Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Dissecting Boeing CEO’s statement next new airplane will cost $50bn April 15, 2024
- Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 3. Propulsive efficiency April 12, 2024
- A350-1000 or 777-9? Part 2 April 11, 2024
- Pontifications: Boeing “transparency”–not so much. April 9, 2024
- Airbus charges and write-offs since 1999: more than €33bn April 8, 2024
Flight recorders narrow cause of AF447
Recovery of the flight recorders from Air France 447, an Airbus A330-200 that crashed into the Atlantic two years ago, appears to have quickly identified the events that led to the crash–and contrary to all those who claimed the vertical tail fell off or the A330 is a deathtrap, it appears the pilots simply weren’t trained properly to handle the events.
The Wall Street Journal has this detailed account of what investigators have found.
Lest anyone now charge that the failure to fly through the frozen pitot tube situation is exclusively an Airbus problem, Flight Global’s David Kaminsky-Morrow posted a link to a National Transportation Safety Report from 19– in which a crew stalled an airplane after the pitot tubes froze up and crashed, killing all aboard.
The aircraft? A Boeing 727-200.
The point: accidents like these often happen across OEM lines. And the actions of Airbus-haters was pretty disgusting.
It will be interesting to find out if during the upset and recovery efforts, the flight computers reverted or were reverted to primary laws which would allow extreme control movements for recovery.
Hmmm, Airbus puts out a statement last week essentially saying it was ‘pilot error’ and this week the French Investigators seem to echo that conclusion.
The A-330 was at FL-350 over the equator when the pitot tubes iced up and became blocked. They were in an area of thunderstorms and turbulance. The airplane entered an aerodynmaic high altitude stall due to slowing its airspeed (the auto-pilot had to have done this before it disconnected. It took some 15 minutes to decend from FL-350 to MSL. The aircraft hit the water in a level, or nearly level attitude. The aircraft was in warm air (warm enough to thaw the pitiot tubes) for, most likely the final 5-8 minutes of the flight (my guess). That means the airspeed indicators would have returned to show the actual airspeed and the altimeters become reliable. The crew thought they were faced with multipul emergencies. But, since it took so long for the airplane to actually hit the water that indicates that one pilot was flying the airplane while the other two were handling the emergencies. That is standard CRM, which AF does teach.
My understanding is that the decent took less than 5 minutes.
i.e 7000 .. 8000 fpm on average.
Ocean surface seems to have been hit
at 50kn forward and 100kn downward motion.
No such statement was made, you seem to be paraphrasing the newspaper spin which came out the day after the advisory note. Is there any need for that?
No such echoing had been made and the investigation is progressing to its natural conclusion.
You claim all that with absolute certainty? Being such an experienced person, you would know better not to paraphrase inaccurate and contradictory leaks and instead to wait for an official report. Your urge to bash Airbus is well noted but please do that with facts.
Take a look at the report NOVA did entitled “Crash of Flight 447.” You can stream it live on Netlfix. It interviews an experienced Airbus pilot, an air accident investigator, and a weather man from the NOAA who shows pictures of the huge weather front that F447 was flying through. It offers an answer to the question, why did the pilots fly into this huge, dangerous mess, by speculating that the plane’s radar failed to pick up the huge storm because it was blocked by a much smaller one which was right next to the big one. Once F447 emerged from the smaller storm it flew into the larger before the crew had a chance to turn and fly around it.
NOVA’s film also has detailed graphics of the A330, its construction and systems, it’s flying through the storm, and what happens to the moisture so ice could form on the tube. For laymen, they explain in detail how a stall occurs and the accepted protocal for avoiding or getting out of a stall after loss of airspeed indication. They show pilots in simulators facing what the AF 447 pilots faced. Some follow the protocal and survive. A surpirising number of others fail. Well worth watching.
Isn’t it amazing how the pitoit tube icing (due to a failure of the heating system) can lead to indications of multipul emergencies (some of them false), overwelming the crew, and it is not the fault of the airplnes design? Thus Airbus concludes it was pilot error, their default conclusion.
Your default level of ignorance, more like. Why not post your theories on anet, including where you got the “15 minute” descent?
That is the time period of the messages automaticly sent to AF maintenance from the airplane. The pitiot problem and airspeed indicator errors were sent approximately 18 minutes before water impact. Based on the multipul systems alarms, sent to maintenance, began at about 15 minutes, which is the time AF beleieves the stall occured. It will take the DFDR and DCVR to confirm these times. I don’t know where Uwe got a 5 minute decent from FL-350 to the water, but you don’t seem to question his timeline, only mine? Why?
BTW, a.net is made up of mostly amatures, with a few experts. They are even more opinionated than I am, except they don’t have experience (other than riding in an airline seat) that the few professionals, and I have about flying, airplane/airport design, accident investigation, etc. A.net is a pro-Airbus, pro-EU, anti-US, and anti-Boeing site.
The available ACARS messages span ~5 ( relevant :4) minutes 02:10 .. 02:14
02:10 position report,
02:11 .. 02:14 various state information incl
“cabin pressure rising fast” ( afair )
ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Automated_messages
“Amateur” A.net and you posting a lot there is indicative ;-?
Someone ( looks like he knows his stuff ) has done some calculations:
http://msquair.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/the-af-447-cabin-vertical-speed-advisory/
http://msquair.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/af-447-cabin-vertical-speed-pt-ii/
cite snippets:
Having previously calculated the altitude at which the safety valve opened (6,898.5 ft) and knowing that the valve opened at 2:14:26
The BEA identified a range of potential causes for the failure to transmit this message but the most credible is the impact and subsequent destruction of the aircraft between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
This would result in a time of impact (toi) of 2:15:23.
#########
Rest of his postings seems to be worth reading too.
Where does Airbus say the pilots were at fault!?
Please provide all of us a source for this continous claim of yours.
Airbus sent out a notice to the airlines flying its planes, notifying them that the initial data does not indicate any safety problems. From WSJ, “Airbus last week, however, issued a bulletin reassuring airlines that the preliminary readout of the recorders hasn’t prompted any “immediate recommendation” regarding the safety of the global A330 fleet.”
Nothing there says that the pilots were to blame nor that the investigation is complete.
Airbus also sent out a press release after this event to explain that the investigation is far from over and that certain silly people should not yet draw conclusions.
BEA also has not made any statements to this effect. You are reacting to what a journalist at the Wall Street Journal has to say, supposedly based on comments from someone who is not authorized to make such statements. Makes you wonder why they aren’t authorized for that, doesn’t it!?
The next point or question is, should a professional commercial pilot be expected to be able to handle the loss of the pitot probe?
It seems that some, according to the WSJ article, do expect them to be able to do so.
If they are not expected to be able to handle such an event, then I guess you can have your pound of Airbus flesh.
Actually the Pitot heating does not fail but is overwhelmed by icing
due to environmental conditions going well beyond mandated specs.
_This is the core finding from BEA research in respect to AF447_
Looks like differences ( by type and manufacturers ) are marginal.
i.e. while one type succumbs at 180% of spec the next one cloggs at
190% ( And encountered conditions were beyond 200% as an example ).
So exchanging Pitots isn’t the “obvious and perfect fix ” that
some people make it out to be.
It seems the pitiot problem is only with the Thades equipment. Even Airbus has a recommendation out to airlines (released in 2001) to replace the Thades pitiot tubes with one from a different manufacture. Airbus has known about this problem on the A-330 and A-340 series for a decade now, yet still offers the Thades as OEM installed equipment.
Dude, they are called pitot tubes (named after the , auuughhh, French engineer, Henri Pitot), not pitiot tubes or pitoit tubes as you have written (#6 & #13) and the company’s name is Thales, not Thades.
Qantas’ 380 crew climbing out of Singapore had a similar experience when #2 engine blew. I have read that only the unusual extra crew, on board for training, saved the day because there were enough crew to work thru the cascading messages. Some training. Beats a simulator. The NOVA piece I mentioned presents an analysis of the differences for pilots between flying A’s heavilly copmputer basewd planes and one on which pilots do a lot more of the flying. I don’t know that they answer the question, which is, do computer pilots actually fly hands on enough so that when they have to they can fly. they know how?
“The point: accidents like these often happen across OEM lines. And the actions of Airbus-haters was pretty disgusting.”
Really? This is what you have to offer as a professional analysis? How about asking why in the 21st century the flying public is still being put at risk by problems identified half a century ago. And I’m quite sure all of those “Boeing-haters”, who would normally laugh at any comparison between a B727 and an A330, will gladly regurgitate this non sequitur ad infinitum in defense of Airbus.
Your biases are not usually so obvious, and your analysis is little more than blogosphere fodder. The deceased deserve better.
That techonological marvel, the venerable B-2, once crashed due to water, not ice, just water, in the pitot system. Fortunately no lives were lost, because the crew were able to eject. That is not an option on a mere commercial passenger aircraft.
Why don’t we wait for the Friday update from BEA before leaping to further conclusions?
Actually the B-2 crashed because one sensor for the attitude input into the computer was wet, it was not an airspeed problem. After lift off, the nose kept raising and would not respond to pilot inputs, that airplane stalled at a very low altitude (about 125′ AGL).
But, there are major differences between the B-2 accident and the A-330 accident, for one the bomber crashed on land, the A-330 into deep water and took over 2 years to find. This makes a detailed investigation of the wreckage impossible for the Airbus, and easily done for the bomber.
“Water intrusion in air-data sensors caused a B-2 bomber to crash during takeoff Feb. 23 from Andersen AFB, Guam, a top Air Force official said in mid-May. The skin-flush sensors, which collect information about air pressure and density, much like a pitot tube on a conventional aircraft, provide angle-of-attack and yaw data to the B-2’s computerized flight-control system.” (from http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/July%202008/0708world.aspx).
The point is, a very expensive, high technology aircraft was lost due to water on its skin.
Well, for the last two years the blogosphere has seen a proliferation of haunt jaunting sciolists who’s been busy pontificating on supposedly how poorly designed and dangerous Airbus manufactured aircraft truly are. These sciolists have, among other things, alleged/claimed that the Vertical Tail Plane (VTF) on AF flight 447 separated at altitude (i.e. allegedly similar to way in which the VTF on American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus A300-600, came off shortly after take-off), and don’t get me started on how these people have been alledgeing, over and over again, that supposedly, you can’t override the Airbus flight envelope system, which is a total misrepresentation of how the flight control systems actually operate on A320/A330/A340 and the A380.
Any reasonably objective observer will agree that clearly, this is disgusting behavior; hence this has nothing to do about ”defending” Airbus. If anyone has gotten a bias directed towards any of the OEMs, it’s you!
You misinterpret. This was commentary, not analysis. All those who slammed the A330 as unsafe and asserted the tail fell off fell into the “disgusting” category. Pitot tube issues fall across differing manufacturers; the tail didn’t “fall off” until the airplane hit the water. One could easily question the safety of the 737 considering the two in-flight skin failures on Southwest airplanes in 2009 and 2011–but we’ve not seen a rash of slams such as was seen in connection with the AF447.
As for “analysis,” it was pretty obvious from the moment that investigators determined the A330 hit the water flat at a high rate of speed that a high altitude upset occurred and the pilots recovered just as they ran out of altitude. The reason for the upset was the key. It came out quickly that the flight envelope at 35,000 was very narrow–and an analysis of the circumstances led pretty quickly to the conclusion that a stall occurred. The point of of the NWA 727 crash was that stalls in connection to pitot tube icing are “old-hat,” so-to-speak.
A330 pilots have been dealing with iced pitot tubes for years. AF447 was the only one to crash. The question is why didn’t these pilots “fly the airplane” through the event? This remains to be seen.
Don’t confuse “commentary” with “analysis,” DK. We don’t.
High automation, while preventing downside risks , could also lead to overwhelming the pilots at the controls ; in terms of philosophy, I would as a passenger would prefer the Boeing way – which places the human element ahead of the smart computer/ automation systems.
In my opinion, if you focus on aviating, in situations like the 447 incident , with simpler systems, you have a better chance of managing the risks.
I do not want to get into an A vs B war here, but simpler systems and human control of the plane enables sharper focus on safety in times of pressure and hopefully the well trained pilots will get the plane fly safer.
I think there is something in this. It looks like pilots can get overwhelmed when planes switch suddenly from highly automated normal operations to totally manual ones in emergency situations. It’s not a manufacturer issue, in the sense that all planes are becoming ever more automated. Indeed, there’s no reason to reject this trend in general. But I think there is an issue that needs addressing. Whether it’s better pilot training, more ground support for incidents like this, or systems that allow a more graceful degradation.
The air savety guy on flight global has
this on his agenda for some time.
Processes tend to go from “flying the airplane” to “carefully observe if the airplane is flying itself correctly”.
Leaned back complacency and/or a lack of educated scepticism is a rising component in air accidents and incidents.
Maybe they need to eliminate the auto pilot function. That would eliminate, or at least severely reduce incidents like the one where the 2 guys were so busy discussing their new holiday schedule planning, they forgot to land at their airport!
Or perhaps ensure a pilot always has his/her hands on the controls, even while the auto pilot is set, through some sort of dead man’s switch!
The procedure is “flight with unreliable airspeed”: maintain a power setting consistent with level flight at the cruise altitude, current weight, and desired [but no longer displayed] airspeed. The FMC should have the weight; the altitude would be the last setting on the autopilot, hopefully still available from the static ports, (not the pitot tubes). The ops manual should have had tables listing the required power setting; the data may have even been in the FMC or, if available, from an on-board laptop
However (and the Nova program may have mentioned this) at night in heavy turbulence, in a flight deck suddenly awash in visual and aural alarms, warnings and advisories, plus multiple failure messages, the crew may have been overwhelmed by too much information to determine what procedure to follow and in what priority until it was too late; by then the airplane may have been in an unrecoverable deep stall.
This could have been aggravated by Airbus’s lack of back-driven throttle levers – if the autothrottles had reduced power due to bad air data, the throttle levers would have stayed put; the only crew indication would have been on the center display
WSJ and Nova notwithstanding this is all speculation for now and speculation it must remain until the investigators complete their work over the coming months.
In any emergency, the very first responsibility is to “fly the airplane”. That means one pilot is only tasked with the actual flying, and other pilots and crew mambers respond to the emergency(s), look up stuff, and support the pilot actually flying. This is one of the first steps in CRM. I know it is taught heaverily in the USAF, and major airlines around the world.
I would assume, but don’t actually know for sure if this is standard for AF.
That’s funny because in reply #2 you actually claimed:
” That is standard CRM, which AF does teach.”
I would really like to know if professional commercial pilots are expected to be able to deal with the loss of the pitot probe due to blockage of some sort.
Could anybody out there (a commercial pilot, for example) clarify this?
It just may serve to save alot of unnecessary and redundant comments.
What would the FAA or NTSB position on this be?
Leeham, not you !
By relaying the WSJ article, you are only widespredding and giving credit to a article stupid enough from Der Spiegel, and Le Figaro.
The BEA has clearly criticized all the curent articles published regarding the FDR/FCVR as it is still analyzing the data.
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/com17mai2011.en.php
I really hope that you update your post, and watch for a formal announcement from the BEA regarding any information about what happened.
Until then, it’s only journalistic sensasionalism without any solid information behind it. And it’s a disgrace to see such a thing on your site.
BEA has criticized the RELEASE of the information in the WSJ, Der Spiegel, and Le Figaro. They have not criticized the information that those news outlets published. There is a difference.
But, you are correct, at this point it is ‘jornalistic sensasionalism’ until the BEA report comes out on Friday.
The question to BEA is, if the information contained on the DFDR and DCVR has already been processed, and apparently released to AF and Airbus, as well as the ‘leak’ reported on, why wait until Friday?
That leads people to think someone needs to ‘adjust’ the conclusions of that information farmed from the DFDR and DCVR.
BEA have have clearly said:
“Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories.”
It clearly criticizes the articles and the non validity of the information.
You don’t really think we were relying *only* on WSJ, do you?
do you assume ( know;-) that all publications drank from the same pool?
The articles don’t read like rumor propagation ( loose some info, gain some in the process ), more like a single source.
My mistake then, but quoting (only ?) the WSJ seems to indicate otherwise.
However, at this point, I’d rather wait for a few more days to have the detailed initial report from the BEA than relaying on “on-dit”.
(Sorry for the harshness of my previous message btw !)
Due to how we often come by our information, it’s common that we can’t attribute or detail where or even what we learn or how much we know. For instance, what we know about Boeing’s new airplane plans far exceeds what we can write about. What we know about the orders likely to be announced at Paris is something we can’t go into. It’s the nature of the beast, as they say.
The irony lies in your “professional” commentary being of equally poor value as a misinformed amateur one, due to what can only be described as your extreme bias and sheer hatred for anything Airbus. While your fellow cheerleaders may applaud your efforts, those who value objectivity – whether true professionals or mere amateurs like myself – see right through it. I respect your service in the military and knowledge in the industry, but in the forums you’re unfortunately putting much of this knowledge to waste. It’s a shame, really.
This couldn’t be further from the truth as the population is certainly skewed in favor of Boeing. It’s just that your clouded rhetoric typically gets called out rather quickly by respected individuals who place value in facts.
OK, People, let’s stop the A.net stuff and who is biased toward what. Get back to the issues, not the philosophies and accusations.
I said AF teaches CRM, but I didn’t know if they actually use it in the cockpit.
What is the point of teaching it if they don’t use CRM in the cockpit?
Incidently, the WSJ piece actually claims that the crew have been busy dealing with the speed failure and forgot to deal with actually flying the plane. No mention of ‘deep stalls’ or anything of that nature. Which reinforces my point about the inconsistent and contradictory leaks coming out all over the place. Better to wait for an official statement from the BEA.
Sorry but I can’t resist…
I see your rants on a.net very often and I mostly dismiss them just by the way you express them, because I don’t have the knowledge for have a more technical discussion.
But I read A.net nearly every day and when you say “A.net is a pro-Airbus, pro-EU, anti-US, and anti-Boeing site” you lost all my credibility, if I have one impression from reading A.net is that the Boeing fans out number the Airbus fans by a few magnitudes
It is obvious that mistakes were made and failures occurred, because the aircraft crashed and people perished. Pointing fingers does no good and besides it is not up to us to resolve the issues. The aircraft type has a very good safety record and crew was trained; however on that night is wasn’t enough. We pray for the victims and their families and hope some good comes from this tragedy.
several years ago i was aircrew on an airliner-derivative military heavy flying in south america. i was in the cockpit for takeoff and climb out of buenos aires. as we got to initial cleared altitude and started to level off, an awful, horrific low-frequency vibration started under the cockpit floor– i could feel the battering through my feet. i then witnessed effective CRM in action. the pilot flying asked the 2P+FE for an immediate level-off, fuel dump, and return and descent to the airport, and he continued to fly the airplane. we discussed the vibration for a very few seconds, but couldn’t establish cause. they contacted departure, declared the need to dump fuel to get down to max landing weight. the whole process was professional, calm and low-key. we dumped, returned and landed uneventfully.
inspection of the nose wheel well revealed that unknown to the crew, argentine customs had unsnapped two heavy canvas covers in the well looking for contraband, and failed to properly re-secure them. they came loose when airflow thru the wheel well increased at level-off.
both pilots and the flight engineer were highly-trained retired military. training and cool heads saved our bacon.
i’ll bet some effective CRM training could’ve done the same for AF447.
simulators save lives.
Jim – see the NOVA piece I reference above. It is clear just yesterday from the French that the plane crashed because of a stall which the NOVA piece speculated had happened. Accoriding to them, there is a protocal in place to respond to stalls like these arising from inaccurate airspeed data, which requires that the pilots take control of the plane from the computers and acutally fly the plane. The questioon posed by the piece is, does heavy computeriztion of aircraft flying mean that pilots are less capable of actually flying a plane in a crisis?
short answer is yes, christopher.
it sounds trite, but in real airplanes it’s absolutely critical that somebody fly the airplane, regardless of distractions.
the results of nobody flying are always the same.
again, sim time is the best investment a flying outfit can make.
BEA publication ( extremely noninterpretive ):
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/info27may2011.en.php
http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf
Topboom’s 15 minutes fit into 263 secons:
From 2 h 10 min 05 , the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said
..
The recordings stopped at 2 h 14 min 28.
The last recorded values were
a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min, ( uwe: about 140kn )
a ground speed of 107 kt,
pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll angle of 5.3 degrees left
and a magnetic heading of 270 degrees.
It smells to me like this computer v pilot-flying-the-plane question is headed for big time litigation against AB because there is growing evidence that their computerized flight system cannot be managed in an emergency. Think Qantas A380 engine explosion and resulting cascading messages. When AB and BEA say that the accident resulted from (dead) pilot error, that does not excuse AB if they should have foreseen that emergencies such as these would occur (they certainly did foresee these risks), and their computer systems makes it unreasonable difficult to get out of these emergencies when other more pilot related systems make it easier. I am certain that aviation accident plaintiffs’ law firms, particularly in litigation friendly USA, are salivating at these revelations from the “black boxes.”
One reason the BEA report is “noninterpretive”.
From the sparse information given I would not
go towards “overwhelmed by error messages”.
More like openeyed and calmly going down
in a full stall. i.e. a silent FUBAR situation.
roger FUBAR.
last ten seconds or so of CVR will be very revealing but likely unrevealed.
i have decided opinions supported by anecdotal evidence, of french software authors, but will not pile on here.
Software ( from whomever ) doesn’t seem to have that
big a place here.
IMHO it is a case of CRM going FUBAR
Where did the PF have his eyes while pulling on the
stick all the time?
Did he try to pull himself upright
by way of the sidestick? unconciously?
( remember attitude was 30++° up in an
unaccelerated fall. Must have felt strange.
fuselage oriented 0.85g down _and_ .5g to the back )
Oh dear, since the loss of AF flight 447; why have I not been surprised seeing so much unfounded, unnecessarily critical BS proliferating in the blogosphere directed towards Airbus. At least, the agenda driven A-bashers could have had the common courtesy to wait for BEAs preliminary analysis (apparently due out later this summer) of why, for example, the AOA, when it was valid, remained above 35 degrees during the decent; before going all bananas and salivating on the “prospect” that “finally” there’s enough “evidence” to “prove” that Airbus’ “computerized flight system” is more or less, uncontrollable during an emergency. Yeah, right!
There have been disputes and valid questions asked about the computer control of basic flying abilities of Airbus FBW equipped aircraft since the crash of AF-296 in June 1988. The pilot, and others, connected to that A-320 crash, IIRC, were convicted of manslaughter (3 passengers were killed in the accident). However, in the months before that accident Airbus issued 2 OEBs for the A-320;
OEB 19/1: Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low AltitudeThis OEB noted that the engines may not respond to throttle input at low altitude.
OEB 06/2: Baro-Setting Cross CheckThis OEB stated that the barometric altitude indication on the A-320 did not always function properly.
Airbus has always accepted these unfortunate crashes, involving computer controlled FBW aircraft as ‘pilot error’. While some Airbus aircraft accidents, like AF-358 at YYZ in 2005 and EK-407 at MEL in 2009 were truely pilot errors, that does not mean all Airbus FBW computer controlled accidents are. The QF-32 accident does show the computer system will display/alert on multipul emergencies beyond the initial, and possibly most important emergency. QF-32 had the benefit of additional experienced pilots actually in the seats at the time. AF-447 had 2 less experienced co-pilots in the seats at the time.
So the B-52 and C-17 Airshow crashes were also due to Airbus FBW faults ;-?
Commercial Airliners are not consumer vehicles were you are mandated
to provision for each and every whim of user induced dumbness.
Oh, I see Uwe, defend Airbus by trying to bring in the crashes of two Boeing products that crashed due to very aggressive flying, outside of USAF regulations? In both cases, the PIC was to blame. BTW, the B-52H is far from FBW, and seems to work just fine without it.
I sited some Airbus accidents that were clearly not caused by the FBW computer, and were true pilot error cases.
The AF-296 accident is relevent here because the computer was alleged to have prevented the pilots from recovering the aircraft.
Basic flying skills taught for a high altitude stall is to lower the nose, not raise it, as seems to be what happened to AF-447 Even the newest co-pilots should know that. The question now becomes ‘did the pilot flying the aircraft command that manuver, or did the computer command it?
As per report: “the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up”
Let me know if your require translation to an even more basic comprehension level 😉
“Let me know if your require translation to an even more basic comprehension level”
Thank you, but no thanks. I am fully capablie of reading it, but also trying to make sense of it.
“the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up”
I know, that just doesn’t make any sense at all. If you are in a stall at altitude, you lower the nose, not raise it. What was the thrust selected for the PF, and did the engines provide the power needed, or did the computer command otherwise?
That question, along with several other questions is critcal and must be accurately and truthfully answered.
Readers have been warned to behave. Some of you have been unable to restrain yourselves.
Comments are closed.