Boeing CEO: Lessons learned are key to certification of 737-7/10 and 777X

By Karl Sinclair

Analysis

June 2, 2025, © Leeham News: Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg believes that lessons learned from the 737 MAX crisis and subsequent in-depth oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are key to certifying the 737-10 MAX and the 777X.

He explained why during an appearance last week at an investors conference organized by Bernstein Research.

“We’re watching real closely to make sure that we aren’t over committing in terms of how many different seat configurations we can get certified in a certain period of time and the complexity,” Ortberg said. “It’s something that we’ve got to watch, particularly the Dash 10s that have types of complex seat configurations.”

Ortberg added that the 777-9 also features complex configurations for international airlines, offering luxurious passenger accommodations.

Kelly Ortberg, CEO of The Boeing Co. Credit: Getty Images.

“It’s going to be with us also on the 777-9 as we bring that into service, making sure we incorporate lessons learned here so that we don’t have seating delays on those aircraft,” he said. “Those aircraft will have the most complex configurations in the front of the airplane.”

Certification of the 777X stalled because of the MAX certification review. There have also been some technical issues that have been and must be resolved. But at long last, flight testing with all four test aircraft has resumed.

“I’m hopeful that we’ll get through the certification flight tests by the end of the year,” Ortberg told the Bernstein conference. “We may still be doing some ETOPS testing going into next year, but there is no real change to our forecast of getting that certification done so that we can start deliveries next year.

“It’s an airplane that has had the most flight testing done of any other aircraft we’ve ever done in terms of hours. We feel pretty good about the stability and our entry into service for the airplane that we’ve done enough flight testing on that it’s going to be a great airplane.”

Increasing 787 production

The CEO told Bernstein that 787 production will increase to 10/mo soon. The final assembly line at Charleston (SC) was designed for 7/mo, a number reached before the COVID pandemic began in March 2020. Production rates were reduced to a mere 0.5/mo during the pandemic. The rate has been slow to resume due to quality control issues that were discovered during the FAA’s crackdown on Boeing following the MAX crisis.

“When you look at production, going to seven [a month] soon on the 787 in Charleston, my understanding is that without a lot of capital investment, you could get to 10 there. With the demand now, particularly with these new orders, it looks like there is potentially demand pressure to go higher,” Ortberg said.

An analysis by LNA years ago concluded that the plant can go to 12/mo with some additional investment. The peak 787 production between Charleston and Everett (WA) was 14/mo. All 787 production was consolidated to Charleston during the pandemic, and the Everett 787 space is being reallocated to the expansion of 737 MAX production.

Boeing purchased more land in Charleston for expansion, presumably for the 787.

“Once we get to seven, we can get to that 10 within the existing production, generally within the existing production footprint,” Ortberg said. “I think to go beyond that’s going to require some additional investment in our facilities there. We’ve authorized that, so we are investing in expansions so that we can go to rates beyond 10 a month rate.”

Ortberg echoed many of the sentiments in the visit with the staff at Aviation Week in an in-depth interview at the Bernstein conference.

There was some fresh ground covered, however, on the appearance:

  • Boeing expects that China will begin taking commercial aircraft deliveries again next month;
  • Commercial aviation was confirmed to be sold out through the end of the decade;
  • 737 MAX production rates are quickly approaching the FAA limit of 38/mo;
  • Ortberg expects deliveries to hit 42/mo by the end of the year, 47/mo six months thereafter;
  • The new fourth FAL at Everett will be for MAX10 production;
  • The 787 program is also quickly gearing up to 7/mo in the near term;
  • Supply chain stability was “in good shape;”
  • Spirit AeroSystems’ quality has vastly improved;
  • Interiors (seats) remain a sticking point; and
  • Every customer is reporting a higher quality of delivered product.

All are very positive indications of the ongoing turnaround.

Annual air show Aviation Week interview

Aviation Week magazine has published interviews with the CEOs of Airbus and Boeing in advance of the Farnborough and Paris Air Shows for nearly two decades. The interview with Ortberg was published last week.

Kudos to Ortberg for openly admitting what has been known in the aviation world for some time.

Since 2018, when the first of two fatal 737 MAX crashes occurred, Boeing has either been marking time or regressing in its recovery efforts.

Some seven years later, this is a clear departure from the stance of previous leadership. Ortberg’s predecessor, Dave Calhoun, had been tasked with the overhaul of Boeing and continually reassured customers and investors alike that Boeing was on its way.


Related Article

The company is now in a watershed period, where clarity of direction and methodology is essential.

“[So] we’ve got what it takes to recover this business. I’m not worried that we’ve lost a step and can’t recover. We’ve just got to execute better,” Ortberg said in the Aviation Week interview, about the beleaguered Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) division – one of the problem children.

Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA) and Tariffs

Ortberg’s wide-ranging and frank dialogue was part of an interview with the AW&ST editorial staff in Renton (WA), before his appearance at the Bernstein Strategic Decisions Conference.

“It’s a very dynamic time. Every day is a new day with tariffs,” he told the magazine.

With those few words, Ortberg perfectly (and gently) summed up the current political and economic climate in America.

Ortberg steps into the breech at a critical time in Boeing’s history, where uncertainty is a daily occurrence, and what held true at 9 AM is done and dusted by 4 PM.

None of which is the company’s doing, to be clear.

“I’m in regular contact with the administration, all the way to POTUS,” he told the magazine. The cynical amongst us might quote the famous line, “Keep your friends close. Keep your enemies even closer.”

On the subject of items that are within the purview of Boeing, even with limited (certification) control, Ortberg had this to say:

“We’re hoping to get the two variants of the 737 MAX wrapped up this year so we can start deliveries of the -7 and the -10, two airplanes that are very, very important to our customers and our backlog. And then the 777-9, which will be the largest dual-engine widebody in the market…we’re making great progress.”

FAA oversight process adds to delays

Why has certification of two more derivatives of the 737 taken so long? In part, it’s because the entire certification process underwent a top-to-bottom review after the 2018/2019 MAX crashes and subsequent discoveries of design, safety protocol, and quality control defects. And, as it has turned out, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) kept asking more questions as new areas of concern were uncovered.

It’s the issues we all know about, one Boeing customer told LNA. But additionally, the elapsed time is just allowing the FAA to dig further on different things. The passage of time adds more pressure to resolve these new issues now, before certification, rather than certify the aircraft and require retroactive fixes.

“The question being asked with all these delays, why don’t we just get it done now? Why don’t you deliver a definitive airplane rather than deliver aircraft and then have people do stuff in 18 months or two years?

It’s more of this holistic approach of saying, taking advantage of the delay and doing more than just what was acceptable in the past, because these airplanes should have already been in service for a year or 18 months.

Previously, it would have been impractical to delay things to incorporate fixes, revisions, or upgrades. But now, is it impractical to delay these actions?

Proceeding with a new aircraft

Boeing has been under years of criticism for failing to launch a new airplane program. The last time a clean-sheet program was launched was in December 2003, with the 787. All aircraft models since then have been derivatives of the 787, 737, 747, and 777.

Ortberg told Aviation Week and Bernstein that he does not believe the market is ready for a new aircraft.

The new technology, which would deliver the needed step-change in efficiency, is not there, Ortberg said. Notably, he clarified that the company is not yet ready to assume the financial burden of such a commitment.

Ortberg places great faith in the hope that when the MAX 10 and the 777X are certified for service, the gap between Airbus and Boeing will narrow.

The ongoing 777X certification delay is something he says he could never have imagined. He told Aviation Week, “I’m still shocked. Now, it’s partially driven by circumstances outside of the 777X program. The additional regulations that emerged and the entire certification process were driven more by the MAX situation than anything related to the 777X. It’s remarkable that it has not been out of service for years. But it isn’t, and the task at hand is to get it over the finish line.”

His was a realistic assessment without dodging the question of what must be done to remedy the situation.

There is, however, a bright light at the end of the tunnel, in that regard, he told the magazine. “Remember, we have half a trillion dollars of backlog, and most of that is commercial products. We have huge demand for those products, and I would say there’s more focus on upgrading existing aircraft, putting new engines and capability on them.”

Ortberg didn’t identify which aircraft fall into this category. But in Boeing’s stable, only one fits this description: the 787. The 737 and 777 received new engines and upgrades in the MAX and 777X. The 787’s design roots for the airframe and engines date to the late 1990s and early 2000s. The days are approaching when the 787 will need significant upgrading, including perhaps new or substantially improved engines.

Additional reporting by Scott Hamilton.

68 Comments on “Boeing CEO: Lessons learned are key to certification of 737-7/10 and 777X

  1. “Interiors (seats) remain a sticking point”

    Does anyone know what caused the recent, significant deterioration in seat/interior supply — as evidenced by the sharp drop in frame deliveries in May?
    Is it related to the trade war?

    Also: any improvement in the LEAP delivery numbers?

    • It might be just as simple as Boeing’s edict: Do it cheaper or lose the contract…

    • Seats, toilets, galleys, carpets… are “Customer Furnished Materials” they buy directly and have shipped to the FAL

      • Sure.
        But that doesn’t explain why there’s a sudden shortage of those items — with emphasis on “sudden”.
        Things have noticeably deteriorated since April.

        • There is a much higher replacement frequency on seats (and carpets) and seats are refurbished frequently and then replaced with new at 3 years intervals (LH and others). So the high volume is there and airlines want the low mass, slim seats to squeeze more “self loading cargo” in.

          • That still doesn’t explain why there was a sudden deterioration from April to May.

            Could be coincidence, of course, but I’m tending toward tariffs / shipping issues associated with the trade war.

    • What makes you say there’s been a sharp drop in deliveries in May?

      The official numbers haven’t been released yet but there are 50 Boeing delivery flights listed at aviation.flights compared with 45 deliveries in April and 41 in March.

      • I gave yesterday’s Planespotters MAX/NEO numbers in a comment below, and I’m only counting line deliveries.

        For both OEMs, line deliveries were heavily backloaded in the second half of the month — the first half of the month saw very little action.

        AB didn’t get near its target of 50, and BA also fell well short of 38.

        BA had respectable 787 deliveries, but AB’s deliveries of A350s/A330neos were meager.

        • How many deliveries from the inventory?

          I know there’re a couple (~six-year-old) ex-China 737 MAXs sent over to India near the end of the month

          • There were just two MAXs from inventory in May that I can see.
            29 MAXs off the line plus a 737-8A. The official figures could be one or two out either way.

            The 29 is higher than the previous two months so I still don’t get Abalone’s query re. seating.

            It’s also been announced today that Boeing hit their limit of 38 new builds for the month on May 30th. Obviously ground and flight testing mean some of these won’t be delivered yet but from June’s figures onwards they should be delivering around 38 until the next ramp up.

  2. “Boeing Confessed To Fraud—The FAA Just Put It Back In Charge Of Certifying Its Own Planes”

    “The FAA has renewed Boeing’s authority to self-certify aircraft designs and production processes, extending the company’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) for another three years — even as the plane maker has just escaped criminal charges (despite confessing).

    “The FAA’s move, announced without fanfare when it was granted earlier in May, allows Boeing to return to performing critical certification tasks on behalf of the agency. The ODA program delegates regulatory responsibilities to manufacturers, streamlining oversight while preserving accountability through FAA supervision.”

    “The FAA framed the renewal as contingent on “strict conditions and increased oversight.” The agency claims it will embed more inspectors within Boeing’s operations, require expanded training for Boeing’s self-certification staff, and audit delegated functions more.”

    https://viewfromthewing.com/boeing-confessed-to-fraud-the-faa-just-put-it-back-in-charge-of-certifying-its-own-planes/

    Continuing from the link:

    “Boeing is said to sacrifice quality and safety for financial gain, but they haven’t actually gained. Boeing shares are at 2017 levels, and we’ve had 20% inflation since then.

    “In most cases share price represents the discounted value of expected future cash flows, so long-term value is reflected in price. Boeing would have been rewarded by delivering quality products that airlines want to buy more than competitor offerings, and that airlines are willing to pay a premium for.

    “Instead they have products they need to discount heavily in order to gain orders. And they have faced limits on their production because of questions over their quality process. Share price still lags even with this unshackling by the government!”

    • Now renewed ODA for the gang that can’t shoot straight, eh? Visions of that 737 door plug
      floating slowly to earth a few months ago..

      #shouldbefine

    • Imagine the embarrassment if the request was approved prior the Alaska Airlines accident!

      As reported recently:

      “The Office of Inspector General said FAA officials in 2023 sought to allow Boeing’s ODA to resume issuing final airworthiness certificates for 737 and 787s. Before FAA senior officials could approve the request, the Alaska mid-air emergency occurred.”

    • Not addressed by the comments is the FAA has no choice.

      Even if it took ODA back, it does not have the engineers nor has congress given them the money to hire them.

      It would take FAA years to take over ODA.

      Also missed is the key is who the ODA inspectors report to. The used to report to the FAA directly. With a language change in legislation that could be done.

      I forget what half measure they did do but it was not revision to FAA direct reporting.

      Congress can pass ECASS but not ODA authority? Hmmm, which is more important?

  3. EIS for the 777-X next year? I’ll believe it when I see it.

    • Agreed.
      I’d like to see some detailed info on the required thrust link redesign — though I don’t think that will be forthcoming.
      I saw a recent article confirming that the thrust link failure was vibration-related (as opposed to a materials spec issue, for example)…confirming something that I discussed with (Boeing insider) @A Jones here a few months ago. Probably rooted in shoddy higher-order simulations during design. Not something that can be fixed in a jiffy.

      Ditto general sentiment as regards the nacelle overheating problem on the MAX.

      Show me — don’t tell me.

      • Yes, that thrust-link issue was “fixed” remarkably quickly.

        Reassuring..

        • I take that as sarcasm.

          If you read the article I posted, it was a weird harmonic on one side.

          They did a quick fix for the cause and a redesign of the tube that allowed the odd airflow.

          As a mechanic I would put that into the realm of, ok, odd stuff, not part of Boeing issues. The kind of things that happen (A380 wing skin issues and the out of tolerance on the RR engine for it that (Qantas 32?) revealed.

          Odd stuff does happen and that is why we test.

          No question sorting out the corporate issues from a typical devleo0pment is
          required and others will have their opinions.

      • Engine nacelle is subcontracted to Safran, so it was their problem to fix.
        The business was previously known as Hurel-Hispano

        • @Duke:

          Oddly it was a Boeing issue as they had the design on it.

          No idea why, but it was Boeing all the way on it. I was not expecting that either.

          I went back and found my post on it.

          https://archive.ph/w0eC1

          This was another link I found though it did not go in depth.

          https://avweb.com/aviation-news/boeing-solves-777x-thrust-link-issue/

          Each one refers to Boeing as have all the other initial reports I saw.

          Again it is odd and not a clue as to why Boeing was involved rather than GE or the Safran but there it is.

        • What’s wrong with the engine nacelle? Something new??

          Lmao 🤣👇🙄
          > They are responsible for the exhaust system, including the complex-shaped unit that guides exhaust from the GE9X engine.

          • Clue: The Safran business division is called Nacelle
            https://www.safran-group.com/companies/safran-nacelles
            And yes the thrust reverser mentioned is part of what they make

            “The nacelle is a structure that “links the engine to the airplane”. It comprises an air inlet, engine cowl, thrust reverser and exhaust system. It’s a complex system, and plays a critical role in the aircraft’s performance”
            You’re welcome

          • Read FG, it has a good explanation of what happened. Hehe.

            Note: Have you seen nacelles? They aren’t thrust links.

  4. Thanks Karl and @Scott for this comprehensive article. Great job!

    As reported during Trump 1.0

    > Trump has… put pressure on U.S. allies to buy products from Boeing..

    “U.S. officials and defense industry sources said that weeks after Trump pressed the Emir of Kuwait in 2018 over a long-delayed deal for Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets, Kuwait said it would proceed with the order.

    Boeing is also one of the largest U.S. exporters to China, and *Muilenburg told an aviation summit in Washington that purchases of its U.S.-made aircraft by China could be part of a sweeping trade deal currently being negotiated*.”

    US politicians are heavily involved with deals by Boeing, Obama once joked Boeing should have sent him a Rolex because he was their best salesman.

    Manufacturers of US aircraft (Boeing), engines and parts are major beneficiaries under the Trump 1.0 trade deal. Boeing enjoyed great success as a major exporter of a superpower, it is not an innocent bystander.

  5. Its potentially encouraging report. Pretty well backs up what I have read from various sources.

    As noted before, Boeing has a great backlog, its execution that is the issue.

    We have to see longer term if its getting solved or not.

    787 re-engine is interesting. All 3 majors would be in the running, I think PW has the advantage with the GTF experience (vs RR who is running test items)

  6. Good work by the CEO- but unless and until a way is found to remove the Stonecipher-Welch-McDonnell interns from middle management and the Bored Of Directionless- the beatings will continue until morale improves.

    Harry Stonecipher, 2004, former CEO of The Boeing Company, reflecting on the late 1990s
    ” When I say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm. It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money. “–

    • You have forgotten the shambles Boeing was in before the merger.
      The production – not the engineering- was frozen in the 1960s and required a 3 week shut down of assembly process in the mid 90s to fix it .
      Financialization has been a disaster in general for all US manufacturing not just Boeing. The upside was fine for a while and great for shareholders but the shareholders have paid a steep price – as they should for management dereliction.

      • @Duke:

        Thank you for the reminder. I think about that from time to time but not in a topic so have not listed it.

        As I recall severe wiring issues? Alarms hooked up wrong engine?

        Pretty vague as I believe there was a crash when they shut down the wrong engine and they checked. If memory serves (very possibly not) they simply shut down the wrong engine but found others that were mis-wired.

        Was that the 737 that glided into a crash on the approach to an airport in the UK?

        I would add the board was fully complicit in the issues and in the demise including the illustrious Calhoun who had a very selective memory.

        No free lunch but you sure can stretch out the agony so the CEOs get their lucre when they are ousted over and over again

      • Because BA mgmt rushed to ramp up production, don’t you remember? 😃
        It sounds familiar, BTW.

        Around the merger in 1997:
        > Boeing [had] been struggling to right itself since … fall [1997], when a surge in commercial airplane orders overwhelmed its assembly lines

      • ”'”The production – not the engineering- was frozen in the 1960s and required a 3 week shut down of assembly process in the mid 90s to fix it …”
        The reason for the shutdown ( 1998 ) as I recall – having retired in 95 ) was the result of ‘ overreach ‘ in automating computer systems and whiz bang (mis) management systems eg (DCAC_MRM if memory serves-Define-ControlAircraftConfiguration – Management Resource Method )- AND the not so wunnerful 1997 (love fest) buyout between Phil Condit and Harry Stonecipher of McDonnel Douglas and the (IN)famous Neutron Jack Welch management methods which put stock price uber alles .

  7. Mister Ortberg’s claim that Boeing’s aircraft deliveries to China will resume “next month” made me smile.

    Also, what’s with this C-suite thing of *always* speaking in euphemisms, metaphors, and the like? It’s almost as if obfuscation rather than communication is the goal..

    I value plain speech, which can be either trusted, or clearly refuted.

  8. 42 MAXes per month by the end of this year, according to Boeing’s latest CEO. I thought there was some FAA-imposed
    limit of 38 (not that they’re gonna be near that number, either).

    Bookmarked for future reference. 😉

    • Indeed.
      Line deliveries for the MAX in May were 30 when I checked Planespotters yesterday morning. Maybe more were built, but are sitting out on the tarmac waiting for interiors? Or maybe not.

      A320/321neo deliveries were just 32 yesterday morning, so shortages are affecting AB more than BA. In that regard, see @Meg’s interesting comment below…

      • Maybe we should compare notes on end-of-year deliveries
        for the two companies; possibly including a quality of life
        indicator.. justice is eventually served, though it often takes some time.

        • Indeed.
          And, of course, EBIT is even more important than delivery numbers. I’m wondering if/when we’ll ever see BCA hit meaningfully positive EBIT.

          By the way, there’s a typo in my post above; the figure for AB yesterday morning was 37…not 32.

          (I sense an enraged correction coming from the usual suspect…😉)

    • We live in a post-Soviet simulation where oligarchs run the show

  9. This is very valuable as he gets down into the tech details of replacing components on Russian aircraft as well as China (less tech details but conveys the picture). He delves into Boeing with facts on the MAX (or almost certainly the NG) and I was not aware of those details of non US suppliers.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIxUJEjIOmE

    You can see why Ortberg is iffy on what is going on, he simply does not know until Tariff(s) happen or do not.

    • As if I should trust any youtuber for stock picks! How not to waste time on the net…

      • Truly stunning you are not aware of Mentour. A 737 Captain, instructor, check ride. He wrote the public video on MCAS (which he had to take down as he used a Level D slight simulator to demonstrate and the owner did not want to be associated with MCAS in any way).

        He has gone onto a staff of 4-6, quit flying and is doing presentations of both incidents and general Aviation discussions.

        I don’t always agree with his take but he always leaves room for a disagreement.

        Short of some of the Behind the paywall on Leeham its some of the best aviation information you can get.

        Nothing in his presentation is wrong that I can see. The MC-21 drop off in fact is shocking to me. Bjorn can (and probably has) done the math, I certainly can’t.

        The C919 sites the issues with trying to go it alone (also per Russia) and not just areas like electronics, the specific systems for aircraft you have to develop that others have and perfected.

        So go ahead and knock it, it just reveals what is behind Door 3.

        It truly says where your head is when you can’t sort out good material from bad.
        It also says you are not in this for discus ion but an agenda.

        • Oh lord, just because one is an experienced 737 pilot, therefore I should take his word at face value about mc-21 and others?? Jfc. 🙄 Does that person has any access of non-public information? How?? He works for UAC?? I’d listen to those who have hands-on knowledge, rather than hearsay and gossip (for clicks).

          PS: Let me remind you how you dismissed what Abalone posted, calling his sources propaganda.

          • SSJ100, not mc-21

            PS2: This is what’s at the top of YouTube description:
            > “For 48 hours, enjoy 15% OFF on all Hoverpens and free shipping to most countries with code MENTOUR. 10% after that.”

            The sources listed are a bunch of yt videos, tell me how many of those have you watched? Can you vouch for each of their accuracy?

  10. It seems like CFM LEAP engines isn’t in short supply when Boeing needs them, but Airbus must held back production due to lack of engines. Seems anti-competitiv behaviour from CFM to me.

    • It is curious.
      Although, one must remember that BA has admitted to stockpiling more than 100 engines in the past months, while MAX line rates were low.

      • @Abalone

        It is two different engines…though there are some components that are probably “similar” it’s not as if you can easily swap one from a BA to an AIB installation. If anything happens on the BA side…it would probably involve delivering more spares to lift any MAX AOGs if the production side was lagging.

        • I’m quite aware of the difference between the engines.
          Who said anything about swapping between them?

          • You implied that CFM could just move capacity over to Airbus. It is not that simple.

          • @ Casey
            I didn’t imply that at all.
            CFM pre-allocates certain numbers of slots to the various LEAP sub-types.
            @Meg’s point was that CFM seems to be able to produce the alotted numbers of LEAP-1Bs, but not the alotted number of LEAP-1As. I retorted by pointing out that BA has been hoarding LEAP-1Bs in the past few months, which would (at least partially) explain the effect to which she alludes.

          • More like hoarding over the last nine months!

    • Airbus came to a deal with CFM at the end of last year where they were sent engines that were meant for the aftermarket. As a result they’ve had fewer engines for the first few months of this year.
      They’ve said all year the supply of engines will be an issue for about the first six months of 2025.

      • That doesn’t explain hold-ups in AB’s widebody deliveries…

    • @Meg:

      Boeing has at times had zero production and has had tried ramp up only to stop again (aka the post door blank blow out).

      Airbus is trying to take pretty much 60 per month.

      The engines are different (diameter is not the same so none of the internals are the same either).

      Parts are a holdup and the higher volume the worse it is. So even if you could shift people back and forth, CFM does not have the parts.

      Safran has the assembly for Airbus (and no I don’t know how much of that LEAP-A engine is US sourced) – so its Safrans fault! No, they work within the CFM system.

      So yea, CFM has build up excess to needs on the -B and the -A has taken all they could get steadily.

      You also need to keep in mind the -C. I don’t know where that is assembled, but its a -A engine size. CFM has to keep an eye on the China ball as long as they are the C919 engine supplier. The protracted C919 development likely means excess engines for that one as well.

      And the other twist is, with all the LEAP issues, there is a protracted rebuild saga and early shop visits that takes PARTS! So you need to build up a larger supply chain parts build that you had not anticipated (should have maybe but you go with your projections until they are proven wrong and it costs if you estimate too high so you go with what the design team says it should be initially).

      P&W is having those same issue except worse as some of the problems demand shop visits well ahead of time. Even with issues resolved they have a significant number of engine to run through.

      P&W got an early jump as its engines have more upside, so CFM could have had lower initial projections as well – note I say could. Factors we don’t know about can be in play.

      CFM is not going to stiff Airbus, they are their most reliable customer. It does not mean they are not behind the 8 ball in this case.

  11. “Spirit Airlines may cancel Airbus aircraft deliveries amid tariff uncertainty”

    “Spirit Airlines has warned that it may need to cancel Airbus aircraft deliveries amid tariff uncertainty since the US government introduced new charges on imports in April 2025.

    “In a SEC filing posted on May 30, 2025, the ultra-low-cost airline voiced concerns about the impact of new tariffs and the potential for retaliation and escalation between countries.”

    ““We may also seek to postpone or cancel delivery of certain aircraft currently scheduled for delivery, and we may choose not to purchase as many aircraft as we intended in the future,” said Spirit Airlines. ”

    https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/spirit-airlines-deliveries-airbus-tariffs

    ***

    Qatar and Air India have probably already been on the phone, asking if they can have the vacated slots.

    Maybe Ryanair and Spirit should swap their orders: pilot re-training costs for a new aircraft type would be much lower than having to pay tariffs.

  12. Delta is looking into flying a321 to Europe 😱 Remember Delta has not ordered any a321LR or A321xlr, but will they in the future?

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