner and Tarpley had developed and
18	provided to Dotzenroth in confidence.
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21	, and neither Wiley nor David Dotzenroth told Wagner that
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	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - Case No. 3.21-cv-00994-L-ACS

71. Potential investors also attended the meetings at NIAR in December 2019, including Jim Gibbs, Collis Chandler, and Brian Mackey. Wagner was also invited to participate in the December 2019 meetings. Although Wagner had attended portions of the multi-day December 2019 meetings at NIAR, Wagner was not permitted to attend the business presentation – the same presentation that

a tour of NIAR's facilities.

72. As in November, Dotzenroth did not tell Wagner that he and Wiley would be giving a presentation that was nearly a carbon copy of the business plan that Wagner and Tarpley had created. At no time did Wagner consent to, or authorize Defendants to use Wagner and Tarpley's work product for the purpose of designing, launching, or implementing a conversion program that would compete with Wagner and Tarpley's.


73. NIAR Defendants knew that the information in the Dotzenroths' December 2019 presentation was not the Dotzenroths' own work. David Jones later admitted to Wagner that he knew that Dotzenroth had not developed the program described in the presentations and that the program must have been created by Wagner. Jones further knew that Wagner was not present when the Dotzenroths made their business presentation to Jones and other NIAR employees and that Dotzenroth intentionally excluded Wagner from the presentation. That, too, gave Jones reason to know that the Dotzenroths' use of Wagner and Tarpley's information was not authorized.

C. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants Use Wagner and Tarpley's Proprietary Information To Secure Funding and Develop Their Own Program


74. On information and belief, the Dotzenroths' presentations – copied from versions of Plaintiffs' business plans – induced NIAR Defendants to agree to develop a

Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3743 Page 25 of 100

Jumbo Jet conversion program with Dotzenroth. Almost immediately after the December
 2019 meeting, Defendants began using Plaintiffs' proprietary information – the result of
 over a year of work, thousands of hours of effort, and significant resources – to plan for
 the conversion program.







82.

83. By March 2020, NIAR Defendants and others at NIAR had received from the Dotzenroths extensive proprietary and confidential information concerning Plaintiffs' conversion program. NIAR Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were the source of that information, and also knew, or had reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to share Plaintiffs' proprietary information with them. Yet NIAR Defendants willingly accepted the information anyway and, working with the Dotzenroth Defendants, used it to craft – at an accelerated pace – a plan for a Jumbo Jet conversion program. Indeed, Plaintiffs, with decades of conversion experience, required over a year to create the business plan and roadmap. Jones, Towry, and the other NIAR Defendants had seemingly accomplished that feat in months.

IV. DEFENDANTS CONTINUE TO SEEK INFORMATION FROM TARPLEY, WAGNER, AND WAGNER AERONAUTICAL

84. In or around February 2020, Dotzenroth attempted to enlist Tarpley's assistance for Dotzenroth's conversion program. Dotzenroth contacted Tarpley, saying that he was very excited to share information about a big, new project that Dotzenroth was working on through his new company, Sequoia Aircraft Conversions. Dotzenroth insisted that Tarpley sign an NDA.

85. Dotzenroth showed Tarpley documents that depicted a Jumbo Jet conversion program. Those documents seemed to be based on the information from the business plan that Tarpley had prepared with Wagner. During that meeting, Dotzenroth asked Tarpley if Dotzenroth could develop a conversion program without Wagner. Tarpley answered in the negative, saying Wagner's expertise was necessary.

86. About a week later, Dotzenroth called Tarpley and again inquired whether he could operate a conversion program without Wagner. Tarpley again told Dotzenroth he

would need Wagner's expertise. During this call, Dotzenroth also suggested that he might
 have a job for Tarpley to work on the conversion program. Tarpley turned him down.
 Tarpley did not believe that Dotzenroth would actually enter the P2F market with his own
 conversion program.

87. Dotzenroth was undeterred. In March 2020, Dotzenroth, with NIAR Defendants, sought to enlist Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical to support a conversion program that Dotzenroth would lead. Having continued his discussions with NIAR, Dotzenroth arranged for representatives of NIAR, including Jones, to visit Wagner Aeronautical in Escondido, California.

88. In anticipation of that meeting, Jones on March 3, 2020, sent a proposed agenda and PowerPoint presentation to Wagner

12	Dotzenroth was copied on Jones's email.
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21	Under the guise of exploring a
22	contract with Wagner Aeronautical to perform work for Dotzenroth's conversion program,
23	Dotzenroth and Jones thus sought information proprietary to Wagner's and Tarpley's
24	Jumbo Jet conversion program.

90. In April 2020, Wiley Dotzenroth sent Wagner another PowerPoint
presentation that Sequoia planned to share with a Major Manufacturer. The PowerPoint
presentation described Sequoia's proposed Jumbo Jet conversion program and identified
"Sequoia Conversions" as the "Intellectual Property Owner." That statement was false

because it represented that Sequoia owned the intellectual property for its conversion program. In truth, Sequoia did not own the intellectual property. As both David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth well knew, the Jumbo Jet conversion program had been developed by Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner Aeronautical. Nonetheless, on information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia repeated that false representation to potential partners and customers, including during meetings with Major Manufacturer in late 2020 and early 2021. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia repeated those falsehoods during another meeting with an air cargo operator in early 2021.

91. As of September 2020, Jones, Towry, and NIAR were still in need of Wagner's know-how and expertise. Again, under the guise of discussing a potential contract with Wagner, Jones and Towry arranged to visit Wagner Aeronautical in California on September 15, 2020. In anticipation of that visit, Jones and Towry prepared an agenda that included

Wagner met with Jones and

Towry but did not provide the details of Plaintiffs' business plan or other confidential and proprietary information.

92. At no time did Plaintiffs' consent to NIAR, or anyone at NIAR, using their confidential and proprietary information.

V. NIAR LAUNCHES A CONVERSION PROGRAM WITH SEQUOIA AND KMC

93. On September 29, 2021, NIAR issued a press release announcing the launch of Defendants' Jumbo Jet conversion program. It explained:

Through a new partnership with Sequoia Aircraft Conversions and the Kansas
Modification Center, the National Institute for Aviation Research at Wichita
State University will begin a large-scale entrepreneurial [Major Manufacturer
Jumbo Jet] passenger-to-freighter conversion program.

The program, led by NIAR's Engineering Design and Modification Team (EDM), will focus on the conversion of [Jumbo Jet] passenger aircraft from passenger-transport operations into cargo aircraft to meet the growing e-commerce high-volume freight transportation market.

Sequoia Aircraft Conversions will market the passenger to freighter conversions. Kansas Mod Center will own the STC and license the conversions.

94. KMC was a new entity. Its investors included Jim Gibbs. The investors in KMC received presentations and information that included the proprietary and confidential information of Plaintiffs.

95. NIAR and Dotzenroth Defendants will reap substantial benefits from the conversion program. NIAR signed an agreement with KMC under which NIAR would provide engineering for the program and secure an STC from the FAA. Additionally, NIAR WERX – led by Defendant Jones – will perform the labor necessary to convert the

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aircraft.

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
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FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

97.

Dotzenroth continued to provide NIAR with additional proprietary and confidential information of Plaintiffs to be used in further developing Defendants' program. On January 19, 2021, David Dotzenroth sent three emails to NIAR program manager Eric Kivett. Each email contained information that Dotzenroth had received from Tarpley. Rather than send the emails to Kivett's NIAR email address, Dotzenroth used Kivett's personal Gmail account.

98. The first email contained information and analysis concerning an operating cost comparison for certain freighters, including the Jumbo Jet that Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth in May 2019. The second email contained a discussion of the suitability of different Jumbo Jet models for conversion that Tarpley also sent to Dotzenroth in May 2019. The third email attached a copy of Plaintiffs' business plan that Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth in July 2019. The cover of the business plan thus read "Mammoth Conversion LLC – Proprietary." The plan repeatedly referenced "Mammoth Conversion LLC" throughout and repeatedly mentioned Tarpley, Wagner, and Wagner Aeronautical, which it identified as an Escondido, California-based engineering firm. It included valuable and proprietary information concerning Plaintiffs' conversion program, such as manhour labor estimates, cost estimates, and financial projections.

99. Dotzenroth's emails made clear that he was forwarding information he had received from someone else. One email included a header showing that Tarpley was the original source of the information. And, of course, Dotzenroth did not alter the business plan, which made clear that the document pertained to a conversion program for Mammoth Conversions that was created and led by Wagner and Tarpley. It was obvious that the business plan and other documents originated with Tarpley and Wagner and related to *their* efforts to develop a conversion program, *their* know-how and expertise, and *their* proprietary information.

100. Around the time that Kivett received these documents in January 2021, he was engaged in preparing a presentation for a potential partner with Defendants' conversion program. On information and belief, Kivett used Plaintiffs' proprietary information – the materials that he had received from Dotzenroth – to prepare that presentation. Thus, even as late as this year, Dotzenroth continued to disclose, and NIAR personnel continued to directly use, Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information for their own benefit and to compete against Plaintiffs.



VII. WAGNER AND TARPLEY JOIN MAMMOTH FREIGHTERS LLC TO IMPLEMENT THEIR CONVERSION PROGRAM

102. On December 1, 2020, Wagner and Tarpley became co-CEOs of Mammoth Freighters LLC, an LLC formed to carry out Wagner and Tarpley's Jumbo Jet conversion program.

103. On April 22, 2021, Mammoth Freighters LLC entered into a Conversion Program Development Agreement with Wagner Aeronautical, under which Wagner Aeronautical would, among other services, obtain and maintain an STC for the Jumbo Jet conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had developed, would implement such conversions, and would provide engineering and technical support services in connection with those activities. Under the agreement, Wagner Aeronautical agreed to assign and transfer to Mammoth Freighters all intellectual property rights in work performed under

the development agreement. Wagner Aeronautical also agreed to grant Mammoth
 Freighters a license in any Wagner Aeronautical intellectual property, including trade
 secrets, that Wagner Aeronautical uses in performing work under the development
 agreement.

VIII. DEFENDANTS' SCHEME HAS IRREPARABLY HARMED, AND CONTINUES TO HARM, Plaintiffs

104. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants thus stole Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information to create a conversion program that would compete directly with Plaintiffs and attempt to usurp their market position. Dotzenroth knew that he could not create a competitive conversion program on his own. That is why Dotzenroth tried to recruit Wagner for his program throughout 2019 and 2020, and why Dotzenroth tried to recruit Tarpley in 2020.

105. As a direct result of observing the most critical and valuable confidential details about Plaintiffs' program, the inexperienced and uninformed Dotzenroth knew exactly how to compete against Plaintiffs. During his time working for Wagner and Tarpley, Dotzenroth was exposed to and entrusted with their confidential and proprietary information. Most significantly, he had the highly technical details – engineering, project management, and budget – needed to successfully establish a conversion program. Dotzenroth learned how Wagner and Tarpley built their conversion program, how they developed their engineering strategy, how they proved the competitive advantages of their program, and how they approached and persuaded potential investors and customers.

106. When Wagner and Tarpley refused the substantial ownership stake that Dotzenroth had demanded, Dotzenroth left with Plaintiffs' playbook, gave it to NIAR Defendants, and then used it to form a venture with NIAR Defendants and KMC that would compete directly against Plaintiffs for the same deals with partners and customers. When Dotzenroth began working with Wagner and Tarpley, he lacked the know-how and expertise to develop and operate a conversion program. Suddenly, in less than 18 months after Dotzenroth parted ways with Wagner and Tarpley, Defendants had launched their

own competing conversion program and had secured a partnership with Split Rock
 Aviation.

107. Defendants are continuing to misappropriate and use Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information and are continuing to use Plaintiffs' business and engineering strategy to compete directly against Plaintiffs. Defendants' actions have harmed and will continue to harm Plaintiffs. Those harms include at least the following:

A. Loss of Valuable Proprietary Assets

108. Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary business plan and roadmap has exposed the most critical and valuable parts of Plaintiffs' conversion program to third parties, which alone is damaging to Plaintiffs' business enterprise. Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary business information – including the highly technical, complex information in the PowerPoint and Excel spreadsheet – is a valuable asset. By misappropriating the confidential and proprietary information in Plaintiffs' business plan and budget and schedule roadmap – rather than doing the hard work on their own – Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants received the benefit of valuable information and data that would have been extremely costly to produce in the first instance.

109. At a minimum, Defendants' wrongful acts saved them the millions of dollars, and extensive time, that would have been necessary to develop a business plan and roadmap for their own conversion program. It gave Defendants a huge head start on when they would have been able to credibly compete had they not stolen Plaintiffs' property.

B. Loss of Competitive Advantage

110. Due to Defendants' wrongdoing, Plaintiffs have lost and will continue to lose their competitive advantage in the P2F aircraft conversion market. Before Defendants' theft of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential information, Plaintiffs had an edge over the competitors in the P2F conversion market because of the unique and innovative structure of their conversion program. The unique and innovative features of Plaintiffs' conversion program result from Wagner's and Tarpley's decades of know-how and expertise in the conversion industry. As described in their business plan, Plaintiffs'
 competitive edge included a conversion program that would provide lighter, more
 efficient, and cost-effective aircraft to customers with assurance that Plaintiffs' program
 would receive FAA certification.

111. After Dotzenroth's misappropriation of Plaintiffs' business plan, Defendants have been able to offer a conversion program with those same unique and innovative features to investors, partners, and customers. This has diminished Plaintiffs' unique position and competitive edge in the market.

112. Additionally, Defendants' scheme gave them a significant head start in entering a market with high barriers to entry. Instead of being forced to wait at least a year and spend millions to enter the market, Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants stole Plaintiffs' business plan and roadmap so that Defendants could begin operating in a matter of months.

C. Loss of Potential Customers

113. Due to Defendants' scheme to compete directly against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs stand to lose customers. On information and belief, Defendants have approached potential customers – some of the largest air freight companies – offering their own conversion service and competing directly with Plaintiffs. Without the head start Defendants received after stealing Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, Defendants would not have been able to offer potential customers a conversion service on essentially the same timetable and with the same benefits as Plaintiffs. Without Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information, Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants would have been years behind in their development of Defendants' conversion program.

114. Losing a single customer in the P2F conversion industry can be devastating. First, only a limited number of potential customers exist. The number of aircraft available for conversion is limited, and the vast majority of those are owned by a few large players, in particular a large air cargo operator and two leading express delivery services. Those customers typically purchase all of their converted aircraft from a single supplier, and they enter into long term contracts with the supplier because the conversion and delivery process
 can take several years. Finally, the lifespan of a converted aircraft is long. If a customer
 is lost to a competitor, it could be many years before that customer needs additional
 conversions.

D. Loss of Potential Partners

115. Plaintiffs' relationships with potential business partners have also been jeopardized by Defendants' theft of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information. Defendants can attempt to present themselves as credible partners with others in the P2F industry only because they could advertise a well-developed and thoughtfully executed business plan and roadmap – a feat achieved only because Defendants had unlawfully misappropriated those materials from Plaintiffs.

COUNT ONE

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (18 U.S.C. §1836(b))

(Against Dotzenroth Defendants)

116. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 115 above as though set forth fully herein.

117. Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under 18 U.S.C. §1839. This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

1 118. Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets,
 2 including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade
 3 secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a
 4 "PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and
 5 using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.

maliciously 119. Dotzenroth Defendants intentionally, willfully, and misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to obtain a competitive advantage. Dotzenroth Defendants had access to Plaintiffs' business plan, roadmap, and engineering strategy. Despite recognizing that the information was confidential and proprietary, Dotzenroth Defendants disclosed this information and used it to create their own competing conversion program. Dotzenroth Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to Dotzenroth Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Dotzenroth Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

120. Dotzenroth Defendants have used and will continue to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Dotzenroth Defendants are using Plaintiffs' trade secrets to lure away Plaintiffs' potential customers and partners.

121. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm as a result of Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers, loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.

122. Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. Dotzenroth
Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer
irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining
Dotzenroth Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1836.

COUNT TWO

<u>Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (18 U.S.C. §1836(b))</u> (Against NIAR Defendants)

123. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 122 above as though set forth fully herein.

124. Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under 18 U.S.C. § 1839. This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

125. Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets, including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a "PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.

126. NIAR Defendants intentionally, willfully, and maliciously misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to provide the NIAR/KMC/Sequoia conversion program with a competitive advantage. NIAR Defendants received Plaintiffs' business plan and other proprietary information and data from David and Wiley Dotzenroth, with knowledge, or reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to disclose the information. NIAR Defendants used Plaintiffs' information to develop and implement their own competing conversion program, knowing, or with reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to disclose the information and that the Dotzenroths owed a duty to maintain the secrecy of the Plaintiffs' information or to limit use of that information. NIAR Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch, in a timely manner, a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to NIAR Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

127. NIAR Defendants have used, and will continue to use, Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm as a result of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers, loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.

128. Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining NIAR Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets or from operating, implementing, or otherwise commercializing any conversion program based on, or derived from, the proprietary information that NIAR Defendants misappropriated.

COUNT THREE

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Cal. Civ. Code §3426 et seq.) (Against Dotzenroth Defendants)

129. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 128 above as though set forth fully herein.

130. Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.
This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of

Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

131. Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets, including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a "PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.

132. Dotzenroth intentionally, willfully, Defendants and maliciously misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to provide their conversion program with a competitive advantage. Dotzenroth Defendants had access to Plaintiffs' business plan, roadmap, and engineering strategy. Despite recognizing that the information was confidential and proprietary, Dotzenroth Defendants used that information to create their own competing conversion program. Dotzenroth Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to Dotzenroth Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Dotzenroth Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

133. Dotzenroth Defendants have used and will continue to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Dotzenroth

Defendants are using Plaintiffs' trade secrets to lure away Plaintiffs' potential customers
 and partners.

134. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm because of
Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of
Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers,
loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.

135. Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining Dotzenroth Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets under Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.

COUNT FOUR

<u>False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1125)</u> (Against David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia)

136. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 135 above as though set forth fully herein.

137. David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have made and will continue to make false statements about the authenticity of their conversion program. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have falsely represented that Dotzenroth developed his own Jumbo Jet conversion program, that Sequoia owns the intellectual property underpinning the conversion program, and that Dotzenroth possesses the competence, experience, and expertise to develop and operate Sequoia's conversion program. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have made these false statements to potential customers and business partners, including during meetings with Major Manufacturer in late 2020 and early 2021 and with a major air cargo operator in early 2021.

138. These false statements have influenced, and will continue to influence, the decisions of partners to do business with Dotzenroth Defendants and to exclude Plaintiffs from those deals. Likewise, the false representations about the NIAR/Sequoia/KMC

conversion program will influence the decisions of customers that may choose the
NIAR/Sequoia/KMC conversion program and aircraft over Plaintiffs' conversion program
and aircraft. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia
are advertising to customers, including a major air cargo operator, that they can provide
the same know-how and expertise as Plaintiffs. In truth, David Dotzenroth's and Wiley
Dotzenroth's experience in the aviation industry simply cannot compare to that of Wagner
and Tarpley.

139. By misrepresenting the authenticity of their conversion program, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia are misleading partners and customers about Defendants' qualifications and ability to develop a conversion program.

140. These false statements have deceived and will continue to deceive Sequoia's partners and customers. These deceptive statements are material to these investors, partners, and customers when they are deciding whether to do business with Sequoia, NIAR, and KMC.

141. David Dotzenroth's, Wiley Dotzenroth's, and Sequoia's false statements have harmed Plaintiffs because Defendants' false statements have convinced, and will continue to convince, potential partners and customers to choose Defendants' conversion program and aircraft over Plaintiffs' conversion program and aircraft.

COUNT FIVE

<u>Unfair Competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.)</u> (Against Dotzenroth Defendants)

142. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 141 above as though set forth fully herein.

143. The California Unfair Competition Law defines unfair competition to include any "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" business practice or act. Defendants have unfairly and unlawfully competed directly against Plaintiffs by improperly and unlawfully using Plaintiffs' own business plan, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy to start a competing conversion program and by approaching the same partners and customers as
 Plaintiffs.

144. After misappropriating Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, and after learning the details of Plaintiffs' engineering and marketing strategy, Defendants started a conversion program to compete directly with Plaintiffs' conversion program. With the competing program established, Defendants then sought deals with the same customers and partners as Plaintiffs. Defendants had an unfair advantage against Plaintiffs when they entered the conversion market because Defendants knew Plaintiffs' playbook and how Plaintiffs planned to conduct their business. This unfair advantage has allowed and will continue to allow Defendants to profit from their wrongdoing.

145. Defendants have been enriched by, and have significantly benefited from, their use of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information, including the business plan and the budget and schedule roadmap. Defendants obtained that benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs. They have not compensated Plaintiffs for that information.

146. Because of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be damaged and suffer irreparable harm through the loss of competitive advantage, potential partners, potential customers, and revenue and profits. Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution and injunctive relief for Defendants' violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17203.

COUNT SIX

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

(Against David Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting)

147. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 146 above as though set forth fully herein.

148. Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting had a fiduciary duty to Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley because Dotzenroth was a joint venturer with Wagner and Tarpley while working with them to develop Plaintiffs' conversion program. Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting owed Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner Aeronautical the duty of utmost good faith.

149. Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting breached that duty when Dotzenroth exploited his relationship with Tarpley and Wagner to misappropriate information, workproduct, and intellectual property developed and owned by Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner 3 4 Aeronautical. Dotzenroth then impermissibly used the misappropriated property for his 5 own benefit - without compensating Tarpley or Wagner - to form Sequoia Aircraft Conversions and compete directly with Plaintiffs for conversion customers and other 6 7 business opportunities.

150. Plaintiffs have been harmed by Dotzenroth's and CAI Consulting's breach of their fiduciary duty because Dotzenroth is competing for the same partners and customers as Plaintiffs and gained a head start in entering the conversion market through the breach.

COUNT SEVEN

Civil Conspiracy

(Against David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth)

151. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 150 above as though set forth fully herein.

152. David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth schemed to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy to create a conversion program that would compete directly against Plaintiffs' conversion program. After gaining access to Plaintiffs' trade secrets and learning Plaintiffs' engineering and marketing strategy, David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth conspired to unlawfully misappropriate Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information and trade secrets, to engage in unfair competition against Plaintiffs, and to falsely advertise their conversion program. David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth have taken at least one overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy.

153. Defendants' conduct has harmed Plaintiffs through the loss of Plaintiffs' competitive advantage, potential partners, potential customers, and revenue and profits.

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JURY DEMAND

Under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues triable as such.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, judgment should be entered for Plaintiffs and against Defendants as follows:

(a) finding that Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants misappropriated one or more of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1836(b);

(b) finding that Dotzenroth Defendants misappropriated one or more of
 Plaintiffs' trade secrets, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 3426;

(c) finding that David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia falsely advertised the NIAR/Sequoia/KMC conversion program in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act;

(d) finding that Dotzenroth Defendants engaged in unfair competition against Plaintiffs in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.;

(e) finding that Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting breached their fiduciary duties to Wagner Aeronautical, Inc., Wagner, and Tarpley;

(f) finding that David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth engaged in a conspiracy to misappropriate Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, engage in unfair competition against Plaintiffs, and falsely advertise their conversion program;

(g) injunctive relief against Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants, including preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from using any of Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information and marketing or operating any conversion program based on or derived from that information;

(h) money damages against Dotzenroth Defendants, including
compensatory damages in an amount to be determined and restitution and/or disgorgement
of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits that may have been obtained
by Defendants, and punitive or statutory damages in excess of \$50 million;

С	se 3:21-cv-0	0994-L	-AGS	Docume	nt 117-2	Filed 10)/22/21	PageID.3764	Page 46 of 100
1		(i)	costs	s, includii	ng attorne	eys' fees	8;		
2		(j)	prejudgment interest at the maximum legal rate; and						
3		(k)	such	other and	d further	relief as	this Co	ourt may deem	just and proper.
4									
5	DATED:					Resp	ectfully	y submitted,	
6									
7						By:	<u>/s/</u>		
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
Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3765 Page 47 of 100

Exhibit 2

Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3766 Page 48 of 100

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Ca	se 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS	Document 117-2	Filed 10/22/21	PageID.3767	Page 49 of 100



Plaintiffs Wagner Aeronautical, Inc.; Mammoth Freighters LLC; William Wagner; and William Tarpley allege:

NATURE OF ACTION

1. This case concerns theft, deception, and the unjust profiting through the skill, knowledge, and hard labor of others. Defendants -David Dotzenroth; Sequoia Aircraft Conversions, LLC; CAI Consulting Ltd.; and Charles Wiley Dotzenroth; Andrew Mansell; and Steven Welo-(collectively, "Dotzenroth Defendants") stole valuable, confidential and proprietary information belonging to Plaintiffs. Dotzenroth Defendants gave that information to develop a competing business Defendants John Tomblin, David Jones, Ronald Towry, Eric Kivett, and John Does 1-99 (collectively, "NIAR Defendants") - all employees of the National Institute for Aviation Research ("NIAR") at Wichita State University. The information pertained to a program for converting large passenger aircraft into cargo freighters. NIAR Defendants knew that information was stolen. As NIAR Defendants were aware, David and Wiley Dotzenroth had no engineering expertise or prior experience developing conversion programs.¹ Wagner and Tarpley had shared information about their conversion program with Dotzenroth, who had promised to secure funding and investment for the program. But Dotzenroth requested an outsized ownership stake in Plaintiffs' program relative to his minimal (if any) contributions. When Plaintiffs refused that request, Dotzenroth and Wiley stole Plaintiffs' work and gave it to NIAR Defendants. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants then partnered with the Kansas Modification Center ("KMC") to launch a competing conversion program.

<u>1.2.</u> The misappropriated information includes a detailed business plan, a budget and schedule roadmap, an engineering strategy, a preliminary engineering design, and a marketing strategy that required an investment of thousands of hours of time and millions

¹As used in this Complaint, "Dotzenroth" refers to David Dotzenroth. Charles Wiley Dotzenroth is referred to as "Wiley Dotzenroth" or "Wiley."

COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

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of<u>over a million</u> dollars <u>in resources</u> to prepare. Plaintiffs have filed this suit to right that<u>Defendants'</u> wrong and ask that this Court enjoin <u>all</u> Defendants' direct and indirect use of the stolen information <u>as well as</u>. <u>Plaintiffs also request that the Court</u> award compensatory damages in an amount to be determined and punitive damages in excess of \$50 million <u>against Dotzenroth Defendants</u> based on Defendants' outrageous conduct.

2-3. Plaintiff Mammoth Freighters LLC ("Mammoth" or "Mammoth Freighters") is developing a passenger aircraft conversion program – designed by Plaintiff Wagner Aeronautical, Inc. ("Wagner Aeronautical") – that takes passenger aircraft and modifies them to carry cargo for the world's leading air freight companies. The co-CEOs of Mammoth are Plaintiffs William Wagner ("Wagner") and William Tarpley ("Tarpley"), two pioneers in the passenger-to-freighter aircraft conversion industry. Wagner – the founder and president of Wagner Aeronautical – has decades of engineering experience crafting successful conversion programs that have received the requisite Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") certifications. Likewise, Tarpley – the business lead for Mammoth's conversion program – has managed numerous aircraft conversion programs during his multi-decade career.

<u>3.4.</u> When Wagner and Tarpley began work on the conversion program, they asked Defendant David Dotzenroth ("Dotzenroth") – a long-time friend with connections in the financial industry but who had little or no aircraft conversion engineering expertise or project management experience – if he would be interested in exploring the possibility of a collaboration whereby Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical would contribute the engineering expertise; Tarpley would contribute project management expertise and marketing expertise to attract potential clients; and Dotzenroth would secure investment capital to fund the development of the conversion program.

4.<u>5.</u> For nearly three years, Dotzenroth learned the most confidential, proprietary, and critical details and strategies that Wagner and Tarpley were formulating to make the conversion program a market leader and success. This included a business plan, a budget

and schedule roadmap, an engineering strategy, and a marketing strategy. Wagner and Tarpley – not Dotzenroth – created these materials, in which they and the Wagner Aeronautical engineering team invested thousands of hours and millions of over a million dollars in resources. These materials were derived in part from more detailed engineering schematics and analyses prepared by Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical – again, without contribution from Dotzenroth, who is not an engineer and who lacked the technical knowhow to develop a conversion program.

5.6. Wagner and Tarpley took steps to ensure that the business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and other materials they prepared remained confidential. When they shared those documents and that information with Dotzenroth, they did so with the understanding – shared by Dotzenroth – that the information was proprietary and would remain confidential. Dotzenroth encouraged Tarpley to add a "copyright insignia" and a "proprietary" label to some of the documents. Dotzenroth also insisted on signed non-disclosure agreements ("NDAs") before disclosure of the materials to other third parties.

6.7. While Wagner and Tarpley produced a plan for a best-in-class conversion program, Dotzenroth failed to secure funding for the conversion program or contribute in any meaningful way to the conversion program itself.

7.8. Instead of formalizing their collaboration, the trio broke apart when Wagner and Tarpley refused – because of Dotzenroth's meager contributions – to grant Dotzenroth the sizeable ownership stake in the conversion program that he had demanded.

8.9. Almost immediately, Dotzenroth began searching for new partners under the banner of his own entity, Sequoia Aircraft Conversions ("Sequoia"). Rather than approach new partners with his own program and business plan – which would have cost millions of dollars to develop, would have required engineering expertise and project management experience that Dotzenroth lacked, and would have taken several years to complete – Dotzenroth simply pitched to potential partners the confidential and proprietary roadmap and business plan and materials developed by Wagner and Tarpley. One such partner was

<u>NIAR. NIAR became</u> the National Institute for Aviation Research ("NIAR") at Wichita <u>State University</u>willing recipient of the proprietary information that Dotzenroth had stolen <u>from Plaintiffs. That confidential, proprietary information included technical information,</u> <u>such as estimated build schedules, estimated specifications, and manhour labor estimates.</u> <u>It also included financial information, such as cost and revenue estimates.</u>

9. Notwithstanding his discussions with NIAR, Dotzenroth recognized the significance of Wagner's and Tarpley's expertise, given that Dotzenroth was using their intellectual property. In February 2020, Dotzenroth sought Tarpley's assistance with Sequoia's program. Tarpley refused. In March 2020, Dotzenroth met with Wagner to discuss the conversion program. Wagner also declined to join Dotzenroth's endeavor.

10. Dotzenroth moved forward without Wagner and Tarpley. On September 29, 2020, Sequoia and NIAR announced a partnershipRather than working to develop their own conversion program business plan, Defendants used Wagner and Tarpley's confidential and proprietary information to accelerate the development of their program and speed their market entry. In a matter of months, NIAR Defendants and Dotzenroth Defendants – who had never before developed a conversion program rooted in Wagner's and Tarpley's own work that would compete directly with them. In a matter of months, with no known source of financing or research and development effort, Dotzenroth_ put together materials and a plan that tookhad taken Wagner and Tarpley – who had decades of conversion know-how and expertise – over a year to devise and ancreate. Defendants then used those materials to secure investment of more than \$1 million.

11.<u>10.</u>In launching Sequoia's <u>for their</u> competing conversion program, Dotzenroth enlisted Defendant Andrew Mansell ("Mansell") and Defendant Steven Welo ("Welo"). Mansell and Welo understood the value of Plaintiffs' conversion program because they also had access to Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information.

Less than a year later, Mansell travelled to California to

meet with Wagner to discuss investment in a conversion program. Although Mansell and Welo must have known that Sequoia's conversion program was rooted in Wagner's and Tarpley's efforts, they nonetheless facilitated a funding deal between their investment firm, Split Rock Aviation LLC ("Split Rock Aviation"), and Sequoia. When Split Rock Aviation and Sequoia announced their deal on February 18, 2021, Wagner and Tarpley knew that Defendants had the investment needed to begin approaching potential customers and commercializing the conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had worked so hard to ereate. through a new entity that would own that program.

<u>11.</u> Defendants have repeatedly used Plaintiffs' proprietary intellectual property against them. Dotzenroth and Sequoia have competedIn September 2020, Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR publicly launched their conversion program as a venture among NIAR, Sequoia, and Kansas Modification Center ("KMC"). NIAR's role is to design the program, handle the engineering, and perform the conversions, while Sequoia would market the program to potential customers. In doing so, NIAR, NIAR Defendants, and Dotzenroth Defendants are wrongfully using trade secrets and proprietary information that belong to Plaintiffs.

12. Defendants and NIAR are, at a critical time, unfairly competing against Plaintiffs for deals with potential business partners. And Dotzenroth and Sequoia have been approaching companies identified by Plaintiffs as and potential customers for their conversion program, including some of the biggest names in air cargo. All the while, Dotzenroth and Sequoia are falsely representing that they own the intellectual property that comprises the conversion program and that Dotzenroth developed the program through his own expertise and knowledge.

13. Plaintiffs have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer both damages and irreparable harm due to Defendants' wrongful conduct. Specifically, Defendants have benefitted from the valuable work they have stolen, wrongfully deprived

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Plaintiffs of their competitive edge, and harmed Plaintiffs' relationships in the conversion industry, including with potential customers.

This sixseven-count Complaint alleges claims against the Dotzenroth 14. Defendants for: misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, misappropriation of trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, false advertising under the Lanham Act, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. It alleges a claim against NIAR Defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act.

PARTIES

Plaintiff Wagner Aeronautical is a California corporation with its principal 15. place of business in Escondido, California. Wagner Aeronautical is an aerospace engineering company that was established in 1993 and specializes in developing aircraft conversion programs. For over 20 years, Wagner Aeronautical has been one of the key players in the aircraft conversion industry. Wagner Aeronautical has completed numerous successful conversion programs, all certified by the FAA. It handled the complete conversion for two of the most successful and longest-running passenger jets in aviation history, and developed significant portions of the conversion programs for nearly a dozen other aircraft.

16. Plaintiff Mammoth Freighters is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New York, New York. Mammoth is developing one of the leading passenger-to-freighter conversion programs. Mammoth is the present owner and/or licensee of the trade secrets and intellectual property at issue in this lawsuit.

Plaintiff William Wagner is a resident of California. He is the founder and 17. president of Wagner Aeronautical and a co-CEO of Mammoth Freighters. Wagner is a pioneer of the aircraft conversion industry and is one of the foremost experts on aircraft conversions in the world. Wagner led the team that created the first FAA-approved conversion program for one popular airplane model. He is also a Designated Engineering **1 ‡**

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Representative for the FAA, a certification that permits Wagner to make findings – for the FAA – that engineering data complies with the appropriate airworthiness standards. He developed his know-how and expertise for aircraft conversion through the creation of numerous conversion programs, including programs for some of the most commercially successful passenger aircraft.

18. Plaintiff William Tarpley is a resident of Florida. He is a co-CEO of Mammoth Freighters and is also the CEO of Creative Freighters LLC ("Creative Freighters").Conversion Management LLC. Tarpley is the business lead for Mammoth's conversion program. He has been managing aircraft conversions for over 30 years. With a degree in aerospace engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology, he worked for 20 years at Boeing as a design engineer and as a program manager for conversion program. Before partnering with Wagner to develop Plaintiffs' conversion program, Tarpley had managed several conversion programs.

19. Defendant David Dotzenroth is a resident of Minnesota. Dotzenroth is the CEO of Sequoia Aircraft Conversions, LLC and the President and CEO of CAI Consulting Ltd. Dotzenroth is also the father of Defendant Charles Wiley Dotzenroth.²

20. Defendant Sequoia is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, Sequoia's principal place of business is in Wichita, Kansas.Watertown, Minnesota.

21. Defendant CAI Consulting Ltd. ("CAI Consulting") is a Minnesota corporation. On information and belief, CAI Consulting's principal place of business is in Watertown, Minnesota.

22. On information and belief, Defendant Charles Wiley Dotzenroth, also known as Wiley Dotzenroth, is a resident of Minnesota. Wiley Dotzenroth is the son of Defendant David Dotzenroth.

²-As used above and below, "Dotzenroth" refers to Defendant David Dotzenroth.

COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

23. Defendant Andrew Mansell is a resident of Wisconsin. Mansell is a partner at Split Rock Aviation. Before joining Split Rock Aviation, Mansell was the Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer at Aviation Capital Group ("ACG").

23. On information and belief, Defendant Steven Welo is a resident of Minnesota. Welo is a partner at Split Rock Aviation. Defendant John Tomblin is a resident of Kansas. Tomblin is the Senior Vice President for Industry and Defense Programs at Wichita State University and the Executive Director of NIAR. As described below, Tomblin is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Tomblin, as the Executive Director of NIAR, has the authority to discontinue NIAR's work on any particular program and to order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

24. Defendant David Jones is a resident of Kansas. Jones is the Director of NIAR WERX at Wichita State University. NIAR WERX is a department within NIAR that provides engineering and other services for aviation companies. NIAR WERX is responsible for designing and implementing NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Jones is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Jones, as the Director of NIAR WERX, has the authority to discontinue and to order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

25. Defendant Ronald Towry is a resident of Kansas. Towry is the chief engineer at NIAR. As NIAR's chief engineer, Towry is responsible for the technical design and development of NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Towry is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets. Additionally, on information and belief, Towry supervises and oversees the various engineers and student workers who are responsible for the engineering and technical components of the conversion program. In that capacity, Towry has the authority to

COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Case 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS Document 117-2 Filed 10/22/21 PageID.3776 Page 58 of 100

discontinue and order the cessation of NIAR Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

26. Defendant Eric Kivett is a resident of Kansas. Kivett is a program manager at NIAR with responsibility for NIAR's conversion program. As described below, Kivett is personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

27. On information and belief, John Does 1 through 99 are employees of NIAR and students of Wichita State University, whose specific identities are presently unknown to Plaintiffs. John Does 1 through 99 are involved in managing, developing, and implementing NIAR's program. As described below, John Does 1 through 99 are personally responsible for, and involved in, the misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets by NIAR.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

24.28. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, the trade secrets laws of the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 and 1839), and the false advertising laws of the United States (15 U.S.C. §1125). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the asserted state law claims <u>underpursuant to</u> 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the federal and state law claims are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy.

25.29. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they have purposefully <u>directed their activities at the State of California and have purposefully</u> availed themselves of the rights and benefits of the laws of this State and this District. Regarding the allegations in this Complaint, Defendants' one or more acts of misappropriation of trade secrets, false advertising, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy were intentional, were expressly aimed at a company and individual in California (Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner), and caused <u>harmedharm</u> that Defendants knew would be suffered by Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner in California. Dotzenroth-also met with Wagner and Tarpley in California to begin planning their development of Plaintiffs' conversion program. Jones and Towry also met with Wagner at Wagner Aeronautical's office in California. Throughout the relevant time, Dotzenroth and Wiley DotzenrothDefendants were dealing directly with Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical in California, both for Dotzenroth's venture with Wagner. Additionally, on information and Tarpley and when Dotzenroth formed his own conversion programbelief, Defendants are competing directly with Sequoia. Mansell also travelled to Plaintiffs

Wagner about the

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26.30. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the <u>claimclaims</u> occurred in this District, a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated in this District, and the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this District. Some of the critical interactions that are the subject of this <u>First Amended</u> Complaint involved Defendants dealing directly with Wagner Aeronautical and Wagner, who are both located in this District. Further, many of the misappropriated trade secrets were located at Wagner Aeronautical in Escondido, California.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. THE PASSENGER-<u>toTo</u>-Freighter Conversion Industry

27.31. The passenger-to-freighter ("P2F") conversion industry converts commercial passenger aircraft into cargo freighters that can be used for shipping and carrying large loads by the world's leading air freight companies. The goal is to engineer modified aircraft that are as spacious, light, and efficient as possible through a detailed, complex process that is quick and cost-effective.

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28.32. A P2F conversion demands extensive know-how and expertise. It requires identification of the specific aircraft model best suited for freighter conversion, creation of a methodology for converting the aircraft, calculation of the most efficient and cost-effective engineering strategy for the conversion, obtaining certification of the conversion from the FAA, and marketing the conversion to potential investors, partners, and customers. This collection of information and know-how is packaged into a "conversion program."

29.33. Aircraft conversion programs are regulated by the FAA and other international regulatory agencies. Each conversion program must receive a "supplemental type certificate" ("STC") from the FAA, which constitutes FAA approval to modify an aeronautical product from its original design. The STC standards are extremely rigorous and require meticulous planning.

30.34. Because of the nature and scope of the undertaking, development of an FAAcertified conversion program is labor- and capital-intensive. Conversion companies must spend over 100,000 engineering hours and invest tens of millions of dollars to develop a conversion program that will meet the FAA's requirements. A conversion program begins with years of intense planning to identify the engineering and design modifications necessary to achieve a freighter that maximizes payload and efficiency. Those modifications cover a "nose-to-tail" reconfiguration of the airplane - everything from modifying the placement of cargo doors and the structure of the floor beams to re-wiring the electrical and other systems. Development of a conversion program entails over 100,000 engineering hours, hundreds of analyses and reports, and hundreds of drawings and schematics. And because the purchase and conversion of a passenger aircraft requires an intensive capital investment, all costs and logistics must be precisely calculated upfront and reflected in the conversion program. Development of the conversion program thus requires extensive financial and cost-modeling expertise as well as deep project management experience.

II. PLAINTIFFS' P2F CONVERSION PROGRAM

A. The Genesis of Plaintiffs' Conversion Program

<u>31.35.</u>Because P2F conversions are highly-specialized, the aircraft conversion industry has only a few key players with the know-how and expertise to develop and operate conversion programs. Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley are among that handful of players.

<u>32.36.</u>In or around 2017 or 2018, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth decided to start a conversion program for a specific model of jumbo jet (the "Jumbo Jet") made by one of the world's largest airplane manufacturers (the "Major Manufacturer"). The Jumbo Jet has been highly successful and popular with airlines for over 25 years. Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth met in southern California to discuss their plans. They emphasized the need to keep their business plan and engineering strategy confidential, and all agreed to do so.

33.37.Each person was to contribute something specific to the effort. Wagner, personally and through Wagner Aeronautical, would provide the engineering expertise for designing and developing the technical aspects of the Jumbo Jet conversion program, drawing on his vast knowledge of the FAA's STC requirements and his experience obtaining STCs for prior conversion programs. Tarpley would provide project management and financial expertise as well as marketing and customer relations. He was responsible for the financial and logistical aspects of the program. With their combined know-how and expertise, Tarpley and Wagner were confident that they could develop the logistical, engineering, and marketing strategy needed to attract investors, secure certification from the FAA, and sell converted aircraft to customers that include the world's leading air freight companies. Wagner had done this numerous times over the past 20 years and had a unique model to accomplish that objective efficiently and reliably.

34.<u>38.</u>Meanwhile, Dotzenroth – who lacked expertise and experience with conversion programs – was to secure funding and investment for the conversion program

based on Wagner and Tarpley's business plan and experience. Dotzenroth acted individually, and through his company, CAI Consulting.

B. Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley Develop the Business Plan, the Engineering Strategy, and the Roadmap to Success

35.39. Wagner, working through Wagner Aeronautical, and Tarpley set to work constructing, detail-by-detail, the foundational plans and strategy for the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including their official business plan as well as a budget and schedule roadmap.

36.40. The business plan was reflected in PowerPoint slide decks that described the conversion process, outlined a customized development schedule, and delineated a plan for achieving FAA certification. The business plan included specific engineering details about the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including the specific design features, costs, logistics, and planning that would be utilized. The plan also detailed the business case for the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including detailed material costs and labor estimates to convert the aircraft. It detailed the business and marketing strategy and included a plan for contacting potential investors and customers. It described both the financial and functional benefits of the Jumbo Jet conversion program that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley had developed, highlighting unique aspects of their design that provided competitive advantages over other conversion programs. The business plan had multiple iterations, and Wagner and Tarpley customized the plan for meetings with different potential investors or customers.

<u>37.41.</u>The budget and schedule roadmap – at that time, a 15-tab Microsoft Excel spreadsheet – provided a more comprehensive version of the data in the PowerPoints. The roadmap details the building blocks for the conversion program, including revenue projections, month-by-month cost estimates, development costs, schedule estimates, the rate of return, program input financing, and staffing inputs. To generate the data in the roadmap (which was ultimately used in the business plan, too), Wagner Aeronautical

completed the preliminary design work for the Jumbo Jet conversion, including a specification, drawing tree, main deck cargo pallet layout, a weight analysis, and other analyses and feasibility studies. This information is confidential, proprietary, and highly valuable.

38.42. The costs and resources required to create the business plan and roadmap were enormous. Even with over 50 years of combined experience in the conversion industry, Wagner and Tarpley still needed over a year to create the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap for the Jumbo Jet program. Creation of the PowerPoint slide deck and 15-tab Excel spreadsheet required tens of thousands of engineering hours and millions ofover a million dollars in resources, which included work by the engineering team at Wagner Aeronautical. Without the advantage of Wagner's and Tarpley's know-how and expertise with previous conversion programs, the costs for compiling this information would have been far greater.

<u>39.43.</u>Dotzenroth had access to the proprietary information created by Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley. Dotzenroth received emails containing drafts of the business plan, information used for the roadmap, and other important documents and communications related to the business strategy, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy for the conversion program. Dotzenroth also had access to shared folders, including Tarpley's cloud storage folder, that contained copies of those documents and that information. In addition to sharing the business plan and roadmap with Dotzenroth, Wagner and Tarpley also discussed other strategies for the conversion program, including how they intended to approach, and negotiate with specific investors and customers. Dotzenroth never had a license or permission to use any of that proprietary information outside of his work with Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley.

40.44. Although Dotzenroth had access to the documents, his contributions to the development of the business plan, the budget and schedule roadmap, and the conversion program were minimal. Dotzenroth lacked any engineering and technical expertise and

was not capable of contributing meaningfully on that front. Dotzenroth tried to offer comments on the PowerPoint slide deck and spreadsheets but did so with obsolete versions rather than the most current drafts that Tarpley and Wagner were editing, revising, and updating.

C. Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley Take Numerous Steps To Protect Their Valuable Proprietary Information

41.45. The confidential and proprietary information reflected in Plaintiffs' business plan and roadmap is absolutely critical to a successful conversion program – and, for that reason, highly valuable. Those documents prove the commercial viability of the program, pave the way toward FAA certification, and convince investors, commercial partners, and customers that the conversion program is viable. Because conversion programs are extremely capital-intensive and time-intensive, investors, partners, and customers will only commit to provide funding or to purchase aircraft if they are convinced of the economic and engineering feasibility of the program. In that way, the tens of millions of dollars of investment needed to operate a conversion program depends directly on the ability to demonstrate the viability of a program through a business plan and the budgeting and scheduling information contained in the roadmap. Developing the business plan and the budget and schedule roadmap thus permit a particular conversion program to compete with other programs for investment and business and provide a competitive advantage.

42.46. Given the extraordinary value of their confidential and proprietary information, Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley implemented numerous confidentiality protocols. For the information developed at Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner required his employees to sign NDAs as a condition of their employment. Wagner Aeronautical computers were locked, such that external devices could not be attached to prevent the unauthorized download of information. Wagner Aeronautical's information technology personnel also monitor the transfer of information on the company's computer system to ensure that information is used properly.

43.<u>47.</u>Wagner and Tarpley also took individual actions to ensure that the business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and underlying data and work-product remained confidential. Those actions included placing "PROPRIETARY" legends on the materials and only sharing those materials with third parties on a need-to-know basis. The budget and schedule roadmap, in particular, was closely held and was not shared with anyone other than Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, Tarpley, Dotzenroth, and individuals working on their behalf.

44.<u>48.</u>Potential investors, partners, and customers were routinely required to sign NDAs before receiving access to any of the proprietary and confidential information about the Jumbo Jet conversion program, including the business plan, or otherwise understood and agreed that the information was confidential. The NDAs prohibited the signatories from disclosing or using "Confidential Information," and broadly defined that term to include "know-how, methods, ideas, creations, improvements, works of authorship, materials, processes, inventions, techniques, data, programs, prototypes, source code, tools, patentable materials, trade secrets, sales information, business and marketing plans and strategies, financial information and cost and pricing information." The NDAs further provided that the disclosing parties "would be irreparably damaged and may have no adequate remedy at law" for any unauthorized disclosure.

45.49. Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth all understood that the Jumbo Jet conversion program work-product – particularly, the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap – were proprietary and confidential information that could not be disclosed outside their group without adequate protections. Indeed, Dotzenroth was one of the most vocal advocates for these protective measures. He repeatedly emphasized to Wagner and Tarpley the need for NDAs before meetings with potential investors and other third parties. And, in one text message that Dotzenroth sent to Tarpley, he encouraged Tarpley to "put a copyright insignia on the bottom" of certain charts "as well as

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proprietary." Thus, Dotzenroth knew and understood that the Jumbo Jet conversion program work-product was proprietary and confidential.

D. Wagner and Tarpley Part Ways with Dotzenroth

46.<u>50.</u>With the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap largely complete<u>Toward the end of 2018</u>, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth turned their attention to identifying potential sources of funding for the conversion program. Securing funding for the contemplated conversion program was Dotzenroth's responsibility and his anticipated contribution to the collaboration.

47.<u>51.</u>Beginning in late 2018, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth began meeting with potential investors and customers. As explained above, participants in such meetings signed NDAs. The business plan slide decks, which were shared with meeting participants, also had a "PROPRIETARY" legend. Dotzenroth, in particular, insisted on such protective measures, and he personally signed these NDAs.

48.—Despite several meetings with investors, by the middle of 2019, Dotzenroth had been unsuccessful in securing funding for the Jumbo Jet conversion program. But by May 2019, Tarpley, Wagner, and Dotzenroth's fundraising efforts floundered for months. By the middle of 2019, Dotzenroth were in discussions with another investment firm about investment in the conversionstill had not obtained financing for the program.

49.52. As those discussions progressed, <u>In May 2019</u>, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth considered ways to formalize their relationship. Up to that point, the three had collaborated in their individual capacities or through the companies that each man owned. In May 2019, Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth and Wagner a draft LLC agreement for a company that would be owned by Tarpley, Wagner, and Dotzenroth to carry out their conversion program through a wholly-owned subsidiary.

50.53. Tarpley, however, struggled to find a role for Dotzenroth that would justify the one-third ownership interest in the LLC that Dotzenroth had requested. Because Dotzenroth lacked P2F conversion experience and expertise, there were few roles he could

fill. And, when Tarpley would suggest certain roles for Dotzenroth, Dotzenroth would express hesitancy or reluctance to accept the full scope of responsibilities that Tarpley had proposed.

<u>51.54</u>.

Group, an aircraft leasing company, but had not yet joined Split Rock Aviation. Welo

signed the standard NDA

52.55. After the meeting, Dotzenroth hosted dinner at his home for Tarpley, Mansell, and Welo. After Welo left, Tarpley remained to visit with Dotzenroth and Dotzenroth's wife. Dotzenroth and his wife questioned Tarpley about the ownership stake that Dotzenroth would be given in the conversion program. They demanded a full one-third of the ownership, even though Dotzenroth was unwilling to accept significant responsibility and had made only minor contributions – if any, at all – to the development of the business plan and budget and schedule roadmap.

53.<u>56.</u>

Notwithstanding Dotzenroth's failure – yet again – to secure funding, Dotzenroth continued to demand a one-third ownership interest in the LLC. When it became clear Dotzenroth would not receive a one-third share, he stopped collaborating with Tarpley and Wagner around the summer of 2019.

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COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS 54. Following Dotzenroth's questioning of Tarpley about Dotzenroth's desired ownership interest in the conversion program, and Dotzenroth's failure yet again to secure funding, Wagner and Tarpley caucused to discuss Dotzenroth's value add to the conversion program. They both recognized that Dotzenroth's contributions — if any were small compared to his requested stake. Given Dotzenroth's inability and unwillingness to contribute meaningfully to their conversion program, Wagner and Tarpley decided to part ways with him. In June 2019, Wagner, Tarpley, and Dotzenroth attended a previously scheduled meeting with another investment firm. But, following that meeting, Wagner and Tarpley no longer included Dotzenroth on communications about their conversion program.

III. DEFENDANTS' SCHEME TO STEAL PLAINTIFFS' PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, COMPETITIVE EDGE, <u>AND AND</u> CUSTOMERS

A. Dotzenroth Approaches NIAR About a Jumbo Jet Conversion Program Using Plaintiffs' Work

55.57. After failing to receive the one-third stake in the conversion program that he desired, Dotzenroth set to work pursuing his own Jumbo Jet conversion program. Recognizing that he lacked the technical expertise and means to establish such a program himself, Dotzenroth instead stole the extensive work-product of Wagner and Tarpley, borne of their experience, know-how, and ingenuity as well as thousands of hours of work by them and the Wagner Aeronautical engineering team. Dotzenroth ultimately devised and executed a scheme to use Tarpley's and Wagner's proprietary information for his own advantage and benefit.

58. Dotzenroth began searching for a new partner to pursue his own Jumbo Jet conversion program. He found that partner in NIAR, which, through NIAR Defendants, willingly and knowingly accepted the work that Dotzenroth had stolen from Plaintiffs and which eagerly used that work to develop, launch, and implement a competing conversion program in concert with Dotzenroth Defendants. At no time did Plaintiffs consent to the

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Dotzenroth Defendants' disclosure of, or the NIAR Defendants' receipt or use of, Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential information.

59. In or around late October or early November 2019, Dotzenroth approached NIAR about establishing a Jumbo Jet conversion program. Almost immediately, Dotzenroth began sending NIAR information that he had stolen from Plaintiffs. On November 6, 2019, Dotzenroth emailed Defendant David Jones, telling Jones: "I'm going to piece meal some educational data to you while we pull financial investor slides from our presentations before sending technical data." Dotzenroth's email forwarded a prior email that included a line graph comparing the payload-range capability for a Jumbo Jet freighter and two other common aircraft that also serve as freighters. Commentary in the email associated with the line graph explained that the Jumbo Jet converted freighter could function as a replacement for one of the other common aircraft identified on the graph. That email, and the associated commentary, was not Dotzenroth's work. In truth, Tarpley had sent that email to Dotzenroth and Wagner, about a year earlier, on November 8, 2018.

60. A few minutes later, Dotzenroth sent Jones another email. This email – which contained no text – simply forwarded an email that included another payload-range line graph entitled "Freighter Analysis: Payload-Range Capability." Like the chart in Dotzenroth's earlier email, this "Freighter Analysis" depicted payload-range curves for a Jumbo Jet freighter and another popular aircraft. It also depicted estimated payload-range curves for different models of a Jumbo Jet that had been converted into a freighter. Dotzenroth had not prepared this chart and did not do the "Freighter Analysis" depicted in the chart. In truth, that analysis was the product of Wagner and Tarpley's efforts. Tarpley had created that chart and then emailed it to Wagner, Dotzenroth, and Wiley Dotzenroth in January 2019.

61. Dotzenroth sent Jones a third email containing Plaintiffs' work on November 6, 2019. That email contained a "build schedule" for the first six converted Jumbo Jet freighters. For each aircraft, the schedule displayed the months within the program during

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COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS which the conversion would occur, breaking down the build by both in-hanger and out-of-hanger build time. Dotzenroth did not create the build schedule. Wagner and Tarpley had, in fact, done that work in 2018. Drawing on their experience, expertise, and know-how, Wagner and Tarpley estimated the schedule for converting the first six aircraft and used that estimate to produce the build schedule. Tarpley had emailed the build schedule to Dotzenroth on November 2, 2018.

62. Dotzenroth knew this information would be useful to Jones. Dotzenroth did not have the expertise and experience to competently prepare a build schedule for a Jumbo Jet conversion program like the schedule that Dotzenroth emailed to Jones on November 6, 2019. Moreover, Jones knew that Dotzenroth lacked that experience and expertise.

63. Jones knew, or at least had reason to know, that Dotzenroth was not authorized to provide NIAR with that information. The emails had indications that they were forwarded from someone else and the metadata, for some of the documents, revealed the author to be "Bill."

B. David and Wiley Dotzenroth Present Wagner and Tarpley's Business Plan to NIAR

64. On November 18, 2019, Dotzenroth sent Jones another email with the "financial investor slides" that Dotzenroth had previously promised to send Jones. Dotzenroth attached a presentation, dated November 16, 2019, entitled "[Jumbo Jet] Converted Freighter Project." The title page of the presentation also included the NIAR logo, and the subsequent slides included information about the competitive viability of the proposed Jumbo Jet conversion program, target weights and specifications for the proposed converted freighter, information about the payload and cargo capacity of the proposed converted freighter, a schematic of the proposed cargo pallet layout for the converted freighter, and a proposed build schedule for the first six converted freighters, among other information.

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65. Those slides and that information were Plaintiffs' work. Many of the slides were exact duplicates of slides from versions of Plaintiffs' business plan that Plaintiffs had used when engaging potential investors in 2018 and 2019. One slide even referenced "Mammoth" by name, providing the anticipated cargo capacity for different versions of the "Mammoth" converted freighter.

g 56.67. Dotzenroth not only divulged Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary 10 information through emails but also through numerous in-person meetings at NIAR. In 11 12 November 2019, Dotzenroth organized a meeting with NIAR in Kansas to give a presentation about a "new project" that he was working on with his son, Wiley Dotzenroth. 13 14 Wiley Dotzenroth, at that time, was a 24-year-old recent college graduate. He did not have the experience, expertise, and know-how of Wagner and Tarpley. Interested in harnessing 15 Wagner's expertise in P2F conversions, and in piggy-backing on the credibility and 16 reputation of Wagner Aeronautical, Dotzenroth invited Wagner to the meeting in Kansas. 17 The meeting attendees included executives from NIAR, including Jones and Towry, and 18 18 several Kansas state officials. David Jones, the Director of NIAR's Engineering Design and Modification Team, was one of the meeting attendees. Dotzenroth did not tell Wagner that he <u>20</u> <u>21</u> had provided Wagner and Tarpley's work to Jones and others at NIAR.

57.68. When the time arrived for the meeting, howeverIn December 2019, Dotzenroth
 told Wagner-organized and NIAR hosted another meeting – attended by Tomblin, Jones,
 Towry, and numerous NIAR engineers – to brief potential partners and investors about
 Defendants' efforts to develop a conversion program. During the course of that Wagner
 was not invited to the businessmeeting, Dotzenroth and Wiley made a presentation;
 Dotzenroth had arranged for Wagner to tour NIAR's facilities instead. that included

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confidential, proprietary information of Wagner and Tarpley. On information and belief, Dotzenroth and Wiley-Dotzenroth falsely represented that they had developed their own conversion program when, in reality, they were simply presenting the conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had developed. Following the meeting (and after Wagner's tour of NIAR), Jones approached Wagner. Jones suggested to Wagner that Dotzenroth lacked the know how and expertise to create a Jumbo Jet conversion program.

69. <u>A few months later,</u>

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deck was nearly an exact duplicate of the business plan that Wagner and Tarpley had developed and provided to Dotzenroth in confidence.

That slide

, and neither Wiley nor David Dotzenroth told Wagner that
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71. Potential investors also attended the meetings at NIAR in December 2019,
including Jim Gibbs, Collis Chandler, and Brian Mackey. Wagner was also invited to
participate in the December 2019 meetings. Although Wagner had attended portions of
the multi-day December 2019 meetings at NIAR, Wagner was not permitted to attend the

business presentation – the same presentation that

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To keep Wagner out of the room, Dotzenroth had arranged for Wagner to take a tour of NIAR's facilities.

72. As in November, Dotzenroth did not tell Wagner that he and Wiley would be giving a presentation that was nearly a carbon copy of the business plan that Wagner and Tarpley had created. At no time did Wagner consent to, or authorize Defendants to use Wagner and Tarpley's work product for the purpose of designing, launching, or implementing a conversion program that would compete with Wagner and Tarpley's.

73. NIAR Defendants knew that the information in the Dotzenroths' December 2019 presentation was not the Dotzenroths' own work. David Jones later admitted to Wagner that he knew that Dotzenroth had not developed the program described in the presentations and that the program must have been created by Wagner. Jones further knew that Wagner was not present when the Dotzenroths made their business presentation to Jones and other NIAR employees and that Dotzenroth intentionally excluded Wagner from the presentation. That, too, gave Jones reason to know that the Dotzenroths' use of Wagner and Tarpley's information was not authorized.

C. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants Use Wagner and <u>Tarpley's Proprietary Information To Secure Funding and Develop</u> <u>Their Own Program</u>

74. On information and belief, the Dotzenroths' presentations – copied from versions of Plaintiffs' business plans – induced NIAR Defendants to agree to develop a Jumbo Jet conversion program with Dotzenroth. Almost immediately after the December 2019 meeting, Defendants began using Plaintiffs' proprietary information – the result of over a year of work, thousands of hours of effort, and significant resources – to plan for the conversion program.

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COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

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	COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

С	se 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS	Document 117-2	Filed 10/22/21	PageID.3793	Page 75 of 100

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<i>∓</i>	That business plan was a near duplicate of a version of Plaintiffs' business
8	plan that Tarpley had sent to Dotzenroth in March 2019. It included all of the same
g	confidential and proprietary information from the previous versions of the business plan
	that the Dotzenroths had shared with NIAR - cost and budget estimates, manhour labor
11	estimates, projected revenues and financial metrics, schedules, and other valuable
<u>12</u>	information necessary to develop and launch a conversion program.
13	<u>80.</u>
14	The Mammoth Conversions logo appeared on the
13	footer of nearly every single page of the business plan. The plan also included references
16	to Wagner Aeronautical, which the plan described as an Escondido, California-based
17	engineering firm, and to Wagner. Thus, Jones must have known the plan was the
18	proprietary information of Wagner and Tarpley, not Dotzenroth.
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	COMPLAINT Case No.
	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

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83. By March 2020, NIAR Defendants and others at NIAR had received from the Dotzenroths extensive proprietary and confidential information concerning Plaintiffs' conversion program. NIAR Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were the source of that information, and also knew, or had reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to share Plaintiffs' proprietary information with them. Yet NIAR Defendants willingly accepted the information anyway and, working with the Dotzenroth Defendants, used it to craft – at an accelerated pace – a plan for a Jumbo Jet conversion program. Indeed, Plaintiffs, with decades of conversion experience, required over a year to create the business plan and roadmap. Jones, Towry, and the other NIAR Defendants had seemingly accomplished that feat in months.

IV. DEFENDANTS CONTINUE TO SEEK INFORMATION FROM TARPLEY, WAGNER, AND WAGNER AERONAUTICAL

58.84.In or around February 2020, Dotzenroth attempted to enlist Tarpley's assistance for Dotzenroth's conversion program. Dotzenroth contacted Tarpley, saying that he was very excited to share information about a big, new project that Dotzenroth was working on through his new company, Sequoia Aircraft Conversions. Dotzenroth insisted that Tarpley sign an NDA.

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	COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

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Tarpley did not believe that Dotzenroth would actually enter the P2F market with his own conversion program. At that point, Dotzenroth had no funding or engineering resources.

61.87.Dotzenroth was undeterred. In March 2020, Dotzenroth again, with NIAR Defendants, sought to enlist Wagner and Wagner Aeronautical to support a conversion program that Dotzenroth would lead. Having continued his discussions with NIAR, Dotzenroth arranged for representatives of NIAR, including Jones, to visit Wagner Aeronautical in Escondido, California. Dotzenroth also made the trip, and NIAR required Wagner to execute an NDA.

62.88. In anticipation of that meeting, NIAR's-Jones on March 3, 2020, sent a proposed agenda and PowerPoint presentation to Wagner

Dotzenroth was copied on Jones's email.

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<u>5</u>	Under the guise of exploring a
6	contract with Wagner Aeronautical to perform work for Dotzenroth's conversion program,
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	COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

Dotzenroth <u>and Jones</u> thus sought information proprietary to Wagner's and Tarpley's Jumbo Jet conversion program.

64.90.In April 2020, Wiley Dotzenroth sent Wagner another PowerPoint presentation that Sequoia planned to share with a Major Manufacturer. The PowerPoint presentation described Sequoia's proposed Jumbo Jet conversion program and identified "Sequoia Conversions" as the "Intellectual Property Owner." That statement was false because it represented that Sequoia owned the intellectual property for its conversion program. In truth, Sequoia did not own the intellectual property. As both David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth well knew, the Jumbo Jet conversion program had been developed by Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner Aeronautical. Nonetheless, on information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia repeated that false representation to potential partners and customers, including during meetings with Major Manufacturer in late 2020 and early 2021. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia repeated those falsehoods during another meeting with an air cargo operator in early 2021.

65. In September 2020, Dotzenroth and Sequoia publicly launched their own Jumbo Jet conversion program in partnership with NIAR to compete directly with Wagner and Tarpley. A September 29, 2020, NIAR issued press release explained:

91. As of September 2020, Jones, Towry, and NIAR were still in need of Wagner's know-how and expertise. Again, under the guise of discussing a potential contract with Wagner, Jones and Towry arranged to visit Wagner Aeronautical in California on September 15, 2020. In anticipation of that visit, Jones and Towry prepared an agenda that included

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	COMPLAINT Case No.
	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

Towry but did not provide the details of Plaintiffs' business plan or other confidential and proprietary information.

92. At no time did Plaintiffs' consent to NIAR, or anyone at NIAR, using their confidential and proprietary information.

V. NIAR LAUNCHES A CONVERSION PROGRAM WITH SEQUOIA AND KMC

93. On September 29, 2021, NIAR issued a press release announcing the launch of Defendants' Jumbo Jet conversion program. It explained:

Through a new partnership with Sequoia Aircraft Conversions and the Kansas Modification Center, the National Institute for Aviation Research at Wichita State University will begin a large-scale entrepreneurial [Major Manufacturer Jumbo Jet] passenger-to-freighter conversion program.

The program, led by NIAR's Engineering Design and Modification Team (EDM), will focus on the conversion of [Jumbo Jet] passenger aircraft from passenger-transport operations into cargo aircraft to meet the growing e-commerce high-volume freight transportation market.

Sequoia Aircraft Conversions will market the passenger to freighter conversions. Kansas Mod Center will own the STC and license the conversions.

66. With a confirmed engineering and testing partner in NIAR, Dotzenroth and Sequoia finalized a funding deal with Split Rock Aviation, Mansell, and Welo in February 2021. Split Rock Aviation's press release announced that Sequoia's Jumbo Jet conversion program "will focus on weight reductions and design efficiency to meet the most stringent environmental and regulatory requirements" and that the "engineering package will be completed by Wichita State University National Institute of Aviation Research." However, as Mansell and Welo

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knew because they had been courted as potential investors in Wagner and Tarpley's conversion program in 2019 Sequoia's conversion program was not the result of Dotzenroth's own efforts, but instead derived from the business plan and roadmap that Wagner and Tarpley had created after more than a year of non stop laboring, thousands of engineering hours, and millions of dollars. With partnerships with NIAR and Split Rock Aviation, Sequoia had both engineering and funding support and was finally positioned to compete with Plaintiffs.

94. DotzenrothKMC was a new entity. Its investors included Jim Gibbs. The investors in KMC received presentations and information that included the proprietary and confidential information of Plaintiffs.

NIAR and Dotzenroth Defendants will reap substantial benefits from the 95. conversion program. NIAR signed an agreement with KMC under which NIAR would provide engineering for the program and secure an STC from the FAA. Additionally, NIAR WERX – led by Defendant Jones – will perform the labor necessary to convert the aircraft.

VI.	DEFENDANTS CONTINUE TO MISAPPROPRIATE PL	AINTIFFS' TRADE SECRETS

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	COMPLAINT Case No.
	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS

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Dotzenroth continued to provide NIAR with additional proprietary and confidential information of Plaintiffs to be used in further developing Defendants' program. On January 19, 2021, David Dotzenroth sent three emails to NIAR program manager Eric Kivett. Each email contained information that Dotzenroth had received from Tarpley. Rather than send the emails to Kivett's NIAR email address, Dotzenroth used Kivett's personal Gmail account.

98. The first email contained information and analysis concerning an operating cost comparison for certain freighters, including the Jumbo Jet that Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth in May 2019. The second email contained a discussion of the suitability of different Jumbo Jet models for conversion that Tarpley also sent to Dotzenroth in May 2019. The third email attached a copy of Plaintiffs' business plan that Tarpley sent to Dotzenroth in July 2019. The cover of the business plan thus read "Mammoth Conversion LLC – Proprietary." The plan repeatedly referenced "Mammoth Conversion LLC" throughout and repeatedly mentioned Tarpley, Wagner, and Wagner Aeronautical, which it identified as an Escondido, California-based engineering firm. It included valuable and proprietary information concerning Plaintiffs' conversion program, such as manhour labor estimates, cost estimates, and financial projections.

99. Dotzenroth's emails made clear that he was forwarding information he had received from someone else. One email included a header showing that Tarpley was the original source of the information. And, of course, Dotzenroth did not alter the business plan, which made clear that the document pertained to a conversion program for Mammoth Conversions that was created and led by Wagner and Tarpley. It was obvious that the business plan and other documents originated with Tarpley and Wagner and related to *their*

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100. Around the time that Kivett received these documents in January 2021, he was engaged in preparing a presentation for a potential partner with Defendants' conversion program. On information and belief, Kivett used Plaintiffs' proprietary information – the materials that he had received from Dotzenroth – to prepare that presentation. Thus, even as late as this year, Dotzenroth continued to disclose, and NIAR personnel continued to directly use, Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information for their own benefit and to compete against Plaintiffs.

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VII. WAGNER AND TARPLEY JOIN MAMMOTH FREIGHTERS LLC TO IMPLEMENT THEIR CONVERSION PROGRAM

<u>102. On December 1, 2020, Wagner and Tarpley became co-CEOs of Mammoth</u> <u>Freighters LLC, an LLC formed to carry out Wagner and Tarpley's Jumbo Jet conversion</u> <u>program.</u>

<u>103.</u> On April 22, 2021, Mammoth Freighters LLC entered into a Conversion <u>Program Development Agreement with Wagner Aeronautical, under which Wagner</u> <u>Aeronautical would, among other services, obtain and maintain an STC for the Jumbo Jet</u> <u>conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had developed, would implement such</u> <u>conversions, and would provide engineering and technical support services in connection</u> <u>with those activities. Under the agreement, Wagner Aeronautical agreed to assign and</u>

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transfer to Mammoth Freighters all intellectual property rights in work performed under the development agreement. Wagner Aeronautical also agreed to grant Mammoth Freighters a license in any Wagner Aeronautical intellectual property, including trade secrets, that Wagner Aeronautical uses in performing work under the development agreement.

VIII. DEFENDANTS' SCHEME HAS IRREPARABLY HARMED, AND CONTINUES TO HARM, <u>Plaintiffs</u>

67.104. Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR Defendants thus stole Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information to create a conversion program that would compete directly with Plaintiffs and attempt to usurp their market position. Dotzenroth knew that he could not create a competitive conversion program on his own. That is why Dotzenroth tried to recruit Wagner for his program at thethroughout 2019 meeting in Kansas and the 2020 meeting in California, and why Dotzenroth later tried to recruit Tarpley at their in 2020 meeting in Texas.

68.105. As a direct result of observing the most critical and valuable confidential details about Plaintiffs' program for nearly three years, the inexperienced and uninformed Dotzenroth knew exactly how to compete against Plaintiffs. During his time working for Wagner and Tarpley, Dotzenroth was exposed to and entrusted with their confidential and proprietary information. Most significantly, he had the highly technical details – engineering, project management, and budget – needed to successfully establish a conversion program. Dotzenroth learned how Wagner and Tarpley built their conversion program, how they developed their engineering strategy, how they proved the competitive advantages of their program, and how they approached and persuaded potential investors and customers.

69.106. When Wagner and Tarpley refused the substantial ownership stake that Dotzenroth had demanded, Dotzenroth left with Plaintiffs' playbook, gave it to NIAR Defendants, and then used it to form a companyventure with NIAR Defendants and KMC

that would compete directly against Plaintiffs for the same deals with partners and customers. When Dotzenroth began working with Wagner and Tarpley, he lacked the know-how and expertise to develop and operate a conversion program. Suddenly, in less than 18 months after <u>partingDotzenroth parted</u> ways with Wagner and Tarpley, <u>DotzenrothDefendants</u> had <u>hislaunched their</u> own competing conversion program and had <u>already</u> secured <u>partnershipsa partnership</u> with-<u>NIAR and</u> Split Rock Aviation.

IV.<u>I. WAGNER AND TARPLEY JOIN MAMMOTH FREIGHTERS LLC TO IMPLEMENT</u> THEIR CONVERSION PROGRAM

70.<u>1.</u>On December 1, 2020, Wagner and Tarpley became co-CEOs of Mammoth Freighters LLC, an LLC formed to carry out Wagner and Tarpley's Jumbo Jet conversion program.

71. On April 22, 2021, Mammoth Freighters LLC entered into a Conversion Program Development Agreement with Wagner Aeronautical, under which Wagner Aeronautical would, among other services, obtain and maintain an STC for the Jumbo Jet conversion program that Wagner and Tarpley had developed, would implement such conversions, and would provide engineering and technical support services in connection with those activities. Under the agreement, Wagner Aeronautical agreed to assign and transfer to Mammoth Freighters all intellectual property rights in work performed under the development agreement. Wagner Aeronautical also agreed to grant Mammoth Freighters a license in any Wagner Aeronautical intellectual property, including trade secrets, that Wagner Aeronautical uses in performing work under the development agreement.

V. DEFENDANTS' SCHEME HAS IRREPARABLY HARMED, AND CONTINUES TO HARM, PLAINTIFFS

72.107. Defendants are continuing to misappropriate and use Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information and are continuing to use Plaintiffs' business and

1 ‡ engineering strategy to compete directly against Plaintiffs. Defendants' actions have harmed and will continue to harm Plaintiffs. Those harms include at least the following:

A. Loss of Valuable Proprietary Assets

73.108. Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary business plan and roadmap has exposed the most critical and valuable parts of Plaintiffs' conversion program to third parties, which alone is damaging to Plaintiffs' business enterprise. Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary business information – including the highly technical, complex information in the PowerPoint and Excel spreadsheet – is a valuable asset. By misappropriating the confidential and proprietary information in Plaintiffs' business plan and budget and schedule roadmap – rather than doing the hard work on histheir own – Dotzenroth Defendants and, in turn, Sequoia, Wiley Dotzenroth, Mansell, and Welo_NIAR Defendants received the benefit of valuable information and data that would have been extremely costly to produce in the first instance.

74.<u>109.</u> At a minimum, Defendants' wrongful acts saved them the millions of dollars, and extensive time, that would have been necessary to develop a business plan and roadmap for their own conversion program. It gave Defendants a huge head start on when they would have been able to credibly compete had they not stolen Plaintiffs' property.

B. Loss of Competitive Advantage

75.110. Due to Defendants' wrongdoing, Plaintiffs have lost and will continue to lose their competitive advantage in the P2F aircraft conversion market. Before Defendants' theft of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential information, Plaintiffs had an edge over the competitors in the P2F conversion market because of the unique and innovative structure of their conversion program. The unique and innovative features of Plaintiffs' conversion program result from Wagner's and Tarpley's decades of know-how and expertise in the conversion industry. As described in their business plan, Plaintiffs' competitive edge included a conversion program that would provide lighter, more

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efficient, and cost-effective aircraft to customers with assurance that Plaintiffs' program would receive FAA certification.

76.111. After Dotzenroth's misappropriation of Plaintiffs' business plan, Defendants have been able to offer a conversion program with those same unique and innovative features to investors, partners, and customers. This has diminished Plaintiffs' unique position and competitive edge in the market.

77.112. Additionally, Defendants' scheme gave them a significant head start in entering a market with high barriers to entry. Instead of being forced to wait at least a year and spend millions to enter the market, Dotzenroth <u>Defendants and NIAR Defendants</u> stole Plaintiffs' business plan and roadmap so that Defendants could begin operating in a matter of months.

C. Loss of Potential Customers

78.<u>113.</u> Due to Defendants' scheme to compete directly against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs stand to lose customers. On information and belief, Defendants have approached potential customers – some of the largest air freight companies – offering their own conversion service and competing directly with Plaintiffs. Without the head start Defendants received after stealing Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, Defendants would not have been able to offer potential customers a conversion service on essentially the same timetable and with the same benefits as Plaintiffs. Without Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information, Dotzenroth <u>Defendants</u> and <u>SequoiaNIAR Defendants</u> would have been years behind in their development of Defendants' conversion program.

79.114. Losing a single customer in the P2F conversion industry can be devastating. First, only a limited number of potential customers exist. The number of aircraft available for conversion is limited, and the vast majority of those are owned by a few large players, in particular a large air cargo operator and two leading express delivery services. Those customers typically purchase all of their converted aircraft from a single

supplier, and they enter into long term contracts with the supplier because the conversion and delivery process can take several years. Finally, the lifespan of a converted aircraft is long. If a customer is lost to a competitor, it could be many years before that customer needs additional conversions.

D. Loss of Potential Partners

80.<u>115.</u> Plaintiffs' relationships with potential business partners have also been jeopardized by Defendants' theft of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information. SequoiaDefendants can attempt to present itselfthemselves as a-credible partnerpartners with others in the P2F industry only because itthey could advertise a well-developed and thoughtfully executed business plan and roadmap – a feat achieved only because Defendants had unlawfully misappropriated those materials from Plaintiffs. For example, Dotzenroth and Sequoia were able to partner with NIAR only because, on information and belief, David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth approached NIAR with a well developed and thoughtfully executed business plan and roadmap – documents they represented to be their own work but that were, in fact, the product of Wagner's and Tarpley's decades of know how and expertise. NIAR's partnership with Sequoia essentially rendered NIAR unavailable for partnership with Mammoth Freighters. Plaintiffs stand to lose similar opportunities and partners in the future.

COUNT ONE

<u>Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (18 U.S.C. §1836(b))</u> (Against <u>AllDotzenroth Defendants)</u>

81.116. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 81115 above as though set forth fully herein.

<u>117.</u> Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under 18 U.S.C. §1839. This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the

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P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

<u>118. Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets,</u> <u>including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade</u> <u>secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a</u> <u>"PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and</u> <u>using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.</u>

<u>119.</u> Dotzenroth Defendants intentionally, willfully, and maliciously misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to obtain a competitive advantage. Dotzenroth Defendants had access to Plaintiffs' business plan, roadmap, and engineering strategy. Despite recognizing that the information was confidential and proprietary, Dotzenroth Defendants disclosed this information and used it to create their own competing conversion program. Dotzenroth Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to Dotzenroth Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Dotzenroth Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

120. Dotzenroth Defendants have used and will continue to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Dotzenroth Defendants are using Plaintiffs' trade secrets to lure away Plaintiffs' potential customers and partners.

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<u>121. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm as a result of</u> <u>Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of</u> <u>Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers,</u> <u>loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.</u>

122. Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining Dotzenroth Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1836.

COUNT TWO

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (18 U.S.C. §1836(b))

(Against NIAR Defendants)

<u>123.</u> Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 122 above as though set forth fully herein.

82.124. Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under 18 U.S.C. § 1839. This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

83.125. Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets, including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a

1 ‡ "PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.

84.126. NIAR Defendants intentionally, willfully, and maliciously misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to provide Sequoia's the NIAR/KMC/Sequoia conversion program with a competitive advantage. NIAR Defendants had access to received Plaintiffs' business plan, roadmap, and engineering strategy. Despite recognizing that the other proprietary information was confidential and proprietary, data from David and Wiley Dotzenroth, with knowledge, or reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to disclose the information. NIAR Defendants used that Plaintiffs' information to ereatedevelop and implement their own competing conversion program-, knowing, or with reason to know, that the Dotzenroths were not authorized to disclose the information and that the Dotzenroths owed a duty to maintain the secrecy of the Plaintiffs' information or to limit use of that information. NIAR Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch, in a timely manner, a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to NIAR Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

85. <u>NIAR</u> Defendants have used, and will continue to use, Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Defendants are using Plaintiffs' trade secrets to lure away Plaintiffs' potential customers and partners.

86.127. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm because<u>as a</u> result of <u>NIAR</u> Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers, loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.

> 41 COMPLAINT Case No. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cy-00994-L-AGS

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87.128. Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. <u>NIAR</u> Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining <u>NIAR</u> Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets <u>under 18 U.S.C. §1836or from operating</u>, implementing, or otherwise commercializing any conversion program based on, or derived from, the proprietary information that NIAR Defendants misappropriated.

COUNT THREE

COUNT TWO

<u>Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Cal. Civ. Code §3426 et seq.)</u> (Against <u>AllDotzenroth Defendants)</u>

88.129. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 88128 above as though set forth fully herein.

89.130. Plaintiffs' business plan, budget and schedule roadmap, and supporting data are trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426. This information has independent economic value because it proves the viability of Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion program, provides the specific business plan for the program, gives Plaintiffs' program a competitive edge in the P2F conversion market, required substantial effort and investment to produce, and confers on Plaintiffs an advantage over their competitors. The information identifies Plaintiffs' Jumbo Jet conversion process and outlines a procedure for achieving FAA certification, including the schedule, resources, costs, logistics, and engineering processes necessary for the conversions. This methodology is innovative and unique to Plaintiffs because it is derived from the know-how and expertise that Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley cultivated over decades in the P2F industry.

<u>90.131.</u> Plaintiffs have taken reasonable measures to protect their trade secrets, including requiring that potential investors and customers sign NDAs, sharing the trade secrets only on a need-to-know basis, marking trade secret documents with a

"PROPRIETARY" legend, requiring Wagner Aeronautical employees to sign NDAs, and using secure computer systems for the trade secret information.

91.132. Dotzenroth Defendants intentionally, willfully, and maliciously misappropriated Plaintiffs' trade secrets to provide their conversion program with a competitive advantage. Dotzenroth Defendants had access to Plaintiffs' business plan, roadmap, and engineering strategy. Despite recognizing that the information was confidential and proprietary, Dotzenroth Defendants used that information to create Defendants'their own competing conversion program. Dotzenroth Defendants misappropriated this information for their own benefit because they fully understood the value of that information and understood that they could not launch a competing conversion program without it. Plaintiffs never consented to Dotzenroth Defendants' use of Plaintiffs' trade secrets in this manner. While Dotzenroth Defendants were not restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, they were prohibited from misappropriating Plaintiffs' trade secrets.

92.133. Dotzenroth Defendants have used and will continue to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets to compete directly with Plaintiffs in the P2F conversion market. Dotzenroth Defendants are using Plaintiffs' trade secrets to lure away Plaintiffs' potential customers and partners.

93.134. Plaintiffs have suffered and will suffer substantial harm because of Dotzenroth Defendants' misappropriation of their trade secrets, including the disclosure of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, loss of Plaintiffs' competitive edge, loss of potential customers, loss of potential partnerships, and loss of revenues and profits.

94.<u>135.</u> Those damages, however, cannot all be easily quantified. <u>Dotzenroth</u> Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets has caused and will cause Plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. For that reason, Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction enjoining <u>Dotzenroth</u> Defendants from using Plaintiffs' trade secrets under Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.

COUNT FOUR

COUNT THREE

<u>False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1125)</u> (Against David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia)

<u>95.136.</u> Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through <u>95135</u> above as though set forth fully herein.

96-<u>137.</u> David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have made and will continue to make false statements about the authenticity of their conversion program. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have falsely represented that Dotzenroth developed his own Jumbo Jet conversion program, that Sequoia owns the intellectual property underpinning the conversion program, and that Dotzenroth possesses the competence, experience, and expertise to develop and operate Sequoia's conversion program. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia have made these false statements to potential customers and business partners, including during meetings with Major Manufacturer in late 2020 and early 2021 and with a major air cargo operator in early 2021.

97.<u>138.</u> These false statements have influenced, and will continue to influence, the decisions of partners to do business with <u>Dotzenroth</u> Defendants and to exclude Plaintiffs from those deals. Likewise, the false representations about <u>Sequoia'sthe</u> <u>NIAR/Sequoia/KMC</u> conversion program will influence the decisions of customers that may choose <u>Sequoia'sthe NIAR/Sequoia/KMC</u> conversion program and aircraft over Plaintiffs' conversion program and aircraft. On information and belief, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia are advertising to customers, including a major air cargo operator, that they can provide the same know-how and expertise as Plaintiffs. In truth, David Dotzenroth's and Wiley Dotzenroth's experience in the aviation industry simply cannot compare to that of Wagner and Tarpley.

<u>98.139.</u> By misrepresenting the authenticity of their conversion program, David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia are misleading partners and customers about Defendants' qualifications and ability to develop a conversion program.

99.140. These false statements have deceived and will continue to deceive Sequoia's partners and customers. These deceptive statements are material to these investors, partners, and customers when they are deciding whether to do business with Sequoia-, NIAR, and KMC.

<u>100.141.</u> David Dotzenroth's, Wiley Dotzenroth's, and Sequoia's false statements have harmed Plaintiffs because Defendants' false statements have convinced, and will continue to convince, potential partners and customers to choose Defendants' conversion program and aircraft over Plaintiffs' conversion program and aircraft.

COUNT FOURFIVE

Unfair Competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.)

(Against AllDotzenroth Defendants)

<u>101.142</u>. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through <u>101141</u> above as though set forth fully herein.

<u>102.143.</u> The California Unfair Competition Law defines unfair competition to include any "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" business practice or act. Defendants have unfairly and unlawfully competed directly against Plaintiffs by improperly and unlawfully using Plaintiffs' own business plan, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy to start a competing conversion program and by approaching the same partners and customers as Plaintiffs.

<u>103.144.</u> After misappropriating Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, and after learning the details of Plaintiffs' engineering and marketing strategy, Defendants started a conversion program to compete directly with Plaintiffs' conversion program. With the competing program established, Defendants then sought deals with the same customers and partners as Plaintiffs. Defendants had an unfair advantage against

Plaintiffs when they entered the conversion market because <u>Defendants'Defendants</u> knew Plaintiffs' playbook and how Plaintiffs planned to conduct their business. This unfair advantage has allowed and will continue to allow Defendants to profit from their wrongdoing.

<u>104.145.</u> Defendants have been enriched by, and have significantly benefited from, their use of Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information, including the business plan and the budget and schedule roadmap. Defendants obtained that benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs. They have not compensated Plaintiffs for that information.

<u>105.146.</u> Because of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be damaged and suffer irreparable harm through the loss of competitive advantage, potential partners, potential customers, and revenue and profits. Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution and injunctive relief for Defendants' violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17203.

COUNT FIVE SIX

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

(Against David Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting)

<u>106.147.</u> Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through <u>106146</u> above as though set forth fully herein.

<u>107.148.</u> Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting had a fiduciary duty to Wagner Aeronautical, Wagner, and Tarpley because Dotzenroth was a joint venturer with Wagner and Tarpley while working with them to develop Plaintiffs' conversion program. Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting owed Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner Aeronautical the duty of utmost good faith.

<u>108.149.</u> Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting breached that duty when Dotzenroth exploited his relationship with Tarpley and Wagner to misappropriate information, work-product, and intellectual property developed and owned by Wagner, Tarpley, and Wagner Aeronautical. Dotzenroth then impermissibly used the misappropriated property for his

own benefit – without compensating Tarpley or Wagner – to form Sequoia Aircraft Conversions and compete directly with Plaintiffs for conversion customers and other business opportunities.

<u>109.150.</u> Plaintiffs have been harmed by Dotzenroth's and CAI Consulting's breach of their fiduciary duty because <u>Defendants areDotzenroth is</u> competing for the same partners and customers as Plaintiffs and gained a head start in entering the conversion market through the breach.

COUNT SIXSEVEN

Civil Conspiracy

(Against David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth)

<u>110.151.</u> Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through <u>110150</u> above as though set forth fully herein.

111.152. David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth schemed to use Plaintiffs' trade secrets, engineering strategy, and marketing strategy to create a conversion program that would compete directly against Plaintiffs' conversion program. After gaining access to Plaintiffs' trade secrets and learning Plaintiffs' engineering and marketing strategy, David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth conspired to unlawfully misappropriate Plaintiffs' proprietary and confidential business information and trade secrets, to engage in unfair competition against Plaintiffs, and to falsely advertise their conversion program. David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth have taken at least one overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy.

<u>153.</u> Defendants' conduct has harmed Plaintiffs through the loss of Plaintiffs' competitive advantage, potential partners, potential customers, and revenue and profits.

JURY DEMAND

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Under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues triable as such.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, judgment should be entered for Plaintiffs and against Defendants as follows:

(a) finding that <u>Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR</u> Defendants misappropriated one or more of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1836(b);

(b) finding that <u>Dotzenroth</u> Defendants misappropriated one or more of Plaintiffs' trade secrets, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 3426;

(c) finding that David Dotzenroth, Wiley Dotzenroth, and Sequoia falsely advertised <u>Sequoia'sthe NIAR/Sequoia/KMC</u> conversion program in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act;

(d) finding that <u>Dotzenroth</u> Defendants engaged in unfair competition against Plaintiffs in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.;

(e) finding that Dotzenroth and CAI Consulting breached their fiduciary duties to Wagner Aeronautical, Inc., Wagner, and Tarpley;

(f) finding that David Dotzenroth and Wiley Dotzenroth engaged in a conspiracy to misappropriate Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information, engage in unfair competition against Plaintiffs, and falsely advertise their conversion program;

(g) injunctive relief against <u>Dotzenroth Defendants and NIAR</u> Defendants, including preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from using any of Plaintiffs' confidential and proprietary information and marketing or operating any conversion program based on or derived from that information;

(h) money damages <u>against Dotzenroth Defendants</u>, including compensatory damages in an amount to be determined and restitution and/or disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits that may have been obtained by Defendants, and punitive or statutory damages in excess of \$50 million;

- (i) costs, including attorneys' fees;
- (j) prejudgment interest at the maximum legal rate; and
- (k) such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.



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DATED: May 25, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

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	COMPLAINT Case No.				
FIRST AMEN	DED COMPLAINT – Case No. 3:21-cv-00994-L-AGS				

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