Boeing to plead guilty to new criminal charges related to MAX crisis

By Scott Hamilton

July 8, 2024, © Leeham News: Boeing agreed to plead guilty to new criminal charges related to the 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement that the US Department of Justice says the company failed to live up to.

By pleading guilty, Boeing avoids a trial. Some families of the 346 victims of two 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019 already indicated they will object to this new agreement, which must be approved by a federal judge.

Boeing will pay a second fine of $243.6m, new conditions related to safety improvements (including spending at least $455m on new safety protocols) and a special overseer will be appointed to monitor Boeing’s compliance this time.

The second fine is identical to the first one in 2021. However, many—including LNA—view these fines as inadequate.

By comparison, previous DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreements include larger fines for violations that did not include safety violations or deaths.

Boeing’s new fine averages $222k a day over three years
  • In 2006, Boeing paid $615m in fines for trade secret theft and the 2001 Air Force leasing tanker scandal. That’s worth more than $958m today. It was up to then the largest fine for a defense contractor.
  • Boeing will “maintain an effective ethics and compliance program, with particular attention to the hiring of former government officials and the handling of competitor information,” the Justice Department statement said. (LA Times, May 16, 2006). Sound familiar?
  • In 2020, Airbus paid the Justice Department $527m in fines ($620m in today’s dollars) for violating bribery and US ITAR regulations. ITAR restricts technology transfers.
  • Nobody was killed in either of these events nor was safety involved. Boeing now has paid $487.2m in fines in two tranches ($539.2m adjusted for inflation).
  • Boeing’s new fine, if spread over three years, is $222,465 per day. It would barely show up in Boeing’s daily expenses.
  • If Boeing was producing 38 MAXes a month, this fine amounts to $185,387 per airplane.

The company has a long history of being fined for safety violations.

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285 Comments on “Boeing to plead guilty to new criminal charges related to MAX crisis

  1. Pretty obvious the government considers fraud against them to be more serious than defective products that killed people. The fines are pathetic. People from Boeing should be in prison

    • Of course the shareholders essentially pay the fines. In theory ( ie: as published in a Boeing proxy) some executives could have some of their “incentive ” pay “clawed back ” for such “safety ” violations up to 5 years after the ‘event’. Will be interesting to see if that has happened or will happen.

      From 2022 Proxy. A search on word ‘ clawback ‘ shows 11 times the word is found Following is an example

      Clawback Policy page 54
      . . . .In addition, even absent a financial restatement, the Compensation Committee may recoup incentive compensation from any executive officer or any other executive who has engaged in fraud, bribery, or illegal acts like fraud or bribery, or knowingly failed to report such acts of an employee over whom such officer had direct supervisory responsibility. The Compensation Committee also may recoup incentive compensation from any executive who has violated, or engaged in negligent conduct in connection with the supervision of someone who violated, any Company policy, law, or regulation that has compromised the safety of the Company’s products or services and has (or could reasonably be expected to have) a material adverse effect on the Company. The Compensation Committee has the flexibility under this policy to direct the Company to publicly disclose any recoupment made pursuant to the policy.
      and elsewhere
      …These forfeiture and clawback provisions continue to apply for five years after the executive’s termination of employment.

      of course if the dog eats your homework. . . .

        • Grubbie. >>> …These forfeiture and clawback provisions continue to apply for five years after the executive’s termination of employment.

          is an exact copy ‘ quote’ from the listed proxy.

          I have not yet searched the most recent proxy..
          And not holding my breath for that ‘rule’ to be enforced against anyone but the Janitor-
          yet to find a Marion Robert Morrison …

      • Far from the first time a Corporation has done awful things and got away with it.

        The legal system is setup to maintain stability at the cost of lives and protect the rich.

      • The shareholders did appoint the board, and the board at least theoretically chose the management, so I suppose it is right that the shareholders suffer.

        • nah,

          the board appointed the board, then offered the shareholders a pretend election where there was only 1 candidate for each post with no meaningful information available as to whether or not the person is fit for purpose.

          corporate governance is no more democratic than china.

          • That would be totally accurate.

            But the shareholders are guilty by their action which was to put Calhoun back on the board.

            I would love to see Boeing go chapter 11 and wipe them all out.

    • I agree Andy, but perhaps even more importantly, the fundamental architectural issues with the MAX flight controls should be addressed. That single box that combines previously separate LRUs, and which has reduced several functional components to mere software modules – well that architecture needs to be weeded out.

      Having a lot of complex subsystems is ok, but there needs to be hardware moats around them, and the interfaces need to be such that they can be cut out of the system if they are misbehaving. And, any misbehavior needs to be easily identified and attributed to the correct problematic bit of hardware by the flight crew, so they can swiftly respond appropriately A valid FMA needs be both possible, and actually performed by the design engineers. And that design needs to be thoroughly tested in realistic conditions. Oh gee, where are those simulators relative to the DE’s? Oh yeah, more than 3,000 miles away and not accessible. THAT needs to be fixed as well.

      • RTF:

        Was this a move on the MAX version?

        I had systems I dealt with and re-designed at times (building controls, fans, boilers, pumps) but in that case I could make it fail safe when they failed to do that originally.

  2. All eyes now on Judge Reed O’Connor in Texas, who has to decide whether or not to approve this sweetheart DPA, and who was instructed months ago by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals to review the DPA in accordance with earlier jurisprudence regarding application of the CVRA. O’Connor is ballsy, and appears to have good moral fiber, so Boeing may yet have a trial to endure — unless, of course, O’Connor has been “gotten to” in the meantime.

    Relevant case law: United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (en banc) — reiterating Supreme Court and prior Fifth Circuit precedent that district judges are empowered to deny dismissal when “clearly contrary to manifest public interest” as assessed “at the time of the decision to dismiss”


    “Paul Cassell, a lawyer for victims’ family members, said he plans to ask the federal judge on the case to reject the deal and “simply set the matter for a public trial, so that all the facts surrounding the case will be aired in a fair and open forum before a jury.””

    • Judge O’Connor criticized “Boeing’s egregious criminal conduct”.

    • Thanks for that comment and the provided links, Abalone.

      When gov’ts start being in the business of protecting
      corporations.. well, I think we’re seeing where that goes-
      as we have before. Not good.

  3. The “slap-on-the-wrist” fine in this instance represents just $704,000 per crash victim in the 2 MAX crashes…

    • Of course.
      Boeing lives from one waiver to the next.
      Previously: EICAS; ICAO freighter emissions.
      In the balance: MAX Nacelle overheating (despite saying that a waiver wouldn’t be sought…but just wait and see…)

    • Boeing seeking waivers and exemptions. Just another day in the office.

  4. Same ol’ same ol’… a guilty plea for gub’mint PR purposes- to say “we got ’em this time”- while behind the scenes, nothing changes at Boing. I now think even another fatal Boing crash would not change anything at that malevolent company.
    I feel sorry for all the line workers there.


    • That is not Boeing specific. Its true of all Corporations and anyone that has money, LLC or whatever.

      If Boeing was crushed the line workers would be out of jobs. There is nothing in the US that can replace Boeing BCA.

      It also has critical defense areas though those would be swept up if Boeing was broken up. Reality is you would have more defense consolidation and the F-35 program alone should be enough to show where that leads.

      And not to give Boeing management any out, but its amazing how the Airbus FBW/computer system logic has also killed many people and that is ignored.

      AF447 is an outstanding case in point. There is nothing that says you have to degrade the control logic if a Pitot is lost, but there it is and was.

      And the Thales Pitot were known to have serious issues. All swept under the rug.

      I have followed other crashes based on Airbus computer logic and its mind numbing where those decisions can lead.

      Its the area that is interesting in that mechanical controls don’t have those choices and you don’t have to make decisions because there are none to be made.

      But the Johanesburg 747 BOA debacle also shows where relay logic fails when people make stupid decisions. Save the engine from some remote possible FOD and loose the aircraft. Phew.

      And the AHJs did not challenge that.

      I know of two elevator failures that in theory could not happen because of all the safeties involved.

      One killed a person. The other one came close to killing me as the elevator departed just as I stepped out of it, a fraction of a second sooner or I had been a fraction of a second slower and I would have been sliced in half.

      All sorts of safeties failed to allow both those to occur. MCAS was incredibly stupid, but there are also many other incredibly stupid decisions made.

      To say Boeing is the only failure in the world of focus only on it means others get a pass.

      • “AF447 is an outstanding case in point. There is nothing that says you have to degrade the control logic if a Pitot is lost, but there it is and was.”

        Are you seriously suggesting that computers should just ignore the fact they are getting faulty data and happily ‘augment’ flight controls? That’s exactly what MCAS was about.

        It is incredible how every time someone wants to make ‘but … but … Airbus automation is bad too’ argument, they point to AF447 and then proceed to show they have no clue about it.

        • JS:

          Everything else on an Airbus is computer based and program logic (or illogical)

          So yes, because there is a safe default mode for Pitot failure. Its 5 deg nose up and 85% power.

          Clearly Airbus did NO research when they shucked it over to the pilots who had been taught Airbus logic always protected the aircraft.

          There were something like 10-20 of those type incidents logged and in most cases, the pilots did the wrong thing (pulling back was common, one shoved controls down and ripped parts of the aircraft off in an over-speed)

          I know your next point will be, well you have to have program limits invoked (ie landing)

          Did you know some alarm functions on Airbus do not occur until you are 2000 feet AGL?

          Boeing elected to have Auto Throttle go off as a 2nd function behind the FLCH function. Airbus does not do that, so please do not tell me you can’t program things in a sane manner. You can.

          Now its all programming and an Airbus or modern Boeing has thousands of those programs a millions of lines of code.

          And yes I have worked with programing and lines of code.

          • “So yes, because there is a safe default mode for Pitot failure. Its 5 deg nose up and 85% power.”

            And how exactly do you trust computer to know what is ‘5 deg nose up’ when data is getting is unreliable? Sorry, but ‘if automation is unreliable, disable is’ is the very basic of safety design. And why do you even think that another layer of automation (this time trying to improvise on unreliable data) would help in case of AF447? The problem was that pilots basically stopped believing in anything they were seeing on instruments, so very likely they would have immediately overridden any safe flight path and done exactly the same thing all over again.

            “Clearly Airbus did NO research when they shucked it over to the pilots who had been taught Airbus logic always protected the aircraft.”

            If automation is unreliable, disable the automation and let pilots fly the plane. It’s not a difficult concept to grasp.

            And don’t tell me about what Boeing elected to do, they are people who decided that automation running on one data source, with no checking and no way to disable it is perfectly safe.

      • The AF447 accident or the Airbus FBW systems have nothing in common with the 737Max dangerous design. Absolutely nothing.
        An Airbus with all its computers can be kept in flight without any engine or pitot. Nothing to compare with a flawed system which acts against the pilots will.

        • Really? Then why was AF447 crashed?

          MCAS was one small program. It was a stupid program the way it was written.

          While I fully agree it sucked (worse it was lethal) it was recoverable. A 2nd aspect was task saturation of the pilot and no help from the First Officers who had no flying time to speak of). Indonesian pilot in fact tried to turn intimidate ops over to the first officer who could not even keep trimming and made it worse.

          No CRM.

          Contributing to Ethiopian was loss of speed awareness which lead to manual trim not working.

          Watch the Mentour U Tube on Airbus thrust reverse programing and the back and forth and the logic busts in that.

          There are many examples of Airbus crashes due to program not being logical.

          Airbus buries it under the magic of computers and gets away with it.

          And I in no way say that Airbus is malicious. But they do have some stupid logic (illogical) that the pilots have to be supremely aware of in an aircraft that supposedly has envelope protection, until it decides it does not.

          • You don’t seem to understand how these complex systems work. Every diagnostic has enabling/disabling conditions. What happened in AF447, is that they were so far out of normal flight profile, that the diagnostics no longer worked. The state of the plane (very high pitch-up at high altitude, very low speed; something which should never ever happen) made absolutely no sense and the computer system could no longer interpret the data. This is because nobody ever considered this condition and actually was not considered in functional safety assessment. When they dropped the nose, the plane went back to a state where the computer made sense of the conditions again and correctly assessed the plane was in a stall condition. The correct response would have been to drop the nose even more, increase speed and get out of the stall condition, but the pilots incorrectly responded by pitching up again and get the plane back in “unknown” territory and thus disabling stall detection again, making the alarm go away. Only the captain recognised this when he arrived in the cockpit from his rest break, but then it was too late.

            On the other hand, MCAS was not really recoverable. In the simulator, the vast majority of pilots crashed the plane. Only a few crews were able to recover. Looking at the logic, it was absolutely stupid and no proper functional safety assessment had ever been done.

            In most of these systems, the code size for diagnostics and response to faults is far bigger than the actual control logic itself.

            Any system has flaws in it and most of them are not deliberate, but flaws in specification, Functional Safety assessment or analysis of Safety of the Intended Functionality. As said before, you can not make things foolproof because God will just invent a better fool.

  5. This is fine. A respectable company such as Boeing would never put the public in danger, not even if year-end bonuses were on the line.

    Seriously speaking, high-profile settlements tend to reach $10M per wrongful death, which would be in the $3.5B range.

    Boeing got off easy through sheer luck. The previous prosecutor that went against them was so tough that, impressed with her performance, Boeing itself hired her for a high-paying position in their pocket defense firm:

    • Sheer luck? Hmmm, money speaks a language all its own.

    • Don’t worry, they are still tempting fate. If they continue, the next accident caused by their QA failures is bound to happen. Boeing will die when that accident happens

      • No they will not.

        The two MAX crashes in fact were not QA failures.

        They were design failures in a control system.

        And in fact that control system has alwyas been there, its called speed trim.

        The logic of using it is not the issue. Its how it was implemented and allowed to do so that is.

        MCAS 2.0 corrects that failure, MCAS is still there.

        Boeing did the same failure of logic with the Auto Throttle off due to another mode select (FLCH). That has been corrected.

        But FLCH would never have happened if the pilots had been managing the aircraft and not acting like passengers.

        • @TransWorld July 9, 2024

          “No they will not.
          The two MAX crashes in fact were not QA failures.
          They were design failures in a control system.”

          To me the above sentences state the deadly flaws in Max’s ‘MCAS/control system which caused 346 deaths were not QA failures but design failures.
          For many years I worked in developing/designing kernal sub-systems for ICL’s Large System’s VME OS. Every ‘design’ I produced was subject to a formal QA process. This process included detailed inspections using technqiues that would routinely detect errors like those found in the MCAS code.
          Designs are created by humans and humans make errors.
          My experince has shown that by using an appropiately structured set of ‘QA procedures’ nearly all these ‘design errors’ are detectable.
          My point is DESIGN FAILURES are also QA FAILURES
          Note, finding bugs sooner also minimises costs

          • TransWorld July 9, 2024

            “No they will not.
            The two MAX crashes in fact were not QA failures.
            They were design failures in a control system.”

            To me the above sentences state the deadly flaws in Max’s ‘MCAS/control system which caused 346 deaths were not QA failures but design failures.
            For many years I worked in developing/designing kernal sub-systems for ICL’s Large System’s VME OS. Every ‘design’ I produced was subject to a formal QA process. This process included detailed inspections using technqiues that would routinely detect errors like those found in the MCAS code.
            Designs are created by humans and humans make errors. My experince has shown that by using an appropiately structured set of ‘QA procedures’ nearly all these ‘design errors’ are detectable.
            My point is DESIGN FAILURES are QA FAILURES
            Note, finding bugs sooner minimises costs

  6. I’m not really interested in the money, I (and the families) want to get to the bottom of what actually happened,I am certain that there are dirty secrets that Boeing and many vested interests do not want aired in a public courtroom.
    This statement from Boeings Safety And Quality Plan pricked up my ears
    “strengthening the role of pilots and flight test personnel “,why do you think they might have realised that they need to do that?

    • Thank you for that statement.

      I too would like to see that but NTSB cannot even get access to the person and or people involved in the Exit Eject.

      At this time I don’t believe anyone could re-construct the truth at Boeing and MCAS.

      No amount of money is going to bring anyone back. The best money can do is allow a family to go on with life.

      And that is not said callously. My dad died in part due to a repair done wrong. People did not sue in those days. His insurance allowed my family the financial stability to make a life for ourselves.

      No amount of money was going to bring my father back nor his friend who perished with him.

  7. Just imagine what a trial would look like…it would be like the Watergate hearings, we would really have Boeing-gate. It would be a PR disaster for Boeing, Calhoun, and the board. Even a court acquittal would see them convicted in the court of public opinion.
    Not gonna happen, but I would love to see it!

  8. One condition of the settlement is that the board will meet with the families of the Max crashes victims.
    The families should have insisted that for this meeting the members of the board face them locked in medieval stocks, and each family member gets a dozen rotten eggs to fling in their faces.
    Or maybe the board members could be seated in amusement park dunk tanks.

    • And does that include Kelnor and the past members who were in charge when that occurred?

      I really dislike the statements about stocks and eggs. Its never happened nor will.

      The people that got locked in stocks were the ones at the bottom of the social order. Rarely does a rich person has ever gotten what they deserved.

      • ….that is why I said the families should have insisted on this, not that it is going to happen…
        Obviously, I am not being serious here, just saying that the board deserves to be pelted with rotten eggs…and worse!

        • Prison would be too good for them.

          Its the ugly reality that they ignore what they caused.

          It took MAD a lot of years to change a mind set that (now impaired) driving was not an excuse to kill someone.

          And yea, I grew up in that era where getting lit and driving was accepted and oh well, not your fault if you killed or maimed someone.

  9. I don’t see how slapping a fine on a company already in financial trouble helps, wont it encourage them to cut ever more corners? Id say go after the the people in change at the time, maybe take back those multi million dollar bonus they paid themselves.

    • True.

      The US legal system does not allow those guilty to be prosecuted.

      Rarely does any legal system allow that.

  10. Leeham has noted the fines are inadequate.

    When has fines deterred a corporation from bad behaviour? (let alone life ending)

    The argument has always been that fines teach a lesson but the reality is I have never seen a company say, oh, we are going to get fined if caught, we should not do that.

    Nope, greed rules and when they go off the rails, no fine is going to stop them.

    Prison time might, but then they are protected.

    From the Pinto gas tank, Takata Air bags, GM ignition to Maconda Blowout.

    Another ugly reality is Boeing is part of the limited defense base, even if they don’t get a contract the bid process needs competition as well as the various products Boeing makes.

    • There is nothing wrong with American capitalism. Capitalism is by definition the choice of millions of different persons.
      Some are well managed some are bad.
      While herd behavior is possible it is rare as the number of actors increase.

      • I have to disagree.

        While the basis of capitalism works, the issue becomes when it gets corrupted.

        Corporations as well as other companies want to do anything they can. When a structure is in place to keep them between the rails, they begin to tear it down and or apart.

        Airbus while not perfect (nothing is) is a lot more socially responsible due the system in which it works.

        Boeing management has been gutting the company for a long time (slow liquidation ) and the board has gone along with it, encouraged it, aided and abetted it. Its an incestuous relationship with board members serving on other boards and who can rub whose back.

        Share buy back is one evil practice. Stock in liu of salary is another. Giving bonuses to do your job (and do we get the 5 million back from Calhoun?). Bonuses when you don’t make any profit. Huge money when you bail out after running the company in the ground.

        So yea, American Capitalism is corrupt and has severe issues that impact all of us as well as other people in the world (lethally in the case of MAX)

        Its not the worst example in history, Big Tobacco was even worse. The amount of death and injury caused by them exceeds the history of warfare in all likelihood (not I have not tried to run numbers).

        And it was done with knowledge of what they were doing, they litterly not only poisoned people, they researched how to poison them and get them addicted.

        If my dad had not died from other causes when I was young, he would have died from Tobacco. Full on hackers cough in his 30s with Asthma thrown in.

      • Capitalism works as long as there is competition. In the commercial business Airbus and Boeing are at best a duopoly. In this market they can both sell planes faster than they can build them, so Boeing revenue is limited not by competition from Airbus but by Boeing’s internal production constraints (and right now by FAA control).
        The very limited competition of commercial aviation is not enough to ensure good behavior as in a more competitive market.
        Also, very hard to believe that CEO compensation is being set by a free and competitive market, as it is for normal careers. Witness how recent Boeing CEO’s have been paid for screwing up the company.

        • No, Capitalism does not work with competition regardless.

          It works if there are defined rules or the road that they have to follow.

          BP has lots of competition. It undermined the regulatory system that allowed something like 6 (or more) safety features that any single one would have prevented the Maconda blowout.

          People died and enormous environmental damage done.

          Competition can keep prices better but never delude yourself that it has anything to do with peoples lives.

          • In a market with true competition customers avoid a business selling a bad product. For example, if a restaurant is serving food tainted with salmonella it will become public knowledge, customers will flee, and the restaurant will close.
            If airlines and the flying public had many other sources for airplanes, they would already have turned their backs on Boeing and it’s commercial business would be failing. But in this business, airlines and the public cannot just walk across the street to a competitor like one could with restaurants.
            I’m not saying we don’t need regulators like the FAA and the health department, just that in a competitive market like restaurant s the market competition means sellers either provide a good service or they fail. Boeing, however, is free to produce crap and customers will still buy it because they cannot wait 6 years for an Airbus, so strong regulators become even more critical in this uncompetitve market.
            I’m pretty much quoting aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia here, I think.

          • John:

            The problem you miss is that the people who get salmanila poisoning can be dead. Yea, maybe others benefit but that has nothing to do with competition.

            Ford Pinto case in point. Did all the survisors flee Ford or did the non affected not continue to buy Fords and even Pinto’s? My brother had one and kept driving it. He undersood the risk.

            The logic bust you are in is, if there was no other restaurant , people would not go to where they get poisoned. They would simply quit going to that restaurant.

            By the time you know about it the authorities have closed it down until the issue is corrected or its such an infestation of issues it gets shut down permanently.

            Chevy had its ignition debacle and people still bought Chevy autos.

            You keep equating price competition with safety and those are two totally separate issues.

            BP about put itself under with cost cutting but they never thought twice about it. We are competitive so we cut corners.

            Or we want to pay our CEO ridiculous amounts of money to kill our business so we cut corners.

            Greed is the driver in this case.

      • Wrong. The people did not choose capitalism, it was thrust upon them with no option. Take it or get lost, we’re making money and you can like it or lump it – sort of attitude prevails.
        Corporate malfeasance can ONLY be stamped out when the consequences of getting caught match the effect of the wrong-doing. Stripped of assets and prevented from EVER being accepted ANYWHERE as more than a simple manual labourer on the minimum wage – EVER. That should be an automatic Contractual agreement condition before anyone is allowed into a management or senior control position. Let the punishment be agreed and match the crime.

        • Like that has ever or will ever happen.

          Corporate malfeasance will never be stamped out.

          All we can hope for is that Boeing builds aircraft to the spec they agreed to.

          • The biggest problem with any economic idea that ends in an “-ism” is that it has been elevated to a religion, on top of the fact that all such -isms lack nice tight definitions and descriptions.

            The idea of raising money in capital markets to fund an enterprise is not a bad idea. The idea of giving the investors a bit of equity ownership in exchange, and making their ROI dependent upon business performance is a good idea too, at least in many situations. Making those contracts negotiable in a dedicated market where they are called shares is also a good idea, at least for some of them. Suggesting that this form of capitalization for any and all business or service activities is the only right way to do things is patently absurd on its face.

            Similarly, suggesting that the state or community should own everything in a “from each, to each” arrangement per Marx and Engels is a curious idea, but as far as I know, it has almost never been tried except in a few religious communities such as an Israeli kibbutz or maybe a few of the Mennonite communities. It certainly does not describe the systems used by the countries we call communist, which have been much closer to tyrannical monarchies or oligarchies than anything else. So I get pretty bored by any argument that suggests some vague thing called capitalism is some superior system of economic virtue.

            If something works, ok. If it has problems, change it or get rid of it.

          • @RTF

            The guard rail for capitalism is supposed to be regulatory bodies and regulation.

            BA lobbied and bought it’s way into the FAA.

          • I agree with Frank P on the guard rails.

            I will disagree that the FAA failures are exclusively Boeing undermining them. The FAA had issues back before the greed kicked in. Boeing made it worse but FAA has long had issues.

            As for enterprise, we are in a world that was formed to what it is by enterprise. Historically its been horrid to many as its been at the extreme expense of others.

            Enterprise can work but shares in a firm should never be used as compensation, its an auto stamp to corruption.

            Compensation probably (not my area) is best served by a base salary and if any bonus, its has to be framed for performance.

            Shares are the issue as then the goal can be to jack up the stock price so your shares get you more money. Or you get money regardless and you can have run the company into the ground.

            The failure if done right comes on the next persons watch or in the case of Boeing, 3-4 CEOs have pulled it off.

            You need to come up with the right metrics, an honest rating no matter what level and it can’t be corrupted.

  11. They should go after those responsible not Boeing per se. Who approved MAX? etc.

    • AlesS:

      If you would read what I wrote, the system stops that from happening.

      Its not right, but is it legal no matter how they have to twist the legal pretzel to make it that way.

      And judges that belong in the camp of extremists rule such that it never can happen. Sometimes you get a fair ruling that is appealed and always over turned.

      Remember the US Microsoft Trial and the absurdity that the Browser was an integrate part of the operating system? MS was not a monopoly?

      Yep, Judges ruled that MS was spot on. I am no programmer and I know that is pure bunk.

      In Europe they made MS split Explorer out of the system and of course it still ran.

      I know of one example where a LLC tried to pin the whole blame of its going belly up on a 5% shareholder. All the big boys were left off the hook.

      The only thing that saved the 5% partner who had no control over the decisions that put them into the gutter was they got good counsel and set themselves up such that they could not be gutted for what others did.

      Some of it was not legal. I applaud what they did. They used the system against itself. Most of us are not in the position where they had access to what they needed for Justice (which was limited to not loosing everything they had worked hard for)

      There rarely is Justice. And Justice and Legal are polar opposites.

      No one is above the Law, LOL. Until you have the money, then you are immune.

      • A lot of chatter, however, I’d like the Retired Tech Fellow to offer his real expertise.

        • As RTF has said, we all (at least those interested in better outcomes) bring perspective to the table.

          No one person has all the answers.

        • I’ve posted it here before, but it has been a while. If you visit my website or YouTube Channel, you can find some fairly extensive (not completely overlapping) bio data there.

          Probably the thing that makes my perspective unusual, is that in my nearly 31 years with the company I got to spend quality time at almost every Boeing site, the big exception being Heath. My time was split between defense, commercial, and total company or corporate stuff, including a curious three month stint in corporate finance doing internal audit work. In a life before Boeing I was a CPA/auditor – but then a friend made me an offer to do computing infrastructure opportunity to do computing/network infrastructure work at Boeing, which played into one of my hobbies and that was that.

          The website is The video channel is charlemangesclock.

          • ‘including a curious three month stint in corporate finance doing internal audit work.’

            You clearly had way too many scruples to last long in that department.

            “Well, this is your 90 day review Craig and I’m not going to mince words or waste time. You’re just not a good fit here, I’m sorry. You look at things way too closely, follow too many rules and that’s not something we take very lightly. We can’t have people like you gumming up the works with procedures and standards. There’s profits to be made.”

          • As for the computing/network architecture stuff, while flight controls per se are not in my wheelhouse, control systems in general are. I spent a lot time working on control systems architectures both in the missile system (Peacekeeper/Minuteman), and in the factories. Working with a good friend who is now in charge of secure identity at Microsoft, we came up with a novel way of leveraging the internal general purpose network for secure links within a machine area network. A successful startup using that technology had an interesting life and is no inside Johnson Controls.

            Another interesting very early project that I did on the side was to reverse engineer the CP/M operating system to find out how some of the built-in functions really worked (its file system had directories! Who knew?), and then I wrote a new user manual for it that was distributed for free inside the engineering community in Ballistic Systems Division – probably about 500 copies were printed.

          • Thanks Frank, and sorry about the typos. I make way too many.

            @Peter The MAX flight control situation is far more complicated than most people realize. I’ve posted it here before, but it is worth repeating for those new. The MAX mess is really a convergence of several unfortunate trends that had to result in disaster.

            One trend was a mindless thing we allowed to happen to the distribution of top quality engineering talent in the American economy after telecom deregulation, the rise of the internet, and the fall of the Soviet Union. Aerospace and communications systems were the big losers. Video games and other tech stuff were the big winners. That’s where the salaries and IPO opportunities have drawn the talent. Sure there are still some top people in aerospace and at the telecoms, but you won’t see any more Nobel prizes coming out of those sectors, and the bench is in worse shape than that of the Oakland Angels.

            The reason that nobody asked the right questions as the MAX was being developed is that there is not a single person in Boeing technical management (people like engineering directors and program managers) who have the chops to recognize an issue like the LRU consolidation mistake. It gets worse – much much worse.

            Humans are just not good in dealing with large number concepts. To say we are bad is an understatement. Pick a thousand people at random, and you will be lucky to find one person in the group that has a good feel for things like deep time, cosmic distances, or IC component densities in a computer chip. But these things have HUGE implications in our daily lives.

            As IC component densities in chips rose into the quintillions (there’s a lot more in there than transistors) the economic pressure to shift from doing things in hardware to doing them in software mounted. The R&D costs for developing something are not all that different between hardware and software, but the marginal costs of production are assembly lines versus zero. So the temptation to do things in software and get rid of as much hardware as possible is enormous.

            OK, so now we have tech managers at Boeing who are more savvy at career ladder climbing than working through the logic of an easy sudoku, and you have all of those LRUs in the EE bay under the flight deck adding huge amounts of weight and cost to the plane, and so what do those idiots assume is the right thing to do? Yeah, consolidate it all.

            Oh, and then there is the FMA impossibility that they created as a result. They didn’t do the work because they simply created a situation in which it is humanly impossible to do the work. Oh, and this is not something large language models (aka AI) can do either). Oh, and then to make it even worse, they shave a few bucks in cost by selling off the simulators to a low cost training startup in Florida thus depriving the lesser ability engineers remaining the ability to go and test the crappy stuff they have been told to design. So on top of a logical systems analysis (the FMA) being impossible, actual simulation testing isn’t possible either.

            So what happens? The wonder is not that there are over 300 people dead. The wonder is that the number isn’t in the thousands.

          • Oakland A’s. I mixed my team names, and was actually thinking of their pre-move name (from KC) when they were the Athletics. Sloppy me …

          • RTF:

            Johnson Controls was what I primarily dealt with though there was some Honeywell early on and later Delta (British Columbia outfit)

            I liked the early system and the mid era system, then it went into the can as they changed it entirely. I could fix the first two, the third I gave up on (horribly complex for no gain and features that were really good dropped).

            I don’t think anyone can grasp the complexity of what is going on in regards to stuffing things into ICs.

            Looking at Airbus FBW failures of logic, they don’t fully understand their system either. They build it, test it, weed out the obvious issues and then as time goes by and its exposed to the real world, deal with the faults as they occur.

            I had one system that the core was almost brilliant in the use of the capability. Then one small item did not work and they patched a fix on top of it rather than figure it out.

            Once they got done patching it, random failures occurred. The field guy often could not figure out why though we fixed things lkike timing issues.

            In the end after a couple of years trying to peel the onion we gave up and just re-wrote all of it.

            At the time you could use Graphic Symbols to get your logic inserted. We were chasing one issue and found the bust, the previous programmer just reversed the logic to get it right with a block, he did not go back and figure out why it had gone wrong.

            Or you could just write a program which is what my guy was good at, we did the standard line out of what we wanted, he wrote it and then we trial ran it fixing any issues.

            And that was a relatively simple system, not like an Aircraft.

            I liked the program approach. If someone wrote a program for damper control and it worked, you just copy and paste it in and that part worked the way you needed it to.

            Anyone could read it and if a flaw was found, easily corrected (some of which I could do as I knew what the code logic was trying to do).

            I don’t know there is any answer now that things have gone so far. Test it and fix the dumb parts (FLCH). I doubt you can ever get all of it.

            Airbus advantage I think is they have worked with their code so long most of the flaws have been at least stopped though I doubt they understood it when the Pilot drove the computer system insane in the flight school crash.

            But then there is just the logic busts and what controls do what under what situations. Timing issues that a failure slips in between the update time.

          • So I’m having a little dig through your website and I came across this (during the Novell time):

            “We had a corporate-wide system up and running even before Microsoft officially changed the name of the product to Windows NT Advanced Server 3.1. The BCS execs inside Boeing who were buddy-buddy with IBM were fit to be tied. Orders were sent down through all of the layers of management, and Joe called me into his office and said that he had been instructed to get the list of all of the NT underground participants from me. I had anticipated this. I had deleted everything from my work computers, and was keeping all of my contact data at home. I told him all of that, and he said good. As I left his office he said: “You’re doing a good job. Keep going.” Which I did.”

            Those are the type of people who have infected BA up and down…

          • @Frank P So the problem with Boeing Computer Services back in the day is probably way off topic here. But it was a problem that became common in many companies. The formal IT organizations became isolated from the businesses they served and lost awareness of the things that mattered. They literally did not know what they needed to be working on. Some organizations realized that something was wrong and tried to address it, but with little success, Boeing tried several approaches, all of which failed.

            OK, the reason things got of track was an economic one. When large corporations developed a modern appetite for computing power (this was in the late 1970s) the machines that were available were still mostly mainframes. Sometime around 1980 mainframe orders skyrockted, and most large companies and governmental agencies built special buildings or even whole campuses (Boeing) to house their new computers and the computer people. But this timing could not have been worse. It was literally an economic disaster.

            At the same time those mainframe orders were being placed, ICs were transforming computing. Plus, the need for the UI/UX is at the point of use, not in some far off campus or building. So the 1980s were typified by budget wars inside companies. Nobody wanted to pay their share of the computing overhead (CRU rates, which was a take-off on standard cost accounting terminology – “cost recovery unit” which the computing people rebranded as “computer resource unit”). So CRU cost avoidance coupled with departmental computing based on machines using ICs became the norm. So not only were the computing people isolated and rapidly losing touch with the businesses they were there to serve, they had the wrong type of equipment and wanted at least two orders of magnitude too much money for it.

            Boeing’s first attempt to fix the problem was when T. Wilson had his sidekick Art Hitsman take over the computing organization. But Art was way in over his head on that one (this is the guy who oversaw the construction of the Minuteman I system). To say that Art failed would be an understatement. The people who worked for him didn’t respect him and he didn’t like them. He knew they were out of touch but they had these big machines and this impossible budget mess/war. What he needed to do was sell the Bellevue campus and move everything onto the major sites in a semi-distributed fashion, but that that would have added many tens of millions more in one time costs.

            The next effort under a guy named Hollman(sp?). He was a nice guy who tried to maintain the status quo, while at the same time setting up an internal organization aimed at slowly dragging it back into the company. A fellow who had run external services named Joe Muldoon was put into the Advance Research &D Technology organization to make this happen.

            Now that may sound odd – having the AR&T group be under the the computing organization, but that’s where the math guys were. You see, back in the 1950s when almost no companies had computers, Boeing had a few and even made some of its own. These were in support of aerodynamics research centered around the wind tunnel complex down by Plant II. So the computing organization over a 20 year period sort of just grew up around them. Yeah, by 1980 90% of the computing budget had nothing to do with that stuff, but they still had their Crays, and that gave them a corner of the Bellevue Data Center, so in a logic we would now call twisted, it seem normal to have them report to the computing org. So Joe was over there.

            Joe went looking through the company for the folks doing advanced stuff with computers and networks in various places. I had left Ballistic Systems and was doing the first program on the defense side to put a computer on every engineer’s desk and build an information sharing system for the total program. It was a Navy program called P3 Update IV. This was the perfect place to push the boundaries since at the corporate level they didn’t care about the program even a little. They had five massive programs that the public knew about, mostly dealing with missiles and a piece of the F-22, and then there was a bunch of black stuff. A little Navy program in the corner was just noise. So we were doing stuff there that was roughly 15 years ahead of where most folks were, and Joe found me.

            His offer over lunch one day was very simple. “How would you like to do it again for the whole company?” I asked him who he thought he was, T Wilson? And he replied that no, he was a guy with budget and the ability to provide me political cover, and besides, it was clear that I was someone who wasn’t afraid of unhelpful rules.” I replied that he had a point and accepted. So it was my job from the get go to find a way to pull the heart out of BCS, get computing service back to being embedded with the users, and adaptable to whatever it needed to be at the time and point of the need. I had a good five year run and then Joe retired.

            So then I got an offer from Commercial to go to Everett and keep going, and by the way, write the requirements for the organization that I was leaving. You should have seen the change in attitude of the VP who at first had been glad to hear that I was leaving. He couldn’t suck up to me enough. Then the web happened, storage got cheap, and what I had been telling the BCS folks for nearly 20 years came true – the company got rid of them. And basically, it was because people did not understand the implications of large numbers (i.e. what Gordon Moore wrote about IC component density trends in 1965).

            Very large numbers will bite very hard if you aren’t paying attention. Their presence in integrated circuits wiped out BCS, and they killed a bunch of people flying on the MAX.

    • ‘Who approved MAX?’ Boeing managers did when they built one and sold it. And Congress allowed such a system, enabled it and assisted the deception when the FAA was stripped of authority and people.

    • One of those useless aspects of regulation.

      Vast majority of those aircraft have had many inspections.

      Frankly its just a heads up in a plethora of them about various aspects of aircraft.

      Often they are ignored until something happens and then often its just that airline that pays attention and the rest ignore it until it happens to them.

  12. Half-year orders just announced by @Airbus. 93% (!) of A320neo family are for the A321. 6.5% for A320neo (one order for A319neo). It’s fair to say @Boeing product strategy missed the mark in the single aisle sector.

    In June 2024 we delivered 67 aircraft to 40 customers and added 73 gross orders to our books. This included @IndiGo6E becoming a new #A350 customer with their order for 30 of our #LongRangeLeader aircraft!

    Airbus received an order for 36 A321neo on June 28; another order for 20 A330-900 on May 15th.

    • Consolation for Boeing: the MAX8 is clearly a better seller than the A320neo, which is going the way of the A319.
      If Airbus allows it, most of the A320 in backlog will be converted into A321.

      Are all A32x FALs now A321-capable?

      • Huh?

        Orders and deliveries by type (summary)[1]
        Type Orders Deliveries Backlog
        A319neo 67 17 50
        A320neo 4,057 2,012 2,045
        A321neo 6,422 1,395 5,027
        A320neo family 10,546 3,424 7,122


        In July 2023, Boeing first revealed the 737 MAX sub-type orders as follows: 2,751 MAX 8 (63%), 810 MAX 10 (19%), 344 MAX 200 (8%), 297 MAX 7 (7%), and 137 MAX 9 (3%).

        Backlog: 2751
        Delivered: 1500 (including Max 9)

        So the Max 8 and 9 have backlog/del’d some 4300

        A320Neo: 4,057


        ‘the MAX8 is clearly a better seller than the A320neo, which is going the way of the A319.’

        2,000 delivered. 2,000 in the backlog. All profitable.


        • I interpreted Tuan’s MAX8 comment as being meant sarcastically 😅

          • Well, then – yes. My mistake. Thanks for letting me know, I clearly missed:


            In that case he/she clearly knows what he/she is talking about.

          • Airbus has steadily been moving production to the A321 as that is where more of the demand is.

            The MAX-8/9 are at least on an even keel with the A320 now if not ahead a bit.

            Both have a seat advantage on the A320, ergo the Airbus associated airlines have to move up to A321 to get more pax as there is nothing in between the two.

            That will mean an impact of some degree on carry costs if you do not fill the A321. Other aspects can negate that.

            It makes sense for Airbus and it makes sense for Boeing.

        • It was an attempt of making fun of people who convinced that MAX is fine because MAX8 sold fine compares to A320neo.
          But I also believe as no-one orders A320 anymore, and with gradual conversion, in 2-3 years there will be more MAX8 on order than there are A320neo. This is inevitable.

          • That wasn’t what you said, was it?

            ‘the MAX8 is clearly a better seller than the A320neo, which is going the way of the A319’


            The A319 has a total of 67 orders.

            The A320 has a total of 4,057 orders.

            If you think that the A320 is going the way of the A319 and that ~4,000 is the same thing as less than 100…you deserve to be made fun of.


            ‘no-one orders A320 anymore’

            In the post pandemic years 2022, 2023, 2024 – there have been orders for 732 A320Neos with 41 cancellations.

            Do you not even check these things before posting?


            ‘the MAX8 is clearly a better seller than the A320neo’

            Once again….4,057 orders for the A320Neo.

            I will, however, back up claims with EVIDENCE


            737 MAX 8

            “The MAX 8, with a maximum seating capacity of 210, has a range of 3,500 nautical miles (4,028 miles) and is 39.52 meters long. It is the most popular MAX variant, with 1,179 aircraft in service and 1,973 on order, according to Cirium.”

            This was as of Jan 2024.

            1,179 in service and 1,973 on order.

            3,152. You could even add this in:

            344 MAX 200…and you are STILL LESS THAN THE A320Neo.


            Your beliefs are your business. Facts are something entirely different.

            Do you want to go ahead and amend your statement and correct yourself, that the Max 8 is NOT clearly a better seller than the A320Neo.

            The A320Neo is NOT going the way of the A319.

            Airlines ARE ordering the A320Neo.


            ‘in 2-3 years there will be more MAX8 on order than there are A320neo. This is inevitable.’

            Call us back in 2-3 years and check in to see the scorecard. We’ll see what kind of shape BA is in, at the time.

            The only thing that is inevitable, is death, taxes and people making wild claims with no basis in fact.

            Just their feelings…


            Let me then, correct your statement for you, as you seem to have the two aircraft confused:

            ‘the A320Neo is clearly a better seller than the MAX8’

          • “The B787 has been a success purely based off of its sales success.”

            Did airlines order 787 because BA dangled unbeatable prices that it itself couldn’t lower its cost to match?? 🤔

      • Yes all the Airbus FALs in Germany France, the US and China are now A321 capable.

        • Frank P – “Let me then, correct your statement for you, as you seem to have the two aircraft confused:

          ‘the A320Neo is clearly a better seller than the MAX8’

          I’m afraid you’re incorrect. A320NEO total orders currently stand at 4,057. MAX8 (including 8200) orders stand at 4,403.

          You mention 732 A320 orders in three years but what has happened in that time is that many hundreds of A320 orders have been upgraded to the A321. In June 2021 the A320NEO had 3,853 orders on the books, now it’s 4,057 so an increase of just 204 in three years. The A321 has gone up from 3,543 in June 2021 to 6,422 now.

          According to Boeing’s own figures for June 2024 ( there have been 1,169 MAX8 and 157 MAX8200 delivered with a backlog of 2,765 and 312 respectively.

          • @Russell

            Without a doubt, there has been a migration of A320Neo orders to the A321Neo. I would even expect that there will be some A321Neo orders that make their way into the A321XLR orderbook.

            There has definitely been a shift to upgauge fleets.

            The way it was presented was that the Max 8 had the niche all sewn up and was the pre-eminent model in the segment.

            In reference to your June 2021 info, Airbus has also delivered a total of 2,000 A320Neo’s, or about half of the orderbook.

            A320neo 4,057 2,012 2,045
            A321neo 6,422 1,395 5,027

            They’ve delivered ~1,400 A321Neo’s into an orderbook of ~6,400.

            Looks like a little more than a 60/40 orderbook split to me, in favour of the A321Neo.

            (I’m sure Airbus don’t mind, as they charge more for the type.)

    • Has Delta again secretly ordered another 30 A321Neo and another A359? There is a current order at Airbus where the buyer was not announced.

      Of course, it would fit exactly on Delta. Always in small installments, quietly and secretly expand its airbusfleet to more reliability and profit.

  13. “In 2006, Boeing paid $615m in fines for trade secret theft and the 2001 Air Force leasing tanker scandal. That’s worth more than $958m today. Nobody killed, no safety involved. Today’s fine of $243.6m is embarrassingly low.

    “In 2020, Airbus paid the Justice Department $527m in fines ($620m in today’s dollars) for violating bribery and US ITAR regulations. ITAR restricts technology transfers. Nobody died and safety wasn’t involved.

  14. Anaemic deliveries and alarming cancellation numbers at BA:

    “(Reuters) – Boeing (BA) said on Tuesday it delivered more commercial jets in June than in any other month this year, but the total of 44 planes represented a 27% drop on an annual basis amid a whirlwind of legal and production challenges.”

    “After adjustments to reflect the backlog, Boeing reported adjusted net orders for the month of a negative 104. The planemaker did not give a specific explanation.”

    “That brought Boeing’s gross order total so far this year to 156. After removing cancellations and conversions, Boeing posted a net total of 115 orders since the start of 2024.”

    “Following further accounting adjustments, Boeing reported adjusted net orders of 26 airplanes so far this year.”

    “Boeing delivered 175 planes in the year to date, trailing its European rival Airbus which delivered 323 airplanes in the first half.”

    “The world’s largest planemaker (i.e. Airbus) also said this week that it had won 327 gross orders in the first six months of 2024, or a net total of 310 after cancellations.”

    Negative 104 orders in just one month.
    That’s an unsustainable haemorrhage.
    Looks like (past) customers are voting with their feet.
    That’s what you get when you’re a corner-cutting felon that uses scrap parts and faked documents in your manufacturing processes.

    • @Abalone

      I expect a lot of cleanup to the orderbook over the next 6 months to wipe some dodgy orders off the book and to give the next CEO some tailwind on net orders.

      Now the real question is where they lost those orders. Was it UA or Alaska? Or someone else out of the blue? I don’t see any near-term hit to delivery. There are too many airlines that will happily fill any near-term slot given the skyline at Airbus.

      • Frankly Boeing customers have that same issue.

        While the numbers are different, the relative issue is lack of aircraft.

        Boeing delivered 35 MAX last month but some of those are stored units.

        Any cancellations of Boeing will be taken up by others that need the aircraft.

        Boeing’s issue is longer term if they can’t deliver and Airbus ramps up to 75 a month (and 14 of the A220 a month planned)

      • @ Casey
        Airlines need planes — but they also need to keep their reputations intact.

    • BA removes 116 order in June because of ASC 606.
      As of June 30, ASC 606:
      737 557
      777 52
      787 70
      Total 679

      • 114 737
        2 777
        Total 116

        June order breakdown
        Orders June BoeingAirplanes : gross orders 14:
        1 MAX AlaskaAir ,
        2 MAX unidentified customers,
        4 777F TurkishAirlines ,
        5 777F unidentified,
        2 777F BoeingAirplanes Customer Finance*.
        1 MAX and 1 787-9 were canceled.
        Net orders: -104, as 116 were moved to ASC 606/not confirmed.

  15. Big guns for hire $$$

    “Former US Attorney in Chicago John Lausch is also on the Boeing defense team in the MAX DOJ fraud case as is another Kirkland lawyer Ralph Dado who also represented @GM during the ignition switch case

    “Boeing is in talks with the US Defense Department over how the planemaker’s planned guilty plea could affect its extensive government contracts, a person briefed on the matter said

    • One of those aforementioned parts that was deemed inadequate, used as a door stopper on the men’s bathroom door for a few months, then noticed by some manager who saw a way to save a few bucks.

  16. Bad ideas and technological screw-ups can sell well and survive for decades before some combination of events causes them to rear their ugly heads and bite hard. That DHC-3 Otter crash near Whidbey Island in 2022 is a good example. Yeah there was either a maintenance or original assembly error, but the design allowed for whichever it was to happen. And it flew like that for a very long time before it bit.

    I bring this up as a reminder that when it comes to complex technology, pointing to sales figures or saying something about popularity has absolutely nothing to do with design, assembly, or maintenance quality. Zero. Nada. Arguing one against the other is silly and makes no point.

    Gee, this super sweet soda tastes great on a hot day. That must mean that it is good for your health. Then a couple decades later, the claimant is taking their daily dose of metformin.

    • RTF:

      That certainly has merit. With Aircraft (more non commercial aka private) that also tends to be an extended life that is a good question if it should last past XX years.

      Not that long ago a Pickle Fork issue was found in the 737 (Classic or NG) that seems not to have affected all but certainly some.

      Aloha was a good example of ops in a environment and flight profile that was not expected. Boieng did understand that and they had the inspection protocol in place to keep it safe. Aloha pencil whipped the inspections and back to your system is only as good as the integrity of the people running it.

      Or the old exploding gas tank behind the seat in Pickups back in the day. Stupidity in that case I think though it was a big deal with modern understanding of tanks under the frame that worked as good as they can.

      Exploding Pinto though was understood and they did it anyway.

      And no one went to prison in the Tobacco cases despite proven culpability.

      • “…sales figures or saying something about popularity has absolutely nothing to do with design, assembly, or maintenance quality. Zero. Nada. Arguing one against the other is silly and makes no point.”

        Since RTF said it now, is that the end of hearing about how the 787 is a good program, poorly executed?

        • Nope. Airbus has the same complexity issues

          I don’t know enough about the LRU and the central box design to discuss it with RTF.

          The FAA should have brought that up, they certainly did the never before heard of possible zark in the computer system.

          Contrast that with an AOA failure in MCAS 1.0 and that was a clear and present danger and simply stupid. Any one that has worked with logic could see the flaws in that a million miles away.

          A good case in point was Boeing did not design the 787 Electrical system (they specified it). I believe Rockwell Collins did the main panel. Whatever modeling and testing they did had a hole in it as the wrench took down the whole aircraft electrical system.

          In theory that has been corrected. But there are thousands of possible angles a wrench could cross an electrical bus and each one could well produce a different result.

          The good news was it manifested on a test flight.

          GE changed their shaft coating process on the GenX for industrialization reasons and the first test shucked blades out the back.

          RR had many failures on the Trent 1000/TEN and the 7000 now.

          Nothing is going to be perfect. I believe a lot more testing should be required before you can put a change into service (GTF anyone?)

          But AHJs are not requiring it. No easy answers.

          • But, but, but….what about Airbus?!?!?!

            (and then a whole host of other subjects)

            Says it all, right there…

          • Also nope:

            No one is immune from what RTF is talking about.

            Unless you contend its unique to Boieng? Then back that up.

            I have seen failures in what is a relatively simple relay logic system. Actually Boeing type arrogance was involved.

          • @TW

            I’m not the one making the claim about the 787, am I?

            Your defense of your statement begins with “But whatabout Airbus…?”

            Silly…like RTF says.

  17. “Boeing’s ‘Convicted Felon’ Status May Affect Overseas Contracts, Less Likely to Affect Those Within US: Legal Analyst”

    Might explain the sudden drop in orders (negative 104 in June alone)…including Italy’s cancellation of its KC-46 tanker order earlier this week.
    Some interesting contract law here: what are the buyer’s (additional) rights when it transpires that the seller is a felon?
    And what domestic laws abroad prohibit entities from conducting business with a felon in the US? What say do insurers have in the matter?

    • And does this give any remorseful buyer an easy way to cancel?Not that it really matters with demand the way it is, but we are only ever a nasty bug away from a collapse.

      • Demand may be high…but gross orders at BA are only at a bare trickle.
        Airlines no longer appear to be willing to take anything available: it seems that having no plane is better than having a junk plane.

        • @Abalone

          The real fun will be in two weeks at the air show. A lot of orders are already completed and just not announced.

    • What everybody knows but doesn’t dare to say: many aircraft ordered by airlines visible in Boeings backlog. They are still there, but the customers have increasingly ordered the alternative Airbus aircraft also..

      The worlds airlines understandably have a strong interest in competition. So have been supporting Boeing in recent years by committing, promoting, forgiving, adjusting, rescheduling, and: not cancelling. Or very low profile..

    • Those were never aircraft for immediate delivery. The problem is not with aircraft produced today. The aircraft leaving the FAL are all getting reviewed with a fine-tooth comb. The problem is the ability to demonstrate a reliable delivery stream…or whether the -7 and -10 will ever see certification. Rest assured there will be large orders announced at Farnborough for both OEMs.

      Sometimes the best solution as an operator is no action at all and to wait.

      • “The aircraft leaving the FAL are all getting reviewed with a fine-tooth comb.”

        And what effect is that having?
        The Alaska MAX9 that suffered the door blowout was delivered at a time when the FAA was supposedly signing off on every individual airframe.

        “Most scrutinized plane in history” = vacuous PR crap.

    • “Weren’t airlines allegedly screaming for new planes?”

      Shure! for
      “real new planes”
      not slots in an unattended waiting list 🙂

      The MAX backlog compares to the A320 backlog because not much has been delivered on the B side.
      Over all: 1,550 deliveries for MAX vs 3,356 for the same period ( 2017..2024.5 ) resp. 3,424 over all ( +68 deliveries in 2016 ) for the NEO line.

      • The LCCs go with all one fleet.

        Sometimes they change mfgs, mostly from Boeing to Airbus and for good reasons.

        The reality is that major Boeing LCC fleets are not going to go Airbus unless forced to.

        United has split its fleet as has Delta, though Delta clearly is more Airbus than Boeing my a hefty percentage.

        A correctly made MAX is a perfectly good aircraft.

        By next next year Boeing will be making its allowed 38 a month.

        Where Boeing goes in the future is the question, not that it does not have viable products right now.

        As Casey noted, what is being released now is built to spec.

        • By next next… next year BA would return to financial health and start buying back shares. Oops.

          WN has been waiting for its MAX 7 since like 2021 IIRC.

          ‘Boeing has told the carrier to expect certification “in the next month, or two or three,” […] Boeing had earlier indicated the plane would be certified by mid-2021, Van de Ven said.’
          Bloomberg: Southwest Cites ‘Frustration’ Over 737 Max Certification Delays

          • Southwest has a hard decision indeed. They can pivot to an A220, but unless Airbus is willing to rain early slots it will not do them any good. By even a pessimistic view, the -7 is months away, not years away from certification.

            Maybe Southwest needs to figure out its load factor quandry with its existing fleet before plunging into a change in their fleet strategy.

          • @Casey

            Not for nothing, but it has been years, already. This is from the 2018 annual report, pg 29:


            Program Development

            The following chart summarizes the time horizon between go-ahead and planned initial delivery for major Commercial Airplanes derivatives and programs.

            Go-ahead and Initial Delivery
            737 MAX 7 2011 2019
            737 MAX 8 2011 2017
            737 MAX 9 2011 2018
            737 MAX 10 2017 2020
            787-10 2013 2018
            777X 2013 2020

            We launched the 737 MAX 7, 8 and 9 in August 2011 and the 737 MAX 10 in June 2017. We launched the 787-10 in June 2013 and the 777X in November 2013.


            The Max 7 is over 5 years late. And counting.

          • @Casey
            “By even a pessimistic view, the -7 is months away, not years away from certification.”

            We’ve been hearing that for 5 years now.
            What evidence is there to suggest that it’s ever actually going to happen?

          • Agree to disagree.

            There is a method to my logic. The -7 was the closest to certification of all of Boeing’s development projects. The biggest wildcard is to what extent the delays become punitive and whether there will be any further incremental design changes.

            The one major outstanding demand was the fix for the anti-ice which was pegged at 9 – 18 months from the end of Feb 2024. Doing the math that looks like NLT summer 2025.

            I no longer put much stock in Boeing’s assessment on timeline. If you want a better lens then Southwest is a better source in their own statements.

          • @Casey

            I imagine the MAX 7 likely is still 12 months away (or more). BA’s C-suites has a historic pattern of being “pathological optimistic with time ” like a SV tech founder.

          • And the hoot is, the -7 was the one that was used to confirm MCAS 2.0 as well as the changes in the computer system where in theory a random comic particle hit could flip it into off.

            And it was the aircraft sent around the world so various AHJ could do their own test flights (including China)

          • @Casey

            ‘Doing the math that looks like NLT summer 2025.’

            Program Launch: 2011

            14 years.

            It’s too late for an A220 switch. That window was open in 2019 when the Max was grounded and they didn’t take the off ramp. Now they’re stuck.

          • I recall “deep into 2025”??

            May 2024
            Jon Ostrower:
            Scoop from @theaircurrent : Boeing has settled on a fix for the risk of the 737 Max’s overheating engine inlet — and with it comes a push of the Max 7 and 10 deep into 2025

          • Frank P:

            No one is stuck.

            Southwest would have to get in line or go with an E2.

            It would be painful but stuck is a truly bad word to be using.

            Southwest could make a play for Breeze and they get both A220 and Embraers.

          • @TW

            Really stuck. Rock and hard place, stuck.


            ‘Airbus has shown little interest in selling A319neos, but the A320neo is too large to be a suitable replacement. Furthermore, the A320 family is sold out into the 2030s. This leaves the MAX 7 and A220-300 as the only potential options. This line is essentially sold out through 2026. The A220-300 can seat up to 160 in a single-class configuration, making it a natural upgauge candidate from Southwest’s 143-seat 737-700s.’


            How’d that JetBlue and Spirit Airlines merger go? Everything work out?

            ‘Southwest management has long been regarded as significantly more risk-averse than its peers, but its long, exclusive ties to Boeing have painted it into a strategic corner.’

            Is being painted into a corner the same thing as being stuck?


            E2 line, huh? The regional jet. They’re going to down gauge from the 737-700 to the E2-195? Lose pax space AND lose range.

            So just to summarize your reasoning:

            Merger – not going to fly.

            A220 order – 2026.

            E2-195 – too small, too short.

            Sounds like they’re stuck. Or painted into a corner, if you prefer.

          • @Frank: “A320, MAX8 too big.”

            magic range!
            the cost differential to the smaller versions is marginal.
            A319 and the 737-7(00) subtypes used to be bought for range. no longer relevant.
            ( and the MAX7 is a direct MAX8 shrink in its current incarnation.)

        • “As Casey noted, what is being released now is built to spec”

          Who knows?? The same could be said for the MAX 9 before one of them blew out a door plug. LMAO not even the FAA can guarantee that.

          • Not being built to spec at all.

            The MAXs currently rolling off the line don’t have an implemented solution for the nacelle overheating problem.

            They also don’t have the 3rd MCAS input mandated by EASA.

            And they all have the same substandard autothrottle as their predecessors.

            Further: are we really supposed to believe that their FOD problems has been solved?

  18. So what are the chances of clawbacks from the C-suiters? Between slim and none, I’d say.

    The utter brazenness just frosts me.

    • It wouldn’t surprise me if O’Connor goes outside the scope of the DPA — which only covers conspiracy to defraud the US — and additionally arraigns BA for much heavier charges, such as manslaughter, criminal negligence, etc.

      The many facts that have emerged in recent months would seem to lend a foundation to such charges.

  19. FG: ‘The DOJ had indicted Boeing on fraud charges in 2021. The company initially sidestepped prosecution by signing a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). That deal set a total possible fine for Boeing at $487.2 million but required the company pay only half – $243.6 million.”
    “The proposed guilty plea deal would require Boeing pay another $243.6 million – the other half of the total fine.”

      • The least they could do is get a per diem for having to lodge at the Extended Stay ISS. I hear the breakfast buffet isn’t all that great there…

  20. MAX Southwest Dutch Roll

    While I know this messes with the favorite sport here these days, for people interested in facts and the tech issues in Aviation, this is most interesting in regards to a tech issue

    While I know what Dutch Roll is, I had never heard of something this severe let alone damage to the aircraft. It does bring up a huge question in Southwest maint and inspections and the FAA role in not managing not just Southwest but when wheels are falling off aircraft, that is a maint/mechanic inspection issue.

    • NZ could easily have shifted to A330NEO or A350 when they dropped the RR x 787s but went with Boeing.

      Other airlines that went with GE from the start would have not had the engine issues NZ did and it says volumes that NZ really likes the 787s and 777s.

      • Yes, absolutely delighted!
        From just 2 months ago:

        “Air New Zealand longhaul fleet faces years of disruption”

        “Air New Zealand could be two Dreamliners short for up to two years because of engine problems.”

        Sell 787s at a loss and keep saying “we’ll have it sorted out next month”…works a treat every time!

        Just look at Southwest — fell for exactly the same trick.

        • In those kind of statements US those have become Alternative Facts.

          Its funny how predictable those twists on reality are and how some simply do not care (they also do not post in the in depth tech articles)

          Just like Fran P will grab any straw to knock the 787, but the reality is its a really good aircraft, nothing like it in its area.

          SW issue is not a MAX issue, its a Boeing management issue.

          As Casey noted as have I, if the aircraft is built to the cert specs they are good.

          And yes, confusion on Airbus aircraft with its flight modes and control law degrading have had MCAS type crashes.

          Down in Brazil they had a crash as a result of re-writing thrust reverse logic and how and when it deploys. The pilots then have to und-do their training and try to remember what the new one does.

          Unfortunately it takes some tech understanding to get it and some like to throw rotten fruit into a complex situation.

          • “…sales figures or saying something about popularity has absolutely nothing to do with design, assembly, or maintenance quality. Zero. Nada. Arguing one against the other is silly and makes no point.”

            Yah….Imma go with Craig, the expert who actually has worked at the company and has the knowledge and expertise to make such a judgement, on this one.

            Why don’t you have a read:


            ‘And the 787 program, right from the vote by the board to commit to full scale engineering development (FSED), was filled with people who pitched watermelon charts as a matter of routine. They did this because starting with the CEO, it was made clear that you only told the boss what they wanted to hear. Nothing else was acceptable. Your task was to make your numbers, meaning your budget numbers. The details of designing and building things that fly? They just weren’t interested in that stuff.

            In the GE culture of greed, they believe that the return on stockholder’s equity is the only thing that is really important. The fact that we were an aerospace company was secondary. One often felt that the GE trained folks believe that designing and building things that fly is boring. It’s that complete Wall Street stupidity that “all companies are the same.”


            ‘ but the reality is its a really good aircraft, nothing like it in its area.’

            You’re absolutely correct. Airbus couldn’t screw up the A330 program to the point of matching the 787 program.

            You’ve heard of the A330 right? The aircraft that is the second most produced widebody of all time behind the 777 and competes with the 787?

          • Frank P:

            Love the entertainment. When did they come out with the A330?

            Yep, made its bones on Boeing management screw ups on the 787, otherwise it would be gone.

            Many airlines like the A330 and some even like the A330NEO. Good for them. One size does not fit all.

            Interesting that Leeham published the order numbers for the A321 at 94% of the A320 series.

            But wait, there is more: Boeing has always offered a bigger airframe in the 900/-8 and the 900/-9.

            Could it be (gasp) Airbus is NOT serving its market and forcing airlines to move up?

  21. Some interesting COMAC data/analyses on AirInsight:

    “C919 Operational numbers revealed”

    “Thanks to excellent work at Skailark, we have the first clues as to how well the C919 performs compared to its peers. Spoiler alert: The C919 is competitive”

    “Analyzing COMAC ARJ-21 operating numbers”

    “Analyzing COMAC ARJ-21 operating number is possible from the latest Skailark data, which provides insight not only into the COMAC C919 but also the ARJ21. We have been following the ARJ21 program for some time, and the program had a long gestation period. Like all Chinese commercial aviation operations, getting a handle on things is not easy. The ARJ21, however, is spreading its wings beyond China.

    Imagine our surprise then to see how the ARJ21 performs. Here are two tables showing the aircraft’s performance among Chinese airlines. Fuel usage, the highest cost for an aircraft, is quite competitive with its contemporaries.”

    • What a shocker!
      Both COMAC models are quite fuel-efficient!
      And there are now multiple versions of each…including a C919 upgrade with 38% more range (and the same seat count).

      Thank goodness we’ve been assured by multiple commenters here that China is a lame duck as regards commercial aviation…otherwise we might be tempted to take this new data seriously 🫣

        • And on a somewhat related note:


          “China starts production of AVIC AG600 large amphibious aircraft”



          “China presents new military aircraft: Fifth generation Jian J-31B intended for aircraft carriers”


          “Despite these hurdles, AECC remains optimistic about the CJ-1000 turbofan’s certification timeline, targeting completion between 2022 and 2025. This endeavor is not just about technological achievement but also reflects the broader competition between China and the U.S. in the realm of advanced technologies.”


          Of course, this is all just fake news — because, in the West, we realize that the Chinese are totally incapable as regards the aviation industry — right?

          * Sarcasm switch off *

          • Actually China is highly capable.

            All Western companies other than Boeing and Airbus got out of the LCA business as the return was limited and the risks were high.

            Boeing was able to leverage its work on the B-47 and B-52 into a commercial product line. The use of Pylon mounted engines was the key enabler.

            China LCA (we are not talking about their military dude) has the issue of a government run fully controlled operation.

            A sloth is faster.

            For good reason the management and workers of COMAC are not going to stick their neck out. Getting sent to a Gulag is no joke.

            So, rather than a composite wing, its the same oh same oh but not advanced, just a pre current generation or maybe a Classic wing.

            As for engines, anyone can make a jet engine, Germany did it in the death throes of WWII. It was a short lived engine. If you are willing to have 10 spares for each active engine, that works. It also is a huge cost.

            Yes they will keep working on it. They have a captive military to experiment on (and are).

            The other aspect you ignroe is support and while Embraer, BBD, GD, Textron, Boeing and Airbus have various fingers in that, China does not.

            You don’t just build that with the swipe of your hand and you sure don’t under risk adverse (keep your head) administrations.

            Leeham is noted for their models and fact derived from it and them. I trust them as a source. Yours, not so much.

            Trying to deluge a discussion with non related links simply makes you look foolish.

            One of the truisms that has been here since I was growing up when Japan was the source of cheap and low cost goods.

            They can make low cost low tech stuff cheaper than we can.

            they can’t make high quality stuff cheaper than we can.

            I worked on the Alaska pipeline. The main pipe was all Japanese. It corroded and companies used to Western pipe quality spent years and hundreds of millions getting it under control.

            The Vertical supports were half US Steel and Half Japanese. All the Japanese VSI split when corrugated. None of the US Steel did.

            I also framed. US Steel vs Korean sinkers. US Steel sinkers did not bend, Korean ones did (a hoot to be charged the same for both, as a custom framer I could pick my boxes of nails and it never was Korean)

            Those are examples of low cost and cheap vs higher cost.

            In the end Nail guns negated Sinkers as a commercial use and we now have cheap sinkers due to the low use.

            I worked extensively with bearings in motors. The only reliable ones were Fafnir/Torrington and SKF. SKF actualy builds bearings in places like Hungary, but its their factory and their quality (also France which was fun to see).

            Torington after buyi9ng out Fafnir went cheap. I would only use SKF sans an emergency and the odd bearing would be noted on the motor and monitored and replaced at the first indication of noise.

            You don’t see high quality mechanics tools from China (nor Japan etc). Its not that they can’t build them (and may in their countries). Its that they can’t build them, export them and have the support for them into the US and Europe.

            If you just need a cheap wrench for occasional use, they can work, though I had a Japan socket break on me causing me endless grief on a filter can).

            Regular use, its Proto, Snap On, MAC and various smaller ops like Williams and Cornwall.

          • Many many many moons ago, China built their version of a 707 IF i recall correctly, it flew once or maybe twice. Since failure was NOT an option in china- it was a bit overweight. So there was a pivot and in Xian ( terracotta soldiers ) they began to subcontract to Boeing and McDouglas for such things as flaps and similar small simple structures.

            And after you have flown as a tourist ‘ passenger ‘ (1997 ) on a military canvas seat equipped TU-154 ( copy of 727) and partly floated out of your seat as it dived from altitude to landing field- the D ticket at disneyland not worth the price.

          • Bubba:

            I think the Disney Ticket would be worth your life!

            I read one account of the fire alarms on that type was always giving false alarms so they ignored it.

            Then the day came of course there actually was a fire. It did not end well.

        • Hundreds of orders, fantastic performance, new models in development and few delivered.

          Most interesting

          And next will be in a fit of major sacrifice, Air China gives up its slots so they can deliver C919s to Zimbabwe!

          • “Hundreds of orders, fantastic performance, new models in development and few delivered.”

            You’re presumably talking about the MAX-7, MAX-10 and 777X? 🤭

      • Not a lame duck – just a heavy one.

        And not just commenters, but the engineers who run the site you post on:

        ‘As we wrote in November 2015, the C919 will be hard-pressed to equal the efficiency of the A320neo and 737 MAX 8. It has the advantage of three seats over the A320 but it will be heavier and its wing is not a step enough up from the A320 to compensate.’

        ‘The C919 becomes the basis for China’s next generation of aircraft. If the C919 is a success, followed by the prospective C929 wide-body, China’s threat becomes real in the next generation.’

        You can take it up with management.

        • “…it will be heavier and its wing is not a step enough up from the A320 to compensate.”

          Well, somebody has incorrect data, because a heavy aircraft with an uninspiring wing does not give competitive fuel economy.

          • Leeham says it and you can take that to the bank.

            Its not an opinion, its an engineered derived fact nor is it a loosely worded “competitive”.

            Pax number and SFC is what counts not verbal looseness.

            You are flogging a dead horse there.

            It also does not have recognized certification. When you own CAC, that is so far beyond regulatory capture as to make a head spin. Its owned.

            Note we have never had a report on the suicide in the 737-800 crash in China. Pesky details like the pilots are human are not allowed.

          • @ Frank P
            Looks, then, like the OEW figures on Wiki may not correspond to the actual values rolling off the production line.

            Perhaps the Chinese started to play around with some composites without telling us?

          • Well, here you go then, don’t take it from wiki – take it from Comac.

            Page 40 of 246 of the PDF viewer:

            Aircraft Characteristics for
            Airport Planning

            Operating Empty Weight – 100 751 lb


            It makes sense because further down, there is this:

            Maximum Payload 41 667 lb

            And for comparison


            Max. payload 20 t (44,100 lb)

            There’s your difference in weight.


            You speculate they’re building them lighter off the line. Ok.

          • OEW to MTOW represents structure efficiency.

            Max (revenue) Payload is more of a layout metric.
            fuel is a kind of payload too 🙂

          • C919 “The airframe, made entirely in China, is primarily constructed of aluminium alloy (fuselage and wing boxes) with 8.8% of structure from aluminium-lithium alloys and less than 10% of composite materials (tailbone, tailplane and fin)”

          • @Frank P

            Got some time to take a look and I found, according to Airbus’ A320 ACAP:

            MTOW of the A320neo ranges from 156,528 lb to 174,165 lb in eleven WV.

            Take WV050/051 for example, the MTOW is 162,040 lb* with say payload of about 18,300 kg (40,260 lb) only*. IIRC the C919 STD has the upper hand.

            MTOW of the C919 ER is within 100 kg of the highest MTOW weight variant of the A320neo.

            And according to a source, the ranking of max payload/OEW looks like this:

            The best to the worst
            A321ceo CFM
            A321neo CFM
            A320neo CFM
            A320ceo CFM

  22. Boeing has a lot problems, but a healthy context can boil these down.

    Not sure if it was written here, but aircraft generally fail for one of three reasons: (1) design, (2) quality and (3) maintenance
    1) Design: the two MCAS crashes were a bad design choice. While the aircraft may not have been made to spec, they ultimately went down due to bad design. Given the severe scrutiney going on, variances to design deficiencies that may have been approved in the past are now a no-go. The FAA has been embarassed one time too many. The Max-7/10 and 777X gets no freebies on their path to certification.
    2) Quality: the Alaska blowout was an example of a build on what should have otherwise been a safe design. There is no excuse for this failure, but the fact that Boeing has had some sloppy work and has used nonconforming parts for years (allegedly) really speaks to a high level of aircraft reliability and redundancy.
    3) Maintenance: a 30 year old B757 losing a tire is not the fault of Boeing (unless they are doing the maintenance). That ultimately falls on the airlines and the MRO outfits they may outsource to.

    Where does that leave Boeing
    737Max: a design that has solved its most fundamental flaws, but is now delayed due to a more risk-averse FAA. An aircraft where poor quality is the biggest concern. An aircraft that is highly competitive at the -8/9, but nowhere else. An aircraft that gets business in many cases only because Airbus is old out

    787: a design that has been incredibly safe (good design), but has lingering shim problems and an engine (RR) that suffers from bad durability but not necessarily bad reliability. An aircraft development way over budget and late, and probably never recoverable deferred production, but otherwise a commerical success.

    777X: an aircraft generaglly understood to have good quality but is now a program with a much more rigorous certification path. And probably a badly missed market opportunity too. The market not named Emirates have shown little interest in this aircraft.

    • Casey:

      While a good overall, I am going to pick some aspects apart in constructive comments.

      MAX: There were no design issues with it. No question MCAS was a crappy setup, so yea it was designed (or kludged) but it was one program and a small one at that.
      The thrust/engine location is not an issue. All aircraft do that (LCA)
      The FAA thought it went over the edge on a spec, the Boeing fix was far worse. You have all sorts of systems that tell you a stall is coming, and if you stall you are going to do what MCAS does, send the nose down.
      The only stall in a LCA I am aware of is the AF447. Those pilots were really bad. All the hallmarks of what we learned a stall was let alone what to do about it.

      The MAX does have build issues, but Boeing made thousands of the NG without those build issues and the MAX issues of build are not in areas of MAX, its all basic stuff.

      The point about overbuilt is spot on. No you do not want to count on it but its a factor in still safe if not to spec (spec is not a safety aspect directly, its a build quality commitment agreed on – I suspect those shim can be wildly out and still ok – don’t get me wrong, it is a build failure but where there was only one of the two issues in the gaps, its been deemed safe by the FAA not just Boeing.

      Airlines like NZ could have moved away from the 787, they did not. The article says NZ loves it.

      777X you are spot on mostly. FAA is not taking anything Boeing says as true, they have to back it up with data. FAA actually put a letter out saying exactly that, Boeing was not offering bad design there, but they could not adjust to all the background data required to prove it.

      The 777X has other customers than Emirates, quite a few freighters sold as well as the other ME big 2 and Singapore and Lufthansa, Cathay Pacific and BA are others. Blue Chips in other words (though CP may not be anymore)

      Boeing has a management problem. It does not have a near term aircraft problem. The MAX is competitive as are its variations though the -10 is not as versatile as the A321.

      Airbus forces airlines to jump to the A321, they have nothing between it and the slightly less capable to the MAX-8 in the A320.

      Boeing has the -9 and it will have the -10. Not as capable as the A321 but probably capable enough for those flying Boeing fleets or split fleets.

      The A321XLT is going to have to drop pax numbers to get the MAX range out of it. Not sure how many routes that covers, but there are few 757s being used that way going back 10 years now when it was the niche.

      The 757 was just versatile and had great hot and high performance. Its not nearly as economical as an A321.

    • Casey

      In two of the three programs (737 & 777), you place blame on regulators.

      ‘but is now delayed due to a more risk-averse FAA.’

      ‘ is now a program with a much more rigorous certification path.’

      How about Boeing lost the privilege of pumping out aircraft as fast as they can, because adult supervision is needed. They have lost all trust and their word means nothing.

      ‘777X: an aircraft generally understood to have good quality’

      Generally understood by whom? Who are these people you speak of? How can they judge the quality of the product, if it isn’t even in service? Because Boeing says so? See above on how much weight that carries…

      ‘787: An aircraft development way over budget and late, and probably never recoverable deferred production, but otherwise a commercial success.’

      Something that is a commercial success is something that earns you profits and cash flows. It does not require you to write off upwards of $8 billion in losses, retain expenses in the DPB and cost you billions in R&D spending which you neve re-coup.

      You’re essentially saying: If the 787 didn’t lose money, then it would earn profits and cash flows.

      But before you (and others) go on about how many units have been sold, thus it MUST be a success, please consider this:

      Through the first 1,000 deliveries BA wrote off some $8 billion in losses. This doesn’t include the R&D spending, but let’s say that BCA had to increase the price of each 787 they sold by $8 million each, so that it could be at a break even position (not even a profit, just don’t lose money)…

      …you still think airlines are ordering them in the quantities they have?

      Perhaps you might consider that it’s sales success is not due to it being ‘a good design’ but because BA is selling it for less than it costs them to make it. As Craig said:

      “…sales figures or saying something about popularity has absolutely nothing to do with design, assembly, or maintenance quality. Zero. Nada. Arguing one against the other is silly and makes no point.”

      • @Frank
        As it relates to certification of new products, I do not necessarily disagree with you. The FAA is more risk averse because of the face plant wrt the MCAS. Instead of blame I prefer to call it consequence. All lingering design deficiencies must be addressed before new variants are certified. This is going to haunt Boeing any time they contemplate a PIP to a product.

        The B787 has been a success purely based off of its sales success. It is a great plane that operators have purchased over the life of the program. Boeing screwed up its development by a mile and cannot seem to deliver it to spec. But it is not an aircraft that airlines do not want

        The 777 has been in service for 30 years. The two total complete losses at Malaysia are the only ones to come to mind. That is an extraordinary safety record. There are lesser incidents (British airways) that come to mind, but I define safety ultimately in terms of crashes not related to pilot error (like Asiana at SFO)

        • Are you trying to assert that, because the 777 Classic has a good safety record, it follows that the 777X is of good quality?

          A little reminder: before it even received a TIA — which it still doesn’t have — the 777X was involved in 2 serious incidents, i.e.
          – Fuselage ripout during wing load test;
          – Uncontrolled pitch change during test flight.

          In refusing to grant a TIA several months ago, the FAA stated that the 777X lacked “design maturity”…even after more than a decade of development.

          And you call that “good quality”…?


          As regards the so-called “sales success” of the 787: you can’t legitimately call something a “sales success” if it has never generated a penny of profit for the seller.

          Calling it a “handout success” might be closer to the mark.

          And we’ll see how happy the various 787 operators are once the long list of current gremlins starts to manifest itself in in-service frames during C/D checks.

          • @Abalone

            ‘Are you trying to assert that, because the 777 Classic has a good safety record, it follows that the 777X is of good quality?’

            Take it to it’s logical conclusion.

            The 737NG has a good safety record therefore, the 737 Max is of good quality.


            You ever see people trying to find the smallest sliver of a silver lining in the darkest of storm clouds and insist that everything is okay and will work out because…well…look at that tiny sliver!

            That’s the case here.

        • “The B787 has been a success purely based off of its sales success.”

          Did airlines order 787 because BA dangled unbeatable prices that it itself couldn’t lower its cost to match?? 🤔

          P.S. My previous post got to the wrong post.

          • Funny to have someone insult all the airlines of the world management (Southwest yes) but they get low cost position (can you say A380 at 70% discount) and then continue to buy aircraft.

            I guess all those airlines managers are truly nuts.

        • @Casey

          Are you familiar with Red Lobster? The seafood restaurant chain? They had this promotion they were running. Endless Shrimp for $20. All you could eat. People loved it. They made it a permanent menu item, whereas it used to be a promotion thing only.

          Problem is, once they ate more than 2 plates, the company was losing money.

          Guess what?

          Red Lobster filed for bankruptcy protection recently. Turns out that selling a product below cost on a long term basis does not lead to a commercially successful endeavour.

          Sales success? Heck yah…people love getting their monies worth. And then some. But it pushed the company into Ch 11.


          Another case.

          You ever hear of Vlasic Pickles?

          Some 20 years ago they had to file for Ch 11 protection. It seems that they were selling these gallon sized jars of pickles to Walmart, who used it’s purchasing power to drive down the cost. Sold them really cheap in their stores.

          Vlasic invested in production and was the top pickle producer, because of the Walmart contract. Couldn’t keep up with demand, they were so popular. Billion and billions of pickles sold…at a loss.

          But man, was it popular….


          Once again – Imma go back to Craig, who put it so eloquently.

          “…sales figures or saying something about popularity has absolutely nothing to do with design, assembly, or maintenance quality. Zero. Nada. Arguing one against the other is silly and makes no point.”


          A different angle.

          Step back and look at this from the 20,000 ft view;

          There is a market segment in the 787/A330 niche, that is X large. It could be 3,000 aircraft, it could be 4,000 aircraft. Airlines essentially have 2 choices – a 787 or an A330. Boeing or Airbus. It’s pretty much an us or them situation.

          If you’re Airbus, the best case scenario is that you sell them A330’s and they make a profit for you.

          The worst case scenario is the airline goes 787’s and they make a profit for Boeing.

          There is a middle ground here, however;

          The airlines buys from Boeing, but the deal is so sweet that it costs BA money to make the sale. Pulling back and looking at the big picture, it’s a win for Airbus because at the end of the day, they haven’t lost a penny. If Boeing has to eat a loss of $8 million an aircraft, over a 30 plane deal, they’re $240 million worse off than they were.

          That’s $240 million that BA could have plowed back into product development, or updating production efficiencies or some other asset that could have hurt Airbus in the future.


          The 787 spiral

          Have a look at the Boeing financial reports for Q1:

          Long-term debt 46,877

          In that ~$47 billion, is some portion of the $8 billion in losses that BA had to write off on the 787 program. Each quarter, they have to pay interest on that money, until it’s returned to lenders.

          At 5%, that $400 million. Each year. For all those 787’s that they delivered to customers. Still costing them money.


          If you were the head of BCA and the 787 program manager walked into your office and after having explained all of this to him, he turned around and said;

          ‘The B787 has been a success purely based off of its sales success. It is a great plane that operators have purchased over the life of the program.’

          Would you pat him on the back, tell him great job – keep it up and offer him a raise?

          Or would you kick him in the a$$ and start looking for his replacement?


          The 787 is one of the 3 commercial aircraft programs that is slowly killing Boeing. I can’t put it any simpler than that.

          They must turn all 3 around and start turning a profit. A real unit cost basis profit.

          • As far as I can tell, Boeing is not giving 787s away.

            So you equate a free buffet with an aircraft company?

            Wild. The Fabric place did the same thing, return it if it breaks (irons for my wife). Then they didn’t and now they are gone.

            Poulon lets you return batteries from their tool for 3 years, except now you have to pay to ship them the batteries.

            It never ends well.

            And yes Boeing has done deals and offsets and ……….

            But that does not detract from the 787 being a good aircraft regardless of the never ending belief by Frank P that its better to shut down now and loose aircraft mfg entirely in the US (LCA)

            The employees of course feel differently as do all the suppliers and myself.

          • Casey:

            Actually describing the FAA as risk adverse is not a wrong description though it is damning to the FAA.

            Just read their first statement on the MAX exit plug blow out and its, oh, we were monitoring paper not the factory floor.

            My dad worked for the FAA, I got to see it function on the ground level (Navaids and weather stations more or less). Like any bureaucracy they had their problems.

            Risk adverse is supposed to be their first name.

            So yea, Boeing feet is finally getting held to the fire and that is a good thing.

            None of it means the MAX, 767, 787, 777 and 777X are not good aircraft. Boeing needs to prove it on three of them (or make them to spec)

          • “As far as I can tell, Boeing is not giving 787s away. ”

            In view of persistent losses in the majority of commercial activities Boeing seems to sell for less than production cost
            and the culture mandated “must make a profit” ..

            That is rather close to “giving away”.

          • Boeing paid like $220m to compensate AS for their MAX 9 debacle. How many MAX 9 Boeing has to sell to make up the loss?

          • Cost will be spread across all MAXes, not just MAX 9

          • By my estimate, Boeing also has to pay say about $200m to compensate UA. How many MAXes Boeing has to sell to cover the loss??

  23. “Boeing Warns Customers of Further Delays on 737 Max Amid Crisis”

    “(Bloomberg) — Boeing Co. has notified some 737 Max customers in recent weeks that aircraft due for delivery in 2025 and 2026 face additional delays, another reminder that production of its cash-cow jetliner faces a long road to recovery.

    “The planemaker has cautioned that delivery timelines continue to slip by three to six months on top of already-late handovers, according to people familiar with the matter. In some instances, deliveries scheduled for next year have spilled into 2026, said the people, who asked not to be identified as the discussions are confidential.”

    Gosh, one wonders if this delay pertains to the MAX-7 and MAX-10. Perhaps fixing that nacelle overheating problem is turning out to be a little thornier than BA assumed (that fix would, of course, be a lot easier in a plane with EICAS).
    I sense waiver requests on the horizon…

  24. Horse trading — you buy our planes, we approve your mergers 🤭:

    “(Reuters) -Boeing is nearing a potential sale of some two dozen 777X jets to Korean Air in a roughly $4 billion to $6 billion deal that could be finalised as early as July’s Farnborough Airshow, industry sources said.”

    “South Korea’s largest carrier has been in talks over a potential return to its traditional supplier of long-haul aircraft for months after placing a surprise order for 33 A350 jets from Boeing’s European rival Airbus in March.”

    “The fleet review comes as Korean plans to purchase nearly two-thirds of smaller domestic rival Asiana for about $1.4 billion. The European Union approved the tie-up in February and the airline has indicated it expects U.S. approval by the end of October.”

  25. @Abalone
    Going to sidestep the B787. It is not a bad design. It is bad execution

    Wrt to certification, aircraft are put through torture tests that they will never see in service. That is how you produce an aircraft that can have a blowout but is still sturdy enough to avoid a crash. The 777X does not have a bad safety record; it has never entered service. The 777X will not be given the benefit of the doubt and allowed either an analytical validation of a fix or a waiver with a wink and a nudge that the homework will never come due.

    It is extremely rare that any aircraft crashes due to an intrinsic design deficiency

    • “It is extremely rare that any aircraft crashes due to an intrinsic design deficiency”

      That’s a very shaky assertion.
      Lots of counterexamples:
      -737 MAX (MCAS)
      -737 Classic (rudder design)
      -737 all models: autothrottle design
      -Concorde (insufficiently protected fuel tank)
      -DC10 (cargo door design)
      -Comet (square windows –> metal fatigue)

      -787 (battery runaway heating)…not a crash, but a number of serious fires.


      Regardless of how “real-life” a wing load test is or isn’t, an aircraft is expected to pass it. Having a large portion of the fuselage rip out during such a test is definitely *not* supposed to happen, and indicates a serious design insufficiency. I suspect that substantial fuselage strengthening is being required by the FAA…and that BA is either incapable of, or unwilling to perform, the necessary modifications.

        • This is an interesting quote on the A320 Debacle of 6 ft decent AGL at CGD. All software aspects by the way and note the turning off just when you need it of RA. Well and the way BP is called out in which the inches of mercury is a better method.

          “There was no ground-proximity warning, says BEA, because conditions to trigger basic protection modes were not met on the particular terrain-awareness system fitted to the jet.

          “The crew indicated that they had not been aware of [their] proximity with the ground,” the inquiry adds.

          Source: BEA

          Animation showing the A320’s approach with an incorrect altimeter setting

          BEA says the aircraft landed safely after a second approach, despite still having a mis-set altimeter, because the runway lights were switched on and the crew was able to establish a visual reference.

          It points out that a 10mb error in altimeter setting is “one of the most frequent” mistakes and one that poses a threat, given that decision heights associated with some procedures can be as low as 250ft – meaning a ground collision could occur before the decision altitude has been displayed to the pilots.

          BEA says the terrain-collision risk from a mis-set altimeter for barometric approaches, despite being “known for decades”, has not been taken sufficiently into account by the international aviation community.

          It postulates that this underestimation of risk results from the development of ILS approaches, the vertical profiles of which are “not affected” by incorrect altimeter settings.

          “Widespread use of ILS approaches probably helped to mask this threat and its consequences for a long time,” says BEA.

          Although satellite approaches with barometric vertical guidance have been introduced to replace non-precision approaches, it adds, they have “not led the aviation community to question the impact on safety levels”.

          The A320 incident at Charles de Gaulle has revealed the vulnerabilities of aircraft to such situations.”

  26. I’m going to bracket your statement.
    There is a difference between a crash and malfunction. We rarely have design related crashes so the focus has shifted to malfunctions and near crashes. That is a success. Agree to disagree if you choose. As terrible as Alaska was we have matured design to the point where that was not a fatal accident.

    I also should clarify that design related crashes are rare “in the last 30 years.” That is in no small part due to a more aggressive regulatory response to safety.

    • “We rarely have design related crashes so the focus has shifted to malfunctions and near crashes.”

      I gave you a whole list of them above…and several of them were in the last 30 years.

      The MAX crashes were crashes…not “malfunctions”. They occured because of a design flaw.
      The same applies to the 737 autothrottle crashes.
      And NASA has implicated the archaic 737 CAS in 5 crashes.

  27. On the one side, there’s the company, its management and shareholders.

    On the other side there’s the US gov representing the population of the USA, their transport and economic / geopolitical strategic needs, and I’ll count the majority of the company staff as being in this category.

    The (necessarily) independent judiciary / courts are something of a wild card in all this. I’m interested in whether their involvement represents and aid to a solution, or (unfortunately) gets in the way.

    In some ways, it feels like there is no judicial solution to Boeing’s issues. It’s not made any difference previously. The only real penalty that a judge can impose on the *company* is a fine, and for that fine to be large enough to sting the people who are the problem would likely kill the company, the opposite of what is required.

    And at the same time, whilst judicial proceedings are in progress that may get in the way of other actions the US gov may wish to initiate.

    I think for the judiciary to play an effective role in all this there needs to be a change in corporate law, or some sort of reset in what a company is for and how it is governed.

    • The court in Texas may yet decide to arraign individuals within Boeing on charges such as criminal negligence, depraved indifference, contributory manslaughter, etc.
      A very public trial, followed by tough jail sentences, would send a powerful message to Corporate America.

    • Matthew:

      US Law is an area I have long watched.

      It breaks down to Legal and Justice, though I keep in mind, you have to define what you means by Justice.

      Legal is the bank take back your farm no matter how much you have paid on it, rarely neighbors rose up and stopped that action but the system grinds you and them down over time.

      Legal provides stability for the bank and that is at the cost to individuals while in theory, society gains from stability (and its true in that unstable society are even more into inflicting horrible consequences on common people)

      In the case of Boeing, there are not legal remedies as those in power don’t want there to be. Judicial rulings stop any remedy as its always interpreted in favor of the people in power (or a company, the Microsoft Monopoly ruling a classic case in points as well as blatantly ignored the reality of Express is just a browser having nothing to do with the operating system).

      Teddy Roosevelt became president in an era of severe abuse and public support to correct it.

      Same with FDR. But then the Corporations and the Rich chip away at regulations (guardrails) and eventually break them down.

      Boeing is a result of a board no longer doing its legal job of oversight and enables the destruction of the company.

      The remedy is supposed to be the shareholders but that fails when they vote to maintain the problem aka putting Calhoun back on the board.

      None of his supposed reforms got down to where they have to be, it was all confusion at best and rewarding of bad management.

      So no, I don’t see any remedy other than a faction of the board having enough votes to put in management that is not out to liquidator the company.
      Certainly no legal remedies.

      Corporate law is not going to get changed, you can’t get it through the legislative system.

      • >Corporate law is not going to get changed, you can’t get it through the legislative system.

        That may well be the case.

        What’s interesting perhaps is that for the first time, the corporate set up in the USA has produced a situation that now unarguably runs counter to the geopolitical strategic aims and needs of the USA. If Boeing were to actually collapse and cease trading, the lesson couldn’t be any clearer to gov and legislators.

        The hands-off, laissez-faire approach to controlling the economy is fine, when the market has multiple players involved. It’s a total bleedin’ disaster, when you get down to just one company left.

        Look at Motorola / Freescale – they killed themselves by using hire/fire employment practices. Did anyone blink? No, because there was still Intel, AMD, the USA was still “in the chips business”. Now, there’s just Intel left manufacturing in the USA and they’re going down the plug hole (because they too indulged in hire/fire), everyone is in a panic and splashing gov subsidies around like water, and efforts to import expertise from Taiwan aren’t going well.

        The reason is because the workforce and up-coming cadre of students has long since learned that you can make more money more reliably by being good at website design, which you can do yourself at home on the kitchen table if needs be. That’s far better than sweating to learn some really hard microelectronics stuff that you can earn a living from only so long as some mega company deigns to employ you, and they don’t.

        Same in aviation QC/QA. No point training to be good at that and looking for a job in the only mass-production manufacturer left in the country. They actively fire such people. Web design is more profitable.

        Fixing all this, i.e. repatriating high tech manufacturing or simply securing it for the long term, requires reform of both how education is funded / incentivized, and reform of how companies are run so that new workers really do get long term careers out of their hard work. Fixing all that is a legislative / political thing, not a regulatory thing. It’s not going to happen all by supply / demand or market forces. The jobs market has gone elsewhere, and it needs to be given a reason to come back.

        • The industrial sector in the US has long ceased to be of much significance.
          75 percent of the US economy is driven by consumption.
          The US trails both China and the EU in terms of total value of exports.
          The largest export sector in the US today is the oil/gas industry.

          The US auto industry is an obvious example.
          Boeing is now in the spotlight, but Lockheed Martin and Raytheon aren’t exactly doing well, either.

          As you point out above: industry is a no-go when it comes to salary, glamour and job secutity — not interesting at all to milennials / Gen. Z.

        • .gov and legislators don’t make the significant decisions.

        • “What’s interesting perhaps is that for the first time, the corporate set up in the USA has produced a situation that now unarguably runs counter to the geopolitical strategic aims and needs of the USA.”

          The growth of the US system is ( was ) dependent on expanding into more or less uncontested resource spaces.
          Constrained it starts to selfdigest.

          • Matthew:

            Well put.

            I do believe a significant number of people like myself are out there. Its not always a job its a calling of sorts.

            I loved what I did for the last 30 years.

            Have to see if that is enough and or the US gets off its butt and encourages certain directions.

  28. Get out the bunting and the fireworks — Boeing has finally received a TIA for the 777-9 🍾
    Mind you, it’s “only” about 7 years late…

    “The company announced that it took the initial test flight late Friday with Federal Aviation Administration personnel. Achieving so-called Type Inspection Authorization marks the start of certification flight testing, a key step in one of the most extensive commercial test efforts that Boeing has ever undertaken.”

    It will be interesting to see what — if anything — has changed in the plane, e.g. has it gotten heavier as a result of fuselage strengthening? It was already about 30 tons heavier than the A350…

    • Casey:

      They don’t want to get it, they have their agendas to drive home regardless of the facts.

      What they do is ignore Airbus control logic and the crashes that has caused vs Boeing, because they want to beat on Boeing for beating sake.

      Going to Alt Law on AF447 with a loss of Pitot was every bit as lethal software as MCAS 1.0.

      Airbus can write a program that does not do what their did on AF447.

      Others they changed to deal with one crash and caused another.

      The Training crash in (Sweeden) of an A319 had several elements to it.

      Part of it was alarms that did not activate until they reached 2000 feet. Training flight like that never reaches 2000 feet (AGL).

      The other was not what I call Airbus fault but more an RTF complexity that they don’t understand all the interactions of their own software.

      In that case something about resetting a computer fault repeatdly while dumb had no limits) caused the whole computer system to loose its brains ans quit)

      That in turn meant NO control law, ie purely mechanical commands and a FBW aircraft flies horribly on that (and Bjorn made just that point, its barely controllable in flight and its virtually uncontrolled on trying to land – its just a matter of how hard you crash) . Airbus has had two of those.

      The goal of NTSB and the FAA is not a legal aspect, its trying to make commercial flying safer (it will never be totally safe, nothing is).

      The Flack Trap on the Boeing FBW system was one of those. It had a logic behind it, it was approved, but the flaw was if you forgot one action in FLCH simply turned off auto throttle.

      Its shocking to have 3 pilots just sit there and not pick up on that. But like MCAS 1.0 it also was a feature that made no sense.

      Programing wise its called a floor, yes ignore auto throttle until certain criteria put it back in (like approaching (not reaching) a stall).

      So while some of us are interested in Aviation, what makes it safer, the tech details behind it, others don’t care. Writing is just a way to thump themselves on the chest.

      That is unfortunate. Scott gives us a good place to discuss and learn and its thrown overboard for an agenda.

      Another aspect they don’t get is that while aircraft have all sorts of cert specs, there are NO cert specs for the software.

      There is no single line in specs that says how an Auto Throttle should work. Each mfg has their own thoughts (not always logic) on it.

      Many years ago, it was realized that one of the worst aspects about aircraft instruments was the scattered placement and each mfg had their own locations for the instruments.

      It was finally decided to impose a standard, flight gauges in a specified configuration with the most important ones immediate to sight (in that case it would have been the Artificial Horizon). Altimeter and VSI both have their places as does the Turn and Bank. Each was intended to be replaced by the others so you could loose one and did not have to shift all over the panel to maintain your flight safety using the cross backups.

      Boeing has a very good feature in the back driven throttles. Airbus had better logic in protections kicking in if you did something stupid like the Asiana crash.

      But no, its all about Boeing bash for bashing sake, not fixing Boeing.

      I was taught a long time ago that you can be negative, the right thing to do is recognize a problem and have a solution (if that is in your skill set)

      If the problem was in my area of expertise, my job was to offer a solution.

      Sometimes the problem was so immediate you just had to deal with it, but longer term ones, repeat failures needed a solution or at least ideas of a solution.

      If you don’t have a solution you are part of the problem.

      • I’d really like to know from which alternate reality you source these “reports/findings” as conversation embellishments.

          • So many sources so little time to educate people.

            All of it is public domain.

          • I remember how good is/are your source(s). 😂

          • Remember the last time we asked, repeatedly, for your sources and how it ended?😉

  29. “Equal Justice Under Law”…well, actually, not really that “equal” at all:

    “The plea deal covers only wrongdoing by Boeing before the crashes in Indonesia and in Ethiopia, which killed all 346 passengers and crew members aboard two new Max jets. It does not give Boeing immunity for other incidents, including a panel that blew off a Max jetliner during an Alaska Airlines flight over Oregon in January, a Justice Department official said.

    “The deal also does not cover any current or former Boeing officials, only the corporation. In a statement, Boeing confirmed it had reached the deal with the Justice Department but had no further comment.

    “In a filing Sunday night, the Justice Department said it expected to submit the written plea agreement with a U.S. District Court in Texas by July 19. Lawyers for some of the relatives of those who died in the two crashes have said they will ask the judge to reject the agreement.”

    “U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor, who has overseen the case from the beginning, has criticized what he called “Boeing’s egregious criminal conduct.” O’Connor could accept the plea and the sentence that prosecutors offered with it or he could reject the agreement, likely leading to new negotiations between the Justice Department and Boeing.”

    “”We want Boeing to succeed,” Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat, said during a Senate hearing last month on what he termed the company’s broken safety culture. “Boeing needs to succeed for the sake of the jobs it provides, for the sake of local economies it supports, for the sake of the American traveling public, for the sake of our military.””

    “”Boeing has paid fines many a time, and it doesn’t seem to make any change,” said Ike Riffel of Redding, California, whose sons Melvin and Bennett died in the Ethiopian Airlines crash. “When people start going to prison, that’s when you are going to see a change.””

    • Probably tax deductibility for a settlement has been assured and personal liability been prevented. We want Boeing to succeed, no choice. TBTF, where marketeconomy stops & reality kicks in.

    • “link to yahoo”
      That is a bit of an eye-centric splinter vs beam thing, isn’t it?

      fleet of new Chineese jets ( 1..2 types )
      Airbus struggling ( -5% ) with production

      Boeing floating unmentioned above the clouds .. .-)

      • 👉 The Daily Telegraph!

        ‘An Airbus spokesman said: “In view of the continued pressure in the supply chain as well as the overall complex economic situation, there is a need to concentrate our efforts on the fundamentals.

        “Airbus has therefore launched an improvement programme.”

        The spokesman said some non-critical internal projects may be paused and workers shifted to key areas to drive up the production.’

    • @ DP
      Well, COMAC has previously indicated that it’s planning a rate of about 20 p/m for the C919 in 2030.

      AVIC previously said that it expects the CJ-1000 turbofan to be ready by 2025 (has been undergoing flight testing for months).

      Once the domestic engine starts rolling off the line, the Chinese will be in a position to start taking a serious slice of market share in China…and potentially also in Asia and the Global South. Air Asia and the Saudis are already expressing interest.

      We know from that recent Air Insight article that the C919’s fuel economy is competitive. And the price will also probably be attractive.

      Airbus sees the train coming down the track…

      • Based on future US election results…especially with today VP pick…

        It could come down to a two horse race for China commercial aircraft orders
        Airbus and Comac

      • “First batch of eight captains from China Southern Airlines successfully completed the C919 type rating training at Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC)”

        “China Southern Airlines will continue to increase investment in safety, operations, and flight training, deepen cooperation with COMAC, and strive to build a platform for joint construction, governance, and sharing, jointly opening a new chapter in the development of the domestic large aircraft industry and making the large aircraft industry better and better.”

  30. “US judge sets quick schedule to consider family objections to Boeing plea deal”

    “U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor in Texas said after the Justice Department files the plea agreement, relatives of those killed will have a week to file objections and then the government and Boeing will have two weeks to respond. The families will then have five days to file a response.”

    “O’Connor previously criticized Boeing, saying in 2023: “Boeing’s crime may properly be considered the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history.””

  31. There have been some MAX orders the last week, nothing earth shaking (42) but a ray of hope regardless.

    Love the TIA for the 777X. Good to see that program progress

          • The only reason why Italy even looked at KC-46 is that they hoped their existing KC-767A could be upgraded to the same standard (so they would end up with 6 KC-46 while buying just 2). When this turned out to be impossible, there was no reason to consider vastly inferior option anymore.

          • JS:

            I don’t believe that for a nano second.

            If you could bring 767s up to a KC-46A standard (granted its issues) then Japan would do it as well.

            You can add stuff, you can kludge stuff in and they have done so on the KC-135R, but its very sub optimal.

            The KC-46A has a 787 backbone and a large number of modifications from the ground up. Its one reason Boeing has had its problems, its no longer a simple tanker.

            The A330MRT has the same issue. They keep adding to it as far as optional features go (yes you have to sleuth that out of many public available documents) .

            They take the 767-2C frame and tear it down and build in the KC-46A electronics, its own ability to take fuel system (as has been pointed out a huge mod by itself)

            The hull is part of the Antennae system.

            Take a 767T and tear out all the T stuff, then the rest and you are far better off (if you want KC-46A) with a bare hull you don’t have to tear the old stuff out of it.

            I have all the respect for Italy for stepping up and boosting its defenses. I don’t blame them for taking a 2nd look at the KC-46A. Its an expense if you can defer it, you get a delay benefit.

            Its also a chance to link in deeper to Airbus if they order the A330MRT and can benefit. Its an aspect all countries do.

            They to walk that line between industrial support for Italy and the needs they have. Its not an easy balance. In Italy case, they have NATO and US support tanker wise.

            Flip is as anyone can see, you can’t have a deep enough stockpile of tanks and aircraft for the immediate up front fight.

            Same goes for munitions. No stock pile is deep enough.

    • Going to be an interesting week. I don’t sweat an empty June. An empty air show would be an unqualified disaster

      • Not just empty June: totally empty April and May, too.

        There are rumors of a Korean 777X order coming — that might save face for BA (if it actually materalizes).

      • Remember, an order is a means to an end, not an end in itself!
        The 777x program is a long way from recovering its cost/investment, no different than the 787 program.

        • First things first!
          Just because it has a TIA doesn’t mean that it will be certified any time soon.
          The MAX-10 got its TIA in December, 2023…but it won’t be certified until 2026 (at the earliest).
          That’s (more than) 2 years!

  32. “Boeing workers to vote on authorization of potential strike”

    “The local represents nearly 32,000 people in the Seattle, Washington, region, with about 30,000 at Boeing plants in nearby Renton, where the US aerospace giant’s 737 is assembled, and in Everett, where the 777 is put together. A strike would freeze activity at both factories”

    “Local 751 president Jon Holden has demanded a “substantial” salary hike of at least 40 percent, as well as provisions for health care, retirement and job security. ”

    One way or another, this is going to (badly) hurt BA’s balance sheet.

    • 40% pay raises don’t work Look at the airlines with pilots 40% pay raises along with other workers…..High capacity and still not making a a major profits

      You want to be highest paid workers and guaranteed work in Seattle…go for it but don’t expect to get it. Just another reason not to launch a new commercial aircraft

      • The Union gave. From the Seattle Times:

        ‘The union has been locked into its contract for the past 16 years, and has had to make concessions since then under threat from Boeing that it would move production outside of Washington if the union did not concede.

        IAM made those concessions while members were still working under an existing contract, and did not have the option to strike.

        In 2011, the union agreed to higher health care costs in order to secure production of the then-new 737 MAX at Boeing’s Renton plant. In 2013, Boeing again threatened to move work out of state; this time focused on production of the 777X in Everett.

        Workers initially rejected the offer but the IAM’s national leadership set up a second, last-minute vote on Jan. 3, 2014, while many senior machinists were on vacation. With 51% of the vote, Boeing and the IAM agreed to the mid-contract negotiations, with workers giving up traditional pensions, settling for 4% wage increases over the following eight years and taking on higher health care costs. ‘

        And what did the company do with the 787? Moved it out of state.

        Why would you think that a corporation that hammered it’s suppliers with Partnering For Success, would do any different with it’s employees?

    • Does the management negotiating team negotiate with the mandate from the out-going CEO?? 🙄

  33. “Airbus SE has entered into a ‘binding term sheet agreement’ with Spirit AeroSystems in relation to a potential acquisition of major activities related to Airbus, notably the production of: the A220’s wings and mid-fuselage in Belfast (Northern Ireland) and Casablanca (Morocco); A220 pylons in Wichita, Kansas (USA); and A350 fuselage sections in Kinston, North Carolina (the USA) and St Nazaire (France).”

    “Entering into definitive agreements remains subject to an ensuing due diligence process; and while there is no guarantee that a transaction will be concluded, all parties are willing and interested to work in good faith to progress and complete this process as timely as possible”

    So, also acquiring part of the operations in Wichita.

    And the second paragraph is a nod to the tough process of getting this deal past foreign anti-trust regulators — particularly in China. A process that will become even more complicated by the increasing likelihood of Trump 2.0…

    • Sold at a loss and Airbus can’t build them fast enough.This is not really the definition of success.I look forward to Leehams article about how this is even possible although it will probably be behind the paywall

      • Hmm have you heard of GE Aerospace (or Boeing Commercial** or Embraer Commercial*)??

        ** Did BCA make a buck in the last four, five years?

        • Between 2012 to 2014, BCA lost a total of $5.4 billion under unit-cost accounting. (i.e. without program accounting a.k.a. the emperor’s new clothes.)

    • Not surprising.
      Debt servicing costs in the US now exceed defense spending, and the debt situation is only getting worse.
      Extra borrowing is not a viable option: rates are still high, bid-to-cover ratios are declining, interest from foreign direct bidders is anaemic, and certain foreign holders are dumping their treasuries. The main driver behind current treasury auctions seems to be yen-dollar carry trades — which will dry up quickly if the Japanese central bank intervenes to stop the yen-dollar decline (e.g. by selling US treasuries).
      Increasingly, defense spending is going to become an unaffordable luxury.

  34. Ah yes, the joys of cloud computing:

    “Delta, United and American Airlines flights grounded due to communication issue, FAA says”

    “(CNN)— All flights from several major US airlines – including Delta, United and American Airlines – were grounded Friday morning due to a communication issue, according to the Federal Aviation Administration.”

    “The ground stop impacts all flights from the airlines, regardless of their destination, said the FAA.

    “It’s unclear how long the ground stop will last, though the FAA suggested an update would be available by 5 a.m. ET.”

    “Earlier Thursday, Frontier said its systems had been impacted by the outage, and offered refunds to inconvenienced passengers.

    “Other competitors including Allegiant and SunCountry also said they were having difficulties, including with their booking, check-in and trip-managing functions online.

    “The FAA also announced Friday morning all Allegiant flights would be grounded”

    “On the Azure cloud software status report site, Microsoft said that service went down for some customers in the central United States around 6 p.m. ET, “including failures with service management operations and connectivity or availability of services.”

    “The company said it determined the cause and is working to fix it. A company spokesman did not immediately respond to a request for comment.”

    Pretty big vulnerability from a national security point of view. But that doesn’t matter, as long as Microsoft can find a way to rake in more dollars…


    “DALLAS — Today, the Airbus A321XLR has received its Type Certification from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The certification comes after a two-year period of flight tests, ground tests and airline demonstration campaigns. The first prototype flew in June 2022.”

    Nicely timed before the start of the Farnborough airshow.

    • An over 500-order backlog for A321XLR, which enters into service this November. Not bad, for a “niche aircraft”.

      Wonder how the Boing Max-7 and MAX-10 are coming along. Oh, and a solution for the nacelle heat
      issue common to all the MAXes. #shouldbefine


      • A Trump 2.0 term will probably be far friendlier to Boeing than the current administration, e.g. as regards granting waivers and binning criminal proceedings. That might give the MAX-7/10 dinosaurs a helping hand toward certification.
        I think we know which horse BA will be betting on 🫣

        • But losing the entire Chinese commercial aircraft market with Trump 60% tariffs and sanctions. Before Covid China was about 20 plus a month 737 to China.

          • Indeed.
            But the Chinese market is already lost to Boeing: no new orders since 2017, and just a trickle of deliveries.

            Big question: will Mr. T try to ban sales of Airbus aircraft to China because they contain some US parts? If he does, then he’ll have an all-out trade war with the EU. And a rapid de-coupling, also.

    • Thanks for that Seattle Times link, Pedro- it’s a useful one.

      I continue to think that decisions were made at a high level some time ago about the future of BCA.

    • ‘Boeing is paralyzed, unable to lay out its future direction even at aviation’s version of a Super Bowl party. Airbus is looking forward.’

      The MAX 10 ‘won’t be certified to fly passengers until 2026 at the earliest. The A321neo is “the biggest and most capable single-aisle jet you could buy,” said Aboulafia. “In the absence of Boeing doing anything even remotely in this segment, it’s very compelling.” ‘
      ‘[A]t the end of 2022, CEO Calhoun definitively dropped that project and announced publicly that there would be no all-new Boeing jet this decade. With that, airlines realized there was nothing to wait for, no other game in town, and A321neo sales took off. Airbus had sold 425 of them in 2022. The following year, A321neo sales tripled to 1,286 jets. “The best year for A321neo sales, by a huge margin, was the 12 months after Calhoun said Boeing wouldn’t be doing anything,” Aboulafia said. “He’s the very best CEO that Airbus could ask for.” ‘

  36. from AW
    “COMAC’s latest product, the C919 “is effectively an A320neo,” Scherer said. It has the same technological features as the European aircraft, he said, rather than anything revolutionary. “There’s no differentiation; there’s no new value being brought to the market.””

    But it will take away market share from Airbus and Boeing

    • Interesting.
      “copy of A320NEO”

      The concept of pharmazeutical generica applied to the passenger airplane market.

      that is a bit more than
      “there’s no new value being brought to the market.”

      • The value added is that it can be built and sold less expensively than competing products.

        It’ll be the next aircraft that really give the other OEM’s problems.

        • Don’t forget: dollar-free, and therefore sanctions-free.

          And it has FBW and ECAM/EICAS…unlike the dinosaur being offered on the other side of the Pacific.

          • Guess why China doesn’t bother to produce a 737 generic 🙂

          • Because China is forward looking…

            The other one is a bit, you know, impossible without grandfathering.

  37. from AP

    “Hopefully, a new CEO next year will make that horrible situation better, but until then, people are just focused on circling the wagons and doing what they can to keep the company functioning,” said Richard Aboulafia, a longtime aerospace analyst and now a consultant at AeroDynamic Advisory. “It’s a tragedy and an embarrassment, but hopefully this air show will be remembered as the darkness before the dawn.”

    • Where would Boeing be today “if”

      1. Didn’t have $60 billion stock buyback and invested in new commercial aircraft programs
      2. Went with 787 composite fuselage with framing instead of one piece mandrel fuselage production (e.g. Phil Condit PhD dissertation)…no shim issues
      3. Replace 737 with a launch of new clean sheet single aisle in 2012
      4. Replace 777 with a new clean sheet twin aisle in 2014

  38. It’s said that the seventh C919 for China Eastern may be delivered before the end of the month

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