FAA assumes MAX inspections, won’t slow deliveries, agency says

Boeing photo.

Nov. 29, 2019, © Leeham News: The decision by the Federal Aviation Administration this week to assume inspections of Boeing’s 737 MAXes before delivery won’t delay the company’s projected schedule, once the airplane is recertified.

The FAA Wednesday notified Boeing that federal inspectors will examine each of the hundreds of MAXes that have been built but stored since the March 13 grounding order before the airplanes can be delivered.

Boeing historically had this authority as designated representatives of the FAA.

The decision raised questions whether this would slow the delivery schedule Boeing plans.

Sufficient inspectors

An FAA spokesman yesterday wrote Leeham News, “We have sufficient inspectors to meet Boeing’s projected delivery schedule.”

Recertification is not expected until January. Return to service, following pilot training, isn’t expected to begin until March.

Bernstein Research forecasts 25 deliveries per month of the stored MAXes, a figure it doesn’t explicitly says comes from Boeing. But the company is close to Boeing and presumably received this guidance.

Bernstein forecasted the inventory would be cleared by September 2021, but based on a resumption of deliveries this month. LNA expects deliveries of the stored airplanes to be clear by the end of 2021, rather than by the end of the 2021 third quarter.

51 Comments on “FAA assumes MAX inspections, won’t slow deliveries, agency says

    • Less optimistic forecasts expect the backlog to be delivered in the form of beer cans?..lol

  1. Maybe Boeing and the FAA gave to much push back, didn’t completely inform other authorities and relied on higher authorities to (again) push things through, as Canada’s Jim Marko letter seems to indiciate.

    Boeings “we report to FAA only” looses strenght if indications are, you had them and their re-authorizators in the pocket.

    Non FAA authorities are taking their responsibilities for certification of the 777X for their territories too. https://www.businessinsider.nl/boeing-777x-certification-review-faa-europe-uae-737-max-2019-11?international=true&r=US

    The 777X has no US based customers. Boeing and FAA better rapidly become very open, transparent with EASA, who will be in close contact with ME and Asia authorities. Those approve the 8 777X launching customers certifications.

    https://www.businessinsider.nl/boeing-777x-certification-review-faa-europe-uae-737-max-2019-11?international=true&r=US

    • Keesje

      There must be enormous pressure on both BA, and the FAA to get the MAX flying again.

      I too read Jim Marko’s email as quite deliberate in order for the MAX to be made safe technically in the face of extreme pressure.

      “Hope you can get to look at this soon as we may have some management movement on this aspect soon, at least by TCCA.” seems to indicate that his reading is that TCCA management may be about to say that they are happy with the fix offered by Boeing. Unfortunately we don’t really know, we’d have to ask him.

      I do think it’s a sign that there are still issues to be dealt with, and that if the pressure gets too much, and the experts are in effect overruled by management, some of them may speak out.

      I’m sure BA, and all of the certification authorities realise what the effect would be of senior members of their technical teams declaring publicly that they still had concerns, but were ignored.

      Jim Marko also might have a point about removing MCAS, just how bad is the issue that MCAS is there to deal with ?

      It may be that just modifying the software so that the AOA is shown on the PFD, and a warning if the AOA sensors disagree, along with training to handle the aircraft in the areas where MCAS is supposed to operate might be enough ?

      Perhaps an extended type certificate may be required, and maybe BA would have to pay Southwest with regard to training if the rumours are true.

      It might just be the quickest, and far more importantly, the safest way to get the MAX back in the air.

      As I’ve said before “the cure should not be worse than the disease !”

      It doesn’t make sense to attempt to mitigate a minor or even major hazard using a method that if it malfunctions creates a catastrophic hazard.

      • Have I missed something. Specifically is Jim Marko’s e-mail in the open or is it’s the NYT summary of the e-mail that is in the open.

        The big question for me is: Does Jim Marko just want to get rid of MCAS or does he want it to be replaced to address the issue that MCAS was intended to address?

        Interesting times. Boeing are still saying December but rumour after rumour is not before March. Even then the rumours don’t say it will happen in March.

          • Didn’t the TAB pre report say that MCAS follows regulations and is safe … LOL … obviously there were/are politics involved, Question is if politics are still involved.

            This email shows that Boeing people are idiots.

          • Boeing is continuing to work this as a power game.
            The outcome will probably not “flow” towards a sensible solution.

            ( pressure:
            Who should pressure Boeing?
            Boeing creates pressure all around.
            )

        • Philip

          The email is dated 19th November, look at “Not knowing the exact reasons for telling us that 12.1 as a fix is not effective (ref. F2.3 recent change to CAT), the fact that it is another point that was just discovered.”

          12.1 seems to refer to: MCAS Authority Limit to Ensure Pilot Control, Does not prevent CAT – 12.1 Ineffective

          Peter Lemme seems to think CAT means catastrophic.

          “the 12.1 changes, seems that there is issue with the circuit that preserves elevator authority driving uncertain acceptability.

          Note the CAT term, I presume is Catastrophic.”

          I think Marko is offering an alternate solution, adding complexity to software is not a good idea unless you go the whole 9 yards, more like full FBW with all that entails, time, hardware etc.

          If the new MCAS 2.0 is to disable itself if it finds AOA left, and right disagree, what is the procedure to be, divert, and land immediately, or what?

          If the idea is that the MAX will almost never have MCAS activate for a valid reason, it might be better for MCAS to be removed, and pilots trained to deal with the condition that MCAS is supposed to deal with.

          How many valid activations have there been?

          • If it’s catastrophic EASA should not certify it!!!
            So easy.
            Other regulators will follow.
            Case closed.

          • No way.
            Take MCAS out, put MAX-10 gears under it, engines down,
            still need to do all other stuff,
            stabilizer/elevator, rudder cables and so on …
            continue with NG, 787 and so on …
            or let it fly in usa only … good luck,
            let courts rule and fine them,
            for each flight with a catastrophic MCAS $1m

          • I suspect CAT refers to CATegory. There would be a rating for each fault taking into account severity and probability ranging from it having a mild inconvenience, diversion to requiring repair before next flight, diversion to nearest airport or a rating that means total loss of aircraft and fatalities. The highest category rating would require the highest fault tolerance, redundancy etc. It probably means triplicated cross checking channels of everything with each Chanel duplicated within itself.

            I suspect the software people had a hard time of this. The B737 traces itself to an era where everything was duplicated but the pilots or flight engineer had to decide which instrument or system was faulty and switch to using it manually. That’s what much of the software was written to conform to. This philosophy is not suitable for high levels of automation or FBW which require a triplicated architecture so that a 2oo3 “two out of three” rule can be followed and cross checking can find most faults. Unless the software, operating system and hardware was developed with this in mind or rather carefully documented and certified with this in mind from the first modules onwards it would be hard to certify because you just don’t know.

            It is a big task.

          • “Other regulators will follow.
            Case closed.”

            Issue is that US institutions and corporations have strong distaste towards (foreign) good advice “we obviously know better” and a long history of just ignoring said advice or going into massive push back mode.
            See, this is a culture centered on short term winning at all cost.
            good chance that system will go into heavy retaliation mode for perceived slights and general obstructiveness.

          • “”good chance that system will go into heavy retaliation mode””

            Sure, everybody has to expect retaliation because Boeing was/is not competitive even with the MAX cheating. Soon they lost 20 billions.
            The rest of the world don’t need Boeing and I’m sure American flight attendants don’t need the MAX too. In the end people will rule and avoid Boeing.

            April 5, Muilenburg: “We Own Safety”

            EASA will uncover more and more. Boeing might have to pay fines and courts will rule. I can imagine the WTO will rule too because allowing exceptions through FAA and keeping it secret is the same as government funding. They did it because of $$$.

            There is no other way. Failures need to be uncovered and criminals brought to justice, TAB clowns too. This needs to be done. It’s not different than 9/11 terrorist planes.

          • The idea that the rest of the world doesn’t need Boeing is idiotic. If, today, you said that there would be no MAX, the airline market would be massively disrupted for at least a decade. Airbus has no ability to backfill for the MAX airframes anytime soon. This past summer was already incredibly profitable for Delta in significant part because it does not have missing MAXes whereas Southwest, American and United do.

            What the world needs is a responsible Boeing. But the idea that it can do without Boeing at all is nutty.

          • “” But the idea that it can do without Boeing at all is nutty. “”

            If US/FAA/Boeing want to keep going their stunt it won’t help the world. 8 years ago I was in Tianjin China. At the harbor city I counted they were building 50 high apartment buildings, more than 30 floor high, 50 only the ones I saw, it might be 500. Sure they are all trash, but if you think they can’t ramp up A320 and A330 production.
            If the world need to separate from US they can. Who cares if it won’t be cheap, passengers will happily pay the price.

            But I’m sure over 100 million Americans won’t like a Boeing stunt either, same as they care about climate.
            This Boeing “We Own Safety”doesn’t help US.

            We need one global independant regulator with one global regulation, not protectionism.

        • Thanks all,

          Jim Marko is too senior to be ignored. Equally I sure he got agreement from others before sending an e-mail of that nature. So I don’t think this is a lone voice.

          These are the keywords in the air current article

          “The recent Joint Authorities Technical Review suggested that an “unagumented” 737 MAX without MCAS “would have been at risk of not meeting…requirements due to aerodynamics””

          Those words were very significant to me when I read JATR. To me they mean the pitch up tendency is serious but they also mean JATR wasn’t given the details of the pitch up tendency, otherwise the words would have been clearer. When I read the Lion Air crash report, I ended up with the same view.

          Boeing do not appear to be telling

          • The second page is titled:
            737MAX Current State – Safety Assesment Standpoint

            The point that stands out for me is:

            Authority confidence in robustness of the architecture and safety assesment – LOW

            William 12.1 is referenced in the article “In its current iteration, Marko suggested that one aspect of the MCAS’s design — a limit on its movement of the jet’s horizontal stabilizer that would always be able to be overcome by pilot controls — was “ineffective” and was an outstanding high risk issue as part of the ISSA or Initial System Safety Assessment.”

            Marko has emphasised 12.1 in red !

            If the stabiliser cannot be overcome by the pilots, the results are catastrophic.

          • Thanks JakDak

            Still trying to get my head round it. I know the words need to be constrained. I like everybody would like more explicit words!

            He’s not a lone voice. I know that through my own experience. The e-mail is with the agreement of many.

          • That was not the only place JATR hints at lack of data:

            The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft. From its data review, the JATR team was unable to completely rule out the possibility that these augmentation systems function as a stall protection system.

            (JATR report p18 – my emphasis)

            I think JATR is being polite here when referring to what is likely their best working hypothesis, giving Boeing a change to redeem themselves, and provide the data… and looking forward to an unaugmented test.

            MCAS the stabiliser-pusher.

          • What’s also interesting is that Nicholas Robinson didn’t throw Marko under the bus, the FAA talks of “robust discussions”, and “This email is an example of those exchanges.”

            So I conclude the email is genuine, and recent.

            I agree, I don’t think Marko is a lone voice, so far he’s the only senior figure worried enough, and brave enough to raise his head above the parapet.

          • It’s already been stated the MAX didn’t meet the force gradient requirement at high AoA, becoming easier to pull higher instead of harder.

            So they are correct, it wouldn’t meet the regulation w/o MCAS.
            That’s the whole reason for MCAS.

      • “” maybe BA would have to pay Southwest with regard to training if the rumours are true. “”

        Ky said EASA and FAA should act together. FAA wanted less training and EASA agreed, but EASA doesn’t want delegation to Boeing.
        Ky said that other regulators might ask for training because of political reasons.

  2. “Bernstein forecasted the inventory would be cleared by September 2021, but based on a resumption of deliveries this month. LNA expects deliveries of the stored airplanes to be clear by the end of 2021, rather than by the end of the 2021 third quarter.”

    I’m assuming this should read 2020 not 2021.

    • Nope, 2021. Board chair David Calhoun also said 2021, though he was not this specific.

    • Nope, at well over 500 already produced but undelivered aircraft plus all the already delivered but grounded aircraft at a rate of 25 a month even end of 2021 seems ambitious to me.

      • Yes, 500/25 is 20 months. Plus the 350 grounded ones, how do those fit in? If they return at rate 25, that is another 14 months, either added on for 34 months total. Or in tandem, 25+25+42 at 92 a month, or 25+25+57 is 107 a month. Will that over saturate the market? Not to mention 120 fuselages in backlog at Spirit by March.

        • Saturate the market?

          It’s delivering backlog that was long ago ordered.

          I suspect the 25/mo is just the backlog, completed aircraft that can’t be delivered due to the grounding.

          The already delivered aircraft and the current production schedules are separate.

  3. We have almost December and how about highly announced (again) MCAS fix, which should be available for testing on live aircraft by EASA?

    And how about addressing other flaws discovered by the way?

    Well, nothing, or less then nothing. Boeing is non-transparent as always, and PRing as always about “MAX safety”.

    As long as I’m concerned, really, interest me less then nothing 737 MAX deliveries, inspections.

    Boeing, present a safe aircraft first. If you can…

  4. Quote: “Recertification is not expected until January. Return to service, following pilot training, isn’t expected to begin until March.”

    Is this expectation coming from the FAA (spoke person), Leeham N&A or from Bernstein?

  5. Someone has to take control. The FAA, the EASA can only do so much, the simple fact is that Boeing should be leading this. They are expected to lead it in a manner that is wholly respectful to aircraft safety and understanding their need to prove to the regulators that they have addressed concerns of the regulators. This is not exactly a shock or difficult to understand. Boeing complete unwillingness to accept this has had continued repercussions, we still seem to be in that mad paradigm that Boeing is still trying to play the system, how foolish has this been. The arrogance of the management has driven the company to billions of needless costs and a massive loss of goodwill and corporate status.

    • The worst of it is that Boeing, representing about half the world’s airliner manufacturing capacity (Airbus being the other half), has a captive market. They seem to be behaving as if their customers have no real choice. And in that sense, they’re right; Airbus cannot suddenly start manufacturing twice as many aircraft.

      However, some of Boeing’s behaviour suggests that they’re quite happy to use that position to force a lot of customer’s hands. The sustained stories about FOD (787, Apache, KC-46, Chinook?), poor design (737MAX, KC-46, rumours about 777X) and poor practises (737MAX certification) and poor attitudes to regulation (refusal to give the JATR all the data they requested, not telling the FAA about 2.5° MCAS) are at complete odds with the company’s apparent certainty that they can be trusted as a quality supplier. With a reality gap that big, if customers had any choice they’d surely flee to a competing supplier. If those customers did have any choice at all, Boeing would have been forced to clean up it’s act.

      All of this completely trashes the whole economic prospect of being a Boeing customer. If you’re buying Boeing, the best you can say at the moment is that you might have flyable aircraft delivered at some time or other, they may have big in-service issues (like groundings) and they’re probably worthless second hand. Pity if your competitors are flying Airbuses.

      And so enter COMAC into the market. If a third player like them comes in and starts doing anything remotely like a good job, Boeing’s number is up.

      There’s another thing about a reality gap that big. I’d not be at all surprised if a major regulator didn’t end up throwing the book at Boeing and start playing hardball about existing and future certifications. And if the regulator says “this Boeing can’t fly”, that removes all choice for the airlines. They might even go under. It’s pretty difficult for Boeing’s customers to buy Boeing product if they’ve ceased to exist as commercial entities.

  6. The 777X certification process took a turn when the FAA showed “a surprising amount of flexibility” allowing significantly updated aircraft with new engines and wings to be grandfathered. The FAA is deeply involved in this, as is congress pushing the FAA, and Congress themselved being pushed by Boeing lobbyist, financers. A challenge from an independent safety perspective.

    This certification approach went wrong for the 737MAX. As documented by the JATR group, including FAA & EASA. Comparing the 737MAX to 777X certification, based on the previous model and previous requirements (grandfathering), the MAX is childsplay.

    The 777X has a new fusealge, wing, engines, tail, cockpit, it is a new aircraft.
    It’s certification requires a top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective.

    https://airwaysmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Screen-Shot-2017-06-07-at-3.04.42-AM-1024×768.png

    When it is not unclear this approach has been followed by Boeing and the FAA in the 2013-2019 period, it leaves EASA no other option than spend a lot of people and time themselves, reviewing the 777 certification process and 777 type certification.

  7. Lawyer
    Politician
    Double glazing salesman
    Car salesman
    Insurance salesman
    Obvious pyramid scam
    Where would you rank Boeing in this table of trust?

  8. I wonder who are the insurance carriers for Boeing and the airlines who will be early resumers of service. If the FAA recertifies revised MCAS, and (as horrible as this speculation is) there is any sort of fatal accident while Canada, EASA etc are still evaluating would, I’d think, expose all the parties to incalculable liability.

  9. Lot of food for thought in the comments and links listed above. I wonder what the cost would be to put the MAX 10 wheel assembly on the 8 and 9? Forget the 7. But the DC-10 did go on to have a relatively safe career for many years. And part of the problems did boil down to maintenance and training. All said and done, I think if MCAS is reduced like they are doing, and training is put in place for the situation that MCAS was developed for, I probably would fly on them without a second thought. It is amazing that behind the scenes, they are now dangling the FSA (an A321 competitor) out to the market. But the devil is in the details on that.

    • Some airlines have been shown proposals for a B737 MAX 8ERX with the beefed up components of the B737 MAX 9 used to create a higher MTOW 4000NM range aircraft. Maybe MAX 10 components can be used instead.

  10. JakDak,

    To clarify my position with regard to aerodynamic problems. I think there are two problems.

    The first problem is the forward lift produced by the nacelles because of high mounted forward engines. The emphasis on the high mounting.

    The second problem is the stabiliser being used in a manner that opposes the elevators. As I have said previously stabilisers should complement the elevators to oppose them.

    I do think the second problem is the result of the first problem. Specifically heavy tail forces are necessary to control the pitch instability caused by the nacelles. The forces are so heavy that the elevators can’t provide it. Hence the use of the stabiliser.

    But two aerodynamic problems, not one.

    • Philip:

      That would be wrong. You trim the stab to the level you want (neural) and then fine tune if flying by hand with the elevator.

      Be it climb, decent or level.

      With auto pilot you do the same so its not large deflections to manage the small changes the auto pilot typically imparts.

      There is no pitch instability. There is a pitch up tendency and that is true of all swept wing jets with throttle as well as the MAX having a bit more so at stall.

      You drift in and out of the non existent stability TFH you have created.

      Again, get a FS or even read Wolfgang Langewiesche Stick and Rudder.

  11. Imagine an entity with significant weight and independency states that, after months thourough research, simulations and analyses, they now classify MCAS as an anti stall system. Rather than a system simulatng 737NG flight characteristics.

    • keeje:

      I really don’t care what they call it, as long as it works or is removed.

      Bjorns description was clear it was a feel affect for consistent through the envelope handling.

      Being clear stall is not a normal event and never seen by a pilot outside the Simulator.

      The issue was it was mucked up by Boeing and not caught by the FAA and needs to be corrected in its behavior not what its called.

      • While attention might steer away to other topics, this hasn’t gone away. If Boeing / FAA might try to put it on the back burner it might back fire.

        “The JATR report recommended the FAA review the stalling characteristics of the 737 MAX without MCAS and associated systems to determine if unsafe characteristics exist and if so, if a broader review of the system design was needed.

        JATR said MCAS and those systems could be considered a stall identification or stall protection system, depending on how the aircraft handled without them.

        Boeing has said MCAS was not meant to prevent stalls and was instead designed so that the 737 MAX would have similar handling characteristics to its predecessor, the 737 NG.

        The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) last month said it planned to undertake flight tests of the 737 MAX including a test without MCAS to check its performance during high-speed turns and stall.”

        https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-findings-idUSKBN1WQ0H8

    • “” an unspecified “design issue” related to the second over-wing exit “”

      Why only the second over-wing pairs?

      Ryanair has a 197 seat configuration while Boeing showed a possible 200 seat map for the MAX-8. Made me wonder why Ryanair is not that greedy. It has the middle door pair and 2 over-wing exit pairs. But the middle door pair has only a 5 seat row, why not 4 or 6? It seems 197 seats is the exit limit. But the same exit configuration is said to allow 220 seats on the MAX-9. Where is the mistake or are the 220 on the MAX-9 a problem too?

      If the middle door pair has a step then middle door pair and over-wing pairs should count for 70 seats and a second over-wing exit pair is not needed. Is this the issue and Ryanair wants to reach 200 seats now?
      The front and back door pairs are smaller on the MAX than on the A321 and should count for less seats.

      FAA allowed less seats on the A321 than EASA.
      EASA might have checked the exit limit for the MAX. If so EASA might check everything.

      • “FAA allowed less seats on the A321 than EASA.
        EASA might have checked the exit limit for the MAX. ”

        FAA first hat: “further US aerospace interests.”

        IMU there is a not insignificant list of strongly partisan activities and decision by the FAA to the disadvantage of foreign market participants.

  12. FAA doesn’t have enough funding to properly give oversight to a comprehensive inspection process for planes before they fly, but has the money to ensure Boeing’s delivery timeline is met once the planes are deemed flyable.

    Seems to me that the FAA’s recent strong stance against Boeing’s control and applied economic pressures to this government organization is limited only to lip service to appease public concerns.

  13. What hazard rating is the pitch up control feedback issue for the software (MCAS), that deals with it?
    The MCAS response to the Stabilizer is quite a bit. Ten seconds of high speed pitch trim. In normal, straight and level flight, MCAS is assumed to be inactive. When close to stall, is when it triggers.
    When in a turn, close to stall is when the test pilots encountered the problem MCAS solves, during testing of a ‘wind up’ turn, escape manuver. But, AOA sensors in that case may be reading incorrectly according to a Boeing article on AOA sensors.
    ===============
    http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_12/attack_story.html
    ===============
    “Pitching the airplane can cause erroneous readings at the sensor. While the nose is pitching up (as in a turn), the local flow angle is reduced, causing the reading to be too low. Although the sensors are placed to minimize the effect of sideslip, it is not eliminated and can be quite significant at sideslip angles that may occur on short final approaches or with an engine out.”

    I assume Boeing takes the bank angle into account, in the Air Data Computer calculations. The 737-MAX only has Two AOA sensors, so it can’t decide which is correct when there is a difference. So, they have to then switch MCAS off. How serious an issue would it be, if MCAS is turned off and a line pilot is in a ‘wind up’ turn? The answer to that question, I think would determine if the Boeing 737-MAX can be certified with Two AOA’s or if it needs Three and a full FBW computer control system for MCAS.

    In the most recent release of the AirDubai (737-NG) accident final report, (a very professional write up), it makes a recommendation to correct the stabilizer trim system. This accident was a 737-NG pitching up too far during a go-around procedure.
    ===================
    https://www.mak-iac.org/upload/iblock/3d1/report_a6-fdn_eng.pdf
    ====================
    “5.21. Consider the practicability to implement the design changes of the stabilizer control system
    to reduce the risk for the pilot to set stabilizer in-flight into out of trim position.”

    In the footnote for that recommendation, Boeing is reluctant to consider changing the stabilizer limits, and they even want to try and suppress mention of it in the report.

    “In the Comments to the draft Final Report the aircraft manufacturer suggested to remove this recommendation, reasoning that the Boeing Company design philosophy implies the pilot can fully operate with the available deflection of flight controls, including the stabilizer control. This may be required in a variety of non-normal situations, for example at the total loss of hydraulic system/hydraulic circuits’ pressure. At the same time according to the manufacturer, the aircraft design provides for reasonable amount of engineering concepts for the PM to stop the in-flight stabilizer setting into the out of trim position by the PF. The investigation team agrees that the aircraft design allows for it. But, the air accidents investigation practice shows that the PM, who monitors the flight management and aircraft control actions by the PF, is not always able to promptly identify the out-of-trim stabilizer position, as well as to detect the mere fact of the stabilizer prolonged motion. The investigation team notes that at the current level of technological development the combination of the mentioned engineering concepts is a possible solution: the limitation of the stabilizer deflection angles, when this could result in the adverse consequences, and the full travel/deflection when actually necessary.”

    The ET302 accident seems to refute the “pilot can fully operate with the available deflection of flight controls, including the stabilizer control”. So, how hazardous is the pitch up control column force that MCAS is there to correct for? Is it hazardous enough to require Three AOA’s as there are on every Airbus? Along with the associated FBW computer system upgrades?

    • If research / flight testing reveals MCAS indeed is a stall reduction/ prevention system, a flight safety item rather than a “cosmetic” extra training prevention tool, it should fully classify as a flight safety system.

      In that case the weak redundancy, single point of failure design and Lionair crash follow up demonstrates a troubling safety culture.

      Full aircraft control by the pilot design philosophy should not be used as scapegoat for preventing more expensive, superior flight safety solutions.

  14. If the FAA certifies the MAX for flight, and all other world regulators want to wait and see more data, have more testing etc. Can Boeing, repaint the 100’s of RyanAir, LionAir, Air Canada, etc planes, that are sitting in Boeing parking lots, into SW Airlines, American Airlines, United, planes and deliver them? Since they can’t deliver them to foreign countries because they aren’t certified there yet, and they could in the USA. Would there be anything in their delivery schedule contracts to allow them an out to deliver to countries that allow them to fly? Would countries they are waiting for more data and testing have their airlines punished by Boeing, if you will?

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