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Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 7. Conceptual Design.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam
September 12, 2025, ©. Leeham News: We do a series about ideas on how the long development times for large airliners can be shortened. New project talks about cutting development time and reaching certification and production faster than previous projects..
The series will discuss the typical development cycles for an FAA Part 25 aircraft, called a transport category aircraft, and what different ideas there are to reduce the development times.
We will use the Gantt plan in Figure 1 as a base for our discussions.
Figure 1. A generic new Part 25 airliner development plan. Source: Leeham Co. Click to see better.
Conceptual Design
After receiving the go-ahead from the company in the Feasibility phase, we can start forming a more structured team for the Conceptual Design. At this stage, it is necessary to formulate high-level approaches for several critical areas, such as aircraft design, supply chain planning, manufacturing strategies, certification, and other essential topics.
The Importance of a Thorough Conceptual Design
According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, about half of the life-cycle cost is expected to be committed by the end of this phase ( Figure 2).
Figure 2. The importance of thorough work in early project phases. Source: NASA.
The cost of changes will also grow rapidly after the concept phase. Even though these numbers and the definition of each phase vary from organization to organization, the importance of this phase should not be underestimated.
Aircraft Design in this phase
Many activities need to progress in parallel at this stage. We already have an idea of the aircraft’s overall data and shape from the feasibility study. The structures team now needs to come up with a layout. The systems teams need to follow the development process to start defining various systems. The engineering sciences team members (such as aerodynamicists, stability & control engineers, aircraft performance experts, etc.) need to begin generating data to support the design and trade-off studies.
Once a sufficiently defined concept is established, the teams can release initial datasets, such as loads, to facilitate the next design iteration. The engineering sciences team may also want to conduct wind tunnel tests to de-risk the design. For example, the team would obtain test data on stall characteristics and compare them with the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) predictions.
Systems also need to mature. We will, in the next Corner, go into more detail about system definition and development.
The interior is an important consideration as well. This is where an OEM and its customers (a.k.a. airlines) generate brand loyalty with passengers. This is also where many tradeoffs need to happen. For example, assume the aircraft could accommodate 200 seats. If we could shave 1 kg from each seat, we could save 200 kg. This means more payload, longer range, or improved fuel efficiency. This could go in the opposite direction as well. We might end up adding 1 kg per seat to improve the functionality of the seats.
Again, aircraft design is an iterative process. There will be many studies and configuration refinements during this period. All decisions are documented. Many requirement documents are drafted. Initial CAD models are created. Engineering collaborates with Supply Chain and Manufacturing for the activities discussed below. Engineering also receives feedback from the Supply Chain and Manufacturing to refine the design.
Supply Chain Considerations
It is unlikely that an OEM would want to, or be able to, design everything itself. Depending on its existing capabilities and willingness to invest in new areas, it may decide to outsource some of the work packages to suppliers. The business team, with support from other functions, needs to conduct make/buy analyses. The team must develop and execute a plan to engage, select, and onboard suppliers for the right scope and at the right time. This is a complex task because it involves many internal and external stakeholders. It also involves a lot of money.
For instance, if a system costs one million dollars per shipset, and we plan to produce 1,000 units, it becomes a one-billion-dollar contract. This is why the supply chain team usually wants to understand the supplier’s financial standing at this stage. An aircraft OEM may not want to do business with a financially weak company.
An OEM also does not want to do business with a company that does not understand aerospace quality control requirements. Hence, the Quality team needs to support the selection effort. This team conducts audits to ensure that suppliers can meet quality requirements (such as, but not limited to, process control, configuration control, quality escape management). It provides valuable inputs to the supplier selection process.
Manufacturing Considerations
Manufacturing is another important area. For this article series, we want to narrow the manufacturing scope to final assembly. The manufacturing team does not need details at this stage, but needs an idea about the production system, the space required, and special facilities requirements. For example, setting up a paint hanger may require an environmental assessment. This could be a challenge in certain regions.
The team may also need to explore the location of a new manufacturing site. Land availability, logistics, and workforce availability and readiness are just a few considerations. Some manufacturing topics need to be considered up front because they require high capital expenditures. They could also impact the supply chain.
Manufacturing engineers also provide input to aircraft design. For instance, do we want a one-piece, two-piece, or three-piece wing? Each design has its pros and cons from a weight, assembly time, and logistics perspective (Figure 3).
Figure 3. The design of the wing is important not only for aerodynamics but also for logistics. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
The team may not be able to select the final solution at this stage, but they could eliminate some nonviable or less desirable options. This is why manufacturing’s involvement is essential.
Certification Work
Certification is a part of the development process, not an afterthought. During this phase, the company must initiate some of the work related to certification. We will go into more detail about certification activities during Conceptual Design in a coming article.
Additional Challenges for Startups in This Phase
In addition to the topics discussed above, start-ups also need to do a significant amount of background work. For example, the team needs to establish many processes, such as data control, configuration control, and change management. These processes are crucial for designing an aircraft. They ensure all teams are working on the same assumptions. Imagine the wing team just updated the design of the wing, call this new design wing_rev_B. In parallel, the high-lift team is updating attachments to the wing using wing_rev_A. This could be a frustrating experience and a non-value-adding exercise. Without proper processes and procedures, the project will become unmanageable very quickly.
Speeding Up the Conceptual Design Phase
There are opportunities to use emerging technologies to reduce work hours for aircraft Conceptual Design. For example, generative AI can help create a rough draft for some of these documents or analyses. Mature OEMs can feed previous designs and analyses into the machine and ask it to generate rough drafts. Engineers responsible for these analyses will still need to review, update, and refine them to ensure correctness. Engineers also still need to be able to explain results to the authorities.
The ability to tie requirements, designs, analyses, schedules, etc., in a streamlined fashion can also save work hours. Team members spend less time chasing answers, consolidating data, and generating reports, reducing the number of people required to support the program.
On the supply chain side, emerging tools could help evaluate supplier bids. AI might assist in analyzing internal historical data and new bid packages to provide down-select recommendations. It may also help automate some of the communications. However, using AI agents to communicate with suppliers might also have disadvantages. Human-to-human engagement helps build rapport. These relationships are valuable in resolving issues over the life of the program. Robot-to-robot engagement, for this use case, may reduce work hours in the short run but may not yield the same results in the long run.
Thanks for this very interesting series.
I hadn’t thought about the upward-pointing arrow representing “cost to change,” so that’s a nice touch. Thanks.
One lesson from the 777 was the value of catching problems as early as possible, where you have more options and change is less expensive.
The corresponding lesson from the 787 was that the “cost to change” arrow can bend upward sharply, when information is isolated and decision-making authority is diffused.
Another very important arrow occurs in production, where learning curve generates a downward pointing arrow. Learning curve is very significant because the early units are typically produced at a loss and learning curve can easily be the difference between profitability and writing off a financial forward loss.
In both cases, a strong problem-solving culture is critical.
@Stan S:
I believe the first couple hundred units are at a loss and initial units more so due to the bargains offered to get someone to buy first. The first 20 or so would be messy due to learning how to assemble it and changes that are made.
Number to break even of course depends on the aircraft size. I don’t think the 747-8 made any money. It did have advantage of a designated assembly are in Everett.
After a decade, Boeing delivered a total of say 400 757.
May be Boeing is selling their aircraft below cost for too long or they overestimated their capability to lower the cost curve.
One of the main reasons for the 747-8 development was to take part of the A380’s market. It may have done that, but in the end the A380 market was smaller than forecast.
Stan…..
This is the reason for the M note on the engineering releases. A Manufacturing Planner reviews the engineering release package pre-release and signs it off as a producable change. The idea is to get experienced eyeballs on the release to check it for producibility issues that experienced planners would see. Things like upstream. A d downstream pilot hole use a different tool indexing. Unfortunately for the end item. Manufacturing Engineering stripped most of the experienced planneers from the review process and threw bods with pulses to rubberstamp the world. Mfg Planning Management was more intrrested in keeping tbeir release schedules than elimi ating pre release problems. We were positioned to catch errors to the logical build process really early, but the non believers made a mockery of things. One of my favorites was when vendors would ELR the drawing for a material change to heat treat of sheet material for formability. We repearedly stopped needless changes by pointing to the Material Substitution Document that already approved their request years ago. When people say Boeing doesn’t have enough airplane people left they point to stories like this, spread all throughout the process.
I find it ironic that Boeing would have wanted the suppliers to be first grade on quality but then proceeded to assemble lower quality.
Exception seems to be Spirit, so maybe another one to ponder would have been other suppliers that were sub par as well?
The area I worked in we always tried to get known quality built and good working equipment listed as the baseline.
And no, none of my equipment was Aviation grade though we had a Simulator Air conditioning cabinet that clearly same out of that arena, beautifully built.
Design of product and design of production are integral.
facet views of the same object or conjoined twins if you like.
Then “The Mythical Man Month” is still good reading and very on topic.
Interesting that NASA methodologies on managing complex projects that require certification, are also used in the aircraft industry.
That makes sense and refutes the hypothesis that NASA doesn’t manage well because they don’t employ rapid iteration and fail fast methods.
There may be some benefit to those methods early in the process, but eventually they have to yield to the more formal structures Bjorn and Henry have outlined here. That’s the only way to teach certification with reasonable costs
Thanks again for this series, it’s really great to see things things explained.
“NASA suffering from ageing infrastructure and inefficient management practices, finds report”
“The report was requested by Congress and published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. It was written by a 13-member committee, which included representatives from industry, academia and government, and was chaired by Norman Augustine, former chief executive of Lockheed Martin. Members visited all nine NASA centres and talked to about 400 employees to compile the report.”
“…they highlight a variety of problems at the agency. Those include out-of-date infrastructure, a pressure to prioritize short-term objectives, budget mismatches, inefficient management practices, and an unbalanced reliance on commercial partners. Yet according to Augustine, the agency’s main problem is “the more mundane tendency to focus on near-term accomplishments at the expense of long-term viability”.”
https://physicsworld.com/a/nasa-suffering-from-ageing-infrastructure-and-inefficient-management-practices-finds-report/
***
If the FAA and/or BA are taking a leaf from that book, then that (partially) helps explain why they’re so dysfunctional…
@Rob:
I don’t see using NASA as a working example of the process listed.
They may have it right on paper, but execution is an organizational culture aspect and they clearly do not have it.
I doubt they ever could have it as its a government organization subject to the same inertia and impedimenta COMAC has.
While I detest Musk, Space X has proved a great model of success (not necessarily for the people of Space X but whats been done)
NASA was the one that ignored their own criteria for the O rings, failed to even look at what was showing up on camera.
NASA has done some amazing research but execution into product that catches the issues before a MAX like crash, no.
@TW
As noted earlier, the evidence is against this viewpoint. Both SLS and Orion are successful programs, although there are nefarious elements doing their best to create a false counter narrative (we have a few such individuals here).
The Presidential Budget Request seeks to gut NASA, under the premise that commercial programs are more efficient. But there are no commercial programs on the scale of Artemis, and no capacity within industry to do what NASA has done.
The usual response to this basic fact is to point to the SpaceX Falcon program, which is an overwhelming success. But the Falcon and Dragon programs are both under supervision of NASA, as they were funded and developed by NASA principley to service the ISS.
You mentioned the shuttle accidents, but ironically they occured under the safety regimes that are now being practiced by SpaceX in the Starship program. As SpaceX officer Gerstenmaier said this week:
“I get what I call a minimum viable solution. I don’t really understand why it works, but somehow it works, so we’re going to use it, we’re going to monetize it, we’re going to make it work.”
Note that the “minimum viable solution” is what NASA had with the O-rings in the Challenger accident. And was also behind the decision not to image Columbia in orbit, despite knowing it had taken a hit from the foam.
That method dates from the 60’s, and was discarded by NASA in the mid-2000’s. Today they follow the probability risk assessment method (PRA), which has also been adopted by FAA, EASA, and the airlines. It’s part of safety culture, and is responsible for the 3 to 5 fold increase in safety ratings at NASA. As well as the huge advancements in air travel safety over the last 30 years.
Also this week, the interim NASA administrator said that “safety can get in the way of progress”. That was a truly cringeworthy statement, as it implies progress is impeded by safety. That is a complete reversal of safety culture, and as Secretary of Transportation, he is also over the FAA, who would argue strenuously against any such concept.
But this is the reality today, there are forces at work to tear down institutions that incorporate decades of learning, in favor of unproven or outright false promises. One need only examine Elon Musk’s track record of predictive statements to understand this.
Turning now to Abalone’s post, he and Pedro use a well known tactic, which is to leverage the objective institutions in the US, that we have to investigate and reveal flaws in the our programs. These institutions may be journalistic in terms of the Fourth Estate established in the Constitution, or they may be internal auditing groups within the government.
Whichever it is, Abalone and Pedro seek to represent those findings as demanding the destruction of the referenced programs, when that is not the intent at all, nor is it their recommendation. The intent and recommendations are oriented to improvements in the program. The criticisms they embody are constructive, not destructive as Abalone and and Pedro would have you believe.
The bottom line is, like anything else, you have to weigh the good against the bad. NASA has accomplished enormous good, and continues to do so. They have made mistakes along the way, and anyone who works there will tell you they recognize the constant need to improve.
But should we destroy NASA’s ability to carry out premier human exploration programs? Eliminate science research because the current administration doesn’t favor earth or climate science? Eliminate STEM education in schools, even though NASA is the #1 provider of classroom STEM materials and lesson plans?
And should we do those things in favor of …. what exactly? Commercial programs that don’t exist? Or that regress decades of progress in safety culture? Or a Department of Education that the administration seeks to also eliminate?
Most Americans say no to this, and for good reason. There’s also a reason why aircraft certification programs have adopted NASA methodology and standards for spacecraft certification. We diminish and ignore those reasons at our peril.
Forgot to mention that also this week, the interim NASA administrator announced the closure of the Columbia Shuttle Preservation Office. That office maintains the remains of the shuttle, and documents exactly what happened, and why.
That has long been a touchstone of safety at NASA. It’s a required orientation element for engineers and astronauts entering the human spaceflight programs. It’s a sobering experience and emphasizes what’s at stake, in terms of human costs.
Once a year on the anniversary, NASA takes a day to review the shuttle accidents, and the Columbia storage building is open to staff. The question gets asked every year, are we adhering to those lessons, and can we improve upon them? So that they are never forgotten.
But we have an administration now that wants to forget, and to rewrite if possible. It’s quite sad.
@Rob: I won’t disagree an Iota on Bryce and Pedro.
Space and NASA are a complex topic. Pretty much splits between manned and unmanned and the use of either.
I grew up with the Mercury and Apollo programs. At the time there was an enthusiasm and beat the Russians (I remember the somber mood as Sputnik went over our heads) and at least one report of a Soviet sub off the Island).
Unmanned splits into two categories as well (my opinion of course) and that is Exploration and Utiitly (com Satellites but also the Spy Satellites)
I fall on the side that manned is a waste. The cost and return is not there. Yes some miraculous stuff came out of the manned end but that is long gone.
Exploration wise, I got no issue. I get a bit tired of the drama of NOVA and making it or not, but I fall on the side that I don’t think there is any involvement of private ops, there is no profit. And yes I like the low cost and return as the info we get from the so called Robots and Probes is immense and beyond fathomable in my view of any manned stuff. Too much goes into feeding and returning manned you get no science out of it. We could have landed a scoop on the moon and got it back with the rocks we got.
The only reason Space X went manned was the profit motive and the underlying support they got from the Govt (yea us). That was a good program. It also had a 50% success, we got nothing out of Boeing.
Space X was closely supervised and maybe for the better, Boeing was not and we saw the results (FAA audit anyone?).
Neither NASA nor Boeing came up with reusable and willing to stick to it (or loose it all).
But you look at NASA and I see serial failures no matter what their form says. That goes back to using pure Oxygen in a capsule. Wow, who saw that coming. That was pure horror. Its not like they did not know the risks of pure Oxygen and electrical. Diving they use exotic mixes for real deep stuff. Down to (more or less) 5 atmospheres its banged air.
I still remember the Mercury capsule they decided to try an insane response to with the retro rockets strapped on that had never had even a simulation let alone test. Like the MAX exit door blank, it had nothing to do with good, it was pure luck we did not loose the Capsule.
We did loose two shuttles and worse their crews and both were easily avoidable. NASA made assumptions and people paid for those with their lives.
So now we have the conglomeration of Constellation and Artemis and the skinny rocket was dumped (we had it why?).
Yes NASA has budget issues, it also can’t do a program due to their ossification and the budget going up and down.
What should be done is dismantle the monstrosity that NASA has become and get aeronautics back to what it should be and the space end can run up and down budgets all it wants.
I don’t blame NASA, someone needs to pull the plug, how much is spent in Houston, Allahabad and Florida each year for programs that go no where?
Musk wants to go to Mars, lease out the rocket if and when it proves out and drop by the moon. Musk is as bad as NASA, there is no money and no return and never will be. People can’t live in space nor on Mars let alone the moon.
So as I mentioned, the criticisms of the space program from 20 – 60 years ago are not at all relevant today.
The PRA method was in its infancy in 1960, as it was developed by the nuclear industry, where you can’t test an accident scenario. You have to evaluate it statistically.
It was suggested for the Apollo program and it predicted loss of crew as 1 in 10. NASA said the public will never accept that, so we can’t use it. And did not change their position until after the shuttle accidents.
As Richard Feynman pointed out, the safety estimates NASA proposed for the shuttle were equivalent to commercial aircraft, which was an absurd claim.
But now that they have adopted PRA, it’s like night and day. When you say NASA is ossified, you are simultaneously criticizing the lack of PRA in the early days, and the presence of it today. You can’t have it both ways.
You might as well claim the FAA and EASA are ossified, they apply the same rigor to certification, and the same life cycle costs and cost growth result in commercial airliner programs. That is the point of this article, and is the central fallacy in the criticism.
Safety assurance costs more $$$ up front. But it costs less $$$ in life cycle costs. The criticism occurs when people only look at the up front costs.
As far as people living in space, that’s a matter of developing the technology. Within reasonable limits, there is a lot to be learned from supporting humans for deep space missions. Artemis does that at a third the cost of Apollo, and further spreads it out over more years to make it affordable.
Robotic science is great and I fully support that as well. But it can’t replicate the learning or the human experience of venturing into space.
As far as SpaceX going to Mars, they have no viable plan to do so. In contrast, the NASA NTRS server is loaded with studies and data for how it can be done safely. But we don’t want to commit 90% of the NASA budget to SpaceX, to go to Mars, which is what the PBR proposes by 2030.
Here is a good example, this week “Everyday Astronaut” made a proposal to shrink the SpaceX HLS lander to the size of the Blue Origin MK2 lander, pointing out that it’s far too large to be practical.
There are many problems with this idea, but even he recognizes that HLS is far from an optimized lander design. To get that optimization, you need a public entity like NASA to drive the engineering.
Blue Origin has been very cooperative and responsive to NASA design requirements which is why their lander comes much closer to the optimum. They aren’t trying to leverage it for a different use.
SpaceX is going to optimize Starship for LEO, that’s where the profit and the utility are for them. I don’t fault them for that at all, but it’s wrong to represent to the public that it can do everything else as well.
And to take a wrecking ball to NASA, believing those claims, is just insane.
@Rob:
Obviously we are not going to agree on this one either. Keep in mind I was a major NASA fan back in the day.
I think using the past is relevant if the current is performing badly.
NASA has not had a chance to inflict the more recent Shuttle losses. So call it in limbo but its a horrible track record. Yes things happen in space business, but when you self inflict on an avoidable, then it is Boeing and MCAS 1.0 and the Door Blank blowout.
Or as Apollo 13 said, Houston we have a problem.
As for manned, I am amazed at that. Back in the day, explorers had air to breath and to some degree a viable temperature.
None of that exists in space or on planets and or asteroids. You spend your budge on the can and environment. Even in LEO you get little or no return.
I don’t endorse Musk and Mars, not sure how you got that. Its foolish with a lunatic (pun intended) mission as bad as NASA. Going to the moon gets us nothing. They can put out all the pretty plans in the world, bottom line is we got a few rocks. Any lander could do that and a Mars type crawler far more.
And no I am far from the first one to suggest NASA be broken up.
Aeronautics takes second place and that is one area that there can be a return.
Break it up, aeronautics, exploring and dump the manned.
having the receipt ( researched, created, codified.. )
and
using that receipt are two different things.
especially if time has passed.
PR motives overriding engineering limitations ..
definitely were cases of not following the manual.
The end is nigh
https://qz.com/faa-commerical-plane-certification-rule-change
> The Federal Aviation Administration reportedly plans to make it faster and cheaper to certify new commercial planes
Lord help us all 🙈
Don’t bet on continuing EASA reciprocal acceptance if this goes through…
“The aviation agency said the proposed modifications would be deregulatory and would include reducing the number of exemptions, special conditions, and safety findings needed in the certification process. The FAA said the changes would cut back on certification costs as well as the amount of time it takes to certify new and updated planes “while maintaining or increasing the level of safety,” Reuters reported. “
Abalone.
This is a logical follow on to MOSAIC. MOSAIC was an update to the General Avaition Cert standards that codified sport pilot and Light Sport Aircraft regulations in one place. It took over 10 years to get it right and quite honestly, was well done. If the FAA starts to look at commercial aircraft certification and uses the care and analysis they have in MOSAIC, it very well could be a great thing. If its another version of the new ATC program they keep saying is coming that started with ADSB, we may be disappointed. Time will tell, but the public comment period should keep it honest. It’s hard to really worry one way or the other until we start to see what the skeleton looks like, and that’s probably years away. We’re still waiting for the rewrite of AC43-13 that was supposed to be inside MOSAIC and its not on the horizon yet, who knows what the CFR updates may look like or their timeline. The best thing to do is to constructively comment when the window opens. I commented on MOSAIC and I think that instead of being chicken little, commenting during the public comment period this will have is a far better thing to do than just planting the sky is falling posts. You should use what you know for the betterment of the process, despite the time it takes…….
You’re assuming that the current administration will pay anything more than lip service to any “comments” submitted on this subject.
There have been many public comments on the negative repercussions of eroding Fed independence — and, yet, the erosion efforts continue. Same with the adverse effects of tariffs. And it was the same a few years ago with the congressional EICAS exception.
Who’s saying that “the sky is falling”? Commenting on the continuing downfall of the FAA’s reputation does not equate to saying that the sky is falling 👀
You go and write your senator if you want to…I have better ways to spend my time 😉
ABALONE wrote…
You go and write your senator if you want to…I have better ways to spend my time
That’s the difference between us I guess. I participate in guiding the industry into the future……. I’m sorry you can’t spare the time…
I further lots of causes in lots of different ways — but not by writing pointless letters to senators.
I know institutions that take amicus curiae input very seriously — but none of those are in the US.
@PNWgeek:
Spot on on the posts.
Bryce has nothing productive to offer, it takes work to just understate a subject. Or you can throw bombs.
GFC:
Defunding of control institutions and deregulation ( faster, cheaper, easier money )
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_Great_Recession#Government_deregulation_as_a_cause
any parallels?
One more accident…
The end of Boeing??
Increasingly it looks like a choice, not a coincidence.
“One more accident…”
Well, we still have to find out definitively what caused the Air India 787 crash.
A US lawyer representing victims’ families is exploring a new possibility (posted in various media in the past few days). He’s not submitting to the automatic “foreign pilot blaming” playbook.
It will be interesting to see where this ultimately goes…
Attorneys around the world have been data mining the 787 AD record for anything that could have caused the crash.
I’ve seen many theories based on many AD’s, but none that are based on evidence.
The latest one is a water leak theory, since there is an AD on that issue. The attorney has been unable to get anything from AAIB, so he is now trying to get it from NTSB, via a FOIA request.
That’s largely a publicity stunt, as NTSB legally denies those requests while an investigation is open. But it gets the attorney’s name into the news, which is the true objective.
In this case, the attorney claims the engine FADEC controller is located in the avionics bay, which is objectively false.
“Attorneys around the world have been data mining the 787 AD record for anything that could have caused the crash.”
Lawyers look for cracks than can be legally leveraged.
Lawyer logic is broken. Low life.
@ Uwe
Lawyers can be very useful when they play Devil’s Advocate — an inconvenient role for many engineers, who can tend to suffer from tunnel vision.
This lawyer isn’t claiming that the FADEC is under the 787 floor — he’s claiming that electronics interfacing with the FADEC (and the FMS/throttles) are located under the floor…where they are subject to potential water damage from well-documented 787 leaks. It’s an interesting take — particularly because it’s so inconvenient to the prevailing narrative.
Basic physics: the best way to study a system…is to disturb it 😉
Just to clarify:
“Andrews highlighted that the Dreamliner had been plagued by technical concerns, particularly regarding its potable water system, which runs close to sensitive electronics. He pointed to FAA bulletins and directives dating back years, warning of water leaks into the electronics equipment bay (EE bay). This compartment houses the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC), the computer system responsible for regulating the aircraft’s engines.”
The attorney also claims that four anonymous individuals with knowledge of the situation have come forward, which prompted his “investigation”.
Just need to be truthful that there is no actual evidence here, as there has not been from any of the attorney claims thus far.
https://www.financialexpress.com/business/airlines-aviation-air-india-crash-victims-lawyer-questions-aaib-report-shares-why-water-leak-may-have-led-to-ai-171-tragedy-3976405/
Just to clarify:
There may not yet be evidence in the public domain — but that doesn’t nean that there’s no evidence.
I’m sure the Indian crash investigation authorities will be very interested in what Andrews and his witnesses have to say and show 👍
As regards the quote: it’s not a direct quote from Andrews, but rather a paraphrase…
Evidence matters. Claims without evidence are not valid, either in debate or in a court of law.
Evidence is what differentiates a scientific hypothesis from a conspiracy theory.
A difficult concept to admit when it goes against tactics, I realize, but true nonetheless.
Evidence is often gathered and analyzed behind the scenes before being presented to a relevant forum.
It’s like a time bomb just waiting to go off.
This is the very nature of a running investigation 👍
Interesting times ahead…
Evidence is often manufactured behind the scenes, or in aviation forums.
Manufactured evidence is not valid evidence. As noted, there is no valid evidence here. None has been presented because none exists.
Claims of evidence without the evidence, are lies.
As previously noted: the fact that the evidence isn’t yet in the public domain doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.
Nerve wracking as it may be for those hoping for this to go away…we’ll just have to be patient.
In the meantime, we can ask ourselves what beans those informants are spilling…😉
The term is ambulance chasers.
A particular sub set of homo sapiens that feeds off of tragedy for the lucre.
You know certain people by their signature, when indisputable facts are presented they spin an alternative that has nothing to do with facts.
Hopeless, you can only call them out with their falsehoods.
@TW
+1
FAA ORDERS BOEING 787 INSPECTIONS TO FIX WATER LEAK ISSUES
> This action was prompted by reports of potable‑water‑system leaks—stemming from improperly installed waterline couplings—that allowed water to seep into electronics equipment (EE) bays, risking electrical shorts and potential loss of critical flight systems.
We’re lucky that this investigation is being led by Indian authorities, rather than bodies that might be tempted to be more “amenable” to BA’s interests… 😉
For like the last 25 years or so, the US has replaced engineering with financial engineering to push the EPS up:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/G0vT6SxX0AAyjf0?format=jpg&name=medium
It’s all about managing the decline.
The pendulum was always going to swing back the other way. It’s inevitable in politics.
We’ll have to see what these changes are. As the article notes, FAA rulemaking is public and requires public commentary. So everyone will have a chance to express their views.
Rob
+1
+2
United Airlines must finally take a decision on 777-200ER fleet replacement, they have 74. Average age : 26,3 yrs.
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/united-ceo-airbus-a350-long-haul-fleet
Ongoing discussion for years.. alternatives:
– A330NEO/ 787-9 (Too small)
– 787-10 (Less range)
– 777-8 (Too much range, development schedule)
– 777-9 & A350-1000 (Too Big)
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DXJfUmnW4AAra_y?format=jpg&name=small
Kirby said in that interview that the A350 is still on the cards…
UA’s wiki page indicates that the B787 is the replacement.
That would be interesting, because it reduces payload-range capacity / revenue potential on the growing Pacific routes.
https://epsilonaviation.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/payloadrange_midsizewidebody.jpg?w=1000
The B747 was replaced by the B777. The B757 by the A321XLR
There is a theme. Fly the smallest aircraft that can fly a route outside of major hub cities. Avoid the trip costs of flying big planes with less than 100% load factor
And fly planes that are liquid in the market and not applicable to only large national airlines
Look at the backlog of the 777X and Emirates is something like 40%…need to check that out. That didn’t end well for the A380
The same was said when the 747 was replaced by 777s and A330s.
First/business class seats now take up more spaces. UA is adding premium seats.
How does that work in a smaller WB?
Buy more planes
209 B787 on order and delivered vs 92 B777 and 53 B767.
UA is simplifying its fleet. Its B757 is going to be replaced with XLR. Single aisle to be split between Max and neo just by sheer volume of slots needed.
To be fair…I was mistaken the wiki page does reference the A350-900 as replacing the B777-200ER…however, there is a lot of chatter the this may never deliver. Those deliveries are “2030 at the earliest”
United’s latest layout of premium heavy 787-9 (with a whopping 56+8 Polaris/Suite) will have only 90 economy seats, a decrease of 40% from current 787-9 configuration. I guess they’re good to replace some 767-300 & -400.
So what is the replacement for the high-density 777-200 United flies?
Kirby is signaling they are about to decide their A350 order. I’m quite optimistic.
Well, does AB have the slots available for early delivery, say late 2028/early 2029 or 2029/2030??
The early demise of… is greatly exaggerated.
“Aeroflot To Order 90 Russian Yakolev MC-21 Aircraft By The End Of The Year”
“At present, Aeroflot has 198 MC-21s on order, according to ch-aviation data.”
“According to TASS, Aeroflot aims to expand its fleet to 460 aircraft by 2030, with the goal of having 50% of its fleet composed of domestically produced planes. Currently, Russia’s national airline operates a fleet of 285 aircraft, with an average age of 10.9 years. The fleet is dominated by Airbus aircraft, totaling 142 units. Russia’s Sukhoi Superjets account for 75 aircraft, while Boeing models make up the smallest portion, with 71 units.”
“The Aeroflot Group chief stated that the Russian flag carrier plans to take delivery of 200 MC-21 aircraft by 2033, with 108 MC-21 airliners expected to arrive by 2030. If the Russified MC-21 receives type certification as planned, the manufacturer would need to deliver approximately 29 aircraft per year to meet Aeroflot’s goal of having 200 MC-21s in service by 2033.”
“According to Rostec, there are more than 20 MC-21 narrowbody aircraft at various degrees of completeness at the factory. Deliveries of new aircraft to customers are expected to start in the summer of 2026.”
https://simpleflying.com/aeroflot-90-russian-yakolev-mc-21-aircraft-order/
I did not think this would be all that interesting but its got a lot more depth and detail that I though. Worth watching. Granted only for those who believe in facts
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dufx-P9BaA
Where is the evidence that the pendulum has swung too far??
We haven’t seen any, have we?
Who believes in facts here? Who believes in “facts”??
I don’t believe anyone has said the pendulum has swung too far. That would appear to be yet another misrepresentation.
What has been said, is that the pendulum has swung towards greater rigor and scrutiny in certification, and that being a pendulum, it will inevitably swing back.
The real question is where the equilibrium point will be, and we have no information on that as yet.
There’s no evidence that the pendulum has swung too far, but addtional scrutiny needed during certification to correct previous lapses are no good? What’s the reasoning? Why is Ortberg whining?
You’ve lost me here. Ortberg isn’t whining, that appears to be another misrepresentation.
The animus against regulation evident in the FAA announcement, is inherent to the current administration. It needs no stoking by anyone else.
As Bjorn and Henry are explaining in this series, there is an inherent tension between certification rigor and certification period. Also described by Mentor Pilot in the video posted by TW. Advancing standards for safety raise the cost and duration of certification.
There’s nothing new or controversial about that, but this series is looking into what can be done to address it. Ideally without reducing standards of safety, which would be a shortcut and an easy way out, but also detrimental to air travel.
The current administration is fond of shortcuts, so we’ll have to watch carefully what they propose.
Fortunately as PNWgeek pointed out, the FAA process is purposely ponderous and slow, to ensure all viewpoints are heard. So nothing is going to happen immediately.
“Ortberg isn’t whining”
Yes, he is.
He whined last week about the “mountain of paperwork” associated with getting the 777X certified…resulting in yet more delay to the certification timeline.
You don’t hear Faury whining about mountains of paperwork.
Then again, BA is used to self-cert, and is having grave difficulty adjusting to a new reality in which self-cert is off the table.
Lol, there’s a difference between whining and statements of truth.
There absolutely is a “mountain of work” to get the 777X certified, as Ortberg truthfully stated. But he cast no aspersions upon the process or the FAA or regulation in general.
The whining allegation originated with yourself and Pedro. As is so often the case here.
Ortberg is not whining? A “misrepresentation”? Oh c’mon Rob!!
Did you read the memo?
> On Thursday, Ortberg said the FAA’s certification process now is “*way too slow*” and he hopes to work with the regulator in “*swinging the pendulum back*.” [Those quotation marks are in the original article.]
What the hell is “Mentor Pilot”?
Is “Mentour Pilot” a journalist, or a content provider for clicks and ad $$$? I’m not naive.
https://www.electrify.video/post/electrify-video-partners-expands-portfolio-with-mentour-pilot-and-mentour-now-investment
😅
10 years after launch…and still a mountain of paperwork? And only a partial TIA?
No wonder he was whining 🙈
“Whine”
Noun
A feeble or petulent complaint
Just to clarify, Ortberg was referring to the phased TIA, which is preventing Boeing from conducting certification testing that they are ready to do.
Boeing is working the certification phases in parallel, but the FAA is processing them serially. This is well known and has been discussed here many times.
The full article quote is:
“We still don’t have authorization from the FAA for a good portion of the certification program. So, we’re working through that right now with the FAA, but we were clearly behind our plan in getting the certification done.”
He alluded to an increasingly deliberate FAA approach to aircraft approval as the major obstacle.
“We can go fly, but we can’t actually get the certification credit until we get type inspection authorization (TIA)—formal FAA testing clearance—for the required tests.”
Going forward, Ortberg sees room for improvement without compromising safety.
“The certification process [is] way too slow,” Ortberg said. “We’ve got to work with the FAA in swinging the pendulum back and making that a process that’ll work. I can’t imagine that we can do a new airplane without having that process refined.”
Note that improving certification times without compromising safety, is also the topic of Bjorn’s series of articles.
https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/aircraft-propulsion/boeing-clearly-behind-777-9-certification-ortberg-says
In ski jump parlance, you guys are constantly way out over your factual skis in these criticisms. If in fact you haven’t left them on the ramp. There is no supporting evidentiary basis beneath you.
Perhaps it isn’t clear to you, but that practice is very transparent. It’s like a giant flashing neon sign that your intent is to mislead. It doesn’t fool anyone.
Just to clarify, here’s Ortberg’s quote over the lack of a TIA:
“Think of it as for score completion of the task, and we are falling behind on the the certification in order to actually get the completion, we can go fly, but we can’t actually get the certification credit until we get this thing called a Tia . And you’ve probably seen where these Tia’s were getting incremental Tia’s, which give us some limited capability of being able to get the the certification credit done. But we still don’t have authorization from the FAA for a good portion of the certification program.”
https://www.tipranks.com/news/the-fly/boeing-ceo-says-falling-behind-on-777x-certification-process-thefly
10 years since launch and still only a few TIA breadcrumbs 🙈
Here’s how Boeing insider PNWgeek reacted to that:
PNWgeek
September 11, 2025
“ABALONE, VINCENT
I bet this is the news that Boeing has been trying to soften with their weird new indirect 777x advertising. What I get out of it is that Boeing again can’t find the truth……….
A couple weeks they announced TIA for the 777x. Now today its incremental TIA. What craap. This means that either they lied about TIA issuance or they failed to note a downgrade of TIA from full to incremental. IN EITHER CASE, there is an ommission of facts that matter. The truth can’t hurt you if you tell it consistently. I’m so glad I’m not there any more its stuff like nothing that shakes your beliefs about their recovery”
***
So, Rob, plenty of “supporting evidentiary basis” 😎
#KellyWhining
It’s patently clear who is misrepresenting here.
The FAA’s current certification is a result of correction of decade(s) long lapses of Boeing self-cert and *lessons learned from the MAX certification fiasco*— a product definition already presented to the FAA that *kept evolving without submitting these subsequent changes to the FAA prior to the certification*.
Clearly Ortberg complained the certification is way too slow and has to swing back the pendulum to his liking!
Evidence of contradiction of what you posted above:
“I don’t believe anyone has said the pendulum has swung too far.”
Stop regurgitating your talking points.
@All
In the absence of inside information all we are left with is an opaque view of what is really going on with certification.
Having said that…somehow Airbus is able to certify its products (albeit late sometimes). This reality implies that either the FAA is biased or Boeing is incompetent.
ÀBALONE. ROB
1. I’m not a Boeing Insider.
2. There is a persistent use of the term Boeing Self Cert that is fundamentally incorrect. At no time has Boeing ever certified an aircraft all by its self.
Now, let’s look at the root of the certification delays. It’s a people problem. The FAA is always behind the industry that it regulates. This is not a new problem. If you go back in time to the Windecker Eagle, the first nearly 100% Composite aircraft certified in the United States , the certification process was significantly delayed by the lack of expertise within the FAA. Its no better today. Boeing has more people doing advanced technology things than the FAA can monitor and approve. Throw in Cessna, Piper, Bell Helicopter, Sikorski Lockeed, SpaceX, New Origin and all the unpiloted electrical aircraft by all the upstart companies, and its easy to see the delays center around FAA staffing. The focus on Boeings problems with certification timelinrd completely misses the real point. The FAA lacks the skilled people in the numbers needed to do their regulatory job across all users. It’s significantly worse after DOGE happened to their staffing. The ongoing dragged out reauthorization process stifles continuiry inside the GAA. I personally killed an STC program because the MIDO timelines stretched out so far it wasn’t worth banging my head into the wall any more. It’s truly a sad state of affairs when your MIDO reps cant analyze a data package without changing directions multiple time. necause it bounces through so many hands that they get paralyzed on fundamental decisions. Admittedly I’m not the Boeing, and I was doing a single product STC for vehicles under 12.5 gross but I got a very clear look at the process failures at a personal level. I completely understand Ortbergs comments about certification timelines as I experienced the same thing.
I would love to see exactly why Pedro says Boeing Self Certifys Aircraft, I never will because Boeing doesn’t certify their own stuff just like at a smaller scale I cant do it either. It’s a shame that so much disinformation get minted by a couple of people who seem to lack real experience inside the system…….
Rob Abalone and Pedro.
The certification timelines for all system users are being stretched out by 2 major issues
I mentioned staffing already but the second one is the Congressional Air Safety Act. This caught the entire industry when congress was actually aiming at Boeing to make themselves look like they were taking action. By ending derivative use of previously analyzed data, there were many victims…. Bell had to refly the program for its last helicopter that was supposed to use the existing 206 LongRanger daya package. Cromans new Sikorski S61 rotor blades took a lot longer than planned. Everybody got caught up in what most call an overreach of Congressional action. Every manufacturer had to create data packages from scratch when modding existing products. This created a huge wave of work they are still choking on. I initially wrote that Boeing couldn’t get the story straight on 777X TIA, Come to find out, the TIA turn on Boeing was informed of was changed to a phased TIA turn on after the fact. Not surprising, this is what happens when you are choking on work. you slow work down so your inbox stays manageable. Nobody inside the FAA will tell you how buried they are, but it’s costing our industry a pile of time to market, and Boeing is only 1 victim of this…..
@PNWgeek
Yes, the phased TIA is the thing Abalone and Pedro refuse to acknowledge or understand (which I suspect is quite willful, as noted).
This point is obvious from the charts Bjorn has provided in this article series, which clearly show overlap between various phases of certification.
What the FAA has effectively done, is eliminate much of the overlap, by processing certification packages sequentially. It’s immediately apparent from the charts that removing overlap will extend certification times, and that is what we see happening.
It’s also abundantly clear why the FAA did this, it’s a response to the MCAS changes on the 737 MAX, falling through the certification cracks created by excessive overlap.
There is also the factor that you mentioned, in terms of FAA staffing levels. The two go hand and in hand. You need multiples of staff for parallel processing.
Note that I don’t fault FAA for slowing the process. As with Boeing and their quality problems, if quality suffers you have to slow down. But also as with Boeing, the slowing is only necessary until you get quality back under control. It’s not meant to be permanent.
That is what Ortberg is really saying about the FAA, phased TIA, and the need for improvement without compromising safety. You can’t remain forever at the slower pace, and there is no reason to do so, once you establish quality in your metrics.
Therefore the pace will pick up again, at some point. I don’t have insight into that because I don’t know the FAA metrics, or how they or Boeing are doing on them. But I believe they exist and are being restored. So as mentioned, the pendulum swinging back is inevitable.
The final evidence for this is that EASA uses the same overlapping processes in certification. The only difference is their quality didn’t slip the way the FAA did, so there was no need for them to slow down. But there is no substantial difference in the process itself.
This is the factual case that I wish could be discussed here, instead of the constant fact-less hyperbole. There is a productive debate to be had on these issues, which is why Bjorn is doing this series. But it needs to be free of the frenetic, breathless, shouted, unsupported criticisms, which add nothing of merit or substance. They serve only to demonstrate the bias of their authors.
@ PNWgeek
– You’re ex-Boeing, and you often weave that into your comments…so you’re a Boeing insider.
– Self-cert doesn’t have to entail certification “all by oneself” — just a large portion without proper supervision.
– As you pointed out in your previous comment: either BA lied about getting the original TIA, or was downgraded without telling us.
– As @Casey points out: AB seems to be able to get stuff certified in a timely manner — so the problem is with Boeing.
@ Rob
All the above criticisms of BA are richly supported by an enormous body of evidence.
Simply not wishing to acknowledge the evidence doesn’t mean that it isn’t there 😉
This is the new regulatory environment after BA’s self-cert and MAX debacle.
Take a look at Gulfstream, yes, it took longer for them to certify, but their CEO never whined and does not threaten to stop new aircraft development. Ortberg should have a call with their CEO or arrange a visit to *learn* not whine.
I am also interested in what United decides re: A350s.