Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 4. Propulsive efficiency April 19, 2024
- Boeing unlikely to meet FAA’s 90-day deadline for new safety program April 18, 2024
- Focus on quality not slowing innovation, says GKN April 18, 2024
- Boeing defends 787, 777 against whistleblower charges April 17, 2024
- Dissecting Boeing CEO’s statement next new airplane will cost $50bn April 15, 2024
Boeing on path to surpass Airbus in single-aisle production
Note: This has updated information from its distribution to our e-newsletter recipients a week ago.
Boeing is on a path to overtake Airbus in producing single-aisle aircraft by the end of this decade.
In the hotly contested single-aisle sector, which Airbus currently leads, both OEMs are essentially sold out through 2019. Few delivery slots can by found by either of the Big Two. Airbus already plans to boost production of the A320 family to 46/mo in 2016, when its new Mobile (AL) plant comes on line. It will initially produce 4/mo but has the capacity for 8/mo. It’s Tianjin, China, plant is producing at a rate of 4/mo and likewise has the capacity to go to 8/mo. The Toulouse and Hamburg plants are understood to be at capacity now, giving Airbus a total capacity of 59/mo: Hamburg can produce 25/mo and Toulouse 18/mo.
Boeing is taking 737 production to 47/mo in 2017 and will announce soon whether to take production rates higher. We understand Boeing has already concluded it can boost rates to 52/mo, probably starting around 2019. We reported more than a year ago that Boeing was also considering boosting rates to 60/mo. Its Renton facility, where 737s are assembled, has the capacity for 63/mo.
If Boeing takes rates to 60/mo–and it’s dependent upon the supply chain, of course–a rate break would likely come in increments from the 52/mo. A jump of 8/mo from 52 in one increment would be unlikely. We therefore think achieving this rate would be by the middle of the next decade.
Airbus would almost certainly match. Could Airbus achieve even higher rates at any of its facilities through better efficiencies? Or would Airbus have to build yet another assembly site, its fifth?
It’s too soon to say.
“Or would Airbus have to build yet another assembly site, its fifth?”
They can expand capacity in XFW or TLS (not the same as building another assembly site) as they have done before.
Since the Mobil plant is still in the construction phase, Airbus could increase its capacity beyond 12/mo. (at or beyond 60+/mo.) now. Whether this is going to happen or not, only Airbus knows. The question then becomes how to use this new plant after the A-320 series is out of production around 2030, or so.
OTOH, Boeing would not need to push B-737 production beyond 60-63/mo. There is no business case to support another NB line in Charleston (for example) when Boeing is already studying the NSA or a post-B-737 airplane.
It would seem that having production lines in China and US does give Airbus an easier option to transition to NSA around 2030. They stop producing A320s in either XFW or TLS and start building NSA. Then transition to NSA at the other. Meanwhile, Tianjin and Mobile continue to produce A320s until the last is delivered, then they transition to NSA in turn.
It seems that Airbus has been less willing to ramp up and down production to the same extent as Boeing. I think their powerful unions and their even more powerful government backers have something to do with this policy. I wonder if the non-Union site at Mobile an will take the pressure off Airbus. They could more easily add or remove workers there to keep European production relatively stable.
Airbus now has many contract workers who could be let go in very short time.
So if they wanted they could ramp up and down. I think there are only three limits to that:
– Contractual obligations to the unions to have only so many percents of the full staff to be contract workers
– Ability of the supply chain to deliver
– Quality and traing costs. It costs some time and money to bring new staff up to the desired standards.
I think Boeing management has quite recently demonstrated they don’t see any significance for the last point when disrupting their own production by laying off the contract workers in Charleston.
When A330 production is ramping down some years ahead a large number of skilled staff may be available for further expansion of A320 production in france.
Did you mean to write:
Since the Mobil plant is still in the construction phase, Airbus couldn’t increase its capacity beyond 12/mo. (at or beyond 60+/mo.) now.
No, I wrote it correctly. Civil construction projects have “change orders” all the time, this would be no different if Airbus wanted to increase capacity in Mobil beyond what is currently planned.
To RICK SHAW
Before commenting your post we should define what is meant undr the name “assembling Plant”. There are plants as the German and French ones which widely takes the components as supplied by the subcontractors. But it is difficult to imagine
that plants assembling only 4 units per month justify an infrastructure to do so, and therefore, these only execute the last steps with pre-assembles prepared in the “mother” plants
Latter is very usual at the automobile industry, where literally hundred of such plants exist, mainly to satisfied the protectionist (or sometimes optical or even political !) needs in the host country!
This said, particularly in the case of the MOBILE an TIANJIN facilities, that by incrementing the production would need additional disrupting pre-assembling work in the already full capacity working “mother” plants
Airbus think US labour costs are cheapest, cheaper even than China, so I think you are right, further construction is more likely in Mobil than anywhere else.
Airbus has two major advantages regarding narrowbodies:
1. Its re-engined model will enter service around 2 years ahead of Boeing’s equivalent. That gives them the option to launch a replacement next generation aircraft ahead of Boeing, once they are satisfied the technology breakthroughs are in place. By the early 2020’s, Airbus will have delivered quite a few NEO’s more that Boeing’s MAX, so they are in better position to again pre-empt their competitor.
2. Its single aisle backlog is larger than Boeing’s.
Airbus therefore, can continue on its sensible approach (of the last 17 years) of increasing production steadily, that has avoided the ups and downs in deliveries that have plagued Boeing (with a slight decline for 3 years, following the 2001 events). If Boeing overplays its hand, they may have to face the same problem again. Or they may have to sell their planes at huge discounts that will hurt their bottom line. Either way spells trouble.
Finally, the bottleneck for both manufactures will be their suppliers’ ability to jack up their production and not the final assembly line capacity.
Its re-engined model will enter service around 2 years ahead of Boeing’s equivalent. That gives them the option to launch a replacement next generation aircraft ahead of Boeing…
What would stop Boeing from launching a NSA, once they are satisfied the technology breakthroughs are in place, irrespective of when the A320 neo enters service?
We will be alluding to this in a post later this week, Rick.
Airbus does not currently have the spun fuselage technology Boeing does and I believe Boeing has it patented (I don’t remember how long that is good for)
A cut and paste CRFP per the A350 is a make do with what you can do rather than a thought out technology would not seem to be a way forward.
Boeing has the pieces in place but not the will to do it. Boeing has not demonstrated the upper management vision or will to do so, the make do 737Max is proof of that.
As my wrestling coach use to tell us, one guy is scared and the other is glad of it. McNenearny cowers in his office any time anyone mentions a new aircraft.
IMU Boeing holds some patents on manufacturing helpers like special scaffolding for handling spun on mandrel cylindrical fuselage sections .. and not much more.
( for the fun of it: Airbus seems to hold some patents on joining wound fuselage sections forex: http://www.google.com/patents/EP2242682B1?cl=en )
There are probably “other” prudent reasons for Airbus not going for wound cylindrical sections. Denied access to the method appears to not be the reason. They seem to very much like conical sections though.
Airbus does not currently have the spun fuselage technology Boeing does and I believe Boeing has it patented (I don’t remember how long that is good for)
Nonsense. The empennage of the A350 is a one-piece barrel.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-airbus-manufactures-first-a350-fuselage-barrel-350647/
A cut and paste CRFP per the A350 is a make do with what you can do rather than a thought out technology would not seem to be a way forward.
Nonsense. Airbus performed its trade-off studies for the A350 across all development and production phases and concluded that using large composite panels were both superior and more cost effective than the full barrel 787 fuselage design, which BTW seems not to have led to a lower cost barrel assembly. As for the A350 not being “thought out technology” (LOL!), it may seem that you’re not aware of the two decade old NASA-funded Boeing advanced technology composite fuselage study of manufacturing methods for large civilian airliners.
https://archive.org/details/nasa_techdoc_19970016010
Tape laying on an empenage and a spun fuselage are two different tech levels.
The emenpenage is not pressurized
And the point is, at the time Airbus did not put the research money into going to the next levels like Boeing did.
Airbus used a frame and skin approach which is an aluminum knock off as they did not have the capability to build a 787 type spun fuselage.
Leahy touted the frame and skin in all sorts of ways, but it is not as light or efficient as a spun. One Leahy insisted was that you simply replaced a panel if damaged. That is pure BS, you are not going to removed the skin of 1/6th of the aircraft for a small hole. You are going to patch it.
That does not mean its wrong, its just not as good as it could be. The spun fuselage maximizes the full benefits of composites. Frame and skin does not.
Also the front of the A350 is aluminum frame (not sure skin). That means corrosion issue to watch for which a properly done spun fuselage should not have happen (stay tuned to see if that is true and they id it right). Ergo the front of an A350 needs more maintenance than the rest (if that has been done right)
The A350 has winglets. The 787, 777, 747 do not. Boeing has the tech to make the cranked wing tip that does the same thing better.
Winglet is not “bad” just not as good.
The A350 has massive structural changes after the first 17 are put out. That means a complete in place re-design took place as they figured out the mistakes and corrected the. It also means there could be issues down the road ala A380 and the wing cracks.
We will see how they did on the A350 when Qatar rejects or accepts their first one and how long it takes to get them to accept. Qatar means 100% is 100%, they don’t accept 98.8 and call it good. You want to do better than the guaranteed 100 then they are fine with that, but they don’t start at 100% and negotiate down, you deliver 100% or better.
Its those small features that make a better tech base. It does not mean the A350 will be a failure, but it is the items I am looking at and for to see how well they really did. Its a work in progress. We have a good idea on the 787 now, we don’t on the A350.
Its management that makes a company run well or drives it into the dirt. Airbus has that end sewed up nicely (I would go so far as to say it has Boeing boxed in).
@TransWorld
My response is further down the thread. 🙂
I think it remains to be seen if the effort of Boeing’s barrel approach is worth the cost and pain that Boeing took (is still taking some would argue). One would have some serious doubts if analysis that the A330ceo is close to 787 efficiency (except at the longer ranges) are accurate. If an ‘old-fashioned’ plane can get that close to an all-new one just by using newer engines and making some minor wing tweaks, then one has to wonder.
It will be very interesting to see what approach Boeing takes with its next all-new plane. Unfortunately, I think we’ll have quite a long wait to find out.
Sorry, I meant A330neo, not ceo in the above post.
@TransWorld
I’m sorry, but a 787 type “spun fuselage” is not the way of the future. Using 787 production methodologies, for example, is a non-starter for any game-changing type of next single aisle aircraft. Thus, 787-type CRFP-wound full barrel sections are too heavy, too cumbersome and expensive to make and takes too much time to cure (etc.) to be used on a 737MAX replacement aircraft. Long A350-type out-of-autoclave cured fuselage panels, on the other hand, can be manufactured using co-cured stringers and frames without the use of mechanical fasteners (e.g. difficult, or outright impossible to do with ancient “barrel-technology”). On the 787 and A350 the fuselage, door and window frames are mechanically attached to the skin using a lot of fasteners. Only the stringers are co-cured. In fact, the holy grail of composite fuselage construction is to have the the skin and reinforcements (i.e. stringers and frames) made in one piece. Of course, by making the skin thicker fewer internal reinforcements are needed. This was the method used in the Lockheed Advanced Composite Cargo Aircraft (ACCA).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T0Fqxt87Qik
Now, making significantly lighter fuselage structures for civilian aircraft may require, doing away with some, if not all of the fuselage cut-outs of the current tube and wing configuration. Explaining why the current fuselage configurations are quite “heavy” is nicely done in this paper:
http://www.dlr.de/fa/Portaldata/17/Resources/dokumente/institut/srw_08.pdf
Essentialy, the only thing the 787 brings to the table vis a vie a next generation single aisle aircraft in particular, is how not to do it. This is, in fact, quite similar to the Space Shuttle experience in which the most valuable lesson learned has been how you shouldn’t design and operate a next generation reusable space transportation system (i.e. no usage of SRBs; no usage of foam shedding external tanks; in fact, preferably no usage of external tanks at all; no thermal protection system with little, or no impact resistance; no usage of main engines operating at 104/109 percent of rated thrust etc.).
–
Tape laying on an empenage and a spun fuselage are two different tech levels. The emenpenage is not pressurized
Not really. Most of the forces acting on the fuselage are forces from the wing and landing gear reactions, tail buffet loads and the payload itself. Hence, the hoop stresses due to the internal pressure of an aircraft is not the major force acting on the fuselage. The point, however, was to rebut the claim that Airbus supposedly cannot do “spun barrel construction”.
–
Airbus used a frame and skin approach which is an aluminum knock off as they did not have the capability to build a 787 type spun fuselage.
Clearly, you don’t seem to know what you’re talking about. Both OEMs seem to be still treating CFRP as a “black metal”. Again, on the A350/787 the individual panels/barrels are using fasteners in relatively large numbers (i.e. to mechanically attach fuselage frames, door frames etc.). In contrast, a composite material typically lend itself to moulding large totally integrated assemblies.
–
Leahy touted the frame and skin in all sorts of ways, but it is not as light or efficient as a spun. One Leahy insisted was that you simply replaced a panel if damaged. That is pure BS, you are not going to removed the skin of 1/6th of the aircraft for a small hole. You are going to patch it.
I’ve never understood this fixation with Leahy. He’s a salesman — and a damn good one at that. However, he’s not an engineer.
Now, as for removing a large fuselage panel on the A350, I’m sure he was thinking more about how to repair a damaged aft fuselage due to a tail strike.
–
That does not mean its wrong, its just not as good as it could be. The spun fuselage maximizes the full benefits of composites. Frame and skin does not.
As I’ve already pointed out, a spun fuselage does not maximise the full benefits of a composite fuselage — far from it. I give full credit to Boeing, though, for having made quite a few people believing all their hype generated by the 787 programme. It’s pretty thought-provoking that in the year 2014 some Boeing afficianados still seem to believe that the 787 “spun barrel sections” is the end of all things when it comes to composite fuselage manufacturing.
–
Also the front of the A350 is aluminum frame (not sure skin). That means corrosion issue to watch for which a properly done spun fuselage should not have happen (stay tuned to see if that is true and they id it right). Ergo the front of an A350 needs more maintenance than the rest (if that has been done right)
Nonsense. The main difference is that Airbus is using aluminium on the area around the cockpit windshield because of bird-strike damage tolerance (i.e. aluminium is not as brittle as composite mareilas), while Boeing used CFRP for the nose section as well butt worked around the brittleness issues. For example, look at all the aluminum frames in the cockpit section of the 787 in the picture below (i.e. aluminium frames are green)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/7702824@N03/3907465730/
–
The A350 has massive structural changes after the first 17 are put out. That means a complete in place re-design took place as they figured out the mistakes and corrected the. It also means there could be issues down the road ala A380 and the wing cracks.
Complete redesign, eh?
The fact of the matter is that the A350 is requiring far less modifications post first flight than what was the case with the 787. Why do you have to spread FUD?
“I’m sorry, but a 787 type “spun fuselage” is not the way of the future. Using 787 production methodologies, for example, is a non-starter for any game-changing type of next single aisle aircraft. Thus, 787-type CRFP-wound full barrel sections are too heavy, too cumbersome and expensive to make and takes too much time to cure (etc.) to be used on a 737MAX replacement aircraft.”
I disagree. If what you say is true, then why is the Clean Sky Initiative touting the progress on their One Piece Barrel (OPB) technology, for use on a smaller 90 seat aircraft? Usually the size problem runs up against the cost of making large autoclaves and tooling, not the other way around.
“Long A350-type out-of-autoclave cured fuselage panels, on the other hand, can be manufactured using co-cured stringers and frames without the use of mechanical fasteners (e.g. difficult, or outright impossible to do with ancient “barrel-technology”).”
I disagree with this assertion as well. It may be difficult, but it’s certainly not “outright impossible” to use co-cured stringers and frames with spun one piece barrels. It comes down to a matter of the benefits traded against the complexities and costs of making it happen. By they way, co-curing stringer and frames with fuselage panels is not a cakewalk either, and then there are the substantial amount of fasteners on the four seams (frames as well) to connect everything together.
“Essentialy, the only thing the 787 brings to the table vis a vie a next generation single aisle aircraft in particular, is how not to do it. This is, in fact, quite similar to the Space Shuttle experience in which the most valuable lesson learned has been how you shouldn’t design and operate a next generation reusable space transportation system (i.e. no usage of SRBs; no usage of foam shedding external tanks; in fact, preferably no usage of external tanks at all; no thermal protection system with little, or no impact resistance; no usage of main engines operating at 104/109 percent of rated thrust etc.).”
Really! We are all entitled to come to our on conclusions, but this sounds pretty whacked out to me.
This so high technical discussion regarding how to adapt a wide-body fuselage to a narrow body new aircraft is totally useless. Now that we have the re-engined A320neo and B737max, still not to be produced in meaningful number for a good number of years, until the backlog of the the not converted A320ceo and B737max is delivered, nobody will seriously think of a SINGLE AISLEneo2 and max2 (or whatever) until possibly performing 2030!! Except if, as I already wrote, something radically revolutionary appears, as a new ultralight building material
But, as I already suggested, IMO there is a market in the scaleless intercity medium range high density market for a 2,000 – 3,000 (or 2,500 – 3500 nm, 400-500Pax 1cl aircraft both in the US and worldwide, Boeing has already widely worked on the design (and even nearly sold to ANA (before the latter decided for a B787-8 instead) a 3000 nm, 350 pax 1cl (which probably should be larger, at least 400 1cl) a wide body which had an attractive LIST price of about $150M (B789/A333 about $250,000!!) and was STATE OF THE ART, not a re-Engined NEO!!
Such would be interesting task for BOEING, of course, I do not know if a 400 or more Pax B784 can be developed economically (meaning making useof the already made design work) out of the B783! It would by no means substitute generally the A320neo/B737max
Addendum:
http://www.cleansky.eu/content/interview/one-piece-barrel-opb-technology-readiness-progressing-time
Hey Mike.
the demonstrator done by Alenia uses pre cured stringers. the most distinguishing detail appears to be not using an inner mandrel ( with all the complications ). they avoid wrinkling by way of an “Outboard Manufacturing Liner” ( here this appears to be a synonym for female mold 😉 Getting tolerances right for a closed loop CFRP barrel will still be significantly more difficult than machined to measure long segments.
Frames are still inserted in a difficult process afaicguess. The demonstrator is sans frames. For a conical section you can insert internal structure as one preassembled arrangement while for a barrel you have to add items one by one from the inside. Forced sequential work is more expensive and takes more time and labor.
“Most of the forces acting on the fuselage are forces from the wing and landing gear reactions, tail buffet loads and the payload itself. Hence, the hoop stresses due to the internal pressure of an aircraft is not the major force acting on the fuselage.”
Uh, the stresses in the skin just due to cabin pressurization are a substantial part of the overall stress state in the skin during flight.
Take the 747 as an example:
Fuselage outer dia: 6.5 m
Ave. skin thickness: 2 mm
Pres. differential: 9 psi (6,000 ft cabin at 40,000 ft cruise)
Resulting hoop stress: 14,600 psi
Resulting z stress: 7,300 psi
The hoop stress alone is 36% of the yield stress of 2024-T351 (40,000 psi) not accounting for any safety factors. Also, since the fuselage cross-section is not circular the peak stress due to internal pressure will be substantially higher. Additionally, while stringers and frames are there to prevent fuselage buckling under flight loads, they actually exacerbate the situation by increasing the peak stresses due to pressurization.
@Mike Bohnet
The wings, tailplanes and fuselages of all airplanes — pressurised, or not — are subjected to tensile, compressive, shear and torsional loads. Over and above these basic in-flight loads comes pressurization loads for passenger aircraft, additional aerodynamic and body forces on fighter aircraft carrying ordnance and external fuel tanks (i.e. contributing to the existing bending, shear and torsional forces). Then, you have shock loads transmitted through the landing during landing and the possibility of severe bending loads due to the large yaw action in case of an engine failure. additional ground loads etc.
As for the pressurisation loads on a pressurised fuselage, it’s the fatigue strength of the materials used that is the important factor, not the yield strength as you’re claiming. The fatigue strength of Aluminum 2024-T3 is 20,000 psi.
So, the main difference in designing a composite unpressurised empennage barrel and pressurised composite cabin is that fatigue loads in a pressurised fuselage barrel are mostly due to pressure cycles. Thus, the increased use of composites, especially in the highly tension-loaded parts of the fuselage greatly reduces maintenance due to fatigue when compared with an aluminum structure.
http://www.roymech.co.uk/Useful_Tables/Fatigue/Fatigue.html
http://asm.matweb.com/search/SpecificMaterial.asp?bassnum=MA2024T3
–
I disagree. If what you say is true, then why is the Clean Sky Initiative touting the progress on their One Piece Barrel (OPB) technology, for use on a smaller 90 seat aircraft? Usually the size problem runs up against the cost of making large autoclaves and tooling, not the other way around.
Just to add to what Uwe said, please do not that a regional aircraft with a high A400M-type wing and “external” main landing gear (i.e. similar to the MLG on either a Dash-8-Q400 or the A400M), would have a fuselage with significantly less intrusive cutouts than what’s the case for the standard single aisle tube-and-wing configuration. Hence, a one piece fuselage barrel (i.e. minus the cockpit section) made in an internal “female” full barrel mold could be a viable option
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-first-airbus-a400m-flight-test-aircraft-rests-on-landing-219688/
Also, I’m somewhat still surprised to see that some people seem to believe that a ” spun fuselage barrel” is the ultimate in fuselage manufacturing without realising that a substantial increase in automation in the fitting out process may not be achievable.
Perhaps this is the way forward, automation-wise: 😉
Airbus Future factory was presented during the innovation days, on June 10th and 11th, 2014. The video shows the assembly of a plane in a high-tech factory that implements the most advanced technologies.
http://www.ics-show.com/show/news/?news=366
–
I disagree with this assertion as well. It may be difficult, but it’s certainly not “outright impossible” to use co-cured stringers and frames with spun one piece barrels. It comes down to a matter of the benefits traded against the complexities and costs of making it happen.
Perhaps you can show me how you’ll design a collapsible outside, or male mandrel that can “collapse” with not only co-cured longitudinal stringers, as in the current 787 set-up, but that will also have to deal with co-cured circumferential fuselage frames , co-cured window frames and co-cured door frames as well.
–
Really! We are all entitled to come to our on conclusions, but this sounds pretty whacked out to me.
Does it, really.
Apart from what seems IMJ to be a dead-end architecture for single aisle applications, at least (i.e. full barrels spun on outside mandrels etc.), the 787 was like the space shuttle launched with a lot of promises and hype.
@OV-099
Anyone with an engineering background would know that if the pressurization stresses are a significant fraction of the yield stress, then those stresses would also be an even larger fraction of the fatigue allowable, which only serves to support the point I was making: that pressurization stresses are a substantial part of the overall stress state of the skin of a pressurized fuselage in flight. This is contrary to what you claimed when you minimized the importance of the hoop stress due to internal pressure by saying: “Not really. Most of the forces acting on the fuselage are forces from the wing and landing gear reactions, tail buffet loads and the payload itself. Hence, the hoop stresses due to the internal pressure of an aircraft is not the major force acting on the fuselage.” Enough said.
In terms of showing you a mandrel design with collapsible sides, instead, why don’t you show me that it can’t be done. After all, you’re the one making this claim. I have some ideas, to deal with co-cured window and door frames but they would be complicated. However, in my judgement, they would not be significantly more complicated than the mold required to co-cure window and door frames with fuselage panels. Curvature is curvature, whether or not you have only an arc of the circle, or the whole circle. Am I 100% sure my thoughts on the subject are valid? No, because I’m not an expert in the field and the devil is always in the details. Admittedly, co-cured frames would seem to be a bit tougher because of the more severe radius changes, but again, I’m not an expert in the field so I wouldn’t say it’s impossible.
Besides, I don’t agree that the holy grail of composites requires that the entire structure be co-cured. In my judgement, removing all the fasteners essentially gets you there. Improved bonding technology could be used to attach the frames. The Clean Sky OPB used pre-cured stingers, so they are essentially bonded onto the skin. Similar techniques could be applied to an OPB that is pre-cured (with stringers) but is co-bonded to the frame.
Finally, saying that an OPB spun onto a mandrel is a dead architecture is pointless. Manufacturing techniques don’t need to be more complicated than the design goals require. The Clean Sky OPB is layed up on a mandrel, it’s just not cured on the mandrel, but rather cured in an Outboard Manufacturing Liner. I wonder what technique Alenia could have used to lay up the fibers on the mandrel. Hmmmmm.
Anyone with an engineering background would know the general relation between fatigue strength and tensile strength (i.e. much less of a “relation” between fatigue strength and compression strength); so I’m not sure why you’re so hung up on the yield stresses. The normal pressurisation stresses on a fuselage are way below the yield strength, thus anyone with an aerospace background would know that high cycle pressurization strains on a modern day fuselage are confined to the elastics range (e.g. after a pressurisation cycle only elastic strains have occurred so no permanent deformation has taken place). Hence, the strains are far from reaching the yield point. Testing for high-cycle fatigue in a fuselage is associated with relatively low loads and long service life. General fatigue testing examines how the aircraft structure responds to stress over a long period of time and during different stages of its operations, such as taxiing on the runway, take-off, cruising and landing. Static tests, on the other hand, establish how the wings and fuselage behave when subjected to both normal and exceptional loads, such as those which they may encounter in various normal and extreme flight circumstances, where of course, knowing the yield strength is of utmost importance. Such tests include all major components (wings, fuselage, etc) being subjected to maximum load levels the aircraft could ever experience in service. After limit-load tests, more tests are run to load the aircraft fuselage and wings up to their ultimate loads as part of the certification process. At limit load you need to get to 100 percent without permanent plastic deformation (NB: nothing beyond fatigue damage) and ultimate load at 1.5 times the limit load without having a catastrophic failure.
–
This is contrary to what you claimed when you minimized the importance of the hoop stress due to internal pressure by saying: “Not really. Most of the forces acting on the fuselage are forces from the wing and landing gear reactions, tail buffet loads and the payload itself. Hence, the hoop stresses due to the internal pressure of an aircraft is not the major force acting on the fuselage.” Enough said.
No, I didn’t minimise the importance of hoop stresses. I’ve just pointed out that it’s not the major force acting on the fuselage. That doesn’t change the fact that the lifespan of an airliner is measured in pressurisation cycles. Was that so hard to figure out?
Now, as I’ve already mentioned, the fuselage is subjected to in-flight tensile, compressive, shear and torsional loads in addition to the hoop stresses due to pressurisation. For example, axial compression loads caused by the bending of the fuselage and the potential compressive skin buckling can have a significant effect on the circumferential stress in the skin and fastener loads. Then, during landing the hoop stresses approaches zero, while you have shock loads transmitted through the landing gear and ground loads etc.
Here’s a relevant link:
What are the sources of the loads acting on the fuselage
• the forces (reactions) from other elements joined
with the fuselage – tail, landing gear, payload, equipment,
• aerodynamic loads – pressure distribution – important
for high speed aircrafts (Ma>0.5) or for lifting fuselages,
• fuselage mass in acceleration field,
• difference of pressure between inner and outer space –only for fuselages with pressurization,
• propulsion units and other force installations, e.g. to tow
sailplane behind the aircraft
http://itlims.meil.pw.edu.pl/zsis/pomoce/BIPOL/BIPOL_1_handout_14A.pdf
–
In terms of showing you a mandrel design with collapsible sides, instead, why don’t you show me that it can’t be done.
You could probably do it if you limited the use of the mandrel to just one manufacturing cycle. On the other hand, it’s quite easy to imagine how you’d do it on an internal concave/female surface and not on a 787 -type outside convex/male surface.
–
“Besides, I don’t agree that the holy grail of composites requires that the entire structure be co-cured.”
If you can produce large integrated components with few fasteners, then that’s certainly something entirely different than what’s currently on the 787 and A350 .
–
Finally, saying that an OPB spun onto a mandrel is a dead architecture is pointless.
Again, as I previously indicated, I wouldn’t rule out a three piece fuselage for a regional turboprop aircraft (i.e. nose-section, main fuselage section and empennage) where the main fuselage section would be constructed in an out-of-autoclave (OOA)
combination of Same Qualified Resin Transfer Molding (SQRTM) in an “outboard manufacturing liner” / “internal concave/female surface”.
@OV-099,
I am familiar with the relationship between tensile strength and fatigue strength, but when I made my original point I didn’t know the fatigue strength of 2024-T351 off the top of my head and I didn’t want to look it up because I didn’t need to. I referred to the yield strength because I knew the number. So, no, I’m not hung up on yield strength, and no, comparing hoop stress to yield stress instead of fatigue allowable for my purposes was not wrong. It was a way for me to easily make my original point that the pressurization stresses (hoop) amount to a significant part of the stress state in the fuselage skin, or in other words, that it is indeed a major stress (not force) in the fuselage.
Obviously, the fatigue strength is most important when designing for cyclic loads over a long service life, but when designing for aircraft encounters with exceptionally high aerodynamic gust loads during flight at altitude, the stress in all of the aircraft components need to be kept below yield to keep the aircraft undamaged. And for a pressurized fuselage, the hoop stresses are a major part of fuselage stress state, very comparable to stresses due to other loads.
“On the other hand, it’s quite easy to imagine how you’d do it on an internal concave/female surface and not on a 787 -type outside convex/male surface.”
How are you going perform the lay up on a concave/female surface without the fibers falling/pulling away from that surface?
OK. UWE
Lets wait, assuming that your takei is that AIRBUS does not follow such “terrible” BOEING procedures,if when the first A359 is delivered if al the 10 year development costs of the A350 will be charged to it, so generating a monstruous loss
No, you haven’t understood. Airbus accounts for the costs in the year in which they occur. For example. last year’s A350 development costs were added to last year’s accounts. Whereas Boeing defers those costs over the whole program – indeed Boeing is still adding significant additional costs to the total (currently about $25billion) to the 787 program per the recent Leeham article.
I would suggest a Google search for a WSJ article titled “Boeing’s Key Mission: Cut Dreamliner Cost” it details just how much Boeing is currently losing on each 787 delivery. As Boeing itself reports in its financial statements, without program accounting, it would be reporting losses, not profits.
“”wiithout program accounting, it would be reporting losses, not profits”
Lets see the B787 figures:
* total cost of B787 development cost ALREADY PERFORMED = X
* The programmed total to be produced is 1,300 aircraft and therefore and therefore AMZ = $ X / 1,300 are as average to be charged to each aircraft
* As 1,050 aircraft are already ordered, Y = 1,050*AMZ are already charged as cost and Z = 250*AMX will so in the next years, when the next 250 units are ordered.
This is no manipulation (as UWE tries to present it) as long the programmed 1,300 are realistic as they are) but perfectly fact-justified. DO NOT FORGET we are in layman language speaking of REAL PROFIT TIME LINE, not of CASH FLOW!!
And this is why the SEC is OK with it!!
By the contrary, to book Z right now as cost would ARTIFICIALLY diminish or erase this year profit results and increase the ones for the next years. Which could be accused to be a tax flattening manipulation, being the last profits so high!!
Finally, if I understand you correctly, AIRBUS considers Development costs as General ones (or overhead ? ) and charge them yearly company wide. This, if really so (??!) being legally OK, has the drawback that profitable sectors are subsidizing the loosing ones and deforming the results
The deferred costs are accounted for when the planes are built and delivered, not when they’re ordered. So while Boeing has an accounting block of 1,300 for the 787, only the proportion of costs for those 787s built and delivered so far have been added to the accounts. Boeing has to charge another $25billion over the life of the program, and they’re still adding to those deferred charges.
“By the contrary, to book Z right now as cost would ARTIFICIALLY diminish or erase this year profit ” But this is how the vast majority of businesses work – you spend money in 2014, it’s added to the accounts in 2014, not over the next N years. If Airbus had built the 787, those $25billion would have been added to the accounts over the last ten years, when the money was spent.
Let’s be clear, there’s nothing wrong with program accounting, but it distorts Boeing’s position when trying to compare their performance against Airbus.
Well, good bookkeeping ( the conservative approach ) is to book losses as early as possible and to value assets conservatively. IMU this is still valid under IFSR.
Harmonizing efforts ( rather slowly progressing ) to align GAAP with IFSR will return the US to prudent bookkeeping.
For yout info:
Some German companies book the aliquote of development cost for the still nor ordered (or delivered) units as you avocate at present date, but book the availability of of these development to be used in the future as an asset, with the same results as attained witd the programmed !!
What is prudent depends only of the programmed sales figure. The B787 figure 1,300, with already 1.050 sold, is totallt in such cathegory
A negative example would be to programme 1,000 sales for an undetermed A330neo
“A negative example would be to programme 1,000 sales for an undetermed A330neo”
Except Airbus will book the costs in the year in which they occur. So from a cost perspective, that money is spent and it matters not if they sell 500 or 1,000. Once the money is spent, profit is profit, it doesn’t have to be used to pay off deferred costs (as would be the case for Boeing).
It does not matter ihow many are sold?? in some cases as here, it would not matter cost-wise, but do you consider that the income from sales has to do a bit with the issue??
But we have already agreed that the booking procedures do not alter the final facts, so lets end THIS discussion, eve if I enjoy doing it inthe respectful fashion we do so
A couple of postings ago you used the difference in bookkeeping standards to show the superiority of Boeing by way of them showing higher profits _today_ .
Your position now ;-?
UWE
I have written I will not continue to discuss this issue, but I wisgh to clarify this
1) I have written that both the PROGRAMMED US system and the European “charge as it comes” are equivalent, as the latter will book the expense for still not made deliveries as an asset dollarizable when the programmed deliveries occur, which finally is equivlent
2) I have written that consider development costs budgetable when occurring is not forbidden, but inconvenient in large companies as AIRBUS with many diffrent activities, as this leas to som product lines subsidizing others
3) I add that obviously a company must select the procedure it prefers and do not change it from year to year, so to avoid not real apparent profit jumps.
4) Even if consider the programmed one the more logical system, this depends of the circumstances of each country and company, between other its effect on the taxes, I am an Engineeer graduated in 1959, an former director in a German-international company firts and later with my own enterprise in South America, and have some insights in such financila problems, but am in no way an expert , not even near to that. I try to approach such issues, as the Aviation ones (as examplem the A330neo contraversy) , with common sense, not with detailed technical arguments.
Obviously a bookkeeping standard is not something you can choose to your liking and cosmetic requirements.
Comparability and exposure of “financial stress” determine reporting rules.
Pushing a gigantic ever growing bow wave of deferred cost is a distinct and dangerous form of “financial stress”. ( and note, all Boeing programmes ride on this wave. Probably the only reason why the 777 can be presented as “profitable” 😉
You simply refuse to understand that no company inthe world would develop a huge new product as the B777X which take years to initiate sales if in the meantime the success to sell such product would lead to the appearance of huge losses in the meantime.
And the Programmed Charge of the development costs is not the only way to show the truth. For the last time, you continue to confuse CASH FLOW with profit disclosure, which neither will be negative if the company does finance these costs throuh bank loans, which interests I guess shall be booked as non-deferred costs.
Which do not mean that loans are booked as profit, as you absurdely stated!!
If the develpment costs principal are charged when they occur, the so created development reserve for future sales of firm or reasonably (and conservately expected to be) ordered products can be booked as an ASSET (as any advance!!) so compensating the charge. Of course, a serious company would write off such asset at the first signal that the order is in jeopardy!! And of course, I am sure that Boeing books a risk reserve for all such operations
I do not know if the costs are charged art order or delivary, this being irreveant as it only shifts the timetable
I hope that you are not implying the still mising development complements would cost the same as all what was done during 10 yearsbe fore, i.e D=$25B (!!) included the many unforseen
Nevertheless I agree with “Let’s be clear, there’s nothing wrong with program accounting, but it distorts Boeing’s position when trying to compare their performance against Airbus”
But I must add: Nobody is comparing, due to above and other distorting reasos I already mentioned
@Mike Bohnet
How are you going perform the lay up on a concave/female surface without the fibers falling/pulling away from that surface?
There’s actually a Boeing patent for doing just that.
Fig 8A to 8G in:
Composite sections for aircraft fuselages and other structures, and methods and systems for manufacturing such sections
US 8418740 B2
http://www.google.com/patents/US8418740
–
Have a nice weekend!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_R2XG9CnOj8
@OV-099,
Thanks for the link to Solveig’s Song. I’m not at all familiar with the work of Grieg (or Ibsen’s play) but that was a beautiful performance.
@Mike Bohnet
You’re welcome 🙂
Grieg — a nice introduction.: Piano Concerto in A minor Op. 16; Holberg Suite, Op. 40; Peer Gynt.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKfGDqXEFkE
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXy21qsLY1A
Airbus’ strength was to be the second actor in a market space with a thought out product competing against a defined competitor with resources sufficient to make their plane better than existing market entrants (see A330 as a response to 767, A310 as a response to the 737). The second actor gets the ability to compete against a known product and build a newer, better, more-flexible product. Airbus gave up the second actor space when they went after the 747 and C-130 building the A380 and A400M (both massive misses for expected future demand and both heavier than original spec). That left Boeing free to be the second actor against the A330 with the 787 and left Boeing free to own the market space the 777 occupies without competition.
Airbus had to improve the A320 and launch it 7 years before its anticipated market entry both for presales to solve a cashflow problem and to force Boeing from having the freedom to build a clean sheet airplane. It was a huge gift to Boeing because Boeing now had a fixed design spec to improve their product against; to which they made it “good enough.”
All of this is to say, Airbus has a more flexible narrow body with a longer anticipated future lifespan; why in the world would they want to prematurely kill their product to allow their competitor an advantage in that market space?
Airbus strength came from getting over shortsighted individual activities, bundling european aerospace efforts and ingenuity. The industry here never lacked ideas and capabilities. What they lacked was clout.
UWE
The multi-assembling sites, especially in different countries, are a source of many problems. We saw this regarding the coordination of the AIRBUS German and French plants (an striking example was the A380) and see it know at BOEING betwen Washington and N. Carolina (B787)
And the five (possibly six) A320/1 plants of Airbus do notseem a good arrangement
otontisch, I do notice that you’re not holding back with your repetitive and relentless criticisms of anything Airbus. However, accuracy is not on the agenda, right?
Now, it was not the “multi-assembling sites” that was the problem with the A380.
–
Perhaps some more reading on the history of Airbus would serve you well. I can highly recommend Bill Sweetman’s piece form 2003.
The Contender
How Airbus got to be number one.
By Bill Sweetman
Air & Space Magazine
November 2003
http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/the-contender-3630193/?no-ist=&page=1
to OV-099
I do know the history. I have stated simply “historical: facts both happening at Airbus and Boeing!!and I respectfully acknowledge different opinions. This what such blogs are for!
Addendum
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-10-04/airbus-first-blame-the-software
The multi-assembling sites, especially in different countries, are a source of many problems. We saw this regarding the coordination of the AIRBUS German and French plants (an striking example was the A380) and see it know at BOEING betwen Washington and N. Carolina (B787)
The issue in both cases was not the fact that work was distributed geographically. Airbus’ A380 issues could just as easily have happened between two teams that were located on the same floor in the same building. In fact, I’ve seen just that happening more than once – albeit not quite at the same scale.
Also, having multiple sites can help as you have some safeguard against one site being unoperational or only partly operational for some time (also see Scott’s continued argument in favour of dual-sourcing).
Similar story with Boeing and the 787 – the main issue wasn’t that they decided to build two assembly lines for the 787.
Instead, for both examples you mention, the primary issue was management and lack of governance.
That’s why, following the A380 debacle, Airbus didn’t primarily focus on redistributing the work, but on better communications and management (including some significant management reshuffles and restructuring).
“huge gift”, “premature”? Methinks you’ve been reading nonsense at another blog.
What advantage does Boeing have, aside from current market share (neo/MAX) of 40%?
Boeing is surely hopes to milk the cash cow 737 as best as possible. They sure want to produce and deliver as many of the existing orders before they even discuss their new NB plane in any details with airlines. Even if that means that they will have to cut down production massively some year later on. They need the cash to compensate for the 787, which I am sure will remain eating up cash for many years to come.
You’re not sure at all. They’re not counting on the 737 revenue to compensate for the 787 program delays and cost overruns.
To ROTATE
The heavy losses BOEING suffered with the B787 were not due to intrinsic problems of the aircraft, but with its subcontractors supplied components, many of which in turn were induced by the fact that BOEING chose to test a so called Global management system just when developing a radically new paradigm. Which was too risky and not unexpectedly failed!!
As you write, the success with the B737max will allow to compensate the past lcost overruns
There is no reason to expect that, as the introduction of the B789 indicates, that
they will not make money with the aircraft from now on, more so because they are increasing the production capacity. IMHO the only premise being that BOEING will be able to iron out a.s.a.p. the snags in their southern plant!
This is true. I am not as versed as you are on this subject but the point I was trying to make was that the revenue from the 737 will not be diverted to make up losses on the 787.
To ROTATE
You are right. It will not be DIVERTED, but obviously will compensate within the general picture
At the moment profits from the well working lines ( 737, 777 ) do not suffice to stuff the holes opening on the 787 and 747-8 production. ( See Boeings non GAAP numbers that provide a somewhat more level comparison to Airbus numbers )
So, where do you think the record profits at BOEING’s Civil division last figures come from??
From the future.
Programme Accounting, by deferring todays hard cost moves potential profit into the present.
In other words you borrow money and show that as profit 😉
US GAAP has succumbed to the profiteers and quarterly resulters,
sane bookkeepers have lost out long ago. Creative bookkeeping rules was one way to show “good” numbers in times of low to negative growth.
No Uwe. Boeing is a publicly traded company and must follow SEC rules, regulations and laws. They cannot project future (potential) profits to keep stock prices up or increases in the price of their stock. The Securities Act of 1933 prohibits such accounting schemes.
Securities Act of 1933:
Often referred to as the “truth in securities” law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:
•require that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and
•prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.
The full text of this Act is available at: http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf.
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml
You explain very well the reason for creating the “programme accounting model” and why Boeing uses it. ( Move fraud out of the official fraud domain 😉
It is about as sophist as the “no s*x” statement of your former president.
UWE (copy kc135topboom:, Leehamnet)
“”You explain very well the reason for creating the “programme accounting model” and why Boeing uses it. ( Move fraud out of the official fraud domain It is about as sophist as the “no s*x” statement of your former president.””
I am confused, Are you here and in your previous post implying that Boeing has filed a quarterly report 10K incorporating hypothetical future profits and such is accounting-wise acceptable by the SEC??
Program accounting spreads the costs over an assumed sales block–in the case of the 787, the sales block is 1,300. This allows Boeing to report profits, as opposed to charging all the R&D monies and one-time costs in the years they occur, which would mean Boeing would report a loss. In Boeing’s SEC filings, it has revealed that if the costs were charged in the years occurred, it would report billions of dollars in losses rather than billions of dollars in profits. The SEC accepts these reporting mechanisms.
As a personal view, we don’t like program accounting because it defers cost accounting despite the money actually being spent; we think program accounting distorts the P&L.
On the other hand, Airbus takes charges under European rules which don’t provide for program accounting. This means Airbus margins are lower compared with Boeing.
Instead of moving future profit into the present (forbidden) they move present cost into the future ( not forbidden but achieves the same result as less cost for the same revenue is more profit.)
But and imho the differentiation is extremely sophistic.
Leehamnet, UWE
Scott, thanks for clarification that this means development costs are being distributed between the number of units as programmed., here 1,300 for B787 (actually ordered at the moment being well above 1,000!). It seems that UWE mistakingly thought that doing so is an accounting trick!!
As long this figure is realistic, this seems not particularly sophistic, as if such is not done so, ALL the development cost would be charged to the first aircraft billed, so deforming any dislosure. Therefore, any major enterprise does so,!
Of course, if at a certain moment it becomes apparent that the programmed figure will probable not be reached, as it happens with the A380, the mnufacturer shall book out the balance
No mistake there.
UWE
“in other words you borrow money and show that as profit”
I am 84, and still learning!!
Wrong. The heavy losses (side of body join and exploding batteries) were explicitly because of design faults with the aircraft. Nothing to do with subcontractors.
To strato:
Right. So BOEING is now a battery manufacturer!!
But Again: I have explicitly stated that even if there were few basic design problems, Boeing is responsible for the “global mismanagement” of the subcontractors.
The tech problem were not the big hold up issues. Frankly an amazing few issue for something this far ahead of things (or the new amount of tech both structure and mostly electric that went into it)
The massive delays were the global messed up system and initial supplier issue (fasteners included) not being available. That was a purely management bust as it was all abut saving money, not getting new tech aircraft out the door. Of course that never bit management, its never their fault.
The tech issues were limited to three big ones, the wing join was an effort to reduce weight (original deigns was good) and the battery is at least patched if not truly solved.
The panel wipe out in San Antonio was the other tech item, though not a huge delay either certainly an embarrassment as the electrical isolation did not work and the plane went dark (landed on batteries and RAT)
I agree with much of what you write, but regarding the “superiority of Airbus technology. see
* A340 versus s B777
* A350 Classic versus B787
* B788 versus A358
* B779 versus A3510 Even if here it is not strictly a technology issue , but more a better appraisal of the market needs, combined with the basic technology of the B777
* the A320neo is certainly not superior to the B737max. Only the management of Airbus was superior by launching it, when BOEING was napping!
Otontisch, in response to your statements:
*A321neo is better than the 737-9 (and sales figures certainly validate this); factual error
*A330ceo was better than 763; nicely omitted
*A350-1000 better than 777-300ER (even Boeing acknowledges 1000 is 20% more efficient than -300ER); omitted
*A380 better than 747-8I; omitted
*A330neo is within 1-2% of 787-8/9 on economics now, based on our preliminary analysis; more definitive analysis coming; Airbus claims even-up economics. Omitted.
*Boeing only talks about the 781 vs A333 and A339, does not talk about 788/789 vs A330neo–because of the preceding; 781 does not directly compete against the 333 or 339, however.
*788 doesn’t compete with A358; the 789 does, a factual error
*A351 is better than the 778, which is the direct competitor; the 779 doesn’t have an Airbus competitor, another factual error
. Airbus is doing a very good job leveraging what they have to maximum benefit and giving Boeing fits.
It’s a vastly different company that even what it was when they started the A350 project. I believe their tech level is not up to spun fuselage but it indeed scared Boeing into changing the 777CEO to the 777X. Both versions move up the ladder and abandon the 777-200 and 300 segment to Airbus (current range, some room for the 777-8 aka 300 size but not the core)
The A320NEO blew Boeings doors off because they stuck with a very old structure instead of upgrading it when the 737NG came out. Cheap move but its cost them a whole lot more to compete with the MAX and failing on the A320 area. Airbus simply put new engine on and Winglets. Nice low cost more than competitive (not to mention sooner, much sooner) .
747 vs A380 is something of a draw with the potential in the A380 court (if there is any) 747 simply can’t compete in the passenger segment and there will not be enough freighter desire to maintain so very likely to see demise much sooner.
A330NEO looks to be a nice addition in its segment giving Boeing fits there “just when they had them boxed in”
McNeneanryh is killing Boeing and that core is going to die, all the tehc and good people cannot overcome bad management. When you enjoy intimidating your employees you are in a steep dive.
Airbus has the vision looking at the long term overall good of the company and that include its employees.
Ideally Airbus management with Boeing tech and engineering. In a few years it will be Airbus management and Airbus tech and engineering.
Boeing can turn it around, Airbus did but not under the current regime
“*A330neo is within 1-2% of 787-8/9 on economics now, based on our preliminary analysis; more definitive analysis coming; Airbus claims even-up economics. Omitted.”
Yes, we’ve seen your analysis at 4000 nm. How do the economics compare at 6000 nm?
We’ll be completing a full re-analysis next month, based on comprehensive updated information, and can answer you then, Mike
To LEAHAMNET
Scott
Thanks for your comments
WROTE, IN RESPONSE OF A QUALITATIVE STATEMENT REGARDING BETTER TECHNOLOGY OF AIRBUS QUOTE I agree with much of what you write, but regarding the “superiority of Airbus technology. see * A340 versus s B777 * A350 Classic versus B787 * B788 versus A358 * B779 versus A3510 Even if here it is not strictly a technology issue , but more a better appraisal of the market needs, combined with the basic technology of the B777 * the A320neo is certainly not superior to the B737max. Only the management of Airbus was superior by launching it, when BOEING was napping UNQUOTE! AND YOU RESPONDED: QUOTE Otontisch, in response to your statements: 1)A321neo is better than the 737-9 (and sales figures certainly validate this); factual error 2)A330ceo was better than 763; nicely omitted 3)A350-1000 better than 777-300ER (even Boeing acknowledges 1000 is 20% more efficient than -300ER); omitted 4)A380 better than 747-8I; omitted 5)A330neo is within 1-2% of 787-8/9 on economics now, based on our preliminary analysis; more definitive analysis coming; Airbus claims even-up economics. Unsubstantiated opinion. 6)Boeing only talks about the 781 vs A333 and A339, does not talk about 788/789 vs A330neo–because of the preceding; 781 does not directly compete against the 333 or 339, however. 7)788 doesn’t compete with A358; the 789 does, a factual error 8)A351 is better than the 778, which is the direct competitor; the 779 doesn’t have an Airbus competitor, another factual error UNQUOTE TO WHICH I IN TURN COMMENT I was as said responding to a general qualification and stated some opposing confrontation. 0) Of course, I did NOT included in the list the cases where BOTH the Aircraft were successful, which do not mean that the sales must be the same: 1) The B739 was clearly successful 2) I did not omit the B767/A330, both sold more than 1,000 units and most clearly very successful (see “0”) 3) The A3510 is a state of the Art Aircraft, far from being operational, and cannot be compared with the much older conventional B773ER 4) A380/B747-8i I did not mention it, even if the B748i has nearly the same fuel burn per seat, being much smaller as the A380 and can operate on any airport where a B774 does so, which the A380 cannot. We can discuss this separately 5) A330neo/B787, The same, I did not mention it, because I have not seen your preliminary analysis. Lets discuss this when you disclose your forthcoming definitive analysis., even we surly agree that “definitive” is not a term applicable to any such analysis. But I am curious how a decades ago designed all metallic aircraft, with an old even if somewhat modified wing design and generally unmodified except the Engines could achieve your preliminary nearby B787 figures, especially because the latter has itself quite new engines. But I am not excluding the possibility that when flying much shorter routes as both the A332/3neo and the B788/9 are designed for, does better, even if still below the B787 By the way: I do not think that neither of the two competitors is optimal for such routes!! 6) Here I do not understand well what you are stating. I agree that the A330neo is not competing with the A3510 and as far I see BOEING precisely addressing the B788/9 At least, I do so! 7) A358/B788/9. No error here! I would say it competed with either of them, which is irrelevant regarding the already dead BA358 , which is one of the larger Airbus mistakes. 8) A3510/B779 The B777-8X is the extra-long range one!! (you have a typo here) The fuel burn or max fuel volume is still not indicated by BOEING , but even (if not reliable) estimates for the B779 show that, even at the max A3510 parameters 8,000nm, 360 PAX 3cl and the A3510 max cargo, the B779 fuel burn is at least equal if not significantly lower Lets discuss this when reliable data is available, but there is a consensus that for the most applications as substitute of the B774 the A3510 is too small, therefore the idea of an A3511!! SCOTT !! I enjoy this objective discussion and hope we can follow it up OTON
Please see my response to LEEHAMNET reagrding the same issue
I will respond to the 6,000nmi question once I get the “definitive” analysis from them!
I’m not sure there is a “winner” in the 747-8/A380 battle unless the contest is who has lost more money to date.
I suspect the economic case for the A330NEO is very sensitive to the price of gas in the same way the A340 was.
And Airbus is counting on A320 sales to compensate for the A380, which will eat up cash forever.
To RICK SHAW
I do not know if the losses at each additional A380 delivered are if the costs include its share of development costs, or if their is a net gain once this share is not added.
It needs be considered that given the difficult market situation of this model, additional orders hardly would be at good prices, both for the present model or a re-Engined version.!
Assuming that each order only would create more losses (and only in such case!!) the right thing would be to cancel the orders which still have not created substantial commitments and invest the so freed resources, personal. financial commercial and technical, to new profitable developments
Airbus has repeatedly stated that they expect to be making a profit on A380s delivered from 2015. That is, the cost to build is less than the purchase price.
Unlike Boeing with it’s program accounting, Airbus has written-off significant sums in previous years so as to not carry that forward in the program, As per a previous article, it makes it difficult to directly compare Airbus and Boeing’s finances.
With Airbus expecting to “pass the red line” next year losses per frame today can’t be all that much, can they? cost does not go in jumps and spurts.
Given that neither Airbus nor Boeing breaks out their P&L numbers by program for financial reporting, all monies are lumped into a single pot, so it’s inevitable that a loss for one program will be ‘covered’ by profit on another.
Obviously, internally they have clarity of the finances of each program.
Agreed. The criteria to continuing deliver still not cost generating aircraft is simply checking that by doing so AIRBUS will have more or less money, this means, the COST to be compared with the SALE PRICE should NOT include any item which would continue existing anyway (as already spent development costs and nearly all general costs)
As long the so calculated net COST is less than the sale price,, the aircraft is worth to be built!!
I would not be surprised to see Airbus announcing a significant increase in A320neo production some time next year when flight testing of the P&W powered A320neo is nearing completion. It’s obviously less risky to do that when they know how the neo is performing.
Airbus could IMJ very well shoot for an A32Xneo monthly production of more than 70 units post 2020. Thus, at that time the production output at the four FALs might look something like this:
TLS: 15 A320neos per month
XFW: 35 A319neos/A320neos/A321neos per month
TSN: 10 A320neos/A321neos per month
BFM: 10 A320neos/A321neos per month
Production rates & the ability to court & woo countries seems to be a forte of Airbus, it certainly enhances politically motivated sales. But then it’s probably true to say Airbus product is politically more acceptable than Boeings worldwide. Outside of Israel or perhaps Australia I’m struggling to identify a meaningful technically capable overseas production location for Boeing that would not hit some kind of political resistance.
The peaks & troughs associated with Boeing out of the door figures is not mirrored by Airbus where with the exception of odd year we see smooth & constant production growth, this has no association with unions or taking on casual labour but good planning.
Don’t be surprised to see an Airbus production facility being approved in the UK The UK is today politically closer now to Germany & France than it has been for decades, With an available & experienced workforce & several sites readily available that would require minimal investment it makes perfect logistical & political sense, The UK government willingness to throw a shed load of cash at it makes it highly probable.
Respectfully, what site in the UK is affordable/available today with a pool of available aerospace manufacturing-trained laborers? Certainly I’m not aware of a site in England that might be converted to an A320 final assembly line with much ease. The Mobile (Alabama) facility entailed a $600 million investment on a 100+ acre site, by comparison. It’s certainly doubtful that Airbus would (today, in sequence with that decision) invest similarly in a 5th site for a model whose production run, plausibly, could be under 15 years.
Airbus could invest in Central Europe, for example in the Aviation Valley (for the 5th FAL).
With respect Airbus is able to draw upon resources in existing infrastructure & experienced labour/manpower in the following UK industrial areas The informed will identify many are recognised as existing worldwide hubs of engineering excellence, I quote the counties not actual sites. Readily available means just that, it would be truly silly to suggest any such move would not demand considerable site infrastructure.
Those with a minimal UK geographical awareness will readily identify the sites concerned, the counties are: Avon, Warwickshire, Cheshire, Lancashire x 2, Cambridgeshire, Northumberland (Geographically not perfect)
Why didn’t Airbus just buy enough land in China to expand their operation in time instead of opening a new plant in the US. Yes, the US approach was to garner more of the US market but at 4 planes a month??
The Airbus foray into China, was a political sweetener, it worked.
China’s still high risk, potentially a car crash waiting to happen no point in developing it further whilst the risk remains
Logistically China’s a nightmare, the facility currently churns out four airframes monthly, annually that equals one months production for Boeing, importantly the Chinese love it.
The Initial target is 4/month.
The “standard” Airbus NB FAL seems to be sized for a 8 to 10 frames per month.
With all available lines (7? ) finally running at full capacity I would expect better than 60 deliveries per month. managing pre FAL work will remain the more “interesting” problem though. Obviously the same goes for Boeing.
Now who is better at herding suppliers/subcontractors in a productive way.
How and for how long is the aviation world going to sustain a build rate by A+B of 12-1400 NBs pr year? Gonna put a helluva strain on the training industry. End of P2F? Values of older a/c will certainly drop like a stone.
Your correct about sustainability, but consider after Boeing deviously absorbed it’s US competitor brands how would they have coped with todays orders, probably they would met production demands but almost certainly a less advanced product..
The rise of Airbus was fraught with problems & was initially shrugged off by Boeing. Airbus’s technology then & arguably now is still superior. It goes without saying that Boeings current product has improved because of Airbus’s creeping market dominance, which is good for the industry, passenger & the environment. .
You could also say that subsidized Airbus killed off Lockheed and MD.
Yes they are doing a good job now and tech wise its been give and take.
I don’t go with their flight protection system. Not because its not workable, but it has gaps and holes that has caused as many or more crashed as Boeings more let the pilot do anything he wants.
they are the only other game in the world and while I don’t think their tech reservoir is up to Boeings, they sure are making better use of what they have than Boeing is (but that’s a management problem not a tech or engineer issue, employees and organizations are only as good as their management lets them and Boeings current prefers cowering employees) Sad state of affairs.
As long as the order horizont for new frames is so far out I would be surprised if the market for older frames implodes.
Keep in mind that production rate and location planning will also be affected by new models which may be offered in response to dynamic market factors and opportunities. Hypothetically: a composite re-winged, .75 mach, 2200 nm A321 neo 2 SR model with a new UHB engine of less thrust, lighter landing gear etc with >20 more seats than a 737-9 MAX — in service by 2023? (a better Airbus business prospect than an A350-1100?); a NSA SR for service in 2025?
Market factors include Airbus vs Boeing’s actual market share of single aisle orders by say 2018; Airbus ambition to become #1 overall commercial transport producer in the 2020’s in terms of both numbers and revenues — and Boeing’s determination to remain #1; market share progress by Bombardier’s C-series and China’s C919; the price of fuel — which is not likely to be going down and possibly will include a price on carbon emissions; the certain availability of better technology — some not applicable to current model upgrades; and pressures by airlines and the flying public for better products.
Current 737 family models including MAX’s and A320 family neo’s are not likely to be produced at 50-60 per month rates for as many years into the 2020’s as conventional wisdom seems to think.
Keep tuned.
I
I have a really dumb question: Does Airbus use metric measures in all of its facilities and, since I honestly do not know, which measure is Boeing presently using?
As far as I know, Airbus uses SI (metric) in all their facilities, which could be interesting when they really start up in Mobile. I do know it is SI in Hamburg and Bremen, am almost certain that it is the same for the facilities in France and am pretty confident it is the same for UK and Spain.
Boeing is still, as far as I know, using the Imperial (inches) system.
I’d say they’ll manage (as other “metric” companies that have started up shop in the US have), and I’d be very confident in saying that Mobile is also going to be a metric system operation. Much easier to train people on that than changing all documentation, software etc. for just a single FAL.
A very interesting approach, GARRET
But let me ask to clarify your conclusion:
If I understand well, you are saying that Airbus should not have launched the A320neo as this was handed to BOEING the role of Second Actor during a time it had a perfectible competitive product (A320ceo) and give it time to develop a CLEAN substitute aircraft (I assume that you do not call so the B737max, but a future, probably 2-aisle short range one) !!?
But now, as BOEING responded with the Max, the status quo A320ceo/B737 was reestablished as A320neo/B737max. Obviously, from the overall national interest this was a good think, saving a lot of fuel, but not so for the companies, which are investing a lot of money without changing anything significant in their competitively!
Again, if this is what you meant, what would be the future of the CLEAN new aircraft??.
Why Airbus did so, which given its lack of logic, BOEING did not foresee and so provided a short term what you call cash flow relief (meaning orders to fill the GAP of Wide Body sales). Most probably forced by this gap, which AB is also addressing with a desperate sounding promotion of a re-engined A330neo, trying to induce the perception that this would be similarly successful as the A320neo, forgetting that the latter had only to compete against the then even not existing B737max, whilst the latter has to confront the state of the art B787, and ironically, by heavily discounting the A330neo, their very own already existing “CLEAN ACTOR ” A359!!
Your comments??
I don’t see where you get that this is not good for the companies and that they are investing alot of money for little change. Airbus is clearly on a path of minimum change/minimum expense for the A320 NEO (which some might see as a disadvantage as they have hardly touched the cabin) and most of that investment seems to be coming from Pratt and Whitney or GE. Boeing has been forced to invest a bit more due to the geometry of the aircraft but they too will not be losing money on this project.
Nobody has claimed that the A330 NEO will be as successful as the A320 NEO but it certainly will not be a money loser. On top of that, it bridges the A330 CEO to whatever Airbus has in store for the mid 20’s, which I do believe will be coming. I do not believe that the A330 NEO will be selling long past 2025 and that Airbus will need something else in the pipeline by that time.
To Aero Ninja (Garrett)
My point is that any money spent for re-engine both the B737 and A320 does not benefit the sale position of Airbus nor Boeing, as it only shifted the competition A320ceo/B737NG to A320neo/B737max. As GARRETT assess, by launching the “neo” Airbus put Boeing in the follower position and I add here even if they seemingly are not working on a future “CLEAN” model, the “max” incorporate some perks which aids slightly their competitivity!
I think the A320-Neo was a clever move.
It forced Boeings hand to do an overhaul instead of a clean sheet. Airbus has closed the gap in economics which the NG enjoyed above the CEO in the current generation. There is no value in beeig second mover in this situation for Boeing. The 737 really has not enough potential anymore to gain a lead again by investing more money in changes and the opportunity for an NSA has been pushed years into the future until new technology provides a clean sheet airplane enough of an edge. Both OEMS said again and again a completly new aircraft familiy needs to be at least 15% better in economics than its predecessor.
Lets assume Boeing launches an NSA some years in the future. Who is second mover then? Airbus. And they will have all options to respond. A NEO2, 777-X style large overhaul or clean sheet. Whatever works to restore parity or even leapfrog Boeing.
Airbus has achieved an additional tactical advantage with the NEO. The written off and smooth running production machinery allows to outrun the CSeries in price and availability. Maybe not for the CS-100 because it’s much smaller and not a direct competitor, but certainly for the larger models.
I would say that AA forced Boeing into the MAX arena.
The prospect of AA going exclusively neo was what forced Boeing’s hand. Their response to neo appeared muddled at first, then rushed. We went from “The 737NG is already as good as neo will be.”, moved through “We’re going to do a new plane!” before settling on the same idea as Airbus.
The MAX will be a fine plane, but it wouldn’t exist today were it not for Airbus launching neo.
Correct. I’m curious where Boeing was with it’s clean sheet NSA when they decided to forgo the NSA and go the Max route.
“nowhere” 😉
In best Microsoft style Boeing announced as competitor product “just around the corner”
a rather undefined thing that had from what is known no chance to be produced on a reasonable time horizont. ( and rather meekly Boeing conceded this later ). With the rather problematic 787 project performance visible to all nobody really took that bait and Boeings bluff was called. Outcome : a hastily patchwork defined 737MAX. ( contrast to Microsoft this kind of FUD only worked once : on the 787.)
to NOFLY and ROTATE
You write: “It forced Boeings hand to do an overhaul instead of a clean sheet”
“I would say that AA forced Boeing into the MAX arena”
YES!! This is why a asked GARRETT to ellaborate regarding the timing of a clean sheet wi
But…. as in the present situation Neo/Max nobody has a significant advantage, who in the future will need first to come up with a clean sheet?? This is the same question which was asked when the competition was CEO/NG!!
So, the sequence seems to be:
1) CEO competing with NG 2) Airbus launching the NEO 3) Boeing caughing up with the MAX, restauring the Status Quo
the only result for the manufacturers being that the implementation of a CLEAN newcomer (ora large “a la: B777X upgrade) will be greatly delayed. .
Obviously, Airbus had to be aware of above when launching the NEO, but, for reasons which I already posted, was forced to do so, exploiting the otransitory benefits of the fact that BOEING had not ready the design of the MAX, a big GAFFE!!
“But…. as in the present situation Neo/Max nobody has a significant advantage”
Some might say a 60-40 split in that market segment suggests otherwise. But that’s just some…
Well, the relation was initially in favor of Airbus as Boeing was not ready with the answer. This has already changed and continues to do so. Pls. refer between other to the assessments within this same blog titled ”
“Boeing on path to surpass Airbus in single-aisle production”
But there is no doubt hat the situation is a neck to neck and this is what I addressed in my post you are replying here.
I would say that Boeing has the advantage because prior to the Max Boeing was already in a NSA mindset, not Airbus. Boeing has no more juice left in the 737, the Max will be its last hurrah. The Airbus A320 has much more life in it still. After the NEO it could churn out 2 more versions or take the A358 fuselage, shrink it, spice it up with new engines. Maybe.
But back to topic. Since Boeing had to divert resources to the Max and cease the NSA project, the NSA project more than likely was shelved but I’m sure they’re working on it slowly in the background. Either Airbus or Boeing could pull trigger on the new NSA but since Boeing has nothing else to offer, they’ll likely do it first.
I would be very surprised if Airbus has no coals on the A320 successor fire.
But by Airbus accessment all the nice stuff that could make a real difference, sufficient to make a significant investment worthwhile, are not yet ready for industrialisation in the very near future. More like a decade or two out.
For Boeing that horizont is slightly nearer due to the 737 having significantly less potential picking wayside advances. But not much.
But I expect Boeing to be under enough pressure to come out early. Maybe too early like on the 787.
You may be right, Uwe. Boeing will, most likely, be the first out of the gate with a new NB successor to the B-737 and A-320 families.
The problem comes if Boeing launches their new NB airplane in the 2020-2022 time frame, Airbus cannot respond before 2025-2028, about 5-6 years later.
I see 2020-22 as being far too soon for an all-new single-aisle from either OEM. There won’t be a new step-change engine available by then so only limited scope to build something that’s better than noe/MAX. I just don’t see them spending $10billion to build a slightly better plane – it needs to be a lot, lot better for that money. I expect the timing to much closer to 2028-30.
You’re going to have to explain why Airbus wouldn’t be able to respond for 5-6 years, they’ll not have much on their plate by 2020.
topboom, why do you think Airbus can’t offer a competitor to an Boeing-NSA in timely manner?
Between, I think the strategical implications of a NSA are a bit more complex than appreciated by some. Lets say Boeing introduces a NSA with tech improvements which can be mostly retrofittet to the A320 of offset by other improvements. Airbus naturally would respond with a NEO2 then, which would be vastly cheaper (FALs mostly written off + lower development costs than a clean sheet) and have much better availibility in the beginning. Even if some percent inferior in economics, Airbus had that disadvantage with the A30 vs NG before and it didnt harm its success too much.
Unless forced by Airbus again, would that be a clever move by Boeing?
What you’re saying is that Airbus can do a refreshed-NEO if Boeing goes full steam ahead with their NSA, build a 777x competitor and strengthen the A350 ramp up to their FAL and decide if they want to re-engine the A380? I doubt it. Airbus is not going to throw away all that it has invested in the NEO to go clean sheet if Boeing does. Boeing doesn’t have a choice but Airbus does. Boeing’s plate is not exactly empty either but the design of the Max and 778/9 are frozen so that frees up some personnel and resources. The design of the 781 and improvements to the 787 line will be an ongoing thing but it may have a silver lining.
I’m convinced that Boeing will revisit the 783 for their NSA. The only thing that hinders this idea is that how does Boeing produce a NB with a 787 like fuselage? They can’t. They’d have to incorporate a new way to assembling a CRFP tube and find a way to cure it to match the proposed rate hikes they have been speaking of. If they can use a new type of stronger of metals along with a smaller CRFP wing assembled in Renton, it could work. Another issue would be how to take customers from your Max backlog and convince them the new NSA is better and have them convert. Lastly is how could Boeing integrate the new scimtar winglet on a CRFP wing?
To ROTATE
Possibly I am not understanding well your post, but:
1) you say: “”Boeing doesn’t have a choice but Airbus does””
Why so??. 2) You say: “I’m convinced that Boeing will revisit the 783 for their NSA. The only thing that hinders this idea is that how does Boeing produce a NB with a 787 like fuselage?”
But they have already widely designed and even sold it to ANA (even if later exchanged for B787-8!) Would it be possible to develop this model to a 400 Pax 1cl 400 (or even 500 pax)?? Obviouslt 2 AISLES. 2,000 – 3,000 nm, not as substitute of B737max, but for high density traffic, as they are b.o. many applications inside North America
Boeing should revisit the B-787-3, but with increased range, out to about 4,000-4,500 nm. It would be the perfect B-757-200/-300, B-767-200/-300 (both non-ER) and A-300-600R replacement. Maybe a smaller (length and wingspan), shorter ranged (3,500 nm), high cycle B-787-2 should be looked at for a B-737NG and A-320 replacement, too?
Because Boeing won’t waste time and money on another refresh on a 60+ year old design in the 737. The Max is a product of Boeing not willing to pass on a dollar today rather making more than that later. Airbus could re do the A320 a couple more times if I decided not to go the clean sheet route. With what they have invested in the NEO, I can’t see them going clean sheet, not with the huge NEO backlog and the oversold CEO dripping into the NEO bucket.
I doubt they will build a N. American NB and a global new NB that’s different. The question is how can they build them as fast as they want to with a CRFP backbone and similar enough to allow Max customers to convert the the new NSA, whatever its called.
* I read that the B737 concept cannot be used any more because it is so old, but the A320, being old but less so, , has 2 lives left. I would be interested in some specifics!!
* I have not though of two different NB’s for the US and global use, only mentioned the US as a large example. High density routes where aircraft with max range 2 – 3,000 nm aircraft are adequate are plenty elsewhere.
* And in no case such a 2 aisle NB could replace A320neo/B737max generally, only where such high density, middle range occurs. Which would be still a high figure for a wide-body!!
@otontisch
One problem that has been discussed here about the 737 are grandfathering rights. If you change too much you loose those and have to recertify the complete plane against current generation regulatory requirements. Not only have those grown much stricter today and would add weight to the plane, more importantly they would require a complete redesign. The latter is a showstopper since a clean sheet design would be not much more expensive and have more potential for gains in economics.
One example for changed lays/requirements is that in case of a crash as of current requirements the plane must withstand a higher g load than required at the time the 737 was designed. I remember that from the news some time ago as consequence of a recent crash.
Another problem already discussed at length is the low ground clearance of the 737. The Max cannot use the new engines as is, they had to adjust their size and form and accept some penalty in economics. Increasing the ground clearance obviously would have meant more changes with a potential problem with gradnfathering rights, higher development costs and additional weight. I think the next generation of GTF engines for 2020+ will certainly not shrink in diameter, probably be even larger, no? That would make a further 737 reengine a difficult project.
I’m not sure if the A320 uses any grandfahrting rights. Maybe some of the tech/engineer folks here can comment on that?
Pingback: As Airbus Looks Forward to $4.6 Trillion Future, Boeing says more like $5.2 Trillion | Flight Chic