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Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 4. Feasibility studies.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam
August 22, 2025, ©. Leeham News: We do a series about ideas on how the long development times for large airliners can be shortened. New projects talk about cutting development time and reaching certification and production faster than previous projects.
The series will discuss the typical development cycles for an FAA Part 25 aircraft, called a transport category aircraft, and what different ideas there are to reduce the development times.
We will use the Gantt plan in Figure 1 as a base for our discussions.
Figure 1. A generic new Part 25 airliner development plan. Source: Leeham Co. Click to see better.
Feasibility studies
We start our dive into the different program phases in Figure 1 with the Feasibility stage. We are pleased that Henry Tam, an experienced Airliner development program manager, has agreed to co-write the series. Here is his background:
Henry Tam contributed to a series of articles on certification of 14 CFR Part 23 aircraft on Leeham News in 2021. He has worked at both mature and startup aircraft OEMs and was the Head of Program for a regional jet and an electric aircraft program. He is a co-mentor at the Sustainable Aero Lab.
Here are Henry’s thoughts around the Feasibility phase:
Feasibility studies
During the feasibility phase, a company must examine multiple dimensions of a potential product: the market needs, potential product configuration, potential cost, potential enablers such as technologies, and potential return on investment. The word “potential” is repeated multiple times to emphasize that these numbers are preliminary and will be refined over time.
Let’s assume we want to make a next-generation single-aisle aircraft to narrow the scope of this series. What range, payload, economics, customer experience, etc., are needed? How big is this market? Who and what are we competing with? What are we good at?
Once the team has an idea of what they want to focus on, technical folks can start some design work. Some can be done parametrically. Others may require more work. Sometimes the team needs to speak with suppliers to see what is available or in the pipeline as well. This is especially important regarding engines. It would also be good for the engineers to check the design against key airworthiness, operational, and airport requirements.
At this point, the team may not have a lot of confidence in some of the systems, but they should have some confidence about things like stability and controllability. This is an iterative process and requires various teams to work together.
Once the study team has shareable data, the sales and marketing team may bring some of these concepts to customers to assess their interest. More sensitive topics may be discussed in one-on-one or small group settings. For more generic questions, the OEM may set up advisory boards or conduct focus groups to discuss and debate the needs. Sometimes, customers challenge each other. Other times, a few customers, as a group, provide strong feedback to the OEM.
It is always a good idea to get feedback from customers. A product needs to appeal to multiple customers to reduce risks for the business case. This feedback could then drive requirement updates.
There might be more groundwork if the new product relies on novel materials & processes, new technologies, or non-traditional arrangements. For example, do we need to qualify new composite materials and their manufacturing processes? Is the complexity of a fly-by-wire (FBW) system, which can control the airliner in a safer way, worth the extra effort in design and certification?
Company priorities
Unfortunately, not all projects get a green light. New products may need to compete with other initiatives or corporate priorities. For instance, a commercial aircraft OEM may want to sell off a product area like business jets if it has both. The marketing, sales process, production, supply chain, and customer support could be very different. Finance is another consideration. If a conglomerate has multiple viable projects, executives may choose the one with the highest return at a reasonable risk. This project selection process often aligns with budget or governance cycles.
Keep in mind, risks are important considerations. If risks are not evaluated and mitigated up front, they could have serious consequences. As an example, the Safran Silvercrest engine was selected by Dassault and Cessna for their new business jets, the 5X and Citation Hemisphere, respectively. The engine development ran into some roadblocks. Dassault cancelled the 5X and launched the 6X with a Pratt & Whitney engine. Cessna suspended the Hemisphere development.
Consider a program where there is a 90% chance of successfully delivering a new product – where success for this discussion is defined as meeting cost, time, and product performance – without new enabling technologies. If a new product requires five new enabling technologies, each with a 10% chance of failure (from significant delays, increased costs, or unmet customer requirements, etc.), the chance of a successful program decreases significantly. This is one of the reasons why companies try to derisk, if possible, ahead of time instead of running technology development simultaneously. Delaying a program during execution phases can be expensive.
By the end of the Feasibility phase, there should be a list of market requirements, an initial design of the plane (not just artistic renderings), a list of key technologies required, and a rough business case to justify the next round of investment. The concept could get a green light for the next phase, be shelved, or require additional work, just like any business proposal.
Speeding up the Feasibility phase
There are potential methods to accelerate these iterations. For instance, conducting market research, formulating market requirements, and obtaining stakeholder agreement typically require significant time and resources. Emerging tools, such as AI, can process large amounts of historical data and offer recommendations. These technologies may also assist in drafting some of the requirements. For the recommendations to be reliable, however, the tools should provide clear explanations of the market analysis and the reasoning for each requirement.
We will, in the next Corner, look at some aspects of AI supporting a market analysis.
Optimizing aircraft design is not a new topic. A few popular aircraft design textbooks offer processes and data for initial sizing, some of which have already been implemented as software tools to streamline analyses. Running these designs through an optimizer can help find improved solutions. Fortunately, this workflow is not new, as one of my classmates in grad school was already working on a multidisciplinary optimization tool for aircraft design two decades ago.
Emerging tools may be used to review hundreds of existing airplanes to help identify a better starting point. Engineers will still need to understand and refine the initial concept to make sure that it is explainable and implementable.
New tools can also help put together a business case. If the design is relatively traditional, an aircraft OEM with a few programs under its belt can make predictions using datasets from previous programs. The challenge often comes from data, or the lack of it. If a company did not track, as an example, work hours with the right granularity, it would be difficult to fix the dataset after the fact. This type of analysis, often done by humans, could potentially be done more quickly with new tools. Yet, explainability is very important because there are tons of assumptions at this stage.
The ability to join these workflows and datasets together could also be beneficial. Design teams conduct trade-off studies regularly. Some of these cross-functional studies are time-consuming. The ability to complete trade-off studies quickly, reliably, and coherently could help converge on a design and its business case better, cheaper, and faster.
For start-ups, this is a more challenging problem. These companies do not have in-house data. They may rely on subject matter experts (SMEs) to help generate estimates. Nevertheless, some of these SMEs may not realize the assumptions and preconditions behind his/her reference point, resulting in biased estimates. Could AI help solve this problem? Perhaps. I could see mature OEMs feeding their data into the machine and using it for some of the workflows previously mentioned. Yet, it is unlikely that these mature companies would allow other companies to have access to their datasets or AI tools trained using these datasets. Could start-ups use synthetic data to train the AI? At this moment, the use of synthetic data is still a field with active research.
This is a great series. Evaluation of the engineering trades at the feasibility stage of development are critical. A large part of that is based on experience and judgement.
For NASA, the vast majority of engineering effort is invested at this stage. They run down thousands of trades to narrow the design.
Automation is appealing to speed up this process and reduce the human hours required. The question is whether that’s something that can be encoded or trained with machine learning. It’s highly based on conceptual understanding and that’s not been a strong point of AI.
What might be helpful though, is to have an AI collate and present the relevant material from the literature and earlier company research, as a starting point for human evaluation.
Thanks, Rob,
You are raising the correct concerns about AI regarding helping in this phase. We will dive into it next week when we use AI to work on the market research part. There is a lot of public market research data that an AI system can use to amass information and train on. Let’s see what we get that we will compare with what we know about the subject.
Normally you want to replace an old existing aircraft with a better one. So better payload-range by using latest engines and a carbon wing, increase reliability and reduce operating cost. The rest is mainly icing on the cake. Don’t let cost glide up and timing is critical. Like now with A350-1000 replacing the 777-300ER on similar routes. Not that easy in spite of all high tech.
The replacement aspect is spot on, looking at the MAX and A3209NEO, the MAX matches the A320NEO and the risk of a new program is not there (yes they messed up but it was not the tech it was the execution aka failing of the documentation cross check and the failure of quality control )
Not sure I get the A350-1000 aspect. It clearly forced Boeing out of that slot. Better ( call it 15%).
But it took all the tricks to get that in materials and engines (which are still an issue).
So the thorny issue is do you get enough to make a new program worth it? Well and does the incumbant have an upgrade that matches it or so close to that its equal?
The Max 8 is bigger cabin than the A320 . Newer, better lift wing with more fuel internally also. ( Comparisons are made with an extra hold fuel tank inserted)
https://leehamnews.com/2014/11/09/boeing-737-max-8-as-a-long-and-thin-aircraft-and-how-does-it-fare-in-general-versus-airbus-a320neo/ …[The 737 MAX 8 is 1.5m (5 feet) longer than A320 with a 2.5m (8.2 feet) longer cabin. This brings a 12 seat higher capacity, everything else being equal.]
Its the Max 10 thats a very close match for the A321 cabin size, which is why Airbus pumped up the MTOW considerably, changed the wing flaps, and designed a novel fixed internal conformal fuel tank to fix the wing fuel deficiency.
The A320 range problem – it couldn’t do ‘transcon’ where the 737-800 could- was the instigator of the neo solution.
Yes, designing a new replacement aircraft is chasing a moving target, just like when Boeing want to kill the A330 over and over and it keeps evolving payload/range/reliability and keeps cost competetive.
There is a market for a 300 seat regional aircraft that was tried with the original A300B, DC-10-10 and L-1011 but failed due to lacking suitable engines for the 1-6hrs mission mix beside other less severe problems that could be solved. Still there are no 50k engine doing 15000cycles on wing like a CFM56-7B. The Z4 flying wing has the same problem finding the right engine. The USAF migh give it some help by ordering a new engine for $4-5 bn to help P&W again.
Pentagon’s tormented on-again, off-again process continues, see my post below.
Tangentially related:
“Rewired: How Boeing Is Rethinking MAX Avionics for a Safer Future”
“After years of crisis, lawsuits, and soul-searching, Boeing is under pressure like never before to rebuild trust in the 737 MAX. While much of the focus has been on mechanical fixes and quality control, one of the most significant transformations is happening inside the flight deck.
“Boeing is quietly rolling out a wave of avionics improvements to the MAX family, not just to meet regulatory demands, but to restore confidence and enhance long-term safety.
“The post-grounding MAX 8 and MAX 9 already include updates to the flight control software and redundancy protocols. But Boeing is going further, working with Collins Aerospace to refine the underlying avionics architecture.
“One major change initiated by Boeing is a shift toward more robust fault detection and isolation systems. These digital watchdogs monitor sensor inputs and cross-check data in real time, ensuring that a single erroneous reading, like the one that triggered MCAS in the past, can’t bring down the entire system.
“Another area of improvement is display integration. The MAX flight deck retains six large LCD screens, but Boeing has refined the user interface and alarm hierarchy to prioritize clarity and minimize cognitive overload.
“Pilots now receive more context-rich alerts, with better differentiation between advisory, caution, and warning levels. These changes are rooted in human factors research aimed at preventing task saturation during high-stress moments.”
“…The most meaningful change, however, may be philosophical. Boeing is moving away from a culture that once prized design minimalism and pilot continuity above all else. That mindset contributed to the MCAS debacle. Today’s MAX upgrades reflect a more balanced approach: respecting pilot experience while embracing automation that informs, rather than overrides.”
https://www.aviationtoday.com/2025/08/21/rewired-how-boeing-is-rethinking-max-avionics-for-a-safer-future/
***
So, the old dinosaur is finally being (somewhat) dragged into the 21st century.
Should have been done long ago.
Short cuts make long delays.
@Abalone
It’s still a 57 year old design with modern avionics. It still uses the ARINC 429 databus , which translates to no EICAS. The mad Max still has the famous ‘six pack’ for altering which isn’t much.
It doesn’t utilize a central maintenance computer like all the modern jets use for enhanced EICAS and AHM alerting. (Airbus = ECAM)
Boeing just did a work around to satisfy EASA…. Not the FAA.
It’s better but it’s still the 737.
Of course!
That’s why I used the explicit qualifier “somewhat”.
One wonders if this push is coming from EASA?
Nor does it need the modern stuff.
Simply put, if you go uber electronics you need ubber detection because ubber electronics have ubber failure modes (and they still just swap modules)
The MAX is the opposite, mechanical and easy to diagnose.
The reporting says the MAX is a bit lower cost maint wise.
Classic example was the A320 they had a problem with, replaced the module, could not duplicate the failure on the bench (it was intermittent) and put it back into the system. Which then lead to a serious incident of total loss of systems on the pilots side.
EICAS is only as good as the programing for faults, if you don’t know about a fault you can’t program for it and where in the tier its shows.
None of it is magic, both systems work and they generally work well. Modern systems are moved to electronics but the old stuff still works.
Next time you have the chance, pull your rear tire and the hub and look at the 100s year old bearing design there!
Have you got the right acronym Airdoc ? More likely 40 years out of date.
Boeing does use Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System, EICAS
https://skybrary.aero/articles/engine-indicating-and-crew-alerting-system-eicas
While older 737s relied on a Master Caution system, modern variants like the 737 MAX feature the MAX Display System (MDS), a variation of EICAS that uses larger, modern LCD screens to provide comprehensive engine data and crew alerts, integrating flight management and other system information.
Picture are worth 1000 words
http://www.b737.org.uk/flightinstsmax.htm#google_vignette
Quite a slippery, deceptive comment there, Dukie: Boeing might use EICAS, but *not* on any variant
of the 737. You somehow forgot to mention that..
Those LCD screens have nothing to do with EICAS and WN prefers a traditional layout exactly like the NG. Your attempt to obfuscate has failed.
EICAS means engine indicating and crew alerting. 737 Max has that
What you refer to is Airbus ( A320) own Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system, which is similar to EICAS. However, the Airbus’ system also shows a checklist for pilots to follow in case of an emergency or a malfunction, with an item from the checklist disappearing once the pilots complete the required action.
ECAM is the acronym you mean. So Im correct.
We all know the A320 series doesnt have a noticebale improved crash rate compared to the later 737 types
For instance the A220 beats its single aisle cousins hands down
Also the A320 series also used the ARINC 429 databus , so the claim that because Boeing has it cant have an a crew alerting system is false
@duke See my post below.
Are you trying hard to revise history??
The reality is that the rewrite of the flight software, to allow cross-checking of the flight computers and ADIR data busses, creates new opportunities that didn’t exist before. Boeing would be foolish not to take advantage of that.
It will never be a true CAS system, so it doesn’t get around the legislative requirement for crew alerting. But there is still much room for improvement. I’m glad Boeing is exploring those changes.
The reality is that the 737 cockpit is grotesquely outdated, and that this is a patch-up to try to — somewhat — drag it into the 21st century, by incorporating basic features that should have been implemented decades ago.
I agree with @Airdoc that this was pushed by EASA rather than the FAA or Boeing. The article makes it clear that the make-over isn’t ready yet — one wonders if EASA has made cert of the MAX-7/10 contingent upon its completion…if so, then that cert won’t be coming any time soon. The EASA may have tired of giving BA grace periods, in view of the continuing failure of BA to retrofit all MAXs operating in Europe with a third (synthetic) AOA input to MCAS.
As noted many times here, and established in the factual record, FAA and EASA have both approved the 737 cockpit. And it has served well and safely for many decades. The supporting data for that are abundant and continue to be established every hour of every day. They are undeniable.
You don’t ever seem to understand that repetitive posting of falsehood doesn’t alter truth. It’s unnecessary and a form of disinformation.
I realize that you believe your own nonsense and have formed an opinion around it. But that opinion is objectively and factually incorrect, and shouldn’t be presented as more than your opinion. Why that is permitted here, is something I will never understand.
In this series, Bjorn and Scott are educating us on an important aspect of future aircraft certification. You then interjected an unrelated article that notes a positive development for Boeing and the MAX. But any positive statement about Boeing grinds your gears, so you have to twist the article into a negative.
And you don’t care what misinformation that requires. It’s compulsive behavior you continuously exhibit here, but its purpose is to disinform and create a false representation.
Stating this is not an attack, it’s just an accurate and truthful assessment of your behavior. It’s tiresome in the extreme and doesn’t contribute anything to the discussion.
More inaccuracies and falsehoods from the local Boeing Investor Relations Dept. 🙈
The EASA has *provisionally* approved the 737 MAX cockpit, but *requires* retroactive modification for MAXs operating in Europe.
That obviously doesn’t suit your narrative, but that doesn’t mean that it’s false. You need to re-read the “established and factual record”, as you call it.
The article I “interjected” wasn’t unrelated, as it pertains to certification standards.
Moreover, Mr. Hamilton has previously indicated that he accepts tangential posts — particularly with links — because they draw his attention to news items that he might otherwise have overlooked.
You’ll notice that my post drew a spirited, affirmative reaction from a Boeing insider — someone who posts real-world information here rather than cotton-candy PR.
I said what needed to be said, and stand fully behind those comments.
Nothing in your article states that EASA has anything to do with the changes it describes, nor does it have to do with certification.
You posted the article as an opening to mount on attack on Boeing, because you can’t tolerate positive statements about them.
I posted that same article in several other forums. In none of them did it draw an attack. Most responses are positive (as the article itself is) that Boeing is acting appropriately and voluntarily for once, rather than in response to a crisis. It’s confirmation of changes at Boeing that we are all anticipating.
It’s only here that these attacks take place, and further it’s only a few people here. As I said, it’s unnecessary and untruthful.
The article was posted because it is an interesting and important news item relating to certification.
If you’re unable/unwilling to read, grasp and/or accept it, then that’s your own private issue — no need to try to persuade everyone else to join your cause.
There’s no “attacking” going on…but there is lots of sulking going on when you can’t control the narrative.
If you don’t like a thread, there’s nothing compelling you to react to it. Neither is there any compulsion upon others to tailor their remarks to suit your taste…or your version of “truth”
Abalone, knock off the personal attacks, it’s against the rules of the forum.
I don’t always agree with Rob, we never will concur on MCAS.
He has done an excellent job on stating the facts here.
A lot of time I skip over Agalone posts, per the reasons Rob stated.
Robs responses the other hand are worth reading so I reread the starter on the above.
One aspect of the article is bogus. Other parts I disagree with, the logic is not there.
MCAS 1.0 had nothing to do with Boeing philosophy. It was SOFTWARE, no different than Speed Trim. So, nothing to do with Alert systems or EICAS.
The other aspect is Boeing does not have to restore confidence in MAX. Boeing yes, MAX no. MCAS nor the door plug blowout have anything to do with Alerts.
On the other hand, there is a factor of familiarization of approach and the MAX is the odd ball out there.
Boeing used auto adjust into a dead engine on the 787. Its a great feature, pilots don’t have to deal with Yaw on engine out and can focus on the cross checks for WHICH engine is out.
Vast majority of LCA are now more automated, working the MAX into matching as close as possible to what those system look like and act, that is a benefit to all.
In the past the Certifying authorities let aircraft mfgs set up their systems any way an engineer thought was what it should be.
Sadly engineers do not work in the real world. What they think on human factors is not knowing how human factors work. So bells, whistles and a nagging voice ain’t it.
Europe has started doing excellent work in that area, AHJs are finally getting that the aircraft mfgs do not know if an alert system works or does not. Any grunt that has worked a dirt spread can tell you backup horns, bells, wheedles etc do not work.
Human factors and what works is getting attention. One aspect is not everyone process information the same way. We will come to a day when the pilots puts his profile in (training and preferences) and their display adjust to them, not forcing them to adjust to it.
Boeing continues to want pilots to have overide, I go with Airbus on that. Pilots are not what they were post WWII, Korea or even Vietnam. You can’t break physics and most pilots and their passengers are better off not letting them.
But underneath the 767/757/777 amid 787 you see more and more automation at work.
There is also a factor of a different view and not blindly following Airbus, the idea is great, execution is again up to engineers and sadly, unlike a pilot, you have to tell a computer its going around.
Modes are an issue. Pilots make those moves automatically, computers currently do not. They can, but that has been left out.
Thanks for this very interesting aircraft design series.
Another one of those regular updates that we get from Airbus regarding new product assembly, certification and EIS:
“Airbus receives first fuselage sections for A350 freighter in Toulouse”
“Airbus has reached a new milestone in the A350F program as the first fuselage sections for the aircraft’s prototype, MSN700, arrived at the final assembly line in Toulouse.
“The forward sections 11-14 and central sections 15-21 were built at the Airbus Atlantic facility in Montoir-de-Bretagne, formerly known as Saint-Nazaire. This site is responsible for assembling and equipping all forward and center fuselages for the A350 family.”
“The arrival of the first fuselage sections marks the beginning of final assembly of the new-generation freighter, which Airbus hopes will become a strong competitor in the long-haul cargo market.”
https://www.airdatanews.com/airbus-receives-first-fuselage-sections-for-a350-freighter-in-toulouse/
***
Anyone have any recent updates from BA regarding the “progress” of the MAX-7/10 cert?
We did receive relatively recent news about hole drilling in a wing spar of the 777-8F…together with an admission that the plane’s design is only 80% complete.
For those who want to understand , an 80% complete design is actually 100% complete. The design world is an area unto itself.
80% comes from the build cycle and at that point its a matter of review of submitted and agreeing on the complete submital package.
In this case its internal Boeing though all the suppliers will be in that chain as well.
Most of it is cut and paste. They are copying off the 777-8 and -9. The flaps and actuators and wing fold (examples) are not going to change. Air conditioning packs are deleted. So you have to blank a number of power feeds, remove the ducting from the design etc.
Added items are the cargo door and beefed up floor and the handling system.
While different, they have the 777F to base those on. The F in this case is not that complicated.
A350 is harder as its composite and its all new.
The A350F door design is bigger than the previous largest metal fuselage cargo doors, 4.3m wide compared to 3.7m
The opening/closing process is now electric rather than hydraulic actuators.
Im sure the Airbus 4 composite panels making a fuselage section has complicated some aspects as the door opening extends into the crown panel area.
As many know the composite skins and stringers are co cured while the composite internal ring frames are built separately
Interesting details of the door itself and the new platforms for the FAL is in this Airbus series
https://aircraft.airbus.com/en/newsroom/web-story/2025-06-a350f-what-makes-the-worlds-largest-main-deck-cargo-door-a-special-one
I have wondered if the new design factors are involved in the A350F delay.
Leeham says its to fill orders but……
Good spot, great info
Just curious, when was you involved in aeronautics engineering??
“For those who want to understand , an 80% complete design is actually 100% complete”
Well, the 777-9 design was supposedly 100% complete — and, yet, it required a major software re-write after uncommanded pitch change issues, and a re-design of its thrust links after the original design started to fail on all test aircraft.
–> Ongoing delay of several years.
Then the MAX design was supposedly “the most scrutinized in history” — and, yet, it now needs a nacelle de-icing re-design (which isn’t going well) and — per link above — also a cockpit re-design.
–> Ongoing delay of several years.
So, 100% at BA doesn’t in the slightest way correspond to what others would call 100%…meaning that 80% really doesn’t bode well at all 🙈
You are unable to tell the difference between design and testing of a design.
No different than the oft failed A400 engines. The engine consortium had a design and in particularly the reduction gears did not work out.
Obviously (to most) if you start building the wing, you have major confidence that the design is frozen.
Neither Airbus or Boeing is stupid in that regard and both employ the same general approach.
Yea I know the evil Boeing aspect, yadi yadi yadi.
Who said Boeing has completed the design? You??
And the latest regular update from the Russians regarding the re-vamped SJ-100:
“SJ-100 Wing Panels Assembled to Fuselage Using Russian-Made Mobile Fixture”
“The Yakovlev Production Center in Komsomolsk-on-Amur has introduced a Russian-manufactured mobile fixture for assembling the removable wing panels of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 regional aircraft. This equipment was first used on aircraft with the factory number VS-97106 and is now actively applied in the assembly of subsequent airframes, including VS-97107.
“Designed and produced entirely in Russia, the fixture features integrated wheeled modules that enable quick relocation between workstations. This mobility reduces both assembly time and operational costs, increasing the flexibility of the production process in response to changing manufacturing needs.
“The wing panel assembly process with this fixture involves several stages: precise alignment and positioning of the wing, secure fastening with specialized hardware, and thorough quality inspections. Maintaining consistent assembly geometry directly contributes to the aircraft’s performance and flight safety.”
“…The Yakovlev Production Center continues to localize components and assembly technologies, supporting broader industrial strategies aimed at import replacement and technological self-sufficiency in aircraft manufacturing.”
https://ruavia.su/sj-100-wing-panels-assembled-to-fuselage-using-russian-made-mobile-fixture/
Yep, all the latest propaganda .
That one finally woke up!
And this lends some details to China C919. 72 Billion, that is more than Airbus or Boeing lost on their respective A380 and 787
https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/rachel-reeves-plots-stealth-tax-060000818.html
And its interesting to note BOC continues to put in MAX orders
Uh- that link has to do with the UK’s budget, not COMAC.
Per the catch bu Vincent correction below.
https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/chinas-jet-dream-stalls-airlines-202747066.html
The link talks about the UK budget, is not about Comac or 72 billion. Not sure what happened — “ai” hallucination again??
Where did you get your number of 72 billion?
“Comac had hoped to deliver 75 planes this year.” More bad information being repeated. Lol.
Still not aware it has been debunked? Hahaha. Bad information has a habit of being repeated on the net.
Good thing they have EICAS to tell them the radios failed!
https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/inquiry-warns-of-possible-airbus-transponder-loss-incidents-before-patch-fully-rolls-out/164244.article
And we have how long to fix it?
Airbus’s system is ECAM, not EICAS.
#Dunning-Kruger
A320 also uses ARINC 429 data bus
Apparently it cant support a Eicas.
Some real facts required please
“EICAS is Boeing’s integrated Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System that displays engine and system data, while ECAM is Airbus’s Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor which provides immediate, integrated checklists for malfunctions. Both systems monitor aircraft functions and display alerts, but ECAM is known for automatically providing the corresponding checklist steps, whereas older EICAS systems might only direct pilots to a checklist on a separate display.”
Who cares what they call it?
Obviously you got the ref.
And spin the aspect of Airbus can build issues into its stuff the same as Boeing did. A couple of near misses, not a warm and fuzzy after the DC not a miss and 70 some people dead.
MAX was rightfully grounded. Why is the A320 etc not? Its just a software change.
Reminds me the meme of Simpson’s grandpa yelling at clouds.
🙂
AW: U.S. Air Force Revives NGAS Market Survey With Airframe Query
Demise of the KC-46?
> The NGAS program is intended to enter development as production of the Boeing KC-46 winds down and procurement begins for a potential follow-on tanker derived from a commercial airliner. The new aircraft replaces the previously retired McDonnell-Douglas KC-10 and still-operating Boeing KC-135 tankers.
Stunning in the move out of any logic.
So the end of the A330MRT as well but that twist of reality.
So, France after lo many years of fantastic service, retires the KC-135 (not sure if those were R models of not). Naturally they are replaced with A330MRT (where have I heard that before, KC-X anyone?)
What happened to the Air Frames? Snapped up by a private contractor. France takes good care of their stuff.
USAF says they don’t have enough tankers (yes before KC-10 retired and no, no one snapped those up). So we have 400 KC-135R (upgraded each cycle through the shop) and around 100 KC-46A. All gainfully employed.
No stealth tanke, just a notion. Size in stealth (that does not exists per some here) is RCSl. Read that smaller is better.
Notional stealth tanker is going to have to trade capacity (A330MRT anyone?) for RCS. That in turn is a trade in F-XX range and size of a strike package.
But then you deny stealth exists, but post a stealth tanker article and spin it like a Tornado.
Got it.
Comprehension failure!
Not sure if anyone here can understand your logic.
* France is procuring a total of 15 A330 MRTT aircraft and, as of 2023, is the largest A330 MRTT customer.
Lol. Sure, sure!
> “So the end of the A330MRT as well but that twist of reality.”
You know better than the USAF about stealth tankers? You couldn’t access what their requirements are!
@duke
Does the 737 MAX have EICAS? Who the hell are you kidding here?
> Boeing 737 MAX lacks a modern, centralized Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) (or a similar system like Airbus’s ECAM) on the 737 family, which was highlighted as a factor in the MCAS-related crashes.
LNA: Boeing adds 737 MAX 7 to at-risk status with MAX 10 for cancellation over FAA certification
> “If the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act (ACSAA) deadline is not amended [beyond Dec. 27 this year] and we otherwise fail to achieve certification, we might choose to discontinue the MAX 7 and/or MAX 10, resulting in future earnings charges and other financial impacts. We may be able to partially mitigate some of these financial impacts to the extent that customers exercise substitution rights into MAX 8 and/or MAX 9 aircraft,” Boeing wrote in its 10Q.
> “However, Section 116 of the December 2020 ACSAA prohibits the FAA from issuing a type certificate to aircraft after December 27, 2022, unless the aircraft’s flight crew alerting system meets certain specifications. With safety as our primary focus, we continue to work to meet all current regulatory requirements to support certification and are also engaged in discussions with stakeholders concerning a possible extension to the ACSAA’s December 27, 2022, deadline.”
Big new “order” from Korean Air
> Korean Air Commits* to Record Purchase
We are living in a reality TV show!
> As a friend put it: “So in other words, they’ve ordered 25 planes that actually exist.” Yup. 😅
https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2025/Korean-Air-Commits-to-Record-Purchase-of-103-Boeing-Jets-to-Modernize-Fleet/default.aspx
> Airlines around the world are busily announcing and re-announcing orders with Boeing.
Yeah, some of us have noticed that “peculiarity”.
massive invisible order
I love the EICAS mud slinging.
The 737 Max does not have EICAS, per se. It has a near equivalent system in the 737 MAX. The reason is in the engine package. The engines on the 737 MAX are Leap engines which are a continuation of the CFM56 engine family. The CFM56 was never “sensored up” to give the digital output needed to run in an actual EICAS environment. Boeings took the analog sensors, ran them thru ADCs and emulated EICAS with their own system. There are upside and downsides to this. The crew in a 737 needs to manage their warnings as they appear instead of getting fed a sequence of warnings the programmers dictate. Both have plusses and minuses. Boeings 737 engine alert system works very well and the latest updates rolled into it meet the compliance requirements from congress. This reopens the good old-fashioned question “is newer better just because it is newer”? We can debate that until the cows come home, but the operators have answered the question by what they purchase, so there isn’t industry consensus.
“The 737 Max does not have EICAS, per se. It has a near equivalent system in the 737 MAX”
The detailed post above from @Airdoc appears to contradict this opinion…
Abalone wrote
The detailed post above from @Airdoc appears to contradict this opinion…
Read again. We both said the 737 doesn’t have EICAS. Airlock pointed at the old Arinc Data bus. I pointed out the lack of digital sensors on the engine as the stumbling block. BOTH of these statements are complimentary. The old bus is there to support ADCs. You stay with the thereotically less desirable Data bus because it is necessary to support the ADCs on the engine. The end result is that there is a display of data in a very similar manner in the MAX cockpit BUT it isnt EICAS.
You are incorrect thinking that Airdoc and I have differing opinions here. we are saying the same thing. I just added why the old data bus wasn’t changed.
@Airdoc didn’t assert or suggest that the 737 CAS was “a near equivalent system to” EICAS…but you did.
It looks like a Duck, it quacks like a duck, it has duck feet and it has duck DNA.
The only point about any of this is to bash Boeing. Nothing more to it than that. If not EICAS its something else equally irrelevant.
We all know EICAS was a bit of language in a congressional bill (said congress of which you disparage). Nothing more than cut and paste for what all but MAX builds have already.
If MAX was intended to be converted to EICAS, then they would have said that.
What was put out was a cutoff date.
Zero evidence presented EICAS is anything other than a tool and not a magic wand. Planes crash with EICAS and they crash without it.
India 171 has EICAS but it was not intended to fix a pilot going suicidal.
While that is a rare occurrence, no crash has ever been attributed to 737 alert systems.
The Sky is falling over and over again.
@TW
Oh no, drivers DUI have accidents, drivers without drinking a drop of alcohol also have accidents. Why the hell people want drivers not to DUI? That’s the fallacy you repeat again and again. Enough is enough.
@PNGeek:
“I love the EICAS mud slinging.
The 737 Max does not have EICAS, per se. It has a near equivalent system in the 737 MAX. The reason is in the engine package. The engines on the 737 MAX are Leap engines which are a continuation of the CFM56 engine family. The CFM56 was never “sensored up” to give the digital output needed to run in an actual EICAS environment.”
I have a question. Is it the sensors or is it the data buss, wiring link into the MAX computers?
Airbus has its version of EICAS and I assume the engines are linked to that, so I believe they can and do have the sensors. A320 with the same CFM and LEAP engines. I know they are a bit different size and setup wise but very close.
The issue would be tranmsion of data/info (or so I think). Older systems are not com as such but wire systems that transmits discreet data (EGT).
I would guess a modern system transmits on a couple of true data lines, CAT 5 or the like that then gets sifted at the computers into the outputs.
I can see the issue on older engines that never had sensors and older air frames that don’t have the data wire type you need (yea I worked with data lines so I am familiar with the concept though maybe not what is done on aircraft as that would be a whole different world of shielding and redundancy)
The KC-135R has new panels that emulate Glass but in fact are just a translation of AI/BI/ to a processor that then puts it up for display but its not a true digital setup.
I worked with having to convert a digital to an analog signal, they just broke it into a whole lot of pulses, emulation of analog but for our purposes on actuators, more than close enough.
Trans.
Its actually both. There was nothing in it for Boeing to abandon a solid reliable data bus, so the Leap engines going to Boeing are configured to interface with them. If you changed the data bus, the electrical systems change, routing and clipping changes, this drives new floor beam assembly’s to accommodate the new routings. The new floor beams drive a new set of fuselage barrel assemblies. All this accomplishes nothing for the customers other than fleet commonality dilution. The best way forward for operators was to reuse the existing structure, wire bundles and routing and clipping to the greatest extent possible. It’s really a simple trade when you look at the bill of materials complexity involved with changing away from the existing data bus. Especially when no regulatory directive forced the move. Eicas wasn’t mandated by congress, they called for Eicas OR an approved syst, a far different requirement.
Makes sense. Just whatever transducer approiate for the system screwed into the hole.
Something like a TF-33 would not have had the digital transducer mfg so E-3 still forced to use it would be useless as it feeds the old system anyway.
Yea the thing about EICAS is werid.
They claim to like Bjorns articles but then contend he is wrong. I call it an illogic chip.
The 737 aircraft’s flight crew alerting system never caused a crash. But it has been popping up in all 737 crash investigation reports over the last 40 years. Not helping but confusing crews.
Exemptions, incomplete statistics, generalisations and mistifications have for decades prevented Boeing from implementing a modern, smart crew alerting system on the 737. Like all new aircraft have since the 757. The 747-400 got it.
Maybe now someone finally drew a line in the sand? Or will it be digged out & moved, pushed by congress?
@keeje:
If everyone puts in EICAS, why do you need language that says to put in EICAS?
Good reminder there were NO references to the MAX in that legislation. It was not intended as a post X date change. Congress writes generalities and the agencies fill in the tech blanks (normally). Someone just cut and pasted we got that gem.
And its not retro either, so thousands upon thousands of pre EICAS built aircraft have it and will continue to fly, 737, NG, MAX.
You can read that EICAS has its own issues as it priotitiezes alarms and alerts and you have to scroll down through them to see what you got (VS a light saying, APU on the panel you then refer to the steam gauges or pull up the APU status Ops page.
The computer deemed top alarm may not be the one you need to address. QF32 had to quit as there were so many piled up as to be useless (not in most cases).
EASA did not mandate EICAS, as long as its got an analogous system they are good.
You can make it more EICAS like with the glass panels now.
Frankly I liked the old steam gauges. I could sweep a panel and see what was out, what was normal and monitor entire systems instead of one discreet item.
Pilots just need to know where it hurts so they can pull up the right procedure to deal with it. They are not techs or engineers.
Thanks, Bjorn, for this great series.
You’ve got me thinking about how past technological leaps haven’t necessarily sped up aircraft development. We are old enough to remember when powerful PC-based tools like CAD programs and spreadsheets exploded from the mainframes onto the scene in the late 80s. Then, in the 90s, the internet and increased connectivity brought another wave of innovation.
We had all this new computing power and great software at our fingertips, but it didn’t lead to faster aircraft development. In fact, it often seemed to do the opposite.
So, my question is this: Will AI be any different? With its incredible data processing, analytics, and speed, will it finally shorten development times? Or will it just complicate things further, leading to more analysis paralysis from endless alternatives, indecision, and a cycle of deep reviews that only lengthens the process?
We have to realize that the certification requirements have changed. The biggest change is for software (we will write about it), where the burden of analysis and evidence has exploded.
And today, almost all aircraft systems have many lines of software.
“Will AI be any different?”
– A study published last week by MIT revealed that 95% of companies experience zero productivity gain from using AI.
– A survey discussed on CNBC earlier this month revealed that, for example, use of AI to write software can lead to a reduction in the number of required low-tier software engineers…but, concurrently, to an increase in the number of required high-tier software engineers, because of more de-bugging requirement. No net gain.
There’s an enormous amount of hype in the AI bubble.
A very old carton from IBM out of the main frame era comes to mind:
You could see a big hall filled up with all kind of now weird stuff like card readers, tape machines, … and a big sign on the wall in the back: “THINK”. Two guys in front of all that stuff and one asks the other “Does that mean we still have to think?”
Do a search for ‘AI hallucinations’, just for kicks.
People trust this cr#p?
#netnegative
“GPT-5 Is Turning Into a Disaster”
“The latest model has also demonstrated, many argue, even more of a propensity to “hallucinate,” or make stuff up — and apparently, it’s taken to gaslighting folks, too.
“Case in point, multiple people have found that GPT-5 will, when asked to generate portraits of recent presidents and list their names and years in office, invent a garbled version of history that’s equal parts funny and unsettling.”
https://futurism.com/gpt-5-disaster
This is a dramatic example of all sensors affected by the same issue.
https://www.twz.com/air/dramatic-f-35-crash-at-alaskan-air-base-caused-by-iced-up-landing-gear
How much cross input do you send into a computer (it only applies to FBW). You could link in the Radar altimeter as an additional and separate input. Or add in the GPS position and runway elevation thought that would be less precise.
Flip that around and what happens when an input is missing? Then you need a way to override it but all the things that WOW changes in a computer, tricky.
Most of us who work with computers closely find them a wonder and a maddening set of issues when they get messed up for whatever reasons.
The “most” advanced fighter jet! How about to involve human at critical juncture?
Another no one knows what happened, therefore ultimately no one is held responsible for water in hydraulic fluid. Sounds familiar? 🤔
> Investigators found the crash traced back to contaminated hydraulic fluid. The 355th Fighter Generation Squadron hadn’t followed the rules for handling fluid barrels, and the jet was refueled from one that contained a large amount of water.
> But it pointed to other factors, too.
The Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board president also found that “by a preponderance of the evidence, that crew decision making including those on the in-flight conference call, lack of oversight for the Hazardous Materials program, and lack of adherence to maintenance procedures for hydraulic servicing were substantially contributing factors.”
The report said those on the call could have looked at recent Lockheed Martin information that said “Weight on Wheels” sensor issues “could lead to aircraft controllability issues.”
> The investigation further added said that procedures for storing the hydraulic fluid, a hazardous material, may also not have been followed and that “the barrel used to service the mishap aircraft was contaminated with significant amounts of water.” But due to a lack of documentation, the board president said that he “could not identify when the water was introduced into the landing gear struts.”
> The fifth-generation F-35, a multi-role fighter operated by 19 countries, has been involved in around a dozen major crashes since its first in 2018.
https://www.businessinsider.com/alaska-f-35-crash-ice-system-think-on-ground-investigation-2025-8
More regulatory exemptions sought:
“Boeing and Pratt & Whitney Request Extended Deadline for 777 Certification”
“Boeing and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) have formally requested an extension of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) deadline, along with regulatory exemptions, to complete the certification process for Boeing 777 aircraft powered by PW4000-112 engines. This move comes as both companies undertake complex design modifications aimed at addressing a series of in-flight fan-blade failures that have raised significant safety concerns. These engines power a substantial portion of the 777 fleet, making the certification process critical for continued operations.
“The FAA currently mandates that all required modifications to PW4000-powered 777s be implemented by March 4, 2028. However, Boeing and P&W face considerable challenges in meeting this deadline due to the intricate nature of the hardware updates and the stringent regulatory requirements involved. These factors may also have implications for production schedules and associated costs. Notably, 777 aircraft equipped with GE Aerospace’s GE90 or Rolls-Royce Trent engines are not subject to similar regulatory demands, potentially placing Boeing and P&W at a competitive disadvantage as scrutiny from aviation authorities and airlines intensifies.”
https://www.eplaneai.com/news/boeing-and-pratt-whitney-request-extended-deadline-for-777-certification
No one is buying PW / RR powered 777 anymore for many years. I wonder if you even can order them. So we are talking freight conversion business?
United has a fleet of (~52) 777 with P&W engines
@keesje:
Taking things out of context, its a really interesting example of the aspects of dumping all the P&W popwered 777 or understanding the core issue (Bryce, Pedro and Vincent want to twist it to where is no longer grounded in reality)
First and foremost this was a P&W and a regulator failure. P&W found that they had blade problems. They came up with a solution for inspection to sort out the bad ones. It never was implemented. The FAA should have busted their chops and did not.
Boeing is the recipient of the engines (bought by aircraft owners) not the supplier.
If the correct inspections had been complied with, it would never have happened.
The PW4000 passed the tests and now the FAA wants a different test, one that RR and GE do not have to subject their engines on the 777 to.
The risk has been mitigated by the correct inspections. The rest is tweaking for an event that will not happen again.
The PW4000 is a very successful engine. When A330 had engine choices it was the preferred. USAF picked it to power the KC-46A (over GE).
Regardless, no one should be allowed to get away with the sort of inaction PW did.
Another history revisionist! Well, what would one expect as our poster is unwilling to accept the reality.
This is why FAA grounded the 777 with P&W engines:
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/united-engine-failure-grounding-boeing-777s/story?id=76042523
They got lucky that no one was killed and the aircraft didn’t crash.
Our poster is in his sour grape derangement syndrome again:
the P&W engine for the 777 is specifically designed for the bigger, heavier jet, it’s a larger, ultra-high-thrust engine. It generates significantly more power to meet the higher operational requirements.
From Claes:
> P&W PW4000 got hollow fan blades for the 112″ version only and then onto the GP7200
Now you know what you missed, okay?
@Pedro
You are correct in that the PW4000 is really about 2.5 different engines. The B777 was functionally unique from the versions on the other models. Even that model was really three different BOMs
The version on the A330 shares a measure of commonality in the core with the baseline version that powered the B767/B747/A300/A310/MD11.
Perhaps what is lost in this whole discussion is that this is an engine that increasingly relies on retirements to remain in service. Cold starts on parts are difficult with ultra low volumes and I am not sure there is really any worldwide capability to produe hollow fan blades today if you wanted to.
All parties are looking to “warm something over” that will bridge United until they complete their fleet transition to a B787 fleet. By “warm over” I mean something that satisfies safety threshold without pursuing a full-scale redesign and retrofit campaign. A good amount of safety threshold comes down to a forward assessment of future fleet flight hours and how that translates to aircraft events per million hours.
@keesje
United was the launch customer of the B777 with PW engines. These are relatively old aircraft that will ultimately be replaced with B787 and A350.
In all reality, these aircraft are not likely going to go for a freight retrofit. The B777F as it relates to new aircraft was exclusively powered by GE engines.
Well regarding AI, don’t get me wrong, I love it :D. It finds, analyses & advises me greatly specially in areas where my knowledge is limited. Question is if it will speed up aircraft development..
PS. as an example, I just asked an AI tool: “Give me a compressed SWOT of the https://leehamnews.com/ blog and 4 improvement suggestions for site ownership and non-paying contributors to further boost the sites relevance & market attractiveness.”
Answering this complicated question my-self would take a lot of time, be baised, incomplete etc..
Okay, so, how often do you thoroughly check the accuracy of what it feeds you?
Try asking it questions regarding things about which you have substantial knowledge, and then carefully check for accuracy. In this way, I find it to be replete with errors, of all sorts.
Now, do a web search on all the lawsuits that are springing up from paying customers — law firms, medical practices, etc. — regarding malpractice issues relating to inaccurate output from AI products. Here’s a related example:
https://www.ibanet.org/Technology-UK-judge-warns-lawyers-about-risks-of-AI-use-in-court
Under the hyped-up, shiny surface, AI has little more than gimmick value.
Here’s another gem for you — how long do you think AI providers are going to be around with junk like this hitting the fan?
“Teen killed himself after ‘months of encouragement from ChatGPT’, lawsuit claims”
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/aug/27/chatgpt-scrutiny-family-teen-killed-himself-sue-open-ai
And then there’s the problem that AI data centers are putting unsustainable strain on electricity grids — a typical AI data center uses as much electricity as 80,000 households:
https://carboncredits.com/ais-energy-hunger-is-straining-americas-power-grids-and-your-home-appliances/
Finally — even Sam Altman himself thinks it’s a bubble:
https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/18/openai-sam-altman-warns-ai-market-is-in-a-bubble.html
***
A modern-day version of Tulip Mania from the 17th century 🙈
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulip_mania
It just stuns me that so many are uncritically accepting this junk. The “AI” hype / PR cycle is immense.
Cognitive scientist Gary Marcus’s blog is a good (free) read on the massive shortcomings of “AI”.
The answer “AI” gives you will be biased, incomplete- and almost certainly inaccurate, as well. They’ve trained it to
make it *sound utterly confident*, though, so rest easy.
😉
Latest Google phone add about AI:
– “How do I get my wedding ring out of the sink?”
– AI: “Unscrew…”
My thought: no bucket beneath the siphon?
Result:
Based on a review of its content and reputation, here is a compressed SWOT analysis of the Leeham News and Analysis blog, along with four suggestions for improvement.
SWOT Analysis of Leeham News and Analysis
Strengths 💪: Leeham News has a strong reputation for in-depth, credible, and impartial analysis within the niche of commercial aerospace. It focuses on major industry players like Boeing, Airbus, and leading engine manufacturers, providing valuable historical context and spotting key trends. Its recent acquisition by AIN Media Group further solidifies its position as a serious and established publication.
Weaknesses 📉: The primary weakness is its paywall-centric business model, which limits access to a significant portion of its content for non-subscribers. While this supports revenue, it can restrict audience growth and limit market attractiveness by making its valuable insights inaccessible to a wider pool of potential readers.
Opportunities ✨: The acquisition by AIN Media Group offers a significant opportunity for synergy, allowing Leeham News to leverage a broader platform for cross-promotion. There is also an opportunity to expand content formats beyond articles, such as regular podcasts or video series, to attract a new, more diverse audience.
Threats ⚠️: The blog faces competition from other well-established aviation news outlets like AIN and Simple Flying. The fast-paced nature of the aviation industry and the potential for reader information fatigue pose a constant challenge to maintaining relevance and a unique value proposition.
Four Improvement Suggestions
For Site Ownership: Adopt a freemium model. Instead of a full paywall, offer a limited number of free articles per month or a “teaser” with a concise summary of paid content. This attracts a wider audience, demonstrating the value of the in-depth analysis and encouraging a higher conversion rate for paying subscribers.
For Site Ownership: Leverage the AIN acquisition to diversify content platforms. Launch a regular podcast featuring interviews with industry experts or a YouTube series with visual explanations of complex aerospace topics. This strategy taps into new audience segments and showcases Leeham’s expertise in a more engaging format.
For Non-Paying Contributors: Create a dedicated user-commentary platform. Implement a well-moderated blog comment section or a user forum directly on the website. This allows non-paying readers to contribute to the discussion, provides a source of user-generated content, and increases site stickiness.
For Non-Paying Contributors: Develop a “guest contributor” program. Allow proven, knowledgeable community members to submit articles on specific topics. This empowers the audience, provides fresh content at a low cost, and can serve as a talent pipeline for future paid contributors.
Probably not complete, irrelevant etc. But if you know nothing about it, e.g. on a technology, company, product, history, relevance in seconds it come up with reasonable stuff..
That whole suggested improvement for non-paying contributors — the user commentary platform — already exists. Didn’t you pick up on that?
And there’s also already a “guest contributor” program.
You’re AI analysis isn’t that impressive after all, is it?
What Leeham does or does not do is in their wheelhouse, they run a successful bossiness and that has been recognized by a larger media entity.
The Poster put forth a logical and well reasoned presentation.
The problem is when an endless amount of non aviation materials gets dumped into a tech Aviation discussion with endless rants on Tariffs , Trump and the Evil US and Boeing by a select group known as the Euro Trio.
Get ready for lots of dirty laundry:
“The 737 MAX’s Pandora’s Box: Boeing Ordered to Declassify a Decade of Safety Secrets””
“A U.S. federal judge orders Boeing to hand over a decade of documents on 737 MAX safety amid a legal dispute with Norwegian Air Shuttle’s subsidiaries.”
“A federal judge in Washington state ruled yesterday that Boeing must release a decade of internal documents concerning the safety of its 737 MAX aircraft. This court order marks a turning point in the legal battle between the American manufacturer and several subsidiaries of Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS), which accuse Boeing of fraudulently inducing them into a massive aircraft purchase agreement.”
“The ruling compels the aerospace giant to disclose records spanning ten years. These documents are central to the argument of Norwegian’s subsidiaries, including Arctic Aviation Assets DAC, which are seeking to cancel an order for 92 737 MAX jets. The lawsuit, originally filed in 2020, alleges that Boeing made false representations about the aircraft’s safety and efficiency, concealing known design flaws, particularly with the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).”
“Lawyers for the Norwegian affiliates maintain that the internal documents are critical to proving that Boeing knew the 737 MAX’s airworthiness issues long before they became public. For its part, Boeing argues that the Norwegian subsidiaries are simply looking for an excuse to default on their contractual obligations due to their financial difficulties.”
https://www.aviacionline.com/the-737-maxs-pandoras-box-boeing-ordered-to-declassify-a-decade-of-safety-secrets
Very interesting. TFTL
And of course we ignore the really bad bits of programing Airbus has done over the years.
Lmao, time to settle. I would be shocked if BA is going to release any safety documents, there are too many skeletons in the closet. Must keep them out at all costs.
Yes, I had the same thought. Discovery is a bi*ch.
In this instance, out-of-court settlement would likely involve voiding the order and giving a full refund (plus interest).
If BA does that, it will open the flood gates to other cancellation demands — a perfect opportunity for customers to dump MAX orders without penalty.
BA is really caught bewteen a rock and a hard place 🙈
..especially if our smoke n’ mirrors US “economy” heads south.
Well this is a sure fire deal!
https://english.mathrubhumi.com/news/world/can-russias-new-widebody-aircraft-rival-boeings-dreamliner-glveue2s
I am sure Abalone is going to buy stock in the operation.
Wow…Transworld gets his international aviation “news” from mathrubhumi.com, based in Kerala…
😅
What did that poster say about news from Russia?
Looks like Spirit (the airline) just filed for Chapter 22.
Reuters: Most Trump tariffs are not legal, U.S. appeals court rules
But I’m quite pessimistic, don’t hold your breath. The SCOTUS is packed with…