By Bjorn Fehrm
November 6, 2019, ©. Leeham News at Aviation Forum Munich: The second day of Aviation Forum Munich had an interesting presentation from Boeing’s VP of Sourcing, Jody Franich.
He described the One Boeing approach for Manufacturing and Sourcing and how Boeing is moving away from its supply chain Partnership for Success program, with the supplier cost down focus replaced by a more long-term cooperation model with a mutual benefit focus.
Nov. 6, 2019, © Leeham News: “It’s not easy to compare the performance of the two companies,” says Guillaume Faury, the CEO of Airbus, when the inevitable comparisons between his company and Boeing are made.
The context was talking about advanced manufacturing, discussed in Part 1 of this interview.
“I don’t think we are behind on digital. I think they might have gained more preparation on the future of production systems. We are catching up big time if not ahead in some important places. I think we will know who’s first when the next generation of airplanes is launched. These will be the first ones with digital design and manufacturing. There’s not a single plane today which is full DDMS.”
The issue is key to the next new airplane produced by Airbus or Boeing.
By Bjorn Fehrm
November 5, 2019, ©. Leeham News at Aviation Forum Munich: The Aviation Forum kicked off in Munich today, a yearly production and supply chain event started by the Hannover based Institute for Production Management nine years ago.
Today’s conference themes were How the OEMs benefit from Supplier Innovation, Additive Manufacturing trends and discussions around Outsourcing and Insourcing.
By Vincent Valery
Nov. 5, 2019, © Leeham News: Boeing already has racked up $9.2bn in one-time charges and additional costs to the accounting block in the 737 MAX crisis.
Some expect there will be more substantial charges before the dust settles. Even Boeing officials said it will be years before all customer claims are settled. Legal liabilities are only partially covered by insurance.
Other countries require unit accounting or charging off costs as they occur during development.
Boeing is one of few companies in the US to use program accounting. This masks current charges in the GAAP-approved financial statements. A few years ago, Boeing also began reporting non-GAAP numbers on the basis of unit costs as additional information.
With one-time charges and added costs to program accounting assumptions related to the 737 MAX grounding, Boeing’s accounting policies are back in the spotlight. The accounting policy became controversial as deferred production costs spiked on the 787 program.
As commercial and defense programs faced cost overruns and delays, the company had to record billions of US Dollars in charges and various losses over the years.
LNA went through all of Boeing’s annual 10-K filings since 1996 to identify all the charges recorded on commercial and defense programs.
After recording billions in charges since Dennis Muilenburg became CEO in 2016, we assess whether there is more to come in future quarters.
By Vincent Valery
Nov. 4, 2019, © Leeham News: The rise of the Big Three Middle Eastern carriers since the mid-2000s has been nothing short of astounding.
They took full advantage of an advantageous geographical location: 85% of the world population is within a 10-hour flight from either Qatar or the UAE. Emirates and Qatar Airways connect all continents, except Antarctica.
This transformation into super connectors did not come without controversies. The most vocal are the Big Three US legacy carriers, through the Partnership for Open and Fair Skies. They accuse the Gulf Carriers of benefiting from massive subsidies that allow them to underprice their competitors.
As part of a deal between Qatar, the UAE, and the USA, the Big Three Gulf Carrier started publishing audited financial statements. Emirates’ and Qatar Airways’ financial statements are publicly available on their websites since 1994 and 2015, respectively. Etihad Airways has been releasing some income statement information since 2010.
Ahead of the upcoming Dubai Air Show Nov. 18-19, LNA had a look at those financial statements. We outline our takeaways in this article.
Nov. 4, 2019, © Leeham News: Last week’s Congressional hearings about the Boeing 737 MAX crisis was just as I expected: theatre, lots of grandstanding, little substance and testimony that elicited little in the way of new information.
The US Senate hearing was a perfect example of playing to the television by many Senators.
The House hearing certainly had its share, but in more lucid moments, some House members produced new documents that were especially damning to Boeing.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg and John Hamilton, VP and chief engineer, did no harm to Boeing, which was probably the prime objective. (Hamilton is no relation to me.)
Muilenburg did harm to himself, however, and some Members of Congress landed some damning blows.
By Oliver Stuart Menteth
Fintech Aviation Services
Special to Leeham News
Nov. 1, 2019, © Leeham News: It was simplistic in design, had a graduated and limited input into the pitch control system and details were included in the relevant training, operational and maintenance manuals. It worked seamlessly and because of this its existence, and reason for installation, has eluded most people in the industry. The system was installed not as a result of a recommendation or regulation imposed by the FAA but at the insistence of the Air Registration Board (now the Civil Aviation Authority) of the United Kingdom.
But first, some relevant background.
November 1, 2019, ©. Leeham News: We start the series on analyzing the Lion Air 737 MAX crash by looking at what went wrong in the aircraft. It’s important to understand MCAS is not part of what went wrong. It worked as designed during all seven Lion Air flights we will analyze in this series.
It was a single sensor giving a faulty value that was wrong with these aircraft. How a single faulty sensor could get MCAS to doom the JT610 flight (called LNI610 in the report) is something we look into later in the series. Now we focus on why the sensor came to give a faulty value for five out of seven Lion Air flights and how these flights could be exposed to two different sensor faults.
By Judson Rollins
Oct. 31, 2019, © Leeham News: One year ago this week, Lion Air flight JT610 went down in the Java Sea near Jakarta. It was the first of two accidents that would expose catastrophic design problems with the 737 MAX – and a regulatory relationship between Boeing and the FAA that had become too close to comfort.
Although much has been written about the US major carriers’ orders for the MAX, relatively little has been said about orders from the Eastern Hemisphere. Prior to the MAX’s grounding, 136 airplanes had been delivered to the region and another 1,186 were on firm order. This comprises nearly 27% of Boeing’s firm MAX orders.
The following table shows the top MAX operators in Asia & Australasia:
By Bjorn Fehrm
October 31, 2019, © Leeham News: We have looked into what a reengining of the 767 with GE GEnx engines would give over the last two weeks. FlightGlobal wrote Boeing considers reengining the 767-400ER with the GEnx engine to produce a new freighter and perhaps a replacement for the NMA project.
We analyzed the aircraft fundamentals in Part 1, then passenger and cargo capacities in Part 2 and now we finish with the economics of different possible variants compared with the standard 767 and a possible NMA.