By Scott Hamilton
Dec. 27, 2022, © Leeham News: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) today issued a critique of the newly released final investigation report of the Ethiopian government of the March 10, 2019, crash of a Boeing 737 MAX.
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 came five months after Lion Air flight JT610, a MAX, crashed. Both accidents began when the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) activated following a failure of the single Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor to which it was tied malfunctioned (JT610) or failed (ET302).
Boeing issued a notice to MAX operators after the Lion Air crash outlining proper procedures pilots should follow in case MCAS erroneously activated again. The Ethiopian government investigation placed the blame for the crash on Boeing. The NTSB’s critique concluded the pilots failed to follow Boeing recommendations and should be partly held responsible for the probable cause of the crash. Had they followed procedure, the NTSB concludes the pilots could have successfully flown through the emergency.
The NTSB’s critique noted that the final report failed to include its comments and misstated other documents and findings in assessing the blame to Boeing. The NTSB also concluded Boeing was partly culpable.
The NTSB’s nine-page critique is here. The press release is here. Releasing an independent set of findings is unusual and was prompted by the exclusion of its comments and what the NTSB characterized as misstating critical information that should have been part of the report for the safety of operators worldwide.
Finally you people manufacturer and operator killed so many innocent lives for your shortcomings blaming each other.
BEA raises some interesting aspects that bear into the situation as it looks like the Pilot engaged Auto Pilot contrary to the standard training and response.
https://fl360aero.com/detail/french-bea-says-eaib-final-report-on-the-crash-of-ethiopian-airlines-boeing-737-max-lacks-operational-and-crew-performance-aspects/1215
Note that, in its report, the NTSB refers to:
“the need for airplane systems that can more clearly and concisely inform pilots of the highest priority actions when multiple flight deck alerts are presented”
In other words: EICAS/ECAM.
We know what Congress did last week on that matter (dollars before safety), but perhaps the FAA will take a different stance.
And note this, on the same subject:
“A-19-10: Require that Boeing (1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from systems such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer assumptions.”
Will the FAA force BA to “incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications)”?
All this puts CAAC condition No. 3 into perspective.
“In other words: EICAS/ECAM.”
If the NTSB had meant EICAS they would have said so.
A pre loaded agenda drives that comment.
The bottom line is the Alert System works and said alert system failed to have the AOA disagree.
The NTSB report makes a lot of non valid assumptions, such as talking about a flight aspect means you understand it, that is untrue. You want to understand a spin, you need to spin an aircraft.
MCAS 1.0 did not take down the MAX by itself, but it setup the confusion that lead to it.
Can you point to another, non-EICAS/ECAM system that “can more clearly and concisely inform pilots of the highest priority actions when multiple flight deck alerts are presented”?
Note the syntax “inform” and “priority”…
If NTSB says EICAS, then they will mean EICAS. And why does that not apply to the NG?
And if its not programed into either system then it does not show up does it?
As Qantas Flight 32 found out, all those alarms and alerts are meaningless as its all a program and who decides what is more important than what? Multiple failures require pilots to fly the aircraft and make decisions, no one can program a logic tree that accounts for every variable.
While clearly MCAS was the trigger, there are other contributing causes involved in both crashes. That includes false assumption on pilot response.
NTSB does not address the simulator failures (deliberate) that lack the fidelity that the FAA mandates simulators to have.
And the Elephant in the cockpit is no one has ever done human factors engineering to determine WHAT alert system works and what does not work (and why) for the best pilot let alone the worst.
“And why does that not apply to the NG?”
Ask the NTSB.
Might have something to do with the fact that NGs will soon be on the way out, whereas MAXs are on the way in.
“MCAS 1.0 did not take down the MAX by itself, but it setup the confusion that lead to it.”
Facepalm x 100
No wonder LNA is going to reduce freewall articles with comment section. 🙁
“And why does that not apply to the NG?”
Lol.
I have it from a very reliable source three things happened on the ET front:
1. The copilot total flight-hours was 300.
2. When the aircraft pulled up during take-off, the stick-shaker went off. The flight crew then re-engaged the autopilot rather than fly the plane. Huh? Who does that?
3. The Ethiopians did not complete and file all of the ICAO-required flight data recorder parameters until 11 minutes before the deadline.
Having worked for two commercial aviation OEM’s I know how the turn the other cheek to outrageous airline customer actions but this was ridiculous for Boeing not to call out ET, Lion Air, and the Indonesian DGCA.
If your source is so reliable, then why didn’t we read these details in the crash reports?
weather the copilot flight hours was 300 or not…… atleast he was the one to notice the problem and the solution… STAB trim cut off completely.
These crashes had nothing to do with flight hours, tho i completely agree that there was Human factor issue involved… but big part was with Boeing not informing anybody about the system in the first place.
“The copilot total flight-hours was 300.”
No. You are dead wrong. Period.
From the EAIB report, the first officer had 361 total career flying hours, 207 of which were in the 737. All of which had occurred in the last 90 days. So he had about 3 months of commercial airline experience.
He had a pilots license and a type rating — and was therefore fully qualified to fly the aircraft.
Evidently, the MAX was less flyable than BA was pretending.
Easyjet trusted this 19-year-old to act as FO on its aircraft — together with a 26-year-old captain. But, then again, Easyjet doesn’t have the archaic 737 in its fleet…
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3806882/The-world-s-youngest-plane-captain-flies-UK-s-youngest-pilot-Kate-26-Luke-19-charge-holiday-flight-Gatwick-Malta.html
The experience level of the crew becomes of obvious importance & value in non-normal situations. This is why individuals with considerable experience command greater salaries and positions of authority, than less experienced individuals. This is common knowledge and practice.
It has nothing whatever to do with the aircraft. The same principles are in practice everywhere. This is also why some countries have requirements for greater experience levels in the cockpit. It benefits both the airline and the passengers, to have those people in place.
“It has nothing whatever to do with the aircraft.”
It has everything to do with the aircraft.
If the aircraft is well designed and built, unrecoverable situations à la the MAX crashes won’t occur in the first place.
Remember the discussion about female pilots perhaps not having enough physical strength to turn the 737 trim wheel? That’s an aircraft-specific issue.
Situations where both pilots may be required to simultaneously turn the trim wheel –> aircraft specific.
Remember that this aircraft is a dinosaur from the 60s.
@Rob, this is crazy logic for an airline pilot. What you are really saying is that pilots who have speared their plane into a field know what not to do next time. Even then, they would still have to fight their natural human instincts to avoid a repeat oweing to poor human factors design Pointing out that someone is new to a job is equally ridiculous, everyone has to start somewhere.
Southwest was the biggest operator at the time, but as far as I am aware they never had an MCAS activation, so we will never know how much better American pilots at dealing with something completely different than what they were doing when building up their high hours.
The assertion that experience builds capability, in any profession, is not crazy. As mentioned, it is the standard in every profession.
Further the notion that a pilot with 3 months professional experience, would not be at a disadvantage in comparison to a more experienced pilot, makes no sense whatsoever.
No one is faulting this pilot for his age or experience level. He did what he was asked to do. The questions are directed toward the regulator and airline, as to whether experience requirements could be improved, in the interests of safety.
Lastly with regard to pilot experience with MCAS, we do have the example of an Indonesian crew who did deal with the situation correctly. Same trigger source in AoA failure. Same multisystem malfunction. Same amplification and aggravation by MCAS, into a flight upset event. But different outcome in terms of a safely completed flight. No American crew involved.
“Further the notion that a pilot with 3 months professional experience, would not be at a disadvantage in comparison to a more experienced pilot, makes no sense whatsoever.”
Nobody is debating the value of experience.
What’s being asserted is that lengthy experience should not be a prerequisite to fly a plane. If a pilot has a license and a type rating, he satisfies the criteria to fly the plane. Period.
****
“we do have the example if an Indonesian crew who did deal with the situation correctly”
It’s called “getting lucky” — helped by the fact that there was a third flight crew member present who could make suggestions while the pilot and copilot were trying to control the plane.
Perhaps all 737s should have a third pilot from now on: that will leave one pilot to fly the plane in the event that the other two are using all their physical strength to turn the manual trim wheel.
@Rob
“The experience level of the crew becomes of obvious importance & value in non-normal situations.”
1) Never read the Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash report??
2) How many flight hours those pilots had??
3) Did it help them save the aircraft??? 🙄
4) Weren’t the pilot properly trained?
Well if these were foreign pilots ….
And yet the airlines keep ordering this archaic aircraft.
@williams
“And yet the airlines keep ordering this archaic aircraft.”
Yeah — because it’s being sold with mouthwatering discounts.
Southwest, for example, got a 65% discount on their -7s.
Further, most orders since re-cert have been from US carriers.
There’s very little interest from the EU: Ryanair, TUI and Norwegian — combined — have only ordered 360 units.
India is interested in whitetails because they’re available cheaply and/or quickly.
The MAX has become a “discount store” product.
@Bryce
And yet they still buy this dangerous archaic piece of equipment. One would think these airlines that actually have skin the game and way more than you would avoid it no matter the cost. Unless…………
@ williams
There are cowboys, gamblers and opportunists in every branch of human endeavor.
Just look at crypto: it has zero underlying value — and, yet, people continue to pile into in, hoping that they won’t be the ones without a chair when the music stops.
One more MAX crash and the show will be over.
@Rob,experience is of no use if it comes from a fatal accident.
What a absolute fitting counter. Thanks.
But Rob has expressed the opinion that they “where too dumb /green to fly”.
The counter is that an experienced American ( i.e. Superpersons) crew with advance warning also was to dumb/green to fly. They failed the experiment.
Riding shotgun is a way to learn things.
But being educated via a designed curriculum seems to be superior. Why retrace the difficult path the early adopters had to use to get proficient?
the way is to stand on the shoulders of giants, not scale them … again.
Never have made the allegation that the crew was too dumb it green to fly. But thanks for the example of the methods for creating a false narrative, that I have highlighted throughout this thread.
As for the comment that experience doesn’t matter if you’re dead, I have no words.
Alternatively:
“Consistently have made the allegation that the crew was too dumb/green to fly. Another example of the methods for creating a false blaming narrative, that I have propagated throughout this thread.
As for the comment that experience doesn’t matter if you’re dead, it caught me off guard and I have no counter”.
Schoolyard regression again, I see.
Charles. Your source is not so accurate.
1) The 300 hour pilot correctly deactivated the trim motors. He knew the drill.
2) MCAS is not active with the autopilot on. If the crew had in fact activated the autopilot, MCAS would have been disabled as programmed.
No far25 airplane built by DHC bombardier ever came out with a single source aoa vein feed without cross voting without accompanying misalignment warning that I am aware of since 1990 and every certification transport inspector knew that . That is why the TC minister of the day sits on his hands on the back benches.
This NTSB rebuttal clarifies and supports arguments that were made here throughout the discussion of the MAX accidents. It’s good to see verification of the truth come out, and misrepresentations be laid to rest.
As noted in the rebuttal, the FAA and Boeing have followed through on the NTSB recommendations and made the requested changes. Let’s hope the EAIB will do that here as well.
“As noted in the rebuttal, the FAA and Boeing have followed through on the NTSB recommendations and made the requested changes”
No they haven’t — see the quote above from the NTSB report:
“the need for airplane systems that can more clearly and concisely inform pilots of the highest priority actions when multiple flight deck alerts are presented”
The rebuttal states that the status of the FAA/Boeing recommendations is ,”Open – Acceptable Response “. Also that the FAA concurred with the recommendations.
As I mentioned, hopefully the EAIB will be equally cooperative.
Seeing as EICAS/ECAM hasn’t been implemented — as required by the NTSB quotes above — one must conclude that your assertion:
“As noted in the rebuttal, the FAA and Boeing have followed through on the NTSB recommendations and made the requested changes”
is incorrect.
It is your assertion that the MAX is not compliant in that regard. The FAA and other regulators have approved the CAS waiver, thus making it compliant. It could not be certified, or recertified, otherwise.
“It is your assertion that the MAX is not compliant in that regard.”
No, it’s the NTSB’s assertion.
***
“It could not be certified, or recertified, otherwise.”
The MAX -7 and -10 haven’t yet been certified: the FAA is holding BA’s feet to the fire with SSAs.
@Rob
If you accept NTSB’s words at face value, how come the whole B737 MAX was grounded for like twenty months? “Uncooperative” FAA/EASA/TC?
The “mystery” deepens!!! 🤣
The answer is well documented. The MCAS fixes were complete within the 6 month timeframe mandated by the FAA. But the FAA also conducted a separate review of the MAX safety assessments and fault trees, to identify other instances where branches for unexpected crew actions were not fully explored. That led to a rewrite of the entire control software, to include those branches, even for extremely remote probabilities.
the whole B737 MAX *fleet*
@Rob, it’s not a “rebuttal” (your word), it is “comments” (NTSB’s word). The difference is significant, especially when the NTSB also say, “Overall, the US team concurs with the EAIB’s investigation of the MCAS and related systems and the roles that they played in the accident.”
Having read the comments, so far as I can tell the NTSB are on the whole adding to the the EAIB’s report. There’s substantial commentary in Section 2 about human factors issues that the EAIB report did not cover. The NTSB is right to point out that a full appraisal of human performance is an important part of ensuring that accidents are not repeated.
However, regardless of one’s views of the quality / completeness of the EAIB’s report, what is inarguable is that the NTSB issued a bunch of actions related to bolstering the performance of human crew in this situation (sim training, etc), and also A-19-10 which basically says “think again about what it is realistic to expect a human crew to be able to do”. The NTSB evidently decided that the MAX + MCAS v1, coupled with the then in-place training, was incompatible with safe operation.
It’s never a good idea to criticise other countries’s efforts, their procedures, norms, outputs. I note that the NTSB comments are presented as strictly factual, not judgemental, which is appropriate. Some may allege political, cultural or commercial influence over the EAIB report, but doing so is particularly dangerous. Right now, there is political influence being applied in Congress by Boeing about the 737 MAX in favour of Boeing’s commercial gain, when the reason for the aircraft being an archaic mess is entirely down to the business culture of the company, indeed the business culture of the whole country. Cast not the first stone…
I’d like to say that, here on the Eastern side of the Atlantic, things were all pure white as the driven snow, but they’re not. What I don’t see is the EASA / CAA firmly and loudly responding to and countering the undisguised political influence currently being weilded in the USA – the “don’t upset the Americans” problem. The problem with appeasement is the longer you go along with it, the harder and harder it becomes to take a stand. In safety critical enterprises, that leads to deaths.
With regard to your reference to Congress, I’m wondering if there’s a link between the timing of the appearance of the EAIB report (Dec. 24) and the Congressional vote to grant BA a waiver on the EICAS issue just a few days earlier.
I can imagine that the Ethopians were incensed by the waiver, and decided that they were no longer going to try to placate the NTSB before publishing their report.
Technically you are correct that the NTSB characterizes their response as comments. However the import goes far beyond that. They do rebut several points of the investigation in their comments.
Further NTSB made clear that they had been trying to get their changes into the report for the last year, without success. It’s been widely reported that the report was delayed for this reason. At one point, EAIB announced that there would be no final report, and the interim report was final. Now they have apparently reconsidered, and went ahead over the objections of the NTSB
Once the final report is published, the only remaining mechanism for the NTSB is the inclusion of comments in the appendix. So that is what they have requested.
As far as the NTSB concurrence on EAIB findings for MCAS, Boeing, and FAA, I agree and have pointed that out multiple times in this thread, in response to claims of bias and conspiracy made by others.
Yes, I’d say that the NTSB has in this case done what it can, and seemingly done it quite well and successfully kept it objective. No mean feat. But that is rapidly becoming of merely secondary concern in the drive to ensure that something like this can never happen ever again.
I think it is interesting to compare the efforts of the NTSB to get important points into the EAIB final report, and lack of commentary from NTSB over what’s happening in the USA w.r.t. Boeing getting a waiver from the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. I may be doing NTSB a disservice, or they may simply be still on their seasonal holidays.
Self-analysis is a necessary part of any regulatory process. It’s the “Are we still getting this right?” question. There is a lot to suggest that the current aviation safety environment in the USA leaves a lot of to be desired. It’d be dangerous territory for the NTSB (Congress is their boss), but I think that NTSB now has the opportunity to “interpret” its remit and make some official comments about Congress involving themselves directly in the way they just have. If NTSB doesn’t do that, then who in the US does? Congress?
If NTSB do comment, either criticising the waiver or explaining why it’s OK , then fair play to the NTSB; they’d have made comments about EAIB’s report and process, and also about the situation inside the USA. That would be a demonstration of a consistent pursuit of safety at every level of the process. However, I suspect that they’re going to remain mute on the issue. And let’s not forget that the NTSB’s own house isn’t exactly in the best of shapes; it’s been 23 years since the Rand Corporation report into the “party system”.
The US aviation safety process is giving off many impressions of being seriously broken. First there’s the MAX crashes and the regulatory and commercial failings that lead to them. Secondly, passing a law about a specific issue (the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act) suggests that the existing legal framework establishing the regulator (FAA / NTSB) is too feeble. It’d be better to bolster the legal framework instead. Thirdly, granting a waiver to that law just reinforces that point. If that isn’t enough reasons for an outfit like NTSB to make an exceptional stand, then I don’t know what would be.
In the present situation one must also ask, what exactly is the FAA for? If one finds oneself asking such questions and unable get straight answers, one does not have a recognisable aviation safety / regulatory process, and sometime thereafter will not have an internationally accepted aviation industry either. If I were the head of an overseas aviation regulator, say the EASA, it feels like I should be talking to the House of Representatives or the Senate, not the head of the FAA or NTSB.
Really, when it comes down to it, can the rest of the world trust *without hesitation* the USA’s word when it comes to aviation safety? Because from where I’m sitting, the answer is definitely not. It feels like there might be a new ugly and opaque equilibrium between the FAA trying to regulate, and Boeing using political means to get regulation side lined by a Congress that’s subject to “political capture” (just like there used to be “regulatory capture” of the FAA). I’m an experienced engineer, not so very different I suppose to those in organisations like CAA, EASA, and I would be unsurprised if my professional peers in those organisations are also finding it hard to believe in it, particularly wrt 737. This is dangerous territory for Boeing; the waiver might badly misfire. If a global regulator takes issue with the waiver, refuses to accept that, that will somewhat stunt sales. It’s not like Congress can fire a foreign regulatory engineer or tell them to change their minds…
I think it notable that in other parts of the world, particularly Europe, UK, Japan, there is much stronger separation of aviation regulatory bodies and politicians / governments. Here in the UK the government and Parliament are basically legislated out of a position of power. UK laws tend to be set up along the lines of “you must follow the regulations”, and “the regulations are set by <insert name of responsible body". Government will have nothing but general corporate overview of that body – if that. For example, electrical safety regulations aren't even a matter for government at all, they're defined by a charitable institution with a Royal Charter to fulfil that role. Parliament, government has no power to set those regulations. There is the question of "who guards the guards?", but generally one finds that, with a decent set of anti-corruption laws, a properly funded, guaranteed independent regulator with a strong mandate will actually make pretty good guards of themselves.
Thanks for that comprehensive comment, Matthew.
Couldn’t they have just pulled the circuit breaker for the MCAS software?
There is no CB. It’s embedded software in the FCC’s
Who said that the pilots knew that the plane’s behavior was due to MCAS?
Was there an “MCAS active” light? — no.
Was there an “AOA disagree” light — no (see link).
Was there an EICAS screen with an “MCAS active” warning message? — no, because there is no EICAS in the 737.
Just a blaring, non-descriptive horn and a continuously shaking control column.
Primitive beyond belief.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/boeing-737-max-warning-light.html
Spiraling off to EICAS as the answer to all issues.
Boeing hid the entire aspect of MCAS from the FAA.
So your wondrous EICAS would also not have been programed with a fault output.
In fact the AOA disagree fault indicator was there but had been programed such it did not show.
Any message regardless of how it was generated is only as good as the training behind it and as we saw in AF447, EICAS does not solve all the aircraft issues, pilots have to fly it and react to the data or you can crash any aircraft, EICAS or not.
And, now, go back and read the previous post again, to see what you missed out on first time…
Every 737 pilot since #1 has been trained and should have been able to react correctly to a runaway trim condition. Trim override is on every 737 everbuilt. Also, there was no runaway trim present as long as they had flaps down. Any pilot should have been able to identify and control the airplane with these conditions, but the pilots in the accident airplanes failed to use basic logic. With the current shortage of pilots and sketchy requirements for some foreign airlines we can only be glad for all the augmentation systems on airliners that are already preventing untold numbers of pilot error incidents.
“Every 737 pilot since #1 has been trained and should have been able to react correctly to a runaway trim condition.”
Which, once again, assumes that the pilot *knows* that he has a runaway trim condition — and that he knows it *on time*.
Garth:
Its not that simple as MCAS 1.0 was a totally unknown program and it did not have the characteristic of run away trim pilots had been trained for.
Keep in mind there was associated warnings and alerts and stick shaker going on. It takes time to sort that out.
I agree an AOA light does not cut it, and it for sure does not cut it unless you are trained on it and know what the correct responses are for that specific aspect as opposed to runway trim.
And keep in mind, the column cutout no longer worked either, that was taken away with MCAS 1.0 because it would have defeated MCAS 1.0 (which would have been a great outcome)
The trim override switch on the center console would still have disabled MCAS. And to my point about pilot logical thinking, why would a pilot who re-selected flaps after the nose down by MCAS and subsequent return to full pilot control, not logically repeat that and return to land? Instead they dumped the flaps again and fought the MCAS for 8 minutes and rode it in. Inexplicable in my mind.
@Garth. If they had a true MCAS OFF switch, then they wouldn’t have to think through flap setting concequences due to MCAS, Manual Electric yoke switch concuences due to MCAS, dealing with the manual forces trying to operate the trim wheel quickly, the time bomb response of MCAS. They could just fly the aircraft. They would have control of the aircraft, without the auto pilot, auto throttle and the auto MCAS playing games with them. They would have fast control of the stablizer via the electric trim switches. That’s what I’d want as a pilot in a difficult situation. FULL CONTROL IMMEDIATELY.
With Boeing moving HDQ’s to WDC they’ve had the payoff from Congress and the FAA and now the NTSB.
Why was it so important, now at this point in time, for them to add comment?
The situation on the ET302 happened extremely fast.
Bryce, the FAA will do nothing.
Money talks, BS walks.
Did the NTSB get involved in the EICAS debate before the Congressional vote last week?
It certainly had every motive to do so, in view of the fact that the above-referenced report describes EICAS as a *requirement* (i.e. non-optional).
The NTSB position was to accept the FAA determination, that the 737 MAX CAS does not represent a safety of flight issue. That determination was sustained by all the regulators during the MAX recertification process.
And yet, in the above-cited NTSB report — which was published just hours ago — there is a renewed call for EICAS/ECAM.
Also, in giving its *provisional* re-cert of the MAX, EASA said that BA had agreed to make modifications to the existing CAS. EASA made it quite clear just 2 weeks ago that it would be holding BA to this promise.
Moreover, the CAAC has refused to re-cert the MAX, because its condition No. 3 hasn’t been met — i.e. that all issues implicated as factors in the MAX crashes be addressed. The much-cited “green light” given by the CAAC was only with regard to MCAS (condition No. 1).
CAAC has it’s own reasons for being the only major regulator in the world to not have recertified the MAX. It seems clear they are not related to aircraft safety.
EASA has made an agreement for Boeing to implement a third AoA display, and a stick shaker disable. These are upheld in the recent legislation. There is no requirement to alter the MAX CAS.
“There is no requirement to alter the MAX CAS.”
From the EASA link below:
“Boeing will also conduct a complementary Human Factor assessment of its crew alerting system within the next 12 months, with the aim of identifying the need for longer term improvements.”
https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/newsroom-and-events/press-releases/easa-declares-boeing-737-max-safe-return-service-europe
And from page 10 of the RTS report cited in the link:
“In order to ensure the long-term safety of the 737 MAX, EASA has also agreed with Boeing two key post-RTS actions: (i) the development of a modification to further improve the AOA integrity, to be integrated in 737-10 version and retrofitted on the in service fleet, and (ii) the further evaluation of the CAS.
@Rob
I read that NTSB was critical of BA/FAA’s human(pilot) interaction/reaction assumptions. No???
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-ntsb-idUSKBN1WB1U6
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/
Yes, these are part of the NTSB recommendations that now have status “Open – Acceptable Response”.
These issues are still unresolved as far as the EASA is concerned: see quotes from the EASA RTS AD.
The fact is that EASA has recertified the MAX, with provisions that have all been undertaken. There is no indication whatever that EASA intends to withdraw that, or has extended the requirements. There is every indication that they concur with the NTSB assessment.
“…with provisions that have all been undertaken…”
Incorrect.
The MAX fleet in the EU still needs to be retrofitted with at least two modifications.
As quoted above, the EASA requires BA to present an analysis of / improvements to the present CAS.
One should remember that the EASA’s re-cert of the MAX is *provisional*.
As I stated, these have all been undertaken, and there is no indication either NTSB or EASA is unsatisfied with the response.
“As I stated, these have all been undertaken”
You can “state” it all you want, but that doesn’t make it true.
There is no “response” with with the EASA can be satisfied or not: the “response” is still pending.
I’m confident that this will not be an impediment, as there is no evidence or cause to support it. But whatever, you are welcome to believe what you will.
“I’m confident that this will not be an impediment”
Being “confident” about something doesn’t somehow promote it into the realm of objective reality.
Similar “confidence” was expressed 2 years ago that re-cert of the MAX in China was forthcoming — and we know how misplaced that “confidence” was 😉
Meanwhile, the real world is waiting for BA to actually implement the required mods…and we know how poor BA is when it comes to execution.
My confidence in the China recertification was based on the presumption that they would behave civilly and not play political games with certification.
That confidence was misplaced, but not because of the safety of the MAX, which has been endorsed by every other major regulator. It was misplaced because of bad behavior by the Chinese.
If your implication is that EASA will engage in similar bad behavior, that argument has zero basis in evidence or fact. I remain confident in both the MAX, and the integrity of EASA, for which substantial evidence exists.
Again there is no evidence to the contrary, or for your position. And again, you are welcome to your own beliefs and position, but not to represent them as facts.
I’m very willing to wait to be justified on this, as I have been throughout the MAX saga. At that time, perhaps we can resume this discussion.
“My confidence in the China recertification was based on the presumption that they would behave civilly and not play political games with certification”
No “political games” being played: China is waiting for the recommendations made by (inter alia) the NTSB to be fully enacted — this is the essence of its Condition No. 3. A completely logical and consistent stance.
The EASA is similarly waiting for certain modifications to be made to the plane, but was generous enough — in the meantime — to grant a *provisional* re-cert. This is detailed in EASA’s re-cert documentation.
The fact that the FAA is prepared to take short-cuts with MAX re-cert does not require other regulators to do so.
Bryce:
That is pure nonsense and in fact MAX is approved for flights in China.
The Chinese government has approved purchase of the MAX by BOC.
And yes China is playing games because they can and don’t need the MAX right now.
@ TW
Wrong again
– The CAAC had approved the modifications to MCAS, but this only satisfies its Condition No. 1 — it doesn’t satisfy Condition No. 3.
– BOC supplies aircraft to customers in 38 countries: it supplies those customers with what they want, and it makes a profit in doing so.
– China is currently taking Airbus aircraft hand-over-fist. So they certainly need aircraft — but only ones certified by the CAAC.
There’s no “partly culpable”
If you really believe that this would never have happened to the worst American pilot on a bad day, then say so. Otherwise its all on Boeing and the FAA. They had analysed the situation and correctly predicted that it would happen again after the Lion Air crash.
Perhaps they thought that it was OK because it wouldn’t happen to American crews?
Thing is Grubbie, Aviation Week posted an article shortly after, where US pilots flew the ET flight in the sim and the result was that they could not save the aircraft, given the circumstances. The pilots in the sim knew what was coming, knew what they had to do (fly the roller coaster manoeuvre, which was never taught), had none of the pressures of 150+ people on their hands….and they still couldn’t save it.
There is no dispute that the aircraft could not be controlled in the final circumstances. The point of the NTSB rebuttal is that those circumstances need not have ocurred.
Nor would those circumstances have occurred if BA hadn’t taken a whole plethora of shortcuts with regard to MCAS.
Cause and effect.
As stated here ad infinitum, accidents result from chains of events, and it’s the responsibility of accident investigators to identify and break all the links in the chain.
The Boeing links were identified and broken. The NTSB is asking that the same be done for the crew links
“As stated here ad infinitum, accidents result from chains of events”
But when the root cause is removed, the rest of the chain becomes irrelevant.
@Rob
What did NTSB say earlier??
As reported
-> “The NTSB said it was not analyzing pilot actions in the two fatal crashes”
@Pedro
Your quote is from 2019, when the NTSB said their analysis of Boeing and FAA roles in certification of the MAX, did not involve any analysis of the crew actions. Which would be expected.
Now, they are referring to the EAIB accident report, which is expected to have an analysis of crew actions. But suffered from omissions and misrepresentations in that regard.
And that is fully valid.
In fact the Ethripiain report over stated MCAS and understated the other contributing factors.
The NTSB is looking at lessons not learned and the political decision of not appending their report by attaching the latest NTSB statement as required by agreement.
All nations play politics and some are being played by Ethiopia as well.
Bird strikes are a valid issue regardless of MAX or not as is pilot training.
It’s in the MITRE report, by the way: a recovery that Boeing claimed would take 1.5 seconds , in fact took 10 seconds- despite the pilots knowing what was coming.
Frank:
Having been in a number of extreme incidents, including people who were as close to me as possible, you do not think about them.
You are working the situation and no passenger of full passengers is not a factor.
There was one time and one time only I notified a bus load of people that the route I was forced to take them was in my opinion stupid and extremely dangerous.
But, I knew the hazard in advance, I stopped the bus, informed them if they wanted to walk that stretch they could and what I would do to hold the bus on that hill if it all went South.
But I told them, if they did not move and move fast, I was not going to linger.
This feels like blame shifting by the NTSB for not recommending the immediate grounding of the 737 following the Lion Air crash a free months earlier. More than hundred people would be alive now who died because it didn’t do that. If the NTSB can make out that reasonably competent operations would have avoided the crash despite fundamentally dangerous equipment, it takes away their responsibility.
NTSB patronizes the Ethiopian Accident Prevention Board. They imply the NTSB gets to decide what gets reported by the Ethiopians.
I fully agree with FF’s comment.
I too am puzzled by the NTSB response in this.
Vast majority were well written.
They do discuss the entire crash and the lessons not being learned from it and maybe that is the major point.
The bird situation being one. Pilot training another but they fail to address the training of the hand cranking did not have the fidelity (real world) it should have. Pilots never practiced unloading and if they had, the cranking would have been easy (until they corrected the simulator programing)
When did the simulator programing change and why was it not discovered? Having worked at a Simulator building they run tests to confirm the fidelity.
There is a reality that Ethiopia and Indonesia do not have first officer requirements (time and training) that are worthy of someone taking control of the aircraft.
How many others are the same?
“Ethiopia and Indonesia do not have first officer requirements (time and training) that are worthy of someone taking control of the aircraft.”
By definition, the plane should be flyable by anyone with a pilot’s license and a type rating.
@TW
What’s ICAO’s flight time requirement for pilots?? 🙄
Both Indonesia and Ethiopia are ruleless countries? 🤔
Unknown unknowns?! You don’t know what you’re lacking of?? 😂😂😂
It needs to be clarified that its not the NTSB job to ground aircraft, in fact it can’t (repeat it CAN NOT)
The NTSB if it has a finding that is on solid ground can RECOMMEND grounding.
The FAA is the agency that would ground it and they DO NOT have to follow what the NTSB recommends.
The NTSB has recommended that Boeing change its FLACH Trap and the FAA has not concurred and has not made Boeing do so.
The NTSB is fully independent of the FAA and well isolated from Political aspects. That does not make them perfect but its better than other systems (my opinion)
Crew performance, task management, CRM, and human-machine interface are common omissions in African air accident investigation reports. When included, they are not analyzed with sufficient detail and as such, the reports lack a proper correlation with actions and/or omissions of the flight crew.
The intent to limit national public accountability seems obvious. EAIB attributed the cause of the AoA vane failure to Boeing, despite having irrefutable evidence to the contrary. In addition, they altered the CVR transcripts, to cast the crew in a better light.
When I read those reports, I’m thankful we have the NTSB as an independent & objective agency.
“When I read those reports, I’m thankful we have the NTSB as an independent & objective agency.”
That certainly can’t be said for the FAA and Congress…
And of course The Netherlands legislature and governance is perfect as is the EASA.
Good of you to acknowledge that 👍
In related 737 news, looks like LUV is having some problems over the holiday season, with it’s operations.
Congratulations!
You’ve just won the “2022 understatement of the year” prize 😉
Well, being part of the Commonwealth, I think it is incumbent upon me to keep up the tradition of understatement.
It is just a flesh wound, after all…
Stunning in its magnitude and on going failures
“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
What’s more important, a new fleet of aircraft or back office infrastructure? Only happens “once”!?
Remarkable
Read the whole thread, from the vid at the top
https://mobile.twitter.com/DavidBSamuels/status/1608183710679191553
😂
https://mobile.twitter.com/DavidBSamuels/status/1608215089936465920
The Blame is fully on FAA and Boeing for not implementing measures after the Li ion jet crash even after going ahead to predict such a crash could happen again. The pilots were following procedure which was not even fully equipped. 2019 and such things still happening just goes to show what a long way we still have to go to inprove flight safety.
Keep in mind that crashes happen in normal and routine circumstances that the pilots put out of control. Many of those are the EICAS equipment Airbus products.
That is not to absolve Boeing or the FAA, what they did was unconscionable .
While I do have issues with the NTSB, part of their job is to address contributing factors and failures to note them. Loss of speed control in the Ethiopian crash was certainly one of them.
Another area is why the auto throttle did not disengage. While its up the pilots to do so, auto throttle does drop out in other circumstances (see the FLACH Trap)
Also failure to address the lack of simulator training vs reading about having to do the yo yo as well as the simulators at the ti9me no where near real to reality with how difficult (impossible) cranking is if the tail is loaded with forces you can’t overcome with the crank and the yo yo maneuver that at least addresses it is not taught.
The “yo-yo maneuver” (well-named, as it should not be needed as a substitute for an adequately-designed Boeing 737 aircraft) cannot be done in the phases of flight where it is *most likely* to be needed, because it requires surplus altitude above ground level which is not then available- as in climb-out.
Bill7:
If you maintains speed control which is impossible not to in climb out, then the yo yo does not apply. Speed control is as basic as breathing (or should be to a pilot).
Its only at high speeds it does (and yes I think this should have been addressed back in the Classic days, what was standard design for all aircraft at that time should have had a tech fix)
The Ethiopian pilots failed to maintain speed due to throttle position not as a result of climb out (or dive)
EASA did not address the manual crank system either. Like the simulators not having the correct response, that too has been allowed to fall into a void.
But the situation is a real aspect of the 737 and has been ignored by all and there the pilots were failed a second time in that they did not have the training they should for it.
It might not have helped, but they did not have the real feel training needed and that is a massive failure.
Thousands of NG and Classics fly with it as well as the MAX. Its at least correct in simulators now. Whether an AHJ has the training required to deal with it is only true of some.
And yes its a conflicting subject.
I have never seen anyone write up a tech fix for this. If there is no tech fix then you need to train for it and that fell by the wayside for unknown reasons.
Transworld said : “..If you maintains speed control which is impossible not to in climb out, then the yo yo does not apply. Speed control is as basic as breathing (or should be to a pilot). .”
Unless a hidden system repeatedly pushes the nose down against the pilot’s will during climb-out, of course. Didn’t both Boeing 737MAX™ crashes in fact occur in just that way?
The points made in the critique add useful detail about the circumstances of the crash. They don’t however change the root cause, which is that the 787 was a dangerous piece of kit that should not have been allowed to fly following the Lion Air crash, until it had been fixed.
The NTSB implies poor operations were a cause of the crash, which is wrong in my view. I also suspect the NTSB has an interest in implying poor operations were a cause of the crash.
@ FF
“Foreign pilot blaming” appears to be in the DNA of the US aerospace industry.
As pointed out by @Frank above, a fully-prepared US flight crew also failed to recover control of the aircraft in an MCAS enaction simulation.
It should be noted that the so-called yo-yo maneuver is not applicable to the conditions of ET302. It’s meant for conditions where airspeed reduction is not possible, due to a small speed margin in thin air within the flight envelope. In that case unloading through altitude loss is advised, but the altitude also is a given.
In the case of ET302, the aircraft was climbing through 10,000 ft, and only a throttle reduction was needed to unload by reduction of speed. The aircraft had more than a 100 knot speed margin to utilize for that purpose.
Did ET302 ever get above 1000 AGL? Certainly not above 2000 AGL?
@Richard
The maximum AGL altitude for ET302 was around 7000 ft. That corresponds to about 14,000 ASL.
@Rob
Some basic geography lesson from Wikipedia:
“Addis Ababa lies at an elevation of 2,355 metres (7,726 ft) and is a grassland biome, located at 9°1′48″N 38°44′24″E. The city lies at the foot of Mount Entoto and forms part of the watershed for the Awash. From its lowest point, around Bole International Airport, at 2,326 metres (7,631 ft) above sea level in the southern periphery, Addis Ababa rises to over 3,000 metres (9,800 ft) in the Entoto Mountains to the north.
Furthermore according to LNA:
“The aircraft climbed very slowly and only to about 1,000ft above ground before crashing”.
Reuters also reported the following:
“the plane failed to climb more than 1,000 feet above ground in an area surrounded by high terrain.”
@pedro .. from the accident report charts around page 84-90 and on .. it looks like the aircraft flew to a height of around 7000 AGL
==
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6801178/ET-302-Interim-Investigation-Report-March-9-2020.pdf
@Pedro
The reporting you quote was preliminary and is incorrect. I refer you to the FDR data presented in the EAIB accident report. As well as the general narrative within the report.
@Richard D
“it looks like the aircraft flew to a height of around 7000 AGL”
Apparently the pilots started to lose control of the aircraft when it was barely 1,000 ft AGL. Don’t forget 14,000 ft is the MSA. 🙄
Well, this is interesting timing.
===
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/congress-year-end-bill-clears-faa-to-certify-boeing-737-max-7-10-unchanged/
====
I guess it’s cheaper to pay lobbyests than follow through with agreements to fix planes.
To clarify, the legislation requires the agreed upon changes, for third AoA display & stick shaker disable, to be applied to all MAX models within 3 years of certification.
The updated CAS ruling was intended by Congress to apply to aircraft certifications following the MAX family. The legislation preserves that intent.
“…was intended by Congress…”
Have you got any links to back-up this perceived “intent” of Congress?
Prima Facie, the “intent” of Congress was to prevent EICAS-less certifications from ocurring after Dec. 27, 2022.
There would be no need for the 2 year delay if the intent was to include the MAX family. So the intent to not do so, is self-evident.
Still waiting on that link vis-à-vis “intent”…
Rob logic is exactly spot on.
Congress is filled with idiots like the guy whose whole resume was a lie (and in fact we are going to find out he was robbing accounts he was Conservator on (or just kiting old people fund) to fund his life and campaign)
The clear logic was EICAS was not intended to apply to the MAX or the 8/9 would have required it.
Legislation alwyas has flaws that they discover as time goes on and some of them get corrected, some we are stuck with.
Boeing got attention on the EICAS one and got it corrected. Boeing has a lot of sway and that is the reality we live with and deal with.
The FAA is not responsible for the legislation, if asked they will give their opinion but said opinion is not the law and regulations they are to carry out.
If the EICAS was an issue it is also an issue with the thousands of NG flying (as well as Classics).
I suppose VW should retrofit my Passat with lane control, people avoider and braking, rear view camera etc, etc etc ……….
Bottom line is no MCAS 1.0 and there would not have been those two crashes.
Pilots should not have to make up for the deficiencies of an aircraft.
Sometimes they do (see the Airstana (sp?) E175 debacle) but pilots follow their training.
Training in this case was a written one, it was not in a flight simulator where you get it into the memory.
So while NTSB has a very tech set of definitions and an experience PM might have stopped both crashes, its not a given as there are many crashes for normal ops that the PM failed to assist as well (of the PF for that matter)
There were no MAX simulators at the time and the ones that were out there (NG mostly) were wildly out of reality with the manual trim under tail loaded conditions.
TW, This video implies that the pilots of ET302 may have had MAX sim training?
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/28/africa/ethiopian-airlines-boeing-max-8-simulator-manual-intl/index.html
More than one thing can be true of a complex event, at the same time even.
Truer words have never been written.
Lessons often are not learned. I don’t know how many incidents of ground handling or inspection failures have occurred.
Loss of control situation are not uncommon regardless if its an FBW with EICAS or a Boeing FBW or not with the alert system.
The Air Astana pilots also messed up as they had a diagnostic they should have run and did not.
Unusual attitude training would prevent a lot of crashes and bad landings but its not world wide. The US and EU has learned that lesson.
The aircraft are so easy to fly pilots who get challenged (and fail) are not found out until they loose control.
There are innumerable simulator training scenairous you can run not only for specific ones but to find out if a pilot is capable of responding to unexpected ones.
One of the cited failures in the aircart automation area was pilots were repeatedly exposed to the same old same old and never challenged. As soon as a situation started to occur they knew what was coming next.
What you want is unexpected failures and out of norm emergencies and does the pilot aviate accordingly (unusual attitudes among those)
Why do we have to have incident with false glide slopes over and over again when it should be automatic to confirm you are not on one?
Unreliable airspeed, stick shaker and one expects the crew to throttle back. Sure knowing what we know now it was easy to save the plane. Use elec trim, to correct, then use the cut out switches. They turn the trim back on cos they could not turn the trim wheels manually, then then in the brief delay switching them back off. MCAS reared up and killed them. Thats what it looks like to me. If they had flipped those switches they would all be alive today. If there was significant blame on the crew then there would be no need to ground the fleet.
Note that it wasn’t just use of the cutout switches. Even more significant was not understanding the effect of both speed and stabilizer position on the column forces.
That is what the NTSB is trying to get EAIB to acknowledge. It reflects an issue with basic training concepts. The goal here is not to assign blame to the pilots, but to be sure crews get the training they need to handle non- normal conditions.
Various news site reported the Ethiopian pilots followed Boeing’s procedures. Are they ALL fake news?? 🙄
The cited reports are incomplete and represent a journalist’s understanding.
The EAIB report makes clear that the crew ran a version of the Boeing recommended checklist for stabilizer malfunction, although they deviated substantially from the prescribed method.
However they failed to acknowledge other alerts & run other checklists that would have helped them develop a better understanding of their condition, and safeguarded the flight.
All of this is detailed in the NTSB rebuttal, which is quite clear and unambiguous.
“However they failed to acknowledge other alerts & run other checklists”
Ah yes, the well-documented crew startling effect of the 737’s grossly outdated CAS, which doesn’t provide meaningful information in multi-alert situations.
Crew are trained on the meaning of all alerts on the 737. Also are trained to call them out and use their memory items in response.
That did not happen, multiple times in ET302. Again this is well documented in the EAIB report, as well as the NTSB rebuttal.
“Crew are trained on the meaning of all alerts”
But — as has been well documented by the NTSB and MITRE — do not have the ability to disentangle/prioritize a whole array of concurrent alerts in a short time frame, particularly against the background of a blaring horn and shaking control column.
That is your assertion. Notably the EAIB report does not make this claim. Instead it makes the claim that the workload was too high, with respect to the column forces which required both crew members to overcome.
This is why the relieving of those forces is critical to the accident, as noted by the NTSB.
“That is your assertion”
Not true.
– It’s also the assertion of the NTSB and MITRE.
– And of the AA pilots union, and Sully (for example).
– And it’s the reason why Congress attempted to mandate EICAS by law — before retracting in response to lobbying and fearmongering.
– And it’s the reason why the EASA requires that BA present a review of the 737 CAS, with proposals for improvement.
– And it lies at the basis of CAAC Condition No. 3.
But as correctly stated, is not asserted in the accident report, and thus is not a matter of the official record, which NTSB is trying to correct.
There are a range of opinions on this subject, and they also change over time, as more information becomes available. We all can point to external dissenting opinions, but they have no impact on the investigation or official record.
The goal of the NTSB is to put the correct and truthful information in the public domain, and into the official record. That is the present topic of discussion.
“…is not asserted in the accident report…”
Once again, citing from the present NTSB report:
“the need for airplane systems that can more clearly and concisely inform pilots of the highest priority actions when multiple flight deck alerts are presented”
“A-19-10: Require that Boeing (1) ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from systems such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer assumptions.”
What is missing is the key sequence that AFIK was not part of the directive. Bascially Boeing just said use the cutout switch. They assumed the pilots would first stabilize the plane using elec or manual trim. These guys were going too fast to use the manual trim. So they used the electric trim. But the captain handed it over to the JR. while he was trouble shooting. The guy could not keep the plane level so he turned on the cutoffs and used the elect trim as he had seen the capt do. BUT, he did not trim enough and before he could switch them off again, MCAS attacked and they were too low to recover. At least that is how I read the situation.
You may be conflating the two accidents. In JT610, the captain had control of the aircraft and entered a holding pattern. Then transferred control to the first officer, who as you said, had not understood the captain’s method, and lost control. The cutoff switches were never used.
In ET302, the pilots worked together, but the captain remained in control and gave the orders. First to use the cutoff switches, then to reengage them. As you said, their speed was too high for the manual controls to work.
Finally the NTSB rebuttal verified that the emergency AD did advise the crew to use the electric trim to relieve loads, before using the cutoff switches. Also that this is part of their memorized runaway trim procedure.
Rob said, on 28 December 2022: ” In the case of ET302, the aircraft was climbing through 10,000 ft..”
Is that 10,000 feet above ground level, Rob- or not ?
That is ASL. As noted in my response to Richard, there is roughly a 7000 ft differential between ASL and AGL, for the airport location. This is based on the FDR, which included barometric effects at the time of the accident.
Your comment was carefully written to give the impression that the ET302 pilots had 10,000 feet of height *above ground level* to work with. They didn’t, as you well know. Creative obfuscation, one might say.
Or perhaps you can provide another interpretation of your previous, context-free statement “climbing through 10.000 feet” – so we can all be the wiser.
The EAIB report states that all altitudes are given in ASL. I was quoting their statements in the report, and their characterization of flight conditions.
The reason for their choice, is that ASL determines air density, and thus the flight conditions and forces acting on the control surfaces.
As mentioned in the response to Richard, the maximum AGL altitude for ET302 was about 7000 ft. There is nothing deceptive in any of my statements.
> As mentioned in the response to Richard, the maximum AGL altitude for ET302 was about 7000 ft. There is nothing deceptive in any of my statements. <
No comment.
14,000 is the MSA and the pilots tried very hard to achieve to no avail.
@Bill7
Have you tried avherald and able to confirm what @Rob stated??
There is no need to consult AVHerald when you have the EAIB’s own statements and data.
As far as the MSA, it’s clear that the crew was trying to achieve that altitude. That is not in dispute. Nor is it disputed that this was extremely difficult due to control column forces.
The point of the NTSB rebuttal, is that those forces could and should have been relieved. Having a crew with the skills to do that, is the value of EAIB correctly citing it in their report.
“The point of the NTSB rebuttal, is that those forces could and should have been relieved.”
Assuming that the highly startled crew knew — in a timely manner — what was happening to the plane.
Coulda, woulda, shoulda.
The big question for 2023 is, of course, whether the various SSAs submitted by BA to the FAA for the MAX-7/-10 will ever be enough to satisfy the FAA that those models are certifiable.
After all, neither model satisfies the *requirement* enunciated in the NTSB report vis-à-vis improved/prioritized crew alerting.
The crash was a failure to use the electric trim switches to trim the aircraft. Was that a failure of the Boeing recommendations, or a failure of any crew flying a MAX to study the two LionAir flights that survived and crashed.
Use of the electric trim switches to trim the aircraft should never have been necessary.
The crash was caused by a whole plethora of shortcomings/misinformation with regard to a poorly-conceived, sub-standard functionality caused MCAS.
The proper trim of an aircraft is a basic skill expected of every pilot, and the electric trim switches are routinely used in every flight.
The use of the cutoff switches is also a trained and expected memory skill. These are the points documented in the NTSB rebuttal.
The pilot is entitled to assume that an unknown utility in the aircraft will not try to pitch the aircraft into the ground: the aircraft is expected to fly, not repeatedly try to crash itself.
Once again: in order to take appropriate action in an emergency, one must first be fully cognizant of the causes of that emergency.
The pilots are expected to deal with malfunctions that may occur during flight. They receive training in non-normal conditions for this express purpose.
In this case, they received explicit training on stabilizer malfunction. Yet did not follow that training, resulting in a fatal accident.
This is the point of the NTSB rebuttal, to explore the failure that ocurred and improve training to prevent a recurrence.
“The pilots are expected to deal with malfunctions that may occur during flight”
Only to the extent that such expectations are realistic under real-life circumstances — which was certainly not the case here.
*********
“This is the point of the NTSB rebuttal, to explore the failure that ocurred and improve training to prevent a recurrence”
The NTSB isn’t trying to “explore” anything: it’s petulantly and pedantically reacting because it didn’t get its way with the Ethopian investigators.
The NTSB has already concluded that the 737 CAS is a mess, and has listed requirements for this to be addressed — including in the present report.
manual trim is problematic, lots of turns, small wheel, …
.. you won’t get anywhere in time available.
using electric trim reset the MCAS logic. i.e. resulted in rinse repeat activity. ( this iMHO is a major culmination in insidious programming. )
Boeing handed out some (obscure, keyhole view ) advice
but did not expose the underpinings ( MCAS function, logic )
Had they exposed the “unfotunate” linking logic of using trim and (re)activating MCAS for the given advice “trim once, disable electric trim immediately after” )
Did they hold back sufficient information for legal fallout reasons?
The standard training and documentation for stabilizer malfunction, is to trim against the uncommanded motion, and if it repeats, trim to neutral and disable the motor. This is a required memory skill.
Further this was re-emphasized in the emergency AD. One of the issues the NTSB rebuttal asks to be addressed, is how and why that training and advisory could have been ineffective.
And how did that work out in real life? Where’s the OFF switch for MCAS?
Why not put in a button or switch to artificially tell MCAS the flaps are set disabling MCAS? That would give the pilot control of the aircraft, the same as what happens with turning off the Auto-Pilot and Auto-Throttle. Why is Boeing so adamant about having MCAS take ultimate control of the stablizer from the pilots? Feelablilty my foot! If this button or swtich had been in ET302, they would have had a much better chance of saving the aircraft. Why won’t Boeing put in this simple solution? I’d bet Pilots would like ultimate control of their aircraft. Especially Boeing Pilots.
If a pilot can’t turn off MCAS, then how are the following FAR’s adhered to? Either you can turn off MCAS itself, or it’s an automated system, which has to be certified to an automated flight control standard. Switching off the electric Trim Motor, and attempting to turn a small trim wheel, in time, isn’t deactivating the system in my humble opinion. The European standards may be different in this matter. I haven’t looked into them.
===========
FAR 25.672 (b)
The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in §25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.
===========
FAR 25.671 (c)
The airplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems), within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot.
This subject has been discussed before. As both FAA and NTSB have pointed out, MCAS does not take control from the pilots. The crew has the means to override and disable MCAS, at their fingertips. The question is why those means were not utilized, in the manner expected from their training.
That is the question the NTSB wants to see addressed, in order to ensure other crews have those skills.
A key point in your recitation of the FAR, is “within the normal flight envelope”. If you overspeed the aircraft beyond maximum safe operational speed, control forces can be greater than specified within the envelope. This is also acknowledged within the FAR.
“MCAS does not take control from the pilots.”
MCAS certainly does take control from the pilots: it autonomically points the nose of the aircraft down, without being commanded to do so by the pilots.
Whether the pilots can regain control of the aircraft is a matter of critical timing: as we now know, once MCAS ran amok for too long, control of the plane became unrecoverable.
MCAS can be instantaneously overridden by pressing an electric trim button, or by use of the cutoff switches. Just as any of the automatic trim systems in the aircraft. It thus does not take control from the pilots.
Again that is your assertion, which you are free to believe if you choose, but is not verifiable in fact or by the positions of the FAA or the NTSB. Whom I suspect, have a greater understanding than yours.
“MCAS can be instantaneously overridden by pressing an electric trim button, or by use of the cutoff switches”
In order to override MCAS, one must first be aware that the problem is being caused by MCAS — and, at that stage, it may be too late.
JFK could have dodged the bullets — if he had known they were coming…and had been quick and lithe enough.
Rob: “MCAS can be instantaneously overridden by pressing an electric trim button, or by use of the cutoff switches. ”
using electric trim resets the MCAS logic.
i.e. after correctively triming MCAS will counter that with the full swing authority it has.
( IMHO a rather insidious behavior. a designed in killer poke.)
Issue is understanding the behavior.
checklist item trim-malfunction requires “continuous trimming” not the case here.
What you seem to require to counter a major design defect is “test pilot” qualification.
Long hours for US MainLine pilots actually is due the broken qualification path and probably creating some advantage for Mil Pilots.
In other domains the pilot qualification process is more structured.
Rob:
As has been noted, you have to be aware of what MCAS was doing so here is no instant to it, there was no alert (even the AOA unreliable message means nothing if you don’t know about MCAS)
The fact is when tested in the real world the 5 second assumption was found to be far less, but then that is the difference between someone who runs race cars and the average driver.
As long as you keep trimming counter MCAS 1.0 could not hit again, but that returns with a vengeance as soon as you stop trimming.
And its not acting like a run away trim which they had training for and recognized.
While Bryce as usual is wrong about the technical nature of MCAS 1.0 function (its a feel trim) the reality is it does force the nose down with a vengeance regardless of air speed.
so yes you could have programed MCAS 1.0 to have reduced air speed affect just like speed trim does (why you throw in an unreliable Airspeed is beyond me).
Bizarrely MCAS 1.0 became the best anti stall thing ever.
So the training would have required knowledge of the system, trim till level then cut the switches to it (which don’t even cut the power, the disable a relay which is nuts)
That all takes time in the confusion Boeing created and confusion lead to mistakes by pilots (Sully failed to arm the ditch function on his A320, mistakes occur in those situation).
No MCAS 1.0, no confusion and no crash.
Yes the other factors should be part of the report but we should not need Sully on each flight (or you are not going to get him so plan and design for the worst not the best)
“Yes the other factors should be part of the report but we should not need Sully on each flight (or you are not going to get him so plan and design for the worst not the best)”
different domain.
Sully’s brilliance lay in going instantly for an inside tolerances achievable objective and rather good systems interdependence understanding.
But Sully sat in a basically sane plane, not one that would BS him with some hidden “sadistic” features and the immutable wish to kill.
apropos: 737 trim is _not_ “just a feel trim”
I believe the Boeing AD said “may” use electric trim, lacking the importance of “must”. That said, it is surprising that any pilot flying a MAX would not have studied the two LionAir flights, and be fully prepared to use electric trim as was used in the LionAir flight that beat MCAS.
Ted:
I gather you would and I would but the Ethiopian pilots likely read it as a routine bulletin and they never had hands on with it.
I like to think I would have responded correctly but sans a simulator I don’t know what and I have a lot of pre loaded knowledge now.
And that pre loaded knowledge is what let me survive the unintended spin. I had read for years about spins and counters as well as Stick and Rudder that had a lot on spins, so once I stopped panicking (which is what I did) I had a solution.
How can a pilot determine if he has a true runaway trim situation, or a MCAS runaway situation? Should they both be treated the same way? In a true trim runaway, will trying to nuturalize the trim using the manual electric switch be the proper procedure? If the electrical signal from the switches (there are two on the yoke that have to agree), are stuck, then no, you want to hit the cutout switch immediately. In an MCAS runaway situation, you may want to use the manual electric trim to try and nuturalize the position before cutting out the motor. How can you tell the difference? Should you jam the other pilots knee against the trim wheel and then try and decide? (serious question actually)
Interesting to see that notorious poster “Rob” after some time in storage has been “warmed up” and send back into the fray to Boeing’s assistance.
Rob, thank you for explaining again Boeing’s position as designed for public reception.
I was curious to see if the community here would acknowledge the truth outlined in the NTSB rebuttal, or stick to their conspiracy theories. Especially since, when I explained those very same things here two years ago, I was called disgraceful and disgusting, among other colorful metaphors. But I see that little has changed in the interim. Which I guess is not all that surprising. Still, on this issue at least, there is a wealth of fact available now, and I can at least see that it is represented in this thread.
“…stick to their conspiracy theories…”
An interesting assertion from someone who believes that the lack of MAX re-cert in China is due to “political games” — when, according to the “wealth of fact”, the Chinese are merely waiting for ALL underlying causes of the MAX crashes to be fully addressed; in particular, the sub-standard CAS in the MAX. The CAAC published its 3 re-cert conditions long ago — no need to resort to fantasy.
Further, regarding “truth”:
The NTSB merely presents a “stance”– which doesn’t equate to “truth”.
For example, it has a “stance” with regard to a possible bird strike — but there’s no definitive evidence that this is “truth”.
If you choose to believe your own statements, that’s your choice, which you are free to make. But as I said, the facts don’t align with them.
China has repeatedly said the MAX certification was imminent, the last time being in July. But always there are “a few things” remaining. In July, they said they had “unanswered questions about pilot training”. But after meeting with Boeing for several days, there was no resolution.
That time Boeing no longer saw their statements as credible, and began offering their stored aircraft to other customers.
The evidence for the AoA vane removal is unassailable. Collins was able to reproduce the FDR data in the wind tunnel. This is not a “stance”, this is fact. Whether it was from a bird strike or other object, there is no question that the vane separated. Further Collins traveled to Ethiopia to present their findings, so EAIB knew full well their allegation was false.
The NTSB does not usually make these statements, and would not do so now if the circumstances were not extraordinarily clear, that EAIB had failed to truthfully investigate and report the available information.
“The NTSB does not usually make these statements, and would not do so now if the circumstances were not extraordinarily clear, that EAIB had failed to truthfully investigate and report the available information.”
Fallout from the MAX investigations seems to show that in most cases the US side in nonUS accident investigations seems to have leaned heavily on the prime investigator to inject their “ideas” but with less to no public visibility at the time … and succesful at that.
the EAIB seems to have been less influencable than expected. Thus the late intervention of the NTSB you are so busy “explaining” to readers here.
We’ve also seen cases where the NTSB preempted the prime investigating institution.
It might be a good thing to re investigate all “foreign pilot error on US made airframes” cases.
@ Uwe
Yes, indeed.
This story comes to mind, as a glaring example:
“U.S. pressured Dutch Safety Board to downplay tech faults in 2009 Turkish Airlines crash”
“Boeing and the FAA successfully pinned the blame largely on the Turkish Airlines pilots, Dekker and another anonymous source told The New York Times. The Dutch Safety board also added statements written by the Americans to its report, the newspaper wrote. These statements said that some pilot errors had not been “properly emphasized”.
“According to the New York Times, Boeing knew for years before the 2009 crash that the Boeing 737 NG had a malfunctioning sensor that could cause the autopilot to reduce speed incorrectly. But Boeing did not see this as a safety risk because pilots would be there to intervene – similar to what happened later with the 737 MAX, according to the newspaper. Dekker’s study showed that important information about the possibly malfunctioning altimeters was not included in the pilot’s manual.”
https://nltimes.nl/2020/01/21/us-pressured-dutch-safety-board-downplay-tech-faults-2009-turkish-airlines-crash-report
These responses fall into the realm of the conspiracy theories I noted earlier. When the relevant authorities assert and offer facts, and those facts cannot be denied, then the allegations shift to bias and conspiracy. This method is well known and familiar to every theorist.
The truth, of course and as always, is quite different. As a party to the EAIB investigation, the NTSB is obligated to not speak for the EAIB, whom are the investigators of record. The NTSB may not do so, until the final report is released, which has now ocurred.
Thus there is no “late intervention”, there is a legally permitted intervention. Further the NTSB has made clear, that they have made their concerns known for the last year, since being provided with the first draft, and that this has been the reason for the long delay in releasing the final report.
Alternatively:
“These responses fall into the realm of the denialism I noted earlier. When the relevant authorities assert and offer inconsistent information, and that information is challenged, then the attitude shifts to denial. This method is well known and familiar to every theorist.
“The truth, of course and as always, is quite different. As a United States entity, the NTSB will try to speak for the EAIB, whom are the investigators of record. If the NTSB cannot do so beforehand, then it will wait until the final report is released, which had now occurred.
“When there is no “early intervention”, there has to be a late “damage control” intervention. Further the NTSB had made clear, that they have made their discontent known for the last year, since being provided with the first draft, and that this has been the reason for the rapid “damage containment” exercise after release of the final report.”
******
Meanwhile, back in the real world, the NTSB report can be seen as an example of “re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic” — ex post facto.
My position is backed by verifiable evidence and fact. Yours is backed by supposition and belief.
There can be no agreement or rational discussion on that basis.
Also you have apparently still not learned, that when you resort to mimicry and schoolyard antics, you have already lost the argument on the merits.
Alternatively:
“My position is backed by verifiable evidence and fact. Yours is backed by denialism and self-interest.
“There can be no agreement or rational discussion on that basis.
“Also you have apparently still not learned, that paraphrasing is a powerful and widely-applied debating technique”
“China has repeatedly said the MAX certification was imminent”
Got a link for that?
I know that western media frequently speculated on the matter, but I don’t recall China doing so.
The Chinese may have given indications about re-certing the modified MCAS — but that only satisfies CAAC Condition No 1.
Pilot re-training is covered by CAAC Condition No. 2. However, there’s not much point in re-training pilots until CAAC Condition No. 3 has been satisfied, since that would materially affect the cockpit.
********
“That time Boeing no longer saw their statements as credible”
The statements are perfectly clear, logical and credible — it’s just that BA couldn’t be bothered satisfying CAAC Condition No. 3
********
“Whether it was from a bird strike or other object, there is no question that the vane separated”
The NTSB report harps on about a bird strike.
Was an AOA found with bird blood / feathers in/on it?
No?
Then this stance is perfectly “assailable”.
I will repost what I stated back in October when Leeham had a story on China/ US relations
“True, but like I stated above, the CAAC has no bearing on whether Boeing will receive orders from the various Chinese airlines. When China’s government and the US trade and geo political situation cools down, there will be no Boeing orders, irrespective what CAAC says or do.
When China is ready to signal a thaw and places a MAX order, watch the CAAC have everything they need to resume MAX operations.”
“When China is ready to signal a thaw and places a MAX order, watch the CAAC have everything they need to resume MAX operations.”
Alternatively, when BA gets its act together and makes an effort to satisfy CAAC Condition No. 3, then watch the Chinese place an order.
The Chinese will accept delivery of their MAX orders, when permitted by the Chinese Communist Party, of which CAAC is an appendage.
No one credibly believes the MAX is unsafe, or that this is the reason for the Chinese to be unique in the world in stalling delivery.
In the meantime, Boeing will leave the door open for them, while offering their aircraft to other customers. It’s ultimately up to the Chinese to decide what is most important to them, political points or their deposits on aircraft.
Alternatively:
“The Chinese will accept delivery of their MAX orders, when CAAC Condition No. 3 is satisfied.
“The MAX is still sub-standard in terms of its CAS, and the Chinese are unique in the world in making a stand on this (although EASA also has demands in this regard).
“In the meantime, Boeing will pick its nose, while offering their aircraft to other customers. It’s ultimately up to Boeing to decide what is most important to them, saving dollars or selling into the world’s largest aviation market.”
******
p.s. No deposits forfeited by the Chinese: cancellation is penalty-free due to the delay cause by the protracted grounding.
Speaking of conspiracy theories, was Mark Forkner the only one involved in misleading the FAA at Boeing?
======
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-boeing-737-max-chief-technical-pilot-indicted-fraud
======
Or is he just the fall guy, the one to take all the blame? Are there any FAA inspectors employed by Boeing also to blame in the hidden software changes called MCAS? Or did they not check the software changes? I can’t believe a programmer can make a change and no one is aware of the concequences. That’s either total neglegence or outright fraud. Can this happen again, with no one noticing?
no one else has been charged?
===
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/why-boeing-pilot-forkner-was-acquitted-in-the-737-max-prosecution/
As established by the OIG report into the MAX certification, and by FAA statements, the FAA certification and flight test teams at the FAA were fully aware of the MCAS changes. Both versions of MCAS were certified by FAA pilots.
The FAA branch that was not aware, was the Flight Safety Board that oversees documentation and training materials. Forkner sent text messages acknowledging he was aware of the MCAS changes, but did not alert the FSB or disclose that information in the Boeing application for approval. That is why he was charged.
so, the FAA was aware, but, not the Pilots flying the 737-MAX?
It was deemed unimportant and a distraction to tell the pilots?
Everyone just wasn’t aware of how big a consequence MCAS could be?
Test pilots have an in depth knowledge of the systems and behaviors they are testing, well beyond that of line pilots.
The FAA agreed that MCAS was a part of the automatic trim system, and that pilots would interpret its operation in that manner. There are many systems in the aircraft which are similarly blended, and not differentiated in pilot training.
In retrospect, that decision did not consider non- normal operations, and both FAA and Boeing have admitted it was a mistake.
In particular the FAA agreement was based on the original version of MCAS, which was incapable of producing a significant upset event
conceptually interesting design approach:
Blind Spots design metrics.
All aligned in a row.
A relative of Schrödingers Box: if you don’t look everything is OK.
How does one unerringly manage to traverse all those blind spots with narry a squeek from the sidelines?
The squeekers did not anticipate the magnitude of pilot error that ocurred. Now, they have, and have added safeguards to protect against them.
Alternatively:
“The squeekers made baseless, wildly optimistic assumptions about the reactions of pilots. Now, they have been caught out, and have added some token, “el cheapo” safeguards to protect against them — but by no means enough yet”.
Relevant to the current story, and one of the reasons why certification of the MAX-7/-10 is currently stuck in limbo:
“U.S. FAA Says Some Boeing 737 MAX 7 Submissions Incomplete, Need Review”
“In an Oct. 12 letter to Boeing from FAA official Ian Won seen by Reuters, the agency asked Boeing to reassess some assertions that hazards classified as catastrophic “do not contain human factors assumptions.””
“Human factors analyses refer to how pilots respond to cockpit emergencies. The FAA letter said Boeing must as part of its review assure the agency “that those safety assessments do not contain human factors assumptions” and if there are others it must identify them and submit them for review.
“A December 2020 Senate report into the MAX concluded the FAA and Boeing “had established a pre-determined outcome to reaffirm a long-held human factor assumption related to pilot reaction time … It appears, in this instance, FAA and Boeing were attempting to cover up important information that may have contributed to the 737 MAX tragedies.””
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-faa-says-boeing-737-232933187.html
Corporatism and Regulatory Capture in action..
“We the Very Large Corporations will tell You the little people what to believe, and anything the latter group say against the former will be labeled a “conspiracy theory”.
People aren’t buying that BS anymore.
Conspiracy theory in action. We’ll choose to believe, in opposition to facts and evidence.
And if an authority presents us with facts and evidence, we’ll interpret that as an attempt to mislead us. Thereby insulating ourselves from said facts and evidence.
This site would be a gold mine for a class in formal debate and logic.
Denialism in action. We’ll choose to deny, in opposition to facts and evidence.
And if an authority presents us with facts and evidence, we’ll interpret that as an attempt to steer us toward enlightenment. Thereby insulating ourselves from said facts and evidence.
Certain comments on this site would be a gold mine for a class in denialism.
Just wanted to say thank you to Scott Hamilton for the open stories that allowed for comments. After the first 20 or so comments it usually goes off the rails, and this story’s comment section is no different. I imagine its tiresome for Mr Hamilton to baby sit……I mean moderate.
Not only that but an embarrassment to the corporate customers and OEMs that subscribe to Leeham that from time to time read the comment section out of curiosity or entertainment. I understand that it will be different next year and that is fine. Thank you again, make your Bank Mr Hamilton.
You are hopefully not suggesting corporate customers and OEM need to be offered only what they like to read.
That could have far reaching consequences for objectivity & fact based reporting..
I’ve seen it happening in some news channels and it supported damaging group think.
Once the discussion has descended into the “powerful technique” of mimicry, as originally developed and refined on the 5th grade playground, there is little point in continuing.
Richard has asked good questions and responded by taking the answers into consideration. He did that in my earlier time here as well. For that I am grateful, as well as for the supporting voices.
Most of the rest is an oppositional defiance disorder. There is no interest in rational discussion or exchange of facts or evidence. The goal is only to extend the theory and deny whatever or whomever counters it.
It’s notable that all of that has had no impact on the progression of actual events. The MAX continues to sell well and increase it’s order book, as was obvious as the outcome some years ago. I have no doubt that will be the case in the future as well.
All the fatalistic predictions made here, have fallen, one by one. The denial of the NTSB rebuttal will be yet another, in that long line.
“Most of the rest is an oppositional defiance disorder”
Spoken like a true denialist
******
“The MAX continues to sell well and increase it’s order book”
The MAX is banned from the fastest-growing aviation market on the planet, and is subject to an ongoing review by EASA. Its sales since re-cert have been at unsustainable discounts, and have been heavily skewed toward US carriers and bargain-hunting LCCs. There have been several high-profile defections to Airbus by former 737 operators.
********
“All the fatalistic predictions made here, have fallen, one by one.”
BA has made 11 quarterly losses in a row, and continues to teeter on the edge of a debt abyss. Not one of its current major programs is free of QC controversy. It doesn’t have funding for a new program, and continues to lose market share to its competitors.
@Bryce
Hey I heard quite a number of voters believe the the election was “stolen” and the one who lost actually won. That’s the level of “defiance” we witness here.
@Pedro, @Bryce: Let’s not get off topic here.
Hamilton
Hello Scott, and Happy Holidays to you!
Actually, Pedro’s post was a sarcastic reference to some election-related posts by @Rob below — he’s the one going off-topic, not us.
OK, experience does count. The experience of the poor dead flight crew has definitely improved the safety of the MAX.
The experts @American airlines Union and capt Sullenberger agree that the plane was at fault and there is no reason to blame the dead pilots. Most experts (including Bjorn) agree that the highly experienced ex fighter pilot lion air captain was better than average. Wishful thinking, tested on people who are now dead.
To clarify, the JT610 captain was reading the manual when control was lost, by the first officer. There is no allegation that the captain’s flying skills or experience were insufficient. In fact the record proved the opposite, he stabilized the aircraft and entered a holding pattern, while MCAS was active.
The NTSB rebuttal makes clear that the intent is not to “blame the pilots”, but rather to address obvious deficiencies in training & performance, that could affect future crews. To not address them would be remiss, as the goal of accident investigation is to prevent future accidents.
Further the notion of the NTSB rebuttal as a cover-up or conspiracy, is ridiculous, as the flaws in the MAX, at Boeing, and at the FAA have already been exposed, and measures taken to rectify them.
All the NTSB is asking here, is that the same be done on the Ethiopian side. If the EAIB had taken those steps, there would be no issue here, and no rebuttal. The NTSB did not dispute any of the EAIB findings relative to Boeing or the FAA. The only exception was the finding of the AoA sensor being an electrical fault. That was a clear falsehood, which the EAIB knew in advance of publication.
“…as the flaws in the MAX, at Boeing, and at the FAA have already been exposed, and measures taken to rectify them.”
Totally inadequate measures, as it turns out.
Some measures were even backtracked last week.
And there is the weirdity in this as Bryce stands alone against the whole world including CAAC!
The NTSB is not blaming the pilots, its role is not even to do that.
The NTSB when it reports tried to come up with a Probable cause as well as contributing factors.
In this case it feels that the Ethiopian AHJ is not doing its job and its not following agreements to append the NTSB report to its finding.
Pilot mistakes were made in both crashes and bird strikes are in issue.
That does not mean the NTSB is blaming the pilots, its trying to ensure that other factors are not swept under the rug.
@ TW
“And there is the weirdity in this as Bryce stands alone against the whole world including CAAC!”
And does TW have any links as to what the “whole world” thinks on this matter?
Or only some links on what the US press assumes on this matter?
It is, of course, painful for the US team to see that a “developing” country rejects a US product as being sub-standard…
Here’s a GT article from August, 2021, that sets forth the CAAC’s 3 conditions for re-cert:
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1230693.shtml
“The three mandatory prerequisites China has set for Boeing’s 737 MAX to be back in service in the country will remain in effect, aviation industry watchers said on Thursday, following reports of a 737 MAX test jet heading to China.”
“Only when the plane manufacturer fulfills such prerequisites, will the country consider allowing it to fly again, Lin Zhijie, a market watcher, told the Global Times on Thursday.”
So true
-> experience and competence are not the same thing, and it’s wild how much many industries value the first over the second
https://twitter.com/sama/status/1607796235603447808
Here is a nice review of Bertram Gross’s prescient and very thorough 1980 book ‘Friendly Fascism’:
https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R215XVDWQDLO4R/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_rvw_ttl
It’s less friendly these days, I think.
Rob, Thanks for the kind words. I”m a programmer and small plane pilot, who couldn’t believe, and still can’t, that Boeing came up with such a large gaping hole in their control system programming for the MAX. The checks and balances I had to go through with my programing to get it into production, usually caught most errors. In programming for a critical flight control system, I’m sure it has to be ten times more. In this case, something failed, and it sounds like it failed on mutiple levels. I don’t want that to happen again. A single point of failure (the one AOA signal) causing this much trouble, and it not being caught in failure analysis, is quite troublesome. Having two AOA signals now, with some other parameters in the mix helps, but, I want three, and I think a complete analysis of the bigger problem that MCAS is trying to solve is warranted. Ray Craig, the Boeing test pilot who I think originally brought up the problem to be solved, leaned towards a hardware rather than software solution. I tend to agree with him. And I’m a programmer. The recent SW Airlines crew scheduling, computer ‘glitch’ is another major problem caused by ignoring a known proglem. That issue was known for quite a while, and people ignored it. Now they have to recognise it. It’s tough being the squeky wheel in an organization.
“Having two AOA signals now, with some other parameters in the mix helps, but, I want three”
Indeed. Basic control theory teaches that even numbers of sensor inputs should be avoided, because of the possibility of a “hung jury”.
Single point of failure in the original MCAS –> monumental shortcut, which even a rookie undergraduate would have avoided.
Helpful to understand that MCAS was conceived and implemented with two types of sensors, an AoA vane and an accelerometer, which required agreement for activation. That was the basis for the use of a single vane.
Also that the MCAS authority as conceived and implemented, could exert a maximum force of about 10 lbs on the control column, which didn’t constitute any kind of upset threat to the aircraft.
All that changed with the adoption of MCAS to be used at low speeds. That was done by accepting the original safety analysis as still valid. Therein lay the fault. There was no equivalent analysis done for the modified MCAS, which would have revealed the vulnerability created by the increase in authority.
Boeing and the FAA share responsibility for that. It should have been caught in certification, but wasn’t. Yet it wasn’t an improper design at conception, or a rookie mistake in design. The FAA approved that design because it was sound.
We see the impact of this now in the FAA certification process. They will not grant TIA to the 777x, until the flight controls are maturely established and reasonably locked in. That’s to avoid a recurrence of late-stage changes not being properly evaluated.
The same level of rigor is being applied to the MAX certifications. Which is an appropriate response to the MAX accidents. The SSA’s must have expanded fault trees to consider branches for human factors, including human error.
IIRC, Boeing did not inform the FAA of their quadrupling
of [hidden] MCAS’s maximum deflection of the horizontal stabilizer from .6 degree, to 2.5 degrees.
“oops.”
As stated in earlier posts here, and many times before, Boeing did in fact fully inform the FAA certification teams of the MCAS changes. This is well documented.
Both the team at Boeing and their counterparts at FAA, accepted the earlier safety assessments and viewed them as still in force, for the revised MCAS.
This highlights the importance of understanding the true facts, before assessing the outcome. It’s the only way you can accurately get to the root of the problem.
Trumpeting falsehoods and making a ruckus about them, only serves as a distraction, polarizes the discussion, and drives it away from resolution.
expanding the domain of a solution with out
re-checking the assumptions and checks made for the limited domain isn’t even a rookie error.
I you do that your basic qualification as an engineer is questionable. void.
@ Rob
Thanks for the long, rambling post — but the issue here is number of sensor inputs, not types.
With just two sensor inputs, MCAS will shut down when there’s a disagree — which is why the EASA wants 3 (or another odd number greater than 1).
Of course, 2 out of 3 can also fail — but a 2-sensor failure is less probable than a 1-sensor failure. @TW repeatedly misunderstands this difference between possibility and probability.
To be clear, MCAS will disable at the loss of either vane, unless the vane or ADIR issues an invalid flag. The third synthetic AoA is for reference, it has no control function or value. It exists to allow the pilots to decide which of the other two vanes are valid.
Also to be clear, the EASA concern for AoA was not over MCAS, but autopilot function on precision approach. The earlier NG separated vanes are approved, but not the new two vane monitoring system, that disconnects autopilot on vane failure.
“Also to be clear, the EASA concern for AoA was not over MCAS, but autopilot function on precision approach”
Got a link for that?
Thanks Richard. It’s good to ask questions and objectively evaluate the answers. That’s the process by which we arrive at truth.
I encourage that, as it’s one of the benefits of an online forum. Many people with diverse knowledge & backgrounds can see the questions and answers, and participate if they choose.
Also the nature of that discussion does not require agreement, so long as the focus of both sides remains on the facts, and attaining a mutual understanding of them. That’s the process by which we arrive at consensus.
I have appreciated your willingness to both discuss and disagree, at the same time, and to evaluate and accept facts that are discovered, through rational debate.
Rob:
Agreed on the facts should be what is relevant. Many run on emotion or bias with agenda driven.
I don’t think that a 3rd AOA is needed, valuable though is both speed and altitude that goes with that system.
Airbus continues with 3 AOA even when the reality is that once you vote one off the aircraft, that leaves you with which of the two is left is right?
The MAX crashes were truly failures of many kinds and on many levels. MCAS 1.0 alone has all those factors that allowed it into the system in its lethal form.
NTSB brings a further perspective to this in pointing out that there were contributing factors and unless those are addressed, a repeat in other venue will occur again.
And you see one airlines have a crash of bad incident (or close call) and it may get corrected there, but another airline pops up and the exact same situation occurs.
In the end its workign systems and people that make it work or fail.
This is a good assessment.
The 3rd AoA is a concession to the EASA valuation of a reference instrument. It’s not a bad concept, as it essentially completes the set of reference instruments the MAX already has. EASA’s willingness to allow a synthetic version, represents reasonableness on their part in finding an equitable solution.
Agreed that you have to look objectively at causation, and accept whatever you find, whether or not it’s favorable to you. That’s the only way safety can advance.
And that people usually end up making or breaking any system. Why human factors are important.
Rob:
Arguably the Synthetic AOA as well as its associated speed and sltifue fucnion are vastly better than the Vaunted 3 AOA.
As noted, once one AOA is gone, which one of the two left is correct if you have another failure (or two go at the same time in a bird strike??)
Bryce likes to taught the 2 out of 3 but in fact its a false statement.
The Airbus FBW system has SEVEN computers. 3 act as backup tot he original 3 and one can jump into the void to fill any of the three.
AOA are dodgy, Pitots and their associated systems are dodgy and only Synthetic Speed is modern.
So the MAX will have the safest system on the planet when the Synthetic System is installed.
The sad reality is that both A320 crashes have occurred as well as 737 crashes when pilots lost their situation awareness and despite the best of Aviation, put them into the ground or water.
I made mistakes when I was flying but I never got confused by my instruments, including learning how to scan and vote out a bad indicator, that I did have to learn but once the logic was presented, no issues.
you really are producing “funnies” here.
3 gives you a majority vote
2 gives you a quality vote : match or mismatch.
MTBF calculations will give you a grace period
from first to second failure.
That grace period should be much longer than a single flight.
Then probability of a common mode error is rather low.
Match the cases that happened ( there are some ) against performed overall flight hours of that kind of system solution.
In fact all 3 AOA got frozen on an A320 and it did result in confusion (or was that a loss?)
In fact when you are down to 2 the system has no way to determine which one is valid.
Synesthetic would give you a way to vote out of that.
And, its got nothing in common with AOA vanes, pitot static system which are extreme persnickety .
It would be interesting to see if the Pitot Static systems were the greatest single hazard to aviation.
It should be noted that all 737s have THREE independent pitot static systems just for that reason.
@Rob .. who knew what when?
========
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/inspector-general-report-details-how-boeing-played-down-mcas-in-original-737-max-certification-and-faa-missed-it/
=======
The FAA test pilots knew about MCAS .. but, the FAA Inspectors didn’t?
There’s a great blur on who reports to and who is paid by between the FAA and
Boeing. The ODA and DER programs don’t protect those that speak up about problems. They may say they do, but, you don’t get promoted by pointing out problems with the process. Will “FAA” inspectors bite the hand that feeds them?
The OIG report documents how the oversight ocurred. The changes to MCAS were considered routine by the flight test team, consisting of Boeing & FAA engineers, and Boeing & FAA test pilots.
The team reported the changes within a list of other alterations, that passed up through the ranks of Boeing and FAA management. They were not highlighted as having any particular importance or significance.
When interviewed by the OIG, the team members all said the same thing, there was no realization or discussion of the safety implications of the changes.
At the Boeing level, there was a cursory review within the context of the original safety assessment, which was not altered. The conclusion was that the risk was not increased, because the same procedures would be used to respond to a malfunction.
That was obviously an incorrect conclusion, but it passed muster at the FAA as well. Again bearing in mind, that the context was within the original safety analysis.
Bryce,
“The MAX -7 and -10 haven’t yet been certified: the FAA is holding BA’s feet to the fire with SSAs.”…
—-
Pious wishes coming from followers of the “absurd thought” which is that the 737MAX-10 and -7 should not be certified like the MAX-8 and -9 themselves certified from the MAX-7 in november 2020…
Bruce
“The MAX is banned from the fastest-growing aviation market on the planet, and is subject to an ongoing review by EASA. Its sales since re-cert have been at unsustainable discounts, and have been heavily skewed toward US carriers and bargain-hunting LCCs. There have been several high-profile defections to Airbus by former 737 operators”…
—–
Completely false. The 737MAX continues to advance in the market. Your false claims that Boeing products are at a discount. The reason why you fear the 737MAX including the -10 is felt. No proof of what you’re claiming outside of Southwest. CEO Ryan Air tried to get MAX-10s on a discount and failed. Using this argument every time BCA sells an aircraft of any model is wrong and not correct. Please send us sources and evidence…
There of course is none. Clearly Boeing sells at a discount as does Airbus.
One item we know of is Boeing under priced Airbus on the Hawaiian Air order, because Airbus complained Boeing was illegally violating margins (of course that is a bit of hyperbole but it captures Airbus outrage)
Equally as you site, Ryan Air tried to strong arm Boeing (good for them) and Boeing told them no (good for them). Boeing has established limits.
Its not Boeing current lineup that risks the future (though the 737 should have been replaced two generation back) its the lack of future product.
“Clearly Boeing sells at a discount as does Airbus.”
But it’s the relative size of the discounts that matters — particularly in relation to each company’s costs.
BCA had 112 deliveries in Q3, but still logged a loss of $640M — without one-off writedowns. Go do the math 😉
Grubbie
And yet, the day before the Lion Air 737MAX crash. The same aircraft had AOA problems reported by the technical team in 2019 in the form of sheets to be filled out by the pilots.
What did the maintenance department do?
Lion Air is also not a safety reference model.
The 3rd pilot seated right next to the cockpit door had managed to control the aircraft…
All that I have been able to hear about the “bleaching” of Lion Air since the crash of the 737MAX is simply awe-inspiring.
This is just my memory. Please if I am wrong please correct me.
Thanks
Checklist:
I think the key here is that MCAS should not have been allowed to exist in the 1.0 form.
As such it was a trigger that no one had trained on and the system response was not what they had been trained to recognize. Ergo, it put huge confusion into both crashes.
That said in both cases pilots had a chance to recover, Indonesian put his flaps down after putting them up started the process. Why he did not leave them down or put them down again is ????????
So a contributing factor has to be an assessment of training and experience. The US and EU have seen that there was insufficient training after AF447 in unusual attitudes and unexpected emergencies (as opposed to the routine they could tell a heartbeat after it started what the scenario they were being afflicted with).
Some of it was also why are you doing take offs and landings when you get experience on every flight with that, train in situation you don’t have routine experience at (and a daily assessment if you can do it right or not)
The bird strike issue was also ignored in Ethiopian report.
_well, actually the first slice of cheese was an American maintenance shop.
Lion maintanace and reporting procedures were found wanting, but AOA vanes fail all the time.
None of this has much to do with the quality of the pilots on that fateful day. The great Sullenberger (over hyped, but most people don’t realise just how amazingly well qualified he is to talk about safety) thinks MCAS would probably have got him too.
In a huge fit of Irony, The Chinese Government owned BOA does what?
https://www.stattimes.com/aviation/boc-aviation-orders-40-new-boeing-737-max-8-aircraft-1347439
No response of course as there is none.
But the Chinese government is indeed buying MAX aircraft.
You have to love it.
BOC supplies carriers in 38 different countries.
If those carriers want a particular product, BOC supplies them with it — and makes a profit from it.
The linkage mentioned by TW is not rational anyway.
CAAC Cert is a “TODAY” issue.
BOC buying MAX today for delivery in a couple of years is a “DAY AFTER TOMORROW” thing.
One could write large books on TW’s divergence from reality.
Rob said, on December 29, 2022:
“..As stated in earlier posts here, and many times before, Boeing did in fact fully inform the FAA certification teams of the MCAS changes. This is well documented.”
That’s an assertion for which you unfortunately supply no evidence. Saying something over and over without evidence
does not make it true. If you have evidence to back up that
assertion, provide it, so we can all be the wiser. Until then..
As stated, it’s in the OIG report on the MAX certification, which found there was no intent to conceal information on either side of the certification process, with regard to MCAS.
It’s also in the sworn testimony of Steve Dickson before Congress. He admitted that the FAA had missed the significance. Neither he, his predecessor, nor his successor, has made any claim of being misled by Boeing on MCAS, or tried to blame Boeing for their error.
The lone instance of this allegation, as described earlier here, was Mark Forkner, who saved his private text messages into his Boeing corporate e-mail account. He texted his partner that he learned of the MCAS changes after he submitted his approval application to the FSB for documentation & training materials. But did not subsequently disclose that information to the FSB, or to any of the Boeing customers.
Due to that action, Forkner was subsequently indicted and acquitted for 2 counts of wire fraud. Boeing also agreed to deferred prosecution for the same 2 counts. This is all documented in the DPA with the DoJ.
Also in the DPA, are statements that this was unknown to management at the time, and was unrelated to the technical certification of MCAS.
Lastly, I’d point out that you are the one insisting there is more to this, so the burden is on you to provide proof of your allegations. In the US, the burden of proof is on the accuser, not the accused.
Making a false allegation, and then insisting that others disprove it, is a classic conspiracy theory tactic. It’s why I keep pointing out to you, the logical fallacies & errors in your reasoning.
Please tell me what “allegations” I am making here, my friend.
Thanks.
In a post above, you claimed that Boeing had not informed the FAA of MCAS changes during certification, which is categorically false.
That is what touched off this particular trip through Bill-Land. There have been at least a dozen other trips before this. Which is why I know you have seen the cited sources before, and know exactly where they are, and what they say.
A very strong analogy here with a prominent individual who claims election fraud, equally without evidence, and has demanded everyone disprove his theory. Then denies all the sources, and all the evidence, to the contrary.
That method is as old as time, my friend. It only works on some people, and then only for awhile, as that individual is now finding out.
Rob:
I think it needs to be made clear that Forkner was not in or his role would not have been to notify anyone other than Boeing or the FAA.
I do question why Forkner was even hired. He had low to no qualifications and I truly do believe it was why he was hired.
“Just hours after the approval for MCAS’s redesign was granted, Boeing sought, and the FAA approved, the removal of references to MCAS from Boeing’s flight crew operations manual (FCOM). The FAA officials who authorized this request remained unaware of the redesign of MCAS until after the crash of the Lion Air flight.”
As you are pointing out, how do you prove a negative but surrounding details paint an ugly picture.
There certainly was experience in Boeing on the 767 MCAS.
I don’t think they ever reached the bottom of what and who knew what and why on MCAS 1.0 and its surrounding details.
@ Rob
“As stated, it’s in the OIG report on the MAX certification”
Well, then, you should have no trouble providing a relevant link / quotation, should you?
Even TV evangelists quote book and verse when they’re preaching 😉
TransWorld
Its not Boeing current lineup that risks the future (though the 737 should have been replaced two generation back) its the lack of future product.
—-
1. I agree with you that Boeing would definitely have missed 3 opportunities to replace the 737. But it might be a pretty tough deal. Boeing has the best widebodys aircraft of any other aircraft manufacturer at the cost of not being able to launch a replacement for the 737 whose closest and most aggressive competitor enjoys being 20-25 years younger.
Other than that it’s actually hard to beat Boeing no matter what those who disagree. With the 787 -8/-9-10 and the 737-8/-10 Boeing holds the market like never before. Those who will tell you that 737 clients have passed to the other side [A32Xneo] have just selective and false memory.
Look at Air Canada and Alaska as an example. Alaska has excellent customer feedback on the 737MAX.
2. You seem blame Boeing for not having launched the NMA or other stupidity of this kind. Damn, in what honor?
The middle Of Market (MOM) do you really believe in it?
Only 1,000,757’s in 25 years of sale. 1,200 767s in 40 years of which ~250-300 Freighter and tanker encroaches on the 767 passengers. And are you happy with the 767-400ER?
Only Delta Airlines and United were interested.
Then ~15 years later they tell you “we want NMA”?!.
The A321XLR is modified. Refocusing gravity with new software, modified double slotted flap, reinforcements, and fire safety systems for more weight. All this complexity for a niche market.
-> 450 A321XLRs sold compared to the simple streched 737MAX10 which has already sold ~1,000 orders in the same period of time between the two new variants.
This is my observation.
And the gap will narrow. Boeing was honest according to thé CEO D. Calhoun. It is just time for them to patiently wait for some cash flow and that is not taboo.
That’s all you have to do today until 2030 and launch a new product, certainly to replace the 737MAX. Until then any other idea would just be irrelevant. Boeing won’t launch a new aircraft for the AvGeek at the price they shocked a lot of people. It doesn’t happen that way. Also you should know that 90% of the efficiency of an aircraft comes only from the engines.
The 737MAX is not a mistake in itself, but rather it has been bad management policy for a little over 20 years. Not launching a new aircraft at Boeing doesn’t mean Calhoun hasn’t cleaned up.
I’m sure the guy very much regrets the mistakes of Mc Nerney-ism, the man who really transformed Boeing and whom Muillenberg wanted to do better believing beyond the limits he would have had all the glory… No doubt Calhoun have saw this decadence as harmful.
It’s time for them to make some cash flow. I expect that the results of 2022 will not be as good as at the time but would be better than the last 3 years!…
Checklist:
I agree Boeing should not launch blindly and no I am not sure of the MOM as a target. What is not in dispute though is Boeing has been loosing market share to the A320 series. They have lost some big and good customers.
Yes the MAX is competitive, its more that they could be still holding market share if they had replaced it even with an A320 like hull.
The -10 has done better than I thought but it and the -8/9 do have performance issues with hot and or high. That goes back to the old hull factor that they can’t get away from (yes the -10 has longer gear but its hull is longer and the gear allows engine clearance and -8 rotation but not as good as the higher standing A320)
The 787 clearly is the class leader there.
What the A350-900/1000 market is and what the 777X is? Right now Boeing is simply loosing as they can’t even get the test program rolling as they have not responded to the FAA correctly.
And an open issue is why the 787F was suspended? Maybe they will get waivers but that is a throw of the dice. The -7/-10 were dicey (pun intended) enough though I have no issue with the current alert system. I have issues with the lack of international training standards though ICAO can dump aircraft due to older engines but can’t get that in place.
Boeing needs a program just to keep its engineers both working and kept, that is why Space X does so well, Musk sucks as a boss but its an exciting area to be working in.
The issue is Boeing is loaded with debt and Calhoun MO is to dump profits into dividends and share buy back.
But if you read what Calhoun said, 2035 and its got to be all in the airframe. That is not true. Give P&W a contract and they would have a modified GTF that can do better as well (its got a PIP coming out that improves it 3% as I recall and that is insert tech)
What none of us have is the market assessment Boeing has and if a 767 replacement is viable. Or is the 787-3 now viable?
And why has not the 787-8 been made 100% common with the -9/10?
That is what depresses me about Boeing, you can make excuses forever but that mind set of profits to anything other than product will kill them.
Calhoun is the classic business killer.
“..About a third of the way through [Boeing 737 MAX] flight testing in 2016, as first reported by The Seattle Times in March, Boeing made substantial changes to MCAS.
The flight-test pilots had found another problem: The same lack of smooth stick forces was also occurring in certain low-speed flight conditions. To cover that issue too, engineers decided to expand the scope and power of MCAS.
Because at low speed a control surface must be deflected more to have the same effect, engineers increased the power of the system at low speed from 0.6 degrees of stabilizer nose-down deflection to 2.5 degrees each time it was activated.
On the stabilizer, maximum nose down is about 4.7 degrees away from level flight. So with the new increased authority to move the stabilizer, just a couple of iterations of the system could push it to that maximum.
Because there are no excessive G-forces at low speed, the engineers removed the G-force factor as a trigger. But that meant MCAS was now activated by a single angle-of-attack sensor.
One of the people familiar with MCAS’s evolution said the system designers didn’t see any need to add an additional sensor or redundancy because the hazard assessment had determined that an MCAS failure in normal flight would only qualify in the “major” category for which the single sensor is the norm.
“It wasn’t like it was there to cover some safety or certification requirement,” the person said. “The trigger isn’t a safeguard. It tells (the system) when to operate.”
>> While the changes were dramatic, Boeing did not submit documentation of the revised system safety assessment to the FAA. <<
An FAA spokesman said the safety agency did not require a new system safety analysis because it wasn’t deemed to be critical.
“The change to MCAS didn’t trigger an additional safety assessment because it did not affect the most critical phase of flight, considered to be higher cruise speeds,” he said…"
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/
Back to all those flawed assumptions that were penciled in and not proven with facts.
That was all driven by commonality and no additional training that we know South West for sure put in the contract with a penalty of 1 million per aircraft.
That in turn lead to cover up and it was not documented because it would have raised the issue.
Brazil AHJ to their credit saw it and insisted it be put in the manual.
A single point of failure on thrust reverse position almost took down a 747 over Johannesburg and it was the same stupid logic.
But cranking up the deg of response on the elevator should have triggered a whole new evaluation as at high speeds that much deflection MCAS had enabled is indeed a massive affect.
This is a long and wonderful post, but it substantiates everything I said above. So thanks for providing it, although it really wasn’t necessary.
Caught off guard, and now trying to bluff one’s way out of a tight corner 😉
How many different tests to stall are there? From the regulations I saw a level test and a banked test. Are there multiple elevations and weights that these two tests must be performed at? How many total?
Something I’ve noticed is that the commenters who repeatedly say *others* are lacking in logic and facts- relying instead on emotive appeals, it is said- do not themselves provide evidence (via quotes and links) to back up their assertions.
’tis interesting.
‘Tis both logical and in accordance with the law. Please see my response above.
Logical it certainly is: it’s difficult to cite evidence that doesn’t exist 😉
@ Bill7
Some context here: in the past, @Rob referred in a derogatory manner to “linkers” 😉
Writing style and innuendo is very similar to what Randy Tinseth used to publish. ( some other sources too.)
Is this a distinct debate club school?
( and I see a strong connection into the domain of professional influencers aided by a backoffice )
The timing of it’s re-appearance is curious: there’s evidently a feeling that damage control is urgently needed.
This was a reference to the practice of forming a conclusion, and then searching the Internet for supporting references. Then stopping when they are found, posting them as copypasta, and claiming proof of correctness, without consideration of other contrary sources and evidence. The technical term for it is confirmation bias.
You mean like when you were regularly quoting to us from third-rate site “sciencebasedmedicine.org”?
Amazing how you change your definitions to suit the situation at hand 😏
The difference, as noted, is consideration of the entire body of evidence. As opposed to just that you can find to support your view.
There’s a reason why the offered quotes don’t come from the authoritative investigative sources that are cited in response.
Most conspiracy theories reject those sources, as Bill has also done, on the grounds that they are biased and protecting the established order. Bill posted a link referring to being compelled to accept the government line, and referred to this as Fascism.
As I’ve tried to point out, these are all well recognized characteristics of people who are pushing agendas, rather than seeking truth.
Also why I used Richard as a contrast to Bill. Richard is extremely skeptical of Boeing and the FAA, but he’s not closed off to any source. Whether or not he’s convinced by the answer, he learns either way.
I’d note that Richard’s method is convergent, in that the accumulation of knowledge shifts his position toward greater understanding. Whereas Bill’s method is divergent, since he is committed to a particular set of facts he has established for himself, and denies all others.
“Whereas Bill’s method is divergent, since he is committed to a particular set of facts he has established for himself, and denies all others”
Just substitute “Rob” for “Bill” in that sentence and it will start to resonate with reality 😏
I’d point out that justifying one’s own actions by falsely claiming the same of others, is yet another of the common characteristics of an agenda.
Putin invaded Ukraine, in order to protect against Ukrainian aggression. Trump tried to overturn an election, in order to protect US democracy. Xi had his predecessor forcibly removed from the Chinese Communist Party meeting, in order to preserve harmony.
History is replete with these actions, they are nothing new. They always have the same purpose: furtherance of the practitioner’s agenda, while claiming justification from the purported actions of others.
I don’t write this for you or Bill or any of the agenda crew, but rather for others who may be reading, so they can understand why the current topic (or any topic referencing Boeing or the MAX) is instantly contentious here. That it’s not a necessary consequence of disagreement, but rather one of method. Readers can decide for themselves whether or not they agree.
William has written that LNA may reduce commented articles next year. If true, I find that really sad, and a shame, but also understandable within the context of the tenor here.
@ Rob
Another weird sermon — this time invoking Putin, Trump and Xi.
You previously brought up US election irregularity, and continually allude to conspiracy theories.
All as a backdrop to promote a self-image of a Crusader on a lonely quest to seek “truth”.
And people are supposed to find some value in all this drama?
Quadrupling of MCAS’s authority + elimination of accelerometer data needed for MCAS triggering = Nothing to See Here..
cui bono
Congratulations, this is a valid criticism. And is widely recognized as being the source of the MCAS flaws.
Not “the” source — just one of many sources.
It’s a long and depressing list.
“..MCAS as it was actually implemented differed in another way from what was described in the safety analysis turned in to the FAA.
The failure analysis didn’t appear to consider the possibility that MCAS could trigger repeatedly, as it did on both accident flights. Moving multiple times in 0.6 or 2.5 increments depending on the speed, it effectively had unlimited authority if pilots did not intervene.
Discussions around this new MCAS design appear to have been limited during flight testing.
Two former Boeing test pilots described a culture of pressure inside the company to limit flight testing, which can delay projects at a time when orders are stacking up, costing the company money.
Matt Menza, a different pilot who did test flights on the MAX, recalled times when test pilots at Boeing would have the chance to thoroughly examine systems in what he called a “system-safety murder board” to explore all the potential failures. But he reported that the general corps of test pilots didn’t have a lot of technical details about the MCAS design, such as the single-sensor input.
>>> Boeing never flight-tested a scenario in which a broken angle-of-attack sensor triggered MCAS on its own , instead relying on simulator analysis, according to a person familiar with the process. One of the former test pilots expressed bewilderment that the angle-of-attack failure was never explored in the air..” <<<
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/
Nothing to see here; move right along..
The AoA vane failure was tested in the simulator, for many years, and in the air on previous models. As are many kinds of failures. Not every failure mode is tested in flight, depending on their hazard classification. There have been numerous vane failures in flight, none of them resulted in a flight upset.
As far as the repeating nature of MCAS activation, that was considered by Boeing in two ways:
1. Standard memory item response calls for stabilizer cutout for a second uncommanded activation.
2. Successive activations would not be cumulative, because standard memory item response is to trim back to neutral for each one.
As one Boeing engineer put it, in an e-mailed response, it wouldn’t be an issue unless the crew chose to fight the stabilizer with the elevator. Which they would never do.
As it happened, Boeing was wrong on all three assertions. But this shows the mindset in place at the time, which had to be changed as part of the safety culture.
There were not enough branches in the fault tree to cover unexpected crew responses. This is what the FAA made them change in the flight software rewrite, as well as in the new certification rigor.
Rob:
Its irrelevant about the AOA failures and any tests done prior as the AOA was not tied into an rear stabilizer trim in the form of MCAS.
Equally the cutout switch was removed from function with MCAS.
Trust me in the confusion aspect that occurs when nothing is matching any of your training.
I got into an unintentional spin one time and I had no spin training. I had lost 2000 feet and was about one spiral away from being an aluminum pile before I calmed down and realized why the controls did not work and which one (only one, aka the rudder pedals) would stop i9t.
I would not be here if not for that moment of calm as I saw death coming at me full steam.
That is the hard part to convey is the confusion. All of a sudden nothing you know is true per controlling and aircraft.
Not everyone can overcome that confusion. I am beyond lucky. I have no idea why I reacted the way I did.
So the hazard did not exist before MCAS 1.0 . Changing something like that without evaluating the possible consequences? Of course Boeing did not want to do it and the FAA had been captured (though that issue is long standing)
When the inspectors were more and more beholden to Boeing management wise ?
Maconda was the same (less loss of life). Boeing pushed for the changes to the FAA inspector program.
The program still has not been fully back to what it was supposed to be with those Boeing inspectors reporting directly to the FAA management wise.
And the test comes 5 years down the road when the eyes are no longer on the FAA and then what happens?
“..After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.
>>> That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment. <<<
“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
The higher limit meant that each time MCAS was triggered, it caused a much greater movement of the tail than was specified in that original safety analysis document.
>> The former FAA safety engineer who worked on the MAX certification, and a former Boeing flight controls engineer who worked on the MAX as an authorized representative of the FAA, both said that such safety analyses are required to be updated to reflect the most accurate aircraft information following flight tests. << .."
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
This assertion by the Seattle Times source is not completely true. The MCAS changes were not widely disseminated within the FAA, because as explained above, they were not viewed as a safety concern. Therefore some FAA staff were not aware of them. But that was an internal failure at the FAA. The same internal failure ocurred at Boeing.
Certainly the FAA flight test engineers & pilots knew, as they were on the team that recommended the changes, tested them, and certified them. As did their immediate superiors.
This was established by the OIG, and confirmed by the FAA in sworn testimony by the Administrator, and confirmed again by the DoJ investigation that resulted in the Boeing DPA.
Sounds good, Mr. Rob, and thank you for your input. I’ll stick
with the Seattle Times’s reporting- which has been superb throughout the Boeing 737 MAX debacle- on the topic, if you don’t mind.
If you want to choose an anonymous source taken out of context, over the objective findings of two investigational institutions, and sworn testimony, that’s up to you. As with Bryce, you are free to believe what you wish.
I’d point out that the prominent individual discussed earlier, believes that voting machines were rigged, and quotes an even more prominent news outlet, who also have anonymous sources.
This despite numerous authoritative and authenticated sources that have established no fault or problem with those machines.
That analogy is not a coincidence. The same pattern of reasoning is at work.
Why is Mr. Rob now talking about “elections” and “voting machines” and “prominent individuals”- except perhaps as a needed misdirection from the
topic at hand?
My topic of interest- the thread’s topic, actually- is the Boeing 737 MAX™ and its safety, and that’s what I’ve limited my comments to.
Others, well..
😉
I think the accurate aspect is that information was deliberately kept from the FAA.
Equally the FAA was not cohesive in its overview and depended far too much on the info supplied by Boeing (read the 787 battery debacle if you need further aspects of what the FAA allowed Boeing to get away with, ie the nail through the battery test having no factual basis as a test)
And the test pilot in charge with Boeing was a weird choice as his background had nothign to recommend it (nor why would Boeing not have its own test pilots involved?)
Politically you can’t indict Boeing as it would then remove them from bidding contracts that the government desperately needs to have some competition for.
So yes there are political aspects to this even if they are not the ones some list. There is the harsh reality of politics and people paying the price for our National Defense (and the reality of how true said defense is needed)
Its not the first nor will be the last time a price has been paid by others.
As noted earlier, the reference to false election claims and the various players involved, is to point out that those methods are the same as employed here. Which I’m confident most readers will understand.
Once those methods are identified, they no longer work. Hence the importance of doing so.
Regrettable but necessary.
@ Rob
“As with Bryce, you are free to believe what you wish.”
And, of course, that same statement especially applies to you.
Some like to proclaim that they’re in search of “truth” — but are actually just selectively picking snippets of information to suit a particular narrative. When they don’t get their way, they sulk, and try to cast themselves in a victim role — a sort-of misunderstood Joan of Arc.
TV evangelism comes to mind.
@ Bill7
“I’ll stick with the Seattle Times’s reporting- which has been superb throughout the Boeing 737 MAX debacle”
Indeed.
And Dominic Gates presents us with a veritable fount of information “as is”, without trying to selectively contort it into a damage-limiting narrative for the players in question.
Very inconvenient for BA, and also for the FAA.
Of course, BA deploys lobbyists and influencers to try to tilt things in a more favorable direction.
TransWorld
I’m not saying you’re absurd, but I read a lot of absurd things in your comments.
1. Regarding the rotation of the 7M8 vs A320n. You are comparing two different aircraft that each place their cursors opposite each other and have different strengths. Before the crash, the 7M8 was better sold than the A320neo and it was the unexpected success of the A321neo that made the overall success of the A32Xneo family. The 7M10 had only just been launched for things to change. The 7M8 is longer and has 2 more rows than its closest competitor. Having the geometrically different characteristics your argument is simply incomprehensible and irrelevant.
2. Currently the 777-X is lagging in certification (thanks the FAA) Currently the A350-1000 was certified in the middle of the last decade and has sold ONLY a few HUNDREDS of aircraft. copies. And then after ? What are you trying to tell us and prove to us regarding the 777-X/FAA certification delays?…
3. What do you know about the 787F market? What do you know about the global market? What would be the size of the 787-F,… the -8 or the -9? from -8? Why ? To redo an A330-200F flop? Do you believe it would be a replacement for the 767-F? Apart from FedEx and UPS who are the other customers to launch such an aircraft? Again, your arguments make no sense to me. Derogation or not, the 767F market is small.
4. Boeing engineers continue to face challenges from the FAA for aircraft certification. Truss Braced Wing (TBW) will soon be a real flying test platform, and future technology test platforms are tested on Boeing Eco Demonstrators every year… Again your comments make no sense to me. ..
5. The problem is that Boeing is being targeted for debt like many companies including Airbus in 2006 with an aggressive “Power8″ turnaround inflicted by competition and former management. CEO N. Forgeard left Airbus with a golden parachute.
Again, no one to talk about it. But luckily I know the story and am not ready to take sarcasm from people D. Calhoun in 2022 put the company on track in terms of safety and drew up a roadmap so that this never happened reproduce in the future (737MAX crash). Dividends and share buybacks are not a taboo subject for me because they are the economic rules of this 21st Century. Wall Street is beyond us and who are we to say what is good or bad. I’m not saying that I agree with this one but these are rules that don’t concern us, see futile subject…
6. Pratt & Whitney? You are not serious …! This company has been out of racing for over 20 years. The GTF? I think you got misled by your emotions. Come to your senses. That one still doesn’t make sense to me…
7.a. And why should the 787-8 be like the -9 and -10? The -8 sold over 400 copies, it is the only alternative to what could be an illusory market of what Middle Of Market is today. Still better than a brand new risky aircraft and moreover having a much more distant 787 community?
7.b Why aren’t you so scared when you see that a competitor’s A350-1000 doesn’t offer more commonality than the -900? Different landing gear, slightly different Engines, Different Wing Parts for ONLY a HUNDRED sale? You’re still not scared though…!?
8. Your quote :
…” That is what depresses me about Boeing, you can make excuses forever but that mind set of profits to anything other than product will kill them.
Calhoun is the classic business killer”…
——–
This is the reason I conclude with your quote,.
“Traditional blah blah blah” groundless (no offense) yourcomplaint is simply inadmissible…
Cordially,
You seem to report from a different timeline.
“4. Boeing engineers continue to face challenges from the FAA for aircraft certification. ”
If you loose best buddy status due to having screwed the pooch on a daily basis .. 🙂
You think they have it more difficult with the FAA
than those lesser airframers around the globe?
and looking at some FAA activity they are still busy tilting the table for the US side.
Moreover, from what the FAA regularly tells us, the failings are on BA’s side.
For example, the FAA has to repeatedly tease documentation out of BA, and, when that documentation finally gets produced, it’s often inadequate/incomplete.
FAA is applying appropriate measures to address failings that ocurred in the last minute updates to the MAX certification. Nothing more and nothing less.
This has raised cries on one side that Boeing is being abused by the evil FAA, cries on another that the FAA is in a death struggle with evil Boeing, and cries on yet another that evil regulation is the end of all industry innovation, or the introduction of a new aircraft.
All of it is nonsense and conspiracy theories. If you identify gaps in your system through which something inappropriately fell, you eliminate the gaps. It’s how you take responsibility for what happened, and for your obligations. It should surprise no one.
Boeing now has a learning curve, as the number of permitted “to be determined” entries in their certification documentation is greatly reduced. The FAA will send it back, rather than allowing it to float until later resolution.
Further Boeing is accepting this, with some frustration but without complaint. As is appropriate.
Remarkable how often our commenter invokes conspiracy theories in an attempt to explain the world…
Hammer in hand thing.
Then, your are in a way “formed” by the things in your toolbox.
and “conspiracy theory” is such a mighty tool at that. A modern form of witch craft allegations. Burn, burn, burn :-).
Checklist:
I would put the various aspects you listed as disagree with.
Wallstreet: No it is not beyond my understanding, it is the part of the mix that drives to profits and profits only out, not in. Wallstreet does not care about longevity of a company as long as they get the profits out of it. When Wallstreet drives the company, everyone looses. Profits back out are only one aspect, profits back in for R&D and product development are also a required part of the mix for a healthy company. Boeing has been ex tracing for a long time. You may disagree, but any economist will say you are wrong.
“1. Regarding the rotation of the 7M8 vs A320n. You are comparing two different aircraft that each place their cursors opposite each other and have different strengths. Before the crash, the 7M8 was better sold than the A320neo and it was the unexpected success of the A321neo that made the overall success of the A32Xneo family. The 7M10 had only just been launched for things to change. The 7M8 is longer and has 2 more rows than its closest competitor. Having the geometrically different characteristics your argument is simply incomprehensible and irrelevant.”
Nothing absurd about comparing a 737-800/-8 to an A320. They are close enough that they are directly comparable.
Boeing has no comparable aircraft to the A321 and even then, the -10 has limitations that leave the A321 a better overall aircraft.
What the crash of 08 has to do with it I don’t know, but even back in 08 Airbus was starting to headreach Boeing on the single aisles and the A321NEO has proven once again that a wider range of product meets market needs better and Boeing did not have that. You are doing something wrong when you go from 60-40 to 40- 60. Boeing could easily have done an A320 equal and should have. That is not absurd.
You should note I did not support EICAS for the 737.
“2. Currently the 777-X is lagging in certification (thanks the FAA) ”
Boeing can only blame itself, the situation changed and Boeing continued to try to bull its way through and failed on all 3 programs.
“Currently the A350-1000 was certified in the middle of the last decade and has sold ONLY a few HUNDREDS of aircraft. copies. And then after ? What are you trying to tell us and prove to us regarding the 777-X/FAA certification delays?…”
I think the A350-1000 is one to watch. It has taken over the slot of the wildly successful 777-300. Boeing moved out of that space with the 777X. Smaller aircraft sell better than larger ones.
For all the years of production, the 747 sold something like 1600 and up to the 747-8, it had no competition in the space.
I think there is a market for the 77X, but I think the A350 will sell much better. Possibly over time, the A350-900 but as the single aisle shifted to A321 size (50% or better now of Airbus production in that segment) Airbus can grow into it. Its going to be years before we know.
But the 777X issues are purely on Boeing. The FAA is doing its job finally.
“3. What do you know about the 787F market? What do you know about the global market? What would be the size of the 787-F,… the -8 or the -9? from -8? Why ? To redo an A330-200F flop? Do you believe it would be a replacement for the 767-F? Apart from FedEx and UPS who are the other customers to launch such an aircraft? Again, your arguments make no sense to me. Derogation or not, the 767F market is small.”
I don’t know the details of the 787F market. I do know there is regs that Boeing has to work around coming in 2027. How well that is received is a major question.
Boeing was working on it and suddenly quit. That smacks of Calhoun wanting profits better.
The A330-300 conversions are gaining a lot of traction. Airbus could do an A330NEO conversion on the 900 now. Its an area to watch and I am seeing too many knee jerk reaction out of Boeing. The A350F sells and suddenly Boeing is doing a 777X/F and in good numbers. I believe BCA knows the market but Calhoun is killing the proposals until he gets strong armed.
“4. Boeing engineers continue to face challenges from the FAA for aircraft certification. Truss Braced Wing (TBW) will soon be a real flying test platform, and future technology test platforms are tested on Boeing Eco Demonstrators every year… Again your comments make no sense to me. ..”
The above is confusing. Boeing faces an FAA doing its job and management has not adjusted. Has nothing to do with TBW.
I am definitely following TBW but it has its characteristics that need to work out and its not a given but it can be used as an excuse.
“5. The problem is that Boeing is being targeted for debt like many companies including Airbus in 2006 with an aggressive “Power8″ turnaround inflicted by competition and former management. CEO N. Forgeard left Airbus with a golden parachute.”
Boeing put itself deep into debt over gross mismanagement of the 787 and then followed up with the MAX crashes and followed up with the 777X issue and more massive issues on the 787. Those are all management self inflicted, merely a flesh wounds.
“Again, no one to talk about it. But luckily I know the story and am not ready to ”
Let us know when you are.
TransWorld
I don’t want to argue. Your arguments are not convincing.
I respect your point of view,
but I respect mine more.
Also you seem to support that smaller aircraft sell better, but you wanted a NEW Mid-size Airplane 767 + New-Freighter / Widebody type, which would sell less than a narrowbody Middle Of Market.
Another contradiction ?…
Returning momentarily to the customary end-of-year delivery spurt, it would appear that the number of AB deliveries for December currently stands at 87, which brings the year total so far to 652.
For BA, the number of 737s and 787s delivered in December currently appears to stand at 61, with an additional 2 767Fs delivered — which brings the year total so far to 474.
Two more (partial) working days to go.
For the 737s, about 35% of December deliveries seem to be coming from inventory, whereas this figure is about 50% of the 787 deliveries.
So, that means that about 40% of BA’s December deliveries won’t make much of a (positive) contribution to earnings.
Bryce
“…For the 737s, about 35% of December deliveries seem to be coming from inventory…”
—-
Seem, seem, seem…
Let’s admit that this one is true, and this one with a fairly strong probability.
Deliveries wherever they come from represent payday. The cash flow is no less there. Anyway, as I already said, I expect a better result for 2022, than the last 3 years and will improve over time until 2026…
Bryce,
…”But it’s the relative size of the discounts that matters — particularly in relation to each company’s costs.
BCA had 112 deliveries in Q3, but still logged a loss of $640M — without one-off writedowns. Go do the math 😉…”
——
If Boeing is losing money, that doesn’t mean absolutely it’s the so-called “heavy discounts” you’re supporting. This is strongly due to expenses and debts due also to the 737MAX grounding, payment and compensation to the airlines.
This does not mean that Boeing is selling at a loss, we must not confuse the events.
It is hard to believe that Boeing would pay among other things
the consequences of the 737MAX grounding, estimate at 42 billion USD, payable in one or three years, but, of course several years…
So we will still see losses while the year 2022 will be better than the last 3 years
…
Those debts manifest themselves as a recurring interest repayment — in this case, about $625M per quarter.
Knowing this recurring cost, discounts on sales should be chosen at a level that allows a profit to be made.
That profit is not being made because the given discounts are mismatched to the known costs — in other words, BCA is giving discounts that are beyond its means.
This problem will persist as long as the debt mountain persists — which will be for a long time.
Airbus doesn’t have this debt mountain, so it can offer generous discounts and still make a profit.
A valuable lesson in the vices of (inescapable) debt traps.
Today’s premises did not exist when
today’s deliveries where sold. ( years ago probably.)
IMU this touches on another bad feature of Programme Accounting.
Mismatch between Planned and Required budget of a programme seeps into the deferred cost basket and thus turns more or less invisible to the shares assayer crowd.
And yet, the eye-popping 65% discount given to Southwest occurred when BA was fully congizant of its debt burden.
Same applies to the 60% discount figure for the recent sale to United.
That’s pure profligacy.
Isn’t it rather ironic that the NTSB is doing its best to try to pin (some measure of) blame on the Ethopian pilots, when Boeing officially and explicitly absolved the pilots of all blame as part of its court settlement with survivor families?
Sure, one is an investigative board and the other is a manufacturer, but it’s still a very inconsistent and self-contradictory face that’s being presented by the US aerospace “machine”.
And to complicate that face even further: look at the backtracking that Congress did last week.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/nov/11/boeing-full-responsibility-737-max-plane-crash-ethiopia-compensation
Expect the reported culpability to be demoted out of sight in media pieces.
The NTSB intervention will be kept floating and it fits quite well into the per media conditioned reflex of “third worlders lack competence” in the general public.
Not just in the media: a “certain commenter” tried to play the same “third worlders lack competence” card above — before subsequently trying to deny having done so.
An interesting document to serve as a backdrop in the current matter: the DPA between BA and the US DOJ.
Of note:
“As Boeing admitted in court documents, Boeing—through two of its 737 MAX Flight Technical Pilots—deceived the FAA AEG about an important aircraft part called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that impacted the flight control system of the Boeing 737 MAX. Because of their deception, a key document published by the FAA AEG lacked information about MCAS, and in turn, airplane manuals and pilot-training materials for U.S.-based airlines lacked information about MCAS.”
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion
I don’t like companies paying what amounts to fines for corrupt actions of this magnitude, causing practically intentional and deliberate death. The specific people involved in intentional fraud or even guilty by inaction, in the corporations should be punished individually. Hiding behind the corporate veil and only paying fines does not set an example to avoid future corruption and fraud. People should be held accountable for their actions. Not doing so, actually encourges more fraud and corruption to take place.
Well, a judge in Texas recently ruled that the crash victims were “crime victims”, which potentially opens the way to get the DPA binned:
https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2022-10-21/u-s-judge-passengers-in-fatal-boeing-737-max-crashes-crime-victims
We’ll just have to see to what extent BA’s lawyers can avert this fate: if they can’t, then heads will roll at BA.
This was a sympathetic ruling in response to the accident families. It contains findings of fact from the judge that the DoJ refuted, based on their extensive criminal investigation.
However the DoJ will have to live with it for now, since as an administrative ruling, it can’t be appealed. But it won’t alter the Boeing DPA, because the DoJ defended it on very solid grounds, and have said there is no reason to change it.
The DoJ will have to listen to the accident families, provide them with more detail, and answer their questions. I don’t think it will come to more than that. But we’ll see.
Alternatively:
“This was a substantive ruling in response to action brought the accident families. It contains findings of fact from the judge that the DoJ will find hard to refute, based on their half-baked criminal investigation.
“However the DoJ will have to live with it for now, since as an administrative ruling, it can’t be appealed. It can certainly alter the Boeing DPA, because the DoJ defended it on incorrect grounds, and will now have to prepare for more flak.
“The DoJ will have to listen to the accident families, provide them with more detail, and answer their questions. The DPA may get binned. But we’ll see.”
You don’t have to limite yourself to an “exclusive or”.
In the US corporations are legal persons, right?
Go “inclusive or”:
You can just line them up with the human perpetrator.
How do you apply things like the death sentence to a corporation?
Update on AB’s year-end deliveries (13:00 CET):
The company appears to have delivered 6 frames yesterday, which brings its December total to 93 and its year total to 658 (to date).
AirInsight is compiling data from 3 different sources and arrives at the following 2022 totals:
AB: 673
BA: 477
https://airinsight.com/2022-deliveries-airbus-673-boeing-477/
Good job from Airbus.
Indeed!
Remember how “a certain commenter” from the icy north very recently told us — with great conviction — that AB would only get to 630, and no further?
More, from Memory Lane:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-27/boeing-737-max-in-mid-air-emergencies-as-us-set-to-launch-probe/101175214
Remember the “retractions” we were told
to “stay tuned!” for- six months ago?
Any day now, I guess. 😉
@ Bill7
Indeed 😏
If you read some of the links from @ Richard Davenport below, you’ll see some figures regarding trim systems failure on the 737 — they happen with disturbing regularity.
Looks like ABC did its homework.
p.s. Isn’t it nice to have commenters who actually post links?
Then again, it’s hard to post a link to somerhing that only exists in a personal fantasy…
The ABC Australia story on prior MAX incidents was a nothing burger. They were pulled from the FAA and NASA incident reporting databases, so they were already known by the FAA, and not deemed to be an issue.
This is a good example of why the linking method of analysis is poor. In these databases, there is also a field for resolution. Those fields don’t show any significant problems being found. But the media doesn’t bother to include that detail, as the story is far more sensational without it.
This is why Internet searches, and even most media reporting, are not the equivalent of true knowledge and understanding.
Alternatively:
“The ABC Australia story on prior MAX incidents prompted action by a Congressional committee and the DoT. The incidents were pulled from the FAA and NASA incident reporting databases, so they were already known by the FAA, but kept under a lid.
“This is a good example of why press reporting of aviation incidents is excellent. In these databases, there is much detail of significant problems being found. The media justly highlighted that detail, and discussed the seriousness of the recurring issues in the story.
“This is why media reporting is a fountain of true knowledge and understanding — a very powerful and necessary counter to the rote, damage-control PR being spouted on behalf of adversely affected parties”
You don’t need to add an OFF switch for MCAS. It’s already there. There are Two Trim Cutout switches on the console of every 737-MAX.
It’s an artifact from days gone by when the 737 had a separate autopilot trim motor. If the main trim motor broke, the pilot still had
electric control of the stabilizer via the separate autopilot trim motor and the autopilot. If there was a short and there was a trim
run-a-way, then the pilot had control of each separate system via the Two Trim Cutout switches. In todays 737-MAX, that’s not the case.
Both switches are tied to the One and only Trim Motor. If something goes wrong with that One Trim Motor, then the pilot is left with the
now smaller in diameter, (because the designers needed added space for the new instrument display screens), manual trim wheel. That’s it.
No other secondary Trim Motor is available anymore to control the stabilizer. A good video on being left with the Manual Trim Wheel as
the only option, at high speeds, is here.
=========
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoNOVlxJmow
============
So, do you only want to be able to deal with MCAS failure at low speeds? A simple OFF switch, which is already there, and just needs
to be wired in, would seem to make much better sense to me. Especially, if you have an MCAS failure at high speeds.
I don’t understand why the 737 has a Speed Trim System and most every other airplane doesn’t. It must have to do with the larger engines
being hung on a short fuselage, and then MCAS being needed because of even larger engines being hung on the same fuselage.
Here’s a good 4 minute demo of the Speed Trim System in action
===========
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXr0PExNqBA
============
Here’s the 737 Speed Trim Systems patent.
(When Boeing put larger engines (the new classic, in 1984) onto the 737, was when this Speed Trim System installed.)
==================
https://patents.google.com/patent/US4676460A/en
===============
See if it can explain to you what it’s funtion is? At certain CG’s and weight, it adjusts the
horizontal stabilizer, but, having to trim to maintain a certain speed on takeoff seems excessive, and it sounds like you’re pushing on a
pencil at low speeds to try and maintain directional control to me. It has to be very pitch sensitive at low airspeeds?
==================
A good explaination of the Speed Trim System (trim for speed) vs MCAS (trim for pitch). One operates with flaps down, the other with flaps up.
Both, seemingly there because of added engine thrust, compared to the orginal 737 design. The Speed Trim System moves slowly and doesn’t seem
to have caused any accidents in the past. MCAS, as everyone well knows, operates quickly, moving a large flight control surface for feelability issues
and has caused Two accidents.
================
https://12ft.io/proxy?&q=https%3A%2F%2Fseekingalpha.com%2Farticle%2F4286602-boeing-737-max-misconceptions-engineers-view
===================
So, if MCAS is only there for a feelabilty issue, then why not use a stick pusher arrangement, to avoid moving a huge, slow acting, flight
control surface. It’s the tail wagging the dog, rather than the other way around. In the rare situation, when MCAS is triggered, during
an Escape Maneuver, you wouldn’t be waiting for the Stabilizer motor to move at high speed, you could trigger forces on the control yoke
directly, and quickly to deal with the feelability issue, ensuring a linear force feedback to the pilot. After the Escape Maneuver is done,
you have the aircraft in control instantly, rather than the Stabilizer somewhere, where you don’t want it. The current, overly complex
MCAS software, to deal with a feelabilty issue, should stop using the One Stabilizer Trim Motor at high speed and find another solution such
as a stick pusher arrangement, or if Boeing contines to use MCAS to wag the tail, then wire the second trim cutout switch to only cut out
MCAS, and allow the Pilots electrical control of the Stabilizer, to keep emergency situations as simple and controlable as possible. All
of the warning and indicator lights and buzzers also need attention, but, in an emergency, when seconds count, I don’t want to be second
guessing MCAS software and sensors, I want to be flying the aircraft, with the stabilizer under my complete control. It might be a good
idea to put the second Trim Motor arrangement back into the 737, since the reduced diameter trim wheel is more difficut to use and with the
more powerful engines now, you need more effort to control the aircraft’s stablizer. The margin of safety has been cut down too much.
What a stunning dissertation — thank you for that!
Of course, when you take a 1960s TV dinner, subject it to several iterations of “warming up”, and then try to serve it in 2011 … what do you expect the end result to look and taste like?
With all of that mess in the background, some out-of-touch nerd at the NTSB still considered it necessary to try do some ex post facto re-arrangement of deck chairs on the Titanic — made even more farcical by the fact that the OEM has already declared that the Ethopian pilots are completely blameless.
> What a stunning dissertation — thank you for that! <
Agreed- a trememdous comment from Richard Davenport on the Boeing 737 and MCAS.
Tthe fact that MCAS cannot simply be turned off
even in V2.0 seems like one of those "dog that didn't bark" issues. Quite interesting.
Every LNA reader should look at the first (Mentourpilot) video in Richard Davenport’s trim post above — particularly from minute 10:00 onward.
Hard to believe that something like this can still get certified in 2022 — it’s more reminiscent of 1922.
It’s a wonder that the video doesn’t include someone shoveling coal into a boiler in the cockpit!
The video in question recreates the mistrim encountered in the accidents, which was far beyond what the crew should ever allow, and was also perfectly counterable with electric trim.
It’s useful to show the extreme situation in which the crew ended up. But not as a representation of typical scenarios or use.
It’s also true that when pilots tried to recover from the final moments if ET302 in the simulator, they could not. But that is like saying the Titanic couldn’t be saved. The outcome was a mathematical certainty, by then.
Yet the media trumpeted this as proof that there was no pilot error involved. Which remains an obviously invalid claim.
but, what if the ET302 pilots had the “OFF” switch to MCAS available to them?
toss that in a simulator and see if Pilots can recover?
==
BTW, technical question for you .. The Speed Trim System could be deactivated by the STAB TRIM CUTOUT Autopilot switch in years past. I assume it can’t now? Did that change with the MAX or the NG? Is the Speed Trim System deactivated by turning off the Autopilot? Or, is he Speed Trim System now also without an effective, independant “OFF” switch?
The crew did have an off switch for MCAS, and they did use it. It made no difference because they also used it to turn MCAS back on again.
You can’t deflect from crew decisions with hardware claims. That’s the whole point of the NTSB comments & rebuttal.
MCAS is a component of the speed trim system, there is no separation in their controls. That system can be disabled by the cutout switches.
As I mentioned below, there were no longer any procedures that called for using the switches separately. So they were combined on the function that gives the greatest protection, which is to disable the motor.
“The crew did have an off switch for MCAS, and they did use it.”
This is explicitly false.
There is no “off” switch for MCAS, so the crew couldn’t have used one.
There’s only the possibility to circumvent the effects of MCAS, by depriving the pilots of other functionalities.
@Rob …
There were prevously 2 stab trim cutout switches labeled “MAIN ELECT” and “AUTO PILOT” .. they had 2 independent actions .. one was to cut out the manual yoke switches, the other the auto pilot .. If the MAX still had that electrical configuration at the time of the ET302 accident, the pilots would have had the option available to them of just cutting off the AUTO Pilot (and if wired correctly, the MCAS system, which is the system that kept cutting into the mix and pushing the nose down at high speed. IF they had the option of just cutting out MCAS, that would have allowed them a chance at pulling up the nose via the yoke mounted trim switches, without having to worry about MCAS fighting with them. If I was a pilot in a 737-MAX, I’d want that option available to me. Even at low speeds, cutting the MCAS software out of the picture quickly and still having electric control of the stabilizer is a worthy goal.
Richard.
Speed trim is always on. It is never deactivated. Its buried in the FCU, Its on, or failed. The Trim actuators may be turned off, but speed trim remains active. This may be a minor point, but speed trim is a requirement to maintain control of the aircraft through its operating range and reduce pilot workload. Speed trim’s function is to compensate for the wings center of pressure movement caused by IAS changes automatically. The aircraft is uncertifiable without an automatic method to control CP movement effects. Of note is that Airbus does the exact same thing within its fbw system.
Speed trim has never had an off switch in the history of the 737. Speed trim operates independently of the autopilot as the autopilot needs speed trim to keep the yoke forces below the yoke force sensors trip point. MCAS is a subroutine of Speed trim and is always on, but its activation requires the aircraft to be flaps up, gear up and autopilot off and receive an AofA value over 12.3 ish degrees.
If you want to kill an MCAS activation with an alternate method, which has one step. Punch the autopilot altitude hold button.
MCAS gets out of the way,. the airplane autotrims while staying in the air.
Bryce wrote
There is no “off” switch for MCAS, so the crew couldn’t have used one. There’s only the possibility to circumvent the effects of MCAS, by depriving the pilots of other functionalities.
This is EXACTLY correct.
@Pnwgeek,
Let’s say you have Two 737 simulators side by side. One an 737-NG, the other a 737-MAX. If you only switch off on the center console, the one marked “AutoPilot” on the 737-NG and the one marked “B/U” on the 737-MAX (both physically the same switch). Will the STS system be active or inacitve in each simulator? I say that on the 737-NG, the STS commands to the trim motor will stop, and the yoke trim switches will still operate. On the 737-MAX, the STS commanes to the trim motor will stop as will the yoke trim switch commands to the trim motor … all electric to the trim motor on the 737-MAX will cease. Your thoughts?
“Yet the media trumpeted this as proof that there was no pilot error involved. Which remains an obviously invalid claim.”
The OEM explicitly declared that the pilots were blameless.
You’re spreading falsehoods again.
Richard Davenport
January 1, 2023
@Pnwgeek,
Let’s say you have Two 737 simulators side by side. One……..
Both simulators will have speed trim active. Speed trim resides inside the FCU. The switchology downstream of the switches I believe is different, BUT the switching of BOTH switches in the runaway trim scenario makes whatever the changes were somewhat immaterial. Turning both switches off interrupts the MCAS trim activation output path to the trim motors. We can get into the whole Left/Right redundant concept later.
@Pnwgeek,
The Right cutout switch on the 737-NG is able to cutout JUST the automated controls of the stabilizer. On the 737-MAX, the wiring was changed, so that you CAN’T JUST turn OFF the automated controls.
If you have access to 737-NG and 737-MAX simulators, try it.
from
====
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-altered-key-switches-in-737-max-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
=======
“But as Boeing was transitioning from its 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, the company altered the labeling and the purpose of those two switches. The functionality of the switches became more restrictive on the MAX than on previous models, closing out an option that could conceivably have helped the pilots in the Ethiopian Airlines flight regain control.
Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches. But after obtaining and reviewing flight manual documents, The Seattle Times found that the left switch on the 737 NG model is capable of deactivating the buttons on the yoke that pilots regularly press with their thumb to control the horizontal stabilizer. The right switch on the 737 NG was labeled “AUTO PILOT” and is capable of deactivating just the automated controls of the stabilizer.
On the newer 737 MAX, according to documents reviewed by The Times, those two switches were changed to perform the same function – flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions – such as MCAS – without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.”
Richard Davenport wrote
On the 737-MAX, the wiring was changed, so that you CAN’T JUST turn OFF the automated controls.
Exactly correct because a fundamental change occurred in the aircraft that has not been noted by many. On the NG, AofA data was reference data, on the Max, it became control data. The NG autopilot uses the gyro for pitch data and has no actual need for AofA input. The AofA data was displayed because a great number of military pilots use “Units of Pitch” as a cross reference to aircraft attitude when shooting ILS approaches. On the MAX, the vane generated AofA data is moved from Ref to Control as it feeds MCAS as a control command value. This meant that the downstream switchology needed to change to be certifiable. The concept of turning off MCAS output to the trim motors alone by the crew is flawed at the concept level. IF speed trim fails, it becomes an FCU Fail, and the FCU backup swap fixes the problem. It would be exceptionally bad luck to fail both FCUs on a single flight. There is no need for MCAS to be directly addressable since its failure trips the existing FCU fail parameter, which has an established process. The problem with MCAS wasn’t its existence, it was the horrifically bad idea of allowing one Pitch Vane to drive the data. Now remember that there are 2 separate transducers in each vane unit, so it WAS electronically redundant, but not mechanically redundant as the Ethiopian bird strike showed us. So I guess I’m fine with how the switchology morphed back into the left/right redundant concept.
@Pnwgeek,
So, if you have an autopilot speed trim runaway in the 737-NG, you can still maintain manual electric control, via Main cutoff ON / Autopilot OFF. If you have an autopilot speed trim runaway in the 737-MAX, you don’t have that option. Obviously the same for MCAS, only on the 737-MAX. The pilots only are left with the smaller manual trim wheel and no high speed electric trim option. I think the pilots on ET302 would have liked to have an OFF switch for MCAS and still be allowed to control the stabilizer at high speeds. If they had reduced their thrust suddenly, in order to try and get the manual trim wheel to turn, I suspect the nose would have dropped even more by the sudden loss of thrust. They did’nt have the time to turn the trim wheel manually, even if they could have moved it. Time will tell on how much margin of safety has changed because of the switch rewiring.
@Richard
All these questions have been addressed in other posts. None of them were factors in the accidents, which is the subject of the NTSB comments and rebuttal.
As far as the use of the elevator feel system (EFS), or a stick pusher, to replace MCAS, that has been explained before as well. The EFS adds a column force gradient that has to do with stall prevention. As does the stick pusher. It has nothing to do with the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft, that MCAS was meant to address.
The stall prevention features also occur far later in the column aft motion, and at steeper aircraft pitch angle, than the gradient that MCAS provides, which occurs far earlier in motion and pitch.
The EFS and pushers are like the stick shaker, they are warning and preventive measures. MCAS is an augmentation system to correct the aerodynamics of the aircraft.
You may recall that one of the determinations the FAA had to make, was whether MCAS constitutes stall prevention. The conclusion was that it doesn’t, for the reasons given above.
” None of them were factors in the accidents”
All of them are key factors in the accidents, since they relate to fundamental shortcomings in the design of the plane.
A good video of the Stabilizer Jack Screw in the rear of a 737 actually moving is in this video
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxPa9A-k2xY
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I don’t know if this is at the high speed trim setting or not, but, it gives you an idea of the force needed to move a large stabilizer. Can you can imagine trying to turn this large screw quickly, via the small trim wheel in the cockpit.
Apart from the forces/torques involved — which, as you point out, have to be applied via a pathetically small wheel in a confined space — have you got any data on the number of trim wheel rotations required to produce a degree of change in the angle of the stabilizer?
From the Mentourpilot video in your previous post, it seems to be a lot: after many turns of the wheel, the co-pilot only seems to have produced a 0.5 degree trim correction…
I don’t have any exact numbers …
But, I did find a couple of interesting tid bits cruising the internet.
First, specificaly mentioning the MentourPilot video
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https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/70184/how-many-turns-of-a-737-trim-wheel-equal-2-5-degrees-stabilizer-deflection
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and another post from a pilot in a simulator practicing a runaway trim sequence
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https://www.pprune.org/10774423-post28.html
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It does sound like its an “if all else fails, then..” type of situation, if you are using the trim wheel.
And remember, every second counts in an emergency.
While one pilot is playing with the trim wheel, he’s not able to help do anything else. The other pilot may even have to try
and help him, on the trim wheel.
Thank you very much for that extra info.
So, one of the answers in your first link indicates 18 trim wheel turns per degree of stabilizer rotation — about consistent with what was visible in the Mentourpilot video in your previous post.
And from your second link:
“I was shocked to find that it was so hard to get half a turn at a time, and as I predicted only as we slowed down towards 230 kts for this specific condition was it possible to get the 40 plus turns we needed to get in trim.”
Further, if you look at the RTS ADs for the MAX, they explicitly mention that both pilots may be simultaneously required to turn the trim wheels — thereby leaving nobody to fly the plane!
It defies belief that that Frankenplane is still allowed to fly around.
> Further, if you look at the RTS ADs for the MAX, they explicitly mention that both pilots may be simultaneously required to turn the trim wheels — thereby leaving nobody to fly the plane! <
This.. should be fine, though.
😉
It’s notable that the FAA tested the trim wheels with a variety of pilots, with the given assumption of MCAS malfunction being present.
In all cases, the pilots were able to manage the wheels, even the female pilots.
The key difference in the ET302 accident, as noted by the FAA and the NTSB, was the aerodynamic load created by exceeding the maximum safe operational speed of the aircraft, during a climb. This occurred due to the throttles remaining at 94%
And yet, the RTS AD explicitly refers — in multiple locations — to the possibility that both pilots may be required to turn the trim wheels…
The AD refers to the corner situations where aerodynamic loads are unavoidable. These are also the cases for the so-called yo-yo manuever. There are no such cases in the accident scenarios, without the causational factor of overspeed being present.
In the absence of those factors, the tests showed the wheels were perfectly manageable by a single pilot of ordinary strength. Further this is documented in pilot training videos on the Internet.
And yet, the RTS AD explicitly refers — in multiple locations — to the possibility that both pilots may be required to turn the trim wheels…
Another question for you Richard:
Has there ever been any discussion of motor assistance to help turn the trim wheel in the cockpit?
So, I’m not talking about the motor at the back of the plane, which is directly turning the screw shaft: I’m inquiring about a motor under the floor of the plane to pull on the cable running from the cockpit to the rear of the plane. A ridiculous construction, of course, but the archaic design of the plane doesn’t leave much alternative, does it? At least a well-designed motor can apply more force than a human hand — though the force applied needs to be small enough to prevent the cable from snapping.
Would that make sense?
It is another “fiddling on the fringes” to fix
a central design fault.
begin with using a slow moving counter to a fast entering situation.
continue into enabling an unrealiable single senosr to have more or less full authority for trim.
move over to little niceties like restart MCAS activity on single activation of manual electric trim. MCAS +2.5° man. intervention -.9?° MCAS +2.5° man. intervention .8?° continue ad nauseam till crash.
who would have know that something that could potentially be seen as runaway trim stops with the first bit of flats extended.
Overall this produces the image of hellishly insidious design that should never have been let loose on a commercial qualified crew.
As I wrote earlier this is Test Pilot stuff and not regular airline crew stuff.
@ Uwe
Of course it doesn’t make sense: the whole design of that plane is an archaic, over-compromised, irresponsible mess — of monumental proportions!
Imagine having a trim motor at the back — and, yet, still having to manually do trim using a wheel in the cockpit? That motor is sitting there, but it can’t be used because of a design that even a third-grader wouldn’t concoct!
But, given that the required trim wheel forces can exceed human strength limits, at least an assistive motor would offer some relief.
Other than the previous 2nd Autopilot motor that was installed on the 737 years ago, I don’t know of any.
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“The 737 originally had two actuators: one for manual pitch trim and the other for autopilot pitch trim. Having two actuators was the original source of the two 737 cutout switches, elec main and autopilot.”
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This is a very informative write up of Trim incidents on the 737.
They happen much more often than I thought. They must happen mostly in the center of trim area, and are caught before they go too far.
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https://www.satcom.guru/2019/05/737-pitch-trim-incidents.html
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@ Richard
Thank you, again, for another extremely informative link 👍
Doesn’t inspire much confidence…
@ Richard
With reference to the manual trim motor that was originally present on the 737 — why was it removed?
And when?
Thanks for your continuing explanations!
@Bryce,
Don’t forget that most all of these trim incidents happend on a non-MAX 737. The MAX 737 has the yoke cutout override to a runaway trim situation missing now. So, a high speed MCAS runaway won’t be stopped by simple opposite yoke movement as in the past. You have to use the console mounted STAB cutout switches. That will take a few seconds to recognize and reach over and take action. And you are left with no Manual Electric Control then. Again, it cuts down on the margin of safety.
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https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/61984/why-cant-the-737-maxs-horizontal-stabilizer-autotrim-be-cut-out-by-control-yok
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@Bryce
From the Satcom.guru article
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The “737s up thru classic” used one actuator for manual electric trim and another actuator for autopilot trim.
The 737NG uses one actuator with two control interfaces, one for manual electric and the other for autopilot.
With two actuators, the loss of autopilot actuator does not render manual electric trim non-functioning. With one actuator, the failure of one control circuit may not render the other circuit non-functioning. However with two actuators, the mechanical components have more independence.
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I don’t know why Boeing at the NG model removed the extra motor.
@Bryce. The Satcom.guru website is a very knowledgeable web site for Boeing flight system questions. Here’s a very detailed discussion on the Trim system for the 737
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https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html
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But, the ‘why’ Boeing decided to rewire the console cutout trim switches for MCAS doesn’t seem to be obvious. Why MCAS doesn’t have it’s own ‘OFF’ switch. Boeing actually rewired it that way. Why?
Thanks again, Richard 👍
Scott should reward you with a free subscription 🥳
With regard to your “why” questions, I strongly suspect that dollars played a role.
There certainly was no meaningful logic involved, nor any engineering prowess.
@Richard
The reason for the column cutout switch disable for MCAS, was that it would interfere with the intended purpose of moderating column force, for aft column position. This was approved by the FAA.
Further it did not play a role in the accidents, as the column was never far enough aft to engage the switch. Thus it’s irrelevant to the case at hand.
The reason for combining the function of the console cutout switches, was that there was no longer any checklist or procedure that did not call for deactivatiing both switches. That was the result of a safety analysis, and had been true for some time, even on the NG.
Thus the MAX change simply codified the procedure in the switch wiring. Also again, this was approved by the FAA, and was not a factor in the accidents. The crew had ample opportunity to use the electric trim switches, they just chose not to do so.
@Richard
Lastly the decision to combine the stabilizer motor functions was to reduce complexity and maintenance requirements, for a feature that was almost never used, and was no longer referenced in the checklists or procedures. Again this was approved by the FAA, and again this played no role in the accidents.
“The crew had ample opportunity to use the electric trim switches, they just chose not to do so.”
BA had ample opportunity to come with a more failsafe and less restrictive “MCAS off” solution, they just chose not to do so (dollars).
This entire column of thread, raises issues that did not occur in the accidents, and ignores the issues that did occur in the accidents.
As did the EAIB report. Which is why the NTSB published their comments and rebuttal to the probable causes.
The true causes of the accident can’t be dismissed or evaded. That is the central point here, and of the NTSB.
“This entire column of thread, raises issues that did not occur in the accidents, and ignores the issues that did occur in the accidents.”
Totally false.
The whole issue of turning MCAS off is of central importance in the crashes. BA chose a sub-optimal, illogical and overly-restrictive approach, and it had fatal consequences.
No, that is a quite willful & incorrect misstatement of the accident events. The crew did turn off MCAS, but then turned it on again, against the checklist which required it to remain off.
The correct action was to reduce throttle & airspeed below the aircraft maximum safe operational speed. That would have unloaded the trim wheels, and enabled their use.
“The crew did turn off MCAS”
No, that is a quite willful & incorrect misstatement of the accident events.
MCAS doesn’t have an “off ” switch so — by definition — it can’t be turned “off”. At best, it’s effects can be circumvented — but, as Richard Davenport pointed out, only via a mechanism that robs the pilot of control features.
Richard wrote.
So, if you have an autopilot speed trim runaway in the 737-NG, you can still maintain manual electric control, via Main cutoff ON / Autopilot OFF.
Incorrect. You have no way to determine the source of a trim motor activation. It can be the Autopilot, The FCU, a stuck switch, a shorted wire harness among a longer list. The QRG recognises this and in BOTH the aircraft the QRG instructs you to switch off ALL input paths during a trim motor runaway. You are confusing the NG Autopilot fail QRG switchology with the Trim Runaway switchology. These are distinctly different failures. You’re making an argument saying that the Autopilot Fail QRG action of turning off only the right switch, whether the trim motor is running or not,is interchangeable with the Trim Runaway QRG action which mandates both switches be moved. It isnt. It doesn’t matter how many times you say it, it will never become true.
@Richard
The trim wheel ratio is 15 turns per unit of stabilizer motion, which represents 1 degree of deflection. That would be a very significant mistrim, which would add about 20 lbs of force to the control column. It would not ordinarily be expected that a crew would not respond immediately to that much mistrim.
Thus in actual use of the trim wheels, about 5 turns at any given time, would be expected. And the wheel crank initial force would be about 4 or 5 pounds.
When the aircraft is in trim, the wheels can be easily rotated without the crank, from the top, and that is most common use.
In an MCAS malfunction that is unopposed with electric trim, the wheels would require 40 turns with an initial crank force of about 20 pounds.
“It would not ordinarily be expected that a crew would not respond immediately to that much mistrim.”
And, yet, it happened — twice in real life, and subsequently in sims.
p.s. don’t forget those grossly incorrect human response assumptions that BA made…something that’s still haunting them in the MAX-7/10 SSA friction with the FAA.
It’s valid to say that Boeing did not sufficiently allow for pilot error in their safety analysis, and that this is something they have and are working to address.
However the said pilot error remains a primary cause of the accidents. Overspeed is not an error that can be protected against, and there is no way for Boeing to counter the aerodynamic loads that result.
“However the said pilot error remains a primary cause of the accidents”
Totally incorrect.
The OEM has officially declared that the Ethopian pilots were blameless.
By extension, the LionAir pilots were also blameless — even more so because they were trying to fight against a system whose existence was unknown to them.
The blame in these crashes lies 100% with the half-baked, over-compromised design of the 737MAX, and with the OEM’s attempts to conceal the existence of MCAS.
Bryce
….”Airbus doesn’t have this debt mountain, so it can offer generous discounts and still make a profit.
A valuable lesson in the vices of (inescapable) debt traps…”
—–
You don’t know Boeing’s debt. We know that they are aiming for a return to normalcy and good financial health around 2026. The debt is certainly being absorbed little by little. Why are you talking to me about Airbus? He is not longer a good student. Power8 didn’t kill it in 2006 despite strategic errors against Boeing. They went through it and launched the A350 after going through 6 drawing boards to be down against the market and against Boeing according to John Leahy. There is something wrong with your argument. An order today will be delivered years later. The context will be different, not the same as you hope. That’s not how it works As for Airbus, which had orders for A350 deliverables from 2014 when it was in crisis for years. At that time only A320 and A330 deliveries would allow a little cash flow. The FAL A340-500/-600 was already threatened with closure with all the costs of closure, the A400M was a flop, the A380 after its first flight a year earlier was already perceived as a commercial flop. Why for Boeing would be different? They deliver 737MAX, 787, 767F, 777F, and they delivered the last 747-8F. 2022 won’t be too bad. When I see a nice order from United and other orders, delivery will be payday and cash flow along the same lines as what Airbus went through. Don’t reduce everything to today and now, this is wrong. You are clearly manipulating a context. When they deliver to the ONLY UA customer (the only customer), around 2026, it will be a different story. I still expect a year 2022 better than the last 3 years and the next even better…
“You don’t know Boeing’s debt”
Go look at BA’s balance sheet — debt is $57B, comprising $51.8B in long term debt and $5.4B in short term debt. Has been at that level for multiple quarters.
Oh, and there’s also a more-or-less continuous additional $9B in net accounts payable — which brings the total up to $66B.
I refer to Airbus because it’s a useful benchmark to show how precarious the situation at BA is.
BA has gotten itself into a debt trap: it needs every penny it can get just to keep its head above water.
****
I think it’s wonderful for you that you have such rosy expectations for BA’s future 🙂 Perhaps you should load up on BA stock before the Q4 results are published? Although you might want to look at earnings estimates (e.g. on the Nasdaq site) before you commit…
This is neither a matter of optimism nor a matter of Boeing stock interest. You claim in an exaggerated way that Boeing’s debt would seem to be eternal because it fulfills your pious wishes…
“They went through it and launched the A350 after going through 6 drawing boards to be down …”
You are overstating things.
A350 was started as a plastic wing a330. didn’t sell badly ( still a bit of a drag to Airbus to morph the sold A350M1 slots.) The a couple of ideas where floated, discared.
Next new offer was the A350XWB. ( IMU one faction inside Airbus won with the knowledge that the Dreamliner had started its descend into “nightmarelane” and would not immediately corner the A330.)
Did Boeing ever reach the drawing board with its daisy chain of N$something and the Middle of nowhere intermission. How many daisies in the chain? 8..9 ?
Apparently never left the PR domain.
Uwe
Sorry, I have no source for you to believe me. But I’m sure the story of the A350 going 6 times on the drawing board is pretty notorious.
This is J. Leahy’s own admission. I know the story very well. There was the A350 MK1, but that doesn’t mean there haven’t been several drawing boards in the meantime. The true version of the story would be that the MK1 was selling so poorly against the 787 Dreamliner with ~400 orders for the latter between 2004 and 2006, that Airbus had to revise its plans.
They now wanted to tackle the 777’s in addition to the 787 as quickly as possible.
Consequences in 2022, 1,600 787 orders , 800 777-300ER orders ~200
777-F orders~750 A350-900 orders ~150 A350-1000 orders.
The development of the A350 (industrial launch in 2006 to Jan. 2015 Qatar Airways EIS) was no walk in the garden. (almost 9 years, nine years !)
The development of the cabin according to Flightglobal has been difficult and has had some ulcers for this conforming to Boeing 777’s and 787 Dreamliner cabin standards …
I’m closing this off-topic…
A350 V.1 was the warmed over A330, with GEnx engines and other modifications.
Version 2 adopted a composite fuselage over a metal frame.
Version 3 dropped the metal frame in favor of a composite frame.
Version 4 refined the A350-1000 engines and wing for more range.
Somewhere there was a vesion 5, which I for this refinement. I don’t know about a version 6.
Hamilton
Scott Hamilton,
I didn’t know the details of the iterations but thank you very much.
Bryce, Richard Davenport
Driving is really not my field. However, I notice that your articles/links are from 3 years ago. You seem to associate the 737NG with the 737MAX and disassociate the 737 “classic”.
In this logic don’t you think that the 737NG’s / 737MAX’s still have a good record in terms of reliability and safety?
Despite the EICAS, fly-by-wire systems, everything that was designed at the end of the last century was not enough to send an A330 (AF447) to the bottom of the Atlantic.
However, these “similar” accidents due to bad information are similar despite the fact that the cockpit design is really very different.
This is what I understand in my opinion! And all this will not prevent the MAX-10 from being certified…
So what does all that mean?
“… 737NG’s / 737MAX’s still have a good record in terms of reliability and safety?”
How many flying hours have the MAX frames accumulated?
Long time grounded, only a limited number delivered… .
Then:
AF447 is predominantly a human resources (actually lack thereof) driven crash. For once a “Real Pilot Error”.
For obvious reasons loud voices from over the pond try to frame it otherwise.
Moreover, AF447 was 13.5 years ago.
The most recent all-fatality 737 crash was just 9 months ago, and we still don’t know what caused that — other than a (subsequently retracted) rumor that the plane’s descent was in response to input from the cockpit controls. In light of the recent hypoxia AD for all 737s, it should — for example — be noted that losing consciousness and slumping onto the controls tends to produce undesirable results…
To clarify, the flight data recorders were recovered by the NTSB, and there was no report of cabin pressure loss. If that was the cause, you can be sure we’d have heard about it by now, and there would be worldwide inspections of other 737s.
Further the aircraft did briefly recover, and then dived again. Which makes the slumped over the controls theory unlikely.
To clarify, the flight data recorders were recovered by the NTSB, and we have had zero official reports of their contents. Just the other day, the FAA issued an AD on the potential hypoxia risk in 737s , prompting worldwide inspections of other 737s.
Further the aircraft did briefly recover, and then dived again. Which would be consistent with one of the flight crew briefly regaining consciousness.
Uwe
…”For obvious reasons loud voices from over the pond try to frame it otherwise…”
—–
What obvious reasons? Be more explicit, we don’t understand…
Please clarify things!!
A long running story with a sad ending.
Boeing has pushed a story line of Airbus FBW with its hard limits being problematic and the Boeing product was superior due to pilots having full push through to save the plane.
Unfortunately Airbus planes ?never? provided for a FBW induced crash that could have been avoided if hard limits where absent.
In the end Boeing on their own produced a case of “protections causing a crash”.
What if Boeing did decide to originally put an OFF switch to MCAS on the 737-MAX console?
Would they have changed the labeling on the console panel for the STAB CUTOUT switches from
“MAIN ELECT” and “AUTO PILOT” TO “PRI” and “B/U” as they did for the 737-MAX update?
(btw, a good question for folks .. does the Speed Trim System have an OFF switch as it had in the past on a 737? And if not, why not?)
or would they have elected to re-label the STAB CUTOUT switches to “MAIN ELECT” and “Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System and Speed Trim System”
(ok, it would have been something like “MCAS/STS”)
But, even so, they could have kept it “AUTO PILOT” for the sake of historical simplicity for the pilots, so they wouldn’t have to have added training as this
comment ponders? (which parallel’s my line of thinking)
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https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1417519&start=4750#p21263649
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But, by doing additional work to rewire the 737 stab trim console, to change it’s function from being able to independantly turn off the AutoPilot commands
to the horizontal stablizier, they took away the option from the pilot to keep manual electric control of the stabilizer, and kept the control in the hands of MCAS.
The same goes for the control for the Speed Control System now. Is there an independant “OFF” switch for the Speed Control System now on the 737-MAX?
Will turning off the AutoPilot disable the Speed Trim System on the 737-MAX? Is the STS system tied to the Autopilot and MCAS to the Flight Control Computer (FCC).
Why doesn’t turning off the AutoPilot turn off MCAS? (because MCAS is only active when the AutoPilot is Off .. think about that for a moment)
Another “OFF” switch for MCAS proponent has a magnificent writeup here. It’s long, but, if you’re interested in the 737-MAX failure, it’s worth the read.
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https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/2019/04/06/overview-of-many-failures-by-boeing-in-designing-the-boeing-737-max/
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Another excellent comment, and extremely informative links (particularly the second one). Thanks again!
A very inconvenient narrative for the BA “back office”.
Bryce,
What’s embarrassing is all these questions with answers. Regulators worldwide have certified 737MAX and unfortunately you have no say because if the 737MAX would not have been fit to fly, certainly regulators would not have certified it.
Don’t forget that the FAA had the eyes of the world on them.
The reality is that the 737MAX has passed the milestone of hundreds of millions of passengers transported and has a better safety and security rate.
Because everything has an end except those who are disappointed not to have seen their wishful thinking not come true?
Comments with links dating back to 2019 are simply absurd, today in 2023 the MAX-10 which obtained very good sales, obtained its exemption.
This is a big victory for Boeing, its industrial partners such as Safran and others, for 737MAX10 customers such as United and Delta to name a few, to the great displeasure of AA…
From Rob
“No, that is a quite willful & incorrect misstatement of the accident events. The crew did turn off MCAS, but then turned it on again, against the checklist which required it to remain off.
The correct action was to reduce throttle & airspeed below the aircraft maximum safe operational speed. That would have unloaded the trim wheels, and enabled their use.”
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Or, with the MCAS “OFF” switch, they wouldn’t have to drop airspeed (with the stick shaker going on etc, that wouldn’t be one of the first things on my mind) .. they could use the Manual Electric Trim, which they did try and do for a brief moment before MCAS made things worse .. what if they did have the “OFF” switch for MCAS available? could they have saved the aircraft? It might be fun to try in a sim (maybe an NG sim to have no MCAS?)
So again, they did have an MCAS off switch, which they did use. Twice.
And they did have access to electric trim, which they didn’t use to neutralize the column forces, as required by the checklist and all their training. There is no valid scenario in which you would only trim back part way, but that is what they did.
Richard, I get what you’re trying to do, you’re trying to find a path by which the accident doesn’t happen. But you also have to acknowledge that a path did exist, and was available to them.
It may help to think of it this way: they had basic training on the solution, and in fact it was supposed to be a memorized, automatic response. Yet not only did they not respond with that action, they made other basic mistakes as well. And when they did finally get onto their memorized response, they made yet another mistake.
You are suggesting that if more switches, more complicated solutions were available, they would have used them correctly. But the evidence we have doesn’t support that.
If we are truly honest, the MCAS upset was resolvable with a button press, and a switch flip. As we know did happen on another flight.
In saying these things, I’m not criticising the crew personally. I’m sure they did their best. But their performance was a function of their training, and that is the point the NTSB is raising with EAIB. You have to address the training that allowed for that performance.
“So again, they did have an MCAS off switch, which they did use.”
So again, there’s no MCAS “off” switch, so it can’t have been used.
Question:
How many of these former Pitch Trim incidents
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https://www.satcom.guru/2019/05/737-pitch-trim-incidents.html
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used manual electric control switches from the yoke remaining active,
while shutting down the Speed Trim System via the Auto Pilot Stab Trim cutout only?
With the new rewiring of the console Stab Trim cutout switch on the 737-MAX
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https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-altered-key-switches-in-737-max-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
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that option of only shutting down the Autopilot functions (MCAS and STS)
is no longer available. So how many of those previous Pitch Trim Incidents can’t you control for now that the STS system no longer has an Independent OFF switch? The pilots can’t turn off MCAS and they can no longer turn off STS without also loosing their ability to control the stabillizer via the manual electric yoke switch. Please return the ability of the pilots to fly without mandatory STS and MCAS systems in a trim runaway situation.
“Please return the ability of the pilots to fly without mandatory STS and MCAS systems in a trim runaway situation.”
Will probably never happen, unless a foreign regulator demands it.
We’ve already seen that the EASA and CAAC posed more stringent MAX re-cert demands than the FAA.
Mind you, the European Parliament wasn’t happy with even the provisional re-cert given by EASA.
Richard, there is no data on the resolution of the incidents Peter Lemme listed. So no way to know if runaway trim was caused by the speed trim system, or another failure.
What we do know, at least for the NG series, is if the crew responded with their memorized checklist, they flipped both the cutoff switches, as that’s what they were trained to do. Then used the trim wheels.
And we also know this method was perfectly successful. If it wasn’t, Boeing would not have simplified it, the FAA would not have approved it, and these incidents would have been much more serious.
“If it wasn’t, Boeing would not have simplified it, and the FAA would not have approved it.”
That is a problematic argument in view of today’s knowledge covering longtime subversion of the FAA to Boeing interests.
And that is a problematic argument due to the long time allusion to conspiracy theories about Boeing and the FAA.
For which there is exactly zero evudence, by the way.
Oh, there’s plenty of evidence — for those who aren’t wilfully looking the other way.
And for those who chase conspiracy theories and make allegations without evidence.
Which you are free to present here, by the way.
@ Rob
An interesting “retort” from someone who *never* posts evidence 😉
That aside: have you forgotten the congressional investigation into the crashes?
“But the US aviation regulator, the FAA, comes off almost as badly. US representatives find it guilty of “inherent conflicts of interest” and “grossly insufficient oversight”.
“More seriously, they say the regulator was, in effect, in Boeing’s pocket and that the FAA’s management “overruled” its own technical and safety experts “at the behest of Boeing”.”
Here’s a nice, readable link:
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54174223
Bryce and Rob are bashing the statement………
And that is a problematic argument due to the long time allusion to conspiracy theories about Boeing and the FAA.
For which there is exactly zero evidence, by the way.
This statement is basically correct. If there was a conspiracy with BA ad the FAA, MCAS would have never been created. MCAS patches a very small, seldom flown portion of the flight envelope abpve 12 degrees-ish AofA. The FAA wouldnt waive this and a software fix was created. Bryces assertion that there is evidence is correct. The evidence points to the FAA holding BAs feet to the fire and forcing BA to fix the divergence of the pitch curve gradient to bring it back to a positive margin and keep the stickforce feel the same as earlier aircraft. If the FAA was in BAs posket, it would have been quite easy for everybody to overlook the non-conforming stick forces at high AofA where the aircraft is never flown in normal operations.
“For which there is exactly zero evudence, by the way.”
you forgot to stamp your foot! 🙂
But that would not have changed reality either.
There is evidence to boot.
FAA was “embedded” at Boeing. With the same “positive” effects on truthful reporting that embedding reporters with active troops had.
Part of the false premise of these discussions, is that MCAS somehow made the runaway trim solution less effective. But that is not really true, all it did was add another potential source of runaway trim.
The thing that made the solution less effective, was extensive overspeed of the aircraft, by almost 150 knots over the recommended value for altitude. Even if they had recovered, that aircraft would have been grounded for a complete structural inspection, due to overstress.
“But that is not really true, all it did was add another potential source of runaway trim.”
It wasn’t “potential” : it was real.
And it was also demonic in its intensity.
Few systems in aviation history can come close to matching the mortality that it caused in such a short time — all due to shoddy engineering, penny pinching and deceit.
Nice list of invented causes, notably absent from the accident reports. Also you notably left out the cause documented by the NTSB and the topic of discussion here, which was crew error due to training deficiencies.
“Nice list of invented causes”
Looks like someone has been living under a rock for the past 3 years.
*********
“crew error due to training deficiencies.”
The OEM explicitly declared that there was no crew error.
“But that is not really true, all it did was add another potential source of runaway trim.”
“runaway trim” is described as continuous and you can’t counter it.
MCAS action is intermittent and can be countered ( but causes another MCAS action cycle.
erroneous MCAS action does not present itself as “runaway trim”.
The FAA and other regulators have chosen to differ with your assessment, by requiring mandatory runaway trim training. There is no difference in that training due to MCAS
So in fact, MCAS does present as runaway trim.
If that was the case, obviously these accidents would not have happened.
The FAA studied this and concluded that it would happen again. These are FACTS
Rob,
I agree on your point.
Remember that the day before the Lion Air crash the 3rd pilot
visibly experienced sitting next to the door had managed to land.
He had drawn up a sheet for the maintenance department concerning the incorrect AOA information.
Lion Air’s poor safety record (owning other non-737MAX crashes!) that SAME 737MAX flew the next day, and we know the rest of the story
What is amazing is to “whitewash” such a mediocre airline …
The bottom line here, is that the people who want to blame Boeing exclusively for these accidents, cannot accept most of the proven and documented data from authoritative sources, because it doesn’t support their theory.
Whereas, those who are presenting from the authoritative sources, acknowledge all the established contributing factors, including those provided by Boeing and MCAS, as well as by airlines and crew.
The NTSB comments and rebuttal, are just the latest example in a long line of this behavior. It’s been going on here for more than 4 years, and is unlikely to ever change.
I almost could accept that, except the anti-Boeing group is not content in just ignoring the evidence, they make up false assertions as well.
I’ve described that method at length here, how and why it’s done. It’s difficult to allow that to stand, without response. So I just keep posting facts, in an endless loop as they circle around to the same arguments again.
Alternatively:
“The bottom line here, is that the people who want to deflect blame from Boeing for these accidents, cannot accept most of the proven and documented data from authoritative sources, because it doesn’t support their theory.
“Whereas, those who are presenting from the authoritative sources, acknowledge all the established contributing factors, including those provided by multiple investigations and contributions from pilots unions.
“The attempt to re-pin blame on the pilots is just the latest example in a long line of this behavior. It’s been going on in certain circles for more than 4 years, and is unlikely to ever change.
“One almost could accept that, except the pro-Boeing group is not content in just ignoring the evidence, they make up false assertions as well.
“That method is manifested at length here, how and why it’s done. It’s difficult to allow that to stand, without response. So others just keep posting facts, in an endless loop as they circle around to the same arguments again.”
And we’re back to the schoolyard mimicry again.
Thank you for so adeptly proving my point. I couldn’t do it as well without you.
I know you don’t understand, but this is an admission that you have no factual response. Just as it is in the 5th grade.
Alternatively:
“And we’re back to the schoolyard sulking again.
“Thank you for so adeptly proving my point. I couldn’t do it as well without you.
“I know you don’t understand, but this is an admission that you have no factual response. Just as it is in the 5th grade.”
If this event happened in a MAX … would MCAS have activated? They went from flaps 15 to 5 to 1 to zero.. that’s when MCAS might activate with no Autopilot on?
The comments to this event seem to indicate that Go Arounds in a 737 can be quite a busy time for pilots. I still prefer a stick pusher or some other system to deal with the stick forces, rather than pushing the entire plane down to compansate for feelability.
Some interesting comments following the article.
=====
https://www.avherald.com/h?article=4f10b7f1&opt=0
======
Indeed: some very interesting comments following the article.
For example:
“I used to fly the 737 and have to say that the automation regrading go arounds is quite bewildering. It depended on how many autopilots were engaged, if the approach mode was captured and what altitude the go around was conducted. There is a bewildering number of scenarios that can occur and need to be managed in a different way. It needs a level of training that I never got. I doubt this crew got that training either, so I have every sympathy for them. 737 go arounds have been screwed up to the point of a crash before eg Kazan airlines. Worst of all it is not the first time a 737 go around has nearly caused a crash at this airline. In the previous guise of TUI, Thomsonfly, they nearly crashed off a go around in Bournemouth. This was a notorious incident and you would have thought that the airline would have learned from that and have great training on go arounds. Not so, it would appear.”
********
“The 737 has a vice when it comes to go-arounds. If a go-around is initiated with the autothrottle engaged and a single autopilot engaged then, upon TO/GA selection, the autopilot will disengage but the autothrottle will not. Approaching the missed approach altitude, the autothrottle can significantly reduce the thrust, causing the secondary effect of a strong pitch-down tendency whilst the aircraft is still being flown manually.”
So just to explain what happened here in factual terms:
The crew initiated a TOGA at just above 2,000 ft, with a selected altitude of 3,000 ft. The flaps were down for landing and the engines went to full power. The crew had thought they were still high enough for the radar altimeter to inhibit full TOGA power, but they weren’t.
In that configuration, the aircraft pitched up sharply and rapidly closed on the 3,000 ft altitude target. Sensing the overshoot, the autothrottle backed the engines way down, and the flaps were also being retracted by the TOGA function. Suddenly without flaps and reduced engine power, plus pilot nose-down input to level off, the aircraft nosed over and descended rapidly. This went unnoticed by the crew for 57 seconds.
The report found the cause was workload combined with rusty skills from COVID downtime. There was no finding against the aircraft.
If this had been a MAX, MCAS would not have activated since flaps didn’t reach full retraction until after the descent started. The report found there were no uncommanded nose-down control forces, only pilot input.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62e9040a8fa8f503312d7d06/Boeing_737-8K5_G-FDZF_09-22.pdf
So just to explain what happened here in factual terms:
The pilots in the incident, in addition to various pilots in the comments section, were at the receiving end of poorly-designed 737 control features.
Or, rather, “out-of-control” features 😮💨
Facts as established in the authoritative report, vs hearsay in the anonymous comments.
But aptly describes the last 4 years here, in a nutshell.
Facts as established by real-world 737 pilots vs obfuscation in the damage control narrative.
But aptly describes the years here prior to your double suspension from the site, in a nutshell
From Bryce’s informative BBC link:
“..The nearly 250-page [Congressional] report found a series of failures in the plane’s design, combined with “regulatory capture”, an overly close relationship between Boeing and the federal regulator, which compromised the process of gaining safety certification.
“[The crashes] were the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA.”
Yet the insistent gaslighting continues..
Well, a “certain commenter” previously dissed this Congressional report.
It’s obvious why: its contents are highly detrimental to his narrative.
Remarkable selectivity 😉
See the comment below this one 🤣
It’s notable that this Transportation report is not an authoritative source. It was disputed by the FAA, the OIG, Boeing, and the Transportation Certification Review board.
So Bill, I’ve given you the authoritative sources dozens of times, yet you still refuse to use or reference them. At some points you claim you can’t find them without a link, yet you found this one without difficulty. Why do you suppose that is?
In fact the NTSB comments that are the subject of this article, are also authoritative, but you don’t use them either. Bryce did at least use them, to extract an unrelated passage on crew alerting
To be clear, it’s not gaslighting to point out confirmation bias in your method.
“It’s notable that this Transportation report is not an authoritative source”
The fact that something is disputed — particularly when that occurs by adversely affected parties — does not mean that it is not an authorative report.
Our commenter’s unique definition of authorative:
“That which suits my narrative” 😄
And that same commenter acuses other of confirmational bias… 🤠
The Transportation Committee report was written by Congressional staffers. There are no professional investigators involved. It was panned by investigators associated with the NTSB, for methodology and incorrect conclusions.
None of it’s recommendations were adopted by the FAA. It was totally ignored by the DoJ in their criminal investigation of Boeing.
The committee (or at least it’s chairman) was angry about this, so they ordered OIG to conduct another full investigation of the MAX certification. That is still underway, but I doubt it will change significantly from the original.
Entities who get cast into a negative light in “inconvenient” reports, routinely try to dis those reports — for obvious reasons.
It’s been going on since Roman times.
Rob,
…”The bottom line here, is that the people who want to blame Boeing exclusively for these accidents, cannot accept most of the proven and documented data from authoritative sources, because it doesn’t support their theory…
I’ve described that method at length here, how and why it’s done. It’s difficult to allow that to stand, without response. So I just keep posting facts, in an endless loop as they circle around to the same arguments again….”
—-
Thank you very much for this, you
counterbalance the disinformation commonly called “Fake News”. I am trying to understand your point of view little by little, because the field of piloting is my thorn in the side. Thanks again for your clarification.
Who said AB doesn’t have early narrowbody slots?
Xiamen Airlines placed its first Airbus order on September 22, and the first aircraft of that order (an A321neo) was delivered yesterday.
https://simpleflying.com/xiamen-airlines-airbus-a321neo-delivery/
https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2022-09-xiamen-airlines-switches-to-airbus-a320neo-family-to-boost-fleet
..And who said Boeing won’t have cash flow in the futur
The 737MAX is more competitive than ever whith MAX-8/-9 and the all-new MAX-10 for upcoming certification
https://simpleflying.com/alaska-airlines-reshuffles-737-max-order/
…”This won’t be a major issue for Alaska, which is currently flying a leased fleet of 10 A321neos, but wants to get rid of them to reach its all-Boeing fleet goal…”
https://news.alaskaair.com/alaska-airlines/alaska-airlines-makes-biggest-boeing-aircraft-order-in-its-90-year-history/
From the ABC article of 6/22:
“..Joe Jacobsen, who has 37 years of experience as an aerospace engineer with the Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing and who has also worked on air crash investigations, found the incidents unnerving.
He was most concerned about the reported incidents involving stabiliser trims, which help with the directional rotation of a plane, including during take-off and landing.
“It’s a D-grade airplane”, Mr Jacobsen said.
“A poor design combined with manufacturing defects is a recipe for disaster.
“Typical failures on this airplane are more of a concern than typical failures on some higher-grade airplanes [because] it’s less resilient to these typical type failures.
“Airspeed anomalies can cause crashes, horizontal stabiliser malfunctions can cause crashes, flight crew alerts that don’t notify the pilots in time cause crashes.”..”
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-27/boeing-737-max-in-mid-air-emergencies-as-us-set-to-launch-probe/101175214
In view of his background and experience, Mr. Jacobsen comes across as being a very authoritative source, don’t you think?
Well, at least when one applies the normal definition of “authoritative”, as opposed to the narrative-selective definition used by some 😉
A “D-grade airplane” — very disconcerting.
Bill7
Quote from article
…”A Boeing spokeswoman told the ABC, “none of the reports indicate a trend”.
“In fact, the in-service reliability of the 737 MAX is consistent with other commercial airplane models,” the spokeswoman said…”
Unquote
Case settled. Many aircraft, regardless of the aircraft manufacturer, fly with problems but land without problems
Other than that a lot of hysterically voiced straw man arguments!
“Yes, but if this and that happens it would be catastrophic”.
This article is from 3 years ago, but has been updated to a more recent date, because a lot has changed.
CEO Calhoun has established a roadmap for safety and quality (assembly)
This is a D-grade article!
(!) Rob is right, you make the same arguments.
Changing discs…
PR spokesmen say lots of things that do not necessarily hold up to examination. Some examples are close at hand.
😉
Bryce,
1. Absolutely not. This a bias. This man no longer works at Boeing. He preferred to be a self-employed lawyer.
2. a D-grade article is out of context with respect to Boeing’s PROVEN efforts regarding safety and quality today!
This could even now be defamation!
Besides, I challenge this man to continue talking like this in 2023. He won’t and we know why he didn’t do it again !
D-grade article !