Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- FAA understaffing affects air operations oversight; NTSB falls short, too January 13, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 4. January 10, 2025
- The market is ready for a 787F. But is Boeing? January 9, 2025
- 2025 remains another year for recovery in commercial aerospace January 6, 2025
- Boeing touts safety progress but opposes SPEEA initiative January 3, 2025
FAA understaffing affects air operations oversight; NTSB falls short, too
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By Colleen Mondor
Commentary
Jan. 13, 2025, © Leeham News: When discussing the topic of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) staffing, it is traditionally Air Traffic Controllers that command media attention. Even when problems surfaced after the Boeing 737 MAX accidents in 2018-19, and following the Jan. 5, 2024, door plug failure on Alaska Airlines flight 1282, the discussion of FAA oversight remained narrow, focused only on Boeing.
Staffing levels within Flight Standards District Offices (FSDO) and how they impact commercial operations, especially among Part 135 operators, are rarely mentioned. (Part 135 operators are commuter airlines and on-demand companies.) And yet it is the inspectors for operations, maintenance, and avionics who can have the greatest positive impact on flight safety or, when absent, the most detrimental.
Between 2019 and 2023, there were 330 accidents involving Part 135 operators. (More than 100 occurred while operating under Part 91 or Part 133. Part 91 are individuals and corporate operators. Part 133 covers rotorcraft external operations.) In 11 of them, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted extensive interviews with FAA inspectors. Such interviews are largely the only way to obtain direct information on inspectors’ feelings about staffing and workload concerns. Their experiences vary, with Alaska standing out with the most severe staff shortages. A common theme is not having enough time to conduct in-person visits.
Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 4.
By Bjorn Fehrm
January 10, 2025, ©. Leeham News: We do a Corner series about the state of developments to replace or improve hydrocarbon propulsion concepts for Air Transport. We try to understand why the development has been slow.
We listed the different projects in the second Corner of the series that have come as far as flying a functional model or prototype. In Part 3, we went through some of the causes of the slow growth. It was a mix of inexperienced startup managments, all wanting to be the new Elon Musk but lacking elementary knowledge in the aeronautical field, to what is the real hard part of an alternative propulsion concept.
Many startups developed new electric motors for eAirplane or eVTOL use, a relatively straightforward development when the real hard part is the batteries. We described how batteries differ significantly from fuel as an energy source in Part 3.
Now, we add a market aspect that is poorly understood by most players.
Figure 1. The Pipistrel Velis Electro trainer. Source: Pipistrel.
The market is ready for a 787F. But is Boeing?
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By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 9, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing will cease production of its important 767F and 777F freighters in two years. Emission rules approved in 2017 by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration means these aircraft will be non-compliant beginning in 2028. As a consequence, production must cease.
Concept of Boeing 787-8F converted freighter. Credit: Leeham News.
Boeing has a solution to replace the 777F: the 777X family’s -8F is now targeted for entry into service (EIS) in 2028. Many believe that this date is squishy due to repeated delays in the 777X program. The aircraft still isn’t certified. The lead model, the passenger 777-9, was supposed to enter service as early as December 2019. Now, Boeing hopes to deliver the first -9s in 2026. This date remains uncertain, however.
The 777-8F is the next in the family, followed in 2030 by the ultra-long-haul 777-8 passenger model.
Boeing asked the US Congress for an exemption to allow the 767F, based on the -300ER passenger frame, to continue production after 2027. Congress approved the request. But with no orders after 2027 anyway, Boeing’s new CEO Kelly Ortberg announced in October that the production of the 767F will end in 2027. (Production of the KC-46A US Air Force refueling tanker, based on the 767-200ER, will continue.)
The market is ready for a 787 freighter to replace the 767F. But is Boeing ready to launch a program?
2025 remains another year for recovery in commercial aerospace
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By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 6, 2025, © Leeham News: Don’t look for any dramatic new product launches in 2025.
Nor should you expect any dramatic news, absent global upheaval of some kind.
This year is going to be yet another year dominated by recovery. Recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, which officially ended in 2022. Recovery by the supply chain. Recovery for Pratt & Whitney’s nearly decade-long problems with its Pure Power GTF engines supplying the Airbus A220, A320 family and Embraer E2 jets. Recovery by Airbus from its production and delivery delays. Recovery by Boeing from its series of self-inflicted crises, now beginning the sixth year.
There is just no getting around the fact that the commercial aerospace industry isn’t a smooth-running industry. It’s a long way from 2018, when all sectors were running smoothly. There is still a long way to go to recovery.
Here’s LNA’s take on what’s to come this year.
Boeing touts safety progress but opposes SPEEA initiative
By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 3, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing today issued an update on its year-long effort to improve safety protocols in the final assembly lines of the 7-Series commercial airplanes.
However, the update received lukewarm reviews from one of its leading unions and some retired employees charged with safety protocols who had complained for years about the safety culture.
Boeing has opposed a safety plan proposed by the engineers’ union, SPEEA. No meeting has been held since March 26 last year, and none is scheduled.
The update comes two days before the first anniversary of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 in-flight blow out of a door plug on a brand new 737-9 MAX. The airplane had taken off from the Portland (OR) airport and was passing through 16,000 ft when the plug on the left side aft of the wing blew off the airplane.
Nobody was sitting in the two seats next to the plug. A teenager in the row in front of the plug was nearly sucked out of the plane. There were minor injuries and damage from the decompression throughout the cabin and cockpit. The plane made a safe emergency landing minutes later.
The cause was traced to line assembly personnel’s failure to reinstall four bolts holding the plug in place. The plug eventually shifted in its track and separated from the aircraft. The plug blowout also blew up Boeing’s recovery efforts from the 2018-19 MAX crisis following two fatal crashes. These were traced to a design flaw with a flight system known as MCAS.
In its report issued today, Boeing said that it has:
Overview
- Addressed over 70% of action items in commercial airplanes production based on employee feedback during Quality Stand Down sessions.
- Instituted new random quality audits of documented removals in high frequency areas to ensure compliance to process.
- Added hundreds of hours of new curriculum to training programs, including quality proficiency, Safety Management System (SMS) Positive Safety Culture, and critical skills.
- Mapped and prepared thousands of governance documents and work instructions for revision.
- Significantly reduced defects in 737 fuselage assembly at Spirit AeroSystems by increasing inspection points at build locations and implementing customer quality approval process.
Updates 1 and 2: Key reason for Jeju 2216’s tragedy: the airport localizer construction and location
Update, Dec. 30: Reuters published this graphic, which is superb and self-explanatory. The full story is here.
Update 2. Dec. 31: A new Reuters article has some important detail about the location of the localizer vis-a-vis the runway and apron. Excerpts:
- Comments in the airport’s operating manual, uploaded early in 2024, said the embankment was too close to the end of the runway and recommended that the location of the equipment be reviewed during a planned expansion.
- “Unfortunately, that thing was the reason that everybody got killed, because they literally hit a concrete structure,” Captain Ross Aimer, the chief executive of Aero Consulting Experts, told Reuters. “It shouldn’t have been there.”
- Muan International Airport’s Operations Manual said the navigation equipment, or localisers, had been installed too near the end of the runway, or just 199 m (218 yards) from the crash site.
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South Korean officials have previously said the structure was about 250 m (273 yards) from the end of the runway itself, though a paved apron extends past that.
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The runway design did not meet industry best practices, however, said John Cox, chief executive of Safety Operating Systems and a former 737 pilot, adding that they preclude any hard structure like a berm within at least 300 m (330 yards) of the end of the runway.
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
Dec. 30, 2024, © Leeham News: The Dec. 29 (local time) accident of Jeju Flight 2216 is a tragedy that didn’t have to happen.
It’s far too soon to say what caused the emergency on the airplane. Within hours a host of theories emerged about the cause. The airport fire chief blamed the accident on a bird strike (singular). I’ve never heard of a single bird strike bringing down an airliner. Multiple bird strikes have brought down airliners going back to the propeller days. In recent history, US Airways 1549—the flight that Capt. Chesley Sullenburger and co-pilot Jeff Skiles safely landed in the Hudson River—is the most famous example.
Korean and assisting investigators will reveal if 2216 suffered multiple strikes that caused power to both engines to quit, as happened with 1549. The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) should put this to rest. The analysis of these should also reveal why the landing gear, slats and flaps were not extended. The cockpit resource management (CRM) will be analyzed as well to understand the coordination between the two pilots.
Whatever the reason for the emergency landing, the incontrovertible cause for the disaster that befell the plane was the presence of a berm and concrete structure of the runway localizer a short distance from the end of the runway. This structure should never have been constructed in this manner. Having been done, it should have been later removed and replaced by a structure that would not have been disastrous to the emergency flight.
I’m optimistic that the initial readout of at least one of the flight recorders will be available this week. One of the recorders was damaged and is being sent to the US National Transportation Safety Board in Washington (DC) for analysis. (It was not revealed which one at this writing.)
In the meantime, a wide list of topics will be investigated. These include but are not limited to:
Merry Christmas 2024 and Happy New Year 2025
Leeham News is taking the holidays off. Unless there is some huge breaking news before, we will return on Jan. 6, 2025.
Adams Park in Wheaton, IL USA, across from the Leeham Co. World Headquarters.
A decade to normal? Delivering every airplane in backlog won’t clear debt to 2018 levels
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By Karl Sinclair
Dec. 20, 2024, © Leeham News: In 2018, the Boeing Company (BA) delivered a whopping 806 commercial aircraft to customers.
That year, the corporation declared revenues of $60.715bn at Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA) and an operating margin of $7.879bn.
Operating cash flow was $15.322bn and Free Cash Flow (FCF) was $13.6bn.
2016 was the last year that Boeing did not have a negative net debt position (cash and cash equivalents less short and long-term debt).
In 2018, Boeing increased its net debt position by ($4.158bn), year over year, while spending $12.946bn on buybacks and dividends.
It borrowed money to give to shareholders.
Fast-forward to the end of 3Q2024. Boeing was forced to raise $21bn in a stock offering on Oct. 28, with $57.65bn in total debt and a ($47.18bn) net debt position.
How long will it take Boeing to get back to a position where it can invest in a much needed clean-sheet design to replace the beleaguered 737 MAX family?
Legendary analyst Cai Von Rumohr retires after 55 years
By Scott Hamilton
Dec. 19, 2024, (c) Leeham News: It is rare that LNA takes special note of aerospace analysts. Too many of them cozy up to the companies they cover because if they don’t, they’re access may be cut off or curtailed. For most reports, we look at them for information rather than analysis and we’re happy to cite the details rather than the conclusions.
Today, we’re making an exception. Cai Von Rumohr, an analyst of 55 years, has retired. He ended his career with TD Securities, more commonly known as Cowen. In his final note to investors, Von Rumohr provides an entertaining lessons learned and rules he followed during his long career. We don’t publish full reports without permission (after all, analysts sell their reports just like LNA sells subscriptions) but in this case, we don’t think Cai will mind offering his farewell for download. It’s available below.
Lilium on the clock to survival or dissolution
Update, Jan. 4, 2025: A German investment group will pump €200m+ into Lilium, purchasing all its assets.
By Scott Hamilton
Dec. 19, 2024, © Leeham News: Lilium, one of the earliest battery-powered eVTOLs, has two weeks to raise €1m to give it more time to fully reorganize—or on Jan. 1, the company moves into dissolution.
Lilium filed for bankruptcy in the US and insolvency under German law in November. As a German company, its future is governed by much stricter insolvency laws than in the US where bankruptcy laws give the debtor wide latitude and almost unlimited time to reorganize.
Under German law, Lilium has until Dec. 31 to raise €1m to tide it over while substantial funding is raised or a merger with a healthy partner can be arranged.
Lilium has an order and commitment book for more than 700 of its eVTOL, a 6-8 passenger Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) design that is flown by one pilot. The advertised range is enough to fly from New York City to Philadelphia. Lilium calls the AAM an electric jet, but in reality the powerplants are electric motors—a lot of them.
Lilium’s “jet” eVTOL battery-powered aircraft. Credit: Lilium.
But Lilium has gone through $1.1bn. It pays its executives handsomely, with critics complaining that they are way overpaid for a start-up company with no revenue. It purchased the former Dornier executive offices and built three big hangars to house parts and components, pre-production and final production.
Lilium bought the former Dornier headquarters at Munich’s research airport, and built three hangers. Critics point to this expense as an example of overspending. Credit: Lilium.
Critics say Lilium’s design is impractical, far behind schedule, and has yet to undergo meaningful flight testing.
Be that as it may, the company believes that German politics got in the way of approving a $100m Bavarian state loan that was a prerequisite for an equal investment from private sources. The critics say Lilium’s spending and executive pay played a role in Bavaria’s rejection.
