Pontifications: Boeing violated previous FAA ODA, SMS demands—Been there, done that

March 5, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) last week gave The Boeing Co. 90 days to come up with a real program that has measurable results to fix safety and quality shortcomings.

By Scott Hamilton

The move follows the release on Feb. 26 of a year-long safety audit by a panel of 24 industry experts appointed by the FAA. More than 50 recommendations were made. Much of the focus was on failures in Boeing’s Organization Designation Authority (ODA), the Safety Management System (SMS), and pressure and fear of retaliation of employees who came forward with alerts about safety issues during aircraft production at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA).

ODAs are employed by Boeing but represent the FAA. The FAA is considering establishing an independent ODA system at Boeing.

In giving Boeing 90 days to come up with a solid safety program, Administrator Mike Whitaker was blunt: “Boeing must commit to real and profound improvements. Making foundational change will require a sustained effort from Boeing’s leadership, and we are going to hold them accountable every step of the way, with mutually understood milestones and expectations.”

Boeing is the top aerospace company with the most fines and number of records, according to the website Violation Tracker. This is for all types of fines, including aviation safety, environmental, worker safety (under the USA’s OSHA), etc. Detail of Boeing’s aviation safety violations is below. Boeing’s number above includes the $2.5bn fine for the 2018-19 MAX crisis. Airbus includes a $500m settlement to the US Department of Justice for ITAR violations. Click on image to enlarge.

But Boeing and the FAA have been down this road before. Boeing and the FAA established the ODA systems ago and the SMS was created in 2019. The FAA previously fined Boeing for failing to follow through on elements of both programs.

Boeing fined for violations

In December 2015, Boeing was fined $12m to “enhance its compliance systems.” Even then, Boeing had committed to establishing an SMS. In the 2015 settlement, Boeing agreed to “Implement the Safety Management Systems (SMS) plan BCA has developed to meet internationally accepted standards, throughout the company’s activities,” the FAA announced.

It took another four years before Boeing committed to SMS, the FAA wrote on Feb. 29.

“The plan must also include steps Boeing will take to mature its Safety Management System (SMS) program, which it committed to in 2019. Boeing also must integrate its SMS program with a Quality Management System, which will ensure the same level of rigor and oversight is applied to the company’s suppliers and create a measurable, systemic shift in manufacturing quality control,” the FAA said in a statement issued on Feb. 29.

Déjà vu all over again

Last week’s 90-day demand mirrors much of what was agreed to in the 2015 settlement. Among a long list of Boeing commitments then are:

  • To improve its internal audit processes, audit teams will be required to report directly to BCA’s Vice President of Quality, and conduct audits across all processes (Engineering, Supplier Management, Production, Modification, Repair and Customer Support) at all sites.
  • To determine whether incomplete work is being accepted, conduct an initial set of audits of its suppliers, analyze the results and consult with the FAA on audit findings.
  • Report to the FAA at least annually about the effectiveness of BCA’s regulatory compliance activities, including a final and comprehensive report after the fifth year of the agreement.
  • Report to the FAA each quarter the results of any internal audits pertaining to safety management, regulatory compliance, corrective action implementation and sustainment, process compliance and conforming products.

The settlement expired on Jan. 1, 2021. The following month, the FAA fined Boeing $6.6m for failing to live up to its 2015 settlement. It deferred $5.4m of the fine.

“Boeing failed to meet all of its obligations under the settlement agreement, and the FAA is holding Boeing accountable by imposing additional penalties,” FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said in a press release announcing the new penalties. “I have reiterated to Boeing’s leadership time and again that the company must prioritize safety and regulatory compliance, and that the FAA will always put safety first in all its decisions.”

Boeing was beginning to emerge from the 2018-2019 MAX crisis. The 737 MAX was grounded in March 2019 following the second fatal crash in five months. The two accidents killed 346 people. The FAA recertified the MAX in November 2020.

More Déjà vu

In August 2020, the FAA fined Boeing $1.25m for violations of the ODA program at the 787 factory in Charleston (SC). The FAA “alleged violations in the program that allows the aircraft manufacturer to perform certain functions on behalf of the FAA. The FAA alleges that Boeing managers exerted undue pressure or interfered with the work of FAA designees….”

According to the website Violation Tracker, Boeing paid $163.6m for 36 instances of aviation safety-related fines. Through 2023, that’s an average of $711,455 a year—peanuts for a company like Boeing. Fines of this puny level are considered the cost of doing business by many companies.

Source: Violation Tracker. Click on image to enlarge.

Real penalties, not peanuts

Perhaps for the first time, Boeing faces real penalties, not peanut fines. The FAA didn’t say what will happen if Boeing fails to meet the latest demands and to truly fix the issues identified in the Feb. 26 report. Boeing already is under heightened scrutiny following the Jan. 5 accident involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.

The FAA also capped Boeing’s new aircraft production rate at 38 per month, even though Boeing is assembling 737s at a far lower rate. After the 2018-2019 MAX crisis began, the FAA revoked Boeing’s “ticketing authority” for individual 737 and 787 aircraft deliveries. FAA inspectors assumed responsibility for certifying the aircraft were ready, a process Boeing performed for decades. Boeing’s ticketing authority remains revoked.

Since fines appear meaningless to Boeing, the FAA’s current actions have real impact. But it has a nuclear option. The FAA could revoke Boeing’s Production Certificate. Doing so means production would have to stop.

This is an extreme and probably unlikely action. The impact on the customers, US exports, suppliers and the US economy would be huge. With Boeing already weakened financially, theoretically such an impact could threaten Boeing with bankruptcy. One would expect Boeing would do all it can to avoid becoming the target of this nuclear option.

Long time to reform

It’s taken Boeing decades to find itself in this predicament. Correcting and reforming itself will take a long time. The FAA’s previous fines amounted to a so-what. Such impotent action makes the FAA culpable in Boeing’s long decline in safety.

Will this time truly be different?

171 Comments on “Pontifications: Boeing violated previous FAA ODA, SMS demands—Been there, done that

  1. What a mess.

    Would be interesting to know who set the fine amounts, what other options were available (eg to apportion fines to individuals rather than corporates), what their backgrounds are, what guidance they received, and what the applicable laws require and/or allow.

    And when (I suppose really if) there will finally be an action, probably class, brought for damages that is sufficiently high profile and eye wateringly costly that it makes Boeing’s top brass, and the FAA, get their act together.

    • The whole idea of the corporation born of the XIVth amendment to the Constitution (https://www.history.com/news/14th-amendment-corporate-personhood-made-corporations-into-people) is that you can no longer fine individuals since they are all cozily subsumed in the Corporation, that’s what incorporation is all about. It is obvious that individuals are to blame, notably top management, they’re running the company after all, but incorporation seems to depersonalize responsibility and we are nowhere near the end of our troubles in this regard.

      • “is that you can no longer fine individuals since they are all cozily subsumed in the Corporation, that’s what incorporation is all about.”

        You can fine the Collective.
        .. and isn’t the US rather fond of the death penalty?
        I would not expect opposition in the case of mass murder.

  2. Reading this could make you really angry. It shows how the Boeing Management just completely ignores the FAA and does what they want.
    My suggestion would be, to arrest Managers and put them in jail for a minimum of a year, starting with the very top. Arrest one after the 90 days. After that, arrest each week another one.
    I’m pretty sure with that kind of outlook, the FAA’s requests would be implemented in record time.

    • I tend to agree (at this stage and with so many ‘escapes’). You can be sure as Sherlock that the blue collar workers who will be identified as being part of the missing bolts (etc.) will be out the door, but those who applied pressure to hurry up will not.

      • The IAM people involved wont be fired. They are union and that’s IMHO is not proper recourse when, after all no executives have taken a fall.
        The same goes for this comment about putting managers in jail. Yeah right that will solve everything.

        • There is a reason why Airbus set up shop in the US
          in a Right To Work state.
          ( and why most other foreign manufacturers do the same.)

          • But it does not work for Boeing the way it works for Airbus, does it?

            Airbus has extensively educated/schooled its workforce for Mobile at the main plant in Finkenwerder, Hamburg.

            essentially the same path Volkswagen took with its manufacturing sites abroad. Qualify the workforce do German standards. Respect them.

          • Uwe

            That is an excellent point about how Airbus trains to their standards for Mobile.
            You’re correct, Boeing is much different and not in a good way. Meaning the way things function in Charleston is much different than in Seattle since it’s all union labor.

          • Boeing treats the experience of it’s work force as just another expense to be minimized. It has intentionally gotten rid of most experienced workers, one way or another.

          • I’ve said it all along, it is not even a gray area. Boeing leadership is not that concerned with rules, laws and fair play. They operate above the law with impunity, as do “many” in this new business environment.

          • “Boeing leadership is not that concerned with rules, laws and fair play. ”

            not limited to Boeing. That quip covers the whole US commercial and political sphere.
            Only Boeing has further progressed into a clash of projection with reality. ( up front due to a state of deterioration reached that really clashes with hard reality not because their acts stick out further )

        • It might ‘put manners on them’, and stop them moving through similar roles in other manufacturers. Something has to change, and new ‘names, buzzwords, and abbreviations’ for half-arsed production methods isn’t it.

    • Harry Stonecipher started the cultural shift at Boeing and James McNerney perfected it. They are responsible for the Boeing culture you see today.

      • Really its not much different than the rest of corporate america, Jack Welch just helped speed things up. What I would really like to see is a story on how many companies the Jack Welch disciples have ruined, and lets be clear they talk bad about McDonnell Douglas being the issue, the issue was Harry Stonecipher was hired into McDonnell before the merger and was brought over. It’s been one ex GE leader after another and obviously the irony is lost on the good ole boy BOD. For all the sharevalue trust stuff, if they had just performed on 787 and done what they normally had done in the past they would have been so much further ahead but nope…lets look at short list:

        Harry Stonecipher- In the name of RONA (Return on Net Assests) sold Boeing Wichita and other sites, I know one in St. Louis sold to GKN is wanting to close shop, Boeing is suing. Was the great mastermind on pushing out the design and build to 787 partners, know how that worked out
        James Mcnerney – Union busting extraordinaire, used every leverage possible to stick it to the union, continued and accelerated the sourcing and cost cutting, we see how that has worked out, union contract coming up, not looking like a great strategy
        Short reprieve with Dennis Muilenberg (BA) – BA Engineer that somehow drank the GE koolaid I guess, was hopeful that Boeing was going to make changes and nope….
        Back to the GE re-treads Dave Calhoun – Was brought onto the BOD back in 2009 so guess who was involved in a lot of the things that McNerney was doing etc, has had 4+ years to do something and what has he really accomplished, nothing has changed, no long term vision etc…
        And finally what do they do, the new CFO is an ex GE employee, I mean why not its worked so well.

        Anyway, Jack Welch GE disciples are the ones that have ruined the company, and we are not the only ones. I honestly not sure if commercial will ever recover, I see no real changes being made. Now its how we can source more work to India and elsewhere, everything is still driven by cost as the top concern. Still no long term vision in place, by the time they get to a place where they want to do a new airplane not sure they will have the workers left that actually know how to accomplish it. Really sad state of affairs but that is just where Boeing is today.

        • @biscuit

          “What I would really like to see is a story on how many companies the Jack Welch disciples have ruined”

          Read the books Lights Out and Jack Welch, The Man Who Destroyed Capitalism. I think Lights Out is the better and more comprehensive of the two. The latter is more of a hit piece.

          • @Scott

            Let’s examine what a dire basket case, GE was just about 7 years ago. The stock was >$10/share.
            The BOD and CEO, Larry Culp at the time put the ‘ Welch way’ in the garbage bin and look what a turn around they are today, highly respected and very profitable. Stock price today ~$156.

            This was recently announced:


            Which I think is going to need to happen for Boeing to get back to being successful. One can only hope.
            Let’s also not forget that many of today’s leadership at Boeing are also former McDonnell Douglas rejects, not just GE. The Mickey D business model, IMHO is more catastrophic than GE.

            I do believe the Welch way is still taught in many business schools.

          • Couldnt we replace Boeing executive management with AI?
            Surely artificial intelligence would outperform natural stupidity.

          • I think the problem with the GE-Welch-Calhoun mentality is all about their time horizon. Commercial aviation is an inherently long term business, while their business philosophy is extremely short term. Hence the problem: a fundamental mismatch between the industry and Boeing management philosophy.

          • ” time horizon ”

            An industry with a long time horizon ( and associated large “value potential” ) gives you much more time to loot before the markers of failure poke through the skin.
            Add a deeply perfected PR machine that tells onlookers what to think.

          • Agreed. They can cut costs in all sorts of irresponsible and ill-considered ways and the inevitable failures may take years to occur, long enough for a couple generations of executive to be long gone and sucking down margaritas on the beach somewhere.
            They call this “unlocking value”, ie, fancy talk for looting.

          • Im reading of more and more finance people questioning the influence of large, passive investors, ie, index funds such as vanguard. Passive funds like this are forced to buy and hold a company like Boeing,and unlikely to push for change even if it’s management appears to be destroying the company.

          • Pulling the production certificate might be the only way to force real change at the top of Boeing.
            It’s another question of short term vs. long term. Pulling their ticket would really hurt in the short term, but if it forces real change would be the best thing in the long term.
            But, it’s not going to happen until a plane load of Americans goes down on American soil.

      • You are absolutely right. The GE thugs destroyed an engineering=focused company. Stone inherent made no bones about destroying the engineering culture at Boeing

        • Boeing, GE may be the light house project for gutting a system.
          But the methods are pervasive in the US “capitalist” system.
          I do wonder where the loot is stored.

          • I think the top executives take a nice chunk of the loot, and the rest goes to the shareholders. Big shareholders take a bunch, and the rest is scattered over the mom and pop shareholders.

    • Withdrawing the production certificate might be a nuclear option but it might be necessary unless Boeing truly complies with the demands being made of it. What’s the alternative? Allowing aircraft to be built under a shoddy and non-compliant regime? There has to be meaningful acceptance of the necessity of change, and the willingness to implement it or everyone’s time is being wasted.

    • Now there’s a plan – and make it a proper jail, not low security, lax one for middle class offenders!

  3. Why no take a step back and use the DER system instead? One would think that most issues that pop up in production on the 737MAX should have been addressed several times on the 737-100 – 737-900ER before in the DER system.

    • Claes.
      There are about 143 ODAs. Only 2 of Boeings are compromised. Wjere is the logic of making everybody go back ro the DER system. Its a step backwards

      • It worked better before. Ideally the DER’s should be paid by the FAA with competitive salaries and benefits reflecting the importance of their work and be shielded from production/delivery pressure

        • Claes:

          When you say worked before you ignore history.

          The FAA failed on the 737 rudder problem, they failed on the 787 thrust reverser deploy and they failed on the DC-10.

          Boeing had the experience that mostly worked. I well remember the totally denial of the rudder design on the 737 have a possible fault path.
          Ditto the 767 thrust reverse deployment.

          The main failure began when management undermined the system deliberately vs the arrogance that Boeing could do no wrong (which also lead to Airbus surviving) .

          The FAA may have had gold standard regs, they did not have Gold Standard application.

  4. Interesting table:
    look at average fine per instance:
    Boeing @ 34million per ..
    Airbus @ 59million per ..

    did Airbus “screw the pooch” each time
    or do we see “leveling the table ops” here?

    Hmm, Boeing volume rebates?

    • Airbus has one fine of $500M and eight more averaging $4M each.

      • Airbus 9 fines (4 for aviation safety), Boeing 122 (36 aviation safety)!

        • We can all read.
          My eye was on fine amount per event.
          With Airbus showing the higher fine ( per event and on average )

          What was the $500m fine levied on?

          • @Uwe: The $500m fine was levied against Airbus as part of the big bribery investigation that resulted in more than $4bn in fines. The $500m paid to DOJ was for violating ITAR rules, which limits technology included in airplanes sold to certain countries (in this case, China). Boeing also has been fined for ITAR violations. I’m not aware of a data base that tracks fines in the EU, so I can’t draw an apples–to-apples comparison.


          • Reuters:
            Feb 29, 2024
            Boeing agrees to $51 million settlement for US export violations

            “The settlement includes a three-year consent agreement and $51 million civil penalty, of which $24 million will be suspended by the State Department so Boeing can use the funds for remedial compliance measures to strengthen its compliance program.

          • thank you, both.

            so the demeanors are mostly overbearing political and not really safety driven. ( especially against Airbus )

            I love reliable behavioral patterns.

          • You can also compare the amount of fines leveled on European banks because of money laundering vs U.S. banks.

          • dieselgate ( everybody had the same or similar solution )
            deep water horizon ( IMU a US corp did the did )
            Toyotas gaspedal. ( nothing really wrong with the pedal )
            and a range of other money siphoning projects.

            The trend to bargained legal judgement.

            Where ever you look a deeply corrupt system.

  5. Link Quality performance & long term portfolio health to the executive bonus structure.

    Free cash flow, buy backs and stock value focus drained innovation, safety & brought the company at its knees.

    A top down system error. Reboot.

  6. This isnt difficult. The FAA does not need the nuclear option. It can cut the monthly production cap to something meaningfully less than prevailing rate (~25) if Boeing is not performing. Set the monthly production cap as a function of the last 3 months metrics on squawks.

    • FAA: We are capping Max deliveries at 25/month until Boeing gets it’s act together.

      BA: Unfortunately, we are going to have to layoff personnel.

  7. This is depressing.

    The recent John Oliver video [start around the 6:30 mark] was also depressing. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8jP70NDNRY

    I am impressed with Boeing’s demonstrated ability to take crushing criticism in stride. I can only conclude that the appeal of another $15-20 Billion in share repurchases offsets the humiliation of being ridiculed repeatedly in public.

    … or maybe it’s time to reflect on one of the fables from our quality training in the ’90’s – the scorpion and the frog

  8. Boeing is incapable of reform, it’s obvious and nothing can force them except:

    1. FAA pulling their PC for 30 days.

    2. Airlines refuse to buy products.

    3. Institution stock holders demand change in the Board and CEO.

    These three are the most relevant in changing behavior and all are difficult to manage and implement.

    Boeing has lost trust in their customers, the flying public and aviation regulators worldwide wide.

    When the next shoe drops is anyone’s guess.

    Based on what we have witnessed over the past few decades, it appears that Boeing is on a self destructive trajectory.

    ***Since fines appear meaningless to Boeing, the FAA’s current actions have no real impact. But it has the nuclear option.

    ***The FAA could revoke Boeing’s Production Certificate. Doing so means production would have to stop.

    With Boeing already weakened financially, theoretically such an impact could threaten Boeing with bankruptcy.

    One would expect Boeing would do all it can to avoid becoming the target of this nuclear option.

    (Special thanks to MC for his expertise)

    • Boeing’s customers, the airlines should have been screaming very loud years ago….

      They are also enablers in this rolling disaster.

      American placing another large order this week for more 737-10 max, is a testament to the stupidity of their Board and CEO, especially as there is no TC and delivery date. At least the UAL CEO, Kirby is seeing through the lies.

      The world desperately needs more new aircraft…. Boeing thinks this will keep them in the game.

      • @Airdoc: AA may have placed MAX 10 orders because Airbus doesn’t have all the slots needed for replacing and growth. Just speculating.

        • @Scott

          Yes I agree, hence Boeings arrogance. Let’s see what sort of move UAL makes.

      • The MAX 10’s price is “unbeatable”??

        American Airlines CFO Devon May: “… we have sufficient Airbus option positions that we will execute if Boeing is delayed in certification or in delivery,”

      • Well, AA operates 59 737MAX8’s and can pretty well figure out how to keep the 737MAX10 in the air on suitable routes. I think more airlines will have a mix of 737MAX10 and A321neo and optimize their daily use.

  9. the entire board must go.

    they are comprehensively and intentionally riding this company into the ground in the name of short term stock performance.

    they do not care as long as their platinum parachute is paid and they can cash it out before it fully tanks.

  10. There is risk all this negative energy will have Boeing talent looking for / finding other opportunities. And recruiters / other employers know who. Change & perspective required!

    • Sadly already true! Many senior engineers retired early or will do so in the next few years.

    • The most experienced employees are already gone. The young ones are gaining enough experience to go work at Blue Origin and elsewhere.

  11. How the mighty Big B has fallen. When I was an engineering student in the early 90s, I wanted to go work a Boeing. But they had a huge layoff when the 7J7 was dumped and the economy soured; I went elsewhere. I later earned a MBA and used Boeing as the brunt of criticism on how to NOT run a company. Jack Welch can be blamed for the three worst CEOs in BOE’s history, but if it hadn’t been him it would have been someone else. There had been a lot of CEOs that decided to chase Wall Street and the hyper fiduciary responsibility of Profits over everything in the 80s/90s. All I have to say is Frank Larenzo as my evidence.

    I think the best thing that could happen is Boeing broken up into at least two companies if not three. BCA (buy back Spirit Aero), Military, and everything else. That latter one, iffy as their Space programs are a mess. My fear is if they are left to continue as they are, the 777-9 will be the last aircraft they will come out with. They will shrink when airlines dump them because the public fear anything Boeing is unsafe. At some point, they will become so small they will not be able to afford a clean sheet design. BCA has so many holes in their product line, it will be interesting if any of them ever will be filled. (737 CS, Mid-Market CS, 767 Re-Engine or 787F, 777X -8/-8F) I hope they can turn it around, but the worst clean sheet they need is new CEO, new Board, new SVPs/VPs. It will be interesting to watch.

  12. It would seem an entrepreneurial law firm has enough data to file a class action shareholder suit to claw back compensation from the board and the C-Suite participants going back quite a while.

  13. I’m watching the live Rust trials today and see many parallels. A culture of “do as I say, not as I do” or in this case “inspect as required, only way faster, then ship it” The same things existed where I used to work, lots of training, crew meetings, production meetings, safety meetings, committees etc. All done either before, or after, a 10 hour shift. People coming in late off the floor, or leaving early to startup the line for next shift. It didn’t matter if you learned anything, what mattered was that you showed up and got your name on the sign in sheet to prove you were there, so you got paid for it. When something went wrong HR had a file of those signup sheets that PROVED you had been trained in whatever had been presented, even though many were nodding off after a hard days work. The company always covered their behind. The employee was ALWAYS found at fault. Boeing maybe has an equivalent to sign in sheets? Rust doesn’t.

  14. Scott may be able to answer the question if the FAA can slow down deliveries as opposed to shutting down.

    Suggestions that they put a manager into jail every X time is purely wish in one hand spit in the other and see which fills up first. There is no legal basis for it, its not going to happen.

    Another good question is what does it take to turn the board over?

    And the bottom line is it has to start at the top and not be lip service but true reform. While Calhoun is complicit, he is also a creature of the board and allowed to be what he is (prior the COB and the CEO were the same position because it was more efficient, hmmm, bleahhhh. )

    The comment about Capitalism needs to be framed. Unrestrained Capitalism is not good for anyone, including the companies. Short term you can get away with the high crimes, you just don’t want to be the one left holding the empty bag.

    How the American people vote dictates a lot, but the judicial system is there to uphold laws, that were put in place to protect the elites.

    So you get the National of Laws garbage, but when the laws allow the guilty to go free, its merely a framework to impose those laws unequally or they only apply to the small fry.

    There is a lot more than just management failures that have gone into allowing the management that is in place and how they operate, but more so, how Corporations operate.

    The Balance has been lost that is intended to protect people inside a corporations to create business and keep them from the consequences of what they create.

    Airlines are not going to control Boeing behavior. They exist for their own purpose of operating and the nature of Aircraft Mfg for LCA means there are no choices. Airbus can’t ramp up to fulfill demand.

    • Pretty sure the FAA is metering Boeing’s delivery by only certifying “up to 38” aircraft per month. Boeing is free to make more than 38 but the excess winds up as undelivered WIP.

      That’s why I think instead of nuclear option…the FAA can simply lower the boom to a lower level…think 25…if Boeing is not performing. Boeing is not actually being limited yet. But there is a number that can be set where real work slowdown will occur.

      • Casey:

        I think you and I are thinking on the same page but different takes in regards to the numbers.

        Boeing may have authorization to make 38 but if the FAA does not have the inspectors and is following up on quality failures, then the level allowed can be and maybe is self regulated.

        Boeing was not making 38, but they were working on an assembly line in Everett. As I understand it, that is put on hold. Boogieing may be able to place equipment but the FAA is not going to authorize its use. So they can not even do minimum production to get it running.

        Boeing was not making 38 a month so that is somewhat mute as well.

        If the FAA is intent on temp fix, then they can make Boeing comply, but that is not the real fix.

        Inflicting long term limitations is going to have an impact. But the real impact is Boeing getting a new group in to manage the company.

        This will be a many years process, it took them many years to mess it up.

        • TW: I think the number 38 is more informational than people realize. It implies that a longer-term cap will be in effect until squawk metrics are under control. It is a backhanded statement saying to not even think about another line until you get your current production in order. Even then that extra line will come under heavy scrutiny.
          Boeing is trending in the lower 30 range today. Given the black eye that the FAA sustained on this blowout they have no incentive end this probationary period quickly. I could easily see the production rate metered “at some level” thru the end of 2025.

          • Casey:

            I won’t argue the possible long term impact, I have nothing to base it on.

            Going on how Boeinam management operates, their first move will be to fake compliance.

            I can see it taking 6 months to get to that point.

            Then its if the FAA accepts the fake or continues to impose inspectors and actually confirming how it is or is not being implemented.

            The 787 and 777X programs seem to be indicative of, no, you are not getting away with it.

            Boeing kept getting slapped until they complied even if they did not want to.

            Pretty much the same MO as dealing with a bad employee. Grill them in the morning as to what they are going to do, assign them jobs, re-grill the next day and not take excuses as to why they did not do it.

            They will work to avoid that or quit.

            Then we have to watch what Boeing Board does as this goes on and on. We saw the first move to fire the MAX manager.

            Then its Stan and …..

            But how long this goes back and forth is fully open.

            It also plays out in what the Boeing Board does or does not do.

      • Boeing will argue that frames delivered from stores (finished certified items ) do not count towards the applied ceiling. 😉

        • So? Boeing can argue anything they want, its what the FAA accepts or does not that counts.

    • @TW: “Scott may be able to answer the question if the FAA can slow down deliveries as opposed to shutting down.”

      Story in the works.

      • Great!

        Will be be able to read it? (non subscribe).

        I was a mechanic for 30 some years and only observations from that level on organization aspects let alone sources on this one as its not happened before.

      • The FAA will not, throttling production further down will have Boeing declared BK. And the Biden admin will not have that.

  15. Ok, Boeing buys Spirit and fires Stan and puts Shanahan in charge of BCA.

    I have not followed Shanahan to speak of so no idea if that is a good idea.

    • Airbus would likely have some legitimate concerns about the CEO of their supplier moving into a position at BCA.
      And you can look up how Pat and his team performed with the 787.

    • Shanahan doesn’t have ideal track record. Defending Trump, Kimberley, 787 program manager, pushing DOA, ethics probe on favoritism.. : might be vulnerable.

      • Thanks guys. I remember his name popping up but was not one of the big players in my take so did not pay a lot of attention.

  16. Jan 11 2024 Boeing statement on FAA investigation:
    “We will cooperate fully and transparently with the FAA and the NTSB on their investigations.” Boeing President and CEO Dave Calhoun addressed the importance of trust and transparency at a recent all-employee safety meeting on Jan. 9, 2024.

    Fast forward to March 2024 …

    ‘ JenniferHomendy reveals the @NTSB still does not know who opened the faulty door plug on #AS1282. “Boeing has not provided us with the documents and information that have requested numerous times over the last 2 months”


          • Brazen stuff from Boing: throwing snark at the investigating body seems unwise- unless you’re
            well-protected / TBTF.

            But what is *not* theatre, these days?

          • Listen to Scott:

            “So much for @Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun’s pledge of transparency.
            We’re told–but it’s unconfirmed–that all the records were *deleted* by someone and that’s why $BA can’t turn the info over.


            I wonder, in the days of modern IT, how can one delete such records successfully? (And without a trace??) I doubt I can delete an email after it entered the “system”.

          • No one, I repeat, no one from BA/BCA has a clue of preserving evidences (even after NTSB announced an investigation)??
            Or 🙊 🙈 🙉 …

            -> “It’s absurd that two months later we don’t have that,” Homendy said. “Without that information, that raises concerns about quality assurance, quality management, safety management systems” at Boeing.

            Shortly after the Senate hearing ended, Boeing responded that it gave the NTSB the names of all employees who work on 737 doors — and had previously shared some of them with investigators.

            “Early in the investigation, we provided the NTSB with names of Boeing employees, including door specialists, who we believed would have relevant information,” a company spokesman said in a statement. “We have now provided the full list of individuals on the 737 door team, in response to a recent request.”

            NTSB fired back, saying that Homendy “stands behind her accurate testimony” to the Senate Commerce Committee.

            -> Homendy said Boeing has a 25-member team led by a manager, but Boeing has declined repeated requests for their names. The manager of the team is on medical leave and unavailable, and security-camera footage that might have shown who removed the panel was erased and recorded over 30 days later, she said.

          • I have not been the least bit impressed with Homendy.

            Video is probably surveillance not documentation and yes they usually record over.

            That is not the same thing as Boeing being non cooperative but you undercut your credulity if you in turn are in error.

            The hoot is Boeing Quality issues as expressed by this.

            Uhhh Earth to NTSB, we would not be here if that was not the case and where were you when Spirit was passing on bad kit?

            Reality is its not the NTSB purview to investigate until after an incident. But it does read like a clown as did the statement about the Cockpit Voice recorder being erased.

            Yes the failure is an issue (as is the lack of cockpit video) but in that case it had nothing to add to the investigation. Uhh we gots masks on and you can’t hear diddly anyway (or a big hole in your airplane and the noise, hmmm)

            All the stuff will come out and its a matter of waiting though sadly the NTSB final report is well over a year away, more like two.

          • It does appear to be written by a lawyer. It seems designed to leave the impression that the documentation does not exist without directly stating so. It uses the conditional “if”. Are we to believe Boeing does not know at this point whether or not the documentation exists?

          • what is the more distasteful case?
            what is more damning in court?

            No documentation at all

            existing documentation ( either tracing reality or not ) deleted

          • That’s weird.

            There seems to be SOME documentation that the whistle blower who posted here had access to, in both the SAT and CMES system.

            He detailed the back and forth between BA guys and Spirit going on about the rivets.

            I wonder if the FAA/NTSB can go to a judge to compel BA to give them access to their internal communication systems to get to the bottom of things.

            I still think that there are some embarrassing orders from managers that Boeing does not want the world to see.

  17. Ok, a ransom twit does not make a headline.

    But if you scan Boeing for news, all the articles that pop up are about the Castigation of Boeing by the NTSB

    I understand why people are skeptical that this is an inflection point, but this is exactly why.

    Boeing management keeps trying to game the system. I had a guy working for me like that. He acted all hale and hearty (we were moving wall panels). So it was two on each end including me (I was running the job but once we were lined out and going, I worked along with everyone else)

    I started to see a different pair of guys moving the panels. Huh, thats odd, pairs should stay the same.

    Then I see (I named him Slide) two or 3 groups back from where he was. He kpet skipping off then re-join and the groups kept just taking the first two that showed up to move a panel (worked far better with a combo of having worked to move them as they got to know how the other guy handled his end).

    So I cornered Slide and it was, I see what you are doing, you can work at the same pace we all are (we kept moving but did not run ourselves into the ground, we had all night ahead of us doing the job). Pace is truly important for long term productivity.

    All the excuses and it was, shape up or ship out, I am now calling you Slide and you will not slide any more.

    Yep, he adhered for a couple of rounds and then did it again and I fired him.

    You can see how this plays out and what kind of legs it has and Boeing management is incapable of complying. Fake it yes, but incapable.

    So the story will go on and on and on and eventually the board will get tired of it (6 months roughly6) and then fire Calhoun.

    And then we see if its any better or just another place holder.

    If its just a placeholder and the FAA holds them to the fire, then another 6 months of bad headlines and they do something that actually addresses the issue.

    No return to profits (however you want to express that) until this is corrected.

  18. Can’t make this up!!

    On a thread about Boing’s safety/safety culture, we have a complaint about news of Boing’s safety/safety culture. 🤷‍♂️

    • 😉

      How convenient that Boing’s records were “deleted”, too.

      brazen / what’s not theatre

  19. MCAS was a quality escape.We still don’t know exactly what went wrong with the “process “and “systems “.I would bet my house that senior engineers and test pilots expressed concern and were brushed off or worse .
    This is just as bad as forgetting 4 bolts

    • Agreed. We could warn management from the floor but even if our immediates believed us, they often could not get theirr to approve money to correct. .

      I saw well over 100k damage on a Hangar door due to our manager not being able to get a $1500 backup limits system in place (and the operating control limit method was a joke)

      I had a fix for the operating control, I could not implement it as it was going to modify the mfg operating control.

      After the carnage the mangers said, do it. He also got the backup limit system approved.

      • Penny wise and pound foolish. That’s what this management is all about.

    • Turns out to be a stuck rudder pedal rather than collapsed U/C. Second time this has happened to a United MAX. It looked like a collapse because the port main gear went down into a drainage ditch.

      To be honest, I’m not sure that that isn’t worse. As a passenger I can probably survive an undercarriage collapse. A stuck rudder pedal though, well, that sounds distinctly less than ideal and probably makes the aircraft somewhat more crash prone, if it happens whilst in the air. Crashes are harder to survive than a bumpy landing.

  20. Boeing are putting on a very good impression of being stubbornly beyond redemption.

    **What Good Looks Like **

    If one looks at the “ideal” regulatory environment, it involves a company minded to do things properly, with an open relationship with a regulator who can come in and check random things over for themselves. The rate of random inspections can be readily tuned to match the problem-discovery rate, which because everyone is trying to do the right thing is anyway going down.

    The regulator can have a small staff. The company can tick along nicely with an efficient and scalable QC process (to suit whatever production rates are desired). And best of all, the assurance that can be given to customers (airlines and their passengers) is strong and believable.

    **What Boeing Looks Like**

    Boeing is not a company minded to do things properly, seemingly not at the board level nor (I imagine) most of the way down the management chain. The only way to be able to give a strong and believable assurance to the flying public is for every single management action to be witnessed and vetted by a regulatory inspector.

    The deeper the trouble Boeing gets into, the more necessary it becomes for a government inspector to witness / test more and more of the work done by the company. That would require a vast regulatory workforce, which is never going to get paid for.


    With the FAA signing off each and every aircraft Boeing produces, Boeing is effectively controlled by the government. The more the FAA has to get directly involved in Boeing’s production, the more control there is.

    The thing that is kinda missing from the debate at present is that, at some point, it simply becomes cheaper for the government to take full ownership of the company themselves – the very un-American notion of “Nationalisation”.

    Would the US Gov ever say, “enough” and directly intervene? Or would it simply let the FAA press that nuclear button and put the whole sorry mess out of its misery?

    The usual US solution to these situations is that one major company that’s succeeding takes over another major company that isn’t. In aerospace there’s still some other heavy hitters – Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumman. The names betray previous mergers… However, I simply can’t see why LM or anyone else would want to take on Boeing. They would be getting the most toxic engineering asset in the whole of the aerospace industry. Some of the individual military projects (F18, Apache) are less troublesome, but that’s cherry picking not wholesale acquisition.

    If the US Gov wants the USA to remain in the commercial aviation airliner market, it’s probably going to have to do something dramatic, and the sooner the better (cheaper).

    The knock-on long term strategic impact of Boeing imploding is not something I relish discovering by practical experimentation.

    **International Politics**

    If one views Boeing as a global economic asset under the care of the US government, the mess inside Boeing takes on some fairly significant dimensions. The FAA stopping Boeing production hurts everybody (thanks to the air freight market, never mind passenger travel).

    Without a plan, a Boeing shutdown could result in a long term halving of the planet’s airliner / airfreighter production capacity. Those workers aren’t going to sit around waiting for a saviour, they have to get work and are probably lost foreever from the industry. Airbus might be able to build facilities quickly, but they can’t get staff quickly, especially if the established workforce pool has suddenly shrunk.

    With a potential long term halving of (Western) supply, the global economic damage would gradually accrue and sting everyone quite badly.

    So, Boeing’s problem is not one for the US government alone to handle. The rest of the world and Europe in particular (well, the French / German / UK / Spanish govs) should be talking to the US gov and together forming a contingency plan. If the FAA really is contemplating the nuclear option, there absolutely needs to be a plan to deal with the result.

    This is exactly the kind of thing that cannot be left to free market econmics; we all have governments specifically to intervene and forestall these kinds of events. Someone needs to tell them to take this one seriously in advance, rather than ignore it until it’s too late.

    • mattew:

      One guarantee is Boeing is not going to be taken over by the Government.

      Nationalization is completely off the table in the US.

      The Auto so called bailout was a bankruptcy proceeding with money provided by the US Government to operate post Chapter 11 (its common though not US Government being the supplier of the money)

      Boeing does not quality for Chapter 11.

      The rest of the world is not going to meddle in US affairs. Not going to happen.

      We can take it as seriously as we want and should, but no one can plan this unless Boeing goes into Chapter 11.

      “When a business is unable to service its debt or pay its creditors,”

      Boeing is no where near that.

      Reading the shares background, 70% of Boeing shares are owned by Institutions, not individuals.

      Boeing could sell off its defense assets. I doubt that would pass review as the US Defense Industry is as consolidated (more so) than is thought to be good (flip is that defense is hugely expensive undertaking for a company and it takes a huge company to manage it as you never know what your future contracts look like, ie bids that fail)

      The FAA can slow down Boeing MAX delivery as much as needed. 787s are ramping up. 777X may be into TIA before July.

      Its not a rosy picture but Boeing has a large part of the wide body markets and the MAX backlog is nothing to sneeze at..

      Boeing is a huge mess but it has the underlying capability to correct that.

      • “Boeing is a huge mess but it has the underlying capability to correct that.”

        A statement that is increasingly contested.

        What value has a well filled order book that you are unable to convert into profits. ( due to production issues AND due to cost of manufacture and paying out damages higher than the order value )

        • “Boeing is a huge mess but it has the underlying capability to correct that.”
          Not that long ago, we were told Boeing is bottoming, and brighter tomorrow is arriving anytime soon; we were also told there’s nothing we have to pay attention to until the brighter tomorrow arrives. Oops!! Boeing is circling/spiraling on “autopilot”, with nose down (may be with the help of an unknown MCAS 3.0).

        • The fact that commercial aerospace is a duopoly bodes well for Boeing’s future. At this point maybe all they need is honest leadership, but that could be hard to come by.

  21. Can a leopard change its spots??

    “A Boeing lobbyist sent an email to Republican members of Congress late Wednesday bluntly trying to discredit NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy’s Senate testimony

    After The Seattle Times asked about the email, Boeing & the lobbyist scrambled to undo the damage



    TAC’s team interviewed NTSB chair and Jon has a write-up.

  22. @Williams is going to be devastated …

    ‘ Boeing cannot find a record of the work done on the door plug that blew out

    “We have looked extensively and have not found any such documentation”
    “Working hypothesis: the documents required by our processes were not created when the door plug was opened”


    In a letter to Sen. Maria Cantwell, Boeing continues the contentious debate over how much cooperation it has provided to the NTSB

    • Hmmmmmm,

      What is in the SAT/CMES files? I wonder if anyone printed that out?

  23. To the NTSB – Boeing no doc point, I am reposting ‘Throwaway’s’ insightful post (2 parts):


    January 16, 2024
    Current Boeing employee here – I will save you waiting two years for the NTSB report to come out and give it to you for free: the reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeings own records. It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business.

    A couple of things to cover before we begin:

    Q1) Why should we believe you?
    A) You shouldn’t, I’m some random throwaway account, do your own due diligence. Others who work at Boeing can verify what I say is true, but all I ask is you consider the following based on its own merits.

    Q2) Why are you doing this?
    A) Because there are many cultures at Boeing, and while the executive culture may be throughly compromised since we were bought by McD, there are many other people who still push for a quality product with cutting edge design. My hope is that this is the wake up call that finally forces the Board to take decisive action, and remove the executives that are resisting the necessary cultural changes to return to a company that values safety and quality above schedule.

    With that out of the way… why did the left hand (LH) mid-exit door plug blow off of the 737-9 registered as N704AL? Simple- as has been covered in a number of articles and videos across aviation channels, there are 4 bolts that prevent the mid-exit door plug from sliding up off of the door stop fittings that take the actual pressurization loads in flight, and these 4 bolts were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane, our own records reflect this.

    The mid-exit doors on a 737-9 of both the regular and plug variety come from Spirit already installed in what is supposed to be the final configuration and in the Renton factory, there is a job for the doors team to verify this “final” install and rigging meets drawing requirements. In a healthy production system, this would be a “belt and suspenders” sort of check, but the 737 production system is quite far from healthy, its a rambling, shambling, disaster waiting to happen. As a result, this check job that should find minimal defects has in the past 365 calendar days recorded 392 nonconforming findings on 737 mid fuselage door installations (so both actual doors for the high density configs, and plugs like the one that blew out). That is a hideously high and very alarming number, and if our quality system on 737 was healthy, it would have stopped the line and driven the issue back to supplier after the first few instances. Obviously, this did not happen. Now, on the incident aircraft this check job was completed on 31 August 2023, and did turn up discrepancies, but on the RH side door, not the LH that actually failed. I could blame the team for missing certain details, but given the enormous volume of defects they were already finding and fixing, it was inevitable something would slip through- and on the incident aircraft something did. I know what you are thinking at this point, but grab some popcorn because there is a plot twist coming up.

    The next day on 1 September 2023 a different team (remember 737s flow through the factory quite quickly, 24 hours completely changes who is working on the plane) wrote up a finding for damaged and improperly installed rivets on the LH mid-exit door of the incident aircraft.

    A brief aside to explain two of the record systems Boeing uses in production. The first is a program called CMES which stands for something boring and unimportant but what is important is that CMES is the sole authoritative repository for airplane build records (except on 787 which uses a different program). If a build record in CMES says something was built, inspected, and stamped in accordance with the drawing, then the airplane damn well better be per drawing. The second is a program called SAT, which also stands for something boring and unimportant but what is important is that SAT is *not* an authoritative records system, its a bullentin board where various things affecting the airplane build get posted about and updated with resolutions. You can think of it sort of like a idiots version of Slack or something. Wise readers will already be shuddering and wondering how many consultants were involved, because, yes SAT is a *management visibilty tool*. Like any good management visibilty tool, SAT can generate metrics, lots of metrics, and oh God do Boeing managers love their metrics. As a result, SAT postings are the primary topic of discussion at most daily status meetings, and the whole system is perceived as being extremely important despite, I reiterate, it holding no actual authority at all.

    We now return to our incident aircraft, which was written up for having defective rivets on the LH mid-exit door. Now as is standard practice kn Renton (but not to my knowledge in Everett on wide bodies) this write-up happened in two forms, one in CMES, which is the correct venue, and once in SAT to “coordinate the response” but really as a behind-covering measure so the manager of the team that wrote it can show his boss he’s shoved the problem onto someone else. Because there are so many problems with the Spirit build in the 737, Spirit has teams on site in Renton performing warranty work for all of their shoddy quality, and this SAT promptly gets shunted into their queue as a warranty item. Lots of bickering ensues in the SAT messages, and it takes a bit for Spirit to get to the work package. Once they have finished, they send it back to a Boeing QA for final acceptance, but then Malicious Stupid Happens! The Boeing QA writes another record in CMES (again, the correct venue) stating (with pictures) that Spirit has not actually reworked the discrepant rivets, they *just painted over the defects*. In Boeing production speak, this is a “process failure”. For an A&P mechanic at an airline, this would be called “federal crime”.

    Presented with evidence of their malfeasance, Spirit reopens the package and admits that not only did they not rework the rivets properly, there is a damaged pressure seal they need to replace (who damaged it, and when it was damaged is not clear to me). The big deal with this seal, at least according to frantic SAT postings, is the part is not on hand, and will need to be ordered, which is going to impact schedule, and (reading between the lines here) Management is Not Happy. 1/2

    January 16, 2024

    However, more critical for purposes of the accident investigation, the pressure seal is unsurprisingly sandwiched between the plug and the fuselage, and you cannot replace it without opening the door plug to gain access. All of this conversation is documented in increasingly aggressive posts in the SAT, but finally we get to the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.” Note: a Removal is a type of record in CMES that requires formal sign off from QA that the airplane been restored to drawing requirements.

    If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required.
    This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility. Finally with Spirit completing their work to Boeing QAs satisfaction, the two rivet-related records in CMES are stamped complete, and the SAT closed on 19 September 2023. No record or comment regarding the retention bolts is made.

    I told you it was stupid.

    So, where are the bolts? Probably sitting forgotten and unlabeled (because there is no formal record number to label them with) on a work-in-progress bench, unless someone already tossed them in the scrap bin to tidy up.

    There’s lots more to be said about the culture that enabled this to happened, but thats the basic details of what happened, the NTSB report will say it in more elegant terms in a few years.


    Salient point:

    ‘This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility.’

    Does the NTSB have this?

    • …and in response to his post, there was (allegedly):

      – an aspiring attorney who wanted him to get legal help
      – someone from Popular Science
      – a former US Rep and chair of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
      – someone from Bloomberg
      – our own Scott (the only verified poster)
      – Dominic Gates
      – someone from the Wall Street Journal
      – someone from the NY Times
      – someone from NPR
      – someone from CNN
      – a recommendation to see a union rep
      – someone from Reuters

      All wanting to talk to him (or provide insight/advice).

      Pretty serious issue. God help Boeing if someone (not necessarily Throwaway) has printed out the SAT/CMES chain on that aircraft and now that BA says there’s nothing…turns it over to them.

      • Throwaway: “CMES is the sole authoritative repository for airplane build records” (at least for 737 here) but SAT is not. What are the implications for NTSB investigation?

        • If Boeing says that they have no docs ( either CMES or SAT )
          NTSB is blocked. ( current state of affairs )

          Can the NTSB effect a search warrant?

          guesswork: never existed or destroyed?

    • Have you read Jon’s report?

      At this stage, are there any investigators working out of Renton? It seems, up to now, NTSB is still communicating with BCA by (e-)mails!

      • From TAC:
        ‘ Homendy said that she and the NTSB had received non-public information from whistleblowers “directly related” to the investigation into Alaska 1282 and “some of the information that we will or have already sought” without saying specifically to what it was pertaining.

        Clearly this interview was arranged for a certain purpose. To send a message??

    • AW: “But detailed documentation will not be headed to NTSB because Boeing doesn’t have any. Sources with knowledge of the probe told Aviation Week that Boeing has provided all the paperwork that exists related to the mid-September 2023 rivet re-work during the aircraft’s production that required opening the plug. *The work’s non-routine nature meant it was not documented in detail.*

      Boeing declined to comment on the Alaska door plug work specifically. “If the door plug removal was undocumented there would be no documentation to share,” the company said.

      Part of Homendy’s testimony ran counter to Boeing’s version of events. Investigators have been told Boeing “can’t find” documents related to the door plug work, and names of employees that did the work “haven’t been provided,” she said.

      She also said it is possible Boeing does not have the documents. “We’ve asked for the records with respect to what occurred,” she said. “Either they exist, and we don’t have them, or they do not exist.”

  24. I have read the FAA background on the MAX over sight (lack of that)

    They were doing paper over sight. That is not the same as having inspectors of the shop floor checking things.

    Much like the vaunted ISO 9000 BS, it was not about quality, it was about perfect paperwork. As long as the paperwork was good you could turn out garbage product.

    Now (wow) they are putting people on the shop floor. Amazing.

  25. I guess after the MCAS debacle, nothing should surprise me about Boeing’s secrecy. They own the FAA. I wonder if they own or will own the NTSB?
    There is no paperwork for the door plug operation that was performed? AND, Boeing doesn’t want the NTSB to know who to interview? I’m totally dumbfounded. The NTSB hasn’t yet interviewed anyone who worked on the door plug, because they don’t know who to interview? This is totally nuts (and missing bolts).

    • OK, this is getting seriously strange. Does Boeing own Nikki Haley, former SC Governor, the Charleston coroner or the Police Dept? I”m just asking the question, as everyone else is asking the same questions in their mind. We know Boeing owns the FAA. We’ll find out the answer as time goes on. This doesn’t sound like a suicide from his lawyers perspective. The headline “whistleblower found dead by gunshot” does in itself demand a through investigation.
      There’s only a few Billion dollars involved, and the future of Boeing and a few airlines. So, the monetary motive for foul play is quite large. Again, time will tell, if any foul play happened, but, people have to being asking questions with so much at stake, and the timing of his death being so circumspect.
      From his known testimony so far, it doesn’t look like he had a lot of good things to say about Boeing. Will someone else come forward now?

  26. Bloomberg: US Opens Criminal Investigation Into Alaska Air’s Midair Blowout

    ‘ Boeing’s acknowledgment that it lacks records for what appears to have been a faulty repair shortly before the jet was delivered last year is highly unusual in an industry that places enormous emphasis on documentation.

    The Boeing team working with the National Transportation Safety Board “has shared multiple times with the NTSB that we have looked extensively and have not found any such documentation,” Ziad Ojakli, executive vice president of government operations, wrote in the letter.

    • The documentation is with the Bolts, washers, nuts and cotter key.

  27. The Houston MAX incident looks to have been hot dogging down the runway by the pilot to get to a more convenient exit closer to the United Gates.

    He was doing over 40 mph when he tried to make the corner.

    Note to Pilot: This is not an F1 car. It has severe understeer at anything over 10 mph.

    MAX with the wrong pilot at the wrong place and time.

    But it sure keeps the story rolling and in this case, Boeing deserves all the bad publicity they get (and more).

  28. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/airbus-plans-special-dividend-takes-new-space-charge-2024-02-15/

    Airbus unveils special dividend, takes new charge in space

    Airbus proposed an unchanged regular dividend of 1.8 euros a share, and added a special dividend of 1 euro per share as net cash topped the 10-billion-euro threshold previously identified as a potential trigger for returning more cash to shareholders.
    Shares fell around 1%, however, with some analysts pointing to cautious financial forecasts for 2024 and a lack of fresh updates on a broader share buyback.
    Investors have been pushing Airbus for a buyback as the company’s strong lead over Boeing at the top end of the busy single-aisle jet market generates cash from airline deposits.
    Chief Financial Officer Thomas Toepfer said Airbus had chosen the special dividend to act quickly and to signal that it was sticking to its pledges on distributing cash.

    • Share buyback is like drugs, once you’re hooked … The plan to save or prolong BA/BCA’s survival is to transmit its disease to others?? 😂

      • Established MoO.

        Same when RR had the Trent1000 issues.
        The attack was started by less than domain knowledgeable analysts
        judging that profits were too low at RR.
        Reflexive remedy was contracting the workforce ( people needed for fixing the Trent1000 issues )

        • Same thing before that when they were caught booking the power by the hour payments before doing anything.Before that a big pension disaster.I am suspicious about the current profit situation considering that they have just sold a lot of the family silver

          • +1

            Companies don’t get turned around in a quarter or two. Theatre..

    • And why pray tell do they not put it into the fund for a new aircraft so they don’t have to go Beret in hand to get money from the UK, France, Germany and Spain?

  29. “Boeing’s woes continue as 50 injured on Australia-New Zealand flight
    A dozen were hospitalised after the LATAM Airlines plane experienced ‘strong movement’.

    […] It is been a turbulent week for Boeing, with the US plane maker suffering a series of safety-related issues.

    On March 4, an engine fire forced a Boeing 737 to make an emergency landing in Houston, Texas shortly after takeoff. United Airlines said the engine ingested some plastic bubble wrap that was on the airfield prior to departure.

    Two days later, fumes in the cabin of a Boeing 737-800 forced an emergency landing in Portland, Oregon.

    On Thursday, a tyre fell off a Boeing 777-200 after takeoff in San Francisco, destroying a car. The plane was bound for Japan but diverted to Los Angeles where it landed safely.

    A day later, a Boeing 737 MAX rolled off the runway in Houston and got stuck in grass.


    • Interesting.

      From AVHerald:
      “Passengers reported the aircraft encountered a sudden dive causing passengers to feel weightless and everything not fastened to hit the cabin ceiling about 50 minutes before landing, there was blood at the ceiling. The captain later said they had briefly lost their instrumentation, then it came back all of the sudden.”

      Instrumentation cutout.
      similarities to the A330 setup years back are less close than I first thought.

    • Or they hit an air pocket and it just dropped and rattled the systems so hard they blanked out.

      Stay tuned.

    • 😂
      AW: Lufthansa CEO Carsten Spohr expects Boeing to deliver the first 777-9 in 2025 after Boeing CEO Stan Deal reassured him of no further delays

  30. AW: Production Issue Damaged 737 MAX Spoiler Wires

    Chafing in improperly placed wire bundles caused uncommanded spoiler deployments on a Boeing 737 MAX, prompting the FAA to issue a draft rule that would mandate inspections to prevent similar occurrences. […]

    The issue caused “multiple” uncommanded spoiler activations during cruise that caused the affected aircraft to roll. The FAA did not say which airline or 737 MAX variant was involved in the incident.

  31. Production “ramp down”?

    AW: Production of new MAXs was believed by Jefferies analysts to have fallen to mid-20s for January and below 20 in February.

  32. Not on my bingo card. Has this saga turned into an X Files plot??

    BBC: Boeing whistleblower found dead in US

  33. “We here at Union-broken Boing Charleston are producing
    our best, safest, highest QC aircraft evah.
    And if you say otherwise we’ll assassinate you.”

    See Boing whistleblower Mr. Barnett, who apparently shot himself twice in the back of the head (RIP).

    It’s a Funny ol’ World, these days.

    • “See Boing whistleblower Mr. Barnett, who apparently shot himself twice in the back of the head ..”

      allegation or fact?

      BBC wrote “massive self inflicted wounds”
      I am willing to concede that some people are limber than others.

      • I don’t know what happpened to Mr. Barnett- and
        there are too many interested parties who say they do.
        At the moment I pretty much trust nothing I read on this here DarpaNet, because it’s not transparent, and too easily faked, manipulated, obscured.


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