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Boeing’s CEO Kelly Ortberg, “Our recovery plan is taking hold.”
By Karl Sinclair
Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg. Credit: Getty Images.
July 29, 2025, © Leeham News: The Boeing Company (BA) President and CEO Kelly Ortberg is confident that, despite there still being work to do, he likes the direction that the company is headed in.
“We’re making steady progress to stabilize our business, strengthen development program execution, and change our culture to set up for the future,” he said on the 1H2025 earnings call.
While the company still reported a loss for the quarter, it was less than expected, and there were signs of improvement in areas that were projected to take longer to turn around.
Related Article
• Boeing 1H2025: Turnaround underway
Despite projections in the first quarter that 2025 would be a loss-making year for the company, along with a substantial drain on cash reserves, management was pleased to note that things were progressing along in a timely and orderly manner.
“I’m pretty pleased with where we are through the first half and through my first year. I’m not surprised with the performance of the company and the recovery. We’ve got great people in the company,” said Ortberg.
Boeing is first and foremost a commercial aircraft manufacturer. The company will go as that division does.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA)
The 737 MAX program has reached the mid-year production target of 38/mo, and the next step will be to approach the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to allow the company to produce beyond that rate to 42/mo. It will do so by first demonstrating stability at that rate over the coming months.
Moving forward, the ambitious goal is to increase production by five units every six months.
BCA plans to do this by opening a fourth production line in Everett (WA), dedicated exclusively to the MAX 10 variant.
However, both the MAX 7 and MAX 10 variants have yet to receive certification, and that process has now been pushed back.
“Work on the solution (for the engine nacelle de-icing design) is taking longer than expected, and we now are expecting certification in 2026,” Ortberg said.
There remain 20 737 MAXes in inventory, down from 35 at the start of the quarter. A further 35 of the uncertified MAX 7 and MAX 10 variants are also stored in inventory.
BCA expects to deliver on the sunny side of 400 MAXes during 2025.
The 787 program has now reached a production rate of 7/mo, with 37 units being delivered during 1H2025. A further 15 Dreamliners remain in inventory, with half expected to be handed over to customers in 2025 and the other half delivered in 2026.
There was no certification timeline offered on the 777X program. However, it was highlighted that production of the first 777-8F freighter variant had begun. Flight testing continues on the program, with all four flight-test vehicles completing more than 1,400 flights and 4,000 flight hours.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes is expecting to improve the 5.1% margin loss over the coming quarters, when it is projected to turn positive.
Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS)
Projected to produce negative margins for 2025, under the leadership of new CEO Steve Parker, BDS managed to surpass expectations by posting a modest positive earnings from operations of $110m for the quarter (1.7% operating margin), and $265m for 1H2025 (2.1% operating margin).
Compared to last year, when the division lost $762m in 1H2024, this is quite a turnaround.
BDS recently secured a contract to produce two satellites for the U.S. Space Force, worth $2.8bn.
“This contract is consistent with our strategy to ensure we enter into the appropriate contract type for the appropriate type of work”, said Ortberg.
This is about Boeing shifting away from signing fixed-price contracts at BDS.
“As we’re entering into these new contracts, we’re following our process to make sure that we only enter into the appropriate contracting type. The recent big wins, we have the development parts of those programs have all been cost plus. We’re not making the errors of the past and signing up for fixed price development, high-risk programs,” explained Ortberg.
BDS booked $19bn in orders during the quarter, and the backlog grew to $74bn. Revenue was $6.6bn, up 10% on improved operational performance. BDS delivered 34 aircraft and two satellites in the quarter.
Boeing Global Services (BGS)
Services continued to be a workhorse for Boeing, delivering solid profits at a 20% margin. The division took in $5bn in orders and the backlog ended at $22bn.
During the quarter, BGS sold its MRO operation at London Gatwick Airport and quietly went about its business.
“BGS remains a terrific long-term franchise that is focused on profitable, long-term, efficient offerings, and the team continues to execute very well,” Ortberg commented.
In 2024, Services delivered $3.6bn in profits and an 18% margin.
There was no mention of the upcoming asset sale of Jeppesen during the conference call, which is expected to raise $10.6bn in cash and close at year-end.
Financial Matters
Last quarter, Boeing projected a 2025 free-cash-flow (FCF) burn rate of between $5bn and $6bn, as stated by outgoing CFO Brian West. This has been upgraded.
“I think the $3bn net (cash-burn) is the right, reasonable assumption right now,” said West.
While declining to offer a timeline, Ortberg expressed the sentiment that achieving a $10bn annual FCF position is a matter of when, not if.
In the short term, expectations are that 3Q2025 free-cash-flow will mirror the second quarter, which will then turn positive in the final period of 2025.
Boeing is also facing an upcoming one-time payment of $700m, as related to the DOJ non-prosecution case, in the third quarter.
The projection for BDS is that it will return to high single-digit margins, as the company continues to focus on securing cost-plus contracts in the future. The risks associated with the current fixed-price contracts that currently saddle the division have much of their sunk costs expensed in previous periods.
Boeing also seems to have a handle on the problems with Commercial Airplanes.
“We’ve reduced travelled work at roll-out by 50%,” explained Orberg. “This is critical to our performance to deliver safe and high-quality aircraft on time to our customers and steadily execute our planned production increases.”
The key to success at BCA is increasing production and delivery rates, without the added expense of re-work. Full-year targets are for ~425 MAX deliveries and ~75 Dreamliners in 2025.
One-year anniversary
Aug. 8 marks the one-year anniversary of Ortberg taking over the helm of Boeing. He was asked about it by an analyst on the earnings call.
“I’m pretty pleased with where we are through the first half and through my first year…my role here is just to help everybody get organized and headed in the right direction. You know, it’s turning a big ship around. I think that we’re turning it,” he commented.
Ortberg knows that there is still work to be done, but Boeing is headed in the right direction.
As I have noted, Boeing has a lot of potential, it needed to change the culture and that is happening faster than I expected.
The MAX-7/-10 is an issue. It should not be that hard to solve the icing issue on the cowl.
Its going to be cool to see the 777-9 get into service.
KC-46A has had a huge leg up the last few weeks. Boeing worked out cost plus issues on the T-7A. USAF wanted more and Boeing said yes we can but we don’t do it for nothing. Usual USAF mess, nothing has changed in training and they want more flight time. Boeing saw that need in advance and built it in.
The original program was 179 KC-46, which is nearing the end. However the buy was extended under that contract to 188. The no competition contract for 75 more is being fianalised.
Originally the KC-46 spec was designed around the fuel load for the KC-135 and to replace that type. However the USAF actually replaced the KC-10 once the orders began, clearly the so called KC-135 replacement was a fudge to block off competition from the A330 tanker .
The no competition bid for 75 more ( plus probably at least as many again) was also done to make sure there wasnt a competing airframe.
Don’t believe that’s true. The KC-10 was a dead duck before KC-46 deliveries started. It’s original mission is gone (European theater operations flown from CONUS), because Europe now has their own tanker fleet. And the KC-10 was also far and away the costliest tanker platform to fly.
It’s a great aircraft, it served it’s function but it’s no longer needed. The USAF wants to focus on more frequent missions at lower cost and lower fuel loads. That gives them the greatest flexibility.
The MRTT has the same problem as the KC-10 for US CONOPS. Again it’s a great aircraft and for most European CONOPS, it’s a better match than the KC-46. It’s just not a good fit for most US missions, just like the KC-46 is not a good fit for most of Europe.
Even Israel is buying the KC-46 mostly because the American taxpayer is paying for it.
“The KC-10 was a dead duck before KC-46 deliveries started. It’s original mission is gone… And the KC-10 was also far and away the costliest tanker platform to fly.”
Isn’t this typical short-term thinking? Did the USAF look ahead a few decades? I guess not. Last but not the least, the capacity of the KC-10 is almost double that of the KC-135/KC-46, shouldn’t critics take that into account?
Don’t cry when such decision comes back to bite the behind.
Your comment reflects a lack of understanding of the facts.
The USAF evaluated the KC-46 for the missions the KC-10 was doing, and found that equivalent missions could be constructed around it. It has flown missions from the east coast to the South Pacific and back.
So that can be done if needed, it just requires a few more steps and resources. But the trade is a large reduction operational costs. And there are better mission designs that don’t require it.
Neither the KC-10 nor the MRTT can conduct those missions without themselves needing to be refueled. So it’s really just matter of degree.
A mission that takes one KC-10 would requires two KC-135/KC-46. Double the crew requirement.
A mission that can be completed by six KC-10 would require 14 smaller tankers.
All in name of saving money??
This isn’t true, because again you haven’t understood the CONOPS.
If you talked to a boomer or saw the tanker mission planning forms, you’d better understand the mission requirements. It’s not a simple matter of capacity.
The same is true for any logistics and delivery system. An 18 wheeler truck is not necessarily best for all land deliveries either.
What matters is the tanking fuel you arrive at the destination with, and the time you can loiter with it, while maintaining an anytime abort plan that allows you to land safely if something goes wrong.
When all that is considered, the larger tanker doesn’t necessarily come out as the best option. And having separate flight and delivery fuel supplies, can also be an advantage in mission planning.
No. The example I cited is what happened, it’s a real life.
Show me your data and your sources.
The same number of crew can staff KC-10 that flies further and carries more. Now it’s gone. To perform the same duty, the USAF has to double the crew. Wow!
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According to a GAO report, the operational costs of flying the KC-135 is over $25k/flying hour, which is higher than that of the KC-10.
Total debunk the myth that it’s more expensive to sustain the KC-10. 😭
No one here says that an 18 wheeler would meet the requirements of everyone. That’s a strawman argument.
OTOH is there anyone that’s brave enough to retire all their 18 wheelers?
While I do not fully agree with Rob, for the most part in my opinion he has it right.
KC-10 was a major cost. It was out of date before they put it into service. The MD-11 would have been a better choice.
An A330MRT also does not replace a KC-10 fuel load wise.
The KC-135 is also old, but there are 400 of them and they have been NEO, one of the most costly systems has been replaced with by far the least costly and extremely reliable engines.
If you want to replace a KC-10, you need a 777 or an A350.
There was no follow on program to maintain a KC-10 capability and unlike the 135, not procured in numbers as it had a narrow focus mission. You can make up in numbers and you have bases from all over the US to draw from.
Numbers are far more important than single focus lift. You can move a couple out of each squadron to another location and have minimal affect on the ops in the area they come from.
KC-46A is actually extending fueling as it has the drogue system at the same time as the boom. The USAF should take advantage of that and go to the drogues system for the fighters.
Reality is that if they needed the KC-10, they would have put a 747 into service and they would have had a follow up program for that slot.
NATO would be better served with KC-46A (no its not going to happen). The A330MRT is a better fit for someone like Australia that deploys out of area a lot.
One odd ball is South Korea, their current mission set favors the KC-46A, but they want to deploy out of area as well so with a limited asset they went with the A330MRT.
What the anti Boeing group won’t accept is the US has a lot of Cargo options and most European countries (or NATO) does not.
For non combat the A330MRT works, but come combat, then you have to give up tanking or cargo you can’t have both.
Haha
1. TW take a look at the GAO report I referred to above to see the readiness of those tankers before you threw out how many KC-135 the USAF has. We’re talking about tankers that have far exceeded their useful lives here.
2. “The KC-135, originally designed for a 50-year lifespan, is now projected to potentially fly for over 100 years”.
3. Posters here have to take out the atlas to see the distance one takes to cross the Pacific. That’s why I’m quite confident there won’t be any fight.
Conops is just a buzz word.
The actual specification was … more specific
‘In 2006, the U.S. Air Force began the KC-X tanker replacement program to replace its aging KC-135 Stratotankers. The program aimed to acquire 179 new tankers, and a request for proposal (RFP) was issued in January 2007. The RFP specified requirements such as fuel offload and range comparable to the KC-135, airlift capability, in-flight refuelling, and multi-point refuelling to support Navy and Allied aircraft.’
The follow on program KC-Y was about a KC-10 replacement , and yet ……
It was all about matching the KC-135 capability and replacement , as they were far and away the oldest planes.
KC-10 had plenty of years left and was well suited to refuelling ‘ thirty drinkers’ like the C-5 and B-52
@Pedro, actually you are the one making the assertion here that the USAF decision is not correct. Therefore up to you to provide the evidence for your position. You can’t place the burden on others to prove you wrong, under the rules of logic and debate.
The GAO figures you cite regarding the KC-135 are the reason USAF wants to replace them. The KC-46 figure is significantly lower.
@Duke, actually CONOPS is the fundamental reasoning that determines the needed capacity and frequency of flight for tanker operations. There is an argument to be made that US CONOPS was designed around the KC-135, as the only option available at the time, and has never really changed. It was retained under KC-X, and USAF has not taken the opportunity to change it.
In the original EADS competition, they proposed a new CONOPS that favored their KC-45 proposal. But that was rejected on the basis that it altered the competition. The USAF in KC-X, then rejected it a second time as well.
JFC. What’s logic? The one who asserted the KC-10 was too expensive to operate suddenly forget their premise when presented with facts. That’s called logic? That’s called the rules of debate? Give me a break. The rules of debate can’t be made up by one who can’t even face the facts with honesty and admit they were wrong, dead wrong. Give it up mate. You have no place in this debate. Your argument is thoroughly destroyed. Assertion has to be supported, that’s the rule of debate. No more incoherent argument that contradicts itself from one post to another.
The winner of a competition to replace the KC-135 turns out to replace the KC-10. Wow, what kind of “logic” is this??? FFS.
Pedro, that’s a nice rant but it doesn’t address any of the points I raised. Which is part of not following the rules of logic and debate, as I’m sure you know, despite your indignation.
There’s nothing to argue about here, except your refusal to accept facts. Which isn’t relevant to the matter at hand.
Fact is the USAF will surely miss its KC-10 in coming years.
In order for BA to recover its $9 billion loss on the program, flying the KC-46 won’t be cheap. These are self-contradictory, you can’t have your cake and eat it too. Boeing’s supporters don’t care who ultimately is going to foot the bill.
All illogic in what Pedro writes.
The cost of the KC-46A does not change. Support contracts are written differently.
The basis of the KC-X pr gram was to replace the KC-135R. The absurdity is that it was 179 (now 188 with options taken up). There are 400 or so KC-135Rs, the math does not pen out.
Billions have been saved just on a KC-46A vs an
A330 MRT. Boeing came in at 10% under.
Throw in fuel savings (more billions) for the life of the KC-46A vs the A330MRT.
Add in more billions for the next 75. Not as good as the KC-X bid but its going to be lower. More KC-46A flying than all the A330MRT orders.
Does the A330MRT have some advantages? Sure does. Very specific in missions flown from Alaska to strike the artificial Islands. Or you can send KC-46A, each fuel offload improves the range. You might need one extra. Then they peel off for Australia. You still need a 2nd group to retrieve your strike package.
First and foremost the USAF needs numbers. Then add ins like the KC-10 are nice. They have mismanaged the fleet and now they need numbers.
And they keep extending the life of KC-135R because its not being replaced. Plans are for the KC-135R into 2040.
Penny wise and pound foolish!
The KC-46 are delivered late, with multiple major deficiencies. Paying the full price in return for a substandard tanker, then comfort yourself by pretending you’re saving money. Can’t stop laughing!
Posters are detached from reality: almost a decade ago, it took 15 KC-135 *and KC-10* to support a single mission of B-2s. The bare minimum they can do before writing fiction is to read. Just read!
Our poster continued to dream up fantasies without learning what’s happened.
Take a look: tankers aren’t safe anymore thanks to BVR AAM and A2/AD. It’s not the 70s Vietnam or 90s Middle East. Update your priors.
Time and time again, those who are arrogant are caught off guard.
“Boeing overcharged the U.S. Air Force for spare parts for C-17 transport planes, including marking up the price on soap dispensers by 7943%…”
Boeing’s plan to make a quick buck from its captive customer.
Counting “billion of savings” without considering now it takes two KC-135/KC-46 to fulfill the mission of oneKC-10, double the crew, double the maintenance shop requirement.
Much illogic from our poster.
👇
Stealth will become obsolete in the future. It’s fast approaching.
As reported:
> The PL-15 that hit the Rafale was fired from around 200km (124.27 mi) away, according to Pakistani officials, and even farther according to Indian officials.
@Duke
Boeing is taking a beating on the KC-46A. If Boeing is dumb enough to sell that aircraft for what they did then the taxpayer is the winner.
At the risk of “beating” a dead horse, Boeing took a “beating” on the development contract for the KC-46, but not the production and service contracts. The development contract was only $5B of the contract total.
Even if that is doubled or tripled by cost overruns, the entire package is now valued around $200B, with the addon orders. So roughly 3%.
IIRC, the losses on the KC-46 program were $7bn. Now add on the cost of financing because BA doesn’t have any money – $53bn in borrowings.
Now calculate how much in revenues is needed, at the current margin – to cover that $7bn loss, plus interest.
Financing is really a separate issue, which Boeing has handled pretty well.
We’ve had this discussion before and nothing has really changed, so no need to have it again. I trust the evaluation of the banks and the many observers who are monitoring Boeing. All of them acknowledge the development loss but none of them view it as a threat.
The KC-46 losses have been written off as they occurred and the remaining majority of the contract is free of loss. So the impact going forward for either BDS or Boeing as a whole, is minimal.
@Rob
“The KC-46 losses have been written off as they occurred and the remaining majority of the contract is free of loss. So the impact going forward for either BDS or Boeing as a whole, is minimal.”
No.
The losses are still there. They just have a different name. They are now called Short and Long-Term Debt.
“Nothing has changed”, as you put it, because there is still $50bn + of debt on the balance sheet, that is still costing the company money.
$1.418bn in the first six months of 2025, alone.
So, that $7bn has to be re-paid, along with the borrowing cost on it. AT 5% that’s $350m per year.
So how many KC-46’s does Boeing have to sell, to cover $350m with earnings? Let’s sat they make $25m an aircraft (we’ll be generous) that makes 14 jets handed over, to cover interest expense only.
Boeing has handed over 5 in the first 6 months. Only another 9 to go, then it can start making money to pay off capital.
(and while this subject may have been covered before, it is worth repeating, when rosy predictions are made.)
Again I can only point out that your analysis and forecast are not shared by others. You’ve been predicting doom for a long time, but notably it has not materialized.
Losses do not necessarily translate into debt. Especially for an organization as large and diverse as Boeing. I have never heard anyone claim that Boeing debt was related to the KC-46 program. It was incurred over the twin disasters of the MAX grounding and the pandemic.
For reference, the KC-46 losses over a decade, amount to about what Boeing spends in one year on research. They’re just not that substantive in comparison to the size, income, and assets of the company. And as noted many times, they were limited to development, not production and services.
The program may experience a loss, but I seriously doubt that it will, when all is said and done and the KC-46 fleet is retired after many years of service.
I realize you believe differently, and you are welcome to your opinion. But I see no signs of that opinion manifesting in reality.
For reference, BDS makes $265m EBIT in 1H25, at that rate it’ll take more than 13 years to recover the $7 billion lost (excluding any interest charges on debts incurred) in one* program! Sobering.
Finance 101
Value of money
$1 today worth far more than $1 a hundred years later.
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I believe total losses on the KC-46 program has reached almost $9 billion so far.
Based on the new number, it’ll take close to 17 years to recover the loss.
@Pedro: Yes, in inflation dollars, you may be right. But these losses are cash-out-the-door charges, not inflationary charges….
Who says Boeing will sell the extended let alone the 75 new for what the bid was?
Anyone see the terms of the contract?
For sure on the 75 added, Boeing can change pricing. The USAF could then turn it down, but its going to be far lower cost than a new bid and assume a miracle, an Airbus win that then has a 2nd very close to the same capability tanker. hmmmm.
All the 75 is a way for the US govt (such as it is not these days) to get more tankers without a new program.
Boeing is going to look at its costs and make sure they make money on the 75. They also are going to take the support contracts into account and come up with a price that is higher than current.
They also have an established production system and there will not be major surprises.
Boeing has clearly stood its ground in fixed price contracts and its going to be assessed on making profits not losses. They did not budge a penny on the E-7 program. F-47 is not a fixed price contract.
If the USAF wants more sooner, they can do that as well (over time, not next month).
Frank P is shading things, a write off goes onto your taxes and reduces them. So they pay less taxes. I don’t like it but Boeing offsets the loss on its whole business. Its not money in the bank but its money not spent as well.
@Scott
One has to consider the value of future dollar, if one lends out $1 million for ten years and receives back the principle only, one is practically losing money over that period.
If I lose $10 by dropping in on the pavement, I’ve lost $10. Not some future value number.
The cost basis of the B767 is about to go up dramatically. There is no more freighter version to spread around overheard costs. If the USAF continues to take deliveries at their current rate…you are looking at a line producing one aircraft per month. Left unstatated was whether the “next 75” are getting re-priced to reflect the new cost basis.
@Scott
My post was in response to Rob: “The program may experience a loss, but I seriously doubt that it will, when all is said and done and the KC-46 fleet is retired after many years of service.”
That’s why I emphasize the value of money: the value of a dollar years ahead in the future does not equal to the value of a dollar at present.
@Casey, actually Ortberg said they will step up KC-46 production as slots become available on the 767 line. I don’t think they will keep it open any longer than necessary, for the reasons you cite.
Does Pedro math not apply to any procurement program?
Or is it exclusive to the KC-46A?
Pretty funny.
Funny to see those who pretend a dollar decades ahead is no different than a dollar today!
Never said a word about procurement. Not sure what you’re reading!
“Who says Boeing will sell the extended let alone the 75 new for what the bid was?”
TW is this your game plan how BA is going to recover their $9 billion lost? For Americans to foot the bill? Wow.
“The MAX-7/-10 is an issue. It should not be that hard to solve the icing issue on the cowl.”
LMAO. Seriously?? If it’s that* easy, why doesn’t BA have the solutionby now after eighteen months of work??
Remember, Boeing initially claimed that issue would be fixed and certified “within 6 to 9 months”.
That was several years ago..
Ah, can TW worked undercover for BA or an inspiration for BA’s engineers?
To clarify, Boeing is about 6 months behind schedule on the deicing fix.
They’ve been through a couple stages. First they said they would apply for a waiver, then when the solution became more involved, they said they would build the redesign into certification.
Now they said there will be another several months delay to redesign for engine air inlet conditions around the improved cowling.
Note that has happened as well for the B-52 engine upgrade. That cowling too has gone back into the wind tunnel to be tuned for specific conditions where it caused a problem.
I don’t know the details, but it’s likely due to geometry or heating that trips the boundary layer of the inlet into turbulence, for specific conditions. That can alter engine performance and create stresses on the fan. And it’s the kind of thing you usually find in testing. CFD only gets you so far.
Agreed.
I suspect they had a fix that did not work out the way intended.
What is bizzare is that the FAA is letting them make -8 and 9 with no fix but they can’t make -7 or -10.
Truly a strange world.
I wonder how many engineers or production people we have commenting?
I have worked both the engineering side and the put it into service side. I always had the benefit of seeing how it was done wrong.
The best engineers I worked with tried to get in the middle of adjustment so you could tune it to work even if the listed properties were not the same as the field.
TW
A history revisionist wannabe? I read Boeing promised the Congress and the FAA to fix the issue before putting the -7 and -10 into services.
Yeah there’re always issues discovered after a new aircraft obtained its type certificate. That’s why there’re AWs. Are you new here?
@TW, that’s the reality of certification rules. Despite what Pedro is implying, you cannot knowingly certify a flaw, without a waiver.
Boeing decided against the waiver and now they are committed to certification. Aircraft that are not certified can have an AD issued to address the problem procedurally, but that’s not an option for certification. Even though it seems crazy at times.
Same thing with Starliner vs Crew Dragon. Dragon flies with procedural waivers that aren’t permitted for Starliner. That’s just how the rules work. And they are probably for the best, so you don’t introduce known problems into service.
Rob: I am not contending otherwise.
It is pretty weird in reality though.
That area of air flow is fraught with complexity and its clear why its not easy.
The nacelle anti-ice system in a composite inlet touches on many systems from engine and on. With new FAA requirements all systems need to be fully fault analysed, tested and documented. Still that should be natural routine for any modification. I guess the new strength requirements for inlets with blade-out at top rpm and fan cowl fool proofing latches indication of fully locked comes into the redesign together with coat and mass reduction.
Wow.
> The B-52 re-engining program and radar modernization are facing significant delays. The re-engining is delayed due to air inlet design issues, pushing the Critical Design Review to next year and potentially impacting the timeline for operational capability. The radar upgrade is also delayed, with initial operational capability now expected around 2030, three years behind schedule. These delays are attributed to challenges with software development, digital engineering practices, and production decisions.
BA is no longer capable of basic engineering.
Lets see, the most complex interactions in air flow is simple?
Have you applied to Boeing? Clearly they need a genius. Better than AI or a Supper Computer, its a bird, no its a plane, no it super dog!
Oh, lets not forget, you have to live with the existing pylon and location on a design that is pushing 100 years?
Right.
Who knows? Shouldn’t BA/BCA have thought of it before rushing a derivative out the door??
“Clearly they need a genius. Better than AI or a Supper Computer, its a bird, no its a plane, no it super dog!”
Let’s not pretend BCA engineers are still using slide rules for their work. IBM has been selling mainframes for more than seven decades. The cpu in today’s smart phone is orders of magnitude faster than Apollo’s guidance computer.
@Pedro
Not for nothing, but you know where ‘you know who’ is located.
I’m not sure if they even have colour TV’s up there, yet…
“Lets see, the most complex interactions in air flow is simple?”
A day earlier on July 29, @TW wrote: “It should not be that hard to solve the icing issue on the cowl.”
Wow! What a difference a day makes.
Still no timeline for 777X EIS. Interesting.
Thats because the flying has been done and the paperwork done. Its FAA timeline now, who knows how many experienced staff have been let go under the ‘ trumpist-party-state purges’
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2025-02-17/hundreds-faa-employees-drawn-mass-layoffs
“Thats because the flying has been done and the paperwork done.”
Can you explain what’s holding back the 777-9 from certification? It seems the glass in your eyes is “overflowing”. 😂 Not sure where is your source or how correct it is, but it’s said that there’s a long, long way to go as the FAA allow BA to move to the “next phase” of certification.
To clarify, they said it was the final phase of certification. You may be reading too much into this.
Leeham just published an article that 777X certification is close, and all signs are pointing to that being the case.
I heard that’s not true. This is the fourth phase of the certification program.
Apparently more tests are underway:
“N779XY is back in the air”
Fourth and final are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The evidence weighs heavily against you here. But if this is what you choose to believe, that’s your privilege.
I heard it’s far from the “final phase” as you claimed.
Does it look like the flying part is done? 🤣
Be honest! 👇
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/N779XY
It’s also your privilege to ignore what’s happening.
Or to consider lack of knowledge?
Some of that testing is building hours under the official cert program, they have built hours under non cert.
And there is a reason why they had 4 test aircraft.
Some of the testing they had time for and did not need the 4th for.
FAA is quietly hiring all those they dumped back.
EASA also is going to be going over the documentation and returning assessment to the FAA.
Which is a good thing. Two different cultures looking at the same aspect means a better end product.
TW
Speaking of a lack of knowledge, what’s your profession? An aerospace engineer?
No sir, I am a certified genius that is all knowing and all seeing.
Ah same as the “stable genius”, neither stable nor…
There is a timeline, it’s just not narrowed down to a specific date. Boeing has ended that practice because they cannot predict FAA progress or requests for further documentation.
Also it creates the impression that the tail is wagging the dog, with Boeing telling the FAA when to certify the aircraft. All of that ended with the MAX accidents.
Except of course, for the MAX 7 and MAX 10 program. Boeing is ok with letting customers know it’s now going to be 2026. That, they can predict and I guess the process didn’t really end with the Max…did it?
And? Boeing explained what they did and why, to shareholders and airlines and anyone else who is interested.
They also said for those airlines that can’t wait, they will substitute other MAX models, and offer compensation. I’m sure the airlines have far more insight here than we do, and will make their own decisions.
I don’t see the need to twist that into something nefarious or negative. It’s just the ground truth. Airlines certainly understand that the certification environment has changed. As do most people.
There’s a reason why the certification environment is changed. It didn’t happen out of the blue as some here pretend, ir happened thanks to BA’s previous efforts to cover up what’s underneath the carpet!
The certification environment changed because it was too focused on timelines and delivery. Boeing played a role in that, by lobbying Congress for greater autonomy.
The current environment has swung sharply the other way, but it’s like a pendulum, it now has incentive to swing back toward the center, which is where it belongs.
But as noted many times here, there was no coverup by Boeing in the certification of MCAS. The FAA admitted publicly that they had the data in their files, they just didn’t identify it.
Once they are confident they won’t make that error again, they will work on improving the certification workflow. But right now, its a secondary consideration. And no one, not Boeing, not the airlines, not Congress, is challenging that. Its an acceptable outcome for everyone.
@Rob:
I disagree on where certification is.
Currently it at the right of center.
Center would be the ODA to report to the FAA like they used to.
It had nothing to do with efficiency, it had all to do with making more money.
Unlike the Tacoma narrows, they did not get away with removing safety aspects. Two tragic crashes and an incredibly narrow escape .
MCAS was deliberately minimized and hiding anything in the process is not an excuse that its the FAAs fault. Boeing bent things to get it there.
They also added stuff to the MCAS in motion amounts they did not document to the FAA and withheld it from Airlines.
Brazil did catch it and put it in their pilots manuals. Burying it in the tech manuals where no one saw it is deliberately hiding.
Assessment of the AOA failures was cherry t picked. If I can pick it out as stupid for a single AOA, then engineers can.
They knew it was horrible logic and the culture encouraged it.
And why have a yahoo as a test pilot?
Requirement:
Looking for special talent whoever can use jedi mind tricks.
@TW, the FAA admitted they had all the MCAS certification details, new and old. That’s in the public record, within Congressional testimony. They flight tested MCAS in both iterations.
Further in the Boeing DPA agreement, the DoJ also specified that there had been no concealment of certification detail by Boeing. Again this is in the public record.
I realize people have strong opinions about this, but it’s a disservice to insist on things that have been factually established as untrue.
If you want to criticize the withholding of training detail on the new version of MCAS, by all means, fire away. I agree with that finding and the fraud charge. Even if Boeing didn’t know about it, they are still responsible for it. But you can’t honestly extend that into certification. There is no evidence to support it.
Certification of the 777-9 Ortberg said is still 2026. That timeline has not changed.
FYI:
A few weeks ago, the talking point still is
“Boeing sees the program is finally on track for certification this year and EIS next year.”
https://leehamnews.com/2025/07/14/at-long-last-boeing-appears-near-certification-and-eis-for-777x/
dec 31, 2026
BA’s earnings report yesterday was a sugar puff: bright and sweet on the surface, but empty on the inside.
Another rinse/repeat of the same old laundry, with the same old promises. Investors weren’t impressed — the stock dropped more than 4% yesterday.
Show us — don’t tell us.
Meanwhile, AB Q2 results have just been released.
H1 commercial aircraft:
306 deliveries, revenue €20,829M, EBIT 1,231M.
That gives average revenue per frame of €68.07M ($78.08M) and average EBIT per frame of €4.022M ($4.614M).
The correspoding BA figures (Q2): $72.49M and -$3.71M (loss).
So, despite having proportionally fewer widebodies in the mix, AB is securing a higher average price per frame.
Why does BA continue the unsustainable discounting? Is it an attempt to win back market share?
AB 60 “gliders completed” but waiting for engines. 2025Q2
And yet you scoff when Boeing falls short on deliveries , they have the same engine issues surely
Lol. BA asked suppliers to maintain production during their strike. As a result, they have “a lot of inventory from the supply chain built up”. That’s why they are less impacted by supply chain disruption in 2025.
Number of aircraft delivered is one metric, ultimately the proof is in the pudding, the P&L account. Can you remind us how much does BCA lose in 1H25? How does it compare with €1,231m Airbus earned in the same period?
At the end of the day, does it matter if BCA delivers say 1,000 aircraft but lose $3 billion?
“And yet you scoff when Boeing falls short on deliveries…”
BCA had the highest quarterly deliveries since 2018 — and it still produced an operating loss. Why? Over-discounting.
On July deliveries: 31 MAXs p/m in the months up to June, then a claimed one-off 38 in June, only to go off a cliff in July. And that’s despite having a stockpile of engines “in triple digits” (Brian West’s words). Sounds like manipulated numbers aimed at wowing the market.
+1
The difference is what’s controllable by BA/AB:
A strike at Safran is not truly controllable by AB, unlike assembly issues like those happened at Boeing, traveled work, production pressure, lack of oversight, inadequate work instructions and systemic issues.
Isn’t that obvious?
Bad outcomes were foreseen years ago, but opposing voices were buried or put in exile.
Former Boeing manager in Renton warned about 737 Max problems
https://www.heraldnet.com/business/former-boeing-manager-in-renton-warned-about-737-max-problems/
Also CFM suffered from GE’s blade yield problems.
Deliveries will catch up in coming months, how our posters would respond?
> Safran CEO Olivier Andries acknowledged that CFM had fallen behind in deliveries to Airbus in recent months…
He confirmed that CFM had an agreement in place with Airbus over the number of engine to be delivered over the rest of the year as the planemaker strives to meet its delivery targets. Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury said on Wednesday that engine makers had agreed to support its delivery goals.
“Despite projections in the first quarter that 2025 would be a loss-making year for the company, along with a substantial drain on cash reserves,…”
That’s still going to be the case at BCA, because unit revenues are consistently too low to cover unit costs. The division is essentially a jobs program.
The company is depending on BCS to subsidize the structural underperformance at BCA and BDS.
> Had an experience over the weekend. A flight meant to highlight new tech for old tankers quickly ended as we had an IFE and returned to base It highlights the question, what good are these limited upgrades if the aircraft themselves face deeper problems?
> The KC-135 I caught a ride on had the RTIC kit for improved situational awareness. But, it also has some sort of vapors/smoke coming from the back so we returned home wearing emergency oxygen. Sidenote, the emergency O2 packs in the tankers do not work that well.
https://x.com/beverstine/status/1950313771785994307
Debrief: An Inflight Emergency Highlights USAF’s Mobility Challenge
AW: https://t.co/63ozU5NkBF
Its why the KC-135R was being replaced in the first place.
The USAF has consistently failed to recapitalize their assets. There should have been a follow on program before the last KC-135 was built.
And people are snapping up the KC-135 that France finally was able to retire.
Happy to have helped them out over the years.
The KC-135 are planned to continue to fly even after they cross one hundred years old.
Yep, not because they want to, they have to.
Even with the added orders on KC-46A, they are short 200 tankers
Obsolete aircraft now, obsolete aircraft then?
> There were five separate TCAS activations for PSA flights flying into DCA in the months leading up to the Jan. 29 accident, including one just the day before the CRJ & Black Hawk mid-air collision.
https://theaircurrent.com/feed/dispatches/live-updates-ntsb-investigative-hearing-on-dca-mid-air-collision/
Reuters: Air India audit finds 51 safety lapses, from unapproved simulators to training gaps
Kelly has talked a great deal about accountability, but as a keen Boeing watcher I don’t see any action being taken against the implicated middle management and individual contributors in huge technical failures of the past 2 decades. Here is an example that should be simple to identify and act upon: the clique that saddled the Boeing shareholders with the trivially ill-advised X-66 project MUST be removed from the company. They are either criminally incompetent, career fraudsters, or fatally untalented. This is the same clique that brought us the long line of totally useless paper airplanes (and now disgraced, to quote the former CEO, as “bad ideas”): NLT, MOM, MMA, NMA, among others. In total, they are responsible for having burned at least $ 1.2B and 15 years with very little to show for it. Now this clique has lucrative and unusually privileged remote work arrangements at Boeing, gotten on the back of the X-66, living their best life in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, etc, as they are getting ready for the next scam. So long as this clique operates at Boeing, no strategic product development would be forthcoming. Production, operations and reliability of current products could get better, but the long-term outlook of complete obsolescence of the commercial product line will remain, and will eventually catch up to the finances. The day I hear they have been fired, I would believe the ship of Beoing Co has started changing course.
Just to clarify on the X-66, that is a joint development program with NASA. Both Boeing and NASA have said it’s experimental. They hope it will become viable but that’s not assured, nor have they ever claimed it so.
Boeing decided not to proceed with the prototype because of unfavorable structural results in the TBW modeling. I know people at NASA involved in this program, and they concurred. There are multiple issues to be worked out in the design before building a prototype.
That decision also frees up the prototype team to work on certifications for other platforms, which is aligned with Ortberg’s statement of focusing on core functions.
However X-66 is not dead, or a waste. It will stay in the lab for now to continue development of structures and materials to support the design. People are still actively working on it, but the prototype construction team is dispersed to other programs.
Boeing and NASA both still believe the future is in high aspect ratio wings. But the application of commercial safety standards is not a trivial problem. That’s been known since the B-24 in WW2, with the Davis wing.
Generals loved the B-24 because it could fly farther with a heavier bomb load. Crews loved the B-17 because it could take a wallop and still get them home. That hasn’t changed, there’s a similar dilemma for commercial development.
just a another fyi
Malaysian Airlines Eyes New COMAC C919 Planes
“Malaysia’s AirAsia , one of Asia’s largest low-cost carriers, has expressed interest in evaluating the C919, though no firm agreements have been signed”
They want better terms. Ryanair did the same thing.
They would not be allowed to operate a C919 in a number of countries.
Malaysia is one of the first countries where Chinese aircraft is in service. Womp womp.
At the end of the day, when countries find alternate markets, the tariff nation will be left behind and forgotten.
Malaysia Airlines has a sizable domestic network.
It also has multiple routes to Indonesia, Vietnam and China — close neighbors that can all be served by the C909 (and, soon, the C919).
Won’t be long before countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar get added to the list.
As a benchmark, how many countries currently allow the MAX-7/10 to operate?
Oops.
Duke & Rob
Apparently BA has plenty 777-9 flight testing ahead! The truth of the fourth phase of certification. 😁
For the record 👇
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Gxizl3KasAA0wGt?format=jpg&name=large
No one can hide the truth.