Part 2: Reconstituting Boeing’s ODA system

By the Leeham News Team


Feb. 21, 2024, © Leeham News: In part one, LNA looked at the Organization Designation Authorization, more commonly known as the ODA, what it is, and why it is so important to industry.

The ODA is an organization that is granted the privilege to operate as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on selected work package types. ODAs are composed of “unit members,” the FAA term for people doing ODA work.

Boeing and many other aerospace companies in the US use ODAs. Airbus uses similar people under a different designation issued by EASA, Europe’s regulator. Boeing’s ODA authority was restricted by the FAA in the aftermath of the 737 MAX crisis that led to the 21-month grounding of the global fleet.

The FAA is reconsidering Boeing’s ODA authority.

There are two types of unit members: Designees and others who do ODA work without formal FAA signature authority.

Credit: Federal Aviation Administration.

An example of how a Type Certification (TC) ODA organization uses these two different talent pools can be seen through the Certification process where detailed analysis done by the group is approved (signed off) by an ODA unit member who is a Designee. The FAA suspended Boeing’s “ticketing authority” for the 737 and 787 following the MAX crisis and quality concerns on the 787 production line. Ticketing authority is one ODA mission.

Boeing’s ODAs

Boeing currently has four ODA types: Major Repair and Alterations (MRA), Production Certificate (PC), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), and the TC. Boeing’s ODAs dwarf the industry in size, volume of work, and complexity of work.

Part of the FAA’s problem with Boeing is that Boeing’s innovations drive leading-edge rule-making. The FAA’s bench isn’t deep enough to do a great job on new technology.

Take, for example, the Boeing 787 battery fires early in that program. The FAA didn’t inject a fire protection/containment specification into the “electric jet” when the original TC was issued. The people on the program missed it. The FAA missed it, too, because their people were a step behind Boeing. This isn’t peculiar to Boeing. Some manufacturers push their technology beyond the feds, but their ODAs respect the process and the FAA has had great successes there.

The second part of Boeing’s ODA process woes appears centered on the fact that the number of full-time ODA unit members is a small fraction of the ODA unit. When those “part-time” ODA unit employees aren’t working an ODA package, they are working Boeing’s normal work packages. This fractionalization of the management reporting sets in place the ability for Boeing to exert pressure on the employees by the non-ODA management chain which has the bulk of the say-so in the employee’s performance reviews and compensation. There have been internal complaints about pressure and criticism from outsiders about the conflicts of interest, whether real or perceived.

The third part of the Boeing ODA management problem is the inability of Boeing’s leaders to drive a top-down change in the culture. Critics charge that Boeing appears to give lip service to Boeing’s code of conduct. The first three items listed, if followed, could have left Boeing in a far better place than they are today.

Code of Conduct

  • I commit that: I will comply with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations. If I do not understand them, I will seek guidance.
  • I will prioritize safety, quality, and integrity above profit, schedule, or competitive edge. If I see something that raises a safety concern, I will speak up immediately.
  • I will engage all regulators—including employees who act under delegated authority—and customers with candor, transparency, and respect at all times.

Fixing the ODA system

So how is this fixed?

The country needs its #1 exporter to get healthy and deliver planes. The supplier base needs to have stable work that a healthy Boeing can supply. Airlines need product and the flying public needs safe airliners to restore their faith in flying.

It comes down to creating a Third Party Boeing ODA unit. This is an exceptionally difficult thing to do. The FAA’s thin bench is an industry problem. There is a void in qualified ODA unit managers industry-wide. These can’t be created overnight, and even if they could, they would need time to get up to speed.

Boeing’s ODA units could function as designed if a way can be found to prevent the undue pressure on ODA unit members. This is a specific people problem. About the only way out is to hire consultants to do the ODA management tasks.

A Modest Proposal.

ODA Management skillsets necessary to get Boeing back on track only exist inside other ODA units at other companies. Boeing’s ODA cannot be fixed overnight, but a safety net can be erected by turning over the day-to-day ODA management to an already existing Consulting ODA.

If a Consulting ODA is interposed inside the Boeing ODA, separating Boeing’s managers from positions where they can exert undue influence on ODA unit members, Boeing’s ODA gets healthy almost immediately.

This gives Boeing’s ODA unit time to get its act back together, but more importantly, allows Boeing’s culture time to return to a trustworthy state. This gives the FAA the arm’s length relationship it needs to be a true regulator and should satisfy Congresses lingering fears about the Agency’s overly close relationship with Boeing.

Few candidates, however

A look through the existing ODA directory shows few candidate Consultant ODAs that may be positioned to do this. If the FAA could place one of these existing ODAs inside Boeing’s ODA with full ODA oversight, immediate changes in the operations could be expected. The FAA would now be listening to a consulting ODA instead of Boeing directly, restoring the arm’s length relationship demanded by Congress.

The FAA could direct the consultant to drive their needs back through Boeing. It solves the problem of standing up a new company from scratch. Boeing would be on the hook for the cost of the surveillance, but one would expect this path to be among the most efficient choices out there.

The FAA can direct the Consultant ODA to make changes instead of directing Boeing. This is not simple, and it would be a lot of work, but understanding the complexities and sheer size of the problem makes this seem like the path of least resistance to a place where the public trust and safety focus can begin quickly.

70 Comments on “Part 2: Reconstituting Boeing’s ODA system

  1. How many Boeing people out there, qualified for the ODA task, who quit the moment their pensions etc were protected? How about the FAA finds them, hires them and recreates the system as it should be. Replace what is now a wooly set dominated by top management more interested in keeping up the share price and their bonus handouts.

    • I would amend that to ONLY interested in their lucre.

      I think it was Vincent that brought us Slow Liquidation and its the perfect term.

    • I’m a retired DER – DAS/AR – ODA/UM. I’ll start with my conclusion: The ODA system has great potential. The FAA knew what was needed to make it work, but failed to carry through with it. It isn’t just about Boeing (I was on the Boeing Wichita ODA, as well as a number of other companies).

      I worked at two different companies as they were establishing their ODAs. One point of contention was the organizational level of the ODA within the company. The FAA wanted to see an organization chart with the ODA administrator all the way up to a director or senior VP level. These companies that always loved to roll out their latest org charts suddenly treated them like the biggest top secrets. The org chart was always “in the works”. They stalled and hid. The FAA finally approved these ODAs anyway. Places I worked, the administrator merely kept member training records, put on occasional in-house trainings, and distributed notifications from the FAA.

      When being interviewed for jobs with company ODAs, I would be interviewed by the project people. No one from the ODA participated. The project people would ask questions the revealed that they were prescreening to find someone who would buy into their cockamamie certification concepts, not to determine my capability of doing the job. To function properly, the ODA should hire/promote/fire members. Not the project.

      Operating in this manner, UMs acted as a bunch of free agents rather than a team. To get ahead, one needs to sign off fast and don’t make waves. I had work taken away from me and reassigned to another UM who is more “reasonable” (This has long been identified by the FAA as “DER Shopping” — a form of undue management pressure). Task assignments for ODA UMs must be made by the ODA, not the project.

      For years, the FAA would have a Partnership For Safety, an agreement on how a company doing business using designees will conduct itself. This would outline forms of unacceptable undue management pressure. Anyone in management involved in a project using designees was to read and sign their concurrence with this agreement. In practice, it was obvious that high level management types who had no concept of undue management pressure would come down with their whips.

      I could go on. To fix it, the FAA needs to require what they already know. The ODA needs to go up enough levels in the org tree to stand up to project. ODA needs to be the sole manager of its members and it needs to manage the certification aspects of projects. The partnership for safety needs to be dusted off and enforced. When a different manager starts pushing his weight around, the ODA administrator needs to say, “Excuse me. Have you read and signed the Partnership For Safety?” Managers outside the ODA should not be interfacing with UMs without ODA administrator participation.

      Well, have I beat that to death?

        Its interesting that you and the author arrived at the same conclusion. The ODA unit members must report to a management chain insulated from BA production management. The idea of inserting a consulting ODA inside Boeing is an immediately implementable stopgap measure. It probably isnt the longterm fix as ideally BA will cure their processes and become trustworthy, but it does answer the immediate need to get Boeing project management out of the ODA unit management as Retired DER insicates

  2. FWIW- I suggest a closer study of the now partly defunct DER system is needed.
    Why it was changed ?
    What were its real limits regarding staffing and desired production rates
    What were its real as opposed to beancounter negatives
    Who was the major pusher for change etc

    My 60,000 foot view ( no doubt biased )seems to show the last ” good ” airplane model designed and produced by Boeing was under the DER system and known as the 777. –

    Also coincident with the last new basic model in production and service before the Welch-Stonecipher- Mcnearney and followers grabbing the platinum ring. Seems to me the correlation statistics would suggest or define the areas really needing change.

  3. One strength of the DER system was the close technical interaction between the DER and their corresponding FAA engineer. That produced two-way learning and an opportunity for a trusted peer to challenge assumptions and ask questions.

    One weakness of ODA is the near absence of meaningful technical interaction between Boeing and FAA engineers. It is no surprise that the FAA “is a step behind” on technical issues.

    Other weaknesses in Boeing’s ODA mostly reflect the weak overall problem-solving culture where management’s default message is “follow the plan.”

    Engineers sometimes ask a question I’ve always found annoying, but which I have come to appreciate: “What problem are we trying to solve?”

    I need to give more thought to the idea of a third-party ODA thingy. It obviously makes more sense to other people than it does to me. With all due respect, at this point I don’t understand what problem it’s trying to solve.

    • RE Stan ” With all due respect, at this point I don’t understand what problem it’s trying to solve. ”

      A few possibilities from a long ago friend ;))

      a) Polite rewording of posterior coverage- version 10.0
      b) Avoid explaining why Boeing ignored Deming and Followers without appearing to do so
      c) Avoid boots on ground and expenses of promoting and keeping experienced people in a ‘ dozen ‘ disciplines
      d) Avoiding management responsibility by introducing another target to blame

    • Hi Stan.
      The ODA problem in the Boeing PC ODA is that the FAA has withdrawn the signature authority of Boeing for issuance of CofA’s. The Boeing PC ODA is broken and the FAA has restricted the sign-offs at 38/mo. That’s an interesting number and perhaps the limit of the FAA to process more work. The FAA Chief himself has broached the subject of 3rd party management for good reason. There needs to be a safety culture reimposed inside Boeing and the BA leadership isn’t getting it done and has published no plan to do so. One would think that a pair of 737 lawn darts would have gotten their attention, but they didn’t. The plug door issue was absolutely/completely avoidable and only reinforces how little progress Boeings safety culture reboot has made. The actual problem to be fixed is this…. The rest of the industry is being slowed down and abnormal costs are accruing systemwide at many other users of FAA services due to the shifting of boots to Boeing and the reduction of services to other FAA users. The myriad of other FAA service users deserve the Boeing ODA to be fixed so they get access to their normal service levels of the past. Since Boeing hasn’t got a plan they’ve published anywhere to do so, the 3rd party oversight of Boeing makes sense as an immediately available stopgap measure to help Boeing as it would probably lift the delivery limits and speed up the cert processes of the -7, -10 and 777x by unloading much routinely approved cert process back into a correctly functioning ODA. Perhaps more importantly, all the other FAA service users would have Boeings adverse impacts to FAA staffing removed as the boots get shifted back to where they were in the near past.

      • 38 a month is the current autorization level so the FAA has frozen it at that.

        I don’t think its anything more than that, it keeps the FAA from having to try to staff the Everett line which makes sense for how badly they have failed to do their job.

        Agreed its a discussion of why the FAA failed, but it is a failure as the increased scruityn means nothing and the Exit Plug blowout is just a gross manifestation of those issues at all 3 entitles as well as the Malaysian supplier (and probably more suppliers)

        The FAA is a massive failure, not just a small one.

        ODA is part of it but those issues with not keeping Boeing feet to the fire go back a long ways.

        I think a number of changes are needed including removing the FAA from being an industry cheerleader.

  4. The root reason the ODA system and place in Boeing changed goes back to the engineering strike in 2000. The DERs (what they were called at the time) were on strike too and the company couldn’t deliver aircraft without their approvals.

    • Mr Lee wrote
      “The root reason the ODA system and place in Boeing changed goes back to the engineering strike in 2000”.

      Thats a stretch. There are 140+ ODA organisations of which Boeing has 4. Its difficult to see how a labor dispute at Boeing caused all the other organisations to be created. ODA creation clearly has its origins somewhere else. Remember, the ODAs at Boeing are the only ones the FAA has seen the need to restrict

  5. I have often been amused when two people I respect and of whom I have a great deal of confidence that they agree with each other, somehow find a way to use words of disagreement in their conversations. Stan and Bubba2 are both right on track as far as I can tell.

    Scott’s missive hints at another issue, which is what happens when the technology being used by one or more DEs is not understood or appreciated for its implications by others who are supposed to be looking over their shoulders. The energy density of the newer batteries is just one example, but a good one. I would like to add another one, and this is the one I lose sleep over – the chain of trust when multiple layers of abstraction make a thorough Failure Mode Analysis (FMA aka FMEA) simply impossible.

    The chain of trust in software combined with the pressure to use software as a substitute for hardware is easily the single most dangerous thing I know about in current technology. Low cost chips now have several hundred trillion IC components on board. Humans have a hard enough time conceptualizing things that are counted in the thousands, which is one of the main drivers of the pseudo science and gaming industries. Meaningful mental models for millions are practically impossible, so millions of millions (i.e. trillions) are so far out of reach that unless one works in something like cosmology or the subatomic realms, these numbers simply lack meaning. And yet, this stuff is all over the place on current model planes.

    I am not arguing against using these powerful technologies that we have available, but rather that we must use them within rigidly defined discrete boundaries. The governing phrase should be something like “use it, but contain it.” Combining several powerful tools that are impossible to fully understand in terms of a 100% complete FMA should simply not be allowed.

    Bob Bogash’s open letter to the FAA is about the wisest public statement I’ve seen that addresses this issue. His sage advice was to quit combining LRUs and break apart into separate ones the ones that already have been combined and which should not have been. Bob restricted his comments to things involved in flight controls, but the principle is generic. This is where MCAS and the 787 battery issues are really quite similar. I think this is a fairly urgent issue.

    Link to Bob’s letter:

    • retired tech Fellow said in part ” I have often been amused when two people ..”
      The biggest difference between us is that Stan worked for Boeing for many years and later for SPEEA many years after I retired, thus he has a bit more recent- and more ” process ” oriented view than this old man. I can leave a clue to Stan as to who I am by simply referring to a meeting we were both at in the early 2000s’ time period in a then VERY Senior Senators office about pensions.

    • RTF:

      I understand the concept but the Genie is out of the bag and managing it is the best we can do. Using Airbus, they don’t entirely understand their FBW/Computer system. Mostly yes, but bugs show up and they are not then re-created and if you can’t recreate it, there is still something there.

      I had more than one ghost in a computer system. We had killed the program, wrote a new one but the thing still floated around somehow. The only 100% solution was new hardware and write the new program to it.

      And the added peril its its both hardware (microprocessor and their insane complexity) and software written into memory that then executes through the hardware (and is stored on the hardware)

      Its not limited to the chip world. I had on more than one occasion a system that had worked fine, simply quit working. Simple relay controlled stuff.

      Some of them I never figured out. All of them were wired wrong in one way or the other.

      It did not matter in those cases, there were standard control methods that did work (grounding) or wire to a standard and once done, no issues.

      A manager once asked me what was wrong with a system that had worked for years. I told him I did not know, it was wired weirdly and rather than spend a week trying to figure out why it worked, I would do what was needed anyway and that was to re-wire it to standard logic and controls scheme that anyone could trouble shoot if it quit working.

  6. With regards to new product development and new technology, there really isn’t any difference between the ODA and DER system. The FAA and EASA are highly engaged when innovative technologies are introduced because the certification path needs to be negotiated and agreed upon. When new technology is introduced, there will be documented agreements between the FAA, EASA and Boeing issued as special conditions or Certification Review Items (CRI) as to how to meet the regulations or provide an equivalent level of safety. The FAA and EASA will both be engaging and consulting with their own particular subject matter technical experts on the subject. In the FAA, these National Resource Specialists have the mandate to support aircraft certified under Part 23 General Aviation, Part 25 Commercial Transport, and Part 27 Rotorcraft.

    The assertion that the ODA system was a contributing factor to the 787 battery fire is without substantiation evidence to that effect. I’d posit that the issue was more that regulatory guidance was inadequate to consider airplane system safety effects.

    I know from my own personal experience that the FAA is staffed by many former Boeing employees that I had the occasion to work with who left the company. It has been said that the Seattle certification office (SACO) is more rigorous than other certification offices as a consequence. To be an effective regulator in this business requires having engineering experience in the discipline. Boeing provided that experience for decades to the industry’s benefit. It is not clear to me that this is the situation today as I have heard that the FAA pay has not kept up with the industry.

    Dilution of knowledge certainly is a concern regardless. One of the under reported root causes of the 737MAX accidents was that BASOO, the ODA organization responsible for Boeing, had low experience level engineers in the flight controls specialty. Having separate organizations for SACO and BASOO resulted in a dilution of technical knowledge within the FAA, which weakened the checks-and-balances needed for regulatory oversight.

    • ODA and related 3 letter groups re Boeing were largely the result of the SPEEA strike in 2000-2001 when the DER types joined in and as a result airplanes could be mostly/partly ” assembled ” but NOT delivered. Harry S and his acolytes came unglued and vowed that such would NEVER happen again.
      Thus the strong anti union and moving of HQ game was born. Plus a major effort to somehow keep management in the ” approval ” loop.

      One of thje major players on the govt side happened by chance to have gained related experience at McDouglas.

    • Jeffery:

      You hit the battery nail on the head.

      From the report on it, the FAA abrogated oversight and let the various Boeing suppliers decide what they wanted to.

      The issues with LI batteries were well understood. The application in an aircraft was new but the problems associated with that battery type was not.

      For those now knowing, it literally was decided that driving a nail into the battery was all the testing needed.

      The investigation revealed a horror story of people who had not a clue what they were dealing with as well as no quality control at Yuasa.

      After the grounding, the FAA took away the standards establishment from Boeing (who should never have had it) and gave it to the Radio Technical Committee as the closest tech committee to a battery and all its management and control issues.

      The ODA never had their hands on it as the Yusa plant had none, the other suppliers were not in the system as they never had been in the system.

      You had Thales as the overall responsible, an outfit in Arizona that installed security system on business aircraft (yep) another firm in Japan that built monitor board and Yuasa of course.

      Yuasa was Boeing’s Japan strategy, not because they knew what they were doing but they were the participant award.

      The Arizona outfit was a weird side branch of Thales.

      The whole job should have been given to SAFT. If anyone understands batteries in Aircraft it is them and they are regarded as the very top mfg in that field.

  7. Jeff good comments but they seem to be directed to the TC ODA. We do know the TC ODA is also being limited. A big difference betwèn the TC ODA and the old DER system is that the unless the product design was new/novel Boeing could execute the bulk of a derivative certification by a combination of similarity and/or computation. The FAA oversight was not nearly as stringent as it is now. Boeings TC ODA had a very wide latitude here prior to the MCAS debacle. There are large conceptual differenced between the older DER based systems and ODA in how they function above the DER and DAR level….

  8. This just in SEA times today wed feb 21–
    Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief in shake-up as blowout fallout mounts . . .

    • Yes, the wood is rotten to the core…but just change the veneer and all will be well.

      • If it isn’t the “Master of Disguises” himself, Bryce-Bondi – or (whatever other alias you can come up with).
        I see you found the courage to return and enlighten us with your presence.
        What can we expect next?
        How many more do you plan on using to conceal your true identity..
        The jig is up Bryce !!!
        Just admit it’s really you, and Scott may give you a reprieve .

          • 😂 lol nice try!!!
            You went to the Boeing hatred well one too many times my friend, and it finally bit you.
            You didn’t cover your tracks Bryce ,and your repetitive comments finally got the best of you!!
            Who is Byrce..😂😊 Comedy Gold!!

  9. Clearly Boeing is suffering from the long term effects of multiple perverse incentives. Boeing, as a mostly vertically integrated aircraft manufacturer prior to 2004, had a profit motive only at the delivery of the final product, a commercial aircraft. This also meant that the quality of the final aircraft was clearly the responsibility of Boeing. This is no longer so. Replacing the older Designated Engineering Representative (DER) system of aircraft certification with the Organization Designated Authority (ODA) system of aircraft certification is just one area where Boeing senior management since the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas has chosen processes aligned more with near term profits than with producing a quality product. As Mr. Sorscher must remember, one unexpected term of the final contract settling the SPEAA strike in 2000 was Boeing agreeing to an “agency fee” provision that was not a high priority demand from SPEEA members. Agency fee was an incredible incentive to the paid SPEEA staff to push ratification of the third contract offer as it would nearly double the revenue flowing into SPEEA by requiring all represented employees to effectively pay union dues, as opposed to the then existing method of only enrolled SPEEA members paying dues. At the same time, when it was obvious that the company was highly incentivized to settle a contract in order to resume commercial aircraft deliveries, there was a request by SPEEA members to include in the contract a provision to seat a SPEEA representative on the Boeing Company Board of Directors. That proposal was resisted by the SPEEA negotiating team as an unreasonable contract condition, even though it is a common requirement in European companies that the labor force has a seat on the company board. A board seat would have given the technical workforce a voice in setting company policy. Such a voice on the Board may have helped prevent senior management from replacing the existing Boeing/FAA DER system with the Boeing/FAA ODA system for commercial aircraft design and certification. It may further have prevented not only the sale of Boeing Wichita to Spirit, but also the sale of Boeing Electronics to British Aerospace, both sales announced in 2004. Both of those divestitures added new profit motives into the middle of the manufacturing value added chain where previously Boeing had directly controlled quality in a vertically integrated operation. Also, the more experienced (thus higher paid) workforce and Boeing supervision level management had been continually incentivized to retire, beginning in 1995 with the first large scale retirement offer from management. These retirements definitely reduced institutional memory and quality culture. It is easy to scapegoat Boeing senior management’s fixation on profit and share price, but we all entered in to that bargain and we all share some responsibility if we chose personal job security and enrichment over doing the right thing, every day, at every task, to ensure safe aircraft.

    • The FAA led the ODA implementation. There are 140+ ODA organisations of which Boeing has 4…. There is absolutely no linkage between Boeings labor issues and the FAAs ODA implementation across the entire industry

  10. ODA designees need to have additional protections in place so that they are able to operate objectively despite the enormous amounts of pressure that management may put on them.

    They need to be unfireable (except for gross misconduct to be reviewed by external audit), and they need to be compensated for the huge amounts of responsibility that they hold.

    The same applies to all aircraft manufacturers. I don’t think ODA designees receive the credit and protection they deserve.

    • Reporting to the FAA and not Boeing is a good step, not a full solution but a good step.

  11. As far as I recall there was a regulation in place for prevention of runaway battery fires with three lines of defense: (1) prevent a cell catching fire; (2) contain the cells within the battery so one cell doesn’t ignite the next one; (3) enclose the battery so fire can’t spread elsewhere in the plane.

    The battery fires in the development stage suggest Boeing never properly tested the second and third lines of defense for the 787.

    • As I noted above (just getting up to speed here) Boeing did not want to do anything other than stuff the Li I battery into the 787 as it was the tech fix to energy density needed for that aircraft.

      note that Airbus was going to do the same battery type on the A350 and changed it to Nicad standard while they ensured that the solutions were in place (they then put Li I batteries in it)

      Boeing simply rammed it through and there literally were no criteria or standards met.

      Any new tech has experts, Boeing did not want to pay for it and the FAA capture meant they could do what they wanted.

  12. ‘SEATTLE (AP) — Boeing said Wednesday that the head of its 737 jetliner program is leaving the company in an executive shake-up weeks after a door panel blew out on a flight over Oregon, renewing questions about safety at the company.

    Boeing announced that Ed Clark, who had been with the company for nearly 18 years and led the 737 program since early 2021, was leaving immediately.’


    Some dot connecting;

    In the aftermath of all the Max/787 mess, anyone who makes a decision that steps outside the rules, opens themselves up to losing their job. Hence, people will cover their backsides.

    If you are ordered to do something that might run afoul of how things should be done, you ask someone to put it into writing (and keep a copy of it). Any problem you run into, you kick it up the chain of command, asking for guidance.

    Investigators have run into difficulties getting Boeing to turn over documentation surrounding the Max 9 blow out.

    Now the head of the program is pushed out the door.

    Was there an issue that got kicked up to the desk of Ed Clark, where he made a decision which can be traced right back down the line, to the Max 9 problem?

    Now Boeing can turn to regulators and say

    “Sorry about the document delay, here they are. That person? Sorry – he’s no longer an employee here…”

    • Frank P:

      I am surprised as all get out it was not Stan, he has to be next.

      The problem with getting it in witting means you just told the boss that you are doing CYA and you will get fired.

      There are ways around it, email was great. You asked for a clarification and left a trail they could not deny.

      But you had to be very sneaky about it.

    • @Byrce (Bondi)
      Don’t forget The Urgent inspections required for 1200 in service 787’s for fuselage issues..
      Do dig up your nearly 3 year old link and share the urgency of your report..😂😂😂

  13. Airlines Filed 1,800 Reports Warning Regulators About Boeing’s 737 Max

    “Between December 2020 and September 2023, Alaska Airlines filed more than 1,230 reports related to the 53 Boeing 737 Max planes it had in its fleet. For comparison, during the same period the airline filed 25 reports for its 10 Airbus A321 Neo airplanes, the main competitor to Boeing’s 737 Max.

    The federal safety reports, compiled by the nonprofit Foundation for Aviation Safety, detail a host of issues with the 737 Max that go far beyond the myriad problems that have plagued Boeing planes in recent weeks. They include fuel leaks on potentially hundreds of planes caused by misapplied sealant, malfunctioning stabilizing motors, debris found in fuel tanks, engine stalls during takeoff, and malfunctioning anti-ice systems, among other issues.

    • “Most scrutinized plane in history”

      i.e. scrutinized by the airlines flying it, who have to be constantly alert if they are to (try to) stop their MAXs from falling apart.

      Boeing considers this to be “the safest plane out there” (see article above).
      Completely disconnected from reality.

  14. Hey Pedro…..
    What does your have to do with a 3rd party ODA at Boeing…… Could you please connect the dots for me??? Thanks

    • Let me have a go:

      Boeing has had it’s ODA suspended/severely curtailed.

      (Question: Is this a 737 Max thing, or right across the board? How about SC? Them too?)

      (Question #2: How about BDS? BGS? Any restrictions there)

      So if in fact, SC operates with restrictions than the 787 program also faces increased scrutiny. Increased scrutiny means slower delivery rates. Slower delivery rates means:

      Air New Zealand to lease 2 777-300ERs after latest 787-10 delivery delays

      You take away ODA authority and the domino effect is that everything slows down.


      This raises another question;

      We’ve been through so much with BA

      – Max grounding
      – 787 stoppages
      – Covid
      – Russian invasion

      Which has messed with the supply chain.

      How much has the restriction of the ODA hurt Boeing? Have people been over-looking it’s impact?

  15. @Pedro
    Yet despite all those issues and shortcomings,here comes indigo looking to lease 737’s to offset the loss of their grounded A320 fleet..
    I know know all your feelings about the max, and all the associated risks of flying the type ,yet here’s indigo , considered one of the safest airlines in India, showing their faith in flying them.
    Go ahead , I’ll await the barage of negativity and foolhardiness of a reputable carrier making such a horrendous decision!!

      • Your point being ?
        It’s still the dreaded max.
        Shame on them Pedro,how could they even consider doing this !!😏😏😏

        • I recall Indigo placed a record order of 500 A320neo family aircraft, just last year. Too bad they didn’t give the “dreaded” max a chance! 😁

          • Oh, even if Indigo placed any order for the 737 MAX, they, along with United, WN and Ryanair won’t be able to take delivery as BA promised any time soon. Oops 😬

          • It’s also too bad they have so many grounded A320’s, that they had a give the dreaded max a chance !!😂😂😂😂.
            Tit for tat ..
            Grow up….I made a valid point,and now your whining about it.👶

          • It’s too bad it’s *all* P&W’s fault, another American aviation giant. 😅

            Oh United dumps the MAX 10 for Airbus A321 …? 🤣

          • Pedro:

            For crying out loud, stick the subject and give it up the flop (that is what a cow waste sounds like hitting the ground)

            Read the RR debacle at the top of the Blog. Pretty close to Europe is it not?

          • @TW

            Lol. What “debacle”? No need to deviate into other companies, let’s stick with AB & BA on this thread. 🙂

  16. Bloomberg
    Odd lots podcast
    Richard Aboulafia on Troubles at Boeing: ‘I’ve Never Seen Anything Like It’

  17. Bloomberg: United Air Closes In on Airbus A321 Jets During Max 10 Delays

    -> “Losing even part of a major order from one of the world’s biggest airlines would be a setback for Boeing and its CEO, Dave Calhoun, that goes beyond the raw loss of sales. The companies share a history dating back to the early days of commercial flying, and a break would speak volumes about Kirby’s confidence in Boeing as it confronts its biggest crisis since the 2019 Max grounding that resulted from two deadly crashes.

    • “Even Delta started retiring more 757s this month, a 32 year-old frame due for a heavy check.”

  18. Enough squabbling children;
    This site is for adults ,at least try to start acting like one.

      • TW .
        Thanks for setting the record straight !!
        Let’s not deviate from AB and BA!!
        Guess reading his own posts, not his forte.

        • You are welcome. Its Scott’s forum, hate to see a specific focus go off the rails but he is the only one who can change that.

          Just throwing out random stuff is ???????? (werid?) wants attention?

          Very sad but all too true on the hypocrisy of a certain poster. I did need a good laugh today and that sure did it!

    • -> ‘ “The seeds of these quality problems were planted a long time ago. These problems were hidden for years, then they exploded,” says a former top executive at a Boeing supplier. […]

      “And Boeing’s current top executives are now extremely dispersed. Though the commercial aircraft chiefs are based in Seattle, CFO Brian West and the treasurer work from suburban Connecticut, and the HR and PR heads from Orlando. It’s not clear how much time Calhoun, who served as chairman before being named CEO, spent in Renton or Everett, prior to the Portland disaster. He’s stated that Boeing’s headquarters “is wherever Brian and I happen to be.” The 66-year-old boss has two homes—one on a lake in New Hampshire, and one in a gated community in South Carolina. […]

      “Pierson says that every top executive and board member at Boeing should ask themselves one crucial question to determine if they’re providing the right leadership. “The simple test is, ‘In 2023, how many times did you spend time on the factory floor and listen to the concerns of the employees who are the backbone of the company?’ If the answer is ‘no,’ you’re clearly not the right person for the job.”

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