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Recovery of the 737 program is unglamorous and arduous: Boeing exec
By Scott Hamilton
Katie Ringgold, VP and general manager of the 737 program. Credit: Boeing.
Feb. 10, 2026, © Leeham News: Boeing’s head of the 737 program yesterday outlined how the company is recovering from six years of crisis, quality control and safety issues and repeated production slowdowns and shutdowns.
Katie Ringgold, the Vice President and General Manager, was at the annual Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance (PNAA) conference in suburban Seattle, said the long road to recovery—which has a few years more to go—has been an “unglamorous” task.
“We took time to deeply reflect on our production system. And some of that you know of what we’ve been accomplishing over the last two years. And make meaningful and arduous changes,” she said. “And I use that word intentionally. It wasn’t just hard changes. It was arduous changes.”
Ringgold noted that Boeing is now producing the 737 at the rate of 42 aircraft per month. This rate was achieved in the final months of last year. Boeing publicly has repeatedly said its goal is to increase the production rate in increments of five approximately every six months.
Ringgold, during her stage appearance, confirmed reporting by LNA in January that the 737’s North Line at the Everett widebody plant will be activated about mid-year. In this report, LNA noted that Boeing’s current 737 production plant in Renton will be capped at a rate of 47/mo. The North Line will be needed for Boeing to achieve rate 52 and beyond, ultimately toward a target of 63/mo.
Three biggest influencers
Ringgold was named program head shortly after the Jan. 5, 2024, accident in which a door plug on a new 737-9 MAX blew out on an Alaska Airlines flight that had just departed the Portland (OR) airport. There were minor injuries but no deaths in the resulting decompression. The accident started yet another crisis for Boeing that delayed by nearly two years its progress in recovering from the 2018/19 fatal crashes of two MAXes that killed 346 people.
Ringgold said that in her view, there are three overarching principals Boeing has pursued in fixing the 737 program.
“Number one, [there is] a genuine commitment to assessing our culture and making positive change,” she said.
“The second thing is a decision to stop the line. In 2024, we essentially went to a rate zero. We demanded a level of quality improvement from one of our major suppliers integral to our business. And it was a tough decision.”
Finally, she said, “Number three, a documented and disciplined method to make SMS-based decisions on line boards at our factory level. Not made at the leadership team level. My phone was no longer ringing at 11 o’clock at night because we had a disciplined process where the working team at the airplane level made appropriate decisions on when and if the aircraft was safe to move forward.”
SMS is a Safety Management System that Boeing voluntarily adopted after the two fatal MAX crashes, but which had not in practice been considered mandatory.
People
As Boeing prepares to open the North Line, the forth production line for the 737 and the first outside of the main Renton factory in 50 years, Boeing must transfer and hire people to staff the line.
“I personally believe I was selected to lead the 737 program at such a critical really crisis moment in our history because of my love for people. And so, as I started thinking about what the North Line was missing, it’s missing the most important thing we need.”
Activating a new production line in Everett requires the transfer of some 737-experienced line workers from Renton, using and training Everett-based line workers who have not built 737s before, and new hires who also require training. Ringgold acknowledged that Boeing is challenged staffing the North Line at this stage.
The learning curve for all workers on the new line takes time. LNA believes that reaching rate 52 will slip to next year. But the possibility of a delay of perhaps a year reaching rate 47 is a significant change from the previously announced goals.
“I personally believe I was selected to lead the 737 program at such a critical really crisis moment in our history because of my love for people. And so, as I started thinking about what the North Line was missing, it’s missing the most important thing we need.”
Here is a pro tip for her….check on the status of the new 8 Renton wing riveters put on order over 2 years ago (should have been in production 6 months ago) with a supplier that never built wing riveters! Also do a deep dive in the industry 4.0 requirements in spec and they will not be met!
Just saying
“with a supplier that never built wing riveters”
a name?
when looking for “Boeing Renton wing riveter” hits come up for new E-Impact machinery in ~~~2000. funnily some for B29 assembly too 😉
Yeah ,we got it .
You’ve been telling the same story, like 10 times over.
What do you expect them to do?
With long time supplier Gemcor closing up shop.
Not trying to be combative, but you’ve become quite repetitive along those lines.
“What do you expect them to do?” Boeing back in the 1970’s would be proactive on the supplier issue So do nothing and have 737 ramp up numbers slip out three years?
I have “No dog in the fight”….but in three years when Airbus is delivering over 90 single aisles a month (A320 series and A220) and Boeing is still stuck at 50 single a month (737), Airbus will have 65% market share.
Airbus delivered 607+93 = 700 NB in 2025 (slightly over 58 a month) –
Going to 1080 a year would mean that is an increase of 10 a month every year. So from 50 A32x to 60 in 2026 to 70 in 2027 to 80 in 2028 – let’s see if the supply chain copes and the engines show up …
Add in the 220-500 – which needs volume to pay back …
Lars Wagner seems convinced he can make it happen..
Having said this, the world needs Boeing to ramp up beyond the 50 a month B737 target just to cope with demand.
@Frank
Consider that AB vows to increase production of the a220 to 14/mo or so. So it probably won’t be 93 only.
Frank:
You forget COMAC is more than capable of filling the gap and with Chineesed parts, including engines.
Not an issue.
@DP:
Like OV-1, I too am puzzled.
You have made the statement repeatedly. Ok, it may be true. I surely do not have an in on Boeing staffing let alone equipment etc for any given part.
For sure there are managment failures. Got it in one.
Not having wings is kind of a big deal. Sure you can build the fusealge and park i9t outise, but its a bit glaring on the obvous part (no wings). Engine? Yea, it hiappens (ask Airbus!)
But to think management is not aware of wing build and suddenly they have fuselages pouring out of the factories and no wings?
I did see a ferry not fit into the slip on the other side of a channel one time. Not what anyone wold call obvious. You get dimension, you build to them and its confirmed you did so on Slip 1, Ferry 1 and Slip 2. No disparagement that a huge gap (well not enough of a gap) but its a given its been cross checked the Slip 1, Ferry 1 and Slip 2 are the same if built to the spec given.
That stretches the credibility, well beyond a believable.
But say you are right, in a year you can bask in the glory of having told the world first. I will be the first to say, well done (well the way the editing on Leeham is going no idea of where in the Que I will be)
So, its noted by at least two of us as well as you. You get all credit if it comes to be a realty.
Time will tell! Not looking for any credit This is not rocket science….at this point, it is or it isn’t
Trans
“But to think management is not aware of wing build and suddenly they have fuselages pouring out of the factories and no wings?”
That begs the question…currently how many completed fuselages are sitting outside in storage at Wichita? What is monthly 737 fuselage production capacity at Wichita Does that need to be upgraded, no supplier excuses now…Boeing owns it
Will continue following the MAX’s progress with real interest- esp the -7, the -10, and the engine deiicing
solution for all MAXes.
Great to see new line and progress on getting to rate 60+
Seems the next big thing is Line 2 at Everett.
““Number one, [there is] a genuine commitment to assessing our culture and making positive change,” she said.”
That’s strange — just yesterday we read here on LNA that ODAs are still being impeded and/or retaliated against when they point out failures.
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““I personally believe I was selected to lead the 737 program at such a critical really crisis moment in our history because of my love for people. And so, as I started thinking about what the North Line was missing, it’s missing the most important thing we need.””
Wow — truly amazing insight! Who’d have guessed that people are needed to run a production line?
🙈
Ms. Ringgold sounds like clearly the right choice for that
job.
#CorporateBoilerplate
Sort of a puff piece rally for Ringgold.
It’s good to see them applying the key SMS risk assessment pillar at the factory level. I just hope since she doesn’t get the 2300 phone call that she doesn’t second guess the managers making the decisions at the lower levels the next morning.
But still after 8 years! Boeing still doesn’t have a mandatory FAA approved SMS.
Voluntary to Mandatory Transition: While Boeing has had an accepted SMS in place for several years, the FAA now requires a more robust, mature system that integrates with a Quality Management System.
Current Progress: As of late 2025, Boeing has submitted its SMS Implementation Plan to the FAA and is working on maturing its programs, including enhanced safety risk management tools and training for employees.
Katie, just keep making good safe quality airplanes. My son flies them for a major airline
All the best of luck for success in Everett.
Yea Verilly
Bookmark this, and remind how far BCA has progressed each and every month:
> 63/mo
It still hasn’t convincingly stabilized at 38 p/m…not to mind 42.
But no worry: people can be very creative in defining line rates 😉
How many 737 Max were delivered last month? How many working days are there in January?
@Pedro: January historically is a seasonal decline for Boeing–and Airbus. Don’t read anything into it.
Hamilton
@Scott
I know. But that was the explanation by others.
February isn’t stellar either.
As of this morning, from Planespotters:
B737: 11
A320/321: 9
Unless the month is heavily backloaded, nominal deliveries will fall well short of targets.
@Pedro
A good approach is to take all p/m rates in a relevant period, subtract the lowest and highest scores, and then average the rest.
That excludes Jan and Dec…and probably Feb and Nov, also.
I find that BA tends to use verbs rather creatively: for example, it tends to say “achieved” where “initiated” might be more appropriate. Use of “stabilized” is even more stretched. Trumpeting such terms right at the top of quarterly reports smells like PR for investors. It’s quite evident that BA is picking up its rates, but these marquee numbers in quarterly reports don’t add up.
Boeing did really good in January beating Airbus all hollow in deliveries and sales. That information was in a thread you comented in.
“In January 2026, Boeing delivered 46 commercial aircraft, compared with 19 deliveries for Airbus. Boei
From an orders perspective, Boeing also led in January, booking 107 gross orders versus 49 for Airbus.”
Boeing had a pretty normal month, no hangover. Airbus on the other hand, well lets just say the reason the Soviet model did not work was the rush to glory then did not start out so good in the next period.
I believe this is the third time in a year Boeing beat Airbus in monthly production numbers
Abalone.
Honest question..
Why so you say they havent stabilized at 42??
Boeing only delivered 36 x 737 last month, so obviously they have not hit rate 38 there (grin)
Sorry for being rude and jumping in answering someone else question.
Trans.
Boeing doesnt quote a delivery rate, they never have. They quote their PRODUCTION RATE which is the rate that aircraft come off the assembly line and go to Post Production. The reason for this is customer variability with the post production package and the inability to make that stuff schedule in any modern MRP system. When people look at plane spotters, it will seldom if ever line up because of the hysteresis that variability drives. Even things like what time the airplane comes off the line matter because a second shift rollout works differently than a 9 am rollout. Test flights are DAY VFR ONLY because they must be able to hand fly visually in case of an instrumentation failure on a test flight. This subjects some deliverys to weather delays as the field may be below VFR minimums. Some people here refuse understand MRP and wring their hands incessantly about Boeing being dishonest when they actually refuse to understand the Mday concept and the fact that the current line rate of 42 means they deliver 2.03 airplanes per Mday FROM THE ASSEMBLY LINE TO POST PRODUCTION
Production at Boeing for 2026 off the 737 line.
If the rate is 42,
The annual rate is 504
There are 260 weekdays in a year
There are 12 holidays in 2026
260-12 = 248 Mdays in 2026
Nominal production is 504/248, or 2.03 airplanes per Mday at a rate of 42 a month.
Jan has 21 Mdays 42.63
Feb has 20 Mdays 40.06
Mar has 22 Mdays 44.26
Apr has 22 Mdays 44.26
May has 20 Mdays 40.06
Jun has 22 Mdays 44.26
Jul has 22 Mdays 44.26
Aug has 21 Mdays 42.63
Sep has 21 Mdays 42.63
Oct has 22 Mdays 44.26
Nov has 19 Mdays 39.14
Dec has 17 Mdays 34.51
This is the scheduled rate coming off the Production Line and heading into post production. There is a bit of fuzziness in post production as post production is not scheduled in the MRP system, but these numbers for rollout are what Boeing quotes as their production rate.
PEDRO
https://www.speea.org/Member_Tools/Boeing_Payday_calendar.pdf
This snippet concerns AB line rates rather than those at BA, but is very interesting:
“PARIS, Feb 13 (Reuters) – Jet engine maker CFM will do its best to meet any request for additional engines from Airbus this year, over and above agreed quantities, but its priority is to meet its existing supply commitments, Safran CEO Olivier Andries said on Friday.
“Industry sources have said Airbus is at odds with Pratt & Whitney over engine supplies for 2026, putting at risk its main production goal. Andries told reporters, however, CFM’s own forecasts did not include any provision for increasing its share of the market.”
===
Safran reported (excellent) Q4 results this morning.
Interesting — but not unexpected — that P&W is at odds with AB.
This is an interesting mess:
“United’s A350 Order In Peril Amid Rolls-Royce Legal Battle”
“As first reported by The Airline Observer, United Airlines no longer plans to take delivery of the 45 A350-900s, an aircraft it first ordered in 2009, switched to the A350-1000, added more, and then converted them back into the A350-900s in 2017.”
“Now, the airline is in a legal dispute with Rolls-Royce. In its latest annual report filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), United Airlines disclosed that, following an initial agreement with the engine maker in 2010 “for engine purchases and related maintenance services for certain widebody aircraft,” in 2017, it paid $175 million to Rolls-Royce.
“In December 2025, following a breach by Rolls-Royce, [United Airlines] issued a demand for payment representing the commitment payment plus contractual escalation.”
“Rolls-Royce did not make that payment, the airline continued, and “terminated the referenced agreements with [United Airlines] and asserted that [United Airlines] breached the agreements.”
“The carrier has “taken steps to recover the amounts it believes Rolls-Royce owes,” as well as other damages, which the airline is entitled to, the SEC filing read.
““[United Airlines] is also considering further implications of this dispute with respect to other parties,” it continued, possibly hinting that the dispute with Rolls-Royce could affect its A350-900 order.
“At the same time, on December 23, 2025, Airbus and United Airlines finalized amending the A350-900 purchase agreement, according to the SEC filing. Unfortunately, all of the key details are confidential.”
https://airinsight.com/united-a350-order-rolls-royce/
===
So, despite some speculation to the contrary, the UA A350 order was still alive in Dec. 2025 — though with deliveries deferred.
I’m confused. What does UA want? A350-900 or no A350-900?
> In the filing, United continued to show its 45 Airbus A350 jets on its books for arrival after 2027, but offered no expected delivery timetable.
> In September 2025, Chief Executive Scott Kirby told Reuters the airline expected to announce its decision on the A350 order later that year.
Constructive ambiguity..
More on the Embraer-Adani deal:
Lula da Silva visits India next week to sign various trade-related deals, and a sealing of the recently-announced Embraer-Adani deal is expected to be included:
https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-brazil-set-to-seal-trade-pharma-minerals-pacts-during-prez-lulas-visit-adani-group-embraer-also-expected-to-sign-deal/articleshow/128319000.cms