By Vincent E. Bianco III

FAA Veteran and Senior Aviation Safety Consultant

Guest Column

Credit: Federal Aviation Administration.

Jan. 13, 2026, © Leeham News: Presidential administrations and Congresses dating to the formation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1957 have failed to adequately fund the agency and modernize the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. An insider examines why.—Editor.

Introduction: A Crisis of Process Over Progress

In their book Abundance: What America Gets Wrong About Capitalism and What We Can Do to Fix It, Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson describe a phenomenon in which institutions become paralyzed by process—where layers of well-intentioned rules accumulate, each logical in isolation, but together quietly stifling the very progress they intend to nurture.

This scenario is not theoretical for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); it is a reality for anyone involved in its modernization programs. The FAA’s experience over the past four decades serves as a case study in how process can overwhelm purpose.

Four Decades Observed: From Control Tower to Congress

Over a 35-year career, I have witnessed the FAA’s modernization struggles from nearly every vantage point: as a controller in the tower, an operator in the radar room, a staffer at FAA Headquarters, and an advocate in the halls of Congress. I have seen four major modernization efforts stall or collapse. Billions of dollars have been absorbed not by system deployment, but by compliance with ever-multiplying processes.

Too often, technology becomes obsolete before the procurement cycle even finishes. The thesis of Klein and Thompson does not simply apply to FAA acquisition; it explains why so many modernization efforts languish or fail.

The Acquisition Graveyard: Case Studies in Paralysis

• Advanced Automation System (1981-1994): Envisioned as a complete overhaul of the National Airspace System’s automation backbone, this program was ultimately canceled after $2.6bn spent, with little to show for it. Stakeholder requirements were all included, each safety concern triggered a separate review process, and every congressional district wanted a share. The result was a system designed by committee, reviewed by committee, and ultimately undone by the overwhelming weight of process requirements.
• Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS): Launched in the 1990s with expectations of rapid deployment, STARS instead took decades to roll out. Each facility required its own environmental review, each union local conducted its own negotiations, and every regional office raised separate issues. By the time STARS reached many sites, the technology was already outdated.
• NextGen—The Perpetual Tomorrow: Announced with great enthusiasm in the mid-2000s as the transformative modernization of American aviation, NextGen remains, decades later, a work in progress. It continues to face the same old battles over spectrum allocation, equipage mandates, airline cost-sharing, environmental reviews, and labor agreements. Each procedural box must be checked before any operational change can occur.
• En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM): This initiative arrived years late and billions of dollars over budget. Software that was considered state-of-the-art when specified was already legacy by the time it was fielded. The deployment process outlasted the technology’s own lifecycle.

The Accumulated Weight: Navigating a Labyrinth of Requirements

Every FAA modernization program must traverse a complex maze of process requirements:

• National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental reviews for every facility upgrade, which are reasonable in theory but often result in multi-year delays in practice.
• Congressional oversight demanding endless justification, intended for accountability, but frequently shaping programs for optics rather than operational efficiency.
• National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) labor negotiations, essential for worker voice and safety, yet turning each system change into a separate negotiation.
• Federal Acquisition Regulation procurement rules, crafted to prevent abuse, but leading to 18-month Request for Proposal (RFP) cycles before any work even starts.
• DO-178C software certification (a federal compliance and certification standard), necessary for safety-critical systems, but it adds years to the certification timeline before deployment.
• Post-9/11 security requirements, crucial for critical infrastructure, but piling on additional layers of review.
• General Accounting Office (GAO) and Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General oversight, aimed at preventing waste and fraud but causing programs to be managed with audit avoidance rather than optimization in mind.
• Interoperability mandates, vital for system continuity but requiring new technology to interface with infrastructure dating back to the 1960s.

Each of these requirements is justifiable on its own. They address legitimate safety, accountability, and operational concerns. But as Klein and Thompson observe, the cumulative effect is a labyrinthine process that few, if any, programs can survive unscathed.

The Bitter Irony: Progress Deferred

The National Airspace System aspires to deliver safer skies, greater efficiency, reduced delays, and modern infrastructure. Yet, the very processes designed to ensure these outcomes instead make them nearly unattainable. We mistake process for progress, celebrating completed reviews instead of completed deployments. Compliance is measured, but not actual capability. As a result, the FAA continues to operate with decades-old COBOL code, because upgrading requires navigating a procedural maze that outlasts the technology itself.

The latest attempt to break this cycle is the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS), projected to cost $31.5bn. Congress has approved an initial $12.5bn. However, without fundamental reform to address the cumulative burden of process, BNATCS could face the same challenges that doomed its predecessors.

A Way Forward: Distinguishing Essential from Excess

The answer is not to abandon oversight or safety standards. Rather, as Klein and Thompson urge, we must weigh the combined effect of our accumulated rules against their individual intentions. Some requirements are essential and truly load-bearing; others are bureaucratic rituals that add cost and delay without improving safety or accountability.

After 35 years inside this system, I can discern the difference. The pressing question is whether our institutions have the courage and wisdom to do the same—to act before another $31.5bn is lost to the process labyrinth.

Conclusion: The Promise of Abundance

The flying public deserves an air traffic control system built for the 21st century. They have been waiting since the 20th century began. The Abundance framework makes clear why they are still waiting and what must be changed to finally deliver on that promise.

Vincent E. Bianco III is a 35-year FAA veteran who served as Certified Professional Controller, Air Traffic Manager, and Legislative Director. He has worked on aviation safety initiatives with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and currently consults on safety management and organizational transformation for aviation organizations. He resides in Santa Rosa, California. He may be reached at vbianco3@marivinconsulting.com.