Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 5. January 17, 2025
- What’s the future of the Boeing 787-8? January 16, 2025
- FAA understaffing affects air operations oversight; NTSB falls short, too January 13, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 4. January 10, 2025
- The market is ready for a 787F. But is Boeing? January 9, 2025
Updates 1 and 2: Key reason for Jeju 2216’s tragedy: the airport localizer construction and location
Update, Dec. 30: Reuters published this graphic, which is superb and self-explanatory. The full story is here.
Update 2. Dec. 31: A new Reuters article has some important detail about the location of the localizer vis-a-vis the runway and apron. Excerpts:
- Comments in the airport’s operating manual, uploaded early in 2024, said the embankment was too close to the end of the runway and recommended that the location of the equipment be reviewed during a planned expansion.
- “Unfortunately, that thing was the reason that everybody got killed, because they literally hit a concrete structure,” Captain Ross Aimer, the chief executive of Aero Consulting Experts, told Reuters. “It shouldn’t have been there.”
- Muan International Airport’s Operations Manual said the navigation equipment, or localisers, had been installed too near the end of the runway, or just 199 m (218 yards) from the crash site.
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South Korean officials have previously said the structure was about 250 m (273 yards) from the end of the runway itself, though a paved apron extends past that.
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The runway design did not meet industry best practices, however, said John Cox, chief executive of Safety Operating Systems and a former 737 pilot, adding that they preclude any hard structure like a berm within at least 300 m (330 yards) of the end of the runway.
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
Dec. 30, 2024, © Leeham News: The Dec. 29 (local time) accident of Jeju Flight 2216 is a tragedy that didn’t have to happen.
It’s far too soon to say what caused the emergency on the airplane. Within hours a host of theories emerged about the cause. The airport fire chief blamed the accident on a bird strike (singular). I’ve never heard of a single bird strike bringing down an airliner. Multiple bird strikes have brought down airliners going back to the propeller days. In recent history, US Airways 1549—the flight that Capt. Chesley Sullenburger and co-pilot Jeff Skiles safely landed in the Hudson River—is the most famous example.
Korean and assisting investigators will reveal if 2216 suffered multiple strikes that caused power to both engines to quit, as happened with 1549. The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) should put this to rest. The analysis of these should also reveal why the landing gear, slats and flaps were not extended. The cockpit resource management (CRM) will be analyzed as well to understand the coordination between the two pilots.
Whatever the reason for the emergency landing, the incontrovertible cause for the disaster that befell the plane was the presence of a berm and concrete structure of the runway localizer a short distance from the end of the runway. This structure should never have been constructed in this manner. Having been done, it should have been later removed and replaced by a structure that would not have been disastrous to the emergency flight.
I’m optimistic that the initial readout of at least one of the flight recorders will be available this week. One of the recorders was damaged and is being sent to the US National Transportation Safety Board in Washington (DC) for analysis. (It was not revealed which one at this writing.)
In the meantime, a wide list of topics will be investigated. These include but are not limited to:
What investigators will look at
- Mechanical condition of the airplane, especially considering the wheels-up and flaps-up landing, looking for hydraulic failures.
- Maintenance records of the aircraft, including how recent any inspections were conducted and what conditions might have been discovered.
- The engine maintenance records, with focus on the right engine apparent compressor stall and if a bird strike or other mechanical issue contributed to the accident. A physical breakdown of the engine will be conducted.
- The health records of the flight crew and whether any alcohol or drugs were in their systems (I emphasize, this is routine).
- The operational records of the flight crew.
- The cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder and radio communications with Air Traffic Control.
- Weather conditions, even though the video appears there were no storms; but winds will be considered whether these were factors.
- The South Korean regulator has prime investigative responsibility. It is common practice for Boeing and the engine maker (in this case CFM (a 50-50 joint venture of GE and France’s Safran) to send their own investigation teams to assist the governing authority.
- A review of the backgrounds of the cabin crew and passengers is also routine, to see how the cabin crew handled the emergency.
Safety of the 737-800
As I’ve been interviewed by media about this accident, I’ve been asked several times about the safety record of the Boeing 737-800. It’s superb. A statistical analysis by Boeing that it does regularly shows the 737NG series (of which the 737-800 is a part) has one of the lowest accident rates since the jet age began. This chart, through 2022, is below.
Source: Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Click on image to enlarge.
I’ve also been asked about whether this accident will hurt Boeing’s recovery. It shouldn’t, because this is almost certainly not about the airplane’s manufacturing process. It’s about environmental factors (the birds), engine performance, the landing configuration and the presence of that localizer construction method and location.
Dear Mr Hamilton,
Finally an objective report, thank you.
You may add for the investigation:
The cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, SEVERAL MEMORY CARDS SUCH AS THOSE OF THE FADECS and radio communications with Air Traffic Control.
Keep up the good work,
Yves Enderlé,
ret. Airline CPT and IFALPA accredited Air Accident Investigator,
Brussels, Belgium.
“…the incontrovertible cause for the disaster that befell the plane was the presence of a berm and concrete structure of the runway localizer a short distance from the end of the runway. This structure should never have been constructed in this manner. Having been done, it should have been later removed and replaced by a structure that would not have been disastrous to the emergency flight.”
—
Shall we extend this statement to the sea wall at SFO that caused the Asiana 214 crash in 2013…?
No, the Sea Wall was below the flight patch of the aircraft.
Oh…so, if it was “below the flight path of the aircraft”, then how come the aircraft hit it?
We can similarly assert that the wall at Muan was outside the flight path of aircraft using the runway in question.
Because the tail of the aircraft was below the runway level.
The cause was gross piolot managment. A cointrubing cause was the flight mode they were in (Auto Throttle would not overide idle when stall speeds were aproached)
There are a number of airports in Alaska that have Sea Walls. Its the nature of rugged terrain and places to put airports. All those Sea Walls are below runway level.
This is the view of the SFO runways at that end.
https://www.google.com/maps/@37.6105366,-122.3576375,56m/data=!3m1!1e3?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTIxMS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D
Without a rock barrier below the runway (or other airports) it would wash out the runway.
What do you think Haneda Has? Or Hong Kong?
A sea wall can be located further from the end of a runway, so as to pose less risk to aircraft on an overly-low approach.
If necessary, an extra strip of land can be reclaimed in order to facilitate this.
If this had been done at SFO, the Asiana frame would just have had a tail strike on the runway.
Agreed.
But, the runway is above sea level (well Bay level in this case)
You still have to have something UNDER the runway, or it drops into the Bay until it is supported.
In short you are off on another weird tangent. It could have been wooden containment structure and the aircraft still would have hit it with a Sea Wall (Bay Wall) a mile away.
Now if we got rid of SFO entirely that would solve your problem. So propose it to the Bay area authorities. Let us know when they quit laughing.
Maybe they quit before I do.
Let us know how you do on Hong Kong (new) and Haneda! Dang if they are not both above sea level, I wonder why.
Here is a pitcher of Hong Kong (New) (one Runway end)
https://www.google.com/maps/@22.2943918,113.8933584,304m/data=!3m1!1e3?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTIxMS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D
Dang, there be rocks! Also known as a sea wall.
Yes .
Chinas newest airport runway out into the water , the 3rd at Hong Kong SAR
https://www.concretelayer.com/en/hong-kong-international-airport-3-runway-system-china-accropodetm-project
notice the major armouring of the embankment in the picture
@Abalone
The sea wall was fine. The chief pilot was not paying attention and thought the auto-pilot was engaged. It wasn’t. When they realized they were low and slow, they attempted to throttle up, but too little and late. They did avert a total loss, but an aircraft engine is not a motorcycle engine and does not rev up that quickly.
This was pilot error and there was no underlying mechanical failure with the aircraft.
There is a dissenting position in the NTSB report
that calls up the un-intuitive autopilot interface ..
US made plane, foreign airline -> pilot error.
set in stone.
@Uwe
Auto throttle certainly was a contributing factor. As with all these crashes there is rarely a sole factor. They thought the cruise control was on.
My take on pilot error is that instrumentation aside, a pilot never stops piloting. You don’t fly a plane into a mountain because your GPS tells you to. And if you see your aircraft shorting the runway you pull up on the throttle.
However, this is an increasingly common issue where pilots are now more operators than actual pilots.
Airline pilots have become more a Spectator than the Primary Operator by both system design, operational demands and training to indoctrinate ‘the way to do it’.
This little space in the Procedures and Practices for the pilots to exercise their control and decision making. Procedures and Practices are not the same thing, there is a big difference in reality though in the real world of airliner operation within the company and aviation culture there is commonly, sadly, no separation with Practices (not written in manuals) conflated and treated as Procedures (written rules) which must not be varied.
People are very bad at monitoring, and rote application of standard Procedures and Common Practices enforced as if they are Procedures leave little or no opportunity to be the in control Operating Pilot.
UNTIL – suddenly in seconds or minutes a Controlling Pilot is demanded to act and from a position akind to that of pure spectator.
Try it – and do not be surprised at the mess that you make.
@ Casey
Pilot error or not, the accident wouldn’t have unfolded the way it did if the seawall was further away from the runway.
So, let’s blame the seawall 👍
A US made plane can be no wrong, pilot error is the norm.
But an Airbus with FBW? Damn!! Must be the designers’ fault!
@All
I stop commenting at a certain point. We are all entitled to our opinions, and I certainly respect your rights to fundamentally disagree. My beliefs are not an AIB vs BA, nor or are they foreign vs domestic. Pilots are there to think…not just push a button. The moment pilots are nothing more than button pushers is the day that aircraft can be remotely piloted because pilots no longer add value.
I am thinking you know, from personal experience, the difference in thrust of a jet engine vs. a motorcycle
@Lee
I am well aware of the difference in power between a motorcycle and jet engine. My analogy was highlighting that a jet engine simply does not rev up that quickly to make sudden changes in flight profile. If you are a few seconds away from impact then it is already too late.
Power levels aside, it is a fundamentally different design. One is a turbine engine generating thrust, the other generating shaft power primarily through gasoline combustion.
Each design has a purpose and each has its limitations. An aircraft engine simply is unable to react to rapid power demands when seconds matter.
To ponder, in light of the assertion made above:
Thousands of flights operate safely to and from Muan airport every year — despite the presence of the embankment and wall at the end of the runway.
Trying to land on a finite strip of concrere at high speed — with apparent loss of hydraulic control and propulsion — is a risky undertaking. For example, such a landing wouldn’t have ended well at the old Kai Tak airport in Hong Kong, or on the island of Saba — despite the lack of a wall at the end of the runway.
If Sully had crashed into a ferry on the Hudson, would the ferry be blamed for the disaster?
All your analogies fall short in my opinion.
The Hudson river was not designed for airplanes to land on. When Muan airport was built, the expectation was certainly that commercial airplanes would indeed land there.
The Asiana accident had them below the level of the runway before actually having reached that runway.
None of this is applicable to the Jeju crash.
I’ll bring in an analogy from racing. Don’t worry, I’ll circle back to aviation in due time.
In Formula 1 for instance, they learned that excursions from the track do happen, and there are zones/curves that are prone to them. Because an axle or the steering breaks, because it’s a difficult spot to navigate, because there’s an accident with two or more cars involved, etc. So after a few fatal accidents, they added run-off zones in such places, in addition to the buffered crash barrier.
Of course, runway excursions also happen. This is also known, and has led to safety margins usually being taken into account when positioning ILS instrumentation and similar equiment. It has also led to certain building standards. Both are evident in the first photo in Admiral Cloudberg’s excellent write-up of BA38:
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/powerless-over-london-the-crash-of-british-airways-flight-38-7b2e20075f26
That photo shows you how much further away the equipment is located (you can also check this on maps – we’re talking over 3x as far away, and how it’s not mounted on a concrete structure.
So… without absolving the pilots of any errors they may have made (we’ll find out about that in due time, and we all have questions about how the airplane ended up perfectly centred on the runway but very far along, and not in landing configuration), it’s not unreasonable to say that the outcome of this crash would have been vastly different if that concrete structure had not been there. It’s also not unreasonable to say that it should at least not have been made from concrete.
We can say that all of these points are not unreasonable to make because there was a review done on the airport, and a sumamry report written, which made precisely these points before the accident happened.
I think two investigations will focus on what happened before the belly landing and after.
The ILS structure seems to violate runway requirements. It is the main reason this belly landing turned into a disaster.
I would not be surprized if in the flight investigation the ‘famous’ 737s non-EICAS emergency system shows up again. With contradicting & confusing messages.
Although this is my pure, unsupported speculations, reading 737 crash investigation reports over the last 30 years, creates expectations..
I think you’re on to something Keesje. The aircraft executed an aborted landing, and then turned around immediately and attempted to land on the reverse runway heading. So, I’m assuming that during the go-around the pilots pulled the gear up (unless that was the reason for the go-around in the first place?). But, for some sudden event, the pilots elected, not to fly a full pattern approach to the
original runway heading, but, to make an immediate landing. In only 2 minutes, they had to reconfigure from a landing configuration, to a go-around, do a quick 180, and then another landing attempt, while dealing with some sudden event. I could see where someone could get distracted with some other major emergency event, (fire onboard, loss of thrust etc) and either not have time, or completely forget to put the slats out, lower the gear etc.
So far it looks like the gear was never down, the aborted before that.
Also, there is a process and procedure in place for those events.
I am putting my faith in Juan Brown and the pilots made major mistakes.
The Aircraft is perfectly under control, they did not wind up setting down on the extend runway center line (aka both engines gone).
You don’t forget to put your gear down or flaps if you are mentally under control.
Don’t they train similar scenarios in flight simulators? Bird impacts, engines out, dead stick landing even in darkness and extremely bad weather.
NO. Engine out yes a lot but commonly at lift off to the point of routine which in the real life situations they often are not (routine) and in any event rare.
Dead stick landings in the Sim are NOT a normal training exercise nor is a gear up and/or flapless landing a Sim exercise.
There has been a number of dual engine events and as paying pax would like pilots to have trained on them, both at T-O (bird impact, ice ingestion and compressor surges), decent (like monsoon causing flame-outs at flight idle) and landings like this one
“I think you’re on to something Keesje. The aircraft executed an aborted landing, and then turned around immediately and attempted to land on the reverse runway heading.”
From AVHerald:
8:59L: Flight 7C-2216 pilot reports bird strike, declares emergency “Mayday Mayday Mayday” and “Bird strike, bird strike, go-around.”
* 9:00L: Flight 7C2216 initiates a go-around and requests authorisation to land on runway 19, which is by approach from the opposite end of the airport’s single runway.
* 9:01L: Air traffic control clears the aircraft to land on runway 19.
* 9:02L: Flight 7C-2216 touches down on the runway about 1,200m (3940 feet) down on the 2,800m (9184 feet) long runway.
Go Around to final Touch Down is less than 3 Minutes.
One interpretation could be that their loop back was too short, rushed.
Regarding the 737 (archive link):
“…a destructive engine failure, combined with the failure of the engine cowling to contain the resulting debris, could easily be the cause of a multiple-hydraulic-system failure. For instance, an uncontained turbine rotor burst in the #1 engine would almost certainly rupture at least some part of the A system’s engine-driven hydraulic pump, would likely breach both the A and standby lines in the #1 thrust reverser, and could easily penetrate the B and standby lines powering the left wing’s leading-edge high-lift devices, leaving the aircraft with one engine and no hydraulics.”
“This would seem to require the aircraft to attempt a landing at very high speed while maintaining a fairly steep bank angle until just before touchdown, and I don’t see how it would be possible to go around without the increases in engine thrust and vehicle angle of attack causing a loss of lateral/directional control, or to avoid a high-speed excursion from the side of the runway immediately following touchdown.”
https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/79399/how-controllable-is-the-737-in-single-engine-manual-reversion-flight-is-it-cont
The area around the Korean airport in question is a wetland, full of large migratory birds. Ingestion of one or more large birds could easily cause an uncontained engine failure. The tower was warning pilots about flocks of ducks in the area.
Whilst there’s much that might be said about hydraulic circuit redunancy and general design as a result of this disaster, I fear that an investigation pursuing this topic in a major way as a result of this crash might serve to do nothing more than dilute the importance of things that were definitely wrong.
It may well be that aircraft design changes are warranted as a result of this disaster. But on the whole, it’d be far safer to make sure that all airports are at least quasi compatible with survivable belly landings, rather than try to make sure that all aircraft designs are compatible *even in emergency situations* with berms built from earth and concrete at the end of the nearest available runway. No aircraft design is ever going to be 100% guaranteed to be able to get flaps / slats / gear down following a major issue with an engine(s), so belly landings are always going to be the option of last resort for the indefinite future.
It would be both more safe and more comfortable, if landing speeds of jets could be lower.
The current high speed slam landing, is hard on the landing gear along with the rest of the aircraft. If they could get vectored thrust, working on commercial aircraft, as they do with some military jets, then landing speeds and distances could both be lowered. Or some sort of high lift assist devices, that were reliable? It would also be advantageous for off airport landings. As for another possible safety device to look at for overrun protection, what about drag chutes? If you know you’ll be landing on an icy runway, or have to suddenly land overweight because of an emergency, you could pop the chutes upon landing. I think some Lear Jets have this option? In this particular accident, drag chutes may have helped a great deal.
Matthew:
Airports fixed so zero issues. Tens of trillions of dollars to do so, where does the money come from?
So lets look at SFO. You want a nice flat pre landing area? Now think of the costs let alone the permits you can’t get to extend into SFO bay.
Abalone blames the sea wall for the Asiana crash, its not a wall, its a wash out support as the runway is 20 feet above the bay. Hong Kong, Haneda and Kodiak Island Airport all have that feature (as well as oddles of others)
Denver is one of the only new airports that has a lot of space (had). As soon as you put in an Airport hotels, car rentals, gas stations show up around it.
Reagon Airport? Close it. Shrieks.
Its simply financially impossible to make even the major airports free let alone smaller ones.
Or the 747 Cargo that had an engine rip off its wing in Anchorages. 10 miles from the Airport and came close to crashing into residential. How do you fix that?
I note that in the list of ‘ related ‘ issues you had ” 787 lightning protection
February 8, 2009 ” – While at this time there is no mention/indication of lightning strikes involved – after reading that link- I was flabbergasted about the discussion then which was correct as far as it went- but had missed any mention of the by then well documented ” history and analysis ” re composites and lightning strike issues available at Boeing. Why ? – Simply because Boeings work on the B2 wing over a decade previous in which even more stringent requirements were addressed – solved and approved. Wuzthere and part of the solutions and which for the most part became public.
Another example to consider:
The Etihad A340 that was written off before it could be delivered in 2007 — was that incident the fault of the wall beside the test pen, or was it the screw-up made by the test crew?
https://aviationforaviators.com/2024/09/21/how-an-etihad-airbus-a340-was-retired-before-delivery/
Plenty of other aircraft were tested at that location without incident.
It was perfecly fine until it was not.
You are aware that sound walls or barriers are common around the EDGES of airports?
was that incident the fault of the wall beside the test pen, or was it the screw-up made by the test crew?
I think you’re mixing up something. Nobody says that the accident as such was the fault of an inanimate object. That object made the OUTCOME so much worse, though. And the Airbus test was supposed to be static, which was why it was carried out where it was. Landings are not static and overshoots do happen.
There’s a reason airports don’t put their terminals and other buildings right on the ends of the runways. Because a concrete structure withing 100 metres of the end of a runway is basically an accident waiting to happen.
But then they put a Concrete Block wall with unknown reinforcement, but it would have the same design issues as the ILS – it has to be Typhoon proof. It has a guard block, how solid is it in the case of an assault by North Korean special ops units? There was a time intrusions were a regular thing.
Regardless hitting a concrete block wall is going to tear up and aircraft. It could be as bad or not as bad as the ILS mound. Unless that energy is gone (then it is as bad) how many thousand feet does it continue at over 150 mph?
Follow that path out, its rife with lights on poles and concrete bases and then trees, structures and rock walls of various types.
How many landings has that airport seen that were non issues?
So, solve on issue and do nothing about the rest?
One of the good sources of information on these crashes is the blancolirio
channel.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BzmptA6s-1g
He is an airline pilot. 757 and 777 for sure, he may have flown the 737 early on. He presented a lot of good information on the 737NG and its various backup hydraulic systems.
Evidence is that the right engine was having a compressor stall (video evidence)
Clearly they aborted the landing as they landed to the South when they were on track to the North.
They floated down the runway so far they were going over the end. There is also a concrete wall on past the ILS system though the ILS mound was what wrecked the aircraft.
Gear was not down, spoilers were not deployed. While not impossible, there are a plethora of redundant and even a manual gear release on that series of 737.
While its speculation, the evidence points to pilot mismanagement as the primary cause. Aircraft was under perfect control, he indicates that none of the procedures were followed for a flyable aircraft.
The ILS Mound is a secondary cause (any landing with gear and spoilers/thrust reverse would never come close). It has not business there nor is there a run-out stop pad though that likely would have no affect with gear not down.
Keep in mind that that mound is on the normal approach from the South, so a short landing would face both the concrete wall and the mound.
“…the evidence points to pilot mismanagement as the primary cause.”
Gosh, it didn’t take long for the “foreign pilot blaming” to begin 🙈
Sadly the US has its share of crashes, most are due to pilot mis management.
Note I simply stated pilots, not South Korean Pilots are the worst, of Asian Pilots or African pilots etc etc etc.
US insists now that a First Officer have 1500 hours flight time. It can be any boring in the air, most do it via flight instruction. 1500 hours on a SEL that has few if any of the systems a commercial jet does. Common aircraft is a C172, fixed gear, few redundant systems (dual mags and spark plugs) and piston powered.
Far better having a commercial license and then get the hours in a Simulator where you handle and practice large complex aircraft and systems and the emergencies that go with them.
Europe has a better system where its not the hours but the experience including time spent flying a commercial training aircraft.
Both Europe and the US realized after a number of crashes (AF447 being the final shakeup) that the Simulators were training rote stuff that pilots knew as soon as it started what all the right actions were.
That has been changed. FedEx actually was leading that reform as they had the MD-11 and its handling aspects that resulted in a number of crashes (Lufthansa had one in Saudi Arabia as well).
So, no more routine landings. If they are landing its with an emergency. Takeoff have emergencies now. Upset training. Teaching that the first thing you have to do in a stall is unload (fancy talk for what any SEL pilot learned, push the yoke forward, you may still crash but you are going to crash if you don’t)
All aviation AHJ across the world have good and bad aspects.
Hats off to Brazil for telling Boeing to put the MCAS info in the pilots manual.
Hats off to India for refusing to let an aircraft fly with not just one iffy engine, it had to be two good ones.
Neither EASA or the FAA mandated that and Norwegian was flying a twin engine problem RR out of Rome when the one failed. It was the newer of the two, which meant the other one should have failed (ie both).
What “evidences” are provided as “proof”?? Speculation and conjecture aren’t proof of anything.
It’s the standard playbook: for foreign crashes involving a Boeing, one must — by default — try to point a finger at the pilots.
It’s well known that US pilots can easily handle a gear-up landing at high speed with apparent loss of hydraulics and compromised power plant performance (potentially with smoke in the cabin) 👍
When UA232 got into trouble in 1989, it wasn’t at low altitude, there was an experienced extra pilot available, it still had 2 functioning engines, and it landed with gear down…and there were still 112 fatalities. But, hey, those pilots were labeled as heroes, right?
You could show a bit more respect for the UA232 crew.
Non-US reader.
@ AA
I have plenty of respect for all pilots — foreign and US.
But the idea that foreign pilots are somehow of lower quality than US ones — I don’t subscribe to that at all.
Time to flush the inconsistent treatment out of the (US) narrarive.
Well when you see 3 experienced pilots and two very experienced on type and training pilot as well, let a 777 drop to no altitude and stall?
It has nothing to do with nationalities, it has everything to do with training systems and standards.
The US has very good training standards. That does not mean the 767 Crash into Houston is stopped.
The pilot in that case threaded his way through the system because of excuses and records not shared.
The odds of good outcomes go up with training standards that are high and relevant to emergencies as well as a capable 2nd officer and good CRM.
The Indonesian MAX PIC was not able to hand over control to the First Officer while he tried to make sense of what was going on.
Europe also has very good training standards. Both are addressing things like AF447 that 3 experienced pilots failed to understand they were stalled.
What South Korea standards are I do not know. Asiana crash was a disgrace to pilots period.
Regardless, the better training and standards for both pilots the higher the odds.
Pilots regardless do get caught out, the Air Candada attempt to land on a Taxiway is another example. No one is immune.
Abalone: “…the evidence points to pilot mismanagement as the primary cause.”
TW: “Note I simply stated pilots, not South Korean Pilots are the worst, of Asian Pilots or African pilots etc etc etc.”
Are we still talking about the same accident of Jeju 2216? Who piloted the 737-800? How quickly did our poster lose his mind and become incoherent?!
A rush to condemn is simply unprofessional and when all the factors are taken into account, all to often wrong.
Why do it and risk showing a cultural bias.
I agree on the rush to judgement and am guilty of that here.
But cultural bias? Wow. I worked in a seething petri dish of cultures for 25 years.
As I told the one clown, not only does the company have extremly serious policies on that subject, I believe in those policies, so if you don’t knock it off, I will report you.
Some people are going to be offended no matter what, I am not going to worry about people like that. They can live an offended life if they want.
Anchorage happens to be a mixing of some 90 cultures and we are a far richer community for having all of them.
My mother and father were rescued by an Alaska Native man before I was born. So while the culture I grew up in was seriously biased, my family was not. We always remembered the man who had every reason to hate my folks who showed what humanity was all about.
My folks tolerated no disrepute towards anyone. We judge purely on what was in their hearts. All ethnicity have people with bad hearts.
Anyone who extends a hand of welcome is in turn welcome in our world and the same for those who return the hand of welcome. There is a huge amount of culture I have adopted from the Native peoples of my state. They were not the only ones I respected, they were the first and showed the way for what I believe in.
The 181 people were fine when the aircraft had belly landed and was sliding down the runway. Usually in accidents like this, the aircraft hits walls, fences, antennas and ends up on a highway, slope, parking lot, in water. There are fatalities and the aircraft is usually a write-off having absorbed lots of energy
In Muan there was a massive barrier, right at the end of the runway, that stopped, disintegrated, exploded the aircraft and only two “lucky” soules somehow survived.
There was no obstacle in the case of UA 232: the plane’s tip hit the runway first, causing a fuel leak and fire.
The frame quickly exploded and disintegrated after that.
112 Perished, 184 survived. That’s the point.
Well, that may be your point — but it’s not the only point.
Another point is that, even under relatively favorable circumstances, emergency landings can end very badly.
Even without an obstacle at the end of the runway, the Jeju landing could still have ended up badly — e.g. with engines digging into soil, ripping off a wing, severing fuel lines and causing an explosion.
All we know is what happened to this one.
All crashes have their own sequence. Ruptured fuel tanks could have left fuel behind.
Regardless, there is no reason a 737 gear cannot be extended. Worst case there is a manual release (well 3, one for each gear).
For consideration is casually flying into a bird ladden area.
If there are birds around all the time, its a big help that ATC says there birds around every time someone lands.
These were ducks vs the geese Sully ran through. Smaller size can mean less engine damage (many birds can compound that issue)
The same as there’s no reason the MAX pilots couldn’t turn the trim wheels manually to trim the horizontal stabilizer.
How soon the same play book has popped up AGAIN?. Congrats!
Pedro:
You truly fuel falsehoods.
I have repeatability not only noted the trim wheel issue but condemme34d how it got to where it was invalid as far as fidelity in the Sims went.
So don’t tell me its any kind of a playbook. Bad piloting is bad piloting be it the 767 cargo crash or any other US crew crash to anyone else.
You should look in the mirror when you accuse people of those false statements.
The thrust reverser appears to have been deployed on number 2 engine, the one that visibly ingested birds. However, thrust reverser deployment cannot occur unless the landing gear is down and locked, and only after touchdown followed by gear compression. For unless there is weight on the landing gear the reversers cannot be deployed.
Some people mentioned the fact that the thrust reverser on number 1 engine was not deployed as evidence that the pilot shut down the wrong engine. Again, reverser deployment cannot occur unless there is weight on the gear. Also, while it is possible that number 1 engine was shut down (I simply don’t know) it doesn’t mean the pilots shut it down themselves for it could too have ingested birds, like number 2 engine did, while giving us less apparent visual clues.
It is also worth mentioning that the earth mound was there to elevate the ILS installation to compensate for the 6 degree negative slope of the runway. However they should have used longer poles to hold down the ILS posts instead of securing them to a concrete slab on top of the earth mound. The engineering principal here is that any navigation aid at the end of a runway should be designed to easily collapse if hit by an airplane.
By the way, the airplane never hit a concrete wall like it is still wrongly reported around the world. This confusion is due to the presence of a nearby concrete wall around the perimeter of the airport (a military requirement) which is made out of ciment blocks. Had it not been for the presence of the reinforced earth mound the airplane would have likely gone through this wall, which would have been blown apart with considerably less damage to the aircraft.
Normand:
I did not fly jets. But from what Juan has reported (he does) thrust reverser and spoilers can be deployed once you hit XX feet (have to look again)
I have not see a left side view of the aircraft.
Agreed on the Concrete wall but that would be next thing to hit.
6° negative slope?!
which slope?
runway has ~5m difference over 2800m ( south lower )
ref: https://scontent-fra5-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.30808-6/471872468_1133349681587896_8478920931507336793_n.jpg
OT:
news here talked about the FDR/CVR going to Airbus for readout?
5m over 2800m works out to about 0.1° downslope, not 6°.
@EWE:
Lots of rumors. Recorders will go to US aka the NTSB. They DO NOT go to the airplane mfg. EASA in Europe but the US has a different independent third party in the NTSB. I think its a good model.
Boeing will be involved as an observer and call on for expert questions as will CFM. Others are on call as needed if it focuses down to a specific component.
The authorities in South Korea — who are leading the investigation — decide who reads the recorders.
Ethopia sent the recorders from the MAX crash to the BEA in Paris, even though the crashed plane wasn’t European.
Perfectly understandable — best to avoid (US) parties with a vested interest.
Ahh,
the regular transition from being out of arguments to being abusive.
Thank you. conversation ends here.
I fully respect the right of Ethiopian authorities to send the crash recorder to where they thought it best would be.
You do need to be reminded of where CHINA sent its 737-800 crash recordings.
Your lies on the NTSB are tiresome. To this day the NTSB has not released what they found in the China 737-800 crash (nor has your so much beloved China)
In a non US crash, the NTSB is purely an assist fucnti9on to get the recording downloaded and in the case of the China 737-800, damage was severe to the recorders.
Clearly the China crash was pilot induced.
I would hate to be the NTSB, find out there was an aircraft issue and the country submitting t he recorders for download would not release the information that all need to know.
Sorry, it should read 6 meters, not 6 degrees.
The pilots are always the last link in a long chain with countless links that terminates at the accident site. Its easy to blame the last and most obvious link, regardless of nationality, knowledge and experience. As aviation professionals we must always resist the common temptation to quick judgment.
ANY object in the actual path of any aircraft that can break the structural integrity of an aircraft should not be there if ANY alternative exists.
Accidents are always the culmination of many factor the removal of one or more of which may have resulted in no accident.
We must let the evidence be discovered and hopefully when done competently we will all be able to learn and give a little meaning to the loss of lives involved.
Peter:
The Pilots are the last piece of the Swiss Cheese model. Their job is to deal with the other failures and the is massive background data for doing so that has resulted in procedures.
Sadly what we see if pilot failures over and over again. The two MAX crashes are an exception. MCAS 1.0 was insane at best and criminally complicit in my opinion. I am in the camp that the pilots in both cases failed to see clues but in that case, they would not have been there if not for MCAS.
In this case the ILS did not cause this. It ended it in a horid loss of life, but it was the end of a trail. Note that the concrete wall was maybe 200 ft past the ILS. An ILS on the correct mount in that case would not have changed the end breakup (it might have been less we will never know but the aircraft would have been ruptured by it.
Nothing says a single lost engine (if it was lost, it certainly was exhibiting a problem though we don’t know if that continue) should never bring down a twin engine aircraft.
Stepping through the logic, the aircraft was perfecly under control. Pin pointy down the middle of the runway. Obviously the crew was not incapacitated.
Frankly this is not even the last slice of cheese. Engine failures are trained for and process and procedure in place.
If the control surface are working then you have hydraulics. Even without hydraulics you can lower the gear if you pull the handles.
Normally I am a wait and see. But like MH370, once you saw the route and actions, there was only once conclusion. This has all the hallmarks of that.
It should be noted, pilots are also the first link – if they can’t handle a routine failure, they are incapable no matter what country they are from.
No, the two MAX crashes were not exceptions, though it is inappropriate to lump a lack of training with “pilot error.” There wasn’t anything insane or criminally complicit about MCAS’ design; when activated unnecessarily due to a faulty AOA sensor it caused a runaway stabilizer — hardly the end of the world. It was designed so the runaway would be halted and kept on hold as long as the electric trim was in use, giving pilots ample opportunity to restore pitch and execute the NNP. One crew handled the runaway as required and landed safely at their destination, never knowing that MCAS even existed. The other two countered the runaway quite successfully—numerous times, reflexively, but didn’t seem to know there was a procedure to shut off the trim system. MCAS wasn’t the superpowerful inexorable monster the media made it out to be. Time to give up the trite and irrational excuses for not pinpointing the lack of runaway stab trim training as the immediate cause of those crashes.
That interpretation is imho faulty.
The flight that made it had a supernumerary (young and fresh) aboard to do “full time thinking” on the issue.
The UI aspect of MCAS I’d deem sneaky, treacherous.
Not looking into the influence of sensor failures in MCAS behavior was an unpardonable oversight.
The major misstep was in going from a bi-lobed _indicating_ system ( pilot interpreted ) to a single lobe _control_ path with non obvious reach through.
That overall is not a pittance.
A runaway stabilizer doesn’t need full time thinking or a 3rd pilot to detect. MCAS had/has no UI—no gauges, levers, switches or messages, only a turning trim wheel whose operation couldn’t be discerned from Speed Trim operation. That’s why there was no training for it—none is possible, and it was not mentioned in the operations manual.
Sensor failure would result in inoperative MCAS or a runaway trim, and the effects were assessed in safety analyses. The media made up the “not looking into” bit.
The proof is in the flight data recordings… all 3 crews countered the runaway trim caused by MCAS as expected by Boeing, recovered pitch attitude and maintained level flight reflexively, so it must not have been terribly sneaky or treacherous. All that was left was to turn off the electric trim, which they’d know to do if they’d been trained in the procedure. One crew did, and lived. The other two didn’t and didn’t. Pretty simple.
What bi-lobed indicating system?
@Pete P.
yeah, sure, you are the boss.
As a pilot I was and still am inflcited on the two MAX crashes.
Bjorn phrased it such that it gave me a foundation to put it MCAS first.
The Indonesian pilots did not know about MCAS. There were not even MAX Sims at the time (there are panel differences in the MAX as well as MCAS).
In my view the Indonesia PIC and flying had two major issues. One was MCAS and the bizarre way it was working and a stick shaker that made no sense. MCAS was not acting like a runaway stab. He had some clues but when he tried to get a moment to sort it out by turning it over to the First Officer, the first officer flubbed it and it was worse. The PIC got cogitative overload in my opinion.
Ethiopian is a bit different. They did have warnings on it and told what to do. No Sim Training though. They should have been able to deal with it.
But MCAS distracted them, no real training and it got away from them. Again it seemed to have factors of no CRM.
But if MCAS had not been there, they would not have been in that situation.
MCAS 1.0 was lethal garbage.
All MCAS does is drive the stab trim motor. When it does so unnecessarily, it results in an uncommanded pitch deviation. Wake turbulence, windshear and a number of other system faults also cause uncommanded pitch deviations. Pilot training teaches them to react reflexively to counter the pitch change with elevator input and then trim to assist. If they detect that the persistent pitch deviation it is not due to windshear or wake, and the trim is running away due to some system fault, training teaches them the procedure to execute, which shuts off the trim system. What is so mysterious or difficult about that? At least MCAS was designed to be interrupted when the pilot used electric trim and to remain on hold while trimming was ongoing, allowing the pilots to recover pitch and altitude. If the runaway had been caused by one of the other failures that usually cause an inexorable runaway, they’d have been dead in less than 40 sec. Also, pilots are not trained on which systems/components can fail to cause a runaway—it would be an expenditure of resources for no gain and might actually be detrimental if pilots think they can fix the system in flight and delay executing the procedure. The hysterical arm waving over pilots not being told that MCAS existed and could be the cause of a runaway was what happens when pilots who don’t realize how little they actually know about the airplane pompously protest that they MUST know about everything on the airplane, while accident after accident shows that they can’t seem to retain or recall what they DO need to know. It would be humorous if it wasn’t so pathetically tragic. The simulator training required when the MAX was ungrounded was not on MCAS; it was on the runaway trim procedure, to correct the dangerous tendency some pilots were beginning to show, of either letting the runaway proceed to discern whether it was being caused by MCAS or not, thanks to the false notion raised here and propagated by the press that the intermittent nature of MCAS’ runaway confused the pilots and caused them to not execute the runaway procedure, or worse, those that believed that simply pushing the stick in the direction opposite the runaway would stop it, thanks to the absurd and utterly false testimony the NTSB Chair gave to Congress regarding the purpose and operation of the column cutout switches, not once but twice, even doubling down to give a corrupted explanation of the runaway procedure to support his fiction. Like I said, it would be humorous… I certainly have newfound respect for the adage: Little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
@Uwe: An education in the pertinent field works wonders.
Pete,
This point was grossly glossed over in all of the MCAS discussions in this forum. Most commenters here were too busy pushing their narratives to consider this.
Bjorn, in his columns on the crashes, did mention this, and went as far as to ask why the pilots in both instances failed to use the electric trim switches to completely counter the mis-trim before cutting out the stab. He didn’t go any further, or draw any conclusions, though. I think he did not want to come across as blaming the pilots too much.
In both crashes, it was almost as if the pilots were hesitant to use manual electric trim too much.
Bjorn Fehrm also said that the design of MCAS was “absolutely unforgivable”…
This doesn’t change the fact that in both crashes the severe mis-trim could’ve easily been corrected by using the manual electric trim switches.
Mike,
If what you stated is true, why Boeing had to spent months to modify MCAS, why didn’t Boeing issue a simple bulletin and FAA unground the MAX?
I still think that returning to the original design and labeling of the Two Stab Cutout switches would give more control to the pilots. They should still be the ultimate decision makers in a Boeing 737. Some black box should not allowed to override the pilots in a Boeing, as it’s meant to do in an Airbus, per design. The original design had a Manual Stab cutout switch, in case a the yoke mounted manual electric swtich became stuck. Then, next to it, there was the AutoPilot cutout switch, in case it began to hiccup, and cause a runaway trim situation. As it is now, both switches cut out everything. The pilot can cut everything, freezing the current trim settings and play with the smaller trim wheel against the larger stablizer expending precious time and effort, in an emergency, or leave the electric trim on, and play hop scotch with every autopilot change of the trim wheel. Why Boeing doesn’t do this puzzles me. It would follow the long standing policy of keeping Pilots as the ultimate decision makers and controllers of the aircraft.
Richard Davenport:
Some black box should not allowed to override the pilots in a Boeing.
Please elaborate… which black box overrode the pilots and what action of the pilots was overridden.
@Pete P. Show me the OFF switch for MCAS. There isn’t one. You can disable the Stab Trim Motor, which leaves you trying to crank the trim wheel as fast as you can, if you can. There’s an OFF switch for the AutoPilot, the AutoThrottle, but, not for the ‘black box’ of MCAS. Why Not? The black box left you fighting every few seconds for control of the pitch, or totally at the mercy of a slow mechanical cable system. Why did they rewire the cutout switches?
Richard Davenport,
I also don’t understand why Boeing rewired the stab cutout switches. It doesn’t make sense to me, but I’m not privy to all the issues/analysis that went into the decision. I agree that a separate Autopilot stab cutout switch (as in the NG) could’ve made things easier for the pilots.
However, I disagree somewhat with this part of your statement:
Use of the manual electric trim switches instantly interrupts MCAS. If you applied short bursts of manual electric trim (less than 1 sec long) continuously on an interval of 5 sec or less, alternating up and down, you could neutralize MCAS indefinitely with very little physical effort.
I’m not saying that this is what the pilots should’ve done, or that this is what the procedure should be, but this is how easy it would be to negate MCAS. Yes, this would still require some mental effort and attention, but would not be that taxing.
In the case of ET302, what the pilots should’ve done is apply 10 sec of up trim using the manual electric trim switches, then flip the stab switches to cutout. The aircraft would’ve then been properly trimmed and they wouldn’t have to fight the yoke or the trim wheel. They could’ve then focused all their attention on making back down safely.
If it were as simple and easy as you theorize, why the heck did BA/BCA had to “coach” FAA pilots before 737 MAX simulation tests?? Where have you been the last couple years?
IIRC didn’t the pilot of ET302 ran of trim because MCAS continued to push down the nose??
The pilot didn’t “run out of trim”.
When the stab trim was turned back on (for the final time), the stab trim position was at 2.3 units. When the aircraft impacted the ground the stab trim position was at about 1 unit. The AND Electric Limit with flaps down is -0.45 units, so the stabilizer still could’ve gone more AND.
The manual electric trim switches could’ve easily been used to bring the aircraft back into trim without having to wrestle with the trim wheels. The pilots did try this a couple of times, but not for long enough periods to make a difference. For some reason, they didn’t persist in doing this.
Mike:
Why didn’t Boeing spell it out as you did in their bulletin after the 737MAX crashed in Indonesia? What was Boeing trying to hide?
Pedro: Neither Boeing nor Airbus provides pilots with the workings of a system and how its anomalous operation can cause a particular effect, unless there is a need to know, i.e. the knowledge helps the pilots choose the appropriate course of action out of many. That is why Boeing didn’t even mention MCAS in their bulletin—there was only one course of action for a runaway stab trim and it didn’t require knowing which system was causing it. But Boeing got a lot of flack from some pilots who were livid that Boeing had dared to withhold information from them, and as typical of people whose egos are easily bruised they accused Boeing of trying to hide its existence.
“runaway stab trim”
is defined by Boeing as “continuous un-comanded movement of the stab trim (actuator)”
MCAS activity does not present as “continuous movement”.
inactive when manual switches are used.
probably time delayed reactivation.
obs: deflection “reach” reset after any manual intervention.
deflection reach significantly increased by Boeing beyond what the FAA had been shown for certification.
why did Brazil cert authority demand MCAS be included in pilot manuals?
Uwe:
“MCAS activity does not present as “continuous movement”.
That argument implies that pilots are trained to wait to see whether the stab movement is continuous before deciding to handle it as a runaway. How long do they wait? Until it runs to its physical stops? In trying so desperately to exonerate the pilots or their lack of training, you are introducing absurdities that cast the pilots and their training in an even worse light.
@Pete p.
your gyrations to shift blame away from Boeing at the expense of the killed crew is absolutely distasteful.
majority of pilots are average, not top gun material
and not trained as test pilots.
Your fake righteous indignation is not fooling any of us, Uwe. You and your fellow Airbustians have no problems throwing pilots under the bus when it suits your narrative.
Mike B:
I think you missed a good pun, it should have been thrown under the Airbus.
I too wonder about the failure to keep trimming back. Clearly it was working, slowly but working and you can see it on the clacking trim wheels.
Get rid of MCAS and those crashes would not have happened.
So, I do put MCAS and its insane implementation as number 1 cause. My first reaction reading it was, the AOA was not cross zoned to the other AOA?
I do agree we need better pilot training. Too much of has been the pilots knew what was coming and they did not react to the incident, they went rote and react to the scenario.
Throw in a wrinkle that the rote turns into something different.
Upset training, startle reaction to odd failures.
The US and EU are working on it hard but I don’t think the rest of the world has followed.
Unfortunately I consider that view, that the ‘MCAS was not an exception so pilot failure resulted in a crash’ as naive and not supported by the evidence. Lufthansa appartently only found out that an automatic nose down pitch system was installed on the MD11 aircraft AFTER the destruction of an aircraft. Embedded systems or flight characteristics innate, though largely unknown or seldom encountered if ever, to a design have resulted in countless accidents many of which were likely assigned to the ‘Crew Failure’ collection of explanations.
That one crew carried out what amounted to a ‘correct’ action in perefect hindsight does not support the view that another crew who did not, failed.
The introduction of the FMC panels into the forward pedestal area with the EFIS version of the B737-300 (Classic) series resulted in a decrease in the diameter of the trim wheels used with extendible handles to manually move the stabilizer. The torque required which increased with either or both speed and displacement from a trimmed position could result in both pilots working together failing to move the trim wheels with both handles UNLESS the elevator force in use to maintain flight control was relaxed sufficiently. This was trained during transition to type with some though perhaps not all operators but was likely an optional item and perhaps not re-enforced in recurrent training. Was it a specific item in transition to the MAX series aircraft with significant weight with an iPad only session?? I doubt this, and MCAS could and did repeatedly make large adjustments ti stabilizer position regardless of speed or flight conditions or actuasl trim required in both MAX accidents.
Pilots can only operate their aircraft based upon what is known and what can be deduced in the moment from the indications they have combined with training, knowledge retained and experience.
A rush to judgement is akin to summary justice – I urge people not to do this with aircraft accidents when the priority is to learn all that is possible to comprehend why and accident occurred to prevent a repeat and NOT to lay blame.
Mike Bohnet,
The Ethiopian was at high speed and the electric trim switches have fasr less authority in that they are slower while the MCAS could achieve full deflection of the Stab in two conseqwuetive actions. The Stab trim postion says nothing about the trim requirment so it was quite likely still way out of trim. At high speed an out of position Stab may be impossible to move by either electric Or manual actions. They did not have a lot of time by that point .
@ Peter,
On that subject, it has been said that MCAS has two “powers” of operation. One at low speed with a PHR displacement of 2.5°/occurence and one at high speed with a PHR displacement of 0.55°/occurence. However, the ET302 will be flying at high speed up to +VMO and the MCAS will be travelling at the speed intended for low speeds. I don’t recall seeing this point addressed anywhere.
Francois,
Good point you make as I too have not seen anything about two speed MCAS operation nor how this is mediated. There are set parameters for when the MCAS was to ‘interfere’ and I suspect if two speed function was included that too would have parameters.
i once commented to the then chairman of the NTSB that I would like to sit through an NTSB inquiry process. His response was that I would be bored to death as commonly fine seemingly minute details, the design of a screw thread for example, are discussed and argued over for hours if not days.
I was pleased that fine details were examined but the discussion and arguing are about liability most likely which is of course governed by politics and money. Poly being a Greek word for many and Ticks being blood sucking pests.
peter,
The second MCAS activation on ET302 lasted 7 sec and brought the stab from 2.38 units to 0.4 units. The crew then trimmed up for 9 sec using the manual electric trim, bringing the stab back up to 2.3 units. This almost completely countered the second MCAS input.
The MCAS rate (based on the second activation) was -0.283 units/s while the manual electric trim rate was 0.211 units/s. This is not much slower than MCAS. If the crew would’ve trimmed up for 20 sec instead of just 9 sec, the stab position would’ve been back up at 4.62 units, which is a bit more ANU than where it was when the A/P disengaged. The crew could then cut out the stab and figure out how to get the aircraft back on the ground without having to fight the yoke or the trim wheels.
Another point that is almost never acknowledged is that MCAS is interrupted instantly when the crew uses the manual electric trim. The second MCAS activation should’ve been 9.3 sec, but was stopped short at 7 sec because the crew used the manual electric trim to counter.
In the ET302 final report, one of the observations from the simulator crews was that… “…it was instinctual to use as much electric trim as needed to reduce column forces in response to MCAS inputs, recognizing that a sustained input on the electric trim switch was longer than typical inputs that pilots are accustomed to making during routine operations.”
Unfortunately this wasn’t the case for the ET302 crew.
Mike,
Excellent info. It is not my intention to remove the crew from the causal factors. Unless they have truly felt the forces involved in major out of trim stabilizer conditions it is all too easy for the pilot flying to relax a little, especially if distracted, and jets especially at high speed will rapidly develop high rates of sink or climb as the case may be.
Immediately after lift off a lot of conflicting alerts, warnings and odd handling behaviour has a very high startle effect and demands an extremely high level of coordination and communication in a very stressful environment. With unknown or little understood systems which had likely never been actually experienced before, interfering seriously with the aircraft flight path and control it should be expected that the crew could , lets say, perform less well than the situation required. Did it have to end in tragedy is the question, and if so why?
With MCAS not interfering, not installed or functioning as it was., the question is could the actual performance of the crew, sub-optimal or otherwise, have been a serious causal factor that would result in total loss.
I suggest possibly not. We will never know unfortunately as aviation is very unforgiving all too often.
Mike,
Hindsight is 20/20.
There was a sim session practiced by a U.S.-based 737 MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the ET302 accident sequence, it’s found that “the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery procedures.”
The session was to practice recovery from a scenario in which the aircraft was out of trim and wanting to descend while flying at a high rate of speed similar to what the ET302 crew faced.
“In such a scenario, once the trim motor is de-powered, the pilots must use the hand-operated manual trim wheels to adjust the stabilizers. But they also must to keep the aircraft from descending by pulling back on the control columns to deflect the elevator portions of the stabilizer upward. Aerodynamic forces from the nose-up elevator deflection make the entire stabilizer more difficult to move, and higher airspeed exacerbates the issue.”
“The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced…”
“What the U.S. crew found was eye-opening. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn.”
“The U.S. crew’s session and a video posted recently by YouTube’s Mentour Pilot that shows a similar scenario inside a simulator suggest that the resulting forces on ET302’s stabilizer would have made it nearly impossible to move by hand.
Neither the current 737 flight manual* nor any MCAS-related guidance issued by Boeing* in the wake of the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), when MCAS first came to light for most pilots, discuss the roller-coaster procedure for recovering from severe out-of-trim conditions. The 737 manual explains that “effort required to manually rotate the stabilizer trim wheels may be higher under certain flight conditions,” but does not provide details.
The pilot who shared the scenario said he learned the roller coaster procedure from excerpts of a 737-200 manual posted in an online pilot forum in the wake of the MAX accidents. *It is not taught at his airline.*”
Pilots needed better training, including those worked for a *U.S.-based airline*!
“The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. “I don’t think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft,” this pilot noted.
The ET302 crew climbed through 5,000 ft. shortly after de-powering the trim motors, and got to about 8,000 ft.—the same amount of altitude the U.S. crew used up during the roller-coaster maneuvers…”
I guess there’s a good chance the crew in the simulation met the same fate as those who flew ET302.
Does it sound positive or as simple or as black-and-white as you painted?
Further to the post from Pedro below about the Us crew simulation of out of trim condition similar to Ethiopian situation.
I have found out the the stabilizer was increased in area for the NG series andn I am presuming remained the same on the MAX series. The elevator however was NOT enlarged and my knowledge and experience suggests that a much larger elevator deflection would be required for a similar stabilizer angle out of trim condition with I am guessing an increase in loading on the stabilizer screw jack mechanism.
It is the load on the stabilizer screwjack that makes manual turning of the trim wheels difficult to impossible in certain conditions because of thje aerodynamic loading combined with the mechanical loading from the elevator.
In the B737-200 and for the B737-300 my airline taught and practiced in recurrent training in the sim realistic significant out of trim conditions. Only with BOTH pilots on their respective handles of the trim wheels was it possible with a see-saw relaxing of the elevator control was it possible to move the stabilizer bit by bit at all and the B737-300 as far as I know did NOT have the enlarge surface area stabilizer.
An experienced test pilot current on. B737NG aircrsaft demonstrated in the SIM that it took little time for the nose down condition to be unrecoverable, certainly for a line crew facing an apparently uncontrollable aircraft with some unknown and unknowable ‘beast’ opposing their actions in certain conditions that they tried.
peter,
You make good points about the stressful flight deck environment with the alerts and the startle factor, points the the ET302 reports emphasize. I also agree that without MCAS, losing the RHS AoA sensor would likely not have resulted in a total loss. So, I agree that the MCAS design was the primary cause.
However, it should be kept in mind that only 11 sec (or less) of manual electric up trim stood between the total loss and likely making it back to the airport with everyone alive. The crew seemed to get that ANU trim was badly needed, they did use the manual electric trim somewhat, then went through the whole fight with the trim wheel.
Near the end they turned the stab back on, presumably to be able to use more manual electric trim, but when they did, they didn’t prioritize it given how little was used. It seems like they prioritized fighting the mis-trim with the elevator. Tragically, this act of turning the stab back on and then only manual electric up trimming intermittently for a couple seconds was what made the flight unrecoverable.
That the crew didn’t focus more on using manual electric trim is a question that is not answered, and is rarely asked by anyone, especially commenters in this forum. In fact, the ET302 final report also fails to ask this question! Of the 88 findings in the report, only three of them deal with the up trim applied by the crew using the manual electric trim switches.
Notice that the report hints at “unknown reason” twice, as if the authors are trying to insinuate that the manual electric trim wasn’t working. There is no evidence of this. The evidence instead seems to indicate that the crew chose not to fully utilize the manual electric trim, whether it be because of lack of understanding, training, or distraction.
While MCAS is the primary cause, don’t believe anyone who tells you that the situation was impossible. There was a relatively easy way (compared to maintaining heroic levels of yoke forces for the duration of the flight) to correct the mis-trim and recover. The crew just didn’t figure it out for some reason.
@Peter, and don’t forget that in the MAX the trim control wheel was changed to a smaller diameter to allow for the larger glass screens, making the turning of the trim wheel more difficult also.
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https://leehamnews.com/2020/11/20/bjorns-corner-737-max-ungrounding-the-technical-background/#comment-345372
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To Richard Davenport,
The Trim Wheels were reduced in size with the 737-300 (classic) for the EFIS equipped models at least so the FMC panels could be squeezed in. Converting from 737-200 to -300, that’s when we discovered how difficult to impossible it was to turn them with any sort of load on the stabilizer screwjack when out of trim.
I do not know if they were reduced yet again on later models as you say as i escaped to the B757/767 via the A320.
semi OT:
why do we have to rehash MCAS insidiousness?
Just because some Boeinginistas have difficulty in accepting established fact .. ?
Or is it preparatory deflection?
Like AF447, the crew actions do not make sense.
You can pull and hit the stab trim.
I agree 100% they should not have to, but if they had been hit with a runaway stab. And why do they still put two in when the 2nd Stab trim motor was removed at the NG (and why did they have it and why did it go away?)
The Ethiopian crew also left the throttle full up which was the cause for the high speed which was a feedback loop that made manu7al trim harder to getting to be impossible.
Flaps go up and the airplane goes nuts. Try putting the flaps back down?
You can easily see that the trim button is working, that trim wheel and the white lines/noise all are positive feedback.
My take is that if not for MCAS they would not have been there.
But its clear that they had no upset training either. The US and Europe is changing that. There was a revealing video of 3 airline pilots discussing the Juju crash.
the one said exactingly what has been stated, oh, minimums at 1600 feet, we know there is an engine out cumming.
This was in regards to a guy who did not do the right moves when he did loose an engine. Why? Minimums were 800 feet and that is not part of the drill.
The Mentrour pilot segment was not about what you can do, it was about demonstrating stab lock up at speed.
You keep trimming to neutral. While the SEL I flew had a manual, it was as natural as breathing to trim to neutral at all times no matter how bad things were (I did a 15 knot cross wind landing and I was still trimming).
Sim training should be about the unexpected, throwing the cow pie at the pilots until they use all the resources and understand the aircraft. Not doing so is a horrible joke in using a magnificent tool (use the worlds finest micrometer to hammer something)
We have seen US crashes where the CRM was bad, the two MAX crashes were in my opinion, zero CRM.
I just watched the Ethiopian Mentour crash sequence. The Pilot kept talking to ATC. He had dropped the prime directvie, AVIATE first and always. ATC can see what is going on and will clear airspace (not like Ethiopian is crowded like New York or London or Singapore etc)
Pilots are in that odd position. They are the first slice of the Swiss Cheese model, but they are also the last.
That is their role, to be that last piece of cheese to stop a tragedy.
It may be slowly changing but I am still seeing the evidence it has not spread across the world and not instilled in Europe or the US.
The 2nd officer should be fully capable of assisting the PIC, not just a lamp post.
Peter: “That one crew carried out what amounted to a ‘correct’ action in perfect hindsight does not support the view that another crew who did not, failed.”
There was no hindsight necessary and their actions were not serendipitous—that WAS the procedure. Given that executing that procedure required knowledge of the procedure obtained by specific training, the pilots who didn’t execute it can hardly be said to have failed if they were not trained by their airline—as was quite obvious given that one flight was saved by a properly trained pilot from a different airline and the other flight didn’t have the benefit of just in time training and they crashed—not because the system overpowered them as some have unjustifiably claimed, but because of the crew members’ gross incompetence at basic aviating.
François: MCAS only operated at high trim rate. The lower trim rate was used during the development phase, when MCAS was thought to be needed only at high airspeeds. When the need for operation at lower airspeeds became evident, the trim rate was switched to the higher trim rate, which caused some simpletons to declare that MCAS was made more powerful and then speculate that MCAS overpowered the pilots—while conveniently ignoring what the data recorder showed.
REALITY: Flight control surfaces don’t flap like a birds wings to produce the aerodynamic forces needed to maneuver the airplane. If they did then the speed at which they flapped would be an indication of their power. No, flight control surfaces generate their maneuvering force by deflecting to a certain amount where the coefficient of lift is adequate to produce the maneuvering force. How fast it moves to that deflection angle is only of concern to producing impulse loads that could over-stress the airframe if it moves too fast (not an issue with the slow moving stabilizer) or creating a hunting effect (oscillation) if it moves too slow where the input is constantly chasing the output because the delay causes an overshoot. MCAS didn’t produce deflection rates faster than what was possible due to some of the other causes of a runaway trim. Also, MCAS operation was held in abeyance while the pilot was trimming to recover pitch, so the difference in rate between pilot trim and MCAS trim was irrelevant.
The Ethiopian crew DID cut out the electric trim system, exactly as Boeing instructed. The problem was that MCAS had already trimmed their 737 MAX nose down so far that it was unflyable.
Trimming a 737 with the manual handle takes hundreds of full turns, and isn’t even possible with the control column pulling up. The handle was open, so we know they tried and failed. They knew electric trim was the problem, but it was also the last chance they had. MCAS still won.
Once MCAS trims you nose-down, it’s nothing short of a movie style self-destruct – possible to stop, but only with superhero strength, reflexes, or foresight. The Ethiopian crew was experienced, had excellent records, received specific guidance, but they were only human.
Precisely. Excellent summary.
No that is not correct.
Ethiopian had control, they failed to keep trimming until they had it neutral, THEN hit the stab cutouts.
The right move is to0 counter trim until neutral, hit the stab disconnect.
The one not trained was the stab lock up but they also lost speed control because the throttle were full forward.
That is a hidden crime as to how and why that fidelity item got dropped.
At times it seems like the AHJs are selective in what they investigate as the full background.
The Ethiopian Captain was well aware that activating the electric trim up switch stopped the runaway momentarily. He may not have discerned that as long as the switch was activated it kept the runaway from starting anew, but that is immaterial. If he had continued trimming to null out elevator forces like pilots are trained from day one in itty bitty Cessnas, he wouldn’t have been subject to the aerodynamic force couple between stab and elevator that made the jack screw more difficult to turn. BTW, the FAA did tests in a real airplane and found the force needed to turn the trim wheel in the most adverse configuration to be within the capabilities of a 5th to 95th percentile human.
I believe the Captain had no clue what the FO was talking about when he queried, “Stab trim cutout?” Twice. The first time with no response, the second time responding, “Okay” but shortly afterwards asking (I believe in surprise) the FO, “We have no trim?” That was indication that he didn’t know that the Cutout switches would disable the electric trim altogether. Neither Capt nor FO seemed to have received training on the runaway trim procedure or received the Boeing bulletin and FAA AD issued a week after the first crash, the FO because he had not even begun his 737 MPL flight training at the time they were issued so wouldn’t have been on the distribution list of 737 pilots. There were complaints that Ethiopian, contrary to its assertions to investigators had not distributed the bulletin and AD to all its pilots and some of them approached Boeing directly to get it.
Also, don’t forget that a runaway caused by MCAS is far more benign than an inexorable runaway caused by some other failure. And pilots have not considered those runaways as needing superhero strength, reflexes or foresight.
The berm aggravated the outcome.
It was not cause.
my educated guess is the plane hit the berm @70m/s 15m/s below no flaps landing speed.
looking into google maps my impression is that the perimeter road ( just beyond the berm ) is on a levee? ( advise!?)
The crash appears as FUBAR fallout well beyond some bird strike.
Rare case of I agree with Uwe
I don’t know about the perimeter road, but there is a concrete wall just past the localizer mound (estimate of 200 ft.)
As has been noted, there is nothing that stops gear going down due to bird strike.
It would take massive damage to the extent of QF32 and that obviously is not the case and their gear did extend.
Again and again, worst case, you pull the manual release. Two of the three gears will come down.
The Pilots spent no time trouble shooting so there is no way they would have known a left gear did not come down until they tried which they did not.
Only selective massive right side damage from a disintegrating engine and we have good pictures that show that engine intact. It may have been damaged but it did not disintegrate.
All indications of a Panic reaction.
I wonder why the NTSB bother to send their investigators over there, apparently we can draw “conclusions” sitting on the coach here.
It’s also been reported that similar concrete structures like the berm are in other airports, including those in the United States, Europe and Africa.
How long does the landing gears take to come down and be secured after a pilot pulled the manual releases (individually??)? Trans, have you tried to do that live in a 737 NG during an emergency a couple hundred feet above ground (and losing altitude?)?
The NTSB is going over there to make sure that Boeing’s interests are served 👍
We already have “wall blaming” and “pilot blaming” — all conveniently detracting attention from the plane and its systems.
Abalone: That is absurd, you should quit putting out lies. This is not Europe, you well know the NTSB is fully independent. They are not perfect but they do and have often clashed with the FAA and Boeing.
They were the ones that made Boeing change the FLCH Trap.
@Pedro:
You just went over an edge, because you have determined that they had an emergency that DEMANDED and immediate landing.
So what do you know the rest of the world does not?
I do know the -800 continued flying just fine. It made a 180+ turn and then a right turn to get back on runway center-line.
It was not gliding. One engine out is not a crisis.
They then came down fully under control, making miner corrections. Without power they never would have made the 180. Pieces of engine were not seen coming out.
The one and only question I have is what happened to the telemetry? (as well as radio calls).
Flaps have an electric backup and the gear has multiple pumps to lower it even without the manual uplock release.
There are hydraulic engine driven motors on both engines, there are elecric driven motors on each engine and there is a backup battery powered hydraulic pump.
This is not QF32 with massive damage.
@Abalone: You are going too far. Some think you are Bryce in disguise. What I know is you and Bryce have Netherland ISPs. Get back in line or you will join him in Never Neverland.
Hamilton
@ Mr Hamilton
I made that comment in view of the NTSB’s well-documented “meddling” in the Turkish Airways crash in Amsterdam.
I’m sorry if you found it offensive, though I don’t exactly see why — I’m not the only person here asserting that the embankment is being used as a scapegoat. I’m also not the only person asserting that another US aviation institution — the FAA — simply doesn’t do its job properly. The aftermath of the Alaska blowout should us clearly how BA can “play” the NTSB.
Not sure what an NL ISP has to do with it: there are 18 million people living in NL, and a lot of aviation enthusiasts (Fokker, Airbus, ESA, Schiphol).
I don’t know anyone or anything called “Bryce”. What I do know is that, if the Dutch have something to say, they just say it. Perhaps that is rubbing some people here the wrong way…
@Abalone: Having covered the Alaska crash, I don’t know how you can claim Boeing played the NTSB. The agency was aggressive in its investigation of Boeing and livid at what it viewed as Boeing’s inappropriate actions. As for “meddling” in the Turkish crash, it is international protocol that the NTSB be a party to crashes involving Boeing aircraft. Re: the localizer in Jeju, it’s hardly a scapegoat. The location and construction, notably the latter, are key to this being a nearly 100% fatal crash. We have yet to under what happened to the airplane and the pilot actions, but that localizer’s construction is indisputable. Your allegations regarding the NTSB are irresponsible.
@ Mr. Hamilton
As regards BA “playing” the NTSB:
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/06/boeing-stonewalling-alaska-airlines-investigation-00145343
I didn’t suggest that the NTSB wasn’t doing its best in this case — but it was rendered somewhat impotent by BA’s stonewalling.
—
As regards NTSB “meddling” in the Turkish Airlines crash in Amsterdam:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-accidents.html
There’s a difference between liasing and modifying reports so as to be more favorable to BA.
—-
The position of the ILS platform at Muan was certainly an exacerbating factor in the crash, and it played a crucial role in causing loss of life which otherwise *might* not have been lost. However, I don’t agree with the assertion that it was a cause of the crash — it was, instead, an exacerbating factor in the *outcome* of the crash. The crash was already happening before the ILS platform was impacted.
—
I don’t see why my comments, in particular, have been singled out here — there are others making similar comments…many being more overt than what I’ve said.
However, since I have evidently become a source of considerable vexation, I’ll withdraw from further commenting.
@Scott:
Abalone was refencing fall out from the MCAS investigation that touched on the Polderbaan crash.
https://www.google.com/search?q=turkish+crash+amsterdam+NTSB+leaned+on+dutch+investigators
( Note non US Airline! )
Afaics this touches on other investigations the NTSB was involved in and had potential to elevate pilot error relative to technical issues. tilting the table so to speak.
Its impossible for an aircraft with any serious malfunction to turn around like the Jiju 737 did, let alone get back on center-line and do a perfect in line touchdown.
Something happened with the pilots. The ILS mound is irrelevant. 200 ft further on it smashes into a concrete wall.
If the aircraft systems were failing they would have put it down in the water.
Instead it flew for something like 9 miles, did a severe 180 deg turn (we ain;’t talking 30 deg bank here) came back across to the center-line, turned back onto the center line of the runway and set down under perfect control.
Something happened to or with the pilots. A failing aircraft cannot do those kinds of maneuvers, plain and simple as that. Impossible.
Did you mean 20 ft. instead of 200 ft.? 200 ft. is the height of a 20-storey building… would make for a pretty steep climb-out gradient!
There is no concrete wall around the airport. It’s just a wall made out of hollow bricks. Use Google Street Map to see it for yourself.
When you are there you can also check the massiv steel pools for the center line lighting. Nice wing tank cutters. Not frangible at best.
Video about frangible airport installations:
https://youtu.be/7Qck0rKhbkc
You know those block are hollow how?
Blocks have open cells that can be filled with concrete.
And in fact, you see many steel tubes stuck in the so called hollow wall with barbed wire attache? Oh wow, now there is some concrete in the cells.
Does it go all the way down to the footing, does it have rebar in it?
Yea it ain’t a flimsy wall, you have any idea how many pounds of force a 120 mph wind exerts on something with that much square footage?
What I can say is there are methods of build that makes that a seriously solid structure. It clearly has withstood the test of Typhoons.
I can’t say what the build systems are, but I can tell you those square or rectangular structures every 20-25 feet are not there for looks.
Hit that wall with an aircraft and its going to rip the structure up, how much? No I can’t say, but its not a piece of paper strung along a line.
Why not chain link? Because they wanted something solid.
The berm destroyed the airframe resulting in deaths. If the berm had not been there would the airframe have suffered an equal catastrophic collapse – perhaps.?
Accidents are rarely the result of a single factor as all professional accident investigators learn and must never forget. It is by piecing together the chain of events and why they each contributed and combined to produce the outcome that a full comprehension can be attained.
The Shuttle Challenger accident sequence began some 13 years earlier with the chosen design of the solid booster seals. There were a long chain of contributing factors that combined to bring about the destruction. One factor alone did not cause the result.
There is no question the aircraft impaled onto the berm.
Equally it then has a concrete block wall 200 feet further on which in fact got debris up against it from what went over or around the ILS mound.
Said wall has reinforced structures (at a guess 2 or 3 per side) every 20-25 feet.
You can equally ask why South Korea puts concrete walls around its airports.
There are hundreds or thousands of airports with as bad features to run into.
Its impossible cost wise to have Denver International wherever you want to put an airport and no thought was given to a huge number of them going back to the Biplane era of Aviation.
I have operated aircraft oif many different types into landing and take off conditions which at times increased the risks significantly. Funchal airport, Madiera before the runway realignment and extension by 1200m for example.
When everything was good there was usually no issue but when things were less than ideal risk assessment and judgement based upon knowledge and experience and a brutally honest consideration of my own ability was critical. Reality hits a brick wall here, no pun intended, as commercial pressures including competition all too often downplay ort even ignore the actual risks. The Korean accident is a case in point – the berm was of no consequence until it was. Wise after the event does not save lives. already lost to bad decisions.
And Transworld, please be more considerate of the full situation any crew face in the real world. More than one VERY knowledgeable and experienced B737 pilot, several test pilots included have made totally clear a total of 10 seconds from first MCAS action is ALL the time that any crew may have to CORRECTLY act to save their MAX 737 from an unrecoverable high sink rate flight condition. Reducing thrust in this condition would have guaranteed a strong nose down component would be added to the already violent MCAS induced nose down pitch action. I contend that the elevator authority in the MAX 737 version was barely able if at all to counter the violent nose down pitch condition the MCAS could produce in ONLY two activation events.
Arguing that continued ‘manual trim’ could counter the MCAS successfully in either accident ignores the reality that both crews were wrestling with an unknown or little known repeated control input the true magnitude and source of which they had mere seconds to establish as well as to effect any recovery.
I think you are far too quick to judge the pilots wanting including in the Korean case. I repeat accident investigation does not happen in a vacuum and they must walk a tightrope between revelations and liability as well as navigating the limitations of available knowledge and means.
As the last link in the chain pilots and their action or inaction must be included as probably causal factors though until ALL the possibilities, all the factors leading to the accident scenario are accounted for no one should be prejudging any of it. Most especially not prejudging the people who are no longer able to defend themselves.
I agree that I have jumped the gun on focusing on pilots.
The issue is with the backups on a 737 it makes no sense, so I try to make sense out of it.
What I will say on the Max crashes, I fully believe MCAS was the trigger.
I don’t understand why pilots would not continue to counter trim until the aircraft was neutral handling, then flips the Stab switches off.
In the case of Ethiopian, or any other crash, what I also see is failure of the Captain to Aviate. I hold or held myself to that same standard.
I certainly messed up hugely one time, recovery was less than graceful but I managed the recovery despite never having been trained for the event.
MCAS was stupidly nuts because it was not cross linked to the other AOA not to mention the insane amount of stab deflection it was allowed to control.
Any engineer that saw that deflection value and did not think, oh drats, what happens at higher speeds?
MCAS 2.0 has all the protections MCAS 1.0 should have had in it.
The 767 has that same system and it was well executed on it (in fact MCAS 1.0 was a bad copy).
But forgive a crew in failing to do their jobs? I hold them as well as myself to a higher standard and if you can’t cut it, get a different job. Sim sessions should focus on finding out if they can cut it when the unexpected happens.
Sim sessions that are rote do nothing. So yea, the AHJ has its guilt if those are not mandated for upset training and unexpected emergencies.
You get tested on your take off and landings daily. You don’t need to waste Sim time on that.
Landing with a bird strike? Taking off with a bird strike? Take off with an engine failing? All that is a legitimate test and a legitimate fail if you can’t react correctly.
That is what a pilot is there for, to react correctly. Otherwise you can put a computer in the aircraft and then see what happens when an event its not programed to handle occurs.
So a good question is, did they incur some damage on the right engine and then shut off the left? That would explain some of the power loss aspects.
Clearly they had control and a lot of power for 3 minutes post bird strike, or they would never have made it anywhere close to back to the airport.
The aircraft would have smashed through the wall on the perimeter. That wall is just there to keep people and animals from entering the airfield.
Meters of mud & concrete under the ILS antennas stopped the sliding aircraft. It probably would have come to a halt in the >600m hundreds of meters of free space in the direction it was sliding. Maybe with fatalities.
https://static.euronews.com/articles/stories/08/93/79/16/1200x675_cmsv2_b46e332f-f196-5f10-ad47-e99e93686440-8937916.jpg
I’m confident investigators are on it. And hundreds of airport executives around the world are having checked runways if similar errors slipped through..
It didn’t cause the belly landing but caused nearly everyone getting killed.
Keesje:
You are of the same mind set that took the Space Shuttle Columbia down, tile are light, they can’t cause damage.
Its inertia not mass that counts (sans Armor and anti tank shells designed to pierce it)
The concrete wall would have done massive damage. Different maybe, better survivalable numbers, maybe, but don’t think for a second you can run an aircraft into a wall of any kind at 100+ knots and not have it rupture.
I seem to remember a ?Russian? A321 landing accident some years ago
where the berm (ahead of the elevated runway ) was misused as a ski jump.
The plane, though looking rather bent, stayed in one piece.
found it, not Russian:
2015, Air Canada @ Halifax : A320 CEO :
https://avherald.com/h?article=483e7337&opt=0
regular landing speed!
Zero fatalities, airframe intact but damaged beyond repair
There was a Ukrainian Airline A320 that hit the runway, came back up and settled in a wheat field.
Also all survived. Extraordinary condition’s.
There are a number of crashes that they went off the runway and hit something that tore up the aircraft.
Each one of these is a discreet event and trying to portray it as survivable is simply wrong.
The concrete wall past the ILS mound is not a Chain Link fence.
@Transworld
There is no concrete wall around the airport. This is just a better fence made up out of hollow bricks. Not reinforced with steel or something. Even a tree is tougher. From the Mühlhausen incident we knew that even a landing in a forest is very survivable.
You do not know what is in those so called hollow bricks.
Decorative my foot.
Regardless hit it at 150+ mph and see how your airplane handles it!
I am of the same mind set that took the Space Shuttle Columbia down? What a non-sense.
? The aircraft would have smashed through the brick wall. It is just there to keep people & animals from the airport.
https://static.dw.com/image/71178090_902.jpg
The plane would have *more easily* penetrated the wall than the embankment, but the wall could still have caused catastrophic damage to the aircraft — particularly relatively delicate structures such as the wings.
A severed fuel line under such circumstances would probably have caused an explosion.
It was still (very) possible for everyone to get killed without any embankment present.
Keeeje:
Inertia is a thing people do not understand. An Aircraft is not intended to penetrate anything.
The impact going from nothing (wall not moving) to 150 mph is hugely damaging.
And that does not deal with the roads and terrain after the wall.
The Russian A320 set down in a flast wheat field with nice drag reduction.
It also was not going 150 mph at the time.
I’ve been avoiding comments for a while since things got fairly rude the last time, but there is a technical point here that is worth noting. Not all airplanes of a given type are the same. There are two significant variations that may or may not be a factor in this case. The common one is that there are several avionics suites that the original purchasing customer can have installed. In a lease return and replacement or sale of an older plane to a second or later operator, the package selections may be adjusted to fit the preferences of the new operator. This question becomes even more interesting since the systems architecture and the role of the Man Machine Interface layer on the flight deck has been changing over time. The number of levels of abstraction and where those abstractions are hosted is a moving target.
I totally disagree with the notion that this is an excuse for something, but in recent years some of the flight control systems engineers in Boeing have been saying that the difference between the designs circa 1992 (i.e. 777 and 737NG era) are quite dramatically less complex than the current ones. I think they have done this to themselves unnecessarily (that is a grossly watered down way of saying what I really think), but it is something that is probably quite real.
The other variation is more subtle, and I have never been able to get a clear picture on how it is handled relative to the provisioning of the ticket for a given tail number. When a new variant is being developed, it is possible to have several new production planes of the previous variants certed and fitted out with equipment developed for the new variant, depending on where things are in the flight test program. Alaska has been involved in these at times with the 737. For example, they fitted some of their so-called NG models with the new wing tips that were developed for the MAX at least two years before the first MAX went into service. Did they also get an early look at the new avionics? I’ve asked that question multiple times of people that I thought should know the answer, and nobody was certain. That said, the topic was raised and then dropped with respect to the Turkish Air 1951 crash at Schiphol in 2009, and the full set of circumstances surrounding that have been very had to pin down. There may be nothing to this, but it is an interesting low probability consideration.
@RTF:
My assumption here is you are raising the possibility of Avionics involved.
I would put myself in the nothing about this says it was anything more than a loss of engine and failure to follow procedures of any kind let alone miner avionics issues.
The 777 is as complex as any modern aircraft though it lacks the Synthetic Speed of the 787. The 737 is different as its a pulley and wire flight control system.
I have seen reports its maint is less and easier than the FBW because you don’t have the electronic glitches that FBW introduces. Having traced more than my fair share of those, its the most exacerbating thing you can run into.
We have seen a number of those, we pulled the affect whiz box and it did not fix it reports and causes of incidents and crashes.
At very bottom, there is nothing new unique nor complex about a 737 manual gear release that has been there forever.
Clearly the 737-800 had a perfectly controlled 2nd approach. Its speed was very high, no speed brakes deployed, no flaps but under perfect control?
That was not my intent. Any one specific accident tends to be unique. I was just saying that the range of possibilities may be greater than early indications suggest.
As for the complexity issue, there is a fundamental design challenge or problem that began sometime around 2005, but this is not the appropriate place to layout the issues. I’ve run some checks, as much as that is possible, to make sure that I don’t step on any classified toes. In a few weeks I’m going to do a series of videos explaining the issues and what I see as the solution, which is a different way of thinking about systems architecture for any control system, not just flight controls.
Where will you be posting the videos you plan to make on this?
They will be on my YouTube channel: Charlemagne’s Clock. They will be a part of my second series or playlist, which I am calling a Brown Bag series. The series I did almost a year ago was more of a critique and commentary. This one is merely a knowledge transfer effort much like the talks I would routinely give within the company before I retired in 2014.
Also, over the past decade I’ve had a lot of time to think about the challenges posed by the profound changes in integrated circuit technology that occurred just after the turn of the millennium, and how that has interacted with the near zero marginal cost of software. Some drastic changes in design approaches are going to be required to wrestle the complexity issues to ground.
Also, with Ortberg there now, the atmosphere is much improved. He still has the same problems with respect to his top priorities as dictated by the board, but unlike every previous CEO going back to Condit, at least he comes across as well intentioned and intent on doing the right things as much as possible.
RTF:
I agree, the one aspect I have yet to see any logical explanation for is the lack of tracking data after the engine incident (almost for sure a bird injection)
I do not know if this is possible, but something about a mirror switch on video so its possible it was the left engine not the right.
Regardless the tracking data stopped and no reports of further coms. That is beyond odd.
The left engine would feed the cockpit its air. But the pictures seem to show a clear cockpit.
So yes, some obscure aspects but a fully under control aircraft. It may go beyond pilot issues or they may have caused issues.
Still a heck of a lot of backup systems while the aircraft itself performed some serious maneuvering.
I look forward to your discussion on the complexity end. Compared to aircraft avionic and control, my stuff was simple and it could be absolutely confounding what the root cause of problems was.
Human error once again ! 🤔
They landed way too far down the runway , and at way too high a speed !
@DH:
No gear down, no flaps down, no speed brakes nor spoilers deployed.
The high speed and too far down the runway were symptoms.
“They landed way too far down the runway , and at way too high a speed !”
Gosh, one wonders why they did that?
Maybe they were too busy finishing their desserts? Or perhaps paging through magazines instead of flying the plane?
Couldn’t possibly have anything to do with extraneous nuisances like thrust loss at a critical time, with possible loss of hydraulics also? Or maybe a few ducks came through the windshield and entered the pilot’s torsos?
Nah…let’s just pin it on human error 👍
And maybe Pigs will fly but zero evidence beyond wild conjecture.
You have an illogical chip. You discount a fantastic dead on runway center-line and set down. So, with the cockpit full of ducks how did they turn around and nail it?
What they did not have was flaps down, gear down, slats down, speed brake deployed. All of which are below Duck line.
At 8:54 am the Boeing 737-800NG operating the Jeju Air Flight 2216 was authorized to land at Muan International Airport in South Korea. As the plane was preparing to land, it was warned at 8:57 am about the potential for a bird strike. A minute later, it issued a mayday alert.At 9:00 a.m, the plane attempted an emergency landing, being forced to go around again after the landing gear was not deployed. A minute later, it received authorization to attempt a landing from the opposite direction. Most pilots are trained for situations like this.
The crash occurred as the aircraft attempted to perform a belly landing,touching down 1,200m along the runway, sliding down the runway on the engine nacelles with a sustained nose-high attitude. It continued 250m past the runway threshold before colliding with an embankment holding the ILS array and exploding.
If they were in a stabilised approach the landing gear would be down WAY before the bird strike zone. The Boeing 737-800NG did a go-around with no problems.
Then nothing like this has ever happened, a plane comes in without landing gear, speed close to take off and on at least at 50% power until it contacted an object on the ground – Pilots missed alternate landing gear extension, alternate flap extension, approach and landing speed judgement, diversion, not correctly configure the aircraft for landing, way too fast, way too far down the runway before touchdown, 15-degree nose-up. Either a complete loss of throttle control or the pilots tried to climb out and it was too late.
We have seen pilots ignore repeated alarms in the cockpit, warnings from the GPWS many times including PIA8303 and Air France 447. This is more than likely another example of a crew doing everything other than what they should have been doing.
There are 3 hydraulic systems aboard the 737 – system A, B and Stand by. The A system powers the landing gear for retraction, extension, and nose wheel steering. The B system powers the flaps and leading edge devices, with an electric backup that can extend and retract the flaps. All have redundancy but a complete failure of all 3 hydraulic systems and the backup electrical system to operate the flaps is damn near impossible.
APU can provide electrical power to the electric motor driven pumps (EMDP’s) and thus supply hydraulic pressure. One of the amazing things that Captain Sullenberger did, when they first hit the birds on takeoff was immediately start the APU, before he did anything else, as I guess he knew he might lose both engine power from the birds.
Hydraulics not required for emergency use of flaps and landing gear on 737. Pilots should be able to manually drop the landing gear no matter what. Landing gear can be manually extended with the 3 red handles-Right Main, Nose and Left Main-behind crew seats on the floor, physically connected to each strut that when pulled releases the gear which falls and locks into place by their own weight and wind drag. On Boeing 737-800 NG, the manual extension handles will function with the landing gear lever in any position.
However it does take time. Crew only gave themselves 7 minutes to execute check lists and final between loss of signal on initial approach and attempted go around.
There’s really no explanation for the gear being retracted other than the pilot forgot. The Control Tower should have informed them that their landing gear was not down though. The aircraft won’t even allow use of thrust reversers unless you have main gear strut compression, in this case with the gear still retracted there may not be any thrust reversers nor spoilers available.
The lack of ADS-B during the final landing implies a complete loss of power.
Passengers from the same aircraft 2 days ago reported one engine kept switching off during the flight. The aircraft diverted to Incheon International Airport while operating Jeju Air flight 8135 to Beijing Daxing International Airport originating from Jeju International Airport. The aircraft was in cruise flight transiting the Yellow Sea at FL320 when the flight crew declared an emergency. A descent and diversion to Searle Incheon International Airport (ICN) was then carried out. Flight crew squawked emergency transponder code 7700, declaring an emergency when established on the descent on track to the diversion airport.
The aviation industry is built on redundancy and there are very few single-point failures in airplane design or airplane operations A combination of unlucky factors including ongoing mechanical issues, a bird strike, and poor crew resource management caused this crash. Also it appears the airport was expecting an emergency landing.
MWX runway 19 has a Landing Distance 2800m. The end of Runway 19 is about 6 m below its threshold. The embankment is to raise the localizer array, to compensate for the runway slope. However, within the United States and Canada these would be required to be mounted on frangible support structures. You want the support structure to break-away and cause as minimal damage as possible in a scenario like this. You would not be allowed to construct an earth mound like this within the runway overruns. This localizer is about 150m off the overrun, which would violate North American Airfield criteria, but it’s a Korean Airport so regulations are different.
My guessing
Birdstrike with severe damage on the right engine and crew incorrectly shuts down the left engine, losing both engines.
Immediate turn back to land tailwind opposite direction.
Split decisions, forgot the landing gear.
The plane wasn’t ready for that belly landing at all.
You’re almost describing a replay of the TransAsia Airways Flight GE235 back in 2015. The PIC had one engine being feathered, (I think from a bad sensor that auto-feathered the prop), and he pulled the throttle back on the good engine, not cross checking with the other pilot. Leaving no thrust at all for the airplane at low altitude. === https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/02/asia/taiwan-transasia-crash-report/index.html === There’s an old German expression that translates to “Go Fast, Slowly”. Why the sudden rush to land the plane immediately? Lack of thrust could be one reason.
@RD:
Its possible but that aircraft was not gliding. Fully under control which means surfaces had hydraulic power (ergo I think there are like 4 hydraulic systems as well as backup)
Complete panic.
I have seen the data per NT and I have yet to see that confirmed. There are some seriously wide discrepancies including reports that one engine out (completely) would cause loss of hydraulics and that is not the case.
I also see reports of an engine loss that is not been confirmed and passenger reports do not cut it.
I have been on aircraft that maneuvered piratically and that is classic the engine go quiet, then come back in. Bad piloting (granted it could be an emergency)
Reuters I believe is saying weather could be involved and we have data and video that it was a clear day and data says calm.
Does Rwy 19 have a variation in slope along its length, i.e. a crest in the middle? That would be the only reason to provide compensation with an elevated LOC antenna as otherwise the threshold would be in a LOC shadow cast by the crest.
fumbling guess:
looking on google maps the perimeter road seems to sit on a levee and the highway beyond looks elevated too.
LOC antenna has to have an unobstructed field of view.
Unobstructed on a bearing of 010° plus/minus whatever the left/right spread is per ILS specs to give a full scale LOC needle deflection. Doesn’t seem to be any obstacle that is necessitating elevation of the antenna.
P.S.: Just noticed error on Reuters diagram indicating that the LOC antenna provided guidance to aircraft approaching from the South… should say approaching from the North, i.e. landing on Rwy 19.
And none of the ILS location has any bearing.
What does is pilot actions.
The aircraft was going off the runway at 150 mph and a concrete wall and roads with slopes past that.
It was not headed to a flat field of wheat.
If the pilot do their job then the ILS is a non factor. Not a great design feature but far far from the only airport that has issues.
Reuters if throwing stuff out and seeing what sticks.
Some of the worst reporting.
@Transworld: I didn’t say anything about the accident at all. I know better than to pretend knowledge about things I can’t possibly know or to pretend that the circumstances of the accident will be limited to the little that I do know. There are plenty here who do that very well. I was merely curious as to what factors would necessitate that a Localizer antenna be elevated at all. Then, when I next see an elevated Loc antenna I can look for those factors and confirm a cause-effect relationship. So far, nothing that can be validated.
@Peter P:
I continue to look at the ILS and the mound as a red haring.
Yes that is where the aircraft stopped, but in an of itself its of no importance. Without it there still would have been carnage.
Why it reared its ugly head is that the aircrtaft came down at very u high speed and that in turn was a no gear down, no flaps down and no spoilers deployed.
I can’t see anything other than pilot involvement in most of this.
The data stream stopping and no reported further coms after the mayday/go around is a major factor and its wild guesses as to the causes of that.
But clearly as far as flight patch went, the aircraft was fully under control.
The runway at Muan airport is 2800m (9186ft) long and there are more than 200m from the end of the runway to the embankment. Since the plane slid onto the runway without slowing down, the outcome would probably have been the same even if the runway had been 500m longer. Many airports in the US have much shorter runways than Muan airport. SNA’s runway is 1737m (5700ft) long, MDW has a runway of 1988m (6522ft) and is surrounded by houses. Would the outcome have been less tragic if such an accident had happened at one of these airports? Rather than blaming the Koreans for not knowing how to build airports (I agree they could have done better), we should understand how the plane could have been completely out of control (if you don’t slow down, sooner or later you will hit an obstacle).
I agree with that.
It is a bad feature but the ILS is not the cause of it, as noted, then was a concrete wall and then various roads. So at those speeds and no slowdown? Yea it was going to end tragically.
Abalone was trying to make a false point about SFO, but the reality is there is not a displaced threshold there as is now the norm. They don’t have the room.
Hong Kong is no different. Haneda is no different. Sitka AK is no different (the whole dang airport is build on a rock pile) – Kodiak is no different (there is a Mountain on one end, approach only over water, said mountain ate an F-15. Once past a given point, you are committed, land or crash, no go around.
You do your procedures and its not an issue. Don’t and you crash.
@ enrigh
+++ 1
Simple logic here, in a situation with:
(A) a highly anomolous landing and;
(B) a topograpgical barrier.
If you remove (A) and leave (B), you just get another uneventful landing at Muan, like thousands of landings before it.
But, if you remove (B) and leave (A), you have absolutely no guarantee that the landing still won’t turn into a tragedy (e.g. the way UA232 did).
It would have been better if the aircraft would have hit an obstacle later.
This ILS installations is plane stupid but cheap. Just an earth wall with a flat concrete plate on top. Just about 2 m heigh. So the 737 doesn’t hit a concret wall that it could have penetratet with the loss of the cockpit section. The aircraft rather hit frontaly a concrete slab several meters thick. That disintegrated the aircraft.
The airport just would have needed to fill up a 50 m x 200 m wide area at a hight of 2 m. The aircraft would have ripped the ILS appart and jumped two meters down. More people would have survived.
No question on the ILS.
But latter, 150 mph into a concrete wall followed by raised roads to run into an probably a dig into the right by the geometry of the road.
Pilots doing their job are required for smooth operations in the first place and extended Sim sessions on how to handle emergencies. An engine out is one of those.
Another report is they did a fly by to check the gear.
Nope, they aborted landing before that.
Yea its a known thing for a gear only issue, com with tower, fly by.
You DO NOT do it with an engine out or iffy. You do the procedures and then just land it and those procedure include lowering the gear and flaps (flaps also have electrical backup).
There is no question that the presence of the concrete-reinforced berm turned what would have most likely been a survivable event for most if not all, passengers on board into an unforgivable tragedy. I’m surprised such an obstacle would be permitted at any airport. I thought South Korea had higher standards.
I do note however from the illustration above that a few feet beyond the berm is a perimeter wall, which, from pictures I have seen, is a concrete block wall. So that has to come out as well because, at the rate of speed that aircraft was going, it would not have slowed down very much before hitting that perimeter wall. And then of course you have possible traffic to contend with on the road next to the wall.
The big question of course is why did the pilots try to land this jet with its gear and flaps in the up position? Their actions are inexplicable. Some theorize that they may have lost power in both engines but in that case, why wouldn’t they communicate that to the tower? In the video of the crash, it does not appear the jet lost power in both engines as it screams down the runway. It sounds to me that the engines are both running.
Here is a LINK to a transcript of the communication with the tower. Other than the bird strike and the mayday calls there is no indication from the pilots that both engines are out as they are cleared to land from the opposite direction. LINK: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GgGGQWzbYAEL5eZ?format=jpg&name=small
From the above link, we learn the jet touched down 3940 feet down a 9184-foot runway!
Hopefully, the damage to the recorders is not too serious and we can get a readout of the CVR which will tell us quickly what happened. I suspect that in the hectic moments after the birdstrike to engine #2 the pilots simply forgot to configure the aircraft for landing.
“…I thought South Korea had higher standards.”
There we go again 🙈
Do yourself a favor and take a look at a satellite view of LAX on Google Earth.
See all the buildings, (major) roads and other structures just beyond the end of various runways.
Similar situation in San Diego.
Uhh abalone and others re LAX – There may be a few exceptions, but takeoff and landings at LAX are TO the west and NOT to the east. I spent 2 plus years living in Inglewood while working at Rockwell next to the combo high school grade school complex which is under the flight path. cannotg remember hearing any prop or jet noise. But that was 40 plus years ago with Commercial jets and props landing every 10 minutes or so until late evening.
I’m bet pilots who have flown into outof LAX can verify.
There are plenty of exceptions, with landings toward the east: just look at the touchdown rubber marks on the runways.
As with any coastal airport, the wind can be onshore or offshore, depending on season, time of day and/or weather.
Good to see Abalone is following the logic and agreeing even if he is not admit ed he was wrong.
Many airports have aspects that plain suck as far as aircraft safety is concerned.
One in Idhao has huge stacks on the approach and emitted steam. Lost an aircraft to that.
Some like Hong Kong, Haneda, Anchorage, LA and SFO have issues with proximity to housing and commercial.
Denver is the rare we can buy an area as big as Vermont and put an airport 30 miles from town (and its still grown up around it)
Anchorage pushes them off to the North or West winds allowing, but when they do not, its right over neighborhoods (and landing is over them regardless though again if possible, South and East runways are used.
But one direction is going to be over the city.
My wife was home when the Evergreen 747 shucked an engine 1/4 mile from our apartment and dropped it into the woods next to another one.
Fully loaded, full of fuel, if it had come down hundreds of homes and apartments would have gone up in flames.
Reports were that the Cargo guys were putting too much fuel in the aircraft and were overloaded on takeoff. This one was 10 miles from the airport and 1500 feet. There is a provision to over fuel with the understanding it can be a long Taxi and you burn that up. In this case they were going way past that (Anchorage has low cost fuel).
Now they are MUCH higher when they cross our side of town.
So it goes. Good pilots and training are needed for routine ops. Good pilot and training avoid outcomes like this because its what they are there for.
Umm… no jet noise in Inglewood?! As far back from the perimeter fence as Aviation Blvd occasionally a twig on a tree would snap off due to wake turbulence after a twin-aisle jet or a 757 had passed overhead on approach to 24R or 24L. On a crisp winter day if road traffic noise was low you could hear an assortment of howls and whistles for at least 2 mins after the airplane had passed overhead, sometimes well after the muffled reverse thrust roar had subsided. In the parking lots just east of 24R/L thresholds car alarms would often go off. This was in the mid-80s and early 90s. We used to park along East Sandpiper Street which is on a hill to the west of 24R almost aligned with the centerline to watch the traffic. Heavy 747s loaded with fuel and pax for a trans-Pacific flight would use up most of 24L on takeoff and pass by us on Sandpiper Hill at less than 1/4 mile horizontal distance and just a bit above eye level.
Also, after midnight (until 6am, I think) LAX goes into quiet mode: simultaneous arrivals and departures are from over the Pacific, 06L/R and 07L/R respectively, i.e. landings are towards the east as Abalone said. Very rarely, daytime TO & L are to the east too, if the Santa Ana winds are very strong.
For some (odd) reason, the NTSB team going to Muan doesn’t include engine specialists…
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/ntsb-jeju-air-technical-team-cfm-engines/
tongue in cheek:
No need, they are the “US Hasbara Team” 🙂
( this is only partly funny. The political upheaval in S-Korea is definitely in scope here)
CFM will have a rep there. Not sure how that got shifted to no engine specialist.
While its a good question, the NTSB has finite resources. They are looking into a Crash in Hawaii right now that has possible engine aspects.
Regardless its an initial team and the engines will go to the US and the NTSB will be in charge and have a specialist there for the tear down.
Jon normally get to the bottom of these so am surprised he does not have a better nswer.
A lot of Federal Employees are getting out of DOGE while the getting out is good.
No CFM rep — read the link.
I did.
Jon does an outstanding job. But as the engine has a part in this (assuming that the video is of the same aircraft same day) then there is really weird stuff going on.
I had noted that a “connector” was missing on the FDR. That seems to have been the access for the AHJ, so its sent off to NTSB in DC to get the chips out.
Why would you not send it off right away? Inference is they tried to access, could not.
Right now there is totally conflicted reporting. Most of it makes no sense.
We do have some reality. Aircraft did a 180+, got back on center line, turned back to spot on and was in perfect control coming down.
You can clearly see through the aircraft front windows as it skids down the runway.
Why is not the nose down? That gets more drag for the wrong condition. Fear creation to what they see coming?
We have dozens of runway overshoots as reference. Usually they don’t end with (nearly) everybody dead, after hitting a huge barrier in line with the runway.
We also have plenty of examples of emergency landings that ended very badly.
Lack of full control of a landing aircraft tends to produce unfavorable results. In particular, landing halfway down a runway at excessive speed and without any form of braking is not conducive to survival.
@Keesje:
This was not a short overshoot nor was it an arrestor barrie slow down as the gear was up.
Yes its an issue and a bad one, 200 feet past your ILS is a concrete wall.
they would have hit that at 150 mph. And then the remnants would have hit various roads.
No gear, no flaps, late or no thrust reverser, no spoilers, no front slats, no speed brake is the issue.
From another forum, it was noticed that the navigation lights didn’t seem to be on. This along with the ADS-B data being cutoff might indicate a total power failure? The APU inlet door didn’t seem to be open in the video also. So, if you did a go-around, and hit other birds or some other additional problem became obvious (no thrust after no electrical power and the situation turning from grim to crisis mode), you’d try and land the plane immediately. The decision to abort the first landing will obviously be looked at closely. If they had electrical problems, then shooting the ILS would be troublesome and they would be flying a visual approach. Commercial pilots seem to lack skill in flying manually since they fly by computer so often these days. So the initial landing approach may have been off so much that the pilots decided to go around. Then, suddenly finding themselves with no thrust and no electric power, the second attempt may be the best landing possible? You find yourself with no thrust, no electrics, and a runway behind you. If the electrical power was off .. will they have any good data at the end on the flight recorders?
@RD:
Agreed no nothing but the aircraft was under perfect control.
No coms, pilots seem to have gone into full panic.
The graphic is incorrect – the Localizer array shown is part of the ILS for Runway 19 (the LLZ is normally at the far end of the runway).
In other words it serves aircraft landing from the north, not landing from the south.
The graphic is correct.
First attempted landing was on Runway 01. They made a hard turn and landed on Runway 19. There ILS is no installed on wall at the end of Runway 01.
The description text on the graphic is incorrect. The localizer antenna at the runway end marked 01 provides centerline guidance to airplanes arriving from the north and landing on Rwy 19. The antenna near the runway end marked 19 provides centerline guidance to airplanes arriving from the south and landing on Rwy 01.
The LOC antenna is located at the far end of the runway so that the autopilot has centerline guidance after the airplane crosses the threshold, touches down and while applying the brakes. The Glideslope antenna (in the white circle to the left of the runway) provides vertical guidance to the touch down zone (thick white bars on runway).
No, you’re wrong about the ILS as well as about the graphic, I’m afraid – both runway ends have an ILS.
The reason the LLZ for 19 is mounted higher than the 01 LLZ is because of the runway slope.
At this speed & no spoilers (why?) probaly still considerable lift and poor deceleration on the smooth runway.
I guess spoilers weren’t armed and wouldn’t extend without LDG compression. But they could have used manual, the BRK lever.
You are missing ground affect which is a lot worse in a low wing aircrat.
Also note that the nose is as up as it can be. Not even getting draft from tee front.
All point to a totally panicked crew (and yea I know what that is like, been there, done that and got a T shirt only because I lived)
Once below 10 feet the who system including thrust reversers are allowed.
Auto spoilers need a squat switch, but the pilot can do spoilers without it.
Thrust reverse needs gear switch but also will operate below 10 feet.
Just looking at Amsterdam airport — one of Europe’s busiest, with 6 runways.
There are freeways just 300m from the ends of 4 runways, and transverse runways/taxiways just off the end of 3 runways. Also numerous smaller roads and canals, and perimeter fencing.
If the Jeju crash had happened here, the plane would have ploughed into freeway traffic and/or nosedived into a canal and/or hit transverse taxiing aircraft.
So, does this airport now need a redesign?
https://vliegtuigenspotter.nl/spotters-info/spottersplaatsen/amsterdam-airport-schiphol-eham-ams/
LAX is even worse, with whole clusters of buildings close to runway ends.
My local airport (Southampton) has a motorway at the end of the runway and a business jet did end up on top of a van once,miraculously no one was hurt.The crash was caused by shutting down the wrong engine and crashed into the motorway at the end of the runway. This is the most plausible explanation,shut down the wrong engine and (as suggested by Denis)put it into clean configuration in order to make the runway when the damaged engine packed in. The crew probably had a lot on so I think it’s unfair to judge them too harshly until we know all the facts.People forget how super qualified Sullenberger was,lack of experience flying gliders could be a factor here.
IMU:
Sully is a “brooder” in leisure moments
going over all imponderables and their solution
instead of putting the brain in idle.
That is not the majority under your typical pilot.
( and even less so when grabbing any random person from the street.)
Sully had the luxury of having a big, wide, slow river at his disposal, at a convenient distance and bearing for him to ditch the aircraft.
Later simulations showed that he would not have had enough time to return to his airport of departure, or to land at a nearby alternate.
He also had necessary electrical power and hydraulics for maneuvering, had no smoke in the cabin, had an intact windshield, and didn’t have to put up with the confusing cacophony of sirens from a pre-historic 737 CAS — and we don’t yet know if the Jeju pilots had those luxuries.
Agreed Sully did have a good situation to work with the potential disaster
Sims show they could have made it back but it would have taken a quick decisis.
Pilots are trained to assess. One of the most common causes of fatal crashes is pilots trying to make turns and airports they can’t. Sully made the right call.
You have missed the Tapes and squawks of an Airbus. So quit point at the 737, you simply do not know what you are talking about.
These pilots also had access to the APU.
They did not take the time to run the checklists and configure their aircraft the way they should have.
They are trained for this and how to deal with and silence any audibles as are Airbus pilots.
737s grandfathered CAS, non EICAS.
A can of worms. Do I think it’s limitations and fuctionality will show up again in the crash the investigation report? Yes, unfortunately. But let’s wait..
https://time.com/5687473/boeing-737-alarm-system/
Pure crock. Mentour T pilot did a great U tube on it, watch it.
Or read about the overwhelming lists of issues on EICAS and how Airbus has been trying to tame the beast because it does not prioritize and you have to deal with each one to get to the one that you need.
There are all sorts of rumors of should been had been had to and totally wrong.
737s have been loosing engines since they were first built and handled perfecly fine by the pilots. Its well know and well trained for.
The Time report is nonsense. Pilots have been getting the same litany of error messages and warnings every time an AOA sensor failed. The only thing added with MCAS was the runaway trim, which isn’t indicated. And its not like the pilots were paying much attention to the messages, they roundly ignored them. On one flight the Captain attempted a checklist for Airspeed unreliable, but gave up in exasperation when the less than helpful FO couldn’t recall the memory items, didn’t seem to think there were any and then claimed there was no such procedure in the QRH. On the other flight they never even attempted any procedures. As usual, the pundits give long-winded hypotheticals instead of focusing on what actually happened.
Why did BCA decide to hide MCAS from FAA and the pilots??
“Pilots have been getting the same litany of error messages and warnings every time an AOA sensor failed.”
Is that all the truth??
The crew was distracted increasingly by a myriad of warning lights and messages on the instrument panel; there’s a loud violent vibration of the control column that indicated the plane was too slow; a loud clacking noise that indicated it was too fast; a recorded voice declaring “Don’t sink! Don’t sink!” which warned the plane was close to the ground.
“Is that all the truth??”
If you believe any part is false, please indicate so. The “Don’t Sink” was pilot induced, not due to the AOA sensor failure, and indicates that the airplane is not following the climb profile after takeoff.
MCAS certainly wasn’t hidden from the FAA, don’t know where you got that idea. And as for pilots, they aren’t informed about every gizmo on the airplane, only those that they can control or operate or receive information from in order to operate other gizmos. MCAS doesn’t meet the criteria. The mechanics were provided with the information they needed. You can characterize the non-provision of the information to the pilot as “hiding” the information, but that is a cheap way to cast aspersions on Boeing.
@Pete P.
Boeing has agreed that it hid MCAS from the FAA and the pilots and has agreed to pay $2.5 Billion in damages
===
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion
Pete P. ANYTHING in the Flight Control systems that can alter the behaviour of the aircraft especially the flight path MUST be known in detail by the flight crew.
MCAS even if admitted to the FAA as ‘on board’ and its basic functions DID NOT OPERATE in the way the FAA was told AND over riode the pilot control imputs.
The over ride was so large as to defeat the pilots attempts in just 10 seconds. In other words, Boeing designed the systems such that if the pilots did not react correctly within 10 seconds the flight path was unrecoverable.
10 seconds to react to a flight control input. a forced controlled input one crew knew nothing of how it could occur and the second crew only a theoretical idea of the possibility of it acting. Simulator training is used to accustomed the pilots to the ACTUAL likely events and the feel and response(s) they could expect.
Neither of these crews had ANY prior practical experience with a system that within 10 seconds could put the aircraft into an unrecoverable condition.
ARMCHAIR EXPERTS can add little to nothing to this conversation.
Richard Davenport: I don’t believe you understand what a settlement is. It is a convenient way to not have to argue against the fallacies that have become embedded in the public’s (juries) mind. Humans cannot consciously unlearn anything and it may be a futile task to attempt to do so. Shame on the DOJ for using Boeing as a cash cow.
Well seeing as how Boeing has used the US system as a cash cow, anything the DOJ does can be thought of as a claw back.
Yes the FAA knew about a thing called MCAS, but what they knew they got from Boeing and Boeing did not disclose that MCAS had been hugely unleashed from a miner nudge at high AOA to a raging monster.
The only place it was in a pilots manual was Brazil who noted it and insisted it had to be there. No one else paid attention.
Boeing cherry picked data on AOA failures vs the surrounding things that damaged the AOA (ramp hits, birds etc).
At the least the AOA should have been cross zoned to the other AOA. It never should have been given the authority of movement that Boeing gave it (and did not tell the FAA).
Oh and big surprise, average pilots do not react at the same time that test pilots do.
Why did AF447 pilot pull the nose up? Propel can do we rid things. You want to train and test pilots to the real world and MCAS did not act like a Runaway stab.
Bottom line if not for the garbage design of MCAS 1.0, those crashes would not have taken place.
Should pilots be better trained and first officer fully capable? Yep. Now, how do you get to be capable without flying?
“The only place it was in a pilots manual was Brazil who noted it and insisted it had to be there. No one else paid attention.”
IMU, my guess:
Mutual acceptance of certs (EU) or not (Brazil).
As an aside, on New Year’s Eve:
AB managed to deliver 11 A350s in december — including a second frame to Emirates today.
Also managed to deliver 6 A330neos.
I’m counting 8 A220s, and dozens of A320s/A321s.
Over at BA, I’m counting 6 787s, and 14 MAXs.
Actually,they delivered 9 787’s in December, a respectable amount considering; slowly getting back on track.
You forgot the “Parking Lot” inventory!!
I did go through the parking lot, but evidently not back far enough: after all, it contains frames going back almost 5 years.
9 787s is very respectable.
But the MAX figure certainly is not.
I don’t buy 9 x 787 is worth noting. Like Airbus they scramble to make the numbers look good and then the next month it falls to nothing (or very low)
MAX makes a lot of sense, they got nothing to scramble with, they already are scrambling (or as much as FAA allows).
Airbus and 11 x A350 is also absurd. Its the month in and more correctly the quarterly in and out numbers that are relevant for rates.
Yearly should reflect quarterly unless its an increasing rate which Airbus is and supposedly Boeing is at least on the 787 so its a bit of a moving target but you are only going to increase 1 a month.
In theory the MAX should go up to 20 a month (30 but counting the parked aircraft).
It’s being reported that AB delivered 760 aircraft for the year, 10 short of the 770 target – or 98.7% of the goal.
Not bad in a difficult supply chain environment.
Airbus stock is up 3.5% today, so investors are evidently happy with that news.
Transworld 06 Jan above makes good sense, excellent points. And BTW with a little inside info (at least one source)IMHO the training background of the crew of AF447 was a big factor if not the major factor in that disaster.
Why did the senior and more experienced of the two F/O’s, the one who was at that instance PIC though not PF, clearly avoid taking over control of the aircraft from a junior F/O, rather new on type, functioning as PF? Because the company procedures and training did not make abundantly clear the command structure and practice when two F/O’s occupied the two operating crew seats. Most operators do make this totally clear so there will never be a conflict.
Next point is why did the PF apply full aft elevator control with the side stick at the moment when confusion and disorientation was highest and no evaluation had been made of just what the ___ was going on? Because I suspect during type training, possibly re-enforced from a previous type (A320?) that when in doubt apply full aft control in pitch and the electronic systems will protect the aircraft flight path. At low level this concept was correct provided all systems needed were not compromised – at high levels the flight characteristics prohibit such as action. The operator training program perhaps did not stress or even reference this reality.
In simple terms, the senior F/O did not use his authority as PIC to take control because he had been trained not to do so and the PF applied a trained reaction suitable for low level operation without restraint because he had never been trained not to (and maybe the F/O PIC also). – IMHO.
In hindsight holding pitch and power as they were just prior to the event for however long necessary would have completely avoided the crash – basic piloting essentially.
I’m a retired Naval Aviator with an ATP, 10,000 flt. hours, instructor at three different levels in the Navy and aviation a mishap experience as an investigator of Navy aviation mishaps. My commentary is from this vast experience.
Given all that has been said, this was an intentional gear up landing. Obviously, when the acft touched down 2/3 of the way down the runway and at high speed, it’s a foregone conclusion the acft would depart the rwy.
While tragic in every sense, the PAC should have touched down in the approach end of the rwy’s safety zone to allow the acft to skid to a stop within the available runway length, knowing there was a navigational structure at the end of the overrun of the rwy.
To land internally gear up and not do so using all the runway available in my judgment is the primary casual factor for the mishap.
Wow…truth really is stranger than fiction.
And how do you conclude — with apparent 100% certainty — that the gear up was “intentional”?
@Mark Denari:
A number of aspect refute that. High speed approach, no slats, flaps and when down low enough, no spoilers. Thrust reverse is ???????
In that configuration and approach speed, the aircraft could not touch down on or anywhere near the threshold.
Unless you contend this was deliberate suicide, zero support.
Ground affect is going to cause a float at those speeds and the nose angle which stayed the same.
Not a pilot- but could it be reason for no slats, flaps was since right side had some sort of damage if only left side flaps and slats worked they would cause perhaps enough roll to possibly partially flip plane with one wing down at VERY low altitude ?
Bubba2, Yes, a split flap/slat condition might warrant a no flap/ no slat approach. For some reason, the pilots wanted to get on the ground as fast as possible after the first go around. Maybe they were losing hydraulic pressure? Cockpit / Cabin fire? Otherwise, I would believe that they would circle close to the airport to diagnose and/or manually activate the landing gear etc. For some reason, they elected to set on the ground pronto. If the flaps were hit by birds on the original approach, and one side damaged, it would dictate some quick decision making, to go around or continue the approach etc. === https://www.tomgorski.com/asr/737/Trailing_Edge_Flap_Assymmetry.pdf === If the electrical system was suddenly kaput, then the FSEU would not get electricity and would be adding to any other issues. === https://termaviation.com/what-is-fseu-on-boeing-737/ ===
And the flight controls are fully operative.
Explain that
@TransWorld If there was total electrical failure, the FSEU would be kaput, and there would be no flaps. You could still use manual reversion, if the hydraulics went out (the cable system), with a lot of effort (both pilots max effort) to control the aircraft. Your panel would be dark and you’d only have a couple of backup dial instruments. If you’re at altitude, you might have options, but, engine trouble on final approach, not as many. Everyone is waiting for the cockpit transcript now, to see what situation(s) they had to deal with.
If it was that bad they would never have been able to do a 180 deg turn let alone the other turns associated with getting back on centerline.
Flaps have elecric backup.
@Transworld
According to my knowledge the 737 has no RAT for electric power because the aircraft has cables…
The 737 has not RAT
It does have a large backup battery and it also has a reserve battery.
How or why all power left and was not restored? Bizzare.
The gear came up, the flaps came up and for landing none of it was put down.
And the aircraft through it all was very well controlled.
Until it is known with reasonable certainty why these pilots made both the approach and landing as they did NO JUDGMENT however determined is NOT valid.
As another comment points out there is no need at all to investigate anything let alone visit the wreckage remains and crash site and examine recorded data if a judgement can so easily be reached while in the com fort and safety of your own home or other chosen space.
ALL speculation without the full available information and an open minded evaluation is simply BS.
TYPO. ALL uninformed or ill informed judgement is NOT valid.
Peter:
Normally I agree, but there is a logic tree involved here just like MS370.
They did not crash on the approach vector – be it on the runway or the extended center line.
They executed a 180 deg turn.
They then returned to not only the same exact reciprocal heading, they did it on the extension of the center line of the runway, heading South at this time. So, it was not a perfect 180, it was a 180, add in a correction vector (just for mental picture, a right 230 deg turn to capture center line (based on they did not have enough time for multiple turns but its possible).
They then made a left turn onto perfect centerline.
The aircraft is see in perfect control on its bizarre approach (no gear, no slats, no flaps).
The touch down under perfect control on a perfect runway line.
Nose stays high which means a panic reaction as they can see the rapidly approaching obstacle.
Like AF447, we will hear complete pandemonium in the cockpit because the pilot collectively of the PIC has lost their minds and have ceased all process and procedure.
All Speculation so a hypothesis and not based upo09n anything more than observation which by the nature of things is severely limited.
I am definitely NOT trying to insult, but as both you and I lack all of the details, the info we cannot have until it is made public in any way then we can only speculate and the records show accidents often produce surprising evidence not immediately obvious. After 43 years as a professional pilot and as an Aviation Psychologist focused upon selection, training and safety, and especially cultural influences for both individuals and organizations, I know not to jump to condemn. It is a common action to rush to find fault which is usually wrong..
Accidents usually have long gestation periods with a lot of potential influencing factors.
@ peter
I think you’re making very good (and logical) points in your various comments above.
However, you’re fighting a very powerful force here — i.e. the immediate tendency by certain parties to point a finger at the (foreign) pilots when a Boeing frame crashes. It was particularly evident in the case of the MAX crashes — where, thankfully, US pilot unions were quick to defend the pilots…just as you and others are doing above.
With regard to the general point that you’re making, a pilot’s job can be summarized as follows:
– 99% of the time: bored sh#tless.
– 1% of the time: sh#tting in your pants.
The CVR data is now being read out, so we’ll probably soon have some idea of the hell in the cockpit — assuming we can actually hear any voices with all the structureless CAS horns/sirens going off in the background.
hi @Peter,
Thanks for the comments. And yes it can be long periods of boredom unless you have something to think about that can be regularly interrupted. I experienced short range and eventually a lot of long range. The latter gaver a lot of time to think and overall IO recognized that pilots, and especially airline pilots are a very privileged group. Not because of money or lifestyle necessarily but because of the experiences we have presented to us.
I do not so much defend pilots involved in accidents as fight off those who would judge without a full idea of what was going on and what came before.
Won’t be long now:
“S Korea says initial data extracted from one black box”
“Both of the plane’s black boxes were retrieved, and for the cockpit voice recorder, “the initial extraction has already been completed,” said deputy minister for civil aviation Joo Jong-wan.
“”Based on this preliminary data, we plan to start converting it into audio format,” he said, meaning investigators would be able to hear the pilots’ final communications.”
https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1785745-20250101.htm
In addtion to the various airports listed above (LAX, SAN, AMS), we can also add DXB (Dubai) to the list of airports with busy freeways not far from the end of runways — take a look at satellite photos of the airport.
And, unlike Muan, DXB is predominantly serving large widebodies — with far more momentum than a narrowbody, and far more fuel on board. Just imagine one of them plowing into rush hour traffic on a major road.
#StructureBlaming
#PilotBlaming
The Jeju FDR is too damaged (missing connector) for the Korean authorities to read out, so they’re sending it to the US for reconstitution. It will be interesting to see if it reveals a coherent picture of the reasons for the plane’s weird landing.
Highways, crossroads, parking lots, open water, all creating damage, casulties, also people just being there at the wrong moment. Terrible.
As long as there are no concrete barriers making aircraft explode killing everyone, it’s acceptable though, because of small likelyhood.
Apparently this one slipped through at Muan.
Managing risk is all about just that – making risk calculations utilizing probability factors as best they can be determined. The chance that a large widebody will run off the end of a runway with sufficient residual energy to impact the nearby highway has clearly been determined as so low that is most probably will never occur. Accurate assessment? Possibly but reality will be the final decider. I doubt that the DBA managers ever thought a B777 would end up on its belly due to a fumbled approach and inappropriate attempt at a go-around. But one did.
Risk management is not an exact science, and science itself is not exact despite the faithful being convinced that it is.
As so much of risk management involves financial factors those factors are liable to play a disproportionate role in the outcome. That’s probably why that ILS system was mounted as it was on concrete on a berm when it should not have been AND it is most likely why B737-800 type aircraft were being operated into and out of that space seemingly so successfully.
All good until it wasn’t. That’s why we must resist the drive to judge, to blame, as ALL the factors that created the scenario for an accident have contributed to the event. Picking one to take all the criticism, the whole blame, is so wrong.
for the sake of variety
Pentagon, China quiet on new PLA stealth jets shown online
“The first jet bore the number 3601, prompting speculation it was a J-36 prototype.”
What Nobody Told You About China’s 6th Generation Fighter – the J-36
Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QRIUnBiWXI
Absolutely nothing here or on Leeham relates to military aviation let alone this specific crash discussion.
If you are bored I suggest you go for a walk.
hmmm…introduction of new aircraft is not news worthy?
Of course it is…particularly something as sophisticated as this.
Some people just don’t want to be exposed to news that highlights China’s advancements in aviation 🙈
So, the only area Leeham touches on Military aircraft is in regards to KC-46A, A330MRT.
Lockheed C-130 no. F/A-18 No. F-15 NO (the only time those come up in regards to Boeing as an entity that does have implication to the finanaialy heath (or lack).
As much as I love to discuss military aircraft, its not remotely commercial aviation.
There are forums you guys can discuss to your hearts content.
It is funny that a statement about military aviation in China translates into commercial aviation in China but Boeing is the Evil Empire if they cross any tech.
The usual absurdity, nothing new there.
The fact that Abalone recognizes that the ILS Mound is not the core issue here is nothing less that astonishing.
Multiple articles on Leeham relate to the geopolitical tensions between the US and China.
Also, Chinese prowess in the area of military aviation is relevant in assessing its prowess in commercial aviation — particularly as regards sophistication, development times, evolution times, and supply chains.
Moreover, many articles on Leeham relate to the KC-46A tanker, and other BA miliary programs. Good benchmarking requires consideration of what other countries are doing in areas that compete with BDS’ portfolio. Chinese military aircraft are already costing potential BA orders, as evidenced by recent Chinese sales to Pakistan and Egypt, for example.
You both know when you are going severely off topic, save us the spin, you continue to do it and then back off when Scott checks in.
Shame on you
Slightly bothering,these Chinese stealthy prototypes seem advanced and capable.
Even more uncomfortable, we were all raised to see everything from Russia/ China is either inferior or stolen from us.
These ones seem to somewhat challenge our believes..
“…we were all raised to see everything from Russia/ China is either inferior or stolen from us.”
Not here in Europe.
That dismissive attitude seems to be a purely US thing.
Is not the fundamental principal of a competitive system all about just that competitive advantage?
Or is competition OK so long as the other guy does not get and advantage however it is achieved?
As WW2 was ending there was fierce competition to grab all the knowledge, records, data and people, possible from Germany with the US importing some 1200 people in Operation Paperclip. Russia, Britain and France and others too were all grabbing what they could and what they saw as valuable to their interests. Its ALL competition so why do peopl;e compolain like mad when ‘the other guy’ ap[pears to have gained an edge by whatever means including spying. Does anyone think that only ‘those bad guys’ do the spying to steal? Industrial espionage likely far exceeds anything the security services are into and often the two work together anyway. Its all competition.
In the eyes of some parties, China was supposed to remain an underdog.
It didn’t.
Now those same parties are suffering from a combination of shock, disbelief, paranoia and panic, because their assumed world model is crumbling and they are totally unprepared for that.
AND, it jusdt masy be that China is not the true essence of the problems the world faces now, China may not be the bogey man it is being portrayed as. That does not mean I see the Chinese nation as a benign force on this planet, it cannot be.
What I am seeing, and many others as well, is an extremely sophisticated programme to change the systems of control across the whole planet.
Here is not the appropriate forum for such a discussion.
CVR is downloaded.
Data recorder continues to have weird ref to a connection, it seems to be related to access not it working.
That said, NTSB would have zero issue linking into it as long as the Data Recorder data modules are not damaged.
I continue to see some incredibly erroneous reporting on the crash.
My hypothesis is that the belly landing is an unfortunate incident that will be investigated to get to the bottom of everything causing it. Aircraft, environment, human factors etc.
The ILS localizer location- construction turned this into an accident, even a disaster.
I’m not a building expert, but it seems the antennas are fixed on a horizontal concrete platform, which itself is no doubt based on a concrete foundation deep into the ground to keep it stable. Covered by mud.
It seems that horizontal concrete platform was at the right height above the field to cause maximum damage to the incoming aircraft.
“The ILS localizer location- construction turned this into an accident, even a disaster.”
Aviation Safety Network would have classified this as an accident without any embankment impact.
That high-speed belly landing was always going to lead to a hull loss, and probably also a serious fire.
If the ILS mound wasn’t in the way, the plane would have rammed the airport perimeter wall, and the arrays of raised approach lights on steel poles behind that. At the speeds involved, such collisions would have been catastrophic.
The real accident here is the apparent dooming of the airframe by one or more bird strikes at a very critical time, leading to a highly sub-optimal landing that was essentially destined to lead to disaster.
A landfill up to the ILS system would prevented this desaster. The aircraft would have jumped down this little step after ILS with some minor scratches. The terrain after the ILS is flat with just a minor wall. 500 meters to save more people.
This set up is just an aircraft shredder.
You need to look at your miner wall and the reinforcement towers built into it every 20-25 feet.
And its not flat after the wall. There is a hill that looks to be 50 dt high to the right and you are funneling down between two roads and still going another many thousand of feet.
There are various structures and rock walls further on.
At over 150 mph, it was going to try to keep going.
Brick poles every 10 m or 30 feet. This setup is cheap to avoid the use of steel.
Just use Goolge Earth for easy measurement and Street View for a clear view on that specific wall.
So the fuselage may have hit one post. Still not comparable to steel reinforced concrete.
Use Street View for a look around: all flat and no rocks.
I have and you have not a clue as to what I will call the towers are made of.
They are not decorative. Brick walls can have re-bar in the cells.
Those walls are part of an airport defense system per South Korea dealing with North Korea and expected incursions (as has occurred in the past) with attacks on airports.
Go ahead and go visit South Kore and rent a car and run into one. Let us know how that worked out.
There is just just a brick wall to keep people & animals out. Cars smash through them, a 737 too.
https://youtu.be/NQ4Ir3-d74Q?si=jhBwK91R2AlHu-pj
Nothing like the concrete platform/ mud wall. It’s not all the same, not at all.
Drive a car at 200km/h into a brick wall and see what happens.
Even better, do it with a car loaded with jerry cans of jet fuel.
Nobody is saying that an embankment is the same as a brick wall: what’s being said is that a brick wall is more than sufficient to cause a disaster in the current circumstance.
Mass difference matters a lot.
A car is in a totally different weight class. A brick wall can crush a car, but will be disintegrated by the fuselage, leaving just a car-sized dent on it.
Had the localizer array weren’t an earthen berm fortified with dozen tons of reinforced concrete, but just 2 parallel brick walls, the 737 would obliterate it and continue to slide forward.
I’m wondering why the localizer array weren’t constructed like that – two parallel brick walls and steel struts on top of them.
The car would do better, they are designed to crumple.
I can believe the focus on one obstacle vs the next one 200 feet further on not to mention that the aircraft goes another 2000 ft and what it runs into after it plows through the concrete wall (an aircraft is not designed to run into things).
And who says its flimsy? Got a cross section? Something in a marsh will be well excavated and anchored and the upper part designed to stand up to Typhoons. If they were after flimsy it would be a chain link fence.
Elevation is 52 ft. 3000 feet on is the water. Now someone tell me, how you get from 52 feet to zero feet without a heck of a drop.
The wall is concrete block. There are reinforced square sections along it as well as a gate not quite but in the patch of the aircraft extending down the runway center-line.
The V funneling of the road outside the Block wall would impact a left wing first, then shuck it off to the right to run into a road that also is going to be raised.
There are trees.
Then there are various buildings on the extended center-line assuming there is anything left to get that far. There are rock walls in various locations.
@keesje:
You keep saying that. Pieces of foam repeatedly damaged Space Shuttles until the wrong piece of foam hit the wrong tile and it was lost on reentry.
Physics is a hard thing. The higher the velocity the more impact force. The aircraft was doing at least 150 mph or more.
As has been noted, after the ILS is a concrete wall. Impact directly into the wall would have been catastrophic . Do you seriously think impact speed does not have an affect? Its not a chain link fence.
Following the wall are dips and roads (raised). Whatever was left would have been flung into that area. Some debris did reach the concrete wall.
Exactly how it would have manifested itself we will never know – it would have been severe, it could have been as bad as the ILS mound impact, better or no survivors at all.
Contrary to Leeham (with all due respect) the ILS mound is a secondery aspect. That airport has been there for years. Landing short on the 010 runway would have had the same issue (assuming they cleared the concrete wall)
Is it a good thing to have a mound like that? No. Is it the cause? No, no and no again.
All sorts of Airports have issues. The one where the A320 went off the side of a raised runway in Brazil is another one. Really? Flat Amazon and you can’t find a flat place to build?
Denver gave up their original airport because of the nutty crowding around it (as did Hong Kong for its horrid approach and crowding)
Honk Kong as a raised level runway and if you are too low you are going to smack into a 10 or 20 foot rock barrier (just like SFO, Haneda , Kodiak)
Go off the end? Yep, into the water.
This is not the A320 into the wheat field. Nice level with wheat drag reduction over time.
However, the wall behind is built from cinder blocks, a much weaker material than concrete. Still bad, but maybe with a there would be 4 survivors instead of 2.
I agree that overall the ILS embankment is just an easy obvious target to scapegoat. The terrain outside the runway and the RSA just isn’t safe, belly landings aren’t safe, and this landing was extremely high-speed for such.
“I agree that overall the ILS embankment is just an easy obvious target to scapegoat.”
fulcrum prep:
On Jan 1st 2025 The government of South Korea stated, that the flight data recorder will be sent to the USA for read out and analysis, due to the damage to the crucial connector. The cockpit voice recorder has been successfully downloaded. The investigation team from the USA have arrived on site and are focussing on the concrete structure, that the localizer was installed on.
ref: https://avherald.com/h?article=52225189&opt=0
And the conclusion is it ran into the ILS mound?
You surely do not need a US Team to tell you that, its terribly obvious.
The one and only thing that matters is what went on inside the aircraft as it aborted the landing (when it had its gear and flaps down).
So how do you think the gear and flaps got UP?
“The one and only thing that matters is what went on inside the aircraft as it aborted the landing (when it had its gear and flaps down).”
That doesnt seem to be the case.
The restaurant owner who was beside the runway and took the video said the plane flew directly over his restaurant roof very low, which attracted his attention after he heard loud bangs , the plane then did a u turn and landed without undercarriage or flaps down.
its a black spot for the flight tracking systems which dont show this “u turn “
Whatever went on inside the 737 is all that is relevant.
The ILS mound is a consequence and it was followed by a concrete brick wall.
Regardless, the 737 pulled up its flaps and gear so there was power to do so. Then it flew something around 10 miles not gliding but enough power to maintain altitude or gain altitude.
An aircart with no power cannot do a 180 deg turn and jets are not gliders.
Tracking data was lost and that is huge. CVR and FDR are cut off, that is huge.
All that matters is what happened in that aircraft. The rest of what happened is directly related to inside the aircraft.
The ILS mound hit was tragic, but hitting a block wall as a result of what happened would have been bad and if that had not stopped the aircraft, then it proceeds to go another 1000 plus feet hitting light towers (set in concretion supports) and rock walls and structures.
To think if no ILS mound it all ends wonderfully is beyond foolish.
Regarding the discussion above about the survivability of a plane hitting a perimeter brick wall at high speed, let’s look at Aeromexico 498 in 1986. It crashed into a suburb of LA as it was coming in to land, after it was clipped by a Piper PA-28 light aircraft. The collision took off most of the tail section of the Aeromexico DC-9.
So, if a relatively flimsy structure such as a Piper — with a thin metallic skin and light beams — can do that at relatively low speed, what’s a brick wall going to do at 150-200 km/h? Forget the Jeju fuselage — it’s the fuel-filled, relatively-flimsy wings that are the most critical part. And who says that the plane would have impacted the wall head-on, rather than in a partially sheared state?
Remember that taxiing Qatar 777 at Chicago O’Hare whose wing knocked against a light pole? The pole went through the wing like a knife through butter…and that was just at taxi speed.
https://www.aviation24.be/airlines/qatar-airways/qatar-airways-cargo/boeing-777-hits-light-pole-at-chicago-ohare-airport/
Why was it possible that a Piper can cut through a DC-9 if aircraft in common are such “flimsy” structures? Strength is different in different directions. Wings are designed to resist a little drag but most they have to risit torsion bending the wing upwards.
The fuselage is rather strong in the direction of flight to avoid beding. There is also structure to carry the loads by the forward landing gear.
The wall at the end of the airport is a rather flimsy and cheap construction. In Goole Stree View you can even look through a gate and see the ILS on its rampart. The rampart is even higher than the wall.
According to pictures from the accident the foundations is about half a meter thick in height. Concrete weights about 4.2 t per cubic meter. So just 2 t per meter due hight but about 6 t per meter due to the depth of the fundation of about 3 m. A 737 has a diameter of about 4 m. So the fuselage would have hit an objekt of 24 t of mass even neglecting the soil of the rampart. That’s about the mass of the fuselage. The wall is made out of hollow bricks. Mass in front of the fuselage would have been 2 – 4 t. That’s a huge difference.
“Why was it possible that a Piper can cut through a DC-9 if aircraft in common are such “flimsy” structures?”
Because the Piper was moving at a speed of about 150 km/h: momentum is proportional to speed, and energy is proportional to the square of speed.
A grain of paint can punch a hole in the reinforced wall of the ISS, even though it weighs essentially nothing. How? Because its high velocity more than makes up for its flimsy mass.
So, you think that you can throw a few tons *at a speed of 150km/h* at the wings of a 737 without rupturing fuel lines…?
Good luck with that!
Ruptured fuel lines are unimportanted in case of the fuselage completely disintegrating.
It’s just a point of view if the Piper moves at a certain speed or the fuselage. The result is the same. The engine block of the Piper is a huge concentrated mass compared to structure of an aircraft’s tail fin. That results in huge force at a small point: high pressure. That was the point I tried to made.
That’s the problem with this accident here. The foundation has a mass of about 5 t per meter. On piece of the foundation may be about 10 meters wide or more. 50 t of concrete against a fuselage with less than 40 t. This mass was also concentrated on a slab of about 0.5 meter high. 50 t against a surface of 2 square meter or 25 t / m^2 (mass not force).
The wall at the airport perimeter has far less mass and also the mass is evenly distributed. Just about 4 t in front of the fuselage’s surface at 12 square meters . That’s just 0.3 t / m^2. The cockpit section would have been definitely been damaged but a huge part of the fuselage would have survived that impact.
Let’s assume the fuselage (25 t) was moving at 50 m/s. Energy would be 25 x 50^2 and both objects will travel together after the impact without energy loss: (25 + 4) x (46.4) ^2. A deceleration of less than 4 m/s (15 km/h or 9 mph) for hitting the wall. With about the same mass deceleration is about 15 m/s.
Then there is still the mass of the rampart of about 4 t per cubic meter. Maybe 4 m deep. 16 t per square meter or 192 t in front of the fuselage cross section.
Fuel lines are not at issues.
737 like all modern LCA has a wet wing.
rip the skin and the fuel is releasing.
People keep missing the point. The ILS is not relevant. Its a consequence not a cause.
Relevant is why a fully controlled aircraft did not drop its gear, its flaps, slats. Compounding that is the coms break in tracking data and no coms after the go around.
The -800 did not simply leisurely turn around and wander back to center-line. These were sharp turns.
It did a sharp 180+ turn, established itself on center-line which would be opposite control actions and then fully controlled.
ILS mound or not, it was going off the end, through a concrete wall and into irregular terrain.
There is a small rising hill to the right (West). Equally there is a string of approach lights down the center-line for 1500 ft. Those are solidly bolted to concreted pedestal.
Then there are various structures and rock walls.
Indeed. Worse the ILS antennas were installed on a horizontal reinforced concrete platform of considerable width and thickness. The aircraft hit that from the side. Terrible, not much left from the cockpit I assume.
https://cdn.i-scmp.com/sites/default/files/d8/images/canvas/2024/12/31/df77116b-1656-45c3-8666-2f0b969c0d5b_84ee57b1.jpg
for those interested in commercial aircraft info
“Airbus handed over ~760 aircraft to customers in 2024, which would come in 10 planes short of meeting its annual delivery target for the year, Bloomberg reported Thursday.”
“Bloomberg Intelligence analysts estimate that Airbus will deliver 869 aircraft in 2025.”
Hong Kong welcomes first C919 scheduled flight
“As an international aviation hub located in the heart of Asia, with half of the world’s population within a five-hour flight, and with the newly opened three-runway system (3RS)”
Be still my beating heart!
Hong Kong, like the not at all independent part of China, one Party two systems?
Seems like Hong Kong will be the C919 hub to service “half of the world’s population within a five-hour flight” and don’t need FAA certification
As the Big 3 Chinese Airlines are all centered ou9t of Honk Kong, that makes perfect sense.
China’s COMAC, maker of C919 jet, aims for Southeast Asian flights by 2026
“Chinese state-owned plane maker COMAC aims for its C919 jet to start flying on commercial routes to Southeast Asia by 2026 as a first step to moving beyond its domestic market, a senior company official told Chinese media.”
Big whoop
Latest Com log (or attempt) has 3 minutes from Maybe/Go around to set down.
And of interest, while I had to review my ILS memory, 01 is not the ILS landing direction.
ILS is precision from the North. Depending on setup its a non precision from the South.
And it crossed my mind, why not continue the approach as flaps and gear was down prior to go around?
I wonder a bit why everyone is going on the concrete structure. I do agree it should not have been there, as other was possible, but the crash had already happened at that point.
Also, nobody can say what would have happened if there`s a trench, perimeter wall, or cliff. Even if they hit only the localizer, it`s unclear what happens, but i am pretty sure that the outcome won`t be good.
You simply can`t overrun the runway by 200m with high speed and and bet on having a 1000m or so obstacle free.
The issue is, for some reason, this plane landed unconfigured without gear and flaps on it`s belly half way down the runway.
You can go a long after the wall, but i would start with the decision for the G/A and then why they went down like they did.
The Korean investigators successfully downloaded the CVR data. We should hear something soon about what was heard, voice and things, in the cockpit. That will be very informative.
This is what happened to a 737 in which one engine failed and the crew shut down the good engine. Casualties but survivable.
@Scott:
And in a landing configuration and then its a, what do you hit as you are skidding alone.
Estimates are the Juju aircraft was doing over 150 mph when it hit the ILS mound.
How long a runway does it take to stop an aircraft doing 150 mph? That assumes gear down.
Inertia is going to keep it going a couple thousand feet unless it hits something that changes that inertia into energy (ripping apart)
If the ILS mound was built to withstand typhoons, does anyone think the primate concrete was not?
We may not see it but standard for a secure wall is to put rebar in it, both vertical and on planes horizontally.
You can see square structures along that wall.
And that does not include the landing system lights bolted to concrete and terrain and various rock walls around structures further on.
The impact was significantly less.Initial impact was 104kts and the main impact when it smashed into the motorway embankment was 76kts. Lots of G scrubbed off by undercarriage ,trees,lampposts,etc
There were recommendations for reinforcing the cabin floor and seats because a lot of the seats became detached.Was this ever acted upon,or does grandfathering apply?
Each one of those has its own signature of setup on the aircraft and what the ground condition s were as well as speed.
Same with the A320 into the wheat field. Hobble messed up landing, trying to fly and then slowly dropping down and a nice flat wheat field and a great drag reduction in the wheat itself.
This one is more in line with the A320 that went off the side of a built up runway and the resulting total loss of passengers and crew and that was 100 mph when it departed the field.
In that case, drop off the edge of the built up runway, hit a warehouse and the complete stop is very much in line with the Juju crash despite the much lower speed.
Its absurd to say the Concrete wall 200 ft past the ILS mound would have no affect. Its going to be built to the same Typhoon proof standards. That is why you see those square larger blocks every 20-25 ft.
We may never know but the standard is to fill the cavity of the blocks with concrete, rebar can be added in the vertical runs and you can have horizontal bond beams.
Each of those mini towers look to be 2 feet by 2 feet. Aircraft hits those as well as the wall and you hit around 5 of those square tower/blocks.
“Ripped, crumpled aircraft manual found at crash site”
“The torn and crumpled pages discovered at the crash site contained details about the minimum distance a Boeing aircraft can travel with its landing gear extended while operating on minimal power.
Several pages also included emergency landing procedures, particularly those for ditching the aircraft in water. Only the essential pages were reportedly torn out for immediate use, indicating the urgency of the situation during the crash.
“The captain may have been trying to calculate the aircraft’s remaining range and evaluate how much time they had left to respond,” said professor Go Seung-hee from the department of aviation operations at Silla University in Busan.”
https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10382450
Reuters reports GE or CFM is there as well. Some strange stuff going on with this investigation. National face is involved.
Much like the China 737-800 suicide we never hear word one on.
I don’t say that the Juju is identical, but its the same arena of we caused this ourselves and we don’t like the world to know.
NTSB is not going to release any info as they are an assist here, not in the US as the investigator.
NTSB can only bring the people South Korea approves to the crash.
Its all got to come from South Korea that is in a Political upset along with this crash.
Japan Airlines Retires Boeing 777, Operates Last Flight to London
JAL has introduced the Airbus A350-1000 to replace its aging 777-300ER fleet.
“Japan Airlines (JL) recently bid farewell to its iconic Boeing 777-300ER on the Tokyo Haneda (HND)-London (LHR) route, marking the end of an era for this aircraft’s international operations.”
There’s a recent report that the plane hit a “very large” flock of birds, after video enhancement. https://www.dimsumdaily.hk/analysis-reveals-jeju-air-flight-7c2216-tragedy-involved-collision-with-massive-bird-swarm/
What I don’t understand at all: why didn’t they continue to land?
They had the runway right where it should be. Gear was out. Engine not OK. Why not land? Massiv bird strike on maybe both engines and TOGA power? Cockpit voice recorder will be very informative.
Agreed. I made that point earlier.
Nothing says you won’t hit more birds, you are in a good a position then as you will ever be. You may be fine latter but there is no point to it.
A bird strike is not a given to stopping an engine. Compressors stalls yes, but it take a large bird or birds to snuff engine (engines) per Sully.
If other things were going on its not at all obvious, the gear and the flaps/slats came up.
One aspect no clue on is the loss of the flight tracking data. Single engine are damaged by birds all too often but there is no mechanisms that would translate into a loss of power (or was obvious as controls worked to bring gear and flaps.stats up.
Compressor stalls can e violation, but can be stopped throttling the engine back and not necessarily off.
One thing to me, note I am not a RW pilot but am an engineer that works on aircraft. I know the 737 has a manual release for the landing gear. There is a door on the floor just behind the right hand pilots chair. It has to be opened and each gear had a tab that has to be pulled quite a long distance. Some of the 737 pilots I know say it feels like you pull forever. So even with a bird strike and complete loss of hydraulics; not sure how come they didn’t deploy them. Unless they were trying to conserve flight energy as they had lost both engines. Also I can’t seem to tell if the spoilers where deployed or not. You can reverse thrust at 10ft / 3m above the ground. Also the speed for a no flap landing in a 737 is ~200kts. I only see the right engine with what appears to have the reversers deployed; that might have been due to the cowling sliding back. No mater what, it is tragic this and sad for their families. Hopefully answers soon.
One thing I heard reported is that the FDR had a damaged connector and was being flown to DC. Korea sent observers so the data is in chain of custody.
Just to keep things in perspective.
The door covering the release levers is behind the pedestal just to the left of the Co Pilot.
I have not seen the angles from the PIC side but it looks like he could reach it as well.
Being behind the co pilot would require getting up and out of your seat.
I would think it would be co located between the pilot and the co pilot but it is biased to the co pilot side. Assumption I guess is the co pilot is there to pull the cables (handles go to wire cables).
If I am tracking this, the South Korean authorities sent it all to DC so that they can link the cockpit voice with what inputs were recorded on the FDR on the same timeline.
If so its going to be a while before we get info. Also to be kept in mind, the NTSB will not release information, its up to the South Korean AHJ. NTSBN has no jurisdiction. Just like the China 737-800 crash (of which we may never get results as its a PR disaster for China to admit a pilot crashed the aircraft)
I don’t think South Korea will do that but they do have an impaired politico system right now and no one is going to put out info without a confirmation from the top.
The US is different in that in a NTSB jurisdiction accident, they are a fully interdependent agency with a directive to getting info out as soon as possible. The release is often very important to get information out if only to reinforce what has been published.
Usually an interim report in a couple of weeks while the full on details take a couple of years.
It should be noted, NTSB is not just aviation, railroads and shipping as well as road incidents in regards to bridges come under their auspices.
It also should be noted, the NTSB cannot mandate a fix, they recommend it if needed. The FAA has ignored some of their input as the FAA also does a cost benefit analysis which the NTSB does not.
Not a perfect system but pretty good.
TransWorld, I initially thought the same thing, about the manual gear extention needing a pilot to be standing up behind the seats to get the door open etc. But, in a mentor pilot video demo, the pilot pulls the gear down manually from his seat .. (I set the video start to the section showing the co-pilot pulling the cords) The checklist does take a bit of time, and it doesn’t look like they may have had a lot of extra time in this landing.
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https://youtu.be/aTS4BEKqi4U?t=366
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Or they did not take the time.
There always is going to be a call made on when you quit procedures and do something.
Usually you are far better off following procedures (assuming you can).
But keep in mind, they flew for 4 minutes and did some serious maneuvering to get turned around, all staying above terrain and had enough altitudes to build a lot of speed setting down.
It gets into did they follow procedure, if not why not and did other actions cause the power loss (like shutting down the wrong engine).
Some of the power flow indicates loss of left engine might do it. I am looking for a full review of what left engine loss means, with a possibly marginal right engine issue going on.
Then how does the backup battery system that can fly the 737 for over an hour (2nd set linked in) play into all this?
This is a good overview of the system.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQlCDFloLg4
One of the reasons this is so confounding, the gear and the flaps did come up.
The aircraft did turn around in a short distance and under perfect control.
While everyone is waiting for the CVR and FDR data to be released. There’s a good analysis of what little data there is in this 15 min video. Very speculative, but, it is, what it is.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-0EgD7urF9Q
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This is a quote from a BBC article. Extremely relevant is the fact that there is another structure less than 70 meters past the ILS Mound. How you make a concrete wall designated to withstand typhoons and frangible is beyond me .
This is not just a concrete brick wall, fill it in with concrete and rebar vertical i the cells as well as possible cap beam and possibly intermediate beam structure entirely in the designee set.
Its intended to keep assaulting forces out. South Korea has some unique requirements in regards to the threat they face.
“It does seem unusual that it’s such a rigid thing. The aircraft, from what I understand, was traveling very fast, landed a long way down the runway, so it will have gone a long way past the end of the runway… so where will you draw the line with that? That’s certainly something that will be investigated.
“Aeroplanes are not strong structures – they are, by design, light to make them efficient in flight. They’re not really designed to go high-speed on its belly so any kind of structure could cause the fuselage to break up and then be catastrophic.
“The fuel is kept in the wings so once the wing ruptures, then the potential for fire is significant.
“So it’s not a given that if the wall had not been there, it would have been a completely different outcome.”
Mr Kingswood said he would be “surprised if the airfield hadn’t met all the requirements in accordance with industry standards”.
“I suspect if we went around the airfields at a lot of major international airports… we would find a lot of obstacles that could similarly be accused of presenting a hazard,” he added.
“However former pilot John Cox, chief executive of Safety Operating Systems, said the runway design “absolutely (did) not” meet industry best practices, which preclude any hard structure within at least 300m (984ft) of the end of the runway.”
And what does Mr. Cox think a concrete brick wall is? Mayne 200 feet past the ILS mound (65 meters roughly)
Accidents are the result of an accumulation of previously seemingly unconnected decisions and factors, or at least ones with limited interactive relevance when applied or introduced. A case in point relevant to the Korean accident is now years old but still pertinent.
A Canadian airline was an early adopter if not originator of the reduced thrust take off procedure which in principal; makes sense and is used extensively today. The difference here was that this operator reduced the thrust to the max such that only a small margin existed in the calculations such that the reduced all engines flight path was not much above the engine out/failure flight path.
On take off one of the main-wheel tyres threw a tread which a tail mounted engine of the DC9-30 ingested with thrust failing very close to or at the V1 speed. An abort was initiated correctly but now with degraded braking due to one blown tyre the aircraft did not track straight and did not slow as rapidly as the take off performance for accelerate-stop was calculated on. In addition the V1 speed point was a long way along the runway length due to the slower acceleration making an otherwise light aircraft take off run more akin to a very heavy one. Analysis lkater showed that little to no margins remained for the crew to use. A bit like the 10 seconds Boeing assumed would be sufficient for a crew reaction in the event of arunaway Stabilizer AND/or for an MCAS issue.
The DC9 aircraft failed to stop on the runway, over ran the short runoff area to then actually become as near as airborne down the slope beyond until it impacted the level ground violently. The first officer sustained a broken spine indicative of the major injuries for the passengers most if not all of whom I think survived.The cabin was a wreckage site with many detached seats and panels.
The airline blamed the pilots who were dismissed for failing their duties in several ways and the inquiry sort of re-enforced that decision. A couple of years later at an international pilot meeting Australian pilots were able to show that the accident pilots in this case had not the slightest chance of avoiding the outcome and they were later reinstated without loss. What happened next?
ALL the take off requirements and the use of reduced thrust take off procedures were re-examined and revised with training worldwide to encourage ‘Go Mindedness’,. a change in the timing around V1, AND a limit to the degree to which thrust could be reduced – never below Climb Thrust as had been the case.
The runoff slope in this case could not be altered in real terms but the use of that runway was restricted in certain conditions and weight and performance restrictions applied I seem to remember to give yet more margin for an aborted take off condition.
Point is many things had to be put in place to make this accident happen. Easy to blame the pilots, or the tyre, or even the slope. The problem though was the accumulation of factors that were not examined as a whole and with no means to bring them easily into a full review without a disaster provoking it.
In aviation I always believed it should not require a disaster to raise safety questions and review – but it does unfortunately as the lesson is still not learnt.
.
That would be a case where the pilots were truly boxed in.
An rejected takeoff is at the bottom of the list and pilots have to make split second decisions, some there are no right answers for.
The opposite is a trigger event that gets out of control.
The last 4 minutes of the flight were not recorded by the flight recorders (CVR-DFDR).
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-11/key-data-missing-from-crashed-south-korean-plane-s-black-boxes/
Thanks. just wanted to post that too.
That combs together with ADSB data reception stopped from ~~same moment.
complete loss of power?
I am extremely surprised that this is possible
Per the post below, the CVR has its own backup battery good for 10 minutes.
I am failing to see how you could loose so much cockpit setup and still fly.
I am not saying it did, but its almost like a bomb went off, but left the pilots fine and at least manual controls working.
The FDR will have backup but I have not been able to trace out if it uses the system battery or has its own.
Note1: Date: 8/17/10
Note2: This AC is not mandatory and is not a regulation.
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_20-141B.pdf p12 “a.”
Yea I stand corrected, I had missed how long they delayed it and never did make it retrospective.
Hopefully there is a rethink on that part.
APU is electric start and it also needs electrical power for its fuel pump.
It may have its own dedicated start battery to keep the system batteries up to snuff during an emergency (ie not drain them down if you start the APU)
Since the Sully ditching I have thought it might be a good idea to have the APU up and running until you get to 10,000 feet.
I was able to confirm that the CVR has its own battery backup.
FDR I could not find out, it would take some more digging.
hic rhodos, hic salta.
a link please!
Yea, got cross read on dates and actual compliance.
It sounds like there was a total electrical power failure when the ADS-B data and CVR (and probably the FDR) dropped out. If one generator failed causing too
much load for the other generator, or both engine generators failed close together, then they’d be on standby battery power, with only the captains displays
powered up and one COM1 and NAV1 operating with only critical engine readouts and basic flight instrumentation and alarms. I think the thrust reversers also are battery powered in an emergency. The FAA has been updating the
power source for the CVR over time for new manufacturers but, granting some exemptions for the current fleet. ICAO has also
been granting exemptions for updating the current fleet. Trying to figure out what an ‘independent power source’ is compared to an ‘independent battery’ etc for
the CVR will have to be figured out for this particular aircraft, along with the last check of it’s battery, if it has one.
The plane was originally manufactured in 2009. So, I’m not sure if the CVR would be powered by the standby battery system on the aircraft.
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This was put out 7/22/2016
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_20-186.pdf
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this was put out 5/6/2024 by the FAA
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/20-186A.pdf
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The aircraft was about 200 ft low on approach 2 miles out at about 450 AGL, and called the Emergency hit birds call.
The “Hit Birds call” was about 30 seconds after the electrical drop of the ADS-B data (and the CVR data?) The co-pilot screen would be blank then, so the
captain may have been focused on the power failure, and maybe some alarms going off in the cockpit. He then elected, to go around, possibly not liking his
landing setup, (speed, altitude, distance from runway etc). Maybe thinking he’d sort things out in the air, and start the APU etc. But, upon the hitting
the TOGO power up, and maybe then seeing an engine failing, he elected to change course and land as soon as possible. Not sure who was pilot flying, but,
if the co-pilot, the captain may have elected to fly from his seat as he’d have the good displays. This all happening in a short time frame, with possible
alarms going off on short final. With no flaps and no landing gear, he’d be landing fast with a lot of kinetic energy to dissipate.
If it was that bad (and it seems to be) , pilot would know it was going off the end.
Flaps should still go down with battery powered circuit.
Why not land in the water? You can hold off a long time and get speed down.
Better than going off the end of a runway unless you have a nice flat wheat field.
I read elsewhere that the regulatory requirement for independent / backup power for the FDR / CVR came in in 2010. So it seems that this aircraft would not have had a functioning CVR or FDR following a loss of power, which seems to have been 4 minutes before the belly landing.
Alt / alt-rate data looks like they tried to go around, but found rapidly they’d not got sufficient thrust. Video footage makes it pretty clear that neither engine was in good shape, with probably only the starboard engine producing any thrust at all (but obviously seriously compromised). That aircraft was clearly badly damaged.
This is all pointing to what Scott highlighted in his article. The pilots achieved a survivable belly landing – the option of last resort allowed for in the design of the aircraft, and normally a pretty good option at that, even if something else was theoretically possible (which I doubt). The airport design is what killed. And the airport location is what inreased the risk of creating the conditions whereby crews would have to attempt such a landing.
Considering all the severe problems we know the pilots would have been facing and the lack of options open to them given the time they had left in the sky, the fact that they got it to the runway at all seems to me to be the work of skilled heroes, much as we praised the crew of BA38 at LHR for making it as far as the fence.
Thank you Matthew. That sparked me to find this link. It looks like in 2009, (when this 737-NG was made) there wasn’t a requirement for battery power for CVR’s for at least 10 minutes, if the main power fails. I don’t think there’s been any requirement to retrofit the current fleet, and/or there’s been FAA and ICAO extentions to avoid updates. This accident may change that. As most regulations seem to be written from past aviation accidents.
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https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-04-05/pdf/2010-7660.pdf
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Landing in the water must be an option depending upon circumstances – Sully KNEW what was required though how many crews do?
My father as an AME in the RAF helped boffins study why aircraft looked intact but so few or none survived water landing with bombers in WW2. Conclusion and instruction to crews was safer to land on a field and smash through stone walls than try on water.
The initial touchdown on water may be smooth but the loss of energy becomes so violent so high in G as the water envelopes the airframe that most crew died of the impact injuries or drowned. Sully’s really was a miracle on the Hudson.
Seems the Korean crew in pure hindsight would have done better to land off the first approach but did not realize it at that moment and a go-around even with a bird damaged engine SHOULD be a safe thing to do. So what changed that situation and made it impossible in forcing an immediate attempt in the opposite with far less working for them?
I know of a number of water landings that were successful.
A P-3 set-down in the middle of a storm out in the Aleutians. Despite insensate weather conditions, fully intact and only one person did not make it out.
A DC-7 set down off Sitka Alaska back in the late 50s or early 60s. Same thing, good ditching (conditions were flat calm). The only injury of any significance was w2hen the Coast Guard insisted the passengers and crew be transferred. One person got their ankle between the hulls.
This is looking to have more in common with QF32, aka not ever foreseen with lots of backups that were barely enough. Nothing to do with A380 systems, they literately took the equivalent of a SAM.
What I can tell you is that a 737 cannot fly past an airport 3 miles, turn around 180 deg and not just set-down but do so perfecly on runway center line on the runway unless you had power for almost the entire distance. Realistically they covered 10+ miles.
Design for the A380 said that what happened not only could not, had never happened in all the years of jet powered aircraft.
And a DC9-30 put down in the Carribean successfully years ago. Water landing can be successful but would it have been the ‘right choice’ or even copnsidered?
And are you still convinced the Korean accident was still the pilot’s fault completely?
Some very serious question to ask with the little evidence that has dribbled out so far indicating to me and many others I suspect that these guys had a bag full of issues to deal with. I will hold any critique until I get all that can be got of what actually appears to have happened.
I’m almost ready to give the pilots a pass.They obviously had a lot on
I am in a re-think but I also think its entirely possible that what occurred is pilot related.
Actions taken that may have relevance.
Confounding is that the gear and flaps came up. That is not an out of control action and at least at that point, systems in the aircraft are working.
The gear will still come down via manual release and clearly that was not done.
From the speeds and the 4 minutes the aircraft flew something around 10 miles and did a 180 deg turn. But even if the 180 deg turn is from runway center-line, you are then off runway center, so you have to turn 180 deg plus, then another turn back onto center-lines.
Its possible it angles off runway center-line and the far turn got it back on, but you still have distance flown fully under control.
I continue to find it impossible for the entire power system to just be gone.
But you also have the loss of tracking and the CVR and FDR no longer powered.
Its going to take a major amount of work to figure out what happened and the wreck is horribly destroyed. Clues that often are there may well be burned up.
There will be some good hard evidence on the engine status but that is not going to tell us what went on inside the aircraft and its systems. Do even the maint chips have power in this case?
At least for the 737-200 and -300 the alternate gear was electrically activated and the standby flap system is also electric. No power, no gear, no flaps.
What I want to know is how does a modern aircraft lose ALL electrical power assuming this one did. Not meant to be possible with the battery and an inverter the last gasp system.
If the pilots made mistakes a thorough investigation will try toi determine how this occurred and whether it was a casual factor or decisive element in the scenario. Things rarely happen in a vacuum with no precursors or precedent(s) and there are lessons to be learnt in this.
Can pilots do idiotic unexplainable things that make no sense? Of course they can and do just as computer programmers can and do. My IT wizard son assures me there is not a computer programme in existence that does not have bugs in it. Clearly they still work well and often monotonously reliably so – thankfully.
CRM and Human Factors training was intended to change cultures and often did though the full potential in my view was lost when cost analysis got hold of it. There is no way to show the value of accidents avoided. The biggest handicap CRM and HF training faced was the resident corporate culture particularly in the senior pilots within an operation who saw no reason THEY should change anything. Instead they battered CRM and HF training into a toothless tiger that could change little or nothing and the bean counters did the hatchet job for them. Despite this cultures did change some.
Training costs money, lots of it and full function simulators are the greatest training aid invented for aviation and most of the potential is wasted despite brilliant efforts by many to make the best use of them. Simulator time is non productive money earning wise and is now very expensive and suffers the age old problem that pushed Boeing to do what they did with the MAX to avoid even a 30 minute fixed base Sim session for the transition. That said a lot about the issues training faces.
BTW the British Midland Kegworth 737 accident had all the elements of poor performing pilots who shut down the wrong engine. Need to look at all the operation organization, regulatory oversight or lack of, and the training system and corporate culture before dropping it all on the two who were the final failure point in the whole sad scenario.
An accident is actually rarely an accident. Sounds weird but is true.
The circumstances of the crash are FUBAR.
Information available is more like a sieve than anything solid.
Lets wait some time before going beyond trying to understand the circumstances.
Valid, this truly is a MH370 like event that is beyond any current analysis.
Its going to take a lot of clues put together and even then you have to wonder if there is enough left to piece any sequence together.
It reminds me of the days before FDR when they had to try to piece things together.
Some things like a power loss like we are seeing (electrical) should be impossible.
Gear pulled up and flaps pulled up while that was going on?
What other data sources might be available? The 737-800 aircraft in 2009, would most likely have a Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPSW), which would most likely be powered by standby power as it’s a flight safety item? It’s been used in other accidents where the CVR and FDR have been lost, to provide some useful data.
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https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/1744.pdf
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but, it’s not stored in a protected box as the CVR and FDR are. So, it could be burnt up beyond repair. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) on each engine might provide some data also, if they are able to be recovered. I’m not sure how much help the Two Flight Attendant’s who survived might be? From what little information has been found online, they don’t seem to remember a lot so far.
I doubt the flight attendants will be able to contribute anything. They were not in a position to see what was going on.
At best they may confirm lights on and power in their area or not.
Its going to take an in depth tracing of power to see if you can loose the FDR and CVR power and still have some of the other system with power.
Flip is they had control to pull up the gear and flaps.
The latest news that the CVR stopped working BEFORE the crew declared the emergency basically means that the electric power must have been lost more or less immediately with the bird strike.
That doesn’t really speak for the Boeing aircraft in my opinion. Shouldn’t at least the FDR/CVR and ADS-B have immediate backup power supply available and always be working? Unless there was some other major problem arising at the very same moment, it doesn’t give me a lot of confidence in the 737 to be honest.
I do hope that the investigators still can figure out the detailed sequence of events that lead to the tragic loss.
Well its safety record matches the A320, so I guess you should avoid those as well.
Yes there are backup systems, whatever occurred is bizzaree and like some crashes or near crashes (QF32) its never occurred in aviation and not foreseen in design.
But blaming a well proven and safe design is not remotely relevant.
I agree with TransWorld, the Korean accident appears unique as most accidents are. The Boeing B737-800 and NG series generally have a very high reliability record as do the earlier 737 models as all well deserve.
Should not be connected together with the issues with the MAX – totally separate design issues.
@peter:
While all accidents have their own signature, usually they have common understood and given specifics on regards to each other.
In this case Unique is meant that its a QF32 type event that has never been experienced before.
How you thread power loss through full aircraft control is beyond mind boggling.
Logic wise its like the Sun came up in the West.
Yes there is an explanation but its going to be a confounding set of circumstance that occurred.
It does not matter if its an A320 or a 737, those aircraft are designed explicitly so that what happened cannot happen. And yet it did.
MH370 type bizarre , I am not saying they have anything in common, just both are hugely beyond unique.
The E190 shoot down you can at least understand how that could occur. Combat zone mixed with civilian aircraft is a bad situation.
Why is airplane control while bereft of electrical and hydraulic power mind boggling? The 737 has manual reversion and the flight control surfaces (except rudder and spoilers) can be operated manually by the pilots to perform all the maneuvers that this airplane performed.
Because of the compressed timeline and the fact that it was very good control, not dorking around, manual control is indeed possible, but its not nearly as fine tuned as having hydraulics.
Then there is the backup batteries.
Still have to see how those kick in, one set is online all the time, the other is in a standby setup.
The only way to loose everything and not have any of it available would be to blow up the Electronics Bay.
Gear will still come down if you pull the release cables. You should have flaps if you cut in or the battery switches over (again is it a relay held open and drops out or do you have to manually change it over)
Nothing shows the 737 as badly damaged other than the probable bird strike early on. (seems to be confirmed on finding feathers but reports have been so poor……..)
An aspect that might shed some light is the power setup off the Left engine, as was mentioned, did they shut the wrong engine down?
The bird hit engine was not necessarily lost, it could have some impact on power from a small amount to a lot.
If the Left engine was shutdown, systems on it would have dropped out. Why not picked up by battery or the other engine remains a mystery if that is even the cause.
Still looking at people who know the systems and what it all means power wise.
My 737 time started on 737-200adv and quickly moved to 737-300 EFIS with Supervisor experience as well.
New Captains I would set up a scenario of loss of both generators, no reset and APU wont start as they sometimes would not after a long flight cold soaking.
What I was looking for was Comand thinking and creativity to stretch the battery life (by turning off the battery switch if necessary) so that the minimal 25 mins life on STBY did not see all electrics go on final in cloud or the dark on a probable divert.
With engines running on internal generator for the FADEC and all other electrics off it would only be cabin pressure leaks and altitude deviation that would force the situation beyond weather of course (horizon to level against etc.). VERY desperate but doable to take the urgency to land anywhere, away somewhat. Not an exercise for newbie pilots but sure pushed a pilot on systems knowledge and command decision making.
Korean 737 appears to be due to odd conditions and deadly errors/slips/mistakes (wrong engine shut down) or other system failures not yet obvious – maybe even more bird strikes though that does not explain all electrical failing.
Peter P. Have you flown a 737 on manual controls only for any length of time? One circuit and approach pretty much pumps the muscles up enough to weaken the ability to fly at all. Needs a LOT of cooperation and sharing between the two up front to extend that time much unless Captain super-fit muscleman is there and even then that has limits.
And flight control is just manageable in calm conditions – doable? YES but tough effort required especially for manouvering and approach and landing.
@peter:
Please stick to what actually happened instead of conjuring up hypotheticals. Adrenalin has been known to make men move mountains, or maybe they were more motivated to fly a stricken 737 with precision down the runway centerline than you were in a simulator. There was enough damage done with the MAX, with arbitrary speculations of monstrously powerful systems that overpowered the pilots and wrested control away from them, which eventually became accepted truth by the hoi polloi, in stark contradiction to what the flight data recorders showed. This accident can do without that sort of detractive nonsense, hmmm?
@Pert P:
You just did what you claimed peter did, imposed an adrenaline hypothetical. Never in history has one let alone two people maintained super human capability for more than a few seconds, let alone 4 minutes even in the face of dying.
No, he is spot on valid.
It is a severe oddity that the aircraft was under perfect control up to and past touchdown.
The investigation is going to be down to analyzing failures based on possibles.
Data tracking going down, CVR and FDR going down are all clues that you can look at the NG systems and, ok, the only way this can occurr is for two engines shut down.
Look at the engines, were they shutdown, was the first impacted engine at partial or full power? What was the other engine doing?
Bird feathers in both engines or one?
What happens if you have a damaged engine and a good one is shut down (it happens, twice I can think of, ATR in Taiwan and the 737 classic out of Hawaii).
Is there fuel in the left engine or was that cut off. What condition is the left and right engines?
There are some good and knowledge minds looking at the setup on the NG and postulating exactly what is likely to have happened.
That kind of thinking solved the 737 Rudder issue, ok, this is the only way that could happen, what could lead to that?
Lauda air another example. It was not supposed to be able to happen but what if you go with it did happen, what could have caused that sequence to start.
I am willing to bet Boeing has laid out the likely possibles to the AHJs.
Were the Pilots victims of overwhelmed or did they take a problem and make it worse?
No, the adrenaline hypothetical was to explain what DID happen… the pilots flew the airplane; not to argue that they didn’t or couldn’t or did something else.
For FDR and ADS-B… there’s not much point in providing backup power to a device when the systems it records or broadcasts are dead.
Those same systems can continue to have data if you have the backup battery (and the backup backup)
There is not supposed to be a total loss of power.
So, yea it worth having a specific backup for the FDR and CVR so that some information is there if it is available.
CVR does not require systems, only what the pilots are saying.
I frankly find it stunning that cockpit video is not mandatory.
The loss of the VSS Enterprise when the guy pulled the feather lever is exactly what video does for an investigation. They could see the lever pulled in the telemetry, but the crew was trained never to pull that lever until XX conditions met. The co pilot pulled it anyway.
You take any chance you can to get data. Without it, figuring out what went wrong is extremly dire and I well remember from the days of piston flight at times impossible to say what occurred.
This is well done laying out the electrical system.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TKoCI9kVtc
If both engines fail and or are turned off, then you loose the FDR and CVR.
Increasing in levels of plausibility is a failure of both Engine alternators (AC is an alternator not a generator) or one engine failure and an alternator/alternator drive failures.
SOP on an engine failure is to pull up the gear and flaps though that is more normal for an engine failure on takeoff, nothing says you can’t continue a landing with a failed or iffy engine.
The FRD at minimum should be required to be on the battery system, even if its a relay drop out setup. Clearly you will continue to get inputs into it from the battery backup (actually two, one active on line and the other in standby and can be put on that system).
As long as you have the battery system you can start the APU though you might think twice if you have to look to maneuvering for an extended time. APU running would get you back to everything working.
If you have an engine running even if not at full power, you would have its alternator capacity. Alternators keep outputting down to idle engine speeds.
CVR often tells you nothing because there is no video to confirm what the pilots actions are, though if the FDR runs you can confirm inputs and responses.
Peter P. Such statements as “This accident can do without that sort of detractive nonsense, hmmm?” are insulting and un-professional AND most importantly uncalled for in this discussion. They do you no credit as well as what appears to be your lack of real world aviation knowledge and experienced shown by many of your statements.
I may disagree with something TransWorld might say and say so, but I respect that he seems to have the background, the experience that makes his statements worth reading and considering.
The Korean 737 accident has too many very unusual aspects still unexplainable with what little knowledge or evidence currently any of us may have. Some very clever and deep thinking individuals are right now scratching through remains of all of it trying to answer these self same questions. Does not automatically follow that what they find we will ever know as politics and money may intervene. Lets hope in this case they do not and we can all learn from it.
Calling out speculation that is contrary to the facts is very much necessary. The politics and money that intervene are usually based on such speculation. The internet allows for the publication of virtually anything at little to no cost, even complete fallacies by those pretending competence in the field and addicted to commenting. In the days of print media such nonsense would have been curtailed by an editor and a bank of real experts before it was published.
P.S.: Would you please do me a favor and point out where my comments indicated a lack of real world aviation knowledge and experience?
peter:
I appreciate the comments. I believe I have gone over something of an edge in pilots assessing but doing some thinking, its coming from the oddity of the whole situation.
I did have a commercial pilot license along with an instrument rating. I was not a Sully type pilot but I loved flying on instruments. My instructor picked up on that and we hammered unusual attitudes under instruments really hard. School did not allow aerobatics or spins.
Loosing control of an aircraft to me is just compounding. Follow the procedures, nothing new in aviation, its all their, the history is written in the many losses.
The MCAS 1.0 crashes were that in between aspect that the pilots had not been trained in (Ethiopian pilots knew about it but had not been subjected to it in a simulator). Their background was the trim wheels were easy to turn because the sims no longer reflected that as speed went up, manual trim went to being impossible.
I do still think crews with good CRM would have figured it out, Electric trim clearly was working and down trim stopped when you countered it. I think the pilots got overwhelmed with the situation. Clearly the Ethiopian Captain was not focui9ng on flying with his regular commands to the first officer to talk to ATC.
One area I continue to think is deficient is actually putting pilots to unexpected (vs rote) stress in odd areas and finding out if they remain calm and work the problem or go off track. If you can’t be trained to stay calm, or your nature is to whig out , then you should not be flying in any capacity.
How many crashes have we seen that were purely pilot induced? Aircraft working fine and they augured it in. Add a stress factor and then the reactions.
Where I think the system is failing is we no longer are learning from the mistakes. You may correct one airline, but another airlines repeats that mistake. Mentour pilot believes they do help correct things. I think they did to a large degree, but the system is now so large and pilot training and skills (and assessment) is so varied with a bias to keep a error prone pilot in the cockpit, those mistakes repeat.
How many times do pilots shut down the working engine? I can think of two very recent ones. Taiwan and ATR? 737-200 Cargo pilots out of Honolulu.
An good running engine shutdown has to be the highest plausible in the Muan crash, its the one scenario you removed power.
As to why the recorders are not powered off the battery bus, that is astonishing. They should have their own battery backup but you still have a battery bus if you put both sets on I believe is good for 1.5 hours. Power use by the recorders is minuscule.
Where I do not have a handle on is a large commercial aircraft. I never flew one of those. The SEL were basic. But a LCA flies on those same basic principles, they are the heart of aviation as that is where you learn them. How pilots who crash aircraft advance through the ever more complex aircraft is beyond comprehension (or mine).
I knew one guy who made it up to a DC-9 pilot level and could not keep ahead of the aircraft. What I told him was, if you can’t do that, then you need to consider a different career. He did. He found that at jet speeds it was past his limits and it was not getting better with time.
Somewhere in this is the huge need for pilots and what gets allowed to pass. Back to high school days where they passed people grade wise who never could do that level work. Did they do them any favors? Fortunately they were not pilots.
But then you look at Boeing and what finally shook it loose how failing they were to the world, was a door blank blowout that in a wonderful outcome, no one was killed and they finally started getting serious about Boeing issues and its messed up management of revenues regardless of costs to people.
And to be clear, the people on that aircraft have my deepest sorrow for their dying. The ongoing tragedy is all the lives of their friends, family in continuing on after those losses.
That loss never leaves you.
The other area that has not been researched, is why pilots with the same training react differently in real emergencies. Obviously they would have failed in the Sim if they acted contrary to training.
AF447 is a real example of how many pilots reacted to a real loss of speed, they pulled up. That is not only wrong per training, it makes no sense, if you actually loose speed, the only way to recover speed is to drop the nose (if your speed goes from 500 Knots to zero, you are already dead, you just ran into a mountain). As there are not mountains over the Mid Atlantic ocean let alone any at all at 35,000 feet……)
So, understanding why people do what they do and then training to figure out how to keep them from doing that is a vast research area. People learn differently so why would you train everyone the same if they don’t act the same?
The other reaction they found in speed loss was to push the nose down. That has some basis of sense, but again, its impossible for your speed to drop from 500 knots to nothing or close to it. Ergo, assess and then follow procedure.
Or, the training that you go to 5 deg nose up and 85% thrust that is the longer term response (though again why would you do anything other than maintain neutral ? – obviously its an instrument issue, most likely is frozen Pitots.
But like bells whittles and the various alarms that have proven not to work, they have failed to note what pilots do and then figure out how to get them not to do that.
Reuters came out with another stupid one, Authorities suspect both engine failed.
Not true, they know electrical power was lost, that does not mean no power, it can’t fly 10 miles or so and glide to a landing straight ahead let alone a 180 deg and more turns.
There are a lot of ways electrical power can be gone from both engines but it does not mean no thrust and it can mean a very minimal impact on one engine while the wrong one was shutdown (and even shutting down a damaged engine is not the norm, if you can get any power out of it you keep it up and running)
Not necessarily a stupid idea from Reuters and it may have come from investigators. A second bird strike from the go-around is a possibility too.
Large fan engines, and the CFM56/Leap engines on the 737 may not seem large compared to the GE90 series but none the less the vibration of a broken fan from the first bird strike can be quite large and/or a fire warning may have prompted the shut down of an engine. Bird parts into the core does major damage to compressor and turbine blades.
Again company/corp[orate culture, company procedures and training are factors that can dictate or confound pilot behaviors especially in what looks to me like an escalating deterioration scenario that defies direct comparison to other events.
The complete loss of electrical power is the most puzzling of all and even shutting both engines or their failure should not produce this condition.
@peter:
I often find its a good idea to go back to the start and run through the possibles.
Someone pointed out continuing the landing was a viable option. I have no experience en operating multi engine aircraft, so what the training says to do in a situation like that I do not know. But it was totally valid to continue the landing. In thinking about it I would think its the trained option.
As you noted there could be further bird strikes. You are already have gear and flaps down and stable on the approach (or so it seems). So that is going to be revealing as to what the training is and what the crew did.
What we do know is they continued to fly from a pretty low altitude for 4 minutes, return to the airport and put it down.
So power loss in both engines? Maybe. Power loss because a good engine got shut down? Of all the possibles that seems a higher one.
As its impossible to do what they did flight wise after data loss wihtout power, they had power aka thrust and quite a bit of it. They may not have had AC power (electrical) but they had thrust. Its a literally impossibility for them to have flown on without a fair amount of thrust. Doing a 180 is a huge scrub of energy. Pilots are trained never to try to get to an airport without power. Its sadly classic that almost everyone of those has resulted in a crash. The few that make it had altitude to work with.
Training wise, no power (thrust in this case) you make the best choice ahead.
Its possible they had thrust and no electrical power though if the right engine was making thrust and the left was off, they should have had electrical.
So either they had it and it did not or was not switched into the elecrial system or they had none but still had the battery system that allowed full control and thrust to do so.
This is the area that people who do not have a pilots license do not get. A license ensures you know what you can and cannot do, ie what is possible and what is impossible to do in various condition.
The problem is people do not follow their training all too often in an emergency. Following your training does not guarantee a good outcome. There are cases where you are going to have a bad outcome. What training does and following it is raises the odds hugely in a better if not good outcome.
This is a case of a US trained pilot who violated his training and severely damaged a perfecly good working aircraft.
https://simpleflying.com/ntsb-united-airlines-pilot-boeing-767-300er-landing-cracked-fuselage/
There is no explanation for it but there it is.
Report is out that bird feathers found in both engines.
https://simpleflying.com/jeju-air-boeing-737-bird-strike/
That does not mean both engine quit, often with birds that size, while some long term damage, engines can operate at full or significant levels of thrust.
Clarity needs to be done on what affect bird strikes have on the electrical drive systems.
Clearly there was thrust and a signfiant amount of it still to do t he post strike maneuvers.
It explains loss of power though specifics are still needed as to swap, are both AC Generators running in parallel or one on line and the other on standby?
And back to what is the training. Loss of one engine at least and both engines on final would seem a likely training scene. Loss or damage to both engine on takeoff or go around is a different aspect.
The Canadian 767 with no power lost 5000 feet in 10 miles. That was straight ahead gliding.
The Jejju 737 was never close to 5000 feet and it flew roughly 10 miles with an altitude grabbing 180 deg turn (if not thrust)
Two separate AC and linked DC systems on the 737 in operation for normal flight. APU is a backup replacing an engine AC generator (OK Alternator).
Engines can decay as they slowly self destruct rather than fail suddenly and fan blades can slice through a LOT of systems potentially. Also the vibrations of a 16-32 ton effective force hit of the bird(s) and one or far worse two full blades off out of balance can and has shaken components free such as IDG drives etc.
And yes in the mess of failings with warnings the crew just may hjave shut the wrong engine – ie due to a ‘fire warning’ on the best engine still running. You are correct TransWorld that the go-around suggest sufficient power but for how long is the question?
Decaying thrust with fire warning(s) may have prompted a rapid un-monitored shut down of one engine, maybe the best operating one, a hasty turn back before a complete failure and then limited means to slow and somehow still get on a runway. They underestimated the ground effect as many do.
Last thing they would have imagined was a concrete platform for the normally frangible aerials. Maybe a valiant heroic effort in serious deteriorating conditions that threatened to overwhelm them and ultimately did. Sad day.