Boeing ponders 16/mo production rate for 787

By Scott Hamilton

July 16, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing is considering boosting the production of its 787 widebody jet to 16/mo, LNA has learned. This record rate would be at its Charleston (SC) plant and would exceed the previous high of 14/mo split evenly between its Everett (WA) facility and Charleston.

Boeing 787-9. Credit: Boeing.

The Charleston plant currently has enough space to produce 12 787s per month, a 2020 analysis by LNA concluded.


Related Article


Boeing expanding Charleston plant

In December last year, Boeing and the South Carolina governor announced that Boeing will spend $1bn to upgrade and expand the plant. Neither revealed what the expansion was for. Now, information obtained by LNA from the supply chain reveals that Boeing is studying the record production rate by the end of this decade.

Boeing declined to comment, citing the quiet period before officers discuss the 2Q2025 earnings on July 29. At a Bernstein investors conference on May 29, CEO Kelly Ortberg said that Charleston needed to be expanded to produce more than 10 787s a month. Boeing currently is producing 7/mo.

In 2006, Boeing pondered rate 16. However, it peaked at 14/mo in 2018-19. Once the COVID pandemic hit in March 2020, Boeing sharply reduced the rate to as low as one-half 787 a month.

Through June, Boeing had 1,001 787s in backlog: 33 787-8s (3.2%), 696 787-9s (69.5%) and 272 787-10s (27%).

Production slots currently are sold out to about 2030. Largely because of the pandemic and resulting supply chain disruptions, which continue, there is a significant shortage of supply from Boeing and Airbus for widebody (and narrowbody) airplanes in the coming decade.

777-9 Entry-into-Service

Separately, the certification of Boeing’s largest aircraft, the 777-9, is anticipated by the end of this year. According to the supply chain, entry-into-service is targeted for June next year.

There are about 30 777-9s in inventory at Paine Field, where its widebody plant is located. Most await engines. The first has been stored since 2019. All need to be brought up to date with any system, software or other changes that were developed since 2019.

112 Comments on “Boeing ponders 16/mo production rate for 787

  1. I’m not surprised to read Boeing are considering higher 787 rates. Widebody aircraft are in structural deficit right now as a consequence of high retirement rates through Covid and very low production rates since. Even when Airbus reach their planned 12 A350 in 2028 (which includes 2 freighters), together with four A330 they will only be building as many passenger widebodies as they were in 2019. As presently planned Boeing’s 10 in 2028, plus a handful of 777s, will also mean they would be building fewer widebodies than in 2019. With an estimated deficit of around 750 widebodies, seems to me that higher rates are needed if airlines are to have enough passenger widebodies in future.

    • Indeed.
      But let’s see how (macro)economic and geopolitical factors pan out.
      If economic growth cools substantially — as currently predicted — then airlines are going to see a (further) revenue hit…in which case it may not be long before we see deferrals/cancellations.
      And trade wars / tariffs can also adversely influence order books.
      Remember: the current circus is going to extend into 2029 🙈

      • Widebodies are mainly used on international flights. Current isolationist trends, not only in the US isn’t helping demand. F. ex I live in Colombia & Avianca are advertising transatlantic flights at prices I’ve never dreamed about, looks like repurposing of equipment from US flights to EU

    • The same company that had so many issues with quality, u think needs to be going faster?

      • This.. and “by the end of the decade” = meaningless claim from BA.

        Trying to bump the stock price via PR, methinks.

      • It is pretty odd in my view.

        The high rates previously were never sustained. 777/787 or MAX.

        Something always comes up and clearly we are in even more volatile times.

        I have stated before, I thought rate 14 was nuts.

        If they want a short term boost then do it in Everett where they have the space.

        The only real rate production there is the 777-ER and the 777-X. Put the 787 in the 747 build or the wrap around line they had or move the MAX-10 to the wrap around line.

          • Not just the wings.

            Leonardo has a fuselage section and I think co tail production.

            Subaru (Fuji) makes the wing box so that is two mfgs in Japan to ramp major assemblies.

            Spirit would have to ramp up as well (nose) – and that is just the big parts of the supply chain.

          • Don’t forget 25% tariff, and the EU is planning for retaliation.

          • We can hope the Orange one cuts a deal and this moves to the rear view mirror.

            He has himself in a conspiracy pickle these days, maybe it will bite him.

    • How much own experienced staff do they have now vs. contractors? Many 787 were flown to Everett to be fixed.

      • One reason I think Everett can do it is the experience group they still have there.

        A lot quicker than training up people in Charleston when they have just got stable and doing a ramp up.

  2. Lets hope these forecasts become reality. If we would create a table with past reported expected production rates since 2020, we would see that Boeing has been off for many years / executives.

    In the first 6 months Boeing delivered 37 787’s a rate of 6.2. I don’t know how many 787s came out of storage in that period, 15? There is a tendency to give Boeing the benefit of doubt, because, well.. not so much.

    It’s essential for Boeing to boast 787 production, because cash flow requires it. Trump won’t help forever. Airbus, sitting in the position it’s currently in, isn’t stimulated to innovate.

    COMAC will up production like only the Chinese seem able to, Airbus won’t sit on its hands and schedule new types (e.g. A225, A322, A350UltraF, MRTT NEO). They have the initiative.

    Boeing needs TO/Cash to move on, next to recovering.

    • @keesje:

      Having watched the China programs for a long time, I don’t see them ramping up production per their other rapid build projects (High Speed rail was impressive).

      I don’t know what the hold up is, it does not seem to be money.

      And while I know some think its anti Chinese I have nothing against the people of China. I don’t like their government nor do I like our current one.

      Government and capability to get things done can be different. That getting things done can be at a cost in quality.

      I don’t see that in their high speed rail system that exceeds anything we have by leaps and bounds. If their are any crashes they are few enough to not get into the press.

      • China lifted an unprecedented 800 million people out of poverty.

        “This is the material dethroning of the west as the central driver of world history. This is really what the provincialization of the west really looks like.” ~ Historian Adam Tooze

        Read this thread:
        https://x.com/dwallacewells/status/1945798429818732821

        > “This is the biggest laboratory of organized modernization that has ever been or ever will be… That changes the game. All of our previous social-theoretic theorizing was a prelude to this… The industrial history of the west was a preface to China’s industrial history.”

        “This is the domain in which China has just not just overtaken but frankly blown away every conceivable alternative center of relevance in the last 20 years. And so the energy transition is essentially a China problem, at this point.”

        “We thought of the energy transition as a static, zero sum, how do we replace a with B—what China has shown us is that development is the master key, growth is the master key, to understanding how we bring about really rapid change in energy technology.”

        My quote comes from the last tweet.

        Which leads me to 👇 this piece from the author of The Rise of The West, William McNeill:

        “A second, less embarrassing bur more important failure occurred in chapter 10, which treats world affairs between AD 1000 and 1500. In this case, new scholarship since 1963 has pointed the way to a firmer and better understanding of what was going on in the Eurasian world, and it is therefore obvious why I missed the centrality of China and Chinese civilization in these centuries. Instead I concentrated on “The Steppe Conquerors and the European Far West,” to quote the title of the chapter. My mistake is therefore entirely forgivable. All the same, it is clear in retrospect how emphasis on steppe conquerors and the rise of medieval Europe reflected the bias of my education. For the chapter looks at Eurasia from a naively Western viewpoint. Turks and Mongols come galloping over the horizon from the east—suddenly, and, so to speak, mysteriously, though I did note the system of bureaucratic management that made Genghis Khan’s armies so formidable. Nonetheless, I failed to connect the remarkable upsurge of nomad power with the fact that the new bureaucratic methods of military administration that the Mongols employed were a straightforward borrowing from Chinese practice. As a result, I overlooked the ultimate disturber of world balances in the era itself: that is, an efflorescence of Chinese civilization that raised China’s culture, wealth, and power to a new level, far outstripping all the rest of the world for a period of four to five centuries.

        […] no one before Jacques Gernet ([1972] 1982) seems to have noticed how the ill-success that attended the Song armies on the steppe frontier arose from the fact that Chinese skills were spreading beyond the country’s traditional borders, upsetting previous balances between China and its nomad neighbors and, as Ghengis Khan’s career soon showed, throughout most of Eurasia as well.

        In view of the way The Rise of the West is put together, my failure to understand China’s primacy between AD 1000 and 1500 is particularly regrettable inasmuch as the book would have attained an elegant simplicity of structure if I had done so.”

        [From the article The Rise of the West After Twenty-Five Years.]

    • Boeing have delivered 42 787s to date in 2025 (including 5 already this month). 19 of those were ‘built’ in 2024 or earlier (by which I mean had a first flight recorded prior to 1 January 2025; 5 are 2020 ‘build’, 6 are 2021 ‘build’, 1 is 2022 and 7 were 2024). To date in 2025 there have been an average of 5 aircraft ‘built’ per month (again using first flights), up from 3 in 2024. In April/May/June it was 6/5/6 so I think the data indicates progress towards 7 which I think is the target this year. There are 26 aircraft which have flown but which await delivery, including 5/6/1/7 with first flights recorded in 2020/2021/2022/2024. 16 of these 26 are for Lufthansa, awaiting the Allegris business class certification. All of this data comes from Cirium’s fleet database.

      Finally, the pace of ramp up for the narrowbody C919 at COMAC is painfully slow. The widebody C929 is apparently in development but not expected to be in service until well into the 2030s. Widebody production will remain with Airbus and Boeing for at least the next 15 years and given significant replacement and slower growth demand, I believe there is headroom for Boeing to manufacture 787 at Rate 16 if they can find a path to do so.

  3. As always with Boeing, the question is, can they execute? They seem to be doing better on that front, but the jury is still out.

    I honestly would rather see them miss their production targets, and keep their quality KPI’s and metrics high. We already know where the alternative path leads, if production is prioritized, and that’s to disaster.

    Also for the record, as a long-time defender of Dave Calhoun here, I was extremely disappointed to find he had misled the board, shareholders and everyone else on Boeing SMS and safety culture progress. While there were some mitigating factors involved, the picture he painted was so different from the reality, that it was completely inexcusable. And frustrating in the extreme.

    The NTSB took 800 pages of testimony from Boeing labor and management, as well as Spirit labor and management. It’s all in the docket for the Alaska Airlines blowout incident. It takes awhile to get through it, but it’s recommended reading for anyone who wants to understand what happened at Boeing.

    I’m glad we have the NTSB who have the power of discovery to document things objectively. There’s a lot to be learned from the acquired information. The picture it paints isn’t pretty, but unless you drag that stuff out into the daylight, there will be no improvement.

    • @Rob:

      Curious what you saw in Calhoun at all.

      While the details of his failures have come out, that he was failing was clear from the start I felt.

      Classic not only not involved in the company but actively avoided even the appearance of managing it.

      Having followed the downward spiral of Boeing, Calhoun was not responsible for it. He was responsible for it continuing.

      That is the group that either endorsed or actively abetted gross nelgelct6 to the point the Company was almost liquidated.

      I think Mulienberg was a dupe outside his capability, so rather than malicious it was getting to the level of incompetence for him.

      Granted that is my view and I realized early in my career that I did not belong even at a foreman level. I could fill in but long term I was only interested in fixing things not dealing with people.

      • Calhoun said all the right things in the quarterly reports and media calls. He said Boeing was making progress on SMS and instituting safety culture. Also said they were compliant with the FAA requirements om those issues. The FAA had accepted that as well, it was only after the blowout incident and they began interviewing people, that the truth came out.

        That’s why the DoJ reopened the fraud DPA, there was a requirement that Boeing report its status, which they plainly had not done truthfully.

        At the NTSB hearing with the FAA, they grilled the FAA safety compliance expert as to how that had happened. I really liked her, no BS, just the unvarnished facts.

        She said that there was a complete disconnect between lowest and highest levels of management at Boeing. At the floor level there was no impetus to adopt the new systems, if anything there was resistance from labor. In the interviews, labor said without exception they would not report problems in the new safety systems because of fear of retaliation. Zero trust.

        But the supervisors told upper management they had implemented all the systems as requested. Which was technically true, but almost no employee used them. They were quite literally “useless”.

        She also said that although the FAA had mandated SMS at Boeing as early as the 2015 settlement, in fact FAA had no regulatory rulemaking or framework for manufacturing SMS until 2022, and the rule did not become law until after the Alaska incident in 2024.

        When asked about this, she said an airline SMS, which had been in place for almost 2 decades, does not necessarily apply to manufacturing. And so Boeing was waiting on the FAA for guidance during that time.

        I thought she characterized it well, that it was necessary to develop a new framework from scratch, and FAA was working with Boeing (as the largest US manufacturer under their jurisdiction) to develop the new rule. So partial blame on FAA.

        But Boeing having the information disconnect and management reporting compliance where there was none, was totally on Boeing.

        So as I mentioned there are mitigating factors for Calhoun. He was waiting on FAA rules and guidance, and he may have believed what his supervisors told him. But ultimately it’s his responsibility to talk to labor and have an understanding of the reality of the floor. Its part of the diligence requirement of his job.

        I’ve heard good things about Kelly Ortberg in this regard, he appears on the floor and talks to people. Also asks them if they are using the new systems, if those systems work, and if they have concerns about management and retaliation. That’s wise because if labor doesn’t cooperate with the changes he’s making, he’s sunk. He seems to understand that, whereas Calhoun seemed to take it for granted.

        • @Rob:

          As usual interesting reading.

          Having been a shop floor type of mechanic/technician, the things I was looking for in Calhoun I never saw. Lots of lip service but absent as well.

          One of the interesting things about WWII (from Allied side) UK and the US Generals had their own people they sent out to see what was going on in the field. Pretty well impossible for an Army General to do that but his direct reports (Colonel I believe) could and did. It did not go over well but it was at least a cross check.

          Ortberg seems to be a lot better and I think their progress reflects that, I don’t expect him to be perfect though I was disappointed at his initial lack of involvement on negotiation in rega4rds t o the strike.

          Someone made a good case maybe they had to go through that (Possibly Leeham)

          One of the shocking statements to me that came out was t hat the FAA was just doing paper audits of Boeing, not floor presence which from their rhetoric they had it covered.

          Reading about the turmoil of re-work on Spirit fuselages and incoming parts for Spirit and Boeing, paper audits do not cut it and they would have known that.

          How good is their oversight of Charleston?

          • FAA was inspecting the paperwork that accompanied the aircraft as it went down the line, and then inspecting the aircraft before the airworthiness certificate. And they were doing floor work audits but only at the major status reporting points, not to the degree they are now, where they could randomly audit any task. And they have now audited the full line to create a benchmark.

            The reality is they can’t watch everything, but the KPI’s are intended to flag areas where they then need to focus their efforts, if there is a decline. And they removed the incentive to speed up the line by reducing quality. If quality falls off, the line instead has to slow down.

            KPI’s are now in place for every line, including Charleston.

          • It mind boggling to me that they could fail to see the quality issues coming from Spirit and the staff on hand to fix them.

            Not to absolve Boeing of causing the issues or allowing them to keep on, but wow. FAA should not have to, but if and when they do, they truly failed until after the blow out.

          • There was no FAA approval of fuselages at Spirit. That was really on Boeing to reject the substandard work in Washington.

            However if you read the NTSB interviews, the picture that emerges is of creeping non-conformances, that slowly overwhelmed the Boeing lines. And at each juncture, Boeing committed more resources to fixing the problems within the line, rather than slowing production. That was the crucial error.

            They did that because they thought it would be temporary, they would get Spirit under control. But they never did, which is why they finally had to reacquire Spirit.

            If you have a fuselage come in, and you are fixing it father and farther down the line, until finally you are still fixing it on the tarmac outside the building after assembly, that’s an unsustainable process. But that’s where they were, until the whole thing collapsed after the Alaska blowout incident.

            The solution has never really changed, you slow production until you get the root of the quality problem resolved. But after two extended shutdowns for the MAX and for COVID, Boeing didn’t want to slow production, they wanted to increase it.

            That’s where Calhoun was at fault, he should have recognized what was happening on the floor. In the end the FAA did it for them, but it should never have come to that.

          • Non-compliance was always a problem. During WWII the factory producing the most compliant B-17’s were Douglas Long Beach. With todays fine measurement instruments, cameras and software any non-compliant part or assembly should be caught quickly. Especially now with all critical parts fully defined in 3D CAD systems with tolerances (mostly Catia) the data is there.

          • The quality problem is more related to process than assembly or parts. The Alaska incident was initiated by rivets installed at Spirit that were excessively countersunk. They are supposed to be flush with the surface.

            When Boeing flagged this, the fuselage was in the Flow Day 1 station. The Spirit team decided to add layers of paint to build the rivets out flush.

            As the aircraft moved down the line, Boeing inspected again and rejected the repair, requiring the rivets be replaced.

            So the aircraft moved again, and they had to find someone to remove the plug door. The aircraft moved again, and they replaced the rivets. The aircraft moved again, and Boeing approved the repair, but they had to find someone to reinstall the plug door.

            Finally the aircraft reached the last station before going outside, and the plug door was still removed. So again they searched for someone to install it. Finally finished a day before it went outside, but we know what the outcome was.

            This points to the process as the root cause. The fuselage should not have been shipped from Spirit until it was compliant. Boeing finally instituted that rule, but it sharply cut the production rate. That’s what they were trying to avoid, but it ends up being counterproductive, if you don’t address root cause.

            The ultimate fix was for Boeing to reacquire Spirit.

          • I never was on the 737 factory and only a visitor to the Everett.

            What I cannot fathom is if as an FAA inspector in whatever capacity or label, they could not see what was going on.

            My take is FAA put deliberate blinders and using the narrow focus to not acknowledge what was going on.

            Behind any process are people and they talk and the presence alone of more and more.

            Boeing never put anything in place to deal with Spirit, they just yelled at them from what I can tell and then shrugged as Spirit found they were not serious.

            Sooner or latter a huge failure was going to occur. I am grateful that this time no one died.

            I do take a different view from the reports but I don’t think its not valid.
            Sticking your head in the sand to avoid an issue is a very short term strategy per the FAA.

            I can understand Calhoun. All greed and no care for what he was inflicting on the public. Criminality that is never prosecuted because the system is designed not to.

  4. Both Boeing and Airbus have projected a need of ~40,000 aircraft (that seems to be the number they both hover around), over the next 20 years.

    About 80% are NB’s, so some 8,000 WB’s, which leads to 400 / year, give or take.

    Since 2019, Boeing has delivered double-digit 787’s, starting in 2020:

    53, 14, 31, 73, 51, and 37 so far in 2025.

    For the 777 line:

    26, 24, 24, 26, 14 and 20 in 2025.

    The 767F variant goes away in 2027, but there are 28 to come. Nominal.

    There is a lot of catching up to do (assuming a 50/50 WB split) on the Boeing side of things. The past five years has them shorting the market in deliveries from 100 to 150 units.

    There is sense and space, for this expansion. Not only for future deliveries, but to play some catch-up ball.

    • @Frank P:

      Its well written but my issue is

      1. Cost
      2. Duration

      As I noted above, something always comes up. Currently as the infamous
      Bryce has noted we are in even more than normal iffy times.

      If Boeing moved to add a temp line in Everett for the 787, I would be fine.

      For rate 16 you are talking at lest one new assembly plant, equipment and people trained when you have a sub use of Everett.

      While can they execute is a valid question, I think under Ortberg they can.

      Its a matter of time and a lot of money when they don’t have the money.

      With the backlog they have the luxury of maxing (pun) out all their ops and not having to invest in more than some tooling for the MAX-10 in Everett.

      Probably Everett is a no go as they had pulled out and are not going to admit they were wrong (board more than Ortberg).

  5. This is good news for Boeing. Purely as a safety precaution, I think they need to test all the swithes world wide including inventory.

    https://aviationa2z.com/index.php/2025/07/16/air-india-found-no-issues-with-boeing-787s/

    One guy noted that as horrid as it is, the people that died are gone and nothing changes that. If we can eek out a lesson from this, then there is some gain for the rest of passengers.

    That Switch than can two different configuration continues to shake me. You should never have critical item like that regardless of Switch or not that can have multiple configurations.

    The core can be shared but the Lever/Knob on top should never be to ensure there is no mix up. Those parts shared in aircraft is unsettling.

      • @Duke:

        I understand that and fully believe that as I have stated.

        My adder on this is, there is an identical looking Switch in the system with a different (no) lock gate setup. No one has said where it is in an aircraft or what it is used for (assume its in an aircraft could be wrong)

        As far as the Switch goes, by mistake or deliberately you could get one or even possibly two into the same Throttle quadrant. Again likely to be caught but odd things do happen.

        I have gotten more than one part that was labeled right and was the wrong one.

        One had been destroyed in the failure, new one did not work in that application and it took weeks of phone calls and descriptions going back and forth to get it to where they realized it was the wrong one. Someone had put the wrong one in with the right ones and I got the wrong one.

        It was not malicious but the parts puller paid no attention to its companion parts looked different.

        Its really bad practice to have something like that in the system. Get it out to ensure no mix ups or even deliberate aka counterfeit parts.

  6. AS far as execution goes, Boeing has major things on its plate and expansion should be the last think on their list if at all.

    The F-47 alone is huge. T-7A as well. 777X ramp up to Everett capabilities already planned and tooled for. KC-46A is for sure going to be extended (those F-47s are going to need fuel). F-15EX is ramping up and has been ordered in more numbers.

    E-7 may ramp up, Europe wants to replace the AWACs though with the USAF trying to back out I don’t know Europe will go for it.

    Spirit integration is going to be a big deal as well as the divestment to Airbus portion. That is not only attention but costs as well.

    Boeing needs 5 years of stability.

    • As you know , Im a big Boeing fan, but I dont have stars in my eyes like the future defence programs you mention.
      There just isnt the revenue stream like there is for volume commercial aircraft.
      The F47 for example , Defence budget spending for that program is going to be shared with the engine maker and the various sensors, radar etc. The airframe development and production on its own is smallish, maybe Boeing gets the systems software development, but do they farm that out too as Im sure they dont have that in house.
      St Louis site is ending F-18 program , finally and the F15 is on again off again, and the T-7 is a co production with Saab. A 15 ship annual contract for KC-46 is only around $2.4 bill
      Boeing Global services is a $20 bill pa revenue, thats probably much more profitable than BDS at $24 bill revenue last year.

      • I don’t see the F-47 as different than a Commercial Aircraft, its not a fixed bid contract in this case. All aircraft mfgs pay for Engines (or the airlines do) and the avionics and pumps and generators and APU etc.

        I believe the KC-46A is two per month.

        F/A-18 is a wild card as the USN has to decide to buy more, get more F-35C or start out of the carrier business, the Squadrons are getting thin.

        4th Gen like the F-15EX are now looked on as, hmm, good enough for a lot of things. The USAF has a lot of ageing fighters and the F-35A is not replacing them.

        No military program is high production but also higher costs and its looking better for Boeing assuming they can execute.

        • F/A-18 program is ending this year. Kaput, as the T-7 ramps up.
          If the Navy needs more planes in this category it will only be F-35C and nothing wrong with that.
          Plus service life extensions for existing F-18 E/F/G to keep in service longer

          The point I made about the revenue stream still holds
          The profits on the KC-46 will fall once the 767F deliveries cease with the 2027 mandate, where the overheads are spread over a bigger yearly production run ( roughly half deliveries are the F version)

          • @Duke:

            The Navy does saintlike the F-35C . F-35A/B are maint hog and worse at Sea. It may be worth it to the USAF but their eye is shifting to F-47, always the shinier object.

            I will believe F/A-18 ceases when they shut the line down. Boieng has built as few as 1 aircraft a month on the lines, so profits are iffy on build, but KC-46A sustaiment?

            T-7 will ramp up and that has a lot of upside beyond USAF A model.

            AH-64, Chinook, V-22 (sustainment maybe) – I think Boeing has a good mix now in Defense (granted they need to dump satellites and space stuff)

            They can get to 50 MAX a month, maybe 777X and 10 x 787 all doable without any investment.

            I would still rather have Airbus backlog and position but its hugely better than it was.

    • NATO wants to replace 14 E-3 until 2035. That is about 2 E-7 per year.

      I’m not so sure about KC-46 comparing it against a MRTTneo.

      • KC-46A is not going to be bought in Europe.

        I could see Europe going with SAAB because of the lack of us buy on te E-7 and the mess OA is creating.

        • The Europeans really only need a KC-46 type plane, while its the USAF and a few others that need the more capable the A330 type ?

          • Some Irony there.

            I would say that the USAF can use A330MRT but does not need it for a lot of missions.

            Alaska is a good example that stays at home and fills for air training and off coast intercept but not strike packages.

          • TW never received the memo that KC-X was more about C and less about the rest. KC-10 fleet is done and retired because the whole fleet was at the edge of structural flying time while KC-135 was sitting around doing about 300 flying hours per year (source GAO). Aerial refueling is a rare compared to cargo transport. Would USAF need an efficient refueling aircraft or an efficient cargo aircraft? USAF has to use an aircraft less efficient in both ways.

            Only Japan and Italy bought the KC-46 because they produce a large junk of the 767 over there. – Oh, accroding to latest news Italy stoppted its order.

            BTW, the next KC-46 hick-up: https://www.twz.com/air/kc-46-crews-ordered-to-drastically-curtail-use-of-jets-onboard-auxiliary-power-unit

          • With regard to the APU on the KC-46, the issue is racking up operational hours on the ground, which results in less than expected time on wing.

            The solution is USAF asking crews to use ground services when available. This more closely approximates commercial practice.

            When the KC-46 flies transport missions, or partial load missions, the fuselage tank has to be inerted for safety before takeoff. If the tank is empty from a cold start, that can take more than an hour.

          • Simple detail is they are using the APU far more than it is in commercial operations and it was built for commercial. Someone not paying attention.

            Curious what the state of APU and use on the KC-135R is?

            I worked on the ramp and they only used APU if forced to. Rest was plug in Engine driven and Electronic Ground Power Units.

        • Pretty depressing a bunch of politicians recognizes what the Sec Def and associated clowns to not (or don’t want to)

          AWACs and the E-7 are programs I felt were good ones. AWACs should have been re-capitalized at least 5 years back and probably 10.

        • Across the pond:

          Francois slams Boeing and demands clarity on Wedgetail

          > Shadow Defence Minister Mark Francois has issued a stark warning over the UK’s lack of airborne early warning capability, accusing Boeing of presiding over a troubled and delayed E-7 Wedgetail programme and demanding urgent answers from the Ministry of Defence.

          https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/francois-slams-boeing-and-demands-clarity-on-wedgetail/

          From TWZ:

          “The program had already suffered notable delays and cost growth, which the Pentagon has said were major factors in the cancellation decision.”

          And nobody cares about the dying F/A-XX?

          And more A-10??

          • I love this dysfunctional reality TV show.

            *And the A-10 serves longer?

          • For our side of the pond, it was chilling to see the USAF list things to change.

            The idea is to buy off the shelf and then like the Navy and P-8, spiral development.

            UK has its own issues as they went with used air frames I believe and then you have the offsets that always add costs, sometimes enormousness.

            The UK went with their own AH-64 engines, great performance in that case but the cost was huge.

            F-4 Phantom was another one with its UK engine (Spey?). All that money and they got a bit of improvement in one area and more drag in another and it was a wash.

            Get a Aussie matched E-7, retire AWACs and then start coming up with needed upgrades and go through the fleet.

            Always keep in mind any statements out of the USAF. They created things out of thin air.

            Survivability of the E-7, like an E-2 is more survivalable?

            Costs out of hand? Buy a bog standard E-7 do not allow mission creep.

          • Just to be clear, the quote from TWZ comes from an article about the USAF’s E-7

            How do you explain that?

            Didn’t you previously assert that the USAF has unique requirements different from those of other NATO air forces? You want to have your cake and eat it too?

            “The U.S. Air Force’s first Boeing E-7A Wedgetail prototypes are facing delays due to rework early in their builds…”

          • The USAF indeed has a different profile and use than anyone, let alone NATO, EU, Singapore, Australia etc.

            The US has fuelers scattered all around the US and world.

            In the case of Alaska it has a full time squadron. We also have F-22 and F-35 Squadrons that intercept the Russkies all the time as well as a very active training operation going on.

            That does not mean the US and NATO don’t also have commonalities.

            But you look at the A330MRT, it was what they had and adapted not designed for the missions. The early fuelers were A300.

            The US has something like 400 x KC-135R and claims it does not have enough. The way its structured that is true. As was noted the KC-135R has low yearly use. But…….. if you need a squadron in Alaska (or Spain or…..) full time, then you can’t just fly them up. Huge costs to move a squadron that is here all the time (or daisy chain in Squadrons ).

            US alone is 3000 miles across and 1500 miles North to South (more or less). Huge area with bases all around it. Same thing with moving squadrons when you need one in an area all the time.

            Then add in Diego Garcia (TDY as they call it) some in Japan (not sure full time or not though some fighter squadrons are as well as a US Carrier home ported out of Japan)

            More KC-46A flying now than all the A330MRTs built and it will keep going up.

            The only way the USAF can get more tankers is to build more KC-46A or do a program for A330MRT that would have to go through all the stages and we are talking 5 years.

            I am not against it, but there is a huge political aspect for that high a profile move and the select missions its an advantage for.

            So shrug. Mostly NATO needs local tankers and did fine with the KC-135s. That too is a political aspect ergo a drive to get SAAB system into an A320/321 or A330.

            What I do not know though suspect is capacity difference between the smaller SAABN and the E-7.

          • The cupboard is bare, to rob Peter to pay Paul can only buy time for so long.

            How do you deal with the money-sucking MIC oligarchs? Cost overruns, repeated delays… You have to make sure everyone is in fighting shape. Why building a box ship in the US costs like six times of that in East Asia, uh?

            Those in power are only interested in rewarding themselves and cut taxes for those who finance them. More spending is not the right solution unless you’re sure the money is well-spent, not to finance shares buyback or pocket the management.

            Ray Dalio:
            “In 10 years, the US government will be $55-60 trillion in debt (which will be 7-7.5 times government revenue) because there will be $25-30 trillion of additional borrowing. That amounts to about $425,000 of debt per American family.

            When I calculate the supply and demand for this debt, I don’t see enough buyers to buy the debt the US needs to sell, which will cause big problems.”

            The ship has to change course or it’ll inevitably hit the iceberg.

          • If this was a financial forum, but its not.

          • “But you look at the A330MRT, it was what they had and adapted not designed for the missions.”

            In theory, this should have been the case for the KC-46 as well, given that the KC-X program’s intent was to acquire standard commercial airliners modified to perform aerial refueling missions.
            If Boeing had to develop and certify a new variant of the 767 (the 767-2C), it was because the KC-767A (based on the 767-200ER and with a maximum fuel capacity of only 70 metric tons, 20 less than the KC-135) had no chance of winning KC-X competition.
            The 767-2C needed four auxiliary fuel tanks in the belly to (slightly) exceed the KC-135’s capacity.
            Instead, Airbus could rely on a standard A330-200 for the development of the MRTT, given that it can carry 110 metric tons of fuel in its wing/center tanks. Because the MRTT’s lower deck can be used for cargo transport, the MRTT has significantly greater multi-role capabilities than the KC-46; this is likely the main reason why the MRTT has beaten the KC-46 in virtually every international tanker competition outside the US. For air forces that don’t have anywhere near the availability of aircraft like the USAF, the ability to employ an aircraft for multiple purposes can be a deciding factor in its selection (e.g. RAF operates the A330 MRTT on the South Atlantic Airbridge connecting the Falklands with the UK).

          • This is a major misrepresentation of the truth.

            There really is no competition between MRTT and KC-46. Any more than there was between KC-10 and KC-135. They have entirely different CONOPS and utility.

            The USAF decided long ago that the KC-10 mission was no longer needed. And so they pursued a KC-135 replacement in the KC-46.

            This has now been confirmed across 3 acquisition rounds. In the first round, EADS convinced the USAF to alter the CONOPS during the competition, because they saw they would lose with the stated CONUPS. The GAO found that to be improper and cancelled the award.

            In the second round, the KC-46 won as expected because it maintains the KC-135 CONOPS.

            In the third round, nothing had changed in the CONOPS so agGmain the KC-46 was chosen, this time without competition.

            If you go outside the US, the KC-135 CONOPs are not favored as they are by USAF. No other nation has anything like the US tanker fleet, or anything like those CONOPS. In that scenario, the MRTT is the more logical choice. If you only have a few tankers and you only have to operate in your own or friendly nation airspace, you get the one that has the greatest capability.

            The KC-46 was never going to do well outside the US. That’s a function of being designed for the unique USAF CONOPS.

          • Rob

            That’s because back in those days, they were backward looking. Now they can’t fight, it’s over.

          • TW

            From time to time, I try to accommodate those who, I’m afraid, are not up to speed. Wink wink.

          • Interesing to see the takes on the Tankers, I don’t agree with Robs verbiage necesarily, but in the whole its accurate.

            KC-10: That was in recognition that in some cases a few big tankers was what was needed. C5 fueling, B-52. There was on huge issue, DC-10 is dated horribly and it became major cost for a small fleet when the KC-135R (still) and the KC-46A can do the job if not conveniently.
            The USAF dropping a capaiblity to keep the fighter mafia up, that is their norm.

            Contract Failure: My take is the USAF convinced themselves to void the rules and give the A330MRT the contract (for which Airbus got a billion + on the award that few ever noted they walked away with.
            While the CT types think otherwise, GAO ruled correctly, they had made the contract illegally based on the terms which after all is what a contract is all about.
            At its core the KC-X was focused on replacing the KC-135Rs. Left hanging by the incompetents in the USAF was the KC-X did not buy in the numbers to do so and KC-135R is still being modified and extended.
            The 767 hull was the only one that was close to a direct replacement for the KC-135R with its 4 engines.
            The US simply does not use an A330MRT capability most of the time. The KC-10 was not about freight, it was about fuel offload.

            While the A330MRT has capability if used, most of the time its not. It either tanking or hauling freight. Can’t do both.
            I think South Korea reflected that, they don’t need an A330MRT capability, the KC-46A would be more than enough. But they want to operate out of areas and like Australia, the A330MRT does work better for that (Aussies will deploy a ssquar4ond to Alaska for a training excersize using the freight capability and then support or part support aerial ops with the tanker part).
            One thing the A330MRT needs is a freighter door.

            If the USAF had given credit Boeing could have used a 767-300 or 400 hull and got more main deck and some lower deck capacity. There was no credits to do so because it was supposed to be as close to a KC-135R as possible. You give something up but you also gain on space and fuel efficiency. The ROA did not give credit past the spec and it was a major area the USAF was stupid, you can’t give contract aka legal credit if its not in the ROA.

            Where enright is wrong is the Falklands is a convenience to the RAF using the A330T (none have booms). You could charter that out. They also cannot fuel USAF aircraft, not very multi role in fact.

            Outside of US: The US has a lot of ops where it acts just like US. Europe, ME, Asia and even Hawaii. Dense need for tankers but not necessarily large offloads. Those may be convenient depending, but, nothing says you can’t land and fuel either.

            With lots of tankers you have the option of detaching a few from each base in the US and beefing up ops elsewhere. More flexible.

            I won’t say it does not happen, I saw it once. Back in the 70s an excersize up at Eilson (Fairbanks) and KC-135s (no Rs at the time) dragged a squadron of F-102 or 106s up there and back. I was under the departure path when they went back. Quite a sight. A KC-135, 4 fighters, another KC-135, 4 fighter etc.

            Butt….. we also have C5 and C-17 as well as the CRAF. So we not only can do it, its better as you have Cargo Ramps or in the case of the CRAF, its freighters that fill it unless its a major crisis.

            The A330MRT is working its way up to KC-46 total capability (or at least options to do so) and they will probably put an F door on it.

            What I do know is the more tankers the better. France and the UK (when they had KC-135) have supported US ops and we have supported theirs .

            While Airbus can build A330MRT, you now have the issue that the future ones will be NEO hulls which means RR engines that the US is very likely not going for. The US does not convert used aircraft.

            And it would take some years to get an A330MRT with the full USAF suite tested and into production.

            In the meantime if the USAF wants more tankers sooner the best way to get them is to ramp up the KC-46A line to 4 a month.

          • Love there’s continual justification using the outdated competition twenty years ago to support a bad decision.

            Nothing learned, nothing changes.

            Wait, we have a history revisionist here?

            LNA:
            > the KC-X (awarded to Boeing in the form of the KC-46A) to replace the McDonnell Douglas KC-10

            There’s nothing worse than self-destruction.

          • Oops! Sorry I stand corrected. The KC-X was a competition to replace the old KC-135. However, the USAF, as a result, decided and went ahead to trim and retire their bigger more capable KC-10 fleet. 😳

            > The KC-46 carries only slightly more fuel than the KC-135R that it is replacing, so the retirement of the KC-10 is actually a reduction in aerial refueling capability for the USAF

          • Pretty funny, KC-10 was an extremely expensive thing to keep operating in low numbers.

            While there are still MD-11F users, there are no DC-10 users.

            The USAF requires high numbers to operate the way they do. Ergo, more KC-46A, extend the KC-135R and retire the KC-10.

            The USAF is not making much if any progress on the tanker front, the KC-46A is above numbers as the retired KC-10, but not the fuel offload.

            I am all for a A330MRT but its not happening.

          • For every one KC-10, the USAF needs two KC-46/KC-135, so how on earth poster can say with a straight face that it’s all about saving $$$?

            Fact is the cost per hour of operating the KC-10 wasn’t significantly higher than the KC-135. More fiction writing?

  7. AW: Leskinen says United is “hopeful” it will begin receiving 737 Max 10s in 2027, but the airline is making contingency plans in case deliveries are further pushed back.

  8. just a fyi

    “Individuals, who typically own a jet through their private business or holding company, can now write off the entire cost of a new or used jet in the first year of ownership for any plane placed into service in or after Jan. 19, 2025. The tax benefit only applies to business jets”

  9. this is a new line of retaliation from Donnie

    “The Trump administration imposed new restrictions Saturday on flights from Mexico and threatened to end a longstanding partnership between Delta Air Lines and Aeromexico in response to limits the Mexican government placed on passenger and cargo flights into Mexico City several years ago.”

  10. “Win-win”, Trump style.

    With a 50% Trump tariff on Brazil’s exports, a cup of coffee could cost 25 cents more. Meanwhile the price of an Embraer airplane will probably soar by a whopping $9 million. As part of a pivot to China (its biggest trade partner anyway), Brazil sent 186.1% more coffee to them last year. More coffee and OJ for Chinese consumers.

    Triple threat:
    The Brazilian company’s CEO says threat of 50% import duty could delay group’s purchases of up to $20bn in US-made products.

    • That has a back story that has been discussed and she lies. Mary Schiavo has taken two unrelated incidents and spun a fairy tale. She is an ambulance chaser and should be ashamed of herself.

      In the ANA case, there is the WOW logic, time delays and a reason. The computer system does not flip switches. In ANA and 171 the FDR recorded exactly what happened and corroboration ops of engines and RAT and APU.

      What she is talking about on the United Nigerian flight, unknown because that looks to be totally different.

      She also goes on to say that MH370 was not pilot caused. Totally absurd as there was corroboration of how the systems were shutdown (in depth knowledge) the link to his home town as well as the route on his Home Simulator.

      Its not proof the captain did it but its damning circumstantial evidence that all points in that direction. The only thing missing is the FDR confirming it.

    • Yeah, Schiavo’s theory has been debunked pretty much everywhere, by everyone. She’s just drumming up business with fear. She has a rapt audience right now amongst the conspiracy theories in India, who are fishing for an alternate explanation.

    • An incompetent primary military contractor is rewarded. Good to shove more $$$ out the door?

      Buying a bunch of wrong aircraft for the mission would only place undue burden on the force that’s buckling. One KC-10 carries almost double the fuel of a KC-46.

      When they write histories of how America committed suicide, will they mention all the cheerleaders along the path?

  11. And the 777X-F starts to be built.

    https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-kicks-off-production-777-8-freighter-seattle-times-reports-2025-07-22/

    Airbus recently lost A350F orders when the original buyer backed out.

    Keeping original can structure is an advantage for Boeing in this segment.

    The 767F and A330F of the various types is interesting as there was no standar45d can in that segment and its split and more so as the A330F types gain more foothold.

    • Airbus is forced to delay the A350F thanks to Wichita’s Spirit AeroSystems. Renovation of Federal Reserves HQ costs over one billion more than the Burj Khalifa.

      • Airbus is delayed on A350F because they went with Spirit, no one forced them to.

        There is no free lunch.

        As the oil Filter advertisement in the US goes, You can pay me now or you can pay me latter.

        • Airbus delayed the A350F because the demand was so high for the pax model and it needed the production slots.

          • I have seen the ramp up ambitions. Odd to not do the F as soon as possible, they keep saying they want into the F market.

            Have to figure there is supply aspect including Spirit or soon to be former Spirit.

            Airbus seems to have gotten hit hard in that regard. Most amazing as they had been good on anticipation and corrections.

        • Yeah, the USG rewards the incompetent MIC oligarchs. How is it different from the planned economy under the Soviet system?

          “No one forced them to.”
          Don’t cry when the “Titanic” hits the iceberg and sink.

          Freightwave:
          > Airbus delays the A350 freighter launch to the second half of 2027 due to production challenges at supplier Spirit AeroSystems

          Reuters:
          > The setback to the A350F comes as Airbus also struggles to increase output of existing A350 passenger jets, particularly due to ongoing delays in the arrival of fuselage parts from Spirit AeroSystems

          > Reuters reported in October that supplies to Airbus of the A350 fuselage sections from Spirit’s Kinston plant were running behind schedule

  12. Trump announces ‘massive’ trade deal with Japan, setting tariffs at 15%

    does that mean the 787 wing and fuselage section from Japan will have 15% tariff on it?

    • “Japan has agreed to purchase 100 Boeing planes and increase its rice imports from the United States by 75% as part of a new trade agreement, a White House official announced on Wednesday.”

    • When will Boeing reshore its production? There’re 50% tariffs on aluminum and steel, and the US steel makers raise their prices to gouge customers. Oops.

      Will it be cheaper for GM to source vehicles from Japan instead of making them in North America?

      GM got hit by one billion dollar tariffs, up to $4 billion to $5 billion for the year.

      • “U.S. automakers worry that President Donald Trump’s agreement to tariff Japanese vehicles at 15% would put them at a competitive disadvantage, saying they will face steeper import taxes on steel, aluminum and parts than their competitors.”
        “Blunt said in an interview the U.S. companies and workers “definitely are at a disadvantage” because they face a 50% tariff on steel and aluminum and a 25% tariff on parts and finished vehicles”

        • Effect of the 2018 Steel tariff under Trump 1.0

          Jobs gained by steel producers: 1k;
          Jobs lost by steel users: 75k

          Reasons for manufacturing job losses are more than foreign competition. The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

  13. Do they have the balls?

    > EU’S €100 BILLION NO-DEAL PLAN TO MATCH US 30% TARIFF

    30% tariffs on everything the U.S. exports to Europe.

  14. Is there a link between GE, BA and Intel?

    This is the end?
    > After shocking the market with mass layoffs in mid-July, #Intel warned in today’s earnings call that failure of #14A could end its advanced node business—pushing it to outsource sub-18A and 18A-P chips to third-party foundries.
    https://x.com/trendforce/status/1948580220220436890

  15. > “It would likely take more than a year and cost between $1.5 billion and $2 billion to replenish the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war”

    WSJ: Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile

    During conflict, Thaad operators burned through nearly a quarter of interceptors ever purchased by Pentagon

    The U.S. has seven high-end Thaad missile-defense systems. During the 12-day war with Iran in June, two were deployed to Israel—and it wasn’t enough.

    Operating alongside Israeli systems, Thaad operators burned through munitions at a furious clip, firing more than 150 missiles to shoot down the waves of Iranian ballistic missiles, according to U.S. officials. That is nearly a quarter of the interceptors ever purchased by the Pentagon.

    The demand was so staggering that at one point, the Pentagon considered a plan to divert interceptors purchased by Saudi Arabia to the systems in Israel, one official said. The discussions were sensitive, because the kingdom’s cities and oil installations were also considered at risk during the conflict.

    It wasn’t just the Thaad. The U.S. ran through large numbers of shipborne interceptors as well, and Israel quickly drained stockpiles for its own systems. Dozens of Iranian missiles got through anyway.

    … Some Pentagon planners say America’s missile defenses—designed to protect U.S. troops and assets from targeted attacks by Russia, China or North Korea—are inadequate for a world where cheap, voluminous ballistic missiles have become the aerial weapon of choice.

    • “It would likely take more than a year… to replenish the Thaad interceptors fired during the 12-day war.”

      However, the US has sought to buy only 37 in the next fiscal year.

      • per wiki

        “A THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) interceptor missile costs approximately $12.7 million to $15 million”

        “firing more than 150 missiles” x $12 million per is $1.8 billion

  16. FG: Alaska Airlines now expects first Boeing 737 Max 10 delivery in 2026 or 2027

    > Alaska Airlines expects to take delivery of its first Boeing 737 Max 10 late in 2026 or early the following year, suggesting that certification of the next-generation narrowbody jets may remain elusive for some time.

    > Seattle-based Alaska previously expected to take delivery of its first Max 10 this year, then later suggested it could start taking the most-stretched variant of the 737 Max family from Boeing in mid-2026.

    > In June, Boeing Commercial Airplanes Chief Stephanie Pope told FlightGlobal that it was progressing on development of an engine anti-ice system, but a solution was taking “longer than anticipated”.

    Boeing has previously planned to complete testing and analysis of those systems with partners GE Aerospace and CFM International this month, then to “update our customers on the path forward”, Pope said.

    • Compare with an airline which is able to plan ahead:

      From AW
      > Etihad plans to take delivery of 10 Airbus A321LRs this year, a further 10 in 2026 and five slated for delivery each year in 2027 and 2028.

  17. “”We are agreeing that the tariff… for automobiles and everything else will be a straight across tariff of 15%,” Trump said. However, the 15% baseline rate would not apply to steel and aluminum, for which a 50% tariff would remain in place.”

    Does that assume 15% on Airbus aircraft? The devil is in the details!

  18. Reuters

    “Von der Leyen said there would be no tariffs from either side on aircraft and aircraft parts, certain chemicals, certain generic drugs, semiconductor equipment, some agricultural products, natural resources and critical raw materials.”

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