Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 5. January 17, 2025
- What’s the future of the Boeing 787-8? January 16, 2025
- FAA understaffing affects air operations oversight; NTSB falls short, too January 13, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 4. January 10, 2025
- The market is ready for a 787F. But is Boeing? January 9, 2025
Boeing touts safety progress but opposes SPEEA initiative
By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 3, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing today issued an update on its year-long effort to improve safety protocols in the final assembly lines of the 7-Series commercial airplanes.
However, the update received lukewarm reviews from one of its leading unions and some retired employees charged with safety protocols who had complained for years about the safety culture.
Boeing has opposed a safety plan proposed by the engineers’ union, SPEEA. No meeting has been held since March 26 last year, and none is scheduled.
The update comes two days before the first anniversary of the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 in-flight blow out of a door plug on a brand new 737-9 MAX. The airplane had taken off from the Portland (OR) airport and was passing through 16,000 ft when the plug on the left side aft of the wing blew off the airplane.
Nobody was sitting in the two seats next to the plug. A teenager in the row in front of the plug was nearly sucked out of the plane. There were minor injuries and damage from the decompression throughout the cabin and cockpit. The plane made a safe emergency landing minutes later.
The cause was traced to line assembly personnel’s failure to reinstall four bolts holding the plug in place. The plug eventually shifted in its track and separated from the aircraft. The plug blowout also blew up Boeing’s recovery efforts from the 2018-19 MAX crisis following two fatal crashes. These were traced to a design flaw with a flight system known as MCAS.
In its report issued today, Boeing said that it has:
Overview
- Addressed over 70% of action items in commercial airplanes production based on employee feedback during Quality Stand Down sessions.
- Instituted new random quality audits of documented removals in high frequency areas to ensure compliance to process.
- Added hundreds of hours of new curriculum to training programs, including quality proficiency, Safety Management System (SMS) Positive Safety Culture, and critical skills.
- Mapped and prepared thousands of governance documents and work instructions for revision.
- Significantly reduced defects in 737 fuselage assembly at Spirit AeroSystems by increasing inspection points at build locations and implementing customer quality approval process.
Few details
Boeing declined to make an official available for an interview. It also did not respond to a question about any progress related to an outside safety committee appointed by then-CEO David Calhoun in the wake of the Alaska 1282 accident.
Boeing’s full press release may be downloaded here: Boeing Safety Update 1-4-25
Boeing did not detail outcomes of what it means by “addressed” 70% of action items. It’s unknown how many items were resolved, affirmed, denied, dismissed, corrected or implemented.
In addition, Boeing said that among the items it cited as safe progress in the past year, it:
- Created and filled a new position of Human Factors Functional Chief Engineer.
- Invested in improvements to the Speak Up system to strengthen confidentiality and keep employees who submit reports informed of the status and resolution of their report.
- Implemented “move ready” criteria across Final Assembly for the 737, 787, and portions of 767 and 777 to manage traveled work and mitigate risk.
- Instituted new random quality audits of documented removals in high frequency areas to ensure compliance to process.
- Released initial simplified installation plans into 737 production.
Related stories
- SPEEA, Boeing at impasse over safety program
- Boeing’s safety, labor battles heat up
- Strike slows Boeing’s march toward improving safety culture; Airbus’ SMS
Skeptics of the progress
Present and former employees, however, expressed skepticism over Boeing’s list. Relating to the “move ready” criteria, one former employee told LNA that in the past, the Everett factory identified downjack critical parts, parts that for structural reasons, had to be fully installed in the vehicle before it could be removed from one Control Code/Tool and moved down the line. Creating a new move-ready process encompassing more than the structural necessities for vehicle safety may introduce unintended outcomes. He said unnecessary delays and “useless” discrepancies are two possible outcomes.
This employee said that the random audits are a “reasonable short-term band-aid” to the removal process. But what’s missing “is a documented process of discipline and corrective action for those that circumvent the process. Renton had a God almighty large removal escape [Alaska 1282’s door plug] and publishing what happens next time to those who get caught gaming the system is a necessary step on the way to 100% compliance.”
The simplified installation plans highlighted by Boeing “is fraught with peril,” the employee said.
“The simplification of a known good, approved process introduces literally thousands of new error points into the system. Boeing’s problems were never centered on the Installation plans. Boeing was the victim of the aging of a very skilled workforce and the loss of institutional knowledge as that workforce retired. This includes the supervisory staff on the factory floor,” the employee said.
Failure to follow processes
Despite a year’s efforts, a current employee said that failure to follow processes remains a problem at the Fredrickson (WA) facility. Repeated leadership turnover also has been an issue. Some issues were reported through the Speak Up system a year ago, but no action was taken, he said. He fears reporting the problems to the FAA would be recognized by his managers as coming from him, resulting, he fears, in retaliation.
He said some facility managers still don’t understand the Safety Management System (SMS) that was put in place voluntarily and made mandatory during the MAX crisis. There hadn’t been a safety standdown in 10 years before former CEO Calhoun departed.
Another current employee said that Boeing Global Services (BGS) hasn’t seen any changes. Focus has been on Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA), understandably. However, this employee points out that BGS is “tethered” to BCA and the Defense unit and between Defense and BCA. There has been no safety standdown at BGS, he said, and complained that the BCA standdown following the Alaska accident was show and little substance.
Another retired Boeing employee, whose duties once included safety, said “addressing” 70% of action items identified during the BCA safety stand down “doesn’t mean they were fixed.” Audits, he said, “are part of the norm. Can Boeing speak to what the findings rate is with the audits? It should be more transparent.”
This employee noted that Boeing didn’t provide a metric to define what “significantly reduc[ing]” defects in 737 fuselage assembly at Spirit AeroSystems means. Nor did Boeing discuss the Everett factory, where quality control on the 767, KC-46A, and 777 lines suffered since the COVID pandemic.
SPEEA’s skepticism
The engineers and technicians union, SPEEA, is involved in every aspect of design and production. Yet the outside safety committee, headed by a retired Navy nuclear submarine admiral, appointed by then-CEO Calhoun after the Alaska accident, hasn’t contacted SPEEA for its input in the ensuing year. The new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, has not met with SPEEA. Upon assuming the position on Aug. 8, Ortberg said one of his first priorities is resetting labor relations.
SPEEA’s year-old initiative to create an Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) has been stalled by Boeing’s labor relations department, SPEEA’s Rich Plunkett told LNA on Tuesday. Plunkett is SPEEA’s Director of Strategic Development. The last meeting was in March. When he queried the department earlier this month, he was told the focus was still on post-IAM strike matters. No new date has been set to meet.
ASAP was previously implemented between the touch-labor union, the IAM 751, and Boeing, as well as with the company’s test flight department. But SPEEA executive director Ray Goforth told LNA in April that the impasse is over Boeing’s insistence that it control the information flow to a tri-party panel that consists of Boeing, SPEEA, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SPEEA wants information to flow directly to the panel without Boeing’s filtering it. The FAA representative, who was recently reassigned, was sympathetic to SPEEA’s position, says Plunkett.
Airbus has a similar program that LNA described in detail in an Oct. 7 post. Airbus doesn’t have an ASAP (this is an official FAA program). But it does have a Speak-Up program, as does Boeing. Speak-Up encourages employees to report concerns about safety protocol and quality control, without fear of retribution or retaliation.
At Airbus, the report is reviewed by a committee of experts in different areas, but not the ones from the management of that person, to assess if there are any lessons learned, or systemic lessons learned.
Spirit embraces ASAP
As for Boeing’s current safety update, Plunkett’s response was caustic.
“It reminds me of the 787 rollout,” he said. The first 787 was rolled out to worldwide fanfare in 2008. The airplane looked intact, but close inspection revealed wooden and cardboard doors and hatches, thousands of temporary fasteners, and other incomplete production elements. In some circles, the airplane was called the Potemkin airplane, after the phony village created to impress a Russian Czar. “It’s a hollow shell put on by a prop department,” Plunkett said.
SPEEA represents Spirit’s engineers and technicians. A new contract was agreed to last month. Included is an ASAP. Plunkett said that Spirit management embraces ASAP, unlike Boeing, and worked with SPEEA to establish the program.
Plunkett hopes that once Boeing acquires Spirit, which is targeted for this spring, Spirit’s embrace of ASAP will migrate to Boeing. But a former Boeing employee isn’t so sure. If Boeing structures Spirit as its own Boeing division, the company may be able to silo ASAP to Wichita, where Spirit is located, and prevent company-wide implementation.
Plunkett said this has been another stumbling block in SPEEA’s efforts to adopt ASAP. SPEEA’s position is that safety is a company-wide issue, not one confined to site-specific locations. SPEEA proposed including Boeing’s Charleston (SC) 787 facilities in ASAP. Charleston is a non-union shop. Plunkett said Boeing’s labor relations department dismissed the suggestion as a “land grab” effort.
Human factors position
“The one thing in there that I was heartened about was, and I was not aware of, was that they created a human factors functional chief engineer,” he added. “That’s fantastic. But one of the things you may or may not know is that the old Boeing had something called the ESB, the Employment Stabilization Board. It met on a regular basis where they managed the care and feeding of the various engineering skill sets.
“They were the ones in charge of looking at what is the current population’s capabilities, where are the schools going in terms of developing the skill sets, how do we get these folks, how do we develop these folks, and then the ESB met on a regular basis with the business units to place individuals in accordance with the business needs. That was a very robust system and a way to manage skill sets, and things like human factors not getting their appropriate seat at the table would be brought forth. Boeing did away with that” after the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, he said.
“Boeing is making some appropriate moves, but it’s like they’re putting out fires while they’re not recognizing the lightning storm that is creating these fires they’re putting out,” Plunkett said.
Furthermore, despite Speak Up, SPEEA will next week file an unfair labor practice complaint over the layoff of a union member whose employee reviews were good but who visibly supported last year’s IAM strike.
“They targeted one of our activists who is involved in, go figure, the ASAP negotiation team and the SMS implementation team and is part of the ODA (the FAA’s authorized designated representative program),” Plunkett said.
The Seattle Times published a long story about Boeing whistleblowers on Dec. 29. In it, complaints about the retaliation of some who communicated through Speak Up were reported.
“A panel of aviation safety experts in February rebuked Boeing’s Speak Up program in a report to Congress. Whistleblower advocates criticized Speak Up for commonly outing whistleblowers to the supervisors they’re complaining about, exposing them to retaliation. Managers sometimes investigated complaints against themselves. Employees mistrusted the program’s promise of anonymity,” The Times wrote.
Similar story (though much less detailed) on Bloomberg: “A Year After Boeing’s Blowout, Quality Remains Work in Progress”
Interesting comment about Ortberg:
“He’s really good at envisioning the future,” said Clay Jones, who preceded Ortberg as CEO of Rockwell Collins Inc. and helped hone his management skills. “I would argue Boeing needs less of that right now because they’re trying to make it through today.”
And regarding Mike Whitaker (FAA):
“His comments suggest that it will take time before Boeing can hope to be relieved from a production cap instituted by the FAA in the wake of the Jan. 5, 2024 fuselage blowout.”
On that last point, it appears that BA delivered just 341 jets in 2024:
https://airlinegeeks.com/2025/01/02/boeing-deliveries-tank-in-2024/
Regarding the Seattle Times article referenced above, this appears to be a paywall-free version from whistelblower.org
It’s a grim read.
“The Seattle Times: Most complaints against Boeing, FAA go nowhere, frustrating whistleblowers”
https://whistleblower.org/in-the-news/the-seattle-times-most-complaints-against-boeing-faa-go-nowhere-frustrating-whistleblowers/
Hard to believe that an outfit that’s been neck deep in civil aviation for over a century is only just coming into contact with ‘Just Culture’, ‘Mandatory Incident Reporting’ and ‘Human Factors’.
Still, they should have plenty of e-mail addresses and phone numbers of all their customers if they want some help.
I sound as if I’m not giving warm words of appreciation – but I am, especially to those who fill the newly created posts. All the best with all of that, don’t forget to ask “If it happened before, what’s to stop it happening again?” and “If it happened to them, what’s to stop it happening to us?”
Quality audits are what began the final downward spiral. They were used to cut labor costs vs 100% inspection.
Look ar the P-8 build documentation. It still uses the previous standard, while 737 commercial uses audits. The NAVY/ DOD refused to allow audits, insisting on 100% inspection.
And as far as removals, sure, documenting them can be an issue, but the real problem is the need for them themselves, because of Boeing’s own chaotic build process and poor supply chain management, and the squeezing and poor treatment of it’s suppliers.
But it looks oh so orderly on the time lapse films.
It isn’t.
The time taken to perform a single removal and document it can throw a line workers day hours behind schedule, and create a persistent time squeeze all the way downline, blowing up timeliness and barcharts as it goes. The only fix is overtime, but on high velocity lines like 737, it’s the kiss of death, as employees doing traveled work interfere with, or even stop in position workers from doing thier jobs, and creating even more removals to get at buried incomplete installations and other removals.
Thus, as always, schedule is still king, and quality/safety take a back seat. Same as it ever was.
” The time taken to perform a single removal and document it can throw a line workers day hours behind schedule…”
Exactly – the 737 plug (door) blowout is the prime example of the word games and documentation. Keep in mind a “PLUG” is not designed to be “opened” it has only two states INSTALLED or REMOVED . A DOOR normally has two states OPENED or CLOSED. Yes it can be Removed but that is not a normal state. Once installed, the door is rarely written up as being opened or closed since either state is obvious and easily checked. But a plug- once installed – cannot be opened- only removed. But if removed there must be paperwork established to replace or (re)-installed.
So joe lunchpail – not wanting to ‘ slow the line ‘ simply “opened ” the plug and later “closed” the plug thus avoiding any paperwork.
IMHO its that kind of games that are played daily when the schedule is prime.
and no amount of audits are likely to change it. Audits are AFTER the fact/issue and are rarely pro-active.
In this case it was another major disruptor, a Spirit traveller’s crew that pulled the plug. The support cell didn’t track them. Neither did the position managers. In fairness, years ago managers were told to Stat clear of technical issues. But they shouldn’t have even been on the airplane without approval from the support cell. But ultimate responsibility for the removal lies with the ones doing the work. It would appear there were no process inspections either. A savvy QA would have halted them. But experienced QA with the moxie to go out if their way like that has become rare, as the few that are left are always under time pressure.
Steve:
Well put.
One question, I thought it was a Boeing crew that opened up the Plug?
Missing I believe was that it was not treated like a removal so a hole in a follow up inspection.
Murky (again per what I am remembering) was who put the plug back in place and of course no follow up inspection.
No matter who removes it, they are required to initiate a removal record, and receive “OK to remove” from QA. It must state the reason for removal.
Before re installation, they must likewise receive “OK to reinstall” from a QA inspector.
On the removal record, ALL the same processes, procedures and specifications used in the original installation must be documented, all tests if any re done and documented, and approved by QA, step by step, with QA approval and a final “re installation complete.”
It’s a big pain, but an absolute requirement.
In this case, my understanding is that a spirit traveler team, working on a bad plug seal, removed the door. I do not know who put it back. There was apparently no removal record which would have flagged that as incomplete. These removal records would be attached to an existing installation plan that cannot be completed unless the removal is addressed.
If it was a Boeing employee that put the plug back, they had no experience. Anyone with any experience wouldn’t have touched that with a ten foot pole. (my view).
Further, the manufacturing support cell is responsible for tracking all activity, and especially traveled work. Anyone NOT from that manufacturing position going onto that airplane is required to sign in and out and state why they need access.
But chaos, lack of training experience/fatigue, scheduled pressure and personal agendas goof on the process, which is all a byproduct of the production system as it had evolved over the past 25 years or so.
This system is designed for speed and efficiency, not quality. And it depends on everything going perfectly, the first time. no late parts, no missing employees, no all hands meetings, no manufacturing errors.
Boeing wants to build airplanes like Ford builds cars. But that system fails spectacularly due to the size, and complexity of an airplane. That is Boeing’s worst problem. It’s production system has evolved into pressure packed, time compressed nightmare, always dancing with a multitude of problems, and not enough time or clever, experienced people left to prop it up.
Steve:
I will go back and read the report again, but as I understand it, process wise, an opening was not the same as a removal.
We know better, but that is the gap this started through.
Also, while it was Spirit that was fixing the rivets, I don’t believe it was Spirit that opened the Door Plug (again from memory Boeing won’t say who and the NTSB is still trying to determine that)
How it got re-defined from a removal catgeroy as far as it requires trhe same inspeions has not been tracked down.
I have said on a number of occasions, the AHJ conveniently takes things to the point of contact but then fails to investigate the background of how it got that way.
The impossible to turn Manual trim is another one. In a Sim it shifted from impossible to turn to one pilot could do it easily.
Its now been put back to what it should be but to change a program like that should have all sorts of alarms going on process wise.
I supported and MD-11 Sim and saw the process they went through including a non compliant noise issue from one of our fans.
It was reported as we fixed it, the management response was not to run sound test again but to put an enclosure around the fan/cooling unit.
It took us years to get it removed (we could not access the unit for maint so each time it failed, we had to pull a structure around it off to access.
Our manager finally told us, we take it off to fix it, the Sim Techs have to put it back on, its their structure not ours.
They finally got tired ot trying to put an increasingly failed set of panels back on as it was wood screwed on (quick to do it initially) and the screews wallowed out.
When it got to be a pain for them, they complained to their manager who finally had sound check run, yep, good to go, we had fixed the noise years before.
The point being, as the Sim was now approved with that structure and only if it was around the unit, they had no choice until they could prove it was not needed.
It was the right process for the wrong reasons. The fan was indeed out of balance and putting noise into the Sim that was not allowed.
Our problem was we needed a balance specialist who knew how to correct the problem. That in turn meant a schedule opening and guy available which took us a week to set up.
If there was nothing to be done then a permanent structure would have been fine but it would have to be setup to be removed for maint. Quick and dirty won.
@Steve
Do you have the documentation that Spirit crew pulled the plug?
IIRC there’s none and it’s not the Spirit crew’s responsibility to do that.
‘However, more critical for purposes of the accident investigation, the pressure seal is unsurprisingly sandwiched between the plug and the fuselage, and you cannot replace it without opening the door plug to gain access. All of this conversation is documented in increasingly aggressive posts in the SAT, but finally we get to the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.” Note: a Removal is a type of record in CMES that requires formal sign off from QA that the airplane been restored to drawing requirements.’
https://leehamnews.com/2024/01/15/unplanned-removal-installation-inspection-procedure-at-boeing/#comment-509963
Transworld, a note for you and Bubba2
Bubba2 wrote…….
Exactly – the 737 plug (door) blowout is the prime example of the word games and documentation. Keep in mind a “PLUG” is not designed to be “opened” it has only two states INSTALLED or REMOVED.
This shows a complete lack of understanding of the issue. The semantics of removal VS opened isn’t the problem with the plug door episode. In fact, this completely masks the discussion of the real issue here. The plug door, just to be correct here, has 3 positions, closed, opened 15 degrees or removed. But this doesn’t matter either…… The removal requirements are being driven by the need to UN-SAFETY COTTERPINS IN THE LOCKING BOLTS. These were previously inspected by QA and the invalidation of a previous bought off QAINSP line dictates the use of a removal process paperwork trail establishing a new QAINSP point replacing the invalidated one…. Since the locking bolts must be un-saftied and removed to EITHER open or remove the plug door, the door state is completely immaterial to the question of the appropriateness of the removal paperwork…..
I do not disagree at all.
But if the paperwork says its not the same, then may not and this case did not get the same/correct procedure procedure.
Yes it would be and is insane. But there it is.
Equally insane is an action that closes it and no paperwork.
I believe this answers some of the issue.
Re-reading it has PNBgeek spot on that opening or removal was the same, nut someone on the scene said it was not. You can see how it spiraled from there.
That gets back to process is onbly as good as the people managing it. I had the burdebn of a manager who violated safety process regularly, oversight knew abnout it and did nothing. How do you tell employees with a straight face this is important and then aid anbd assist bin the violations?
Nothing in this says Spirit had anything to do with the door plug. Their work focus (or lack of) on the rivets, its clear that they are telling Boeing to open the door plug.
Its a Boeing work group that is supposed to do that, both open anbd buttoning it up, not a Spirit group.
Directive had to be from a Boeing manager for open and push it back in place and as no paperwork was initiated, no inspections.
In a fundamental way, all of these issues flow from a serious flaw in the way corporations are chartered and governed in the United States. There are several issues with the current system which was never designed the way most of our institutions were.
In the latter half of the 18th century, the folks leading the effort that culminated in the Revolutionary War and the drafting and adoption of the Constitution came to the conclusion that they should start by hammering out some key principles, write those down, and then draft a constitution that provided a place to start on the journey of evolving institutions that enshrined those principles into working processes and touchstones. However, one big item they failed to anticipate was the emergence of the corporate form of business, which didn’t get going until 1827 when the financial community in New York started the process of putting together what would become the B&O Railroad.
Over the century that followed, the corporate form of business gradually became the way we structured virtually all economic activity. By 1886 the fact that there was no statement of principles guiding this transformation, let alone a governance process, had become such a problem that Chief Justice Morrison Waite decided to do it on his own, basically in the dead of night. What he did was arguably the single most outrageous act by any of our national leaders ever. He and his buddy Bancroft Davis added a headnote to the official summary of an otherwise boring SCOTUS tax case stating that the justices had decided that corporations were persons under the law, when in fact the justices had done no such thing.
By the 1940s, the situation had begun to trouble a lot of people, and Alfred P. Sloan, the legendary CEO of GM, invited Peter Drucker to do a study of GM and make whatever recommendations and observations he felt were warranted. Drucker had access to the entire company and its people. Out of it came his 1946 book “The Concept of the Corporation” in which he stated the obvious that this form of business had become the way we organize our economic society, and that without a set of generally accepted guiding principles and governance processes, it was at odds with our democratic form of government.
Sloan was not happy, but he couldn’t argue with it. He and Drucker remained friends. They would meet often for lunch or dinner, and Sloan used his personal wealth to found the Sloan School of Business at MIT, endow the chair that Drucker held, and put in place a massive scholarship endowment.
Part of the problem that Drucker outline, although not in the way that an accountant would, is what accountants would point out as being the limitations of accounting, and its implications on the balance sheet. These limitations and the governance problem the shed light on are the root of Boeing’s problem in this so-called culture of safety issue.
Accounting is limited to things that can be measured in monetary units and for which two independent teams of accountants can be expected to come up with similar valuations. There will be differences, because some valuations are based on judgements and the selection of methods for things like valuing inventories, but a variance should never exceed 10%, and should be a lot less than that. OK, that leaves significant elements of Pacioli’s equation (A=L+E) out of the financial records. Even the footnotes to financial statements omit these elements. That’s why in an M&A activity, the agreed upon valuation of a firm never equals E (the equities, or A-L) as reported in the financials.
OK, so what are the missing elements? On the asset side, the big one are the employees and their knowledge. Missing liabilities are the things we would generally call risks. And the missing equities, which Drucker pointed out that nobody likes to talk about, are the interests of society at large. This brings us to the question of who owns The Boeing Company and who is in control of its governance? The answers are very troubling because they are totally at odds with each other.
The shareholders’ ownership interest came to an end over a decade ago. Two independent teams of accountants could reasonably argue over just when that occurred. We’re talking about when, per GAAP, the equity section of the balance sheet went into negative territory. I would argue for 2007, but reasonable people could argue for a later date, perhaps 2012 or so. But the point is that despite that reality, people who have no ownership interest in the company have been permitted to govern it, for over a decade. That’s the fundamental problem here.
I really believe that Ortberg is a good guy. But he has an employment mandate to try to restore the shareholders to an ownership position. That mandate is totally at odds with the best interests of society and the employees, who by the way, just happen to be the current owners of the company. That’s a problem.
Every time I read about Boeing’s travails I am amazed that the “market” still values it at $127B (end if trading 1/3/25). What am I missing? It seems more like a candidate for some form of bankruptcy (which typically wipes out (or gives a big haircut to) the current shareholders and debt holders) so it can have a clean start.
It’s so tragic. Seeing that 1950’s nose on the current narrowbody is depressing. It should (and could have for less money) been and resembled a shrunken 787 (which is an elegant looking airplane). Even the 777-X with it’s 13 year time line (2013-2026 EIS) for the development of a derivative is looking a bit old.
Nothing like 25-30 years of finance driven management.
@RTF:
A fantastic summation and I learned about a huge missing bit to the Corporate puzzle evolution. Much appreciated.
A more current court then went onto put their stamp on a Corporation as a Citizen.
If it was not so tragic it would be funny that the same group that condemn so called revisionists then revisions like there is not tomorrow.
The reality was as technology evolved, so would the need for interpretation that adheres to the principles in the bill of rights (that was not written for We The People at the time but a select group of White people)
One of those evolving principles was more and more inclusive of who could vote to where now anyone (in theory though blocking and attempts to do so is a norm) can vote.
Moving from written privacy to phones and cell phones would be another.
Again thank you for clearing up a key aspect that I had not come across and failed to delve deep enough into the last Corporate ruling to understand its origins.
Yes, it is tragic. And while the most current outrages by SCOTUS have been by conservatives, there is ample blame for this mess across the entire political spectrum. Effectively, what Waite and Davis gambled on in that 1886 head note to Southern Pacific Railroad v. Santa Clara County, was that lazy law clerks would only read the head note and not the opinions that the justices wrote in deciding that tax case. That bet proved to be correct. Even William O. Douglas referenced that 1886 case in some of his opinions, and he was about as much of a lefty as anyone who has ever been on the court.
So while I find Sam Alito to be a perfectly disgusting guy, when he says that the majority opinion in the Citizens United case was merely a minor extension of long established precedent, he is exactly correct.
There is an obvious fix to this mess, and that would be be for Congress, out of anger with the crappy quality that Boeing has been delivering to both the Pentagon (think about the tanker fiasco) and American carriers, they should just seize the company exercise ownership just like they did GM back in 2008. Then, they should recharter the company as an American corporation under a new set of rules. They could setup a new branch of the SEC to oversee governance of corporations so chartered. Tear up that useless thing that Delaware issued that has no oversight at all.
I would go further, and require all board members to be licensed professionals whose license requires adherence to a minimal code of ethics, just like doctors, lawyers, and accountants. Heck, we even require professional licenses for young women going into business to paint each others nails funny colors. Why the heck do we tolerate these frat boy clubs of incompetents over whom we have basically no recourse when they do things like enable the likes of Stonecipher and McNerney to strip mine a company like Boeing (those are Sen. Josh Hawley’s exact words when he was grilling Calhoun last year). Given the importance of these institutions to all of us, this setup is totally insane.
By and large, the system of free enterprise has been, and will be massively beneficial. Advocating state controlled enterprise (facism) always ends poorly, but it seems a bad idea that rises from the grave at the behest of those that foolishly wish to apply extreme politics to an anomaly of capitalism, much like a sledgehammer to a thumbtack. No amount of high minded decompensation can explain it without revealing a disdain for a system that brings massive economic benefits across a broad range of people. And it STILL ignores the basic moral tenants of personal responsibility and accountability. Insisting on those last two points, rather than engaging in deeply discounted political pot shots is the actual solution.
I am not advocating state ownership in the sense that Stalin setup in the old USSR. That was every bit the disaster that our current system has been. I am advocating not allowing a board that has proven itself to be a bunch of incompetent thieves to avoid going into bankruptcy in hope that if they sell of enough assets and shove enough experienced people out the door, that they can regain an ownership position in fact, not just this fig leaf of imagination that we now permit. That’s irresponsible on our part, and it kills people.
As was done with GM, once the mess is cleaned up, sell a new issue of stock. That’s fair. Setup a board that Congress thinks is qualified, which we do now with the practice of putting on a couple of retired 4 stars to oversee the black programs. But this nonsense of using Delaware and Nevada charters that have zero oversight, and zero qualification for board membership is totally insane. There is no defense for this system.
It makes sense for the states to issue charters for startups and have some minimal requirements that are not obtrusive or that get in the way of entrepreneurship. That part of our system works well. But once a company is large enough that it is reasonably considered to be a vital part of the economy, then rechartering it as a national corporation with some stringent board membership requirements is the only rational solution.
How can anyone defend a system in which having the right buddies is the only requirement for board membership to oversee a vital part of the economy? That’s not capitalism. It’s medieval feudalism with a bunch of princes that think they are better than everyone else just because they found favor with the local overlord. In this case, that favor is found by approving C-suite compensation packages that are obscene. And that is exactly the way things work when a country is run by a communist dictatorship. It’s organized corruption on a scale that would have made the Roman emperor Claudius smile in approval, since that’s the way he ran things. We’re better than that, or at least I hope we are.
Agreed on the Corporations but to get reform there, we need reform in a number of other areas first.
Money rules and the money resides in Corporation and people who feel that what is good for them the rest of us can just suck it up.
Where is TR when you need him?
@RTF
‘GM’ may not be the right model. It’s shrinking its business so that there’s more *FCF* to pop up its shares and enrich the few!
It will be back on taxpayers’ lap within a decade or so.
Unrestrained capitalism lives at the cost of grinding up and throwing away people.
Its when rules are imposed that society benefits.
The Courts exist to enforce the rules of the mighty (those with money be it a corporation or an indivual)
Right now we are much closer to the Robber Barons era than not.
Yea I see Boeing’s spewing s as doing as little as possible and keeping the FAA happy.
And I am 100% on inspections. P-8 was a fantastic example. The military has long learned you have to inspect everything.
I know its a pipe dream but if the Airlines said we want y0u to follow the same process as the P-8/E-7?
Random quality control works for some processes, but not building aircraft.
My best one from working days was a Hot Work Permit (huge losses due to workers setting a facility on fire, some careless, some stupid but a loss – the Insurance people finally started to try to cage it).
Basicly if I was going to solder a pipe the Hot Work kicked in.
1. Can this be done some other way? In our case technology had advanced and the move to crimp connections was an answer there for most copper pipe work. Nice.
2. If you no alternative (welding work) then secure the area, have hoses standing buy, fire extinguisher and a check list of all the things needed to secure the area of flammables.
3. A different person then inspected the setup, cross checked all the tick points on clear and signed it. I used our most picky person because I wanted to be audited, he pointed things out, I fixed those until he was good with it. I always thanked him.
4. We then did the work, followed up by 30 minutes of active monitoring and eventually they extended follow up to 2 hours. I thought it should be mandatory from the start. Navy required a 4 hour quit of hot work before shift was done. Then every 30 minutes.
I felt an hour should be mandatory full on time followed up by 4 hours of every 30 minutes.
Sadly, I saw the process violated by a manager or he refused to intervene when I reported a problem.
You then get into that, is it worth my job?
One of the lessons driven home over and over again, any process is only as good as how it is implemented and if people cheat at it, paperwork can be faked.
At some point you get a door plug blowout. Adherence comes from the top.
Boeing retaliation on the so called secret reporting is sadly its norm.
Ortberg may change that but he also has not met with SPEA.
And if you report an issue vis the super secret squirrel line, if you hare the one that is the obvious reportee, then its not secret if a company is tracking you and wants to inflict pain.
When I quit work I used a list of all the managers to the top of our operation (they sent it by mistake and I kept it)
Nothing changed after I left and they had established a secret squirrel line. Obviously two parts of the company in conflict. I think HR realized they had a huge problem, management gave way but nothing changed, so spitting into a Hurricane.
Its all about process and if its sincere or just eye wash.
If the management that counts listens and agrees things need to work right, then you do not need secret squirrel lines.
There are a few comments that have nothing to do with the post. Get back on topic.
Hamilton
@Scott:
Not trying to be snarky but the posts all reflect on the issue, higher level addresses why Boeing got where they are now and the one of mine looks at process which is good, then how that process gets corrupted by an individual (manager who has what Mentour aka Peter would call a power gradient).
I saw one case where the uppers insisted it was not the individuals but the process that was important. While it was the individuals that were compensating for the process not working. All of it is related to Boeing and its employee relationships as well as the build failures.
I have seen serious off topic such as bringing Chinese military stealth aircraft into the posts that last look was not called out.
@TW. Going back to the 1800s, the Supreme Court, the USSR, Stalin and GM aren’t relevant.
Hamilton
TW
“I have seen serious off topic such as bringing Chinese military stealth aircraft into the posts that last look was not called out.”
New aircraft is on topic…in fact China has another new fighter J-50 fighter…see video for difference “New 6th-Gen J-50 Fighter Video Emerges in China – What You Didn’t Notice” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNf6tXpX3xg
So what is the US developing? that the question to the board
I’m curious, but why did you think SCS is okay?
One can argue that after a corporation reaches a certain size and have massive government contracts that the board of directors must pass some skill and legal tests relevant to the business they are in.
@Pedro
No I do not have documentation, that is my understanding of events as reported. Ot makes sense on several counts:
1. They did yhe original installation.
2. The underlying rework was theirs.
3. By the time the airplane is moving down the line on it’s landing gear, everybody has thier own job to do, are busy doing it, and haven’t the time to screw around removing bits a Spirit traveller crew is perfectly capable of.
4. There are no extra bodies standing around to do such work, and each worker in any given position is limited to the tools specific to their own work package.
5. Even if all those planets aligned, nobody was going to touch that plug without a management directive.
Removal records do not exist independently. They are generated and attached to a scheduled installation plan, and become part of the build records. Nobody wants a removal by Spirit attached to thier IP. Not even management.
If there was going to be a removal record, it should have been done by Spirit, under their own work orders, and their procedures. But if Boeing’s own employees did it, it’s tough to imagine who. Nobody has the time to have their day disrupted. The normal average mindset on the floor would by “not me, hell no”.
Management – the control of working parties in your facility is your responsibility, not theirs.
It’s true in maintenance, it should be true in production. You know about the state of the aircraft, what’s being done, what needs to be done, who’ll they’ll get in the way of, complications for shift handover etc. A working party doesn’t (though you can reasonably expect them to be following their quality processes too). It’s your job to fit them in safely so they, and everyone else, can get their jobs done.
Example; we have a shop send a team to audit the condition of thrust reversers a few weeks before a maintenance input. This involves retracting and de-activating the slats, opening the fan cowls, de-activating the thrust reversers then opening, closing, deploying and stowing them. Do you think we let the working party do that? Not at all. Even though the working party are good engineers who know about thrust reversers, it can’t be assumed that know anything about working on a live aircraft. Licenced aircraft engineers do the necessary, and that work is staged. Everything that they do they stamp for, and they stamp for returning it to normal. They are responsible for checking C/Bs are re-set and tools are accounted for and returned to stores.
Boeing should have a robust procedure for control of working parties.
They’re not the first to fall foul of this. About 30 years ago a BAe 146 on the flight line was worked on by a factory crew who used an AGS bolt (rather than an approved tool with a streamer flag) to baulk the flight controls. They didn’t stage their work, or practice tool control and they forgot to remove the bolt. Crew’s full & free check picked it up.
The factory crew were doing what they did in production, and had no experience of maintenance on live aircraft.
AFAIK the Spirit crew doesn’t have the authority or the experience to remove the plug, it should be handled by Boeing’s “door team”. But on that day, there’s confusion of whom did it. It’s still a mystery.
Dominic Gates has written up a piece based on the timeline in a NTSB report.
Spirit does not even have a door team in Renton.
Its all Boeing. Not following the procedure is the root cause, but NTSB has not released what they have for the whole aspect and may never if no one will talk.
Flight Global
Washington targets more than 130 Chinese firms as military suppliers
“A notice published in the Federal Register on 7 January reveals that the Pentagon has formally designated 134 manufacturing and technology firms as “Chinese military companies”.”
so looking at Federal Register Vol 90 No 4 Tuesday January 7, 2025 page 1105/1106…
Some key Chinese commercial aircraft companies listed
Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd (Comac)
COMAC America Corporation (CAC)
Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co Ltd. (Assembly Mfg Center)
The question? does this stop US companies on the C909 and C919 program that supply components/subsystems along final assembly systems (tooling support) to support current production?
If so, what will the response be from China?
just a fyi..
Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co Ltd. (Assembly Mfg Center) does A320 doors, C909 and C919 FALs…so why is it on the US Chinese military companies listing?
AW
Pentagon Identifies Comac As Chinese Military Contractor
“The U.S. Defense Department on Jan. 6 added Comac to a congressionally mandated list of Chinese military companies operating in the U.S.”
“The Pentagon designation complies with Section 1260H of the fiscal 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), but does not immediately trigger any new sanctions or export restrictions.”
“But the move puts the Chinese commercial aircraft manufacturer on notice. On June 30, 2026, Section 805 of the fiscal 2024 NDAA will come into force, imposing possible new contracting restrictions for DOD on companies placed on the list.”
do you expect any difference? US government consider Japan/Nippon Steel a national security threat.
Just the next step on US global decoupling strategy!
“Pentagon Identifies Comac As Chinese Military Contractor”
Just a ‘friendly” reminder to US companies that are currently or consider working with Comac and have US DOD contracts not to get new contracts from Comac
So who wins, European companies will expand their presence in China as Comac ramps up the C919 production rates and starts supplier selection for the C929
Not the first time IIRC
Back in 2020
https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/in-latest-china-jab-us-drafts-list-of-89-firms-with-military-ties/
New commercial aircraft launches are a good time for suppliers to innovate their products and advance technologies/processes.
Since Boeing will not be launching a new aircraft before 2035, and C929 is in the only show in town, Europeans suppliers will get the jump on technology development for the Airbus new single aisle in mid 2030’s and the US supplier base keeps falling behind on the technology curve.
When the C929 starts test flights in the early 2030’s and we find out how the aircraft is more advance than the “30 year old 787”, some on this board will say the Chinese “stole” technologies but in reality they help develop/foster it.
It seems Boeing has some catching up to do if it wants to maintain it’s marketshare in Defense fighter/bomber aircraft. Skip 5th Gen.
I “retracted” the landing gear, extended ailerons etc. from the picture shot last week in China. The clean configuration.
Placing this next to a fifth Gen F22, F35 or J20 and it becomes clear industries moved on.
https://groups.google.com/group/aviation_innovation/attach/885fd8c5becfa/Chinese%20stealth%20strike%20aircraft%20dec%202024.jpg?part=0.1&view=1
This is not a concept, impression or design. It is flying around today.
Take into considerations it take 5-10 years to actually fly a new prototype from its initiation. Also for the Chinese.
No worry: we’ve been assured multiple times that China will take decades to catch up with the western aviation industry, so we can just assume that the imagery is AI-generated / fake…right? 🙈
Oh, and on the subject of AI:
“How China Is Advancing in AI Despite U.S. Chip Restrictions”
https://time.com/7204164/china-ai-advances-chips/
👇
https://x.com/pstAsiatech/status/1877466435103981802
About six months ago:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GgSSmH9aIAADfDp?format=jpg
https://t.co/4fh2ufDeEv
“If the Chengdu Aerospace chief designer’s predictions of a sixth-gen fighter being operational in 2035 hold true, Joe said a maiden flight would need to take place at least five years before then, and thus a prototype would need to be ready around 2028. He expressed confidence this is possible, although Mulvaney predicted it will probably take China “until the late 2030s, if not the early 2040s,” to reveal a meaningful design.”
How objective are those analysts really? Miss informed anyway..
“Brendan Mulvaney, the director of the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute”
Apart from the objectivity of analysts, one also needs to question their thoroughness.
Many just seem to automatically dismiss China and automatically assume that the US is better.
One of @Pedro’s links above sums it up nicely: the ex-Google CEO Schmidt says he’s shocked by China’s AI prowess…but the interviewer says he’s shocked that Schmidt is shocked. The interviewer is in the real world, as opposed to Schmidt’s auto-assumed world.
Florida flyer sparks debate after showing ’30 pre-board’ Southwest passengers in wheelchairs
“Southwest passenger writes on X, ‘When we get off the plane 28 of them walk off'”
I can relate to this, when flying to Dubai on Emirates A380 there were over 30 wheelchair passengers and 95% walk off without assistance….flying is just good medicine!
Taiwan’s Starlux Airlines orders five more Airbus A350F freighters
“This second order from this fast-growing airline is another endorsement of the all-new A350F as the future game-changer in heavy lift markets,” Benoît de Saint-Exupéry, Airbus’ EVP Sales Commercial Aircraft, said in a statement.”
At best, (if ever) the 777x freighter is 5-10 years away based on development and 777x backlog
““Black boxes” from crashed South Korean plane stopped recording about four minutes before disaster, officials say”
“Officials probing the country’s deadliest aviation accident in almost three decades had hoped information from the so-called black boxes would shed light on why Jeju Air flight 7C 2216 from Bangkok belly-landed at Muan International Airport on December 29, erupting into a fireball.
“But South Korea’s transport ministry said Saturday that both the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) from the Boeing 737-800 had stopped working about four minutes before the crash.”
“Footage of the crash showed that neither the back nor front landing gear was visible at the time of the crash-landing.
“Prior to the emergency landing, the pilot made a mayday call and used the terms “bird strike” and “go-around,” according to officials, who also said the control tower had warned the pilot of birds in the area.”
https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/11/asia/south-korean-airline-black-boxes-stopped-recording-intl-hnk/index.html
Suggests/indicates a cut-off of electrical power…which is not something that should happen after a bird strike.
So, the focus is now on the plane, rather than the ILS platform.
Its been a while but I thought they had battery backup on the recorders. I believe they can still get system info from the various chips on equipment.
If that is a valid report, it does follow why the Air Data tracking quit.
As noted, there is no way a bird strike would stop power, t here are too many redundant systems.
Severe compressor stalls (bird strike and aftermath) are extremly violent and if continue, they could be rippling into systems.
I know of one that the pilots self reported, 747 out of SFO that almsot ran into a hill.
It was not that they did not have power, 3 engines were fine. It was so viol ant shaking they could not see the instrument panel.
No reports of continued explosions so it would seem to rule that out, but the power gap is top of the list issue wise.
Distance flow and the turn all indicate power on one engine. Partial power is possible on the other or they both could have been impaired.
Regardless, the ILS mound was never the main issue, its a secondary o0ne at best that huge numbers of airports have associated features that are as bad.
Confounding is both a turn (extreme if not total altitude loss if you have no power) and the excellent capture of center-line and the perfect runway track set down.
This is turning out to be something else category as far as crashes go.
Both FDR & CVR stopping is a seriously hampering the investigation on the origins of the belly landing.
The concrete platform at the end of the runway is a seperate investigation into the causes of the huge loss of lives.
Now we have no pilot feedback + no data.. Very unsatisfacoty.
I agree.
Shocking in this day and age that we’re still essenially using 1950-era designs for flight recorders.
Loss of power suggests that both engines were out…but one wonders why the APU wasn’t (or couldn’t be) used.
Sully started his APU without delay.
If there were so many overwhelming issues, they could well never had a chance to start the APU.
The APU takes power to get started. Maybe bleed air but electric as well.
If they were having engine and electrical power problems it may well not have been possible to start it, or dealing with no power. A 737 can fly without power but its a handful (an FBW type cannot, if all power is gone you have nothing, huge amount of redundant so that does not happen but if it gets down to direct its virtually uncontrollably as far as landing goes, it can fly but landing is going to be a crash of some type)
A320 has a RAT for electric power backup. The 737 has cables and no RAT.
It’s not the design of the flight recorders. It’s the design of the 737 which causes no recordings. If there is no electrical power, no microphone will work or instrument read outs.
Issue is that the 737 does have not just one but two large battery backups.
Neither one is hooked into supplying the CVR or more importantly, t he FDR.
That is the crime here, an independent battery per each unit is better but they have the meas to wire in battery backup that is very likely to provide the power needed as long as the hull is intact.
Even if it worked 90% of the time, that is hugely better than not working at all.
How often both fdr & cvr stopped working minutes before a crash/incident in recent years??
I don’t recall any such situation.
Usually the Cockpit voice recorder gets written over (yea bad regs there) because they leave the power on to it and they forget to shut it off or in some cases the pilot do it deliberately.
I am going to have to do a system dive to see how the power goes to them.
I would expect both systems to have continued power for some time after a power problem. Apart from that a cut-off was apparently 4 minutes before the crash. Was that the moment of the bird strike ? Theoretically some circuit breakers could have been pulled too.
Even if the flight recorders themselves had electrical power — e.g. due to battery backup — a lack of power in the cockpit would have meant that no data was being generated for the recorders to receive.
It’s possible that, after an initial bird strike in one engine, a second bird strike occurred in the other engine during the go-around. There would then have been no electrical power without the APU. No power would mean no instrumentation or communication.
The fact that flaps were not deployed would suggest a hydraulic failure, in addition to the apparent electrical issues.
It looks as if those poor pilots had a hellish situation in the cockpit.
Not official, but as a reference:
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GgU0qpeWYAAfDhx?format=jpg
Its impossible for a 737NG (or MAX) to pull up the gear and flaps and climb and fly at least 10 miles.
The reality is that at least one engine was providing a lot of thrust.
The probability laws say the wrong engine was shut down and the impacted engine was providing a lot of thrust. Engine often run up to high thrust rates after a bird strike, sometimes full thrust.
An important question is how power is split and did the impacted engine continue to have electrical power that was not switched over?
While they call them Generators, in fact they are alternators. AC freq (400 in this case) depends on engine speed, so there is a mechanism to control the Altneroar speed so that the freq is maintained.
The speed range for an Alternator is between Idle and Full thrust.
Voltage is maintained by a regulator and that is not speed related though output in KW is relevant to speed.
Regardless you have to maintain t he 400 hz. Stuff gets unhappy[y when you vary from that by less than 10%.
Its possible the Right engine alternator was damaged, or cutout when the electrical system saw an impact and things went outside shutoff limits.
But there had to be a lot of thrust still as a 737 is not going to do 180 degree turn and maneuver back to center line of runway.
You would have to be at 10,000 ft to glide 10 miles and that is straight ahead glide, not a speed shedding and drag inducing 180 deg turn.
I have yet to see an altitude but it would be under 2000 ft to start with.
“Theoretically some circuit breakers could have been pulled too.”
A pilot would have to get up, go to the rear panel to do so. So while “possible” its equally impossible that happened. Add in timeline does not support it.
Seattle Times
Superstar engineer John Hart-Smith skewered Boeing’s strategy | Obituary
““I had lived through the destruction of Douglas Aircraft and I saw the same thing about to happen at Boeing,” Hart-Smith explained in a 2019 interview.”
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/superstar-engineer-john-hart-smith-skewered-boeings-strategy-obituary/
We know Boeing has failed, what is going on going forward?
The reasons have been repeated over and over again.
Thanks for this comprehensive column on safety at Boeing.
AW
Boeing Set To Resume 777X Certification Flight Tests
“Boeing is poised to conduct a functional check flight on the third 777-9 test aircraft, marking a return to flight for the stalled certification program after a five-month grounding caused by the failure of engine thrust links.”
‘The flight, which is expected as early as Jan. 15, follows the replacement of the thrust link components on the four primary test aircraft in the 777X certification program. Delays to the effort caused by the component failure and compounded by a seven-week labor strike in late 2024 have already forced Boeing to push initial deliveries back to 2026.”
Ahh, “2026 EIS” now. Love how they slipped that in. Maybe they didn’y notice it’s already 2025.
What a hoot / can I get a 2029?
I don’t see it as funny.
A lot is at stake.
Is it hard to believe it will happen on that listed timeline?
Maybe not. But a huge amount of work has been done. The thrust links of course were not remotely suspected. Everything else has been well tested.
some things take time and how a thrust link holds up is one of them. Yea I would love to have the story as obviously something went wrong but it is something totally unexpected, its not like this is a new area.
We probably will never know if it was a tech issue or a management decision that lead to a tech issue. I lean to management.
TW
Airbus is developing the next gen thermoplastic fuselage that reduces the use of rivets (see article below) and Boeing has on order for 737 production line in Renton 6 new wing riveters (to replace the 1960 vintage) at $150m Seems like Boeing will be using old production processes for the next 20 years! Not funny but sad
@Trans
Never heard of the 90/10 rule??
“With Boeing in crisis through all of 2024, year-end data show Airbus again the world’s No. 1 jet maker, for the 6th consecutive year
As Boeing begins 2025 with an ambition to correct its course, the pressure from Airbus is intense.”
https://x.com/dominicgates/status/1879552812205699568
The Seattle Times:
https://t.co/a2FJyH283a
2024
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GhWDUj2aAAA_HQW?format=jpg
Annual deliveries 2002 – 2024 Airbus & Boeing
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GhWEhBDaAAAcqC5?format=jpg
Hardly new, over the last 6 years Airbus delivered 4202 aircraft versus Boeing 2233.
The gap has widened.
Who Knew?
“SCOOP from @michaeldmarrow – the Air Force is reworking the T7 trainer program, pushing back a key production date by a year and offering Boeing more cash if they add new capabilities”
https://x.com/AaronMehta/status/1879529279203213627
https://t.co/0BI1QLSX6y
Wildly off topic but as Scott is allowing it, yipee.
So, the problem with Fixed Price contracts is your supplier delivers exactly what was agree to, no more (and of course no less that if less, they pay to fix until its on target)
As usual, the USAF realized too late that they limited the specs and boxed themselves in.
Boeing had no reason to cost more money and not get paid. So you want capabilities? Pay the rent, its how fixed price contracts work. Same on the KC-46A when the USAF messed up the Wide View on the refueling boom, they are paying for that part to fix. They also are paying for the shcok absorber in the boom as they issued the wrong Spec for that. Ironically they are retiring A-10s as fast as they can which is what the change is needed for.
Boeing was looking down the road and built in significant upside capabilities into the T-7A.
I suspect one of the add on is more speed. Spec was Mach 1.01 and it has enough engine to go to at least Mach 1.5.
Not that they need the speed (it uses that precious fuel) but for short bursts of maneuvering you need the thrust.
We saw the same thing with some tests. Only so much was allocated there and if the USAF wanted more, well they were going to have to pay for it.
The T-7 is capable of being in the same class as the T-50 and can fulfill a lot of roles including being a low cost interceptor.
So Boeing was not so stupid after all in this case.
Boeing CEO in India in his first overseas visit
“Though the visit has been kept under wraps, it is learnt that Mr. Ortberg will visit some of Boeing’s facilities in Hyderabad and Bengaluru”
https://www.thehindu.com/business/boeing-ceo-in-india-in-his-first-overseas-visit/article69099964.ece
What would you do if you were Michael Whitaker?
RUD!
https://x.com/DavidCaroe/status/1880036195985682710
“Move fast and break things”™
Fantastic thermoplastics (Airbus)
“Thermoplastics can enable this, largely since the weighty fasteners that join conventional metallic fuselage sections together are either no longer needed or the number needed is far lower.”
“shells are joined by automated ultrasonic or laser spot-welding, rather than riveted together.”
https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2025-01-fantastic-thermoplastics
Seems like the technology is being developed for Airbus’s next gen clean sheet aircraft. And Boeing?
AW
Boeing Confirms 777X Certification Flight Restart
“Boeing confirms it conducted a functional check flight on the third 777-9 test aircraft on Jan. 16, setting the stage for a return to flight for the aircraft’s delayed certification program. The 2 hr. 9 min. flight marked the first time WH003 had flown since returning to Seattle from Kona, Hawaii.”
It’s been reported:
Investigators have found bird feathers and blood in both engines of the Jeju Air 737 that crashed in South Korea last month, killing 179 people