Would you fly the 787? When will it return to service? Take a poll

Yesterday we published a link to a survey conducted Feb. 14 by Travel Insider in which a large number of people will avoid or prefer to avoid the Boeing 787 once it returns to service. We were stunned by the depth of the result. We fully expected a portion of fliers will avoid the airplane. Travel Insider’s survey found 32% of frequent fliers (airlines’ bread-and-butter) will avoid the plane and another 35% would prefer to avoid it.

While neither Travel Insider nor this poll are scientific, the results may indicate the depth of the brand damage done by the grounding and battery issues.

What will you do? We’ll hide the answers for the time being.

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When do you thing the 787 will return to revenue service?

54 Comments on “Would you fly the 787? When will it return to service? Take a poll

  1. I would have no problems flying on the B787 once the fixes are in place. I would have no problems flying on Airbus planes if they were in the same situation. Both manufacturers make fine and extremely safe planes.

  2. I define return to service as in start flying paying passengers again. Anybody have a different definition?

    Reason for asking is that I have seen articles were return to service seemed to imply some sort of test flights… (technically I suppose a plane could be in service at an airline while doing test work, but that is not how I would generally use the term).

    • I voted on the basis of a “return to revenue service” – carrying fair paying passengers. And I voted 2014.

      The reason I voted 2014 is I strongly believe Boeings proposed fix will be rejected. If not by the FAA, it will be rejected by the airlines as unacceptable.

      This is my own opinion based on the information I have read about the fix, but I guess we’ll have to wait and see how this plays out.

  3. “I don’t know” (I want to see what the actual fix is before passing judgement)
    “July” (was tempted to say August-December, but remain hopeful it’s not *that* bad.

  4. I would like to add, Boeing make 100% sure the issue fixed, so lives can be safe.

  5. Can’t vote for the first question !
    Since I will not be confident in the announced fix, but I may fly this plane anyway, since I don’t think it will be dangerous to fly without battery !

    I think we may see the B787 at Le Bourget !

    A voté ! (Une foi)

    I think the poll of Flying Insider is not significative !

  6. Boeing 787 is a fine plane and will be one after the battery issues are fixed ;the brand has taken a beating for sure , but will recover with travellers like us as well as investors.

  7. The 787 is as safe or safer than any other airplane flying today. The battery will be fixed, and the airplane will take to the air once again. The airbus A380, had cracks in the wing, and no-one refused to fly on it, and that is a major structural problem, people need to get a grip.

    • Not really comparable. .. and a rather misplaced attempt at “leveling the playing field”
      in an environment that already is rife with spin action.

      The cracks were/are an expensive irritation without a structural savety implication.
      Though early exposed by way of the QF32 repair the first scheduled regular structure checks would still have been early enough to maintain save flying conditions at all times.

      No certification shenanigans were uncovered.

      Should I continue ?

      • As you like to say Uwe, IMHO it certainly is comparable. You can’t with any confidence say that the cracks wouldn’t let go before scheduled structure checks. If there were no safety concerns why didn’t they wait with the expensive repair irritation until after the scheduled structure checks? And what certification shenanigans are you talking about?
        Also, if there is anyone who could be an expert on knowing spin it would be one who is an expert in providing it under the guise of IMHO. Just an observation!

        • Repairs:
          you have three groups of planes afaiu:
          in service : fixes will be incorporated either at the next check or earlier.
          wings produced but still undelivered: customers will demand a “fixed up plane” for delivery, obviously these will get predelivery fix application. nobody takes a plane with defects
          ( LH forex demanded that the full set of(damaged) ?wall panels? on one of their 748i be replaced before delivery )
          wings not build yet: certified final production fix will be applied during manufacture.
          for delivery turn of 2013/2014 onwards.

          So, nothing spinny about when fixes are applied.

          All in service frames were checked immediately.
          initially this was triggered by QF32 repairs. starting afair in Q3 2011 during inspection of further frames 2 more types of defects were noticed leading to a round of EASA mandated immediate inspections.
          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A380#Post-delivery_cracks
          “the problem is considered to be minor and is not expected to affect operations.[96]”

      • You question the value of politeness?

        Now why should I add spin.? It just is not my instrument.
        ( Maybe you can lead the blind here? )

        What has been happening the last weeks is mostly an act of despinning an intricate but hollow structure. Taking a decade or more of spin away layer by layer.
        Result : Cold Turkey for some 😉

    • The A380 wing cracks where not major structural issues. If they were the A380 would have been grounded for sure. The cracks needed attention but didn’t affect the integrity if the aircraft. Furthermore, Airbus have been completely upfront & honest about those issues.

      Transparency is key when building trust with the general public. Boeing have NOT been open about the battery issues and still seem to be in denial about it.

      • Well, the cracks being found accidentally is worse than Airbus knowing about it in advance and fixing it.

        Also – it they were without any safety implications – why did they have to be repaired at immense program delay / penalty costs . Aesthetics?

        Furthermore engine failing to be contained is much worse and should have raised questions about certification etc.

        Interestingly both B and A can claim that they were 3rd party supplied but both are OEM responsibility. I can see exact parallels between them with 380 incident much worse.

        And how ppl continue to love and fly 380, I dont think 787 should face any public avoidance action for the batteries being fried.

      • @Flyer121

        The cracks were identified during the evaluation of VH-OQA. I don’t expect manufacturers to know about everything in advance. That would be extremely unfair and maybe even impossible.

        The wing cracks formed on parts of the wing that were non-critical. If they had occurred on critical areas they would have required the A380 to be grounded – and rightly so.

        However, after investigating the issue and running it past the appropriate authorities it was determined that temporary repairs could be done until the aircraft could receive a more robust fix. In this situation, the problem was fully understood and so a routine of checks could be established to ensure the aircraft could still fly safely in the meantime.

        In regards to the engine issue. The part of the engine that failed CANNOT be contained. It should never fail in the first place. The fact this engine failed in this way raised serious alarm bells. Qantas immediately grounded their A380 fleet.

        During the investigation, it was quickly determined why the engine had failed. Again, this allowed airlines & authorities to put in place a comprehensive inspection program to ensure aircraft could fly safely until RR could replace all of the faulty engines.

        In BOTH A380 cases you raise, the root cause was identified. A thorough and comprehensive inspection program was implemented and a PERMANENT 100% fix put in place.

        In regards to the 787, neither Boeing, nor the authorities have been able to determine what caused the battery issues. The Boeing ‘fix’ is to contain a fire/explosion if one occurs.

        My argument is:

        How can Boeing know for sure the batteries are the only culprit in this case? How can Boeing implement this ‘so called fix’ when they can’t even test it – because they don’t know what caused the issue to replicate it/understand it.

        The fact is, until Boeing know what caused these failures the 787 is unsafe and no inspections can be carried out to ensure safe flight.

        They’re basically crossing their fingers and hoping for the best and that isn’t good enough!!!

  8. I will surely fly it. A couple of battery running hot is miles safer than an engine failure like the 380 had which I would happily fly too.
    Strangely – there were no questions raised when Qantas brought the big bird back and people continued to fly on other airlines 380s

    • The battery is not just running hot though – its more serious than that. The underlying cause is still unknown.

      The A380 engine failure was taken very seriously and resolved relatively quickly after the problems were fully identified. The reason people were happy to fly the A380 afterwards is that they were fully confident the problem was fully understood AND fixed!!

  9. Avoté!
    I’ve voted “I want to wait a year or two”…. I don’t really know why because i think we can be confident in the fix the FAA will approuve.
    And i hope the 787 will return to service in june… I hope!

  10. Scott, some of the comments are not fair to say the least and Boeing bashing in my view has certainly gotten out of hand on this 787 grounding issue. It fouls the atmosphere of tracking what is going on, the how and why for a safer future.

    • Airbus got roundly bashed (and in many cases unfairly so) following AF447 and QF32. We didn’t censor those and we aren’t censoring these–as long as everyone stays within the Reader Comment Rules.

  11. Flyer121 :Furthermore engine failing to be contained is much worse and should have raised questions about certification etc. >

    Flyer 121, with all due respect, but you don’t seem to know what you’re talking about. Nancy Bird Walton (QA’s first A380) suffered an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc. While a modern turbofan engine is designed to contain a fan blade off, a high/intermediate pressure turbine failure is not expected to be contained due to the significantly higher energy of the rotating discs. Therefore, engines are designed so as to never experience a failure condition (i.e. by operation, maintenance etc.). Also, one should keep in mind that is not feasible to make a turbofan engine “foolproof” containment-wise. If you did, the engine would be so heavy that the aircraft would be un-economic. A modern turbofan engine is designed in such a way as to mitigate the overall risk by reducing the probability of the incident occurring in the first place, not protecting against its effects.

    • Exactly my point from the very beginning in trying to convey that certain events are mitigated to the maximum possible but that does not mean it couldn’t happen. Yet, for some reason the “need to find whatever is the cause of something in order to fix it.” has become the only thing that could be possibly done. It would be a lot better to know what cause something so you could just concentrate on that particular issue, but when that is not known, then you have to prepare for a lot more possible outcomes. In the case of the 787 battery problem(s).
      1-make the battery cells better separated between one another plus shielding in between them if one fails, it would not damage the others.
      2-better charging monitoring system to at all possible avoid overcharging the battery and avoid creating a fire.
      3-if the battery still catches fire, a strong enough enclosure to contain it and placing it in a spot where critical component of the plane would not be compromised.
      4-gases emitted by the batteries routed outside through valves so no smoke will enter the cabin of the airplane.
      Whether someone thinks that is not enough is up to that individual, but if it passes certification by the authority then it is considered safe enough.

      I’m done with this explanation too. No matter how you try to explain this things and without having any affiliation (I could care less about either two major aircraft companies) some or someone will still treat you as just another fan-boy. “Leeham News and comment” used to be better than that, but I guess that’s the norm now a days.

      • Tom, the difference here is that Boeing is trying to protect against the effects of a battery thermal runaway while radiating bewilderment on what caused the batteries to fail in the first place. Also, keep in mind that mature turbofan engines has reached reliability levels of less than one shutdown per one million hours of flying time, which is truly a remarkable achievement. Wouldn’t you agree that the current lithium ion battery technologies used on the 787 still has along way to go to reach the same levels of reliability.

        When Failure Is Not An Option
        http://atwonline.com/aircraft-engines-components/article/when-failure-not-option-0202

        During the rollout of the first 787 in July 2007, Rolls-Royce Director-Boeing Programs Dominic Horwood challenged the industry to achieve a zero event rate for new engines. He told media that a 0.005 inflight shutdown rate per 1,000 hr. no longer was acceptable and that the engine-maker was determined to achieve zero. That statement highlights the incredible strides the industry has achieved in improving engine reliability to a point where a shutdown is responsible for just over 4% of diversions or turnbacks on ETOPS operations, according to Boeing data.

        Ironically, that record, and the public’s high expectations concerning engine reliability, were brought into sharp focus last November when a Qantas A380 suffered an even rarer uncontained failure of the intermediate pressure turbine on one of its Trent 972 engines. The immediate impact on Rolls was significant, with 14% or £1.75 billion wiped off its market value in two days, although it subsequently recovered.

        According to GE Aviation, the emerging issue for all engine-makers in the quest for zero events is not the core engine itself but the line replaceable units attached to it, such as pumps and sensors that in many cases were not designed for the durability engines now are achieving. A good example is the time on wing for GE’s CF6, which has almost tripled over the last 15-20 years from about 5,000 hr. to around 13,000 hr. For the newer CF6-80C2 the TOW is about 20,000 hr. owing to design changes from in-service experience that have produced a 6%-8% improvement in TOW year-over-year.

      • “2-better charging monitoring system to at all possible avoid overcharging the battery and avoid creating a fire.”

        Therein lies a very large part of the problem. Boeing was supposed to do this as part of the Special Conditions allowing them to use Lithium Ion technology in the first place. This is no oversight or a case of not understanding the material properties sufficiently such that calculations were not accurate. This is a case of not adhering to the Special Conditions as set out by the FAA.

        “3-if the battery still catches fire, a strong enough enclosure to contain it and placing it in a spot where critical component of the plane would not be compromised.”

        This is a very interesting point. Do you actually believe that the batteries are now located in a non-critical area of the plane? What would be a non-critical area of the plane? You wrote critical component but I use critical area as I find that any area near the flight crew, cabin crew or passengers are critical.

        Furthermore, just how strong must a strong enough enclosure be and how would one test it? Should it be allowed to burn uncontained for 330 minutes (3,5 hours) without burning through? Or should there be a 1.5 safety margin for the test, meaning that a fire must burn for 495 minutes (8 hours and 15 minutes) without flames escaping? Just how long would a battery burn on its own, and at what temperature, before it burns out?

    • Well – it wasn’t supposed to happen. But it did happen didn’t it? Thats one of the biggest special conditions anyone can put.
      Look I m not trying to prove that B is handling the crisi it with flying colors but I feel that A380 had similar issues and Airbus wasn’t hung out to dry.

      Boeing is trying their best to resolve the issues. What more do you want?
      In fact – to all the critics here , would you please spell out as to what would you have done if you were the CEO of Boeing

      • “Boeing is trying their best to resolve the issues”.

        That is the point contested here.

        Boeing has started at least 3 pushes to force the FAA towards
        accepting their “non solution”.
        “Hiding the problem in a box”. Out of sight out of mind.

        Boeing knew they had a problem from at least 2008 onwards and seem to have avoided any move towards resolving it.
        Instead batteries were exchanged silently and Washington lobbied for easing Li-Ion battery transport limitations.

        Boeing does not get more scrutiny than Airbus has been inundated with.
        What changed is that the carefully orchestrated “under the rug sweeping” by interested parties has lost effectiveness.
        The same proponents who seem to have been busy blowing every Airbus item out of all proportions.

        The different Interests start to lose their synergetic leverage. A kind of blowback.

  12. I voted July because I want to avoid thinking about the consequences of a longer delay. Radical things could happen. High profile cancellations vs the low profile ones so far. Pilots getting into the mix, US government taking active steps (FAA, DoD, NTSB, NASA, Im-Ex, State, DoJ) to protect its long term interests, stock holder demanding changes, etc. When will the broad review be ready?

  13. Flyer121 :In fact – to all the critics here , would you please spell out as to what would you have done if you were the CEO of Boeing

    Gee, maybe admit there is a problem that needs to be fixed instead of saying that the plane is safe but, golly, somehow it has been grounded and we need to change something even though we really don’t believe we should have to.

    These announcements that the plane is safe whie it has been grounded is either a total obfuscation or the sign of someone who does not want to accept reality.

    Perhaps what they are trying to say is that it is now safe because it has been grounded.

    The safely grounded dreamliner. How’s that for a slogan?!

    • Again – what would you rather Boeing do? Redesign the whole 787 electrics back to hydraulics ? Change the batteries to NiCAD forcing them to write off 2013 deliveries.
      Or Scrap the project itself?

      Try to answer this honestly as if you were running Boeing and had 200k people depending on you for livelihood.

      • Flyer121 :
        Again – what would you rather Boeing do? Redesign the whole 787 electrics back to hydraulics ? Change the batteries to NiCAD forcing them to write off 2013 deliveries.
        Or Scrap the project itself?
        Try to answer this honestly as if you were running Boeing and had 200k people depending on you for livelihood.

        Option 1:

        I would have started work immediately on using an alternative system. A non-Li-Ion system.

        Yes, it would have taken longer. Yes, it would have cost a lot of money, but it would have resolved the issue. Completely restored faith in the aircraft and so on.

        The benefit of the Li-Ion battery in terms of weight savings is now gone with this thick, heavy, steal containment box and additional vents etc so there is no reason to stick to this technology accept for the fact the aircraft is built with Li-Ion power source in mind.

        Option 2:

        I would wait until the root cause of the issue is identified so I knew exactly what I was dealing with. Once we knew that, I would personally feel more comfortable knowing that what actions I was taking were based on solid data.

        If Boeing have another event happen concerning the 787 batteries, or god forbid they lose one, their reputation will be destroyed, the FAA’s reputation will be destroyed. No one will want to fly the 787.

        Not only that, but any money saved trying to get the aircraft back in the sky as quickly as possible will be of little comfort when airlines begin cancelling their orders – because the public have lost all faith in them.

        Boeing management won’t do this though. Why? Because they have to prove to shareholders that they are delivering value for money and trying to get back a healthy return on shareholder investment. Boeing management aren’t running Boeing, the shareholders are – and they want profit more than anything.

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  15. Flyer121 :Well – it wasn’t supposed to happen. But it did happen didn’t it? Thats one of the biggest special conditions anyone can put.

    No, the A380 didn’t have similar issues. Uncontained engine failures happens from time to time. The parts exiting the engine can either puncture the fuselage and/or wings, or fly off leaving no other discernible damage apart from the those to the engine/nacelle. If anyhing, what the QF32 incidenet demonstrated, was that the A380 design team had done an exceptional job in building in enough redundancy into the aircraft. A similar disk exiting trajectory on any other aircraft might not have led to a sucessful flight conclusion.

    http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:7a78f54e-b3dd-4fa6-ae6e-dff2ffd7bdbb&plckPostId=Blog:7a78f54e-b3dd-4fa6-ae6e-dff2ffd7bdbbPost:03f1a332-ad2f-43ca-b6b5-cea3f335806f

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1288

    • Well then we are arguing on the definition of “similar” .
      They are similar in terms of a new type having a failure condition which was not supposed to happen. Both failures occurred because and on 3rd parties supplied parts.
      Both incidents were reasonably controlled – (A380 less so)

      BTW – I agree that Airbus has an excellent safety record probably better than Boeing in terms of hull loss.per 1xxx flying hrs

      • Well, in that sense the A380 had similar issues as that experienced by other in-service aircraft, neither of which led to a grounding (i.e. uncontained engine failure and rib feet cracks).

        The 787, on the other hand, is now in its 7th week of being grounded. In contrast to the A380 “issues”, the 787 “issue” is seemingly deemed by regulators to be a whole different ball game (i.e very little industry experience of critical systems batteries self-consuming in a fire).

        The 787 has had two battery fires similar to a late 2011 Cessna battery fire. However, in contrast to what Boeing has been doing, Cessna ordered an urgent recall of all in-service lithium-ion batteries. Cessna required CJ4 operators to replace the batteries with nickel cadmium or lead acid-based batteries within 10 flight hours, or seven days.

        Why hasn’t Boeing been as proactive as Cessna?

        Is it because no simple conventional battery replacement for the “all electric” 787 is feasible within a reasonable time period?

  16. @Uwe

    Uwe :
    “Boeing is trying their best to resolve the issues”.
    That is the point contested here.
    Boeing has started at least 3 pushes to force the FAA towards
    accepting their “non solution”.
    “Hiding the problem in a box”. Out of sight out of mind.
    Boeing knew they had a problem from at least 2008 onwards and seem to have avoided any move towards resolving it.
    Instead batteries were exchanged silently and Washington lobbied for easing Li-Ion battery transport limitations.
    Boeing does not get more scrutiny than Airbus has been inundated with.
    What changed is that the carefully orchestrated “under the rug sweeping” by interested parties has lost effectiveness.
    The same proponents who seem to have been busy blowing every Airbus item out of all proportions.
    The different Interests start to lose their synergetic leverage. A kind of blowback.

    Then my question is what would you like Boeing to do? Or what would you do personally?

    If you cant find a root cause, what is the second best option? Contain it on multiple levels so that you mitigate any remaining risks to a very negligible amount.

    You cant reduce the risk to 0 as was shown by the 380 incident – where parts not supposed to fail also failed. Right?

    • IMHO Boeing is hiding some unpleasant information.
      They are much too focused on “fixing the batterybox” like a fast action shell game.

      My personal guess is that they have a principal issue with the high powered electrics and electronics. I don’t have a precise idea but my guess is one or more items from
      ground return problems, EMI, Charger sensors or logic, Arcing and the controlling software.
      The batteries are sensitive first indicators i.e. the “sacrificial firstborn” but they are not the cause.

      I don’t see reason to mandate a return to hydraulics.
      But certainly a return to more principled design work.
      ( and maybe not taking two steps at a time when one step already is a big step )
      Take money away from PR.
      Invest in humility and qualified middle management.i.e. persons that have a systemic understanding of the project. get away from cubicle minds.
      Come to a realistic estimation of capabilities away from believing their own PR.

      ( OK now, my fireproof suit is on 😉

      • So Uwe, we are once again indulging in inuendo, unsubstantiantiated hypotheticals and good old IMHO.
        In other words spin. Interestingly enough I thought you would have more confidence in a fellow EU manufacturer who is the actual developer of the system in question. As for the 787 middle management, you know nothing about them or their qualifications to give you the right to call them incompetent. I suggest you look into the system developers if you think there is a design problem, afterall they are also a MAJOR developer for Airbus too.

      • Ignoring your personal comments.
        ( and you misrepresent what spin is anyway )

        Thales, Yuasa, Securaplane mostly keeping mum
        is a strange item. Gag order from Boeing?
        Keeping in mind the cultural specificities the japanese firms involved seem to be fuming. Loyality seems to have been worn to shreds.

        The thing that sticks out here is that all components perform to spec in bench tests. ( source NTSB, JTSB ).

        In the actual application the batteries perform significantly below expectations. ( independent of the observed catastrophic failures, this is a Boeing known item ).

        Cause may thus lie with one or all of the following items:
        * spec requirements are insufficient.
        * unexpected interaction of components and systems
        * systems integration
        * design errors
        * nonconformal workmanship
        collectively indicating lack of experience, understanding or the inability to bring experience and understanding to bear.
        With most of the “revolutionary” design elements Boeing does not seem to have much previous experience.
        Then obviously zero experience exists in the integration of such elements.

        Independent of what you may think or feel about the relevant persons at Boeing the vagaries the Dreamliner has experienced show
        performance below required levels and it is selfafflicted
        ( lack of continuity, disjunct teams, unenligthened management )

        In previous designs Boeing seems to have had a lot of
        problem fixing done by “silent gnomes” i..e the workforce on the shop floor. Changes there never made it back to the design documents. ( This came up during the 747-8 design effort. )

  17. The shareholders may be counting on Boeing executing the 2013 787 delivery forecast. However, the 200k people is not depending on the 2013 787 deliveries, but rather that the program will be fundamentally sound in the end. Being held “hostage” to an immature battery technology is not very sound.

    • Was a response to:

      Flyer121 :Again – what would you rather Boeing do? Redesign the whole 787 electrics back to hydraulics ? Change the batteries to NiCAD forcing them to write off 2013 deliveries.Or Scrap the project itself?
      Try to answer this honestly as if you were running Boeing and had 200k people depending on you for livelihood.

    • You know it as well as anyone that if 787 doesnt deliver this year, it could put Boeing itself in jeopardy. Customers could leave in droves. Airbus is ramping up 330 production.

      If Boeing’s big investment goes down the drain, 200k people can definitely be impacted in some form or the other.

      • So you think Boeing should be let off the hook for compasionate reasons. Jobs and all that socialist dreck?
        Fascinating.

        We’ve been told repeatedly that even if the 787 program founders no significant impact will be seen on BA earnings ;-?

      • What would put Boeing in jeopardy is another battery incident. In the grand scheme of things, another 6 months on the ground won’t make much of a difference IMO. The A330 is sold out for the next two to three years even though is is about to be produced at a maximum rate of 10 per month. Even if some 787 customers should cancel and order the A330 instead, they would probably have to wait until 2015 to get hold of a brand new A330.

  18. All I am saying realistically (not idealistically ) Boeing has done all it could.

    Of course , it can defer deliveries and redesign the whole architecture. But if you put yourself in the decision making position, you will realise its not as easy as that – irrespective of whether short term stock price holds or not. As being alleged, the last thing on Boeing’s mind will be the stock price.

    If Boeing knew that this was really a serious issue, they will nkow that it will come out later causing even more havoc and then no PR will save the stock from plumetting and may even take them to Ch11 considering huge penalties on 700+ frames.

    So , it follows that Boeing think that thios issue is not that great deal of a problem – FAA may think otherwise because they dont know and are always “too cautious” by definition.

    In other words , if Boeing didnt have faith in the current architecture (and also the proposed fix) , it would be extremely foolish of them to continue to posture the way they are . In the days of public safety being paramount, If God forbid fatalities occur , there will be lawsuits going into billions as BP s oil spill case showed. No matter which supplier was responsible BP almost perished due to that.

    I doubt Boeing has that much of a risk taking appetite that they throw all caution to the wind and carry on.

    • “All I am saying realistically (not idealistically ) Boeing has done all it could.”

      From nearly day one onwards Boeing publicly pushed their Bomb Calorimeter Approach
      as a viable solution to an unknow origin fault type.
      Not much visible effort is made to look further and diverging views from partners is derived : “Yuasa is convering their ass, nothing of value here”.

      No idea what happens behind closed doors. But it looks like the bloodhounds have lost the scent and now maul a carefully placed distraction.

      If the bomb box is approved further interest will be lost just like the proposed but never excecuted chemistry change in 2008. It works, nothing happened, move on.

      To come to an end: Boeing hasn’t even started going in the right direction.

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  20. I have no doubt Boeing will do the right thing and have a fix that works and restores their reputation as a maker of fine and safe aircraft. They won’t knowingly rush something that could have a disastrous consequence. Boeing is not stupid and you armchair pundits haven’t got a clue how to design an airplane. This is an incredibly complex machine as are Airbus planes.

    Obviously Boeing knows how to make airplanes that fly many millions of passengers safely every year. This 787 problem will fade into history soon enough. Then I will be back to complaining about the horrible economy seat configuration most airlines have chosen. Packing in 9 seats where 8 were intended is a reason I will avoid flying a 787 again. Only ANA and JAL did it right so far with 8 seats.

    United’s 787 is the worst flying experience I ever had jammed in rubbing shoulders. After a few minutes of playing with the dimming windows and the auto flush toilet, I was ready for a comfy ride that never happened. I couldn’t wait for that Houston to Los Angeles flight to end. NOT the way I wanted my first 787 flight to end, unhappy and extremely disappointed. And I’m a guy who LOVES to fly, just not on a 787 in economy.

    Oh well, at least I’ve flown on Dreamliners 4 times now, something a lot of folks can’t say when an airplane fleet is grounded.

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