By the Leeham News Team
June 29, 2021, © Leeham News: United Airlines today announced its order for 200 Boeing 737 MAXes and 70 Airbus A321neos.
The size and split of the order were first reported by Airfinance Journal.
The deal is the carrier’s largest, as well as the industry’s largest “in a decade.”* The order is for 50 737 MAX 8s, 150 737 MAX 10s and 70 A321neos. “United will replace older, smaller mainline jets and at least 200 single-class regional jets with larger aircraft,” the airline said.
On March 31, United has 94 A319s and 96 A320s in service and parked. There are 373 737s in service and parked, mostly 737 NGs. There are 61 757s in service and parked.
There were 50 A321XLRs on order, with deliveries beginning after next year. It had 180 737 MAXes (including 100 MAX 10s) on order. Thirteen MAX 8s/9s were scheduled for delivery for the remainder of this year, 40 next year and the remaining 127 after 2022. The MAX 10 now is scheduled to be certificated in 2023, two years later than planned. Deliveries are through 2030.
United also said it will refurbish its entire fleet to expand premium seating. “United Next,” the name of its refleeting, refurbishing and branding campaign, will increase the total number of seats per departure by 30%.
“United expects to introduce more than 500 new, narrow-body aircraft: 40 in 2022, 138 in 2023 and as many as 350 in 2024 and beyond,” the carrier said. “That means in 2023 alone, United’s fleet will, on average, add about one new narrow-body aircraft every three days.”
Although United is reducing its reliance 50-seat jet, it will retain the Mitsubishi CRJ550, a 50-seat downsize version of the 76-seat CRJ700. The -550 is configured with 50 seats, expanded first and premium class sections, larger space for carry-on baggage and added space for food and beverage service.
United now has 120 A321s on order. Boeing missed the opportunity to keep the A321XLR out of the United fleet. UAL ordered the A321XLR because Boeing dawdled on a decision whether to launch the New Midmarket Airplane. United, along with Delta Air Lines, were certain to be launch customers.
Faced with endless indecision by Boeing, United ordered the XLR. Although United did not specify the A321neo model in its press release, it is typical for an airline to have the flexibility to swap sub-types within a specified period before the planned delivery date.
*United must mean among US carriers. India’s Indigo placed an order for 300 Airbus A320s in 2019.
The mixed nature of the order will make it difficult to figure out (from later document submissions) what the unit price was for the MAX-10. One can assume that at least some of the MAX-8s were whitetails, with bargain basement pricing. Apart from general downward pricing pressure due to BA’s current “predicament”, there was probably additional downward pressure so as to avoid an even bigger incursion of the A321 into the order. I suspect the margins were (very) lean.
Re: “One can assume that at least some of the MAX-8s were whitetails, …”
According to the Fox Business story at the link below, United Airline’s new order for 200 MAX aircraft announced today 6-29-21 will include 25 MAX
“The deal includes 50 Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 150 MAX 10, accelerating a recovery for the MAX in the wake of a two-year safety crisis overlapping with a COVID-19 travel slump.”
“The order includes 25 737 MAX “white tails”, or orders cancelled by other buyers during a lengthy safety grounding.”
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/uni … irbus-jets
No 737-10 white tails will be included in the order, since both of the 737-10’s that have emerged from the final assembly line in Renton (N27751 and N27753) were already destined for United.
Thanks for the news about the 25 MAX-8 whitetails.
There are, of course, no MAX-10 whitetails (yet).
The excerpt below from the Seattle Times story at the link after the excerpt, agrees with the Fox Business story that I cited above about United having purchased 25 MAX whitetails, but disagrees with the FOX story regarding when they were purchased. The FOX story states that the 25 whitetails were part of the new order announced today, whereas the Seattle Times story states that they were all purchased in March of this year, and that no whitetails were included in the new order that was announced today.
“United placed an order in March for 25 MAXs, all of which were planes originally bought by other airlines that had abandoned their purchases. A United spokesperson said none of the planes in the newly announced order are taken over from previous customers, but are additions to Boeing’s order book.”
No mention of the Max7 or any other small single aisle. Will the 200 to be retired regional jets be replaced by the Max8 or is there another order yet to be announced for a Max7/A220 size aircraft?
Answering my own question, I guess not:
Seems like a large gap between the smaller regionals and the Max8.
That doesn’t rule out the 145-seat A220-300, though I agree its acquisition is unlikely.
Last year one legitimate report stated United and American were looking for used A319s for that market sector. But as noted, they are watching what Delta does, so maybe at some point they’ll add A220s.
Re: “Last year one legitimate report stated United and American were looking for used A319s for that market sector.”
According to Wikipedia as of now United still has 19 used A319’s and 7 used 737-700’s on order, and currently has 94 A319’s and 53 737-700’s in its fleet. Perhaps there is a difference between what you buy new for $$$ to use for the next 15 to 20 years, and what you snap up to use for a few years if you happen to run across a bargain.
From one of the slides in the “Investors Event” presentation appended to an 8-K United filed today with the SEC today 6-29-21 (seepage 36 at the link below.
“New generation large narrowbody aircraft provide significant fuel burn reduction.
Fuel cost per seat.
50 seat RJ: $36
MAX 9: $16
Newer aircraft are at least 50% more fuel efficient per seat than our least efficient fleets.”
Re in my post above: “According to Wikipedia as of now United still has 19 used A319’s and 7 used 737-700’s on order, …”
Typo: According to Wikipedia the number of used A319’s that United has on order is 12, not 19.
From United’s 4-22-21 SEC 10-Q filing (see page 32 at the link below).
“United also has an agreement to purchase seven used Boeing 737-700 aircraft with expected delivery dates in 2021. In addition, United has an agreement to purchase 15 used Airbus A319 aircraft, which it intends to sell, with expected delivery dates in 2021 and 2022.”
Again, looks like United is taking a chapter out of Delta’s playbook. All the used B717s, and maintaining those DC-9s for well over 30 years. Note – with many additional seats added, if/when the economy stumbles, the weaker players could disappear.
In 2019, United expanded its B737-700 fleet almost by 50%, picking up used jets.
Why compare the unit fuel cost of 50 seat RJ with a much larger MAX 9? Are they flying the same segment? Why would United fly a 50 seat RJ if the market can accommodate the MAX 9?
“””Fuel cost per seat.
50 seat RJ: $36
MAX 9: $16″””
The A319ceo doesn’t have higher fuel burn per trip than the MAX-9. A319ceo fuel burn is much lower.
If the fuel burn would be the same, the seats for the MAX-9 can be calculated.
A normal configuration for the A319 would have 144 seats.
$25/seat x 144seats = $3600/trip
$3600/trip / $16 = 225seats
225 seats for a MAX-9, which is a much smaller seat pitch than a 144 seats A319, IF the fuel burn would be the same. But the fuel burn is not the same, the MAX-9 would need more than 250 seats to reach United’s numbers.
United LOL … severe Boeingitis
did you really believe those numbers 🙂
Overall (new and outstanding orders) for every Airbus A321 ordered Boeing is getting 3.15 MAX orders. Curious as to whether United uses the 10 LD3/45 containers the A321 is capable of carrying for cargo.
Did they munge “comitted buy” and “options to buy” again for Boeing to make it look good?
Re: “Did they munge “comitted buy” and “options to buy” again for Boeing to make it look good?”
When specifically are you aware of this having been done in the past?
According to 8-K filed by United today 6-29-21 with the SEC, all of the 200 MAX orders and all of the 70 A321neo orders that were announced today are firm. See the excerpt below from this 8-K, which is followed by a link to the full 8-K.
“On June 27, 2021, United Airlines, Inc. (“United”) entered into a supplemental agreement to that certain Purchase Agreement, dated May 15, 2018 with The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) for a firm narrowbody aircraft order of 200 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The order consists of 150 Boeing 737 MAX 10s and 50 Boeing 737 MAX 8s. Also on June 27, 2021, United entered into an amendment to that certain Purchase Agreement, dated December 3, 2019 with Airbus S.A.S (“Airbus”) for a firm narrowbody aircraft order of 70 Airbus A321neo aircraft. The firm orders of 200 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft and 70 Airbus A321neo aircraft are expected to be delivered starting in 2023 through 2028 and 2026, respectively.”
The LH 777X/A350k order was reported as sum of orders and options for Boeing’s product.
which was later given better detailing.
finally LH reduced the fixed 777X order further.
Range of 787 and MAX orders where press compacted the reporting to nn orders for Boeing. often fixed later on.
and there still is the case around that a German Airline ordered further 787-9 just ahead of the NTSB Batteries report. while in reality reducing and morphing the remains.)
US press is rife(r than other domains) with fishy reporting.
Don’t baffle Ameriphobes with facts. They can’t handle it.
I assume you’re only talking about his year?
It’s not surprising when most of the compensation for MAX is in the form of credits for new aircraft. Boeing will likely not be making much money on these sales.
Hello William and Stealth 66,
Re:”Overall (new and outstanding orders) for every Airbus A321 ordered Boeing is getting 3.15 MAX orders.”
“I assume you’re only talking about (t)his year?”
Current United Airbus narrowbody fleet according to Wikipedia.
Total: (94 + 96) = 190
Current United Boeing narrowbody fleet according to Wikipedia.
Total: (53 + 141 + 12 + 136 + 1 + 30 + 40 + 21) = 434
Boeing / Airbus in current fleet = 434 / 190 = 2.28
United Airbus narrowbody aircraft currently on order according to Wikipedia.
Total: (70 + 50) = 120
United Boeing narrowbody aircraft currently on order according to Wikipedia.
Total: (89 + 49 + 150) = 288
Boeing / Airbus on order = 288 / 120 = 2.40
Boeing / Airbus in current fleet = 434 / 190 = 2.28
2.40/2.28 = 1.05, thus, according to Wikipedia fleet data, the ratio of Boeing to Airbus aircraft currently on order by United is 5% higher than the ratio of Boeing to Airbus aircraft currently in United’s fleet.
In the reality that I live in, there has thus been lots of hollering and pontificating over something that has not changed much at all, and to the small extent that it did change, went in the opposite direction than many are hollering about.
According to the Wikipedia data that I used in my calculations above, United has 288 unfilled MAX orders. This does not agree with a press release issued by Boeing today which states that Unites has 350 unfilled MAX orders. See the excerpt and link below. One obvious anomaly is that United says that they added 150 MAX-10 orders today; however, the Wikipedia data only lists a total of 150 MAX-10 orders although United had previous MAX-10 orders before adding another 150 today.
“The purchase increases United’s order book for the fuel-efficient, single-aisle family to 380 airplanes, including 30 that have been delivered. As the launch customer for the 737-10, United placed its first order in 2017 by converting 100 737-9 orders to the larger 737-10 variant.”
I count 380 MAX on order and 120 A321 on order i.e. about 3.15:1. In terms of value the A321 is a slightly larger aircraft and the A321XLR probably sold at a higher price given its 24% to 30% greater range to the MAX 8 and MAX 10.
In the few hours since I did the above calculations, Wikipedia’s data for United’s current Boeing narrowbody orders has changed as follows.
737-8: Changed from 89 on order and 1 in service, to 90 on order and 0 in service. N27251 has been delivered, but has not yet flown its first passenger flight, so one could make a case for either (89/1) or (90/0) on order/in service.
737-9: No change, 49 on order, 30 in service.
737-10: Changed from 150 on order to 250 on order.
Old total United Boeing narrowbody orders was (89+49+150) = 288.
New total United Boeing narrowbody orders is (90+49+250) = 386.
The Boeing press release that I cited above stated that United had ordered a total of 380 MAX of which 350 had yet to be delivered, so
I think Wikipedia is getting closer but is still not correct.
United’s 4-22-21 SEC 10-Q filing stated that United then had 180 MAX aircraft on firm order. United’s 8-K SEC filing of today 6-29-21 states that United has placed another 200 MAX firm orders. Note that 180 + 200 = 380, which is the number of total MAX orders that Boeing’s press release stated that United had, but 30 more than the number of undelivered MAX orders that Boeing’s press release said that United had.
The used aircraft that in this case United has orders for, could skew totals a small amount. This is because some could be planes acquired by Boeing, where others will be purchased elsewhere.
There are probably more existing Boeing frames to go than from their Airbus subfleet.
757*, 737-9 non ER ?
This ratio seems to be manifesting itself in the US only.
Worldwide, the total order tally for A321neos is currently 3020, whereas the total order tally for the MAX-10 is 483 [and 234 for the MAX-9] (source: Wikipedia).
As others here have pointed out, Boeing is offering airlines the option of receiving (bargain) planes instead of cash as compensation for the MAX grounding, and that’s probably the driver behind the sudden recent surge of MAX orders in the US.
This order is to replace a lot of older aircraft… the PR spin is incredible.
Mainline taking over regional hops? I will believe it when I see it.
‘Regionals’ in US are a bit of a misnomer as to the markets they serve, they are often urban areas with million plus populations. A quick check on Flightaware shows a CRJ900 connecting Pittsburgh and Minneapolis, Phoenix to Houston , Nashville to JFK and similar
150 Max10 and 70 A321, and maybe the only reason for the Max8 is they were built and a good deal. This to me is further proof that the market has moved past the 738/A320 size and is moving to 200 seats as the standard minivan. Interesting that WN will be flying 7s and 8s against AS with 9s, DL with 900s and A321s, UA with 10s and A321s. With the composition of this order, I think the 737 replacement capacity has moved up 20% to 25% from the 738. That is where an A range(500 to 3Knm) twin aisle, is the next evolution in airliner design for either or both manufacturers.
The market could be changing. That 767 replacement might be a big home run if done up right.
That 767 replacement isn’t happening.
I was also wondering if Boeing got in only because Airbus couldn’t build / deliver that many air frames fast enough.
The Max 10 component of the order is surely contingent upon successful certification of that model, and with B’s track record lately that might be a tough wicket to bowl.
If I recall correctly EASA has demanded a third AOA measurement, using the “synthetic” method. Such systems exist on fighters, and I believe on the modern airliners, but shoehorning something like that in the 1960’s fuselage is a tough proposition, not to mention finding/installing the necessary computer capacity.
IMO, the 2023 target is quite optimistic.
EASA did mandate and I believe back fit to the other MAX jets as well (I did not see how long a transition allowed).
I assume (always a bad thing) Boeing has a plan for the install. Certainly an interesting mix of old tech and new tech on that bird that is increasingly unique to put it mildly .
I had felt Boeing might avoid the upgrade by not doing the -10, so wrong on that one.
It will be interesting.
> I had felt Boeing might avoid the upgrade by not doing the -10, so wrong on that one.
It will be interesting. <
Yes, it will.
If BA drags its feet with the MAX-10 similar to the way it’s dragging its feet with the 777X, United can probably forget getting its -10s within the agreed timeframe (or anywhere near it).
She just flew, so it appears BA is going to get them sold and flying as quick as possible. They truly want MAX revenue for the NSA and/or B757 replacement. With Airbus mfg lines fairly book, MAXes make sense to United’s expansion. Also, they ain’t giving ’em away. At the end of the day, it’s a Duopoly.
The 777X is showing us that “flying” is not the same as “certified”.
As one commenter very astutely stated here, BA just doesn’t seem to be able to cut it now that self-cert is no longer available.
The Flight Control computer module on even a large plane like 777 is roughly the size of a shoe box ( it would have more than one). Sitting next to me here is an i10 box (bare bones system) for a desktop computer that is even smaller with 140cm diagonal or 6 in and 40cm high or just under 2 in. It even has its own little internal cooling unit with fan for CPU, the power supply is separate like a laptop would be. Would be easy to have it run a synthetic air data system., with inputs from other on board system. The military unmanned drones have them as the multiple pilot tubes arent reliable enough and no space
computers for doing real work and
computers for waiting faster (TM) M$ 🙂
are vastly different.
What Boeing could do to stay inside the “unconnected lobes” system design is replacing one AoA with some munging box that delivers a syntetic AoA _____ for each lobe.
The issue IMO will be the integration of the new shiny synthetic system into the limited (286 box?) principal flight control computer. That was already a significant constraint for the MCAS fixes if I recall correctly.
Obviously, significant software issues will be involved, and we all recall the sterling work B subcontracted and install for said MCAS….
The ADIRU already have all the data they need except
1 Flap settings
2 Thrust Settings
3 Undercarriage position
4 Weight Modelled by Initial Weight Minus Fuel Burn.
It looks like all of that data could be communicated from elsewhere.
Of course highly accurate synthetic data is not needed, you just need enough to stop or limit FCS responding to faulty pitot and alpha vane inputs and to keep operating.
A iPhone has far more power than an ADIRU and even has GPS/GLONAS/Galileo and a barometer (artificial horizon apps very good) but of course the issue is certification.
I would say that EASA (Patrik Kye) is doing Boeing a favor by potentially forcing an upgrade from a 16/32 bit 286 to a full 32bit or 64 bit architecture. The world has moved on. Eventually the advanced compiler technologies that allow verification of code may not be available.
William, your concerns are overblown. What sort of computer processor do you think the A320 uses for FBW , certified back in Nov 88?
They have multiple systems of course
Looking around we find a detailed outline of the A320 whole plane computer design
‘The five fly-by-wire computers are simultaneously active. They are in charge of control law computation as a function of the pilot inputs as well as individual actuator control, thus avoiding specific actuator control electronics.’
2 elevator -aileron computers (ELAC)
3 Spoiler -aileron computers ( SEC)
2 Flight augmentation computers (FAC)
the ELACs are produced by Thomson-CSF around 68010 microprocessors
and the SECs are produced in cooperation by SFENA/Aerospatiale with a hardware based on the 80186
Of course its not such an issue as they dont use bloated Windows operating systems and the applications are very well written to do specific tasks. Modern CPUs while great for home and office , its laughable that you seem to think a 64 bit CPU will be essential for these specific applications. This sort of factoids gets into the wider public who , without knowing any real facts, assume its true
Regarding the EASA and the requirement for a 3rd AOA sensor (synthetic).
This story covers all you need to know
For the existing Max 8 and 9, with only two sensors there a restriction of certain type of complicated flight profiles called RNP AR for the 2AOA Max. None of the european airspace has any such landing profile. The Queenstown NZ one is a probably a good example.
Its ‘well known to many’ that 2 sensor 737 and 3 sensor A320 have similar accident rates and both type have had crashes from AOA disagree situations. The bigger challenge maybe upgrading the A320/321 3rd AOA to a synthetic sensor – to improve its safety of course. Maybe its little Motorola 68010 or Intel 80186 processors cant handle it as its a full FBW ……..
@Dukeofurl, My concerns are not overblown. AF447 and hundreds of souls were lost with it. Airbus has updated flight manuals, the airlines have added a little training and the sensor robustness has been improved slightly. Overall little seems to have been done with the highly likely event of multiple simultaneous pitot static failure or alpha sensor failures?
Has airbus addressed the fundamental issue which is 1 they didn’t have enough sensor diversity?
One reason Airbus don’t have synthetic air data on the A320 series nor the A350 series (despite the far earlier in service B787 having this facility) may be because the 1980s microprocessors they’ve certified their aircraft around are simply not up to the task.
Why have they not converted to active side sticks?
The computerised modelling needed works best with 64 bit floating point processing because the programmers should be focused on implementing the simulation not in worrying about round of errors or concerning themselves with worrying about execution times or memory space for code. The software needs to be modern, verifiable and using advanced compilers and languiages that assist in producing bug free code.
Airbus it would appear is letting its FBW system age the same as Boeing did for the B737. In 2037 the Airbus FBW system will be 50 years old.
What is to stop the A32x/A350 series from ending up like the B737 MAX with archaic flight controls.
afaics you have compacted a long list of misconception into one single post.
Question: What position does ( did?) EASA have on complex creation of synthetic flight parameters? ( In relation to Boeing certifications EASA is “over a barrel” they have to accept the FAA position. Their stance may well be different in their own domain.
United breaks guitars with this one. It seems that they wanted A321; and the Maxes where at Maximun discount?
“The computerised modelling needed works best with 64 bit floating point processing”
The x87 math coprocessor uses 32, 64 or 80 bits floating point.
Do they have the 80287 fitted? Then there is the issue of execution times, transferring all of those 64 bit reals into the coprocessor.
I am surprised it the -10. It would seem A321 works into that slot.
The -8 and -9 give you a seat advantage over the A320.
Maybe just part of the capacity keeps shifting up.
I’m assuming the 10s were at a good price & as Airbus have long talked about improving margins I guess the deals for A321s might not be so good.
What surprises me is UAs appetite for A321s considering how many “competing” 737-10s they have on order, it sends a poor message about the “10”‘s capacities to operators who are still deciding between the two types.
The Airlines would know what the -10 is and is not.
I would not call it a poor message.
Reality of being able to use the A321 capability. Its almost a flip interesting UA is buying MAX at all.
For sure lots of factors go into that so each airline makes decisions on what they think works for what is available, what they want, etc.
AK is sticking mostly with MAX (have to see where the A321 wind up but that is some years out)
South West stuck with Boeing, others mix and so it goes.
The 737-10 was made for the UAL and AA domestic networks it looks like, mainly to shuffle people on pretty short/medium routes at airports with long runways at minimum cost per seatmile. The A321’s are for flexibility when you need more seats, more range, more payload in LD3-45’s or when competitors fill their Airbuses while booking lags on UAL 737’s. So UAL route and staffing computers will chew the numbers and come out with the most profitable schedule while digesting bookings and historical data. The question is how can they afford it as delivieris pick up steam?
“The question is how can they afford it as delivieris pick up steam?”
I asked myself exactly the same question when I heard about this new order. United seems to be counting on several years of very good revenue from domestic travel.
> United seems to be counting on several years of very good revenue from domestic travel. <
Interesting, given recent/present circumstances.
Did United get some of that there recent U$G bailout money, or not?
"We're in super-dire straits, so we need to order
many, many new aircraft."
Really cognitive dissonance-inducing times.
The 737-10 was made principally for Ryanair.
My theory is the -10 were cheaper and work for all continental US routes. Since United is already a Max customer so it is not really affect fleet commonality. The more expensive A321’s are for where their capabilities are needed.
might well be.
Nice for Boeing to get the order.
Would be nice for Pratt & Whitney for Airbus to get a big US A320neo order with pure power engines.
That’s my interpretation too. The MAX-10s are for high-density domestic routes (range=3,300 mi. with auxiliary tank or about 250 mi. less than the -8), the A321NEOs for longer international routes.
Hello Richard Finch,
Re: “The MAX-10s are for high-density domestic routes (range=3,300 mi. with auxiliary tank or about 250 mi. less than the -8), the A321NEOs for longer international routes.”
In Bjorn Fehrm’s 3-12-17 post on this blog comparing the 737-10 to the A321neo (basic version, not the more expensive LR or XLR), he concluded that the range and passenger capacity of a 737-10 with one ACT and a A321neo with 2 ACT’s were roughly the same. See the excerpts and link below. It seems clear from Mr. Hamilton’s posts about the 737-10 over the subsequent years that he does not agree with Mr. Fehrm’s analysis of the 737-10. I do agree that the 50 A321XLR’s that United has ordered, or any additional XLR’s that they order, will be superior to 737-10’s for longer international routes, but if one accepts Mr. Fehrm’s conclusions, then there will be little difference in range between a 737-10 and any non LR or non XLR A321neo’s that United orders.
“Both aircraft have about the same range when sensibly equipped. The A320 series wing holds about an ACT’s (Auxiliary Center Tank)-worth of less fuel. So Boeing justly equipped the A321neo with two ACTs and the MAX 10 with one. This means both aircraft are just passing 3,200nm without becoming limited by the fuel amount.
Which of the two who then flies on the longest depends on where Boeing put the final Max Take-Off Weight. When modeled with a reasonable increase (around 5,000lb), they both run out of operational max range (with a 100% load factor cabin and ACTs as above) after 3,200nm. So we would say that on maximum range with passengers and their bags the aircraft seems about equal.
The same goes for operational costs. Our model shows them to be close on this dimension as well. We can’t see in our model the claimed 5% better seat and trip cost for a 737 MAX 10.
If Boeing decides to go ahead with the MAX 10, it will have a credible alternative to the standard A321neo. The MAX 10 will have worse field performance (essentially the same as MAX 9, which is a bit of a ground hog), but for airlines serving large airports at reasonable altitudes, it will be OK.”
“We would agree with Boeing’s claim, the cabins are about equal size. Part of the three seat difference comes from the Airbus using slim-line lavatories in the back, of which two can combine to a PRM (Person with Reduced Mobility) lavatory. Boeing uses standard domestic size lavatories.”
Bjorn’s article is more than 4 years old and describes assumptions.
The MAX-10 doesn’t have 5000 lb more MTOW than the MAX-9. MAX-9 has 88314kg and MAX-10 89765kg. But the OEW of the MAX-10 will be much higher than the MAX-9, especially with all the addidtional stuff it needs to get certified and then the MAX-9 will get heavier too.
The MTOW of the A321neo is not mentioned in Bjorn’s article and Boeing didn’t mention it too LOL guess why. The LR has 97t and 3 ACT. But Airbus describes another version with 97t which is not the LR.
Over 7t more MTOW for the A321neo can’t result in the same range as the MAX-10. Or do you think the A321neo has 7t higher OEW.
There is a reason Airbus is not showing Space Flex in their Aircraft Characteristics pdf, it’s not needed for normal configurations.
With Cabin Flex the distance between the doors got smaller, but even the without Cabin Flex the A321 has more space between the cockpit and the first door, and also in the bulkhead area than the MAX.
United chose to take more MAX because of the cheaper purchase price but for sure United doesn’t care about passenger comfort and doesn’t care about passenger safety.
Maybe United are already calculating with more compensations that will come when the MAX is grounded again after the next crash.
Ouch – ? Max crash Part 3 and …4?
Do you mean an impending and sooner rather than later maxcrash both BA and it’s one or two old faithful customer airlines have already built in to their business plans, aircart pricing, and their mutual co dependence ‘understanding’
This is quite radical a suggestion
Hoots of US derision have already greeted world wide regulators scrupulous/hesitant to re cert this particular aircart, and are blamed for all manner of sin/corruption for doing so
They do not want to play the ‘fall guy’ pun intended
If Airbus backfeed the optimised single slotted flap used on the A321XLR to maintain field performance on to standard A321neo they should get rather better field performance without having to introduced a stronger gear.
The possibilities for the A319 or A320 is also interesting. Could London City take such an aircraft one day?
I suspect it’s risk mitigation. Should the MAX 10 experience delays the A321 will be available. In addition A321XLR’s extraordinary range is a factor as may be its ability to carry LD3-45 unit load devices. In addition United has a large cadre of Airbus pilots.
I agree, but can the old 737 structures take the beating of 10-14 flights per day with 200-230pax. The same “tube” was used on the 757 but it did not have this brutal utilization. The A321 most likely will have less cycling as its longer range will be used and hence reduce hr/cy ratio.
As far as loosing out on orders for the NMA, whatever combination of not enough orders or commitments and or cost (panic?) and its not to be.
Not sure that is a very good reference as majority of av experts (if I have that right) did not think it was a viable program .
Its strange people here (and on other website(s)) say “Boeing must be giving away their planes, they probably aren’t making anything on those 737’s, etc.”.
Last I recalled, Airbus has never beaten Boeing on profit margins.
I challenge anyone here to show me that prior to 2019, Airbus has beaten Boeing in profit margins in the civilian division.
Were talking about recent events, resulting from BA’s current unenviable financial situation due to the MAX grounding and 787 production halts.
There’s evidence that the price that Alaska paid for (many of) its MAXs essentially meant zero/negligible margin for BA. Similar evidence exists for (much of) the Southwest order.
Moving a huge flock of whitetails in the current market essentially necessitates “giveaway” pricing. Once that process starts, Airlines can exploit BA’s dire straits to force similar pricing for non-whitetails.
BA’s quarterly figures for the coming year(s) will doubtless reveal the meager margins that many are alluding to.
Where is this so-called “evidence”? Please provide.
Also, its not just sales price which is important (of course, it is, I’m not underestimating that). There are many other ancillary revenues Boeing, etc. will get from purchasing a plane.
BA is not in the business of “giving away” products. It would be out of business quickly.
The evidence is in the form of SEC filings made by Alaska and Southwest. If you go back and look at the LNA articles that appeared at the time of those orders, you’ll see detailed info in the comments section. Much of it came from @Frank.
In its current desperate situation, BA most certainly is in the situation of (essentially) “giving away” products.
How to generate “class-leading” operating margin (TM) and generous CF without trying:
LNA Feb 2021
Richard Aboulafia, the highly regarded aerospace consultant for The Teal Group, wrote last week, “It has been nearly 25 years since Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merged. Given Boeingʼs significant engineering cuts, program execution problems, clear prioritization of shareholder returns, extremely uncertain product development road map, and deteriorating market share outlook, it is time to consider whether Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) is destined to share Douglasʼ fate.”
For years, Aboulafia noted Boeing’s Research and Development spending trailed Airbus’. “Much of this BCA R&D budget was spent on rectifying problems with the 787 and 737 MAX. The rest was spent on derivatives. Boeing has not launched a clean-sheet jetliner since 2004 when the 787 began. Douglas went 30 years without a new jet launch; Boeing is at the 17-year mark.”
Man, Boeing must really produce for cheap if they could get a positive margin for the 23 million per max 7 they sold to southwest (reported in their financial statement)
Most, if not all MAX customers have received a big chunk of their compensation in the form of purchase credits. It’s hardly surprising they’re buying more MAX at even lower prices. I’m not suggesting for one second that Boeing is losing money, but they’re making less than normal on these deals.
As for profit margins, I’m sure you appreciate that the companies use different accounting standards, but Boeing handily used to publish figures based on per unit accounting as opposed to program accounting (I don’t know if they still do). If you look at those historic figures you’ll see that the adjusted margins are lower than Airbus in multiple years.
Both Boeing and Airbus are probably making less than normal on their deals. Lets not forget, a lot of these deals were made prior to COVID-19 and if a carrier cancels or delays then it will be the one (probably) penalized.
I do know both Boeing and Airbus have different accounting standards. I used to take that into my calculations as well. Boeing still for the vast majority of years came out well ahead when it came to profit margins.
IIRC, even the current (or previous) CEO of Airbus has stated a few times that they wanted to focus on profitability and margins over market share.
I just don’t post much here and on other aviation forums so I really don’t do as much research on these things.
Profit margin is just a small slice of the picture:
-Which company’s cash position is better?
-Supplier and employee satisfaction, and consequences of same? [FOD, and more]
-Forward-looking and flexible product lineup?
That is an interesting aspect but also has to be crossed to the profit losses we have seen on the 787, the MAX and the 777 issues developing.
Important is what you do with that profit, in this case shares to managers, share buy backs, dividends when the development programs are starved.
You have to put money back into the operation for it to continue.
Boeing elected to gut programs and cut corners and the cost has been huge. Its the defense side that is holding them up right now .
I do not have the accounting ability to compare those so called profits to the losses but it seems they kill all the profits for the last 10 years.
Boeing lost the balance between the business and shareholders as well as cut corners (or tried to).
787 deliveries are on hold, 777 is being put under serious scrutiny and the MAX is just starting to climb back.
I agree and I’ve been very vocal about management. I feel most if not all, along with the BOD should be removed.
They have put profits over product and they have put stock buybacks, etc. over hiring and retaining good talent.
I’ve even gone on to say that I invested in Airbus , Spirit Aerosystems, etc. but not Boeing because of Boeing management.
Jacobin, my Miami Dolphins friend – past performance is no guarantee of future profits. While statement may be true for the NG and prior models, BA has a butcher’s bill to the tune of $20 billion+ on the Max program to pay. Just like the red ink of $18 billion on the 787 and the $6.5 billion charge taken recently on the 777X program – BCA is in a really tough state.
Airlines know this. Lessors know this. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out that BA needs the sales, Airbus has the upper hand in the narrow body market (2 to 1 advantage) and nobody is going to pay pre-grounding prices for a Max, today.
BUT, in the interest of knowledge – I’d love to know how much Boeing makes on the sale of a Max and what Airbus profits off of the sale of a Neo. You have any of that info?
PS – Go Steelers
Hello as well to my Steelers friend! 🙂
Of course, past performance doesn’t guarantee future performance.
Even though Boeing has its share of problems and carriers know this, carriers also know its primarily a “two horse race” between Boeing and Airbus. While they will do their best for their particular order, they also know Boeing and Airbus have some leverage as well.
Carriers also don’t want any one particular manufacturer to have a massive upper hand because that tilts pricing. Of course, if one plane is basically “the only game in town” (such as the B77W used to be and the A321NEO currently is) then a manufacturer will certainly have an upper hand.
I used to post both Boeing and Airbus profit margins however I really haven’t looked into them the past few years.
IIRC, Boeing civilian aircraft margins were blowing away Airbus civilian aircraft margins by a factor of 2x – but that was 5-6 years ago. Don’t know about now.
PS – Go Dolphins!
PS – Go Dolphins!
Bring back Danny Marino, I say- best QB ever.
..and Duper and Clayton, too.
1) BA’s program accounting is the perfect tool for financial engineering (imaginary profits)
2) BA’s MAX development looks penny wise and pound foolish
3) How do you count the compensation credit due to the twin crashes? BA booked the losses in 2019 and 2020. At the end of the day, BA receives less proceed from selling 737 MAX.
Not so. Boeing reports program accounting alongside the other non program version. So you are the one that ‘imagining’ something that you just made up ‘out of the blue’
From a LNA post in late 2019 analysing BA’s accounting, it shows between 2011 and 2015 BA had overstated its profits by close to $25 billion thru’ its financial black box: program accounting. It’s noteworthy from 2012 to 2014, BCA would have recorded losses rather than profits.
Good point : BA in general for all planes except DoD cutting prices to, probably, very tight or negative ‘profit’ margins, no matter how tricky their new accountant Lynne Doughtie (see scandal impelled resigantion from former employer KPMG) cooks the books
BA is, at this stage, little more than a ‘branding’ operation – some call this industrial laundering- riding on the backs of their sub contractors – a poorly managed and unprofitable branding operation, badly treating everyone bar WS, and especially exploitative of their workforce
I think – do you agree?- that they should copyright the brand name ‘aircart’ – no one will try and steal this IP
For anyone interested, here it is:
Also interesting to go back through the comments to see what people were saying, back then…
Both sets of numbers are in Boeings accounts ( from maybe around 2012 onwards).
Anyway only unsophisticated investors -or you- make a big deal on ‘headline profit’ number as its the free cash flow each year that matters most….crudely put, its whats left over from revenue after the bills are paid. Which is paid from borrowing if a loss , doesnt matter what the ‘account name’ the spending is put in.
Actually, if you look at CNBC when live quarterly results come in from a particular corporation, focus is put on “top line” (revenue) and “bottom line” (earnings per share).
I suppose we’ll just have to assume that the analysts at CNBC are “unsophisticated”.
However, on the subject of free cashflow, here are the 2018, 2019 and 2020 figures (respectively) for BA and AB:
BA: 13.72B, -3.946B, -19.417B
AB: 0.291B, 1.708B, -7.94B
Perhaps some “creativity” in 2018, before the sh#t hit the fan?
1) “Sophisticated” investor can tell the level of debt of BA is incomparable with Apple, the most valuable company in the market. Just saying.
2) Emphasis of FCF and appeasement of the WS resulted in weak product strategy and the co. in downward spiral. We know whom to blame.
Think about how Hawaiian got 787-9 and not A330-800.
IIRC Boeing killed the lease contracts it had and needed to beat the Airbus price. Then 10 years after EIS Boeing started with QC on the 787 and the aircart gets more expensive day by day.
Boeing is paying that Hawaiian can fly 787-9.
“Real Bookkeeping (TM)”
“shell game with GAAP”
Since the introduction of the A320, and inclusive of it, Airbus has launched 5 separate models (A320, A330, A340, A350, A380), and neo-ised 2 of them (A320neo, A330neo). Boeing has done, what, 2 new models (777 classic, 787) and updated 3 (737NG, 737 MAX, 747-8).
Perhaps Boeing’s profit margins come by incurring a lot of technical debt.
And in the turboprop airliner business that Leeham occasionally dips into, some surplus deHavilland Dash 8s are being absorbed into the fire suppression business.
Conair Aviation of Abbotsford BC has purchased 11 from bankrupt Flybe, to convert to fir etankers.
It is also converted several others into multi-role tankers for the French government.
Some US operators may follow its lead, perhaps purchasing kits or tankers from Conair.
Conair also operates BAe146/RJ aircraft as fire suppression tankers.
In its own operations, besides AK, Canada, and lower 48 it operates in Australia in its fire season.
Heavy maintenance facility Cascade Aerospace was founded by Conair people but was later sold to IMP Aerospace of Halifax Nova Scotia.
Conair Aviation is not to be confused with the US’ prisoner transport operation Con Air (at least the movie), airline Comair, not hair dryer maker Conair.
The aerial fire suppression business has used old airliners for a long time.
DC-6 and 7
Convair 580 (the Allison turboprop conversion of CV340/440)
Total absorbed small relative to airliners produced, but increasing, perhaps 50 between online this fire season in North America and ones in work.
now Dash8-400, apparently good airfield performance to reload closer to fires, but less drop capacity than other recent models in this list.
now B737 (Coulson Aviation)
Coulson tries to design its tank systems to be removable, to be able to carry cargo and perhaps pax in any off season and in support of spoolup for a season, though it is big in Australia in its season not just in North America, .
Over the years, various ex-military aircraft have been used.
C-130 – Coulson is big in recent models (C-130A models were used in northern US by others, one had a wing break due inadequate inspection, the A model is underpowered)
Tracker patrol airplane, re-engine with turboprop engines for fire fighting, successful
Neptune P2V patrol airplane served for decades
Martin Mars biggies from Vancouver Island (monster seaplane operated by USN circa 1950)
Few purpose built ones:
Canadair/Viking CL series
Air Tractor 800 series adapted for fire fighting
Boeing sells 200 MAXs and the Leeham News caption is “Missed opportunity for Boeing”? Odd perspective.
A short time ago the site was opining about how the MAX 10 was struggling with sales.
@Elias: Both statements are correct, when not taken out of context.
As United seems to have given up on waiting for a NMA, what will Delta do?
Are we to expect further orders of A321Neo’s for Delta, or do they wait & end up joining the back of the queue as positions are taken up by other airlines?
Hearing that Delta are looking for used A350s ?
How many would they be able to find right now, or what time frame are they looking at I wonder ?
Re: “Hearing that Delta are looking for used A350s ?”
See the excerpt below from the ‘One Mile at a Time Post’ at the link after the excerpts.
“There has been a thread on airliners.net for about a week about how Delta is allegedly considering acquiring some used Airbus A350s and Boeing 737s. There are plenty of 737s on the market, so there don’t seem to be many specific details there as of now. However, the A350 situation is a bit clearer.
South American mega-airline LATAM is currently in bankruptcy protection, and the airline group recently made the decision to retire its Airbus A350-900 fleet. LATAM is the first airline in the world to retire its entire A350 fleet. The airline is instead focusing on its 787s, even though the A350s are only an average of a few years old.
There were a lot of questions about which airline would try to acquire these A350s, and it looks like we now have a clue. The planespotters.net airframe tracker indicates that the LATAM A350 with the registration code PR-XTK is being taken over by Delta, and will have the registration code N575DZ. While this isn’t an official source, I’ve always found it to be quite accurate.”
If you have a subscription to Jon Ostrower’s The Air Current, take a look at the following link.
@Jak: I think the number is 6 or less, but certainly less than 10.
More from the ‘One Mile at a Time’ post that I gave a link to above.
“Assuming this is accurate, the next question is how many additional A350s Delta could be acquiring (Delta already has a total of 40 A350s on order). LATAM had up to 13 Airbus A350-900s in its fleet, and it’s being suggested that on Monday Delta reserved a total of 13 tail numbers in the range of N570DZ to N582DZ. Keep in mind the “confirmed” A350 going to Delta is in that range, so this is making a lot of sense at this point.”
Thanks Robert & Scott.
I just noticed on Wiki “Delta will acquire four A350 aircraft from LATAM and has agreed to assume LATAM’s commitment to purchase 10 additional A350 aircraft to be delivered beginning in 2020 through 2025”
Makes much more sense now with what you’ve mentioned from ‘One Mile at a Time’.
Presumably they will need to fit Delta cabin to the LATAM airframes, but the 10 additional will come with Delta cabin fitted.
I didn’t think there were many ‘used’ A350s around.
Do Delta not have any MAX on order?
Update on Delta and used A350’s and 737-900ER’s.
Delta announced in a press release today 7-13-21 that they will be leasing 7 used A350’s from AerCap and purchasing 29 used 737-900ER’s from Castlelake. See below for excerpts from the press release and a link to it.
“Delta has entered into agreements to add 29 used Boeing 737-900ERs and lease seven used Airbus A350-900s as it continues to streamline and modernize its fleet. The 36 additional aircraft will improve fuel efficiency and enhance the customer experience, while supporting Delta’s fleet renewal strategy focused on simplification, scale, size and sustainability.”
“Delta will lease the A350s through AerCap and purchase 27 of the 737-900ERs from funds managed by Castlelake, L.P., while the remaining two 737-900ERs will be financed from funds also managed by Castlelake, L.P. Both transactions are subject to closing conditions. Deliveries of the aircraft will be completed by the first quarter of 2022, and they will enter service after modifications are completed.”
Another important point pertains to United having thrown down the gauntlet effectively for both Airbus-Boeing, by having dropped the 757-300 replacement bone (see the fine print of United’s press release), which, along with the upcoming KC-Y competition, will shape the next rounds of the relentless battle for the aerial heavyweight champion title in the global aviation ring. Will provide some interesting piece of action for viewing from the sidelines over medium term.
Good reference for those wanting to read in-depth, with a blow-by-blow account of the previous set of rounds.
How about a new competitor connecting Asia with continental U.S. by flying narrow body jets??
Too far even for A321XLR. Pacific is a very big ocean, Hawaii is something like 5 hours
Anchorage (USA) – Harbin (China) is well within the range of an A321 XLR.
Some niche routes might be possible. Seattle to Sapporo is 3800NM/7000km which is less than the 4700NM/8700km the A321XLR is capable of.
So Seattle/Vancouver to Tokyo/Sendai/Sapporo should be possible with 2 class or 3 class layout (165-180 passengers). Airbus might exceed performance by 2% or so.
Using Anchorage as a mini-hub, passengers from all over the lower 48 states could be flown to a variety of Asian cities — Northeast China, Japan, Korea are will within the range of an A321XLR.
Whether one would want to spend that length of time in a narrowbody is another matter.
Alaska Airlines, the best airline positioned to take advantage of using the A321XLR to hub to Asian destinations doesn’t seem to be grasping for this opportunity of hubing via Anchorage given it is retiring its Virgin acquired Airbus fleet, things can change.
I don’t accept that a narrow body, at least an A321 is going to be less comfortable than a widebody. The seat width and pitch is the same.
Maybe due to aisle access the 2/3/2 on a B767 or the 2/4/2 on an A330 was more comfortable than 3/3/3 but certainly not the 3/3/3 on B787 or A350 nor the 3/4/3 on a B777.
Using Anchorage as a refueling stop ?
This isnt the 1970s and 80s anymore. And only from the cities in Pacific Northwest ?
This story indicates the time taken on ‘one stop’ can be double!
People want to fly non stop to the major northern Asian cities from Detroit, from Philadelphia, from Denver , from Chicago etc.
The scenario from Bryce and William is ignoring the ‘lesson’ of the A321XLR: that it can go to all the cities in Europe from major cities in Eastern US.
“””Using Anchorage as a refueling stop ?
This isnt the 1970s and 80s anymore. And only from the cities in Pacific Northwest ?”””
In former times I preferred nonstop flights, but now I search for connections with stops.
For long range distance, what is it good for to fly nonstop if you arrive at 2am in the morning.
Using Anchorage as a hub is a good idea. Nobody could beat the XLR. But Alaska has boeingitis …
Seeing as the Pacific is broader than the Atlantic, flying 11 hours non-stop transpacific in a narrowbody is only going to be possible for cities located relatively close to the northwest of the North American continent and the northeast of the Asian continent. For passengers coming from / going to other cities, this will inevitably mean use of a hub in those locations (such as Anchorage).
The VAST majority if air journeys nowadays go via hubs — ULR point-to-point is still only a tiny minority. For example, anyone flying from Europe to Hawaii or from Europe to NZ must go via a hub.
As far as I’m aware, there are no airlines offering budget fares on transpacific flights…in contrast to the transatlantic situation pre-CoViD, which had Norwegian, WOW, Aer Lingus, etc. So there’s certainly a theoretical market there — although a limited one.
As regards “re-fuelling stops”: once the Greenies get their teeth into kerosine-guzzling point-to-point ULR flights, we may see a forced re-emergence of this old concept.
True, there are no LCC carriers on trans pacific flights. Main reason is its not an ‘open market’ like the EU-US flights were( and allowed Norwegian and other LCC ), they are still country-country bilateral flight agreements.
Qantas for instance on its flights from Sydney to LAX has its planes sit at airport on arrival for most of the day, as they have to wait till evening to leave so they can arrive in Sydney just after curfew is lifted in morning. US airlines can use their planes on other routes after arrival at LAX instead of wasting time parked and schedule other planes for turn around for Sydney at right part of day. No one sits parked at Sydney end as the planes leave in the mid morning period.
@Bryce, A hub in Iceland lets an A321XLR service North America, all of the Carrabin, Central America and the top section of Sth America. Interestingly Iceland and Anchorage Alaska are in flying distance of each other by plane A321neo.
Both Keflavik (Iceland) and Anchorage have the intrinsic advantage that they naturally lie on/near great circle routes between major destinations — so they’re efficiently located.
They also both have the advantage of having stunning natural beauty in their back yards, for those tempted to make (summer) stopovers.
You’re right about the flying time between the two cities…it’s just over 9 hours. Which means that a mini-hub in Anchorage could also reach (all of) Scandinavia.
Who knows what the future will bring? 😉
” Boeing and FAA are finalizing 737NG nacelle modifications to address issues spotlighted in 2 Southwest Airlines CFM56-7B engine failures. FAA will mandate changes to inlet, fan cowl, exhaust nozzle. More via Aviation Daily ”
do you know when the last ordered MAX-10 is scheduled for delivery and same with the A321neo and XLR?
I guess your question was directed to me since I believe that I am the only Robert that has posted in this thread.
The following quote is from page 2 of United’s 6-29-21 SEC 8-K filing (see the link at the end of this post for the full 8-K).
“The firm orders of 200 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft and 70 Airbus A321neo aircraft are expected to be delivered starting in 2023 through 2028
and 2026, respectively.”
I find the wording of the above quote somewhat confusing, but I think it means that United’s new MAX order will be delivered in 2023 through 2028, and that United’s new A321neo order will be delivered in 2023 through 2026. This interpretation is consistent with the following information from one of the slides in the investor event presentation that is appended to the 8-K filing (see page 38).
New MAX order deliveries in 2023: 68
New MAX order deliveries 2024 and after: 132
Total new MAX order deliveries: (68 + 132) =200.
New A321neo order deliveries in 2023: 16
New A321neo order deliveries 2024 and after: 54
Total new MAX order deliveries: (16 + 54) =70.
Why do you ask?
One thing that has not been discussed much if at all in this thread is that if United wanted new planes fast for an anticipated rapid recovery in traffic, Boeing likely had many more slots available for near term deliveries than Airbus did.
so United made the MAX order to cover the time till 2028, especially to take advantage of the pricing opportunity.
United might not be ready to plan so far with the A321 because many changes are in the pipeline. New wings, new fuel tanks, different weight variants.
What sort of limits will the MAX10 have when Phoenix hits 116º or DEN is sitting at 99 or higher? Phoenix is an out station for UA, but as summers get hotter, Denver ops my have impacts?
Interesting you ask. Some 25 years ago I flew out of Salt Lake city at near 100 deg on a 727. It was supposed to be a through flight to Anchorage. They could not make it with a full load of passengers, refueled in Seattle.
And once we were off the ground in Salt Lake, we flew about 5000 feet for 50 miles across the flats until they burned enough fuel off to start climbing.
My wife just flew that same route on a 737-800, same thing, high temps and they had to stop in Seattle to fuel when it was supposed to go straight through (not sure about the climb)
So all these years and the same issue. Not sure what that says but its not specific to the -10 and might affect more aircraft than people think (if it pushes the range vs one that is not affected because they often don’t fly that far (2125 though that is not per an aircraft flight path).
Re: “And once we were off the ground in Salt Lake, we flew about 5000 feet for 50 miles across the flats until they burned enough fuel off to start climbing.”
I don’t believe this story. Such a flight would have been a blatant violation of FAA regulations for a Part 25 transport aircraft, such as a 727, and readily apparent to air traffic control, who would have inquired if the aircraft was unable to climb due to an emergency and have reported this gross safety violation. Such a flight would have been the last flight as an Airline Transport rated pilot for any crew member who was party to such a gross violation of transport category safety rules.
It is a violation of FAA regulations to take off in a Part 25 jet aircraft if it cannot climb at a specified minimum gradient AFTER failure of one engine during takeoff. An aircraft that can climb at the minimum gradients after an engine failure, will easily be able to climb with all engines running. The limit for takeoff weight is usually set by “Phase II” climb requirements, which for a 3 engine aircraft such as a 727 require that after a failure of the most critical engine, the aircraft be able to climb without power from that engine at a minimum gradient of 2.7%. See below for details.
The following excerpt from an AOPA Blog cites the 2.4% engine out phase II climb gradient requirement for two engine aircraft. For three or 4 engine aircraft, the required phase II climb gradients with one engine out are 2.7% and 3.0 %, respectively.
“The second segment requirement is often the most difficult one to meet. Segment two begins when the gear is up and locked and the speed is V2. This segment has the steepest climb gradient: 2.4 percent. This equates to a ballpark figure of around 300 feet per minute, and for a heavy airplane on a hot day with a failed engine, this can be a challenge. Often, when the airlines announce that a flight is weight-limited on hot summer days, this is the reason (the gate agent doesn’t know this kind of detail, and nor does she care; she just knows some people aren’t going).”
For those interested in the gory details, see below for the applicable CFR. The landing gear extended, landing gear retracted, and final takeoff segments identified in the CFR, are commonly referred to a phase I, phase II, and phase III.
“§ 25.121 Climb: One-engine-inoperative.
(a) Takeoff; landing gear extended. In the critical takeoff configuration existing along the flight path (between the points at which the airplane reaches VLOF and at which the landing gear is fully retracted) and in the configuration used in § 25.111 but without ground effect, the steady gradient of climb must be positive for two-engine airplanes, and not less than 0.3 percent for three-engine airplanes or 0.5 percent for four-engine airplanes, at VLOF and with –
(1) The critical engine inoperative and the remaining engines at the power or thrust available when retraction of the landing gear is begun in accordance with § 25.111 unless there is a more critical power operating condition existing later along the flight path but before the point at which the landing gear is fully retracted; and
(2) The weight equal to the weight existing when retraction of the landing gear is begun, determined under § 25.111.
(b) Takeoff; landing gear retracted. In the takeoff configuration existing at the point of the flight path at which the landing gear is fully retracted, and in the configuration used in § 25.111 but without ground effect:
(1) The steady gradient of climb may not be less than 2.4 percent for two-engine airplanes, 2.7 percent for three-engine airplanes, and 3.0 percent for four-engine airplanes, at V2 with:
(i) The critical engine inoperative, the remaining engines at the takeoff power or thrust available at the time the landing gear is fully retracted, determined under § 25.111, unless there is a more critical power operating condition existing later along the flight path but before the point where the airplane reaches a height of 400 feet above the takeoff surface; and
(ii) The weight equal to the weight existing when the airplane’s landing gear is fully retracted, determined under § 25.111.
(2) The requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section must be met:
(i) In non-icing conditions; and
(ii) In icing conditions with the most critical of the takeoff ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with § 25.21(g), if in the configuration used to show compliance with § 25.121(b) with this takeoff ice accretion:
(A) The stall speed at maximum takeoff weight exceeds that in non-icing conditions by more than the greater of 3 knots CAS or 3 percent of VSR; or
(B) The degradation of the gradient of climb determined in accordance with § 25.121(b) is greater than one-half of the applicable actual-to-net takeoff flight path gradient reduction defined in § 25.115(b).
(c) Final takeoff. In the en route configuration at the end of the takeoff path determined in accordance with § 25.111:
(1) The steady gradient of climb may not be less than 1.2 percent for two-engine airplanes, 1.5 percent for three-engine airplanes, and 1.7 percent for four-engine airplanes, at VFTO with –
(i) The critical engine inoperative and the remaining engines at the available maximum continuous power or thrust; and
(ii) The weight equal to the weight existing at the end of the takeoff path, determined under § 25.111.
(2) The requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section must be met:
(i) In non-icing conditions; and
(ii) In icing conditions with the most critical of the final takeoff ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with § 25.21(g), if in the configuration used to show compliance with § 25.121(b) with the takeoff ice accretion used to show compliance with § 25.111(c)(5)(i):
(A) The stall speed at maximum takeoff weight exceeds that in non-icing conditions by more than the greater of 3 knots CAS or 3 percent of VSR; or
(B) The degradation of the gradient of climb determined in accordance with § 25.121(b) is greater than one-half of the applicable actual-to-net takeoff flight path gradient reduction defined in § 25.115(b).”
Re: “What sort of limits will the MAX10 have when Phoenix hits 116º or DEN is sitting at 99 or higher?”
Takeoff performance of the 737-10 is supposed to be similar to that of the 737-9. On 6-30-21 when the high temperature in Denver was 84 F, not 99 F, United and Delta’s 737-900’s and 737-9’s were doing just fine in Denver. See below.
Below is a list of all 737-800, 737-900, and 737 MAX departures, according to FlightAware, from Denver between Noon and 1 PM on 6-30-21, where the high temperature of the day was 84 F. None of these flights made intermediate fuel stops or crashed due to being unable to climb. All flights were typical of the flights that I see A32X’s and & 737’s making in the US , i.e. several hundred miles to several thousand miles, and there are zero long range transoceanic narrowbody flights on the list of the type that aviation blogs seem to be obsessed with. All of the aircraft on this list are capable of flying at least 3,000 sm with full passenger loads, which is a capability that the longest flight on the list (DAL 785 to New York – Laguardia, 1,610 sm) doesn’t even come close to using. The straight line distances for the nine UAL flights on this list range from 390 sm to 1,020 nm. Does spending more for an aircraft with range greater than 3,000 sm make sense when United is shopping for replacements for older aircraft flying routes of 390 sm to 1,020 sm out of Denver?
DEN Elevation = 5,434, feet
DEN longest runway: 16,000 feet.
Airline & Flight # / Aircraft / Departed /To / Distance /Destination Elevation & Longest Runway
UAL690/737-900/Noon/Seattle-Tacoma,WA/1,020 miles/DEL 433 ft/DLRW 11,901 ft
UAL544/737-900/12:02/Sacramento, CA/907 miles/DEL 27 ft/DLRW 8,605 ft
AAL1316/737-800/12:04/Charlotte, NC/1,330 miles/DEL 748 ft/DLRW 10,000 ft
UAL1108/737-9/12:08/San Diego, CA/852 miles/DEL 17 ft/DLRW 9,400 ft
UAL 1866/737-9/12:09/Phoenix, AZ (high temp was 102 F)/601 miles/DEL 1,135 ft/DLRW 11,489 ft
UAL373/737-9/12:10/Las Vegas, NV/627 miles/DEL 2,181 ft/DLRW 14,515 ft
UAL497/737-900/12:11/Boise, ID/648 miles/DEL 2,871 ft/DLRW 10,000 ft
UAL275/737-800/12:14/Salt Lake City, UT/390 miles/DEL 4,227 ft/DLRW 12,002 ft
SWA2359/737-800/12:16/San Jose, CA/946 miles/DEL 62 ft/DLRW 11,000 ft
UAL671/737-900/12:24/Bozeman, MT/524 miles/DEL 4,473 ft/DLRW 8,944 ft
DAL2544/737-900/12:25/Minneapolis, MN/679 miles/DEL 841 ft/DLRW 11,006 ft
SWA3076/737-800/12:26/Salt Lake City, UT/390 miles/DEL 4,227 ft/DLRW 12,002 ft
UAL2312/737-9/12:34/Chicago O’Hare, IL/885 miles/DEL 668 ft/DLRW 13,000 ft
SWA5287/737-8/12:35/Seattle-Tacoma,WA/1,020 miles/DEL 433 ft/DLRW 11,901 ft
SWA436/737-8/12:40/Minneapolis, MN/679 miles/DEL 841 ft/DLRW 11,006 ft
DAL785/737-800/12:44/LaGuardia, NY/1,610 miles/DEL 21ft/DLRW 7,003 ft
Airport data is from Wikipedia.
Flight distances are straight line distances in statue miles per Web-Flyer’s mileage calculator.
Note that since the US is not a 3rd world country or dictatorship with poor infrastructure pretending to be a world superpower, hot and high airports tend to have long runways, for instance, Denver’s old Stapleton airport was replaced by a new one in 1996 whose runways are 12,000 to 16,000 ft long.
According to the FlightAware track log for the longest flight on the above list, DAL 785 to New York LaGuardia, (1,620 sm), the aircraft was at 6,300 ft at 12:44:53 and at 23,375 ft at 12:54:39, thus its average rate of climb was (23,375 ft – 6,300 ft)/10 minutes = 1,707 ft/min from 6,300 ft to 23,375 ft, and the initial cruising altitude of 35,000 ft was reached in about 22 minutes.
> Note that since the US is not a 3rd world country or dictatorship with poor infrastructure pretending to be a world superpower, hot and high airports tend to have long runways.. <
Interesting meta-commentary; thank you.
"Slowly at first, then faster."
“Takeoff performance of the 737-10 is supposed to be similar to that of the 737-9.”
Emirates doesn’t believe promises from Boeing anymore after it learned the hard way of Boeing jets’ performance in hot weather.
“Takeoff performance of the 737-10 is supposed to be similar to that of the 737-9.”
What passes for evidence these days..
“Emirates doesn’t believe promises from Boeing anymore after it learned the hard way of Boeing jets’ performance in hot weather.”
That came up in relation to a different plane the 787-10, and they havent learnt any the ‘hard way’ ( your words) as it was converted to 787-9. Conversions of options into orders for a different version are common. Both versions have almost the same MTOW, but different range
But some think a source such as Motley Fool is evidence, they even say on their website ..NEVER rely on what you read here
Perfectly reasonable comment.
Tim Clark was recently complaining that he hasn’t been provided with engine performance data for the 777X — despite such data being available to the manufacturer for more than a year now. This suggests that performance may not be up to scratch, hence prompting Clark to publicly state that he wouldn’t take the aircraft if it wasn’t 100% up to spec.
Tim Clark just wants to renegotiate his previously signed deal, thats all. Likely feels he can screw a better deal out Boeing in current circumstances.
If he asked for guarantees in performance and got them in the contract, why would Boeing give him a wedge issue to battle them with ahead of delivery. I dont think Emirates is the launch customer – thats Qatar and or Lufthansa, so weight savings can come for later planes
Poster here shows dangerous signs of inability to recall recent events contrast sharply with ability to remember tangential minor details that happened ages ago. Sigh.
If BA sees Clark as being a complaining nuisance, then they won’t mind in the slightest if/when he ditches his entire 777X order, will they? After all, it’s not worth having a nag like than on your customer list for the sake of a few airframes, is it?
IIRC Emirates deferred some 777X orders to 787-9 before. That was a mistake, Emirates could have waited and cancelled those 777X.
Then Tim Clark asked for 787 instead of 777X, but Boeing didn’t agree. Another reason for that can be seen now, Boeing can’t deliver 787.
Then Tim Clark asked if the 777X has new embbeded software. How spot on was his question. Did he say at that time, that Emirates will not take 777X with new embbeded software? Turns out 777X has CCS with, according to FAA, major problems.
Boeing in full meltdown. Boeing offered cheap 787 as compensation for the MAX mess. Now Boeing can’t deliver 787 and soon they might offer cheap MAX for the 787 mess.
The 787 is not really a problem. Airbus can satisfy the widebody needs alone.
The problem is Boeing. They can’t do it anymore without self-certs. All MAX self-certs are still not checked, thanks Dickson.
Airbus could replace the MAX too. Much better than more aircarts falling from the skies.
“Note that since the US is not a 3rd world country or dictatorship with poor infrastructure pretending to be a world superpower”
If the infrastructure in the US was as good as you seem to believe, then Mr. Biden wouldn’t be trying to muster up (= borrow) 6 trillion dollars to give it urgent upgrades…would he?
You do remember the famous remarks that Biden made about LaGuardia when he was vice president under Obama, don’t you? He described it as “third world”.
Regarding US infrastructure you are misinformed – it is in a state of disarray and degradation
Why use contemptuous terms such as Third World when it is advisable to take a more objective approach in appraising the visible reality of the state of the union
Take a look at any of the recent reports by the ASCE
Read articles by recently appointed FTC Chair (google Lina Khan)
Keep up with DoD complaints about the weakness of the vanishing US industrial and infrastructure base (google DoD)
DoD – It’s not just Boeing which is inadequate it’s every corporation and supplier
Interesting analysis of the United order from the Motley Fool investor site:
“On the one hand, it’s good news for Boeing that customers are placing big 737 MAX orders. On the other hand, big customers tend to get bigger discounts. That’s especially true in the current environment, as Boeing has been fairly desperate to get sales rolling again for the 737 MAX.
For example, when Southwest recently added 34 737 MAX 7 orders for delivery in 2022, it raised its capital spending forecast by just $800 million — less than $24 million per plane. The 737 MAX 7’s most recent list price was $99.7 million.
Meanwhile, United Airlines’ new aircraft orders increased its capital spending commitments by a little over $12 billion. That works out to an average of perhaps $46 million per aircraft. United is almost certainly paying more for its A321neos than for its 737 MAX 10s, as it was a smaller order and Airbus is less desperate for new business right now. The 737 MAX 8s are even cheaper. All things considered, United is probably paying about a third of the list price for its Boeing order.
These deals will help Boeing keep its 737 factory busy for the next few years and give suppliers more confidence about future output. But selling a large proportion of its output at rock-bottom prices is likely to weigh heavily on Boeing’s margins and cash flow. To make a real recovery, Boeing will need to start winning orders from a broader base of customers.”
This is really not surprising given one form of compensation for MAX delays favoured by Boeing is credits on further purchases.
Anyone that thinks the likes of WN and UA are paying anywhere near normal prices for their recent MAX orders is fooling themselves.
I totally agree.
But, as you can see from the comment thread above, there are commenters who appears to have difficulty accepting this.
What I found interesting is that MF thinks that the price paid by United is about 1/3 of the list price. If correct, this appears to be higher than what Alaska and Southwest paid.
WSJ: The Question is about price not sales
Interesting article in the WSJ:
“Boeing’s New CFO Faces Tough Decisions on How to Reduce Debt
– The company on Wednesday hired Brian West, a former GE manager, to lead its finances”
“The company’s consolidated debt stood at $63.6 billion at the end of the first quarter, which in part stems from a $25 billion bond sale last year that departing CFO Mr. Smith orchestrated to help the company through the pandemic.
“There are issues everywhere at Boeing,” said Ken Herbert, a managing director at financial services firm Canaccord Genuity Group Inc., referring to the company’s capital structure, its portfolio and recent glitches around the delivery of new aircraft.
Boeing should focus on reducing interest payments and growing free cash flow to generate funds for the development of new aircraft, Mr. Herbert said.
Boeing, which is waiting for major growth markets like China to recertify its 737 MAX after two deadly crashes, has fallen behind Airbus in terms of market share, said Burkett Huey, an equity analyst at research provider Morningstar Research Services LLC. “What Boeing really needs to invest in is a middle-of-the-market aircraft,” Mr. Huey said.
“They have a ton of cash, a bloated balance sheet and a portfolio that is currently more like a stopgap,” Mr. Huey said. Boeing had about $21.9 billion in cash and marketable securities at the end of the first quarter, up from $15.5 billion during the prior-year period. The company booked $15.22 billion in revenue during the first quarter, down from $16.91 billion a year earlier.”
> “Boeing’s New CFO Faces Tough Decisions on How to Reduce Debt
– The company on Wednesday hired Brian West, a former GE manager, to lead its finances” <
Doughtie on the Board for the accounting angle, new GE-dude as CFO..
"Slowly at first, then all at once."
Hows that NMA twin-aisle family coming along
Dominic Gates of Seattle Times:
– [West]’s main appeal to Boeing’s leadership is probably the 16 years he spent at GE, where he was CFO of GE Aviation and of GE Aviation Services
– Former executives from the Jack Welch era of GE leadership including former CEO Jim McNerney and current CEO Calhoun, have for many years been a core part of Boeing’s leadership and helped shape the culture that has prioritized protecting the company’s financials and the stock price
The ‘so called cash’ is really just the store of planes built but not yet delivered to new owner. Thats the reason its called cash ‘equivalents’ as it can be turned in revenue once the ownership process is completed. Car manufacturers have a similar pipe line of cash equivalents for cars built but not yet in customers hands.
LH picked up 787 white tails on the cheap as BA’s firesale continues
Goods without buyers/not able to be delivered is NOT a good storage of value. Econ 101??
were those 787 whitetails deliverred to Lufthansa?
Delivery expected between this winter and the first half of 2022.
Thru’ the magic black box program accounting, BA continues to book imaginary profit even if jets were sold at a loss.
The parade continues with Emporer wearing his new cloths.
As of 3.31.2021, BA has over $6 billion short-term and long-term debts due within a year.
DoU said: “..its laughable that you seem to think a 64 bit CPU will be essential for these specific applications. This sort of factoids gets into the wider public who , without knowing any real facts, assume its true..”
Odd, then- if what DoU says above is true, and the necessary computational upgrades and their integrations are relatively child’s play- that Boeing did not incorporate a third, synthetic (or otherwise) sensor into the 737MAX from the beginning- could this not be seen as gross negligence on BCA’s part?
What has that to do with the Maxs main CPU. Remember this is not a FBW plane ( except for spoiler activation, mostly on landing) and yet the A320s CPU are even older than ‘286’ type.
It has nothing to do with whether upgrades are ‘childs play’- not that has been claimed.Tthe comments once again show your ignorance, by some means you are certainly ‘in the clouds’ , perchance its on ‘Fool Air’ again?
Thanks for your comment, DoU.
How does the processing power of Boeing’s 737 MAX compare with the A320’s seven flight computers??
Your comments are in essence perfectly legitimate.
BA’s recent reputation with regard to software is anything but stellar. We have:
– The dog’s dinner of MCAS — and the inordinately long time that it took to come up with a bandaid, which still isn’t up to international “best practice” (only 2 inputs);
– Uncommanded pitch changes in the 777X, which occurred in December but for which BA still doesn’t have a solution (much to the exasperation of the FAA);
– A November flight management software update for the 787, 747 and 777, which caused an auto-throttle issue and prompted an AD from the FAA;
– The revelation that BA was outsourcing MAX software to “El cheapo” firms in India.
Against that background, one can opine that software isn’t exactly BA’s “forté — what other OEMs do with software appears to be too much of a hurdle for BA. Hence, one can also opine that hardware with which another OEM could easily work may be too challenging for BA.
Nice financial summary from investment site Motley Fool (specially for Duke):
“Better Buy: Boeing vs. Airbus
Comparing the investment cases for the two aviation giants.”
“All told, gazing into the crystal ball for 2023, the risk around Boeing is that revenue and profitability could fall short of expectations due to pricing concessions on the 737 MAX, while Boeing could find itself without a viable NMA. Also, its 777X airplane might not be profitable over the long term relative to expectations.
While these concerns don’t necessarily mean you should avoid Boeing stock, given the choice the two, they are enough to make Airbus the better buy.”
July 3, 2021
> She just flew, so it appears BA is going to get them sold and flying as quick as possible. They truly want MAX revenue for the NSA and/or B757 replacement. With Airbus mfg lines fairly book, MAXes make sense to United’s expansion. Also, they ain’t giving ’em away. At the end of the day, it’s a Duopoly. <
#Should be fine (if I'm correctly understanding the above comment; it's a bit cryptic to me).
"if everything goes precisely according to Our Plan for the next forty years, we at mcBoeing will be golden."
BA delivered a MAX, first flew on Mar 12, 2019 on July 1.
Data shows that BA still have 317 “pre-built” MAX in inventory, including about two doz, “white tails”.
Re: “BA delivered a MAX, first flew on Mar 12, 2019 on July 1.”
According to the website at the link below, the only 737 MAX delivery flight that occurred on 7-1-21 was for the following aircraft, which first flew on 6-7-21.
Ryanair 737 MAX 8-200 Registration EI-HGO, LN8071
First Flight (B1): 6-7-21 from KRNT (Renton) to KMWH (Moses Lake)
Ferry Flight: 6-16-21 from KMWH to KBFI (Boeing Field – Seattle)
Customer Acceptance Flight (C1): 6-25-21 KBFI to KMWH to KBFI
Flight number for all of the above flights was Boeing Flight 42.
Delivery Flight: 7-1-21: KBFI to EIDW (Dublin, Ireland), Ryanair Flight 820
According to the same website there were 33 737 MAX delivery flights in June 2021. These were a mixture of aircraft coming out of storage and off the assembly line, with most coming out of storage. At least the following June delivery flights were aircraft recently off the assembly line.
LN 7942 PH-TFU to TUI, first flew 6-3-21.
LN 8035 N2751 to United, first flew 6-10-21
LN 8066 N291BT to Alaska, first flew 6-14-21.
Of the 31 MAX aircraft that this website indicates are currently in “Production Testing” (first flight has been completed but final customer acceptance flight has not been completed), 13 have LN’s greater than 8000 indicating that they recently came off the assembly line. This will also be true for some aircraft with LN’s 7950 to 8000.
Of the 31 MAX aircraft that this website indicates are currently in “Pre-Flight Prep”, 6 have LN’s greater than 8000 indicating that they recently came off the assembly line. This will also be true for some aircraft with LN’s 7950 to 8000.
Hi all. The delivery took place on June 30. Forgot to take into account different time zones. My bad.
Here’s a link showing the large number of MAX-8s that are assembled but still undelivered.
When sorted according to “delivered”, the non-delivered frames with a tail number fill about the first 7 pages (53 per page).
I checked the MAX-9 on planespoters, there are only 2 pages. It shows that 28 were delivered before the grounding, but I read somewhere that less than 10 were in service before the grounding.
According to FlightAware, at 8:15 AM MT on 7-6-21, there were 28 737-9 aircraft enroute on a flight, as follows. Unless one believes that all 737-9’s that have been delivered were enroute on a flight at 8:15 AM MT on 7-6-21, then clearly more than 28 have now been delivered.
1. UAL 2445 – Chicago O’Hare to Phoenix
2. UAL 1093 – Denver to Los Angles
3. Alaska 1426 – Seattle to Las Vegas
4. United 1181 – Las Vegas to Houston
5. Alaska 1380 – Seattle to San Diego
6. United 2042 – Fort Lauderdale to Chicago O’Hare
7. Aeromexico 509 – Cancun to Mexico City (Elevation 7,343 ft)
8. Copa 472 – Tocumen to Los Angeles
9. United 1517- Orlando to Newark
10. Copa 371 – Tocumen to Havana
11. Copa 110 – Tocumen to Punta Cana
12. United 1592 – Orlando to Denver (Elevation 5,430 ft)
13. Copa 316 – Tocumen to Cancun
14. United 1058 – Philadelphia to Denver
15. United 2459 – Sacramento to Denver
16. United 1590 – Chicago O’Hare to Tampa
17. United 1133 – Seattle to Denver
18. United 203 – Chicago O’Hare to Las Vegas
19. United 2229 – Houston Bush to Denver
20. Icelandair 343 – Helsinki to Keflavik
21. United 647 – Boston to Denver
22. United 469 – Houston Bush to Chicago O’Hare
23. United 760 – Fort Lauderdale to Denver
24. United 2178 – Tampa to Chicago O’Hare
25. United 1110 – Kahului to Los Angeles
26. Copa 303 – Los Angeles to Tocumen
27. United 2003 – Anchorage to Chicago O’Hare
28. Copa 724 – Sao Paulo to Tocumen
Following is a list of 737-9’s that have been delivered to the airlines that have flights enroute in the above list, according to Wikipedia.
United Airlines: 30
Alaska Airlines: 5
Copa Airlines: 13
This adds up to at least (30 + 5 + 4 + 13 + 3) = 55 737-9’s that have been built, not including any undelivered 737-9’s.
In other transportation management news, a parallel to airline staffing is being found in Washington State Ferries.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/transportation/why-your-ferry-might-be-late-or-canceled-this-summer/ advises that a spare crew position was eliminated to save money, the purpose of the position was to fill in if a crew member was late or ill.
Integration anyone? (Get all significant factors into the discussion.)
Albeit it apparently took Pacific Western Airlines a while to step up to having a spare Captain-qualified pilot report for work at major terminals like YVR.
The pilot was paid for a half-shift if s/he was not needed that day. (I suspect the assigned pilot was often a check pilot from the office, where s/he went if not needed.)
I don’t know what was done for F/As, one approach is to qualify some counter agents as F/As and have some of them keep an overnight bag at work.
PW had good leadership in the Systems Operational Control Centre, thinking outside of the box sometimes.
Another example was not trying to land in an intermediate stop, such as Kamloops on the way from Vancouver BC to Calgary, if weather was questionable. Reason was that persons headed for Kamloops would end up in Calgary where they did not want to be, whereas they could do more business or visiting in Vancouver – or be at home there.
Which reminds me of one of the Midway airline versions, a counter agent took care of a passenger’s young children for a while so that she could phone her husband when the flight was delayed or cancelled. The airline’s maxim at that time was “What would help the customer most?” Money is not necessarily the answer.