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Ortberg reaffirms goal of Boeing 777X certification at first appearance at bank’s investors’ conference

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By Scott Hamilton

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing CEO. Credit: Boeing.

Feb. 20, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing hopes to certify its largest aircraft, the 777-9, late this year or early next year so that it can finally begin delivery of the 425-seat aircraft.

Delivery was originally supposed to be in December 2019 or the following quarter. However, technical delays, including those with the giant 115,000 lb thrust engines from GE Aerospace and the negative halo effect from the 737 MAX crisis, resulted in this unusually long delay.

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing’s CEO, reaffirmed the certification and delivery hopes during his first appearance since taking his job last August at an investment bank’s investor conference.

“We’re going through the flight test program, and we’re planning to get the certification done towards the end of this year or early next year so we can start the delivery,” Ortberg told the Barclays Bank event today. “The challenge is we’ve got to get through the certification here on the Dash 9 to start delivering these things to our customers.

“I was just with Carsten Spohr, the CEO of Lufthansa. He impressed upon me how critical that airplane is to his operating model,” Ortberg said.

The program is in a reach forward loss, so Ortberg said that any additional schedule delay with the program will likely result in another loss. Over the life of the program, he says it’ll be a profitable airplane.

 

Certification process

Certification of the 777X isn’t the only airplane stalled in the process. The 737-7 and 737-10 also are years behind certification due to the crisis that erupted following two accidents in 2018-19 of the 737-8 that killed 346 people. The ensuing investigation revealed irregularities in the airplane certification between Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration that still reverberates.

“One of the things that I’m going to focus on with…the team this year is the certification process. We’ve got the Dash 9, and then the two variants of the MAX that still have to get through certification, and a lot of change is going on with the FAA leadership,” Ortberg said.

“We’re trying to be very proactive. I’m meeting with the [new] Transportation Secretary. We’re going to get him out to Seattle. We’ve got the new interim FAA administrator coming to Seattle to make sure we don’t have any misalignment as we go through leadership changes there with the FAA. We have a pretty good plan on the rate increases. I don’t anticipate the administration change is going to impact us in that.”

Returning to higher production rates

The FAA capped the 737 production rate at 38/mo a year ago as Boeing worked through safety and quality control issues in the factory. But throughout 2023 and 2024, Boeing was stuck producing new 737s in the high teens or low 20s per month. Reasons included Boeing’s internal problems and continuing external supply chain issues, especially with Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the fuselages. Spirit’s QC problems have diminished, and Boeing will assume ownership of the Spirit Boeing work later this year.

Still, Ortberg is optimistic that the company will achieve a rate of 38 later this year.

“Things look really, really good. The supply chain on 737 is in good shape. We don’t have any supply chain constraints right now that I see that are going to stop us from ramping up here to the 38 a month. That’s where we have the FAA cap that we’ve got to get through this year,” Ortberg said.

“Our metrics are tracking really well to allow us to do that. But it’s early innings, so we’ve got to stay focused on this and stay disciplined. One of the things that I think we really are benefiting from, both in the supply chain and our own production work, is during the [53-day IAM] strike [last fall],  we didn’t waste that time.

“We did go clean the inventory, get the production system cleaned out, and rebalanced. We’ve just got to stay disciplined to make sure it stays that way as we ramp back up,” he said.

787 program

Boeing ended 2024 at a production rate of 5/mo, a year behind schedule. Supply chain delays, notably on seats, and certification of business class interiors have been perpetually troubled spots.

Ortberg said Boeing wants to increase this rate to 7-8/mo, but some quality milestones must still be met first.

“That creates some challenges for our customers because it’s fewer airplanes than if we went faster,” he said. “But I think it’s much more important that we deliberate here and do it the right way than try to go fast and let our production system get unstable again.”

Ortberg said there is a shortage of heat exchangers that go into the 787’s engines, causing delivery delays. “That’s an issue that came out of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and we had to move production in our supply chain,” he said. “They’re not exactly where we’d want them to be, but they’re making good progress to get there. I don’t think the heat exchangers will be a problem for us to move from five to seven.”

Seats continue to be a problem, but it’s not production. “It’s getting the seats certified. It’s not the butt part of the seat. It’s the cabinet and the doors for first class and business class,” he said.

“These are pretty complex systems, and getting those certified has taken both the seat suppliers and us longer than anticipated. If you were in Charleston [where the 787s are assembled], you’d see we’ve got completed airplanes that are held up for delivery for the seats, which obviously go in pretty late in the assembly process. That’s something we’re going to continue to work through, but it’s generally only if it’s a first-of-type seat.”

 Category: Boeing

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177 Comments on “Ortberg reaffirms goal of Boeing 777X certification at first appearance at bank’s investors’ conference”

  1. It’s great to see Ortberg talking production system specifics. At the same time, It’s puzzling to see that the 737 cert urgency back burnered, unless the feeling is that with a capped production line capacity it’s not as high a priority…

    Reply

    • @PNW

      Boeing does have some Max7 complete but cannot deliver. Calhoun was rather silent on expectations for both versions.

      Reply

    • The supply chain on the 787 sounds like a world class mess. Ortberg needs to clean house and get a supply chain guru from outside Boeing to run operations. Sadly, it has always been considered a backwater position at Boeing. I was mystified when the company put a career sales executive in charge recently.

      Reply

  2. Just finished reading Air Wars. I wrote a review on Amazon:

    After reading Air Wars I discovered that the introduction I was about to write to summarize this book had already been very well expressed by Laura Mueller, of Airfinance Journal. Her comment can be found at the back of the book and goes like this:

    « Air Wars is more than a story about the global combat between Airbus and Boeing. It’s a business strategy story pitting the world’s two giant airplane manufacturers against each other and how they pursued sales campaigns and product development. It’s how Airbus overtook the market leader, Boeing and how Boeing’s own decisions helped lose that lead. »

    That is exactly what this book is all about, more than a supposed “biography” of John Leahy, Airbus’ top salesman. I would say that it’s more about the professional career of Leahy than a biography per se. In fact a substantial portion of the book only mentions Leahy once in a while and he is completely absent in some chapters.

    If there is one thing I would criticize this book for is the way the 27 chapters have been organized, as they do not form a coherent whole and sometimes overlap with disorienting repeats. That being said, there are few mistakes or errors in this book. Much more numerous are the interesting things I learned anew, or had never heard about before. For you will find in this book informations you won’t see anywhere else. It is important to know that Hamilton had access to John Leahy a number of times during the writing, either by phone or direct contact. The same thing applies to other protagonists of this book, but not all.

    Air Wars does have a main hero, as the book cover suggests, but a single one unfortunately, when we know that many other people also played an important role in this conflict. And there is not much drama either, as one would expect to find in a real war. Besides, instead of several wars we should be talking about one continuous war encompassing several major battles. That’s why I am not very confortable with the plural in the title. I also find it hard to swallow that without Leahy Airbus would not be where they are today, because this business is not a one-man show. It might have taken a bit more time without Leahy but the quality of their people and the products they were offering would eventually have taken them where they are right now. For the writing was on the wall before Concorde made its first flight, even though the company we know today was only created the year after. In my opinion where Leahy made a real difference was in helping Airbus to develop the US market.

    All in all, despite being well written, this story does not come out as a thriller or a page-turner, as I was expecting. It also lacks the human element, except for a number of personal stories recounted most of the time with little colour or emotion. For instance, I would have liked to hear what Leahy had to say about Europe in general and France in particular. How was life in Toulouse for an American? Was he happy to leave and come back home? Or does he miss his time in Europe? And how did his family adapt? Instead it’s all about business. This made the reading a bit dry at times. I know that Scott Hamilton had enough material to write a 650 page story and had to leave a lot behind. Still, it seems to me that it would not have been that difficult to interspace the main narrative with a few personal anecdotes here and there, not related to the job or business, in order to spice the book a little.

    But this is minor quibble, and I would not want to finish this review without mentioning that what I have always appreciated with this author, and this book is no exception, is his absolute neutrality. Proof of it is that Airbus fans say that he sides with Boeing, while Boeing fans are convinced he favours Airbus. This explains why he is so well respected, if not necessarily liked, by both aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing.

    Reply

    • Air Wars projected target audience may have been painted with a broad brush to bring that many more new readers into a better understanding of the two big players left in the global aerospace business. To us that work, worked or follow aerospace closely, it may be relatively easy to see or want more of one aspect or another of “The Battles” discussed in the chapters of the book.

      But I concur, it is a good read. I am waiting for the sequel… to answer the questions that keep popping up in the business of building passenger
      airplanes. We still don’t know how a plane can be built without a door panel bolted to the fuselage…

      Reply

      • I am pressing to finish the manuscript during 2Q2025 of the sequel to Air Wars. My target is to publish in September, the 4 year anniversary of Air Wars. We’ll see if I get there.

        Hamilton

        Reply

  4. I wonder when they’ll actually get the 737-7, 737-10,
    and 777-X certified. Watching ( rather than listening) with interest.

    Reply

    • Well I think most of us wonder and ……..

      Ortberg is clearly avoiding commitments on time, he is an engineer. He gets it you can’t promise anything until all the tests are done (and he knows even then, issue can and will come up)

      There is no way to know they cured the thrust link issue until they test it and even then, 10 years down the road it could need another revamp. Clea not only did something go wrong but their modeling of how it should work, or the material or the treatment did not work the way they thought. To an engineer that is sobering in the extreme.

      The MAX still has the inlet de-ice issue.

      FAA is in turmoil so who knows if the guy you need to make a decision has been fired?

      Orteberg is letting Musk run all around the 747 to his hearts content knowing its all a joke but the best acting job of all time keeping a straight face.

      The best outcome would be for the US to cancel the AF1 and then Boeing collects the penalty and closes it out. Then park them (two) pickerel them and they are there for the next administration to take up.

      Or go with a 777X. As I understand it they have cancelled the refuel system for the current AF1. Its really a hoot as if the bases you could land at are radioactive, then the bases tankers fly from would be as well. Maybe fly to Candada?

      Sorry to rant, its all nuts right now.

      Reply

  5. Considering that huge numbers of staff at the FAA are being fired, it is wishful thinking that the actions of the new administration will not affect the certification process.
    Or perhaps he is just trying to appease the unstable new leader.

    Reply

    • I don’t think less than 1% should be described as huge. They were all probationary (hired less than 1 year ago).

      Reply

    • Or the Unstable One just orders them to certify the 3 models and drop production limits.

      Anything is possible.

      Or course EASA, Candada, Brazil and even China would refuse the cert.

      I think Ortberg knows it needs to be done right, but then AF1 will be flying in a few months as well.

      Reply

      • @TW

        Pretty sure Boeing is in the doghouse now with Trump. He made some veiled threats when news broke about the AF1 delay into 2029 or beyond.

        Reply

        • Well, having negotiated such a fabulous deal the Orange one will of course be annoyed he did not get something for nothing (or more something for nothing)

          Ortberg will play the game. Best option is Trump gets to run around on his gulf course using AF1 as a Caddy Buggy. You just need the all wheel drive option.

          It does not take much if anything to distract Trump so that too will pass.

          Me, I am still waiting to get rich from the last go around.

          Reply

          • Quid pro quo. You give me AF1 – everything else is copasetic. New regulators are all “company men.” Remember, they are firing for hiring.

      • I expect something of that kind. Certification of all 3 models plus those in development by Executive Order. Now! Every county that does not recognize: 100% customs on everything!

        Reply

    • Considering Delta CEO re Canada crash claimed on TV in answer to a gotcha question re DOGE fault – that there were only (to date ) 300 firings out of 50,000 FAA, IMHO “huge numbers ” doesn’t fit.

      Reply

        • Well one can stretch things a bit to make the specific connection to the Canada crash- in that the plane met US/FAA certification standards so IF- big stretch IF something is found that related to a part failing causing the crash AND that part failed because it was supposed to meet FAA standards and did not- then a POSSIBLE realationship re FAA MIGHT be established. Note that it would take multiple probabilities-inprobilities for that specific a chain. Even so the Canadian equivalent to FAA and the US FAA will have worked together for a variety of other reasons not ‘just in case’ But all- repeat ALL such speculation is just that at this time.

          Reply

          • You know that is a Canadian jet?

            Us recognizes Canadian certification so at the time it was automatic.

            but come on, the odds of an issue after 20 years or more in service? Nope.

            Nothing more or less than a landing that went bad in tough landing conditions. Happens all the time. they bent up a 767 severely a while back and stuck the gear through a 737 wing.

            You can see there was little if any flare. Right wing down to deal with the cross wind and prang.

            Fantastic news is even the seriously injured are looking ok.

            I am seeing some absurd comments about how the wings and tail are supposed to break off in a case like that. Wow.

            When they taught me to land they taught us not to prang it on hard.

  6. Nice of Ortberg to tell us about his “goals”, but there’s no meat on the bone, is there?

    For example, did he give any specific information on the 777X thrust link problem/solution, so that we can ascertain for ourselves to what extent his “goals” are achievable?

    Also no details as to precisely what aspect of the MAX-7/10 is holding up their certification. Is it a software problem? A problem with system failure alalyses? The telescoping gear on the MAX-10?

    Is Ortberg even interested in details?

    Reply

    • As yes, the return of the Inupiat.

      Seeing as he designed the thrust links he of all people should know what the fix looks like.

      Sadly there are only so many testing hours in a flgiht (ie the duration of the flight).

      It could be years before anyone knows and then they would take another crack (pun) at another fix.

      Reply

    • Most likely did Boeing let GE do the engine/mounts/pylon detailed analysis and propose a new thrust link design that works.
      Regarding CRJ900 crash it will be interesting to see what comes out of the investigation regarding the right main landing gear if it failed before max certified load.

      Reply

  7. Boeings 777x certification problems originate early in the previous decade, with 2012 legistation and 2014 777x certification strategy approval being milestones.

    Reviewing 737 MAX certification short cuts in 2018, it quickly became clear the parallel 777x certification process was even more “ambitious”.

    The 777x is a new aircraft, not an upgrade. That became known to stakeholders 6 yrs ago.

    Reply

    • @Keesje

      Subtle point too…the 777C is subject to the same 2027 ICAO regs that are killing off the the B767F. The 777X was supposed to be the next version.

      There is a hard end in 2027 for all 777F (classic) production or P2F, though it has been pointed out with irony that there is negligible P2F activity because the of the certification delays in the 777X driving 777C operation far longer than planned with airlines.

      Reply

      • It should be pointed out that the current 777F is a smaller size than its larger Cousin the 777-8F.

        No where near all cargo ops need that larger size.

        Boeing can ask for a waiver on the 777F, they wold get it. Numbers build are too small to have any meaning in the emissions levels.

        A current 777 PFC is a big gamble. You still need to fill it. Too many firms jumped into what was going to be a short term market.

        The big operators can afford a new aircraft. But that still leaves an F gap so some 777PCF will continue to be built. You gain nothing.

        The big market area is still the 767F be it conversions there or A330 conversions and new offerings, 787 new offerings (no conversions for another 10 years or longer).

        Most conversions will continue to be 737 and A320.

        Reply

          • Nothing wrong with posting links. I regret I did not file a lot of them as it often can be used to prove a point that has been made.

            My take is the F market is werid and has always been weird.

            UPS ordered 757F from Boeing. FedEx stuck with 727s of all things and then suddenly woke up and, oh, we need those.

            FedEx was the first F on the MD-11 and still flying them (days are numbered). DC-10 is gone but MD-11 seems to have a mix that works (basically it is a higher ops and maint cost of the 777F, aka a converted 777F is about the same range and capacity)

            UPS went with 767s until they woke up one day and decided MD-11F was the way to go (so they had to buy used pax and convert them)

            FedEx hates 4 engines, UPS loves their 747s.

  8. Scott

    I think there is a typo in the second paragraph. It cites the thrust rating of the new engine GE9x as being 115,000 lbf. This is the rating for the 777-300ER engine GE90-115B. The correct published rating for the new engine is 110,000 lbf at takeoff and sustained max. continuous thrust of 103,500 lbf.

    Reply

    • @Mike:

      I have seen that, I think there is confusion on its max rating ie tests vs what is being used and certified on the 777X.

      Reply

  9. This is a bit off topic, but my biggest fantasy (germaine to this website) is for the four ex-CEOs that created the hot, steaming mess at Boeing (Stonecipher, McNerny, Muilenberg, and Calhoun)to sit for press interviews and answer the basic question: “What went wrong?”
    I am certain that none of the four would accept any responsibility for anything. The first two would say everything was fine when they left, and the last two would point at the first two and covid. Not one would take any responsibility and they would never, ever say “I was wrong”. After all, they each rose to the pinnacle of a business culture in which avoiding those three words is a prerequisite for advancement.

    Reply

    • Legally, they should be prosecuted for fraud. But their crimes go even higher: I am talking about crimes against humanity. It is amazing what you can get away with just because of your status in the structure of this system. They all walked away with 10s if not 100s of millions of dollars. Because of that, they will have Business Schools named after them.

      Reply

    • Their response would be ‘ Just following orders ‘ from the Bored of Directionless AKA the good ole ‘them’ gang.

      and to borrow and misquote an old meme ” never in history have so many been harmed by so few “

      Reply

      • Under those whacko CEO, it went exactly the way they wanted it to.

        Wrong is not in their lexicon. They simply wanted to get as many gold eggs out of the Boeing goose they could and not have it die until they got their ill acquired gains.

        They could care less about the economy, the US, anything, its all about money and getting far more than anyone could spend in 1000 lifetimes.

        The deaths under their watch are just collateral damage to them. I think Mullenberg was shook, but he was just a puppet, keeping in mind the board was on board for all of it and just as complicit.

        Reply

        • There seems to be from time to time the repeated MYTH that shareholders really ‘elect’ or “choose” the Board. While partially true and advertised as an shareholder election, in fact and real life, it is the board who chooses who to elect and it really is the major funds -with rare exception- actually run the ‘ election’. Joe Lunchpail/employee who owns maybe a few thousand or less shares directly or thru their broker is given a choice – vote YES or NO for the person listed. But few individual shareholders hold say a million or more shares or enough to really affect the results. For decades, 50 million shares typically represented maybe 10 to 15 percent of shares voting which is barely enough to allow more than one time at ‘ bat’ at the annual meetings.
          Of course its not impossible to ‘ fire ‘ a board member, just highly improbable- one or a dozen or 10000 employee/owners usually have a better chance of winning the lottery then firing a board member of a company the size of Boeing. yes- I’ve benther got tee and 40 to 50 million yes shares in favor of my proposal(s) a few decades ago.

          Reply

          • And how many people own 95% of the shares in the country? Like 1%. The game is rigged for retail investors.

      • Yes, but these CEOs essentially created these boards, stacking them with like minded Welchian bean counters and compliant figureheads (eg Caroline Kennedy and Nikki Haley), to create rubber stamp boards equally ready as these CEO’s to sell off the future to boost the stock now.

        Reply

        • And who wouldn’t want their performance judged by a committee of one’s friends?

          Reply

      • No, he figured it out from the outset.
        But a lot of US-ians are only waking up to this effect now…including some pretty well “educated” people on CNBC, who previously rejoiced that less bureaucracy and lower taxes would be great for the economy, but forgot to consider all the negative effects of the Trump/Musk circus.
        The economy is already showing signs of cooling, inflation is trending up, the dollar is weakening, $66B worth of US Treasuries were dumped in December by the Brits, Chinese and Japanese, and the Dow 30 is having indigestion. And that’s only the start of what’s to come.

        Reply

  12. Planespotters:

    BA’s 737 MAX deliveries in Feb (as of this morning) only amount to 16 frames.

    And I’m only counting 4 787s: two from the line and two from the parking lot.

    Looks like Ortberg’s “goals” are still a long way off.

    Reply

    • Over at AB, I’m counting (so far):
      17 A320/A321 neos
      3 A220s
      2 A330 neos
      Zero A350s

      Looks like the slow start to the year has stretched into February…

      Reply

      • Some were from the parking lot, so the line number is even less than 16.

        But you’re right: who’s going to worry about something as trivial as a 60% shortfall? 🙈

        Reply

  15. > “Air traffic controllers and pilots must now follow rules for ‘radar separation,’ which requires 1.5 miles of lateral distance between aircraft or 500 feet of altitude separation. Because [DCA] is so close to… the White House, that effectively shuts down traffic… when Marine One” is in the air.

    https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:t2rloykje2a4vwe6yorlmk7q

    > “On Feb. 14, when Trump left the White House on the first leg of a trip to Florida, roughly 30 airliners bound for National were kept circling in the sky, publicly available flight tracking data shows. At least nine aircraft diverted to other airports.”

    Reply

  16. Clearly US manufacturing has a target on its back:

    Donald Trump orders new tariff investigation into US copper imports

    Reply

    • ““No way,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an aviation and business analyst with Leeham.net who has run detailed models on 787 costs and revenue. “They need to recover far too much money per airplane. They will never do that.””

      —

      “I can’t get the math to work. It seems very tough to bridge,” said Strauss. “You need a much, much, much bigger block than 1,300.”

      —

      “The most conservative of IISL’s models, the one most favorable to Boeing, projects that after delivering 2,000 Dreamliners, the jet-maker will still have “a total program loss of approximately $5 billion.”

      —

      “Worse, the above IISL, Wall Street and Leeham analyses of 787 costs don’t include Boeing’s original investment to develop the jet, estimated by most analysts at a further $20 billion or more.”

      —

      Mind you, we have a commenter here who thinks otherwise, but the Seattle Times doesn’t seem to have wished to quote him, oddly enough. 😄

      Reply

      • Way back in the early days of 787 operations, Ray Goforth, the executive director of SPEEA (Boeing’s engineers union) told Boeing it should consider the 787 just one huge R&D program–it would never make money. Boeing was not amused.

        Reply

      • Back of the envelope math, makes this impossible.

        $10.8bn written off on the first 1,150 deliveries.

        Another $10.3bn in DPC’s, waiting to be expensed.

        $20bn in R&D spent on the program.

        Call it $40bn that the program needs to make in margin, to cover those costs (not revenues, profit).

        Boeing would need to start delivering TODAY…2,000 aircraft at a $20m margin per airframe, to get level.

        Every quarter that there is an increase to the DPC balance, an ‘abnormal production charge’, or any such setback – puts them further and further behind.

        The numbers just don’t work.

        Reply

    • @Vincent
      This is exactly why a lot of people hate program accounting. Whether the B787 ever makes a profit is now a historical footnote…the investment is already baked. For as much Boeing (and others) go to obfuscate the true cost of production…nobody seems to notice whenever billions of dollars of special charges are taken.

      I have to wonder whether Wall Street would even care if Boeing just made the strategic decision to pivot away from program accounting and take whatever charges are necessary. Just dump the charges on top of the rest of the pile. Then we can stop this nonsense with accounting blocks too.

      Reply

    • Nevertheless BA/BCA is able to book “profits” quarter after quarter, and enough stonk buyers believe so.

      Reply

    • Christ, the ATC situation in the US has sunk to the level of a banana republic.

      Also, were the pilots in the crossing regional jet looking out their side windows *at all*…?

      Reply

      • Darn, look at El Presidente, we are a banana republic!

        While part of the problem is ATC, that is tangled up in staffing, so lets fire on coming people (controllers and support) so we can make this worse!

        At another level its a tech issue. Talking over radio on a common channel is gross stupidity. That is 1930s tech. Transmission walk on each other, sound quality is bad at times and accents can make it harder. Then you have ground control, tower for final approach and hand off to ground, ATC that gets you to the tower take over point and for a go around you have departure and then cycle through all those channels again.

        It should be text based. Each pilot clearly has in front of him instructions sent and each controller has the same.

        Your other problem is you look at it as singular, its not, dozens of aircraft movements were going on at the same time because not only do we have commercial, we have business traffic and even private prop jobs mixed in (all have the same rights to a slot of airspace – ergo, there is a cost issue involved that the Uber Strong private pilots don’t want to pay their share). I have a much right in a C-150 to land at Chicago as an A350. Business jets and High Performance Turbo Props the same.

        Anyone think with all the cutting going on that the TC system gets on a path to better?

        All aircraft should be linked into a position sensor and the go around should have been autonomic as the movement of the BJ was in conflict with the orders and the buffer was hugely violated. Ground movement needs to be linked into landing approvals and cleared to do so.

        We have the tech, we are not using it. As it stands the controllers are more pin ball artists than the flow managers they should be. It like Model T where you had to adjust the spark advance.

        Reply

        • No, aktually you’re living in Paradise, in heaven after life… does this make you sleep better now?

          Reply

  21. The invisible COO! Is she on her way out the door; and how wounld one tell?

    weird stuff at that outfit.

    Reply

  22. “ALPA Opposes Boeing MAX 7 and 10 exemption request”

    “The Airline Pilots Association International (ALPA) has come out against the FAA granting Boeing a regulatory exemption for the 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10, currently in the certification process. The exemption request, which Boeing made in January, is for the stall-management yaw damper (SMYD). If granted, Boeing would not have to demonstrate that the SYMD software meets more stringent standards, as well as more quickly apply upgrades to the MAX 8 and MAX 9 which are already in service.

    “ALPA, in a letter to the FAA earlier this month, stated “ALPA believes the certification of the SMYD system should be concluded before entry into service. ALPA furthermore does not agree with the 3.5 years Boeing is asking for an exemption.”

    “Boeing’s exemption request is a departure from their decision last year not to seek an exemption for engine nacelle issues resulting from the de-icing system. At that point, public opinion was quite negative after the MAX 9 decompression and a series of Boeing failures. The company has now requested an exemption one year later, after a management change and improvements in manufacturing quality. ”

    https://airinsight.com/alpa-opposes-boeing-max-7-and-10-exemption-request/

    —

    The junkie that just can’t survive without exemptions…

    Reply

    • @Abalone
      This is not a defense of Boeing…but if the risk to safety of the SMYD is functionally identical on Max7 and Max10 as it would be on the Max8 and Max9 then a waiver does not hurt my head.

      If both variants go away…Boeing is still putting out product with an identical risk profile.

      If it is a big enough risk it can be handled with an AD

      Reply

      • Or…one could argue that the MAX 8 and 9 should never have been certified — and then, later, re-certified — with that gremlin in place.
        So, now that BA has a chance to rectify it, they look for another 3.5 year delay? Excuse me? 3.5 *years*?

        How about this: “You have 6 months to rectify it on all MAX models, or we’ll ground the MAX 8 and 9 until you have a fix”.

        We’re talking about stall management here…not the seat recline or interior lighting dimming control.

        The attitute to safety at BA hasn’t changed *at all* since the MAX crashes.

        Reply

        • @Abalone
          I would actually be more sympathetic to your second option. If the concern is really that bad…then this requires immediate action. It is not immediately clear to me how severe the concern is. There is a fine line between design deficiences and known safety risks. Before EIS you endeavor to minimize the deficiences whether there is a real safety risk or not. At a certain point, fleet experience does matter and will inform regulators whether there is real concern to deficiencies.

          The longer the Max8 and Max9 remains in service without incidences of stall issues only makes the case that there is minimal fleet risk.

          The issues on waivers (at this point) really ought to focus on design differences and concerns specific to the Max 7 or Max10.

          Reply

          • “The SMYD system increases an aircraft’s stability when nearing stalls by providing warnings, identifying stall conditions, and actively controlling the aircraft’s yaw. The version that Boeing used on the 737 MAX 9 was modified to fit the MAX 7 and then again for the MAX 10 to accommodate their different fuselage sizes.

            “The new software also implements enhanced angle of attack (EAOA) features to reduce pilot workload and improve system integrity,
            specifically during air data and AOA system failures. This change addresses two accidents in 2018 and 2019 that caused 346 fatalities and
            were partially attributed to said failures.

            “While the FAA likely appreciates the plane maker’s upgrades, it can’t
            ignore the fact that the new SMYD system is out of compliance with two
            CFR sections. The SMYD also does not qualify for Level A (DAL A) certification under the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics’s (RTCA) standards since it was previously only approved under Level B.”

            —

            Are you suggesting that we switch to a system of “assume all is okay until the first crash”…?

            The system is out of compliance…why not just get it into compliance? Does BA not have any competent engineers left at all?

          • No I am suggesting that the urgency of the SMYD should not matter wrt the Max7 or Max10. If there is a real safety risk then the mitigation needs to be driven into the Max8 and Max9, regardless of whether the Max7 or Max10 ever enters service.

            I have no context to know how big the risk is. I don’t want to go down a rabbit hole here…but not every design deficiency is a risk. Somewhere there is a safety risk assessment that will inform both sides whether the fleet risk meets accepted safety standards. Generally, when the risk falls belows threshold it is monitored…but no mitigation is generally prescribed.

            There are many flaws in the design of the systems. Not all flaws warrant a fix. There is a difference between addressing evaluated fleet risks and holding a standard of a “perfect” design.

            The issue of compliance is an updated certification standard. The rules are there to be helpful, but they are not written in stone. There is no logic to allowing one design variant into production without a fix and holding certification of another variant with an idential fleet risk profile. I am going to sidestep whether the SMYD is necessary and simply state that the treatment of all variants ought to be consistent. That is not necessarily disagreeing with your argument.

          • The reality is that we have a lot of flight time in MAX but we have an enormousness amount of flight time in the NG.

            During the fix of MCAS to 2.0, the FAA noted an issue with a possible computer corruption. It was deemed needed to fix despite millions of hours of operations in which it never occurred.

            Casey says its a fine line, I don’t believe its fine. Time is a proven tester in conjunction with the analysis of it being possible.

            Anyone could tell you sooner or latter Reagan was going to have a traffic conflict that resulted in a mid-air (not to mention all its other issues).

            In this case SMYD is a math possible but reality no. So, like many other issues that have cropped up, including on Airbus Aircraft, its a determination on is it needed now or down the road.

            I don’t blindly agree with Boeing, but on a tech basis, its clear that its a pie in the sky issue. So yea, work it out over time but don’t stop the world for something that is never going to happen.

            There was a wiring issue on the 737s that showed up. That too never happened.

            If you want to eliminate ALL risk of flying, do not fly. There is no such thing as zero risk.

            But you should stop driving as well, far more risk there.

            Just because its Boeing does not mean its wrong, nor does it mean Boeing is right and they have their issues when they clearly were not and fatally so.

            And to be clear, its a request its not a given. The FAA has been strict on Boeing accountability for some time (and rightfully so).

            EASA and the other AHJs also weigh in.

            The poster child for a bad decision by EASA was the Norwegian 787 that was allowed to fly with two iffy engines based purely on a computer model.

            When in fact the better engine failed, the other engine could very well have packed it in. Fortunately that did not happen. It was a bad decision, no aircraft sh9ouod be allowed to fly with even one iffy engine.

            India flipped that script around. When Indigo wanted to fly with an iffy engine, they refused. You will fly with two good engines or not at all.

            Those decisions have to be made all the time by AHJ. As Casey noted, aircraft are never perfect. Its impossible to be perfect and the cost to try to do so would ensure no flying period.

            You balance it out. More views are good. That is why each AHJ should not accept another findings, they should do their own analysis and discuss it and see what each and everyone is seeing and why they feel it should be a yea or nay. If they can’t come to a concurrence then it should be a nay.

          • @TW
            Appreciate the insight. A good example of an aircraft that aspired for “perfect” was the MRJ. Let alone its lack of backlog or scope clause relieft…it was an aircraft designed almost with a Japanese automotive mentality involved that you design as close to perfection as possible.

            That may work in some industries, but unfortunately in aircraft systems you really do not know how something behaves until it enters service. There are known design risks and perceived design risks. The known risks are mitigated prior to EIS. The perceived risks “may be” mitigated with design changes. Many times those risks never materialize. And often…failure modes crop up that were never even contemplated.

            A proper fleet risk analysis will monitor the occurrence rate of events…and the risk of system and aircraft level hazard when no mitigation is in place. The FAA (and EASA) will have accepted safety standard for events per million hours. That standard is not zero.

            Mitsubishi swung for perfection and never entered service at all. We are all safer for the sum cum of over 100 years of commercial safetey learning, and that is why new aircraft certification is so difficult. It must clear that hurdle of all that institutional knowledge. In reality you enter service knowing that there may be hiccups along the way. You monitor fleet health and insert mitigations as necessary. It also helps to have a slow taper of aircraft at EIS so that any known issue does not have the opportunity to develop into a substantial installed fleet.

      • Remember Reagan National airport has been “accident-free” for years. It’s perfectly “safe” until Jan 29 this year.

        We won’t know what’s going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month or next year.

        Reply

        • One is a clear issue and the other is not even close.

          Irrelevant comparison.

          Reply

          • As an informed aviaitionist, I have been concerned about Reagan for 40 years.

            Its not been a topic on this Blog before. Again you make a false comparison.

            I am far from the only one, I suspect I first read about it from Av Week. Many in the community have had concerns with it. I was through Dulles back in 1980, wondering why LCA were still landing at Reagon.

            Denver closed down Stapleton when the new airport was built, sold it off, not even a small aircraft field.

            I have been to Denver and have seen the Stapleton site when it was being dismantled.

            Muan had nothing on Stapleton as far as risk hazards of long or short landings.

            Frankly I suspect I was bouncing around in DC-3s and Super Cubs before you were born.

            The ride from Chicago to Milwaukee was quite concerning for a y0ung lad who knew oil is not supposed to be blowing out of an engine and rivets popping off the wing.

      • “During 737-7 development and certification of the yaw damper function, updated analysis led Boeing and the FAA to determine that the SMYD should now be certified to Design Assurance Level A,” Boeing’s exemption request says. Level A systems are considered those for which failure may be “*catastrophic*”.

        Could it be another MCAS? If this doesn’t cause you any concern, what else can it be?

        Reply

        • @Pedro
          I am sympathetic to a hard line if they discovered something specific to the Max7. Otherwise be mindful that the business end of your risk profile is on the two variants that will sell the most and are already in service. If this is really a problem then the biggest priority belongs on those two variants by sheer flight hours alone.

          Even when a known safety risk is identified that requires mitigation, it is typically done in a way that minimizes fleet disruption so long as the calculated safety risks are within accepted ranges. The safest path would be to ground fleets anytime a risk is identified. That is reserved for only the most severe risks

          Neither of knows the arithmetic behind “may be” in this instance. One in a billion hours and one in a thousand flight hours both “may be” risk. I said it in an earlier comment. The threshold is not zero.

          Reply

          • Much easier and safer to just get the system in question into compliance before certification…that way, we don’t have to have this discussion about failure probability.

            Regulations are there for a reason. If ALPA is publicly worried about this, then it needs to be addressed quickly and properly.

            There’s no reason why BA needs to be given a 3.5 year exemption to modify a system that is important to preventing/correcting stalls.

            If BA doesn’t have the engineering resources to do this quickly and efficiently, then it’s time to draw conclusions and close the shop.

          • Time for BCA to fix the issues they have on hand instead of endless “exempts” extended repeatedly. Remember the 767 debacle? IIRC BCA never found a solution, just asking one exempt after another. Enough is enough for this shenanigan.

            “Following the 1996 in-flight explosion of TWA Flight 800, the FAA introduced new rules about flammability reduction in 2008. In 2012, Boeing requested an exemption for the 767 from new wiring separation rules that would prevent ignition sources, because design improvements it introduced fell short of meeting such rules. One of the justification by Boeing: changes to the fuel quantity indication system would require a halt of delivery by three years as production of the 767 model was expected to end shortly. FAA gave the manufacturer three years to have a compliant system while deliveries continued. In 2014, Boeing, without a new design available, asked for and received another time-limited exemption for just the 767-300 and 767-300ER until 2019 when commercial production was expected to cease. But in 2017, with continual demand for the 767-300F, Boeing asked for another exemption up to the end of 2027, well past the revised production end date. It is noted that while Boeing requested extension of the original exemption from 2016 to 2019 based upon the cost of upgrading the design and their low production rate and ending production in 2019, Boeing developed the KC-46 tanker (based on the 767) which fully compliant with the new rulings and is assembled on the same production line as the 767. Since the 2019 exemption went into effect, Boeing has increased production of the freighter to satisfy demand.

          • Lots of issues that are noted on all aircraft and a determination to deferr made.

            The A320 has had its share and one I know of because it hit the news at the time my wife was flying had 5 years to fix.

            It was a critical flight item (forget what) much like MCAS, Airbus had a work around to an inertial system.

            Of course there goes you QMI. Trained to do X and either do X or start X and have to shift to Y.

            Why was it not fixed ASAP? Airbus got a waiver, you only had to correct when you did a D check. It was some kind of software issue and it only took a software fix.

            You can’t do that now? How about the next inspection? Nope, years and years. Am I flying an A320 that has been fixed or is it the old system?

    • A shell of a company that has completely lost the ability to design/make *anything* to spec…

      Reply

  24. That seems accurate: surviving on exemptions and special treatment on ancient equipment.. not pretty.

    “Trust us” oof

    Reply

  26. CNBC: Boeing No. 2 executive’s role narrowed to focus on fixing commercial plane

    Reply

    • Nice that they’re thinking about that- after how many years?

      what an outfit

      Reply

  27. An interesting consequence of US Defense budge cuts has come to light in regards to the KC-46A (just that aircraft as its included in allowed items)

    “Curtailing the Air Force’s F-35A buy or T-7 Red Hawk trainer program would also be a mistake, Penney argued, but the service could delay its efforts to develop a next-generation refueling tanker.”

    Depending on outcomes, that would be an allowance to keep buying KC-46A and possibly in much higher numbers.

    The current program is less than half the KC-135R numbers that the program was intended to replace.

    No KC-Z, then either you keep those KC-135Rs flying at a high cost or you replace them with KC-46A.

    Reply

    • @TW
      The next gen tanker was all part of the NGAS that went with the NGAD 6th gen fighter. That funding was held up due to concerns over affordability (and rightly so). In reality, if the Air Force is not going to fund NGAS anytime soon and they want new aircraft, then it will be compelled to order another tranche of KC46A (or Airbus if it wants to go that route). The USAF has “maybe” two years to decide about the KC46A before Boeing kills off the B767 once the current tranche of orders is delivered and now that the freighter is on its way out.

      Reply

      • @Casey:

        I knew the two programs were casually linked but I thought it was separate as the F-35 and the F-22 both need tankers to get into strike range (more so the F-35 I think).

        Its going to be interesting to see what happens with production as it now mixes up with the administration and their nutty behaviour.

        Reply

        • There is no hard linkage with 6th gen fighter funding. However, that program would render a higher priority than NGAS. NGAS contemplates a “more stealthy” tanker that is not a commercial derivative. Stating the obvious, if you are worried about contested air space then a KC46A sticks out like a sore thumb.

          The USAF is going to want to figure out the nature of what the next of fighters (or drones) is going to be before launching the system that will refuel them.

          Reply

          • The whole “stealth” discussion has become defunct.
            The Brits and Russians have shown that “stealth” aircraft can be detected by passive radar and/or long-wavelength radar. Russia has helped Egypt construct a long-wavelength radar tracking station in the Sinai that can track “stealth” aircraft up to 1000 km away. And Iran recently showed that it could track and lock onto Israeli F35s over Iraq…probably using a mixture of S-400 radar and long-wavelength ground stations. China has also constructed counter-stealth radar on Triton island in the South China Sea.

            Hypersonic speed is now the only way to penetrate a sophisticated enemy’s defenses. The whole concept of using tanker-supported “stealth” aircraft to strike a distant, sophisticated enemy has become invalidated. The Pentagon must surely be aware of this — the other side certainly is.
            At best, “stealth” aircraft are now only useful for limited tactical operations against less sophisticated players.

          • The A2/AD works. I don’t talk about this, just FYI, the UASF and navy are largely pinned down.

    • The Pentagon is ordered to cut/shift 40% of its budget in five years! (8% each year, over five years)

      Haven’t you read the “news”??

      Reply

    • So who is this Mr Penney, a member of the USAF or not? Why should anyone take his words at face value?

      Reply

    • Plus:
      The US 10-year/3-month yield curve inverted yesterday (yet again), and the US budget deficit more than doubled to $129B in January.

      Stagflation is now a real risk.

      Not good news for BA, or US industry as a whole.

      Reply

  33. In “Paradise”, better days ahead…

    TWZ: Cracks In KC-46 Pegasus Tankers Halt All Deliveries

    https://t.co/HnoVoQhEbN

    > The Air Force will inspect its entire fleet of 89 KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers after cracks were found on two of the four new planes set to be sent to the Military Delivery Center, the Air Force told The War Zone exclusively. The issue was discovered by Boeing, which makes the jets, the Air Force said.

    In addition, Boeing “is taking measures to temporarily halt deliveries until we fully understand the root cause and implement an effective corrective action plan,” the Air Force stated in response to our query about the latest problems with the troubled Pegasus program.

    > “The cracks were not found on any flight surfaces or hinges, but rather on the primary or secondary structures,” the Air Force told us.

    Boeing told us it is working to fix the problem.

    Reply

    • Cracks in primary structures ?? Geeze- Just a unverified guess about what process was fubared on the tankers as part of cost cutting and similar measures.
      The process is commonly known as ” coldworking ” [CW] and does require a few extra steps in production when drilling (other than rivets ) fastener holes in structure and in diameters from about 1/4 thru about 3/4 inches. Including lower wing panels, wing box, spars, and similar.
      While coldworking [CW] of certain fastener areas had been done on AWACS ( 707) it was on 757 and 767 the process use was expanded-included on many more areas subject to lower and medium stress fatigue areas. For specifics of the process- look up a local firm https://www.fatiguetech.com

      Now a bit of history re fatigue issues/improvements on 757 767 and hopefully following ( I wuz there and involved somewhat on 767 in the early 80;’s and on the 777 in the early 1990’s ) but the story really starts in the 1970’s. And very much involved in incorporation on the first and subsequent 767s.

      The basic method consists of 4 steps in hole prep instead of the simplified single step ‘drill the hole ‘ – insert fastener. ( I am avoiding numbers deliberty

      1- drill an undersize hole
      2- insert a split sleeve on a special sized mandrel into hole
      3- pull mandrel thru sleeve and hole which expands the hole via compressive stress- which is usually then out of round and not of fastener size.
      4-ream hole to final design size- insert fastener.

      Side note – the compressive stress typically goes out about to an additional radius of the hole diameter, and is only partially relieved by the subsequent reaming. Fatigue improvement is significant.

      And yes an expanding mandrel design can also be used on 1/4 to 3/8 holes.

      The process was developed and improved by Boeing in the late 60’s and early 70’s by Lou Champoux who was a ‘ seatmate ‘ of mine in the 60’s – and I designed an improved extended nosepiece first used on 767 and later models [But thats another story ]

      So my guess is that the cost cutting wonders involved in the tanker decided to scrub the design and manufacturing process to eliminate ‘ areas of no concern re fatigue ‘ as part of – “process/cost improvement” faster-cheaper.

      Of course I might be wrong :))

      Reply

      • Thank you for bringing up a possible explanatory.

        As those were newly delivered tankers, clearly something in the producible process and I was baffled for an aircraft that has been built for 40 some years.

        Maybe putting two and two together, what cracked was something in the mod process they go through to put all the plumbing and other systems in.

        It would seem to be obvious that they found it that quickly. I would guess also easy enough to fix though as you say, if its a method different, they would have to check all places that was used.

        The rip out and mods are not done on the line, they build the bacilli 767 and then its moved to Boeing Field fro the perversion, so its a whole different group doing that.

        Going to be interesting, as well as how widespread it is in the current fleet.

        Almost all the mission ready rates have to do with spare parts and the USAF was notorious on low balling parts. That is the F-35 Achiless heel.

        What the posters seem not to be aware of is that the KC-135 has its own center of how to fix it as they find the problems and a large number at any time are going thought that center to fix them (that is not the we are adding equipment part).

        Does Boeing deserve a lot of beating overt the head? Of yeah.

        But as the denial exists, the USAF also mucked up things and the boom spec was one. Boeing built it to the spec the USAF said to and it was USAF wrong.

        The issue with the vision fix was half the same. The USAF did not like the wide vision part. But that was their spec, Boeing just built that part to what they asked for.

        Then when the narrow vision was not working, the USAF wanted Boeing to fix the wide vision part on their dime. Boeing is on a fixed contract of course, you want something different (or extra) look at clause 185A, you pay for it.

        The T7A is the same. The USAF realized that they messed up on range. Seems pretty simple but there it is (its not like they don’t train with T-38 and know what range works). So, the USAF is willing to dearly the program to get the range increase on their dime.

        The USAF also wanted a bunch more tests. Boeing said, clause 135D said you get X, that is all we are budgeted for. If you want more, you pay for more.

        A fixed price contract goes both ways!.

        Reply

        • I used the term ‘ coldworking’ since that was the designation used for a few decades. But FTI (fatigue technology inc ) has some time in the past few decades and maybe for some other legal reasons elected to use the term ‘ cold expansion ‘- Since the two planes were new with few if any flight hours, its a bit hard to relate a new (as built ) crack to a fatigue centric process – (lack of )- being an issue.
          However- it IS a result of at least Poor- non existent – inspection for which there is NO excuse- or somehow over use of the traditional ‘ bend or twist – pound to fit and file to suit ‘ process or shortcut brute force ‘expansion’ of a few fastener holes. I hope not.

          Reply

          • Yea its mind numbing as you now have to figure out how long its been going on and what else uses the same process.

            Hopping its a new screw up but have to watch it of course.

            Good it was spotted but concerned it happened and no real background yet.

          • A bit more explanation which is not obvious to those who take the time to look up FTI explanations which are good and well proven BTW. Note that the split sleeve when expanded will leave a vertical ‘ line’ in the hole. Such location/direction will raise the ire of almost any stress guru akin to finding any hole with a vertical “scratch ” or discontinuity- but what is not explained or mentioned or obvious is that many many many tests ( made in the 70’s) by Boeing – and later in service use have shown that that ridge is of no consequence whether left as is or normally reamed out to final size. Initially Lou C wanted to use a spiral wound sleeve to avoid that ” problem “-but the spiral wound sleeves were a near nightmare to produce to ‘ size’ and use. Yep wuz there then.

          • Thank you. Not an area I would normally encounter though I have seen some odd stuff.

            We had some issues with putting a startup device on a shaft, aka one of those super magnet things that gives you a soft start (softer).

            The Hub we had was impossible to get the eccentric out of. Turned out there was a hub that was perfect, but you looked at it and it was, no squeeze, that is impossible.

            It worked. One of those you just had to take it on faith and not understand it (or go to school for 10 years to understand it).

            One of those it had been sold, then sold again and was back with the original company but in the meantime the hub spec for what was to be used got changed and did not get caught to get changed back.

          • RE ” The decision to pause deliveries was made on Feb. 27 by the service’s KC-46A program office “due to the identification of in the ‘outboard fixed-trailing-edge support structure’” of the two planes, an Air Force spokesperson said. ”

            From memory – 40 years or so — 767 used an ASAT (Automatic Spar Assembly Tool ) for much of the rear spar. And that tool incorporated a first-second generation of ElectroMagnetic Riveting which eventually “evolved” into the founding of a company now known as Electro-Impact ( but thats another very personal involved story not needed here )
            That process also gives great fatigue life on the spar.
            But when you attach a ( forged-machined ) hinge structure, my guess is that most of the fastening should have also been” cold expanded” due to the multiple actuation of variable loads ”
            A great place to skip a few steps-faster cheaper . But remember the above is pure- unverified speculation on my part- but I will be interested in whatever FACTS get released.

          • From the article:

            “A source with knowledge of the program told Breaking Defense that the issue revolves around cracks found on the aileron hinges… The service and Boeing have been aware since 2018 that the KC-46 — like its parent aircraft, the commercial 767 — could develop cracks to the aileron hinges over time, but the discovery of cracking on brand new aircraft led the service to stop deliveries.”

          • I doubt they are related. If so, hugely distant.

            To be cracked on delivery they did has to be a build process failure (as well as an inspection failure).

            Clearly the KC-46A has its issues that in turn are directly related to lack of QC at Boeing. FOD in the KC-46A was another one.

            the 767 line may not have got the attention as MAX but also needs it. So Ortberg has another fire to put out. Probably relatively quick to resolved, they have not been delivering 767s all these years with cracked attach points.

            Much like the MAX grounding, ok, we changed it, process was not right, we can fix it. Egg on the face but just worse as so many eggs have hit.

            Boeing recovery is and never was going to be problem free. Things will crop up, get assessed and corrected. The 787 has been through the process, the MAX is working its way through, the 767 at least in the guise of the KC-46A has shown another one.

            Its also fixable and KC-46A production into more units is almost certain.
            There is no alternative. It would take Airbus 5 years to crank up to levels of build Boeing has and they would have to deliver a USAF spec A330MRT. They may have the kit to do so now, but has it been all integrated into an airframe? And any kit missing has to be built, integrated and tested. IOC?

            As the one tanker pilot said, we always have work arounds, its not a perfect world and we adapt and adjust.

            You want to remove known issues (RWS) but issues there always will be

          • An item of interest is Boeing bidding into two Polish programs with a singel offering.

            One has to do with fighters and the other tankers of which the A330MRT is the leading candidate.

            That said Boeing is offering the F-15EX with the KCC-46A as a package.

            Considering Polands defense needs (very regional) the KC-46A would make sense. Not sure how soon you can get them is a factor. USAF has given up slots to deliver KC-46A to Japan and Israel.

          • @Casey

            Is this clarity? What would the Trump admin decide? I’ll wait & see.

            @TW

            Did you forget what happened on Feb 28? Lol.

          • @Pedro
            Not sure what form of clarity you are alluding to. If you are asking what I really think is going to happen…I will say deciding not to buy an NGAS that is not even awarded is a rather easy decision. I don’t see USAF buying A330. So the decision really boils down to deciding to fly really old KC-135 indefinitely OR not. My guess is they buy more KC46A. As long as Boeing is dumb enough to continue to offer lowball bids it is hard to say no. Fixing craftsmanship is a lot simpler than fixing a fundamentally bad design.

            If you are talking about NGAD, I am having a hard time seeing that get greenlight. Just because the USAF likes it does not mean it’s getting funded. Best guess is they keep pumping out F35.

            As it relates to Boeing defense, you can only help them so much. The KC46A has been a money pit and now the entire line will be tanker only. I am not sure that is really a win for Boeing to keep making that system. The F15 is only saleable in very specific situations and to specific countries. Poland is a F35 partner country. That will form the backbone of their future air defense. And don’t even get me started on AF1. Starliner may fly again before AF1.

            Stated this before, but IMHO Boeing defense lineup is even sadder than Boeing commercial.

          • @Casey

            Do they have the final say?? Not likely

            ‘Top U.S. Air Force officials are increasing their public push for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter months after the program was placed on pause, arguing that the future fighter is necessary for potential future conflicts.’

            https://x.com/AviationWeek/status/1897325232584634554

          • @Pedro
            Ultimately Congress has final say in the matter. I have yet to see any military branch not push for shiny new toys. The Chinese jets that looked like 6th gen certainly did add some oxygen to the argument for an American version. I did not bring it up earlier, but the Navy is pushing for its own 6th gen fighter…link below looks like Lockheed just got booted so maybe Boeing has the inside track on that one. And maybe when you have two different branches seeing a limited pool of funds and they are both fighting for their share. One thing to consider…the F18 is going out of production in a few years. The armed services can advance these competitions further and down-select a winning option without committing an enormous amount of resources.

            There are other factors to consider…are the wingmen drones coming? Did the unit costs come down from the initial proposal? Is Elon going to tantrum about this? None of this I really am in a position to comment on…but cycling back to my original point…NGAS appears to be at the back of the deli line for now.

            https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/exclusive-lockheed-out-of-navys-f-a-xx-future-fighter-program/

          • @Casey

            IIRC Kendall previously indicated they have a tight budget and limited financial resources. How little a reasonable NGAD is going to cost? Similar to the F-35 (per Kendall)? Can it work out? Or another half-baked empty shell like the F-35 with promised capabilites back-filled (with additional taxpayers’ $$$)?

            Going to be mostly the decision of the current admin.
            The admin under Trump is doing all sorts of things, what has the Congress done about that?

          • https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/trumps-top-us-navy-pick-endorses-f-35-capabilities

            So just more f-35?

            “The KC46A has been a money pit and now the entire line will be tanker only. I am not sure that is really a win for Boeing to keep making that system.The KC46A has been a money pit and now the entire line will be tanker only. I am not sure that is really a win for Boeing to keep making that system.”

            Exactly, but such is too difficult for some to get it.

        • @TransWorld
          — Considering Polands defense needs (very regional) the KC-46A would make sense. —
          Why did Sigapore ordered A330MRTT? When will USAF order A330neoMRTT for the Pacific?
          Also Poland wants a real stake of Airbus. Won’t happen buying US aircraft.
          — USAF has given up slots to deliver KC-46A to Japan and Israel.—
          Dump the waste somewhere else?

          Reply

  35. Reuters: Spirit AeroSystems reports $577 million quarterly operating loss

    ‘The major supplier to the U.S. planemaker reported $2.1 billion in net losses for 2024, and it “will need to obtain additional funding to sustain operations, as we expect to continue generating operating losses for the foreseeable future,”

    Reply

  36. While there is some heart tug nonsense in this one, its interesting in that the so called shadow factories are seeing an end.

    https://www.postandcourier.com/business/boeing-787-dreamliner-shadow-factory-stephanie-pope-charleston/article_fab998bc-f848-11ef-b459-9bedb33a7bd8.html

    For those not following Boieng had to fix the shims, it was not an option. Shim fix if it had one of two aspects can wait the first heavy check but Boeing could not deliver any NEW 787s with that issue once found, identified and the scope established.

    Reply

    • “The new CEO, who started in August, also expressed dismay over Boeing’s culture, echoing remarks he made during his first all-hands session in November. It’s a reference to the lack of civility with which people treat each other — as well the harsh backlash that lower-level workers and managers can face for flagging operations breakdowns, as whistleblowers have documented.”

      Reply

      • The best thing any CEO can do (and should be doing as he has people to do the rest) is going into work places and talking to people.

        How else do you find out what is going on?

        I read a lot of WWII history and specifically Patton and Montgomery had their own group of (Colons I believe) who were loyal to them and toured commands. It was the only way to find out if they were getting accurate information.

        Time sorted out good commanders but bad ones could cover things up, they needed to know if that was going on.

        Ortberg can’t trust any managers, he has no idea which ones are part of the problem and those that really want to run the ops to Boeing benefit.

        Give employees a chance to talk adn they will. I well remember one meeting when the Big Whig asked why no one was asking question. I pointed at our manager and said, with him in the room, no one is going to say anything.

        So, he had the manager leave the room and boy did he get an ear full.

        Reply

        • In the 80’s- On the B2 program I met and had great dealings with a REAL manager VP – well respected and liked by grunts and supervisors.
          https://obituaries.seattletimes.com/obituary/dale-shellhorn-1092422408

          He REALLY wanted to talk to and respond to grunts and had little regard for Theory X managers. He started a “rapid response ” system wherein anyone could call or write or speak directly to him at almost anytime. When I contacted him about how several managers were making sure that contacting him would be a probable ‘career choice ‘ issue, the NEXT day he sent me a copy of a handwrtten signed memo to most managers that such was not allowed and only those who should fear such communication had something to hide”

          I still have a 15 minute copy of a fun video made and distributed to total 40-50 employees (manager and grunt level )when dale left for Northrup to help finish B2 issues.

          Reply

  40. D Gates will retire next week.

    His free speech
    “P.S.
    There will never be a city on Mars.
    Don’t believe Elon”

    Other item:
    “Elon is lucky he’s basically running the executive branch because in any other situation the FAA would shut down the Boca launches for like 10 months after doing this in back to back tests”
    https://x.com/DrChrisCombs/status/1897845510523785553

    Reply

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