Pontifications: Boeing gets boost from Farnborough; now, it must deliver

July 25, 2022, © Leeham News: Boeing announced last week during the Farnborough Air Show orders and commitments for 278 737 MAXes, nine 787s, and two 777-8Fs.

By Scott Hamilton

Now, Boeing must deliver. Some of the 737 delivery positions in earlier orders were promised to begin in 2023. Some in the Farnborough orders are promised from 2025. These early delivery positions are one of the reasons (but not the only, to be sure) that Boeing has won some 1,000 MAX orders since the plane was recertified in November 2020.

But Boeing struggles to bump its MAX production rate. Officials hoped to hit a rate of 31/mo early this year. Boeing hasn’t confirmed a report that it hit rate 31 only this month. Confirmation may come during the Boeing 2Q2022 earnings call on Wednesday. Delays from the supply chain hurt Boeing’s ability to ramp up. With a projected production ramp up to 52/mo by 2025 (the pre-grounding level in March 2019), the question is whether the supply chain will be able to meet Boeing’s schedule.

No gliders

Among the supply chain delays is a delay of up to six weeks in the delivery of the CFM LEAP 1B engines. A similar delay from CFM and Pratt & Whitney effect Airbus’ ability to deliver aircraft. Airbus has about two dozen A320s stored without engines. Stan Deal, the CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, said during the air show he won’t build “gliders.”

At the end of the first quarter, Boeing had 320 MAXes in inventory. More than 250 were “legacy” stored aircraft produced during the MAX grounding, with the balance of new production aircraft not yet delivered. Of the 250, about 140 were built for Chinese airlines. Boeing awaits Chinese government approval to begin delivering these to airlines and lessors. The regulator recertified the MAX in December, but because of domestic COVID policies and political pressures between Beijing and Washington, deliveries remain stalled.

Going slowly

Delivering stored aircraft has gone more slowly than originally anticipated. Each airplane must be thoroughly checked after long-term storage. All the systems and engines must be confirmed as operational, without flaws. Software must be updated, from the Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System (MCAS) to any other updates that were implemented in the new-production aircraft since the recertification. Personnel shortages needed to “wake up” the airplanes contributed to the slower-than-forecast deliveries.

Also, MAXes that were built for airlines that either went out of business or canceled orders due to delays must be reconfigured for new buyers.

“You have a couple of things that happen,” Mike Fleming told LNA during Boeing’s pre-air show briefing. Fleming is senior vice president of 737 MAX Return to Service, Commercial Customer Support, and Commercial Derivative Programs. “Number one is, when you have an airplane come through production, you don’t have to wake it up. Turn it on when you get to a certain point in the production and then you move through. As it came through production, it’s got all the latest changes on it.

“On the stored airplanes, you do have to turn those airplanes back on. There are changes that have come together. Since we built that airplane, there are additional changes that we have to put onto those airplanes as opposed to bringing them back up to speed with the current production configurations. Those additional steps take longer than if you have one come off the line. It’s just because you have additional work to do,” Fleming said.

Delayed MAX 10 certification

Boeing also faces uncertainty over the certification of the MAX 10. As part of the US Congressional investigation into the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines MAX accidents, Congress adopted a law, the Aircraft Certification and Safety Accountability Act, that among other things have manufacturers (in this case, Boeing) two years to put certain pilot warning systems into the cockpit. It was anticipated that the MAX 10 would be certified by the deadline, which is December 31 this year.

Certification of the MAX 10, however, has been very slow. But the US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration, stung by criticism over its role in certifying the MAX in the first place, has been meticulously slow in processing certification of the MAX 10 (and the MAX 7, discussed below).

“We’re putting the [MAX 10] through our paces out in the flight test program. We’re nearly complete with all the engineering test points we have to do,” Fleming said. “We’ve flown over 500 flight hours, over 600 flights on that airplane. We recently wrapped up performance testing of the airplane. We’ve tested the new main landing gear. We’ve been going for brake testing, which is a consequence of the heavier weight and then the gear as well.

“We’ve also been testing the enhanced angle of attack system that we put onto the airplane. It’s been flown by our crews. We’ve had customer pilots looking at the enhanced Angle of Attack indicator.”

Fleming said that now it’s just working through with the regulators, providing all the documentation in the order that they’d like.

Certification slips to 2023

David Calhoun, CEO of The Boeing Co., told Aviation Week magazine that if the MAX 10 wasn’t certified by year-end, and if Congress doesn’t extend the MAX 10’s exemption from installing the additional pilot warning system which will make the MAX 10 cockpit not common with the MAX 7, 8 and 9, he might cancel the program.

There are now about 800 orders for the MAX 10. Despite placing a firm order for 100 MAX 10s and options for 30 more, announced at the air show, Delta said it might cancel the order if the cockpits aren’t common with other 737s. Delta has a large fleet of 737NGs. Alaska Airlines, which previously ordered 60 MAX 10s, previously said the same thing.

The handwriting was on the wall that certification wouldn’t come this year. The key question then becomes whether Congress will act to exempt the MAX 10 from the December 31 deadline. At least through the start of the air show, Boeing says it hadn’t asked for an exemption. (An update might be coming on that July 27 earnings call.) Some expect Congress to grant an exemption, perhaps as early as the first quarter.

MAX 7 certification

Certification of the MAX 7 also is taking much longer than expected. Flight testing was completed last year, Fleming said.

“We’re in the process of working through all of the documentation requirements to provide the FAA. The one that is with us along has to do with the Aircraft Certification and Safety Accountability Act. We’re working through all that. We’re nearing the completion of that,” Fleming said. “The service-ready activity is already underway. By virtue of the fact that it’s nearly identical to the -8 and 9, we expect it to go into service and perform just like the 737-8/9 airplanes as well. That is just us working through all of the documentation.”

It’s unclear if the MAX 7 will be certified by year-end or whether this, too, slips to next year.

Then on top of these challenges, Boeing had 115 787s in inventory on March 31, a figure that should not have changed much in the intervening three months. Deal, the BCA CEO, said at Farnborough that he believes deliveries will resume soon. The production rate was slowed to about 0.5 airplanes a month. Bringing the 787 production rate back to 5/mo or higher also may be supply-chain constrained.

Long road back

Despite the boost in orders at the air show, Boeing has a long road back to pre-ground, pre-pandemic levels. But I believe the company has bottomed out.

210 Comments on “Pontifications: Boeing gets boost from Farnborough; now, it must deliver

  1. On past form, it is unlikely B shall perform well on all this.
    On past form as well, Congress shall undoubtedly bail them out.
    Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose…

    • It was never intended by congress that the Max series would be affected. The 2 yrs window was thought to be enough time …. pandemics and FAA foot dragging ( as mentioned in the story) changed that
      If they wanted that to happen it would have been say a 90 day window ( or less) and that would have caught all the Maxs uncertified.

      • Making this up as you go along, are you?
        Perhaps you can quote the preamble of the law in question, so that we may see for ourselves what the “intention” was?
        Or better still: have the trajets préparatoires been published?

      • Duke is correct.

        Further more, the so called Crew Alert system is not base on any science, its based on opinion.

        While AF447 is the most stark example, anyone who follow aviation to move than a 1/16th inch depth knows there are innumerable incidents where the vaunted Crew Alert system was ignored.

        Having worked for a living, I drove dump trucks a lot. First it was a mechanical clanger on the wheels when you went backward that was ignored (background noise, humans tune that stuff out).

        As time has gone by we are into our 4th or 5th generation of whopeee electronic sirens, flashing lights and they are ignored (I think they got that from the Belgium police).

        To quote Einstein, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

        Astonishingly, there are no regulation on how the automated system work but by golly we will have bells, whistles, voices and the Ray Christie Minstrel playing.

        In science its called human factors and you accept what human are, how they react and then you work out systems to get inside that decision circle (otherwise you are on a ship and spitting into a Hurricane Wind)

        • Unfortunately for you and Duke, the ASCAA law was passed and the ASCAA law stands “as-is” — regardless of your theories as regards its “intentions”.

          • Yes it was passed, congratulations for stating the obvious. Water is wet by the way as well.

            If required, this will get a waiver. There is a single democrat that does not want to and he will be outvoted.

            The committee may well be run by republicans the way the vote looks right now.

            Regardless, Boeing is a huge company and major impacts involved and there is a required reports as to whether there is an merit to installing a kludge in system to the -10.

            As a pilot, you want the same stuff in the same location and the same responses to the same issues. It does not have to be perfect.

            You might want to look at the horror that was a Spitfire cockpit. It was ergonomically a disaster and its not wonder new pilots did not survive. Sadly that was the way it was.

            While US layout was better overall, the Brits did put in Artificial Horizon in their aircraft and blind flying was hugely easier. Having flown with it taken away, its a dicey balance using Turn and Bank along with Airspeed and the VSI/Altimeter. I would have to look in my logbook but as I recall, Airspeed was also taken away as it was vacuum powered and it was Turn and bank (stand alone) as well as VSI (off the static port).

            Of course it take a pilot to really get it, some well informed non pilot understand it but its like touching 480 volts, you really get electrical shock when you touch the innocuous wires/buss/contacts.

            I grabbed a 277 wire one time (color confusion). Good news was I was on a ladder and all I had to do was step off and I dropped off it.

            My arms and upper body were doing the Funky Chicken.

          • Always good to know that US corporations think they can have laws undone “to order” 😏

            However, the opera isn’t over ’til the fat lady sings.

          • The law had a 2 yr delay on its implementation specifically to allow Boeing to complete the certification under way on its last 2 737 variants.
            There was no other reason for the 2 years and this is why it was
            part of many reforms of the FAA and passed. The Senator who indroduced the bill was Maria Cantwell, Democrat of Washington- BCA home state, who chairs the Senate Transportation Committee with oversight of the FAA.

          • “The law had a 2 yr delay on its implementation specifically to allow Boeing to complete the certification under way on its last 2 737 variants.”

            And Boeing missed the boat.
            And when you miss the boat, it doesn’t come back to pick you up.
            Time to adjust to a new reality here.

        • The crew alerting is based on law and regulation. Every commercial airliner since the 80ties but the 737 has it.
          As the 737 jurassic did not have it, the classic, the NG and the MAX 8 and 9 got an exemption. Even the P8, a military 737NG derivative has EICAS. The military did not accept it without.
          It was time to call an end to this exemption with NG and latest with the MAX.
          In the report about both MAX crashes the missing EICAS was mentioned as a contributing factor

          • A recent MIT audit commisdioned by the FAA implicated the current 737 CAS in no less than FIVE crashes…

          • This is something that I don’t really understand, but then again, I do:

            “Even the P8, a military 737NG derivative has EICAS” it would have made sense for Boeing to add EICAS as standard when they did the MAX, it’s going to be flying for the next what 30+ years …

            Adding EICAS would be in Boeing’s own interests, 30 years is a long time, what if there’s another catastrophe with a MAX crash & it comes to light that the CAS played a significant role?

            But I get that the airlines didn’t want any changes that would mean more training and I get that Boeing had painted themselves into a corner there. One of their biggest mistakes perhaps?

            I also find the narrative that you can’t expect an existing 737 pilot to adapt to changes between various 737 models absolutely nuts.

            I know of pilots that routinely fly various 737 models, A320 and A330, also 767 on a regular basis! Fly a 737 for a few days, then fly an A320 for a few days, then back on a 767 the following week.

            Is the bar for 737 line pilots so low that they wouldn’t cope with a change from a 737 with traditional CAS to a 737 with EICAS?

          • The sad reality is that the reason to not introduce EICAS on the 737NG and 737 MAX had little to do with safety.

            More with hiding behind slippery safety track records to avoid investment. Problem now, FAA signed off on the certification requirements long ago. And Boeing wants to stick by them.

            For the 737MAX there was massive political pressure to cooperate on certification in the interest of the US aerospace industry. (Streamlining, Delegation, Exempting). Congress & industry were all over the bureaucratic FAA.


            A by now epic example of lack of insight and accountability. Pushed by the 787 development drama and NEO runaway success against the 737 shortly before.

            And the MAX is childsplay compared to the “changed product rule” – but entirely new 777X – certification..

      • EICAS was mandatory since 1-1-1993. It was never intended for any plane flying to need 30 years for something like EICAS.

        Imagine having no seatbelts nowadays because the manufacturer has been grandfathering a 50 year old plane.

    • All FAA wants is BA to dot all i’s and cross all t’s in accordance to the rules and regulations. No doubt BA has lost its institutional memory since it hasn’t done so for awhile, long enough for a whole product development cycle. The surprise here is the institution appeared so lack of self-awareness and caught flat-footed.

    • Congress will give them a certification extension – its the cheapest way of keeping Boeing in business – and for the same reason Boeing will receive the next tanker contract.

      The problem is, if EASA and other certification bodies insist on changes because the deadline is exceeded.

      • Its a US requirement and we have not heard from EASA.

        It was not in the requirement by them for return to service, the Synthetic AOA/Airspeed was.

        China also did not require the so called alert system.

        If the US grants a waiver it never comes up as an issue.

        • EASA can make its own decisions, for its own reasons, and according to its own timeline.

          The EASA re-cert documentation did contain a separate appendix on (1) synthetic AOA, and (2) CAS — saying that these topics would be revisited before the provisional re-cert is finalized.

          • FAA and EASA are in ‘lockstep’ regarding the B737 max requirements , according to Director Ky
            M. Ky isnt an aerospace engineer or safety expert , as he came over from the ATC side- or as they call it in Europe ATM. Im sure ‘his people’ are the experts there

          • Ky is director of EASA, and he calls the shots — even if he was a baker or a shoemaker in a previous job.

            And EASA and the FAA are certainly not “in lockstep”: as was explained to you in detail last week, re-cert of the MAX in the EU is *conditional* upon certain conditions being met …

          • Not how aviation safety works my computer chip friend.
            M. Ky probbaly has little understanding of the complexities of certification
            Neither does the FAA head ‘call the shots’ over their safety requirements.

            There would be a complex bureaucratic process, but one Senator did call the FAA’s oversight of Boeing ‘like a dog watching TV’

          • Maybe not how aviation safety workED (past tense), but things have changed now — surely you’ve noticed?

  2. “Boeing hasn’t confirmed a report that it hit rate 31 only this month.”

    Spirit AeroSystems said last month that they would deliver 315 MAX sets this year. That corresponds to 26.25 per month — which, indeed, indicates that rate 31 was not achieved early in the year.

      • Shortages of parts … even whole engines are months behind. Boeing doesnt want to be building more 737s for the parking lot

          • … in a planned / negotiated environment.

            not in Boeing’s stops and bouts framework.

          • More like self-harmed but it’s easier to point finger at others to shift blame.

          • Spirit does not make the whole fuselage for Airbus.

            Spirit also had a backlog of fuselages and where those got stored?

            And clearly fuselages without engines be they Boeing or Airbus are not going to be delivered to anyone until they have the suck and blow mounted on the wings.

          • “Spirit AeroSystems builds the wing leading and trailing edge elements of all the A320 family of aircraft at the company’s plant in Prestwick, Scotland. The components for these narrow-body jets are shipped to Airbus’ three A320 assembly lines in Toulouse, France; Mobile, Alabama; and Tianjin, China. New composite technology for the spoiler developed by Spirit will appear on the A320neo in mid-2019.”
            One of many locations outside EU, Prestwick a former BAE plant taken over in 2006

            They left out Hamburg Final assembly.
            Of course A320 didnt have the long shutdown like the B737 did

          • And yet, “shortages of parts” aren’t impeding the components that Spirit is shipping to Airbus…amazing that only BA is being affected in this way, isn’t it?

          • Boeing isnt getting parts from Prestwick , nor did A320 have the complete halt to production that B737 had.
            last year A320 was 40 pm at end of 2020, and went to 45 by the end of 2021

            I hope you can count and observe one manufacturer went from 40 to 50 plus while the other went from Zero ( after Dec 2019) to…

            There, its something simple for you to pontificate on yet you failed to even get the basics . I hope you stay well away from the ‘big noise’ like aviation safety

          • That “complex halt to production” effectively ended 19 months ago, when the MAX was ungrounded. More than enough time to get things up and running again — for a competent OEM, that is.
            Perhaps we should ask Spirit which OEM they prefer working with from a planning point of view? I wonder if they could give an expletive-free answer.

          • Cold start is much much harder than an already warm production that is liesurely ramped higher

            Tell us how they did in China when they copied the computer chip lithography machine , down to the last screw. But couldn’t get it to work, when surely any competent organisation who knew what they doing would rise to the challenge

          • @DoU
            You’re not up to date on your news: “dry” SMEE litho machines are up-and-running at DUV and ArF wavelengths. Further:

            “Per many media reports and a few official announcements, SMEE is currently on the mission to produce its 193nm ArF *immersion* DUV lithography machine, which can be leveraged to manufacture chips at the 28nm process node”


            BA has been in this buisness for decades…and, yet, it can’t ramp up an existing production line in almost 20 months…?

        • “For sale” (or should be for sale) stored somewhere in Washington State 140 Chinese 737 Max (with engines) So do you really need a near term rate increase?

          • Indeed.
            But whitetails aren’t selling well for BA, are they?

          • Unless the Chinese revoke the purchase those aircraft are for China who will have money down and a significant amount on completed aircraft.

            The reason they are sitting there is China has not rescinded the delivery of those.

            China can revoke those but have not, so they will stay there until China takes them up or kills the contract for that group.

            Future obligation depend on China as they have to put money down again for any new production that were for them.

            As usual its more complicated than a washer (granted production of washer is quite technical).

  3. BCA’s “no gliders” policy seems like them presenting a necessity as a virtue, to me.

    • Well its a dig at Airbus but as CFM is behind on deliveries to both, either Boeing has aircraft sitting waiting for engines or they limited ramp up so that does not happen.

      Airbus wants to go to rate 75 but does not have the engine delivery for that (and they have two sources).

      Might want to think which mfg is smoking dope or maybe both are.

      • AB can deliver a manufactured frame as soon as its engines are delivered.
        In contrast, BA only starts manufacture of the frame when the engines are on the way.
        Which approach is more satisfying to customers, who are waiting for planes?

        • Once again that is wrong. He is into 500 strike outs by now? Worst ball player ever. While not .000 even I could hit a ball better than that (I was a wrestler and chess player not a ball player other than recreational). Granted I was AK 3rd and 1st in Wrestling as well as the Anchorage Area chess champion.

          Boeing is throttling its plan of production by what it knows is coming. There may be a bit much or a bit too little.

          Airbus on the other hand is hell bent on 75 a month no matter what with both P&W and CFM telling them they will not even meet current until next year.

          • None of which negates or addresses my previous post…

          • AB has orders on hand and needs production slots to meet demand; OTOH BA is cash poor and can’t afford to build gliders as excess WIP burns cash. That’s the dilemma it’s facing.

  4. I share Scott’s sentiments. As much as we hope Boeing will get their act together & start volume deliveries of good aircraft to the industry again, there’s a lot to be accomplished first. A few hundred (questionable) orders at Farnborough don’t change that. It’s not about marketing, hoping, it’s about delivering.

    (“questionable” as in uncertified, production stop aircraft types).

    A big (5 yr) EICAS retrofit program for all 737MAX produced should be considered IMO. Biting the bullet it’s called.


    • What is the net order count?
      some orders seem to just be restatements of earlier “sales”.

      • I go along with keesje and Scott.

        That said, some of the orders were rehashed (Vietjet) and two 777-8F were moved from ANA pax order to freighters. Nice for the Freighter part but overall mfg wise its just a swap not new order.

        I continue the belief that Boeing does not recover to its best under current lack of management.

      • It is really desperate if Boeing reaffirms the vietjet order from 2016 and 2019 again in May 2022, then AGAIN during Farnsborough.

        Meanwhile, reuters reported both times 200x MAX orders. Boeing is gaming journalists, who in turn want clicks. A match made in hell.

        Scherer said that current year orders is about 800 for Airbus.

        • Agree. The press went all in on a pathetic number of orders for an airshow.

          That said I have to laugh at Airbus spin as well.

          I have to give Boeing the press battle, not deserved but we live in clicky times.

    • One can wonder if they can develop a mixed system, using exisiting databus and wireless data from modified boxes to the EICAS and have it as an optional SB for the already certified 737MAX’es. The requirement is certifying the 737MAX-10 with it but airlines can choose to turn it off to get commonality and have it as part of the emergency checklist on the ones having it.

      • claes:

        I don’t think so.

        If the FAA mandates it then it becomes a mandate by the mutual agreement on cert by EASA and the rest of the world including China.

        It only applies to the -10 at that point. Then a decision to back fit it to the rest for commonality.

        Unfortunately is not a program aspecft as its a different alert system that in turn means removing the original NG/MAX and probably back further alert system, acknowledgement and status when it is acknowlede0.

        That is why Boeing is against it. Its a major change and then requires that, split commonality as well as more delays to install it.

        All MAX customers are going to be seriously unhappy and with very good reason (perfect)

        Much like the Alaska Railroad having to put in bullet proof windows because of problems on the East coast with people shooting at trains (the train body itself are not, right)

        That does not happen up here. But they had to spend millions to do so, we are not big enough to force a waiver.

        • @TW, My idea was an additional EICAS to be used only as part of an emergency checklist. During 99.99% of flights you don’t use it, but when warnings lights up the airline procedures would allow pilots to light it up for better understanding of what is happening for aircraft “post SB”. Still I agree certification could be very cumbersome for a partly wireless warning system.

      • B737 max series already has warning systems. theres warning lamps next to most switches to cover an anomaly.

        The engine power, electrical and hydraulics have modern digital displays on the large PFD screens which are switchable.

        EICAS is just an alphanumeric display like cell phones from the late 1990s an a bit bigger screen instead of lighted buttons.
        Corrective action wording can be displayed after the warning ‘message’

        This is A320 series ECAM but engine displays amoung some others are already on PFD for the B737 max

        for a readable description

        • Its not a miracle worker as this incident shows – chosen randomly form Aviation Herald results that use “ECAM”
          ‘An Air Canada Airbus A330-300, registration C-GHKC performing flight AC-110 from Vancouver,BC to Toronto,ON (Canada) with 152 passengers and 10 crew, was on approach to Toronto’s runway 05, when upon selecting the landing gear down the crew received a “Brakes – Auto Brakes” message on their ECAM display. The crew went around, worked the related checklists and determined only the alternate braking was available for landing. The crew declared PAN PAN, requested runway 15L and landed on runway 15L without further incident.”

          A warning light could easily say the same thing…’Brakes-auto brakes’ and the pilots go through their checklists !

          Again another flight
          ‘An Air Transat Airbus A330-200, registration C-GUBC performing flight TS-327 from Cancun (Mexico) to Toronto,ON (Canada) with 315 people on board, was climbing out of Cancun’s runway 12R when the crew received a Brake Hot ECAM indication. The crew worked the related checklist, the brakes cooled down and the gear was retracted. However, the warning re-appeared two more times, each time the checklist was completed. The crew declared PAN PAN, stopped the climb at FL150 and returned to Cancun for a safe landing on runway 12R about one hour after departure.’

          • From what I understand is, that a centralised messaging system is much easier and clearer to handle for pilots.

            – Instead of scanning the whole cockpit for errors, you focus on a single point
            – When multiple errors pop up, EICAS can prioritise more critical errors over less urgent ones

            As many improvements, in daily operations it might not really make a difference, but in a true emergency it really shines.

          • https://humanfactors101.com/incidents/air-france-flight-447/

            Experience shows differently
            ‘The crew focused on certain indicators, but ignored others. They expected bad weather, and so they thought that the aircraft shaking was due to turbulence, rather than a stall. This expectation was combined with their mental model that the aircraft would not allow them to cause a stall – but with the autopilot disconnected, different control rules applied and their assumptions were incorrect.’

            ‘The PNF was likely confused with the various information being presented, which may not have made sense to either pilot; and his attention was distracted from the key parameter (the aircraft’s inappropriate pitch altitude). The numerous messages presented by the monitoring system (ECAM) likely contributed to workload:

            Its clear you are doing exactly what the 3 pilots were doing , making unfounded assumptions, that the technology will save you .

            maybe you would like to review the last claim-‘but in a true emergency it really shines.’

          • @DoU

            What the severely sleep-deprived AF447 pilots did or didn’t do, doesn’t apply “copy/paste” to how other flight crews use EICAS on a routine basis..

            Got anything more recent? It’s been 13 years since AF447…

          • @DoU

            Apparently the technology would have saved that aircraft, if only the pilots would have let go of the sidesticks. But if you keep pulling up when the aircraft is in a stall, even non-pilots like me can imagine that it’s not going to end well.

            Is/was that ECAM perfect? Most likely not, but a simple Web search brings up plenty of hits that claim it is a big improvement.

        • The 737 has a steam-age attempt at a warning system.
          We’re talking now about modern warning systems — ones that are centralized, descriptive, and which list issues in order of priority.

          Things have moved on since the 707 era…

          • Contributed to the cockpit confusion AF447.
            Essentially the plane had nothing wrong with it ….. maybe they needed a message display that said ‘Dummkofs’

          • @DoU

            MIT analysis commissioned by FAA implicated archaic 737 CAS in FIVE crashes.

            Got nothing more recent than AF447 to harp on about? That was 13 years ago — oh, and the flight crew was severely sleep-deprived…

          • Wasnt an analysis of previous crashes at all.

            The MIT professor ( unknown ) that you claim did nothing of the sort.
            There was some sort of statistical prediction around the MCAS issues that had many more future crashes ‘predicted each year ‘ . They didnt happen of course as its been flying for some years now with none ( after the needed changes made)

            The FAA commissioned some studies, none by MIT

            Another instance of incoherent claims which are revealed to be baseless

          • @DoU
            If you look below, you’ll see that @Bill7 has kindly posted some links to the referenced MITRE report (MITRE being an MIT spinoff).

            Once again, you’re attempts to alter objective (and published) reality have blown up in your face; the same occurred last week with regard to EASA’s *conditional* MAX re-cert. Why are you so industriously trying to create a fictitious narrative in Boeing’s favor…particularly when the aviation press is rife with articles that consistently undermine these attempts?

    • See SamMiles’s comment downthread, if you haven’t already.

      I expect that after some expected political posturing, the MAX™-10 will get an exemption from EICAS (and other) requirements. What will happen after the next MAXCrash, though, with that craft having such a paper trail? Lawsuits and much worse, galore.. will Boeing be able to brazen-it-out one more time?

  5. MAX-7 “Flight testing was completed last year, Fleming said.”

    “It’s unclear if the MAX 7 will be certified by year-end or whether this, too, slips to next year.”

    If the MAX-7 which completed flight testing last year and “the fact that it’s nearly identical to the -8 and 9” may not be certified by year-end … this means that there is no way that the MAX-10 will be certified by year-end or Q1 2023 unless Boeing has decided that MAX-7 can wait until the MAX-10 is certified, but really ?

    OK so Boeing won’t build gliders, could we have a technical term for the “115 787s in inventory on March 31” and the “320 MAXes in inventory.” please.

    Boeing really need to concentrate on delivering aircraft and yes there’s an FAA component, but perhaps there wouldn’t be if Boeing could still be trusted to certify the aircraft they build.

    Boeing needs to get back to what it used to do well … designing, building and delivering decent aircraft, it’s been a while.

    Get on with it Boeing, we need a duopoly at the very least.

    • “Boeing needs to get back to what it used to do well … designing, building and delivering decent aircraft, it’s been a while.”

      It can’t — massive braindrain.

    • “Get on with it Boeing, we need a duopoly at the very least.”

      Why are you worried? In 10-15 years, when Boeing has descended into a mere ghost of its former glory, Comac will have risen to a serious competitor.

      In around 5 years, when the majority of the development of the C929 is completed, they will start with a C919neo or another clean sheet narrow body. Why? Cos first of all, they can afford to just dump the previous model, second, because by then they have learned enough to get it “right” and get much closer to Airbus’ latest models.

      • Indeed.
        I suspect that COMAC will very quickly start to upgrade/tweak the C919 once it’s in volume production. They have a huge market, they have money, and they have a vast pool of skilled workers to draw from. Most importantly: they have motivation.

        Compare that with BA.

        • The gents from back office insist COMAC is/will not be competition, but
          when you look at how Boeing’s doing..
          details not necessary on the latter, I think.


          • Mathh:

            The 929 was never going to fly as it was a fight between the Soviets and China as to who got what and why (call it a match made in heaven).

            The 929 is on hold and will never be delivered with Vlad and his imperialist ambitions

          • Once the C919 is certified and in production, COMAC than then concentrate on completing the CR929 project on its own, if necessary.

          • The 929 cannot continue as it requires the Soviet tech of out of auto – clave composites that the Chinese both lack and have no experience at in or with.

            Of course in 20 years they can do an A330 type wide body with an aluminum wing.

            But then without FAA/EASA cert it can’t fly anywhere.

            787NEO will be out by then leaving it two generations behind. US/UK will no longer supply engines.

          • The Chinese are very quick learners — they’re more than capable of having a good go at the CR929 😎

            Russia can still supply parts, if required.


            Not sure about any possible “Soviet” role — though I do recall that Scott asked you (twice) last week to cut the Soviet crap…

      • A monopoly would be bad for consumers.

        In 15 years, perhaps what you say about Comac will be true, but in the shorter term, “Western” airlines are going to be a bit hesitant to buy Comac aircraft until there’s been a good measure of how reliable they are (dispatch & especially safety), there’s no shortcut.

        I wonder now and then what Boeing would look like if they hadn’t had any competition from Airbus, more recently, I’ve started to think they look pretty much the same as they do at the moment (but probably without the MAX, just more NGs, no reason to innovate/progress).

        Safety is probably the biggest reason I think we need a duopoly at the very least.

      • Yes, better to focus on one model, the 919 and learn from the first one to make a better second one. Prestige can stop it admitting the first is not perfect with all the high ranking officials in the program and after serious funding you can make the 2nd cheaper, better, lighter and more easy to work on.

    • “Boeing needs to get back to what it used to do well … ”

      For a co. that sold its soul to devil is it even be possible without a fundamental sea change like GM’s??

  6. Let’s not forget that we’re heading into a travel slump / recession once the summer’s over — which increases the risk of deferrals and/or cancellations. Huge portions of BA’s order book can be cancelled without penalty, due to ongoing delivery delays.

    • Are the 140 aircraft built for China and unlikely to be delivered in the near-ish future a potential pool of pare engines and other parts to keep production flowing? Or are they stored without engines, meaning that once they are delivered they’ll be competing with the production line for incoming deliveries of engines? It seems strange that with Leap deliveries no longer needed for the C919 and P&W GTFs no longer needed for the MHI Spacejet both manufacturers would have some slack manufacturing capacity to divert to support t the major airframers.

      • Roger:

        Its not slack mfg in place. GE and P&W both look down the road and assess what is committed to and the realistic status of a program.

        They know what they need to have available for the C919 (very few) and P&W wrote off Spacejet a long time ago.

        Anything that could be moved was and you have the throttle back with Covid as well as the MAX grounding.

        CFM for example delivers a whole jet to Boeing or Airbus, but behind that delivery are hundreds of suppliers to GE. Those suppliers have been hit as well and an engine sitting on the floor without a key part is as worthless as a MAX or NEO with no engines.

        No one is vertically integrated and never were though some more so than others in the past.

        So CFM (and GE) as well as P&W have to watch their supply chain and manage it as well as themselves for their personal.

        RR probably is in the best shape as no one wants the Trent 1000/10 now and they can shift their supply to the few A330 and A350 engines.

        As the Trent 10 and the 7000 are very close, that mfg and its supply chain morphs over.

        The XWB may not and it depends on how RR has managed that part of the supply chain.

        In a fit of irony, RR now has huge surplus of repair centers they did not want to license as the cancellations and no orders for RR new 787 means its a mute issue though maybe they can work on the 7000 and XWB engines!

    • Wait: wasn’t the Narrative- just a few days ago!- that airlines were bringing back mothballed A380s and the like, because of stunning, off-the-charts demand?

      • Well there is planning and there is reality.

        Lufthansa was bringing back A340 they were that desperate.

        But reality may well be that with BA5 and the Ukraine situation causing a world wide recession it all flops back.

        Its impossible to really plan ahead when things are shifting this fast. That is equally a reason no one will return to the Soviet union, they are nothing but chaos creators and as was forecast by the US long ago, weaponizing gas and oil supplies.

        • > That is equally a reason no one will return to the Soviet union.. <

          Scott H ?

        • @ TW
          More Soviet crap — you really just can’t control yourself, can you?

          • Well its a fact of Aviation life that the Soviets seized whole fleets of aircraft from the Lessors.

            And who created Ukraine war? That is a fact of Aviation as well. Its driven oil prices sky high (since dropped back a bit) and the ripple affect into the recession you just talked about.

            Ignoring the economic impact of the Soviets is the same as ignoring BA5 impacts. It all plays into what is going on in the world in case you had not notices.

          • @TW
            Scott threatened to ban you if you didn’t stop the Soviet crap.
            Which part of that message do you not understand?

          • “And who created Ukraine war? ”

            Probably rather influential: Victoria Nuland
            propping up /bankrolling the UKR Bandera holdover followers to the tune of ~~$10b _before_ 2014 culminating in the synthetic Maidan event.

            Who did/does Victoria Nuland work for 😕
            Interesting in context: Bolton’s comment on Trump’s (non)professionality in creating a synthetic uprising .

        • Lufthansa never ‘retired’ all its A340s. It had 19 still in service and like many airlines during pandemic just parked them

          ‘By the end of 2022, monthly A380 flights will be almost 60% of pre-Covid totals, Cirium data show, defying the jet’s doubters. British Airways will operate more A380 flights by the end of the year than it did before Covid-19.’

          The US may – in theory- having a recession, but in practice with unemployment at 3.5% many arent noticing it. Canada is over 5%!

          • The current high inflation has a greater negative effect on consumer demand than either economic contraction or unemployment levels.

          • Duke:

            Kind of splitting hairs as Lufthansa had not intended to put the A340s back in the sky.

            A missing point is Lufthansa is having pilot shortage issues. It might be better to fly an inefficient non full aircraft than to cancel flights.

            BA clearly likes the A380, they might even pick some more up as they are retired by others. But that is Heathrow and severe capacity constraints and issues.

            Also the big Kahuna is Emirates and they have an outsized impact on the A380 use.

            But BA has also said it works very good in some markets but it does not in many and those are specific markets it works in.

            The one thing an A380 is not is flexible. It either works and you have high pax load number or it fails badly.

            FedEx does the same thing on the Freighter end, they park and mothball aircraft and bring them back out if needed. Some regularly like Xmas and others if there is a hiccup in the fleet.

          • USian unemployment stats (“U-3” is what gets reported) are not directly comparable to any other country’s: if one even briefly stops looking for work here, they are no longer counted as part of the “labor force”,
            and are therefore not counted as unemployed. Strange, huh? The net effect is to make the US unemployment rate look much lower than it is.

            “The U-6 real unemployment rate includes the underemployed, the marginally attached, and discouraged workers. It’s usually much higher than the U-3 unemployment rate, which is the rate most often reported in the media. The Bureau of Labor Statistics only counts people without jobs who are included in the labor force for the U-3 rate. They must have looked for a job in the last four weeks to remain in the labor force.

            “The U-6 real unemployment rate is a broader definition of unemployment than the official U-3 rate. The U-6 was 6.7% in June 2022, down from the rate of 7.1% seen in May 2022. There has been an overall downward trend beginning in December 2020. It still marks a vast improvement from the 22.9% rate in April 2020 which was close to the record unemployment rate of 25.6% set in May 1933..”


            “Figures don’t lie, but Liars figure.”

      • @ Bill7
        I suspect the decision to mothball the A380s was taken before the downturn/recession picture became clear…

        • It seem that we’re talking past each other on this relatively minor issue.
          Myself, I do not see adequate demand for bringing the A380s back into
          service, but we’ll see how it goes.

          • I also don’t see that demand.
            It may have been there in the summer, but I suspect that the landscape will change in the fall.
            Still, if the earnings from the A380s exceed the mothballing costs, then it will have been worth it.
            And BA is subsidizing some of these airlines, in the form of monetary compensation for late 787s and 777Xs…so that reduces effective costs even further.

  7. I wonder if the 320 MAXes in inventory have engines of not?

    Some of these 320 MAXes might be 5 years old when they finally will be delivered. I wonder how that will influence the value of the aircraft.

    • Scott needs to hire one of the satellite companies to take some pictures for us!

      Or ask Airbus for theirs (I am sure Boeing is taking picture of Airbus backlog)

  8. Interesting to see Airbus announcing another order for 40 jets just after Farnborough closes. Condor is really going for it with this new order.

    And I liked the comment of Christian Scherer: “We do business, not show-busines” when asked why it wasn’t announced during the show.

    • Right, Airbus being like a snake oil salesmen with orders at the end of a year to win the order numbers when none of hte contract were signed and the whopee at both Farnborugh and Paris air shows.

      Tell me another one! I need the laughs, its raining.

      • My experience is that management will offer extra discounts at the end of a quarter and more at the end of a financial year just to get orders in. So I’m not surprised when Airbus pops up with orders at the end of the year, and I’m not aware that those end of year orders are more fragile than the others. I can’t explain why it doesn’t happen as much for BA.

        I am surprised at so many orders being placed at a show. My experience again is that any good salesperson will never delay picking up an order at the very earliest moment, flying red eye, neglecting spouse etc, or doing whatever is necessary to get it signed and pick it up. I suppose some of these “show” orders were really signed long before, but there are times when, for one reason or another you can’t delay the announcement for very long.

        So I’m not really surprised when AB announced the large Chinese order not long before the show.

        • I disagree. Airbus MO is to stash order for the two big airshows and this is a huge change on the Chinese orders.

          Something behind the scenes for that. We likely will not get to see what was behind that curtain.

          • The 2 big defections earlier this year — Qantas, AF/ KLM — weren’t “stashed” for any air show…

          • Why was Qantas group a ‘defection’
            They already fly A320s, A330’s, A380s as well as B737, B787 and used to fly B767
            Once again the claims dont match the facts

          • Flight Global:
            ” **Defections** of two long-time narrowbody customers – Air France-KLM and Qantas – to Boeing’s arch-rival in Toulouse…”



            You answered your own question: for its mainline NB fleet, Qantas switched — i.e. defected — to Airbus.

            “Once again the BA “back office” window dressing efforts don’t match the facts”.

          • @DoU: Qantas itself flies BA NB jets only.

            Logic? What logic??

            Facts? When did BA wake up to face facts?? Otherwise, what’s the explanation for the MAX 7 cert. delay?

          • Robert P:

            Leahy was all about show and he is now gone. Airbus may have changed how it goes about orders and this is the yea we really mean it so don’t wait for the Airshow because it no a work no more.

            Might be why Condor order was delayed, Condor was trying to find out if there was some hedge there (nope!)

            You do hear Airbus is more disciplined now and they are making airlines take commitments.

            Boeing on the other hand may well have given Delta some slack to get them to commit to the MAX. Clearly they are more in need of orders but also keep in mind Ryanair did not get what they wanted so between the two someplace.

      • Work from faulty observation and deride from there.
        ( at least you are consistent 🙂

        Your allegation could work if it was a single event.

        But it is Airbus MoO: get lingering contracts out the door on year end closure. Every Year!
        The same they do with airframes delivery.

      • Not like Boeing ‘won’ 2021 by pulling dozens ASC 606 planes out of nowhere. Boeing likes to announce ASC606 or non-ASC606 orders like they please every year to make the number seem better, which is why they announced non-ASC606 numbers during the whole of 2019-2020.

        • @LUL: Boeing doesn’t “like” to move orders to ASC606. It’s an accounting requirement, based on the financial stability of the customer or uncertainties of the firmness of the contract (in recent times, due to delays or the prospect of cancellations by customers, usually due to contractual delays provisions.

  9. “Ryanair Voices Concern Over Boeing Delays and MAX 10 Certification”

    “DUBLIN (Reuters) – Ryanair on Monday said that Boeing had warned it of possible delays to 21 737 MAX aircraft due for delivery before the end of the year and said it was also worried about the certification of the new MAX 10 aircraft.”

    “”In the last two weeks, we’re getting letters out of Boeing telling us there might be problems with 21 aircraft this side of Christmas,” O’Leary told investors on a conference call.

    “A delay would be “inexplicable and unacceptable,” he added.

    “O’Leary said that he had been assured that Ryanair deliveries would take priority this winter.

    “”Management in Seattle… need to get their finger out,” O’Leary said, repeating a call for a change in management at Boeing’s Seattle operations.”



    One wonders what’s causing this latest delay…

      • ‘ “Management in Seattle… need to get their finger out,” O’Leary said, repeating a call for a change in management at Boeing’s Seattle operations.’

        I guess politesse is not O’Leary’s thing?


        • I like OLeary. He is out for himself (or his airline).

          Flip side is he scalped Boeing a couple of times and while true of Boeing, OLeary is not a poster child for definitive. I worked with one guy who was really good at assessing others performance. the problem was he did the same things he noted in others.

          Like TC he always has a spin he is trying to pull.

          OLary is at least entertaining.

    • If one reads the story by Scott , no need to wonder any more

      ‘Among the supply chain delays is a delay of up to six weeks in the delivery of the CFM LEAP 1B engines. ‘

      It also says thats not the only supply chain issue.

      Ryanair CEO should stick to making sure his passengers get to their destinations on time – getting what they paid for in advance.

      Maybe theres some ‘wondering’ needed for Ryanairs passengers

      • There are more than 5 months left in the year.
        Explain to us now how a *6-week* delay can cause non-delivery of ** 21 planes** in a *5-month* period…🤔

        Logic dictates that the whole block of 21 planes should shift by just 6 weeks…

        • Logic?? You expect that from our commentator?

          What if BA has the *cash* to build gliders? Shrug.

    • This piece has been lost:
      “We’re driving industrial requirements upstream, so instead of designing to design requirements and then looking at how you might make it, we are understanding how you’d want to make it and then really challenging the design requirements to align” explained Partridge.

      • Thats been done for decades . The manufacturing team is included in the intial design stage rather than after the design is almost complete.

        Whats new is the desire for more automated manufacturing and the process where a supplier will design , say a generic fuselage shell ‘section’ that they can fully automate and thats then supplied to the design engineers of what the end result will be and they can vary the dimensions and design loads and strengths

      • Dukeofurl:
        “The manufacturing team is included in the intial design stage rather than after the design is almost complete”
        Did Boeing this for the 787? Why are they still trying “to look how you might make it” after more than fifteen years?
        Reality is they went after the “Plastic Fantastic” PR and damn the manufacturing, someone is going to solve the problem later.

  10. There was a statement that Boeing would go to 3 x 787 a month once deliveries resumed (or would work up to that)

    Seems about right with 115 to deliver and the current low state of orders for wide body aircraft.

    • Who’s the snake oil salesman? The guy that promised delivery repeatedly but failed to deliver.

  11. FARNBOROUGH, England, July 19 (Reuters) – Pratt & Whitney said on Tuesday it expects to have engine deliveries to Airbus for its A320 airliner back on track by early 2023 at the latest and to be able to meet the planemaker’s schedule for upping output to 75 aircraft per month by some time in 2026.

    “In regard to where we are with Airbus PO (purchase orders), our intent is to try and climb that back this year,” Rick Deurloo, P&W’s president commercial engines, told reporters at Farnborough Airshow on Tuesday, adding that it would be no later than early next year..”


    • Lets see, 2026 is 3 years away and with the current chaos? Good luck with all that planning.

      • One of the excellent reasons for planning is to adapt to *changing circumstances*.

        Maybe the other guys’ approach is better, though (737-7, 737-10, 787, 777-X, KC-46A, debt levels, workforce relations, supplier relations; larger service to civil

        • Its funny but as I recall from reading, Airbus should be up through 60 a month if it ever hopes to hit 75 a month.

          Shrug. Have to back check if the 36 a month was just Europe or included Alabama and China.

      • Who said this above?? 😂

        -> GE and P&W both look down the road and assess what is committed to and the realistic status of a program.

        • You can’t expect that commenter to have any
          consistency or rigor, Pedro: it can’t remember what it just said thirty seconds ago.

          It’s a [“Soviet”-fixated] Troll.

  12. It does not argue in good faith- as a commenter I respect here pointed out
    awhile back.

  13. Musing about the “parts shortages” we’re hearing about from Boeing, and their
    competitor’s relative lack of them, I wonder if the two companies’ stores of
    goodwill with suppliers might be a factor. Also, just survival instinct: who, as a supplier, are you gonna trust for future steady, decently-compensated work?

    tough call.

    • Bill7:

      No question that suppliers are loath to invest in expansion when you whack them (forget for sure, something like 3 months notice?)

      So yea, the small guys will not expand or tell the next tier up, put your money where your mouth is. No interest loans, guaranteed contracts.

      Thank Toyota and its Just In Time Delivery system that only works in a perfect world and its no longer a perfect world!

  14. A side note about Farnborough:

    Is Airbus pissed off with the organizers there?

    A couple of weeks before the airshow, they come out with the China order for 300 aircraft and a couple of days after the show – it’s another order for 40 from Condor – which is a flip, replacing the 757’s there.

    They do a little business there, let BA have their moment in the spotlight, and say goodbye.


    • Frank:

      I see no reason why the Airshow be it Farnborough of Paris would have any affect on Airbus or Boeing as far as getting ticked off.

      They only present a place to display, they don’t set any policies

      Worst was pricing at Paris Airshow for a time and that was other vendors not Boeing or Airbus (Lockheed?)

      Agreed something odd but maybe two different aspects of odd. China may have been one reason and Airbus playing hardball on contracts for the Condor order.

      Kind of like the Mafia, once we got you we are not going to let go! (my dentist told me that one time and it is true!)

    • The Condor order wasnt a ‘flip’
      As the report says
      ‘They will replace the sixteen A320ceo’s that have an average age of almost eighteen years, the A321ceo’s (average age just over eight years), as well as the Boeing 757.’ No word on the 767s in service.
      Thats 24 A320/321 and 13 757 replaced and nice repeat orders for Airbus
      Condor of course is in new ownership now

      • Of course it’s a flip.
        The A321neo is also widely regarded as a 767 replacement…and Condor’s 767s are up to 28 years old.
        28 A321s to replace 13 757s and 13 767s — that’s a flip 👍

        • A321 isn’t a 767 replacemnt at all. The hint is in the story …replaces A320 and A321 CEO and B757

          Even the most die hard Airbus fan wouldnt never say the small winged , range limited A321 neo would replace the long range wide body 767. It’s hilarious in circus clown way to say so. But dreams are free.

          • “For example, British Airways … replaced the 767 with A321s on short-haul routes.”



            “What will Delta do with premium Airbus A321neos?
            …The 767s are getting old, and if you’re focusing on a premium market, there’s something to be said for a lower capacity aircraft (so that more frequencies can be operated with more premium seats).”



            JAL: “The airline is considering the 787 and A321neo families as viable options to replace its 767 fleet”



            Our commenter simply isn’t up-to-date as regards current fleet replacement strategies.

          • “Even the most die hard Airbus fan wouldn’t ever say the small winged , range limited A321 NEO would replace the long range wide body 767. ”

            You don’t really buy on absolute capabilities.
            You buy on best performance for the use case.
            (As long as the capabilities exceed the use case.)

          • @ Uwe
            Just as with the A330 ceo, I think it’s reasonable to assume that most 767 flights are in the 6-8 hour range — in other words, the plane has range overkill for most of the passenger routes on which it’s deployed.

            So, when it comes to fleet replacement, 767 operators can either upsize to a small widebody or downsize to a large narrowbody. If the load factors on the 767s were not (near) 100%, then downsizing makes more commercial / logistical sense.

          • The really successful part of the 787 was that the over-realistic sales pitches locked in so many customers, which is why the A330neo is having a hard time atm – the market left to it is limited.

      • ‘No word on the 767s in service.’



        ‘For the fleet renewal effort , Condor is already waiting for seven long-haul A330s acquired from Airbus to replace its Boeing 767s.’

        ‘Condor Orders 41 A320neos, Set To Become All-Airbus Operator’


        ‘The new jets will be delivered in Spring 2024, just as the airline completes its long-haul fleet renewal. The airline ordered seven Airbus A330neo and will lease nine more to replace its long-haul Boeing aircraft. Condor currently operates 13 B767s with an average age of 27 years. ‘


        ‘Condor ordered 41 Airbus A320/321neo to replace its aging Boeing 757 and A320/321ceo fleet’

        ‘The aircraft will gradually renew its narrowbody fleet, which consists of thirteen Boeing 757-300s, 16 Airbus A320ceo and ten A321ceo, with an average age of 16.3 years.’


        SO, bye bye 757’s & 767’s.

        Hello A330Neo & A321Neo

        • Plus:
          Just as with British Airways, some (long haul) 767s can be replaced by A330 neos, whereas other (medium haul) 767s can be replaced by A321 neos. Alternatively, Condor now has the option of switching between A330 neos and A321 neos according to seasonal demand — since both planes offer adequate ranges for most Condor routes.


          Isn’t it just stunning that Boeing “gifted” so much business to Airbus by abandoning the 767 without giving adequate thought to a replacement?

          • @Bryce

            BOTH the 757 & 767.

            In BA’s defence, I’m wondering if they looked at the market – essentially 1000 sales for each (excluding tankers/freighters) and though that it wasn’t enough of a niche and thought that they could get 767 operators to migrate to the 787 and 757 guys to step down to a larger 737?

            In hindsight – investing in exactly what the guys before them did; a dual certification of two aircraft at the same time, with a common cockpit and making as many parts as possible the same, between those planes…was the way to go.

            If they made 3 aircraft;

            a true clean sheet 737 replacement
            a better 757
            an improved 767

            Airbus would be in a real fight. Heck, make the cockpit between all 3 common, fly by wire.

            I’m sure even Duke would agree

          • > Isn’t it just stunning that Boeing “gifted” so much business to Airbus by abandoning the 767 without giving adequate thought to a replacement? <

            A real important point, I think. As someone here pointed out, they really need two or three new aircraft to be competitive.. when there is not even
            one on the horizon, as far as I can see
            (Boeing PR excepted).

          • What does BA fleet plans have to do with Condor?

            But theres this
            ‘The final Boeing 767s in British Airways’ fleet were configured in a short-haul layout that featured up to 244 seats.

            Many of British Airways’ 767s have been replaced with new Boeing 787 Dreamliners. The carrier took delivery of its 30th Dreamliner last week.’

          • @Duke

            “What does BA fleet plans have to do with Condor?”

            Actually, not very much – anymore, hmmm?

            (but I digress)

            Considering that Condor flew both the 757 & the 767, both of which will be replaced by the competitions products…

            …you ever hear of the old business adage about it being easier and cheaper to keep an existing customer, then it is to seek out new ones?

          • > Isn’t it just stunning that Boeing “gifted” so much business to Airbus by abandoning the 767 without giving adequate thought to a replacement? <

            Mind the backstory:

            After the rise of the A330(-200) over the 767 Boeing designed the 787 ( and engulfed by a fully fantastic PR campaign ) to redirect that interest to their own product and coffers. ( Leahy: plastic Chinese A330 copy 🙂
            unfortunately the bigger than life Dreamliner CGI could not be transferred into a functional real product. ( over promise and systemic incapability "Cargo Cult copy").

          • >Isn’t it just stunning that Boeing “gifted” so much business to Airbus by abandoning the 767 without giving adequate thought to a replacement?

            I understand the A330 killed the 767. Boeing responded with the 787. Sales figures for both rivals seem to indicate they hit the sweet spot of the long haul market with the A330/787 size.

  15. An interesting note on Airbus A320 production per month.

    They are counting production at station 40 where the wings are attached. Real production as of Mid June was 36 a month of the A320 series.

    Not sure how that plays out in Alabama or China. Engine delivers and or parked aircraft. Where is our Alabama observer when we need them? (China of course you would be arrested)

    Fun to point fingers at Boeing (and justified) but Airbus has a history of deceit as well in false sales and air show numbers.

      • I believe the article included that in the calcs and that included the end of the year hiatus at Airbus.

        Not sure Alabama and China share that but those are (4 a month each?)

  16. I see that that one reality-challenged commenter is still going on and on about nonexistent “Soviets”.

    • Stuck in the past. No wonder have difficulty to comprehend what’s happening now.

      • You and others might get a related chuckle out of the early-60s cartoon series called ‘Mr. Magoo’.


    • It’s interesting that it takes this country so long to certify the A220 and re-certify the MAX. I would presume this has much more to do with politics than aviation. The A220 has flown millions of miles with many, many cycles by now.

      • I think we can assume that it’s deliberate strategy: cleverly and patiently use bargaining chips to extract certain reciprocal “favors”.

  17. “Boeing cash flow on investor radar as supply disruptions shackle output”

    “July 26 (Reuters) – Boeing’s BA.N cash flow will be the focus on Wednesday when the U.S. planemaker reports results as production snarls limit its ability to take advantage of a rise in demand for long-haul Dreamliner jets amid an insatiable appetite for air travel.”

    “Some analysts expect the company to push its goal of positive cash flow to 2023 from this year as inflation drives up costs and supply chain disruptions hamper its ability to raise jet production.

    “”We have a feeling that because of the delays in commercial airplanes and some of the issues they’ve had with their defense programs … they will struggle to hit break even or positive free cash flow in 2022,” Melius Research analyst Robert Spingarn said.

    “”The planemaker is expected to burn about $1.2 billion cash in the second quarter ended June, as per Refinitiv data.”

    “In April, Boeing cast doubt on its ability to hit its previous full-year delivery target of about 500 for the MAX. Investors expect that number to be closer to 400, RBC Capital Markets said in a note.”


    • Thanks @Bryce

      Confirms my suspicion that BA’s laughable no glider statement, it’s not that BA doesn’t want to build gliders, it’s they can’t afford to build them.

      Kicking the can down the road, from FCF+ to clearance of the MAX/787, one quarter at a time. 🤔

      The boy who cried 787 coming “soon”.

      -> At the start of this year, American said it expected [787] deliveries to resume in April.

  18. Not the type of headlines that BA needs at the moment:
    “Boeing’s 777 at Risk of Fuel-Tank Explosion as US Urges Fix”

    “A proposed airworthiness directive from the US Federal Aviation Administration calls for operators to inspect the jets and install Teflon sleeves and cap fasteners to certain parts of the center, left and right main fuel tanks, according to the filing. The order would apply to 282 aircraft, the FAA said.

    “The action follows a Boeing service bulletin issued in August and expands a similar FAA directive from 2017 to address a larger number of 777 models, from the -200 to popular -300ER series. It’s intended “to prevent arcing inside the main and center fuel tanks in the event of a fault current or lightning strike, which in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane,” the filing said.

    “The FAA estimates it will take about 90 hours per plane to conduct the inspections and repairs at a total cost of $14 million for the US fleet of the twin-aisle jets. Airlines would have 60 days after the directive takes effect to adopt the new inspection program and as long as 60 months to make the repairs.”



    One would have thought that this type of issue was cleared up in the aftermath of TW800…

    • This type of news is going to become a nasty headache for Ryanair, which has no competing planes…

      • Apart from some Med coastal destinations in North Africa, Ryanair isnt interested in the longer range destinations outside Europe….especially a high priced resort in Indian ocean like Maldives ( isnt that the sinking place from all that CO2?)

        Many years ago there was talk of flights to the US , but nothing came of it.
        The ‘headache’ is of your own imagination

        • “…Ryanair isnt interested in the longer range destinations outside Europe…”

          Ryanair will become very interested in such destinations when its competitors fly there and it doesn’t…

    • So far no low-cost long haul venture was succesful. The cost difference to legacies is quite a bit smaller than on shorthaul.
      So Wizzair is embarking on an adventure there.
      That only changes if the A321XLR can beat the competitors A330Neo/787 in seat-mile-costs. Does it?

  19. -> GERMANY ENERGY CRISIS: Until now, Berlin has tried to shield its citizens from the full impact of rising wholesale gas and electricity prices. But many inside Germany are now asking for prices to rise (and a lot), so demand reacts.

    “A high gas price is the most efficient incentive to limit consumption,” the letter said. “If the price signal is overridden, [consumers] no longer have an incentive to save on gas consumption.”


    • The German energy crisis has nothing to do with the Farnborough post. Terminate this line of discussion.


  20. The best time for a new jet program??

    -> The “synchronized monetary tightening across countries is historically unprecedented, and its effects are expected to bite […] The outlook has darkened significantly since April. The world may soon be teetering on the edge of a global recession, only 2 years after the last one”


  21. Thesis for Max7 and 10 (and 7 and 9).

    The problem is: it is either MCAS with reading two (plus the virtual) sensor or it works EICAS. But it doesn’t work paralell. The CPU is too weak. New CPU = completely new certification.

    • MCAS and EICAS have their own processors. The EICAS is done by a ‘warning subsytem’ not a central flight control computer.
      B737 Max like its earlier models has different coloured warning lights located next to the various switches. That would be switched to a simple digital display screen….eg ‘Brakes hot’ message Some of EICAS monitoring functions already happen on the pilots PFD screens

      • No, the main calculator delivers and determines all the values required. It’s not about Eicas’s OS. It’s about the entire cockpit function. See P8. The CPU is at the limit. An MCAS, if necessary in the P8, would not have been possible.

  22. ‘Boeing Q2 FY2022 Earnings Report Preview: What to Look For-
    Focus on BA commercial airplane deliveries’:

    “..Shares of Boeing stock have underperformed the stock market in the last year. Boeing stock zigzagged above and below the market between July and October 2021, but it has underperformed since that time. The shares dropped in February and March 2022 and failed to fully recover, then plunged again in April and May. Since reaching a low point in June, Boeing stock has recovered some of its lost ground. However, as of July 24, it is still well behind the market, with a 1-year trailing total return of -28.4% compared with -9.3% for the S&P 500..”


    Should be an interesting day. If anyone has a link to the MIT analysis of the 737’s cockpit
    alerting systems and their role in that Boeing
    aircraft’s crashes, please post it. I have it bookmarked.. somewhere. 😉

  23. Jun. 7—”An independent report commissioned by the Federal Aviation Administration may influence a crucial, looming decision about Boeing’s not-yet-certified-to-fly 737 MAX 10.

    The previously undisclosed March 2022 report is highly critical of how, during the MAX’s original certification, the safety agency exempted earlier MAX models from the latest standard for pilot-warning systems. On an airliner, the crew-alerting system provides the pilots a series of visual, audio and/or tactile warnings that something has gone wrong.

    The MAX 10’s crew-alerting system has been upgraded from the previous MAX models, but still falls short of complying with the current safety regulation. Boeing is likely to need that exemption extended to get the MAX 10 certified for passenger service.

    The independent report from the MITRE Corp., a federally funded research organization, concludes that exemption from the crew-alerting standard contributed to the two MAX crashes that killed 346 people, and also influenced Boeing to suppress information about the new flight control software on the MAX — known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — that was the main cause of the crashes.

    The FAA assigned the assessment of these proposals to MITRE, a spinoff from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that’s a nonprofit engineering organization conducting research for government agencies..”


    Sorry it’s not the original Seattle Times link.

    • Note that the MITRE report implicates the 737’s substandard CAS in a total of 5 fatal crashes…

      • It was pilot error.
        In one case they didnt even check before they left the ground- Helios cabin pressurisation
        In another A320 crash – not covered by MITRE- the pilots ignored a ECAM message about stabilisers.
        Too many cases the Pilots beliefs about aircraft automation were contrary to what Airbus manuals say , and they rely on it till they hit the ground/sea
        maybe there should be a warning light with message that comes on to tell Airbus pilots which flight mode they are in!!!, or maybe they will ignore that like they do for some EICAS/ECAM messages

        • From the report:

          “In a strange argument for the claim that a new crew-alerting system was unnecessary, Boeing had identified three fatal 737 accidents in the previous decade where investigators found the crew-alerting system was a factor — but pointed out that in each case it had made a specific change to fix the problem.

          “The MITRE analysts were unimpressed.

          “They concluded that the fixes Boeing retroactively provided in each of those crashes merely “patched the inadequacies of the 737 pilot-warning system rather than proactively implementing better human factor designs and pilot-alerting systems that the company was already installing on other aircraft.”

          “Subsequently, the pilots on the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines MAX crash flights were confused and distracted by a cacophony of crew alerts that failed to help them understand what was causing the planes to nosedive.

          “The report said its analysis of the three earlier crashes plus the two MAX crashes “strengthens our focus on the need to hold flight deck, crew-alerting, and other safety-critical systems to a higher level of scrutiny.””

    • Thank you for posting these links — you beat me to it.
      I commented here on LNA a few weeks ago when the MITRE report first surfaced, and posted a link at the time.
      It seems that the rather self-assured commenter to whom you alude, is a selective reader.

      • Down the Memory Hole, as they say, regarding that last.

        “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink.”

        • Not a ‘MIT report or professor’ saying crashes attributed to the 737 cockpit warning systems.
          They mention 3 crashes Helios Fl 522, Aeroflot Nord Fl 821 ( both 737 classic planes and historically old) and Turkish Arlines 1951 an NG model
          All essentially crashes where pilots did little to no monitoring , like most crashes .
          The Helios was a pilot error
          ‘After the aircraft was returned into service, the flight crew overlooked the pressurization system state on three occasions: during the pre-flight procedure, the after-start check, and the after take-off check.’
          3 times !.
          Aeroflot …’The primary cause of the crash was that both pilots had lost spatial orientation due to their inexperience with the Western type of attitude indicator on the aircraft. Lack of adequate rest, poor crew resource management, and alcohol consumption by the captain also contributed to the accident.’
          Turkish Airlines was a altimeter issue on landing ,
          ‘The crash was caused primarily by the aircraft’s automated reaction, which was triggered by a faulty radio altimeter. This caused the autothrottle to decrease the engine power to idle during approach. The crew noticed this too late to take appropriate action to increase the thrust and recover the aircraft before it stalled and crashed’

          All of these types of problems occur in A320 crashes too, relying on automation seems to be a major issue , but no one is suggesting that automation be reduced. Its the pilots !

          I gave the FAA document which summarises the reports you have referred to.
          The Max had major MCAS issue , from Boeings negligence and the FAA oversight ‘being like a dog watching TV’.
          That MCAS has been resolved now, so the plane is safe to fly

          • “Not a ‘MIT report or professor’”

            Who said anything about a “professor” — other than you, in a convoluted post above?

            And MITRE is an MIT spinoff — the acronym “MIT” even occurs in the name “MITRE”…see?

          • “That MCAS has been resolved now, so the plane is safe to fly”

            – Only provisionally re-certified in the EU, pending retroactive installation of synthetic AoA and (ongoing) review of CAS [from the the EASA link that you posted last week, with appendix pointed out to you by @JakDak].
            – 60 serious incidents, 6 emergencies and a grounding of a large sub-fleet in the past 18 months — triggering DOT audit.
            – Sully: MAX is “not up to modern standards”.
            – Max-10 (and, perhaps, also MAX-7) not certifiable after Dec. 31 if they don’t have EICAS.

            That’s what’s called “an accident waiting to happen”…

        • “were confused and distracted by a cacophony of crew alerts that failed to help them understand what was causing the planes to nosedive.”

          That’s what I remember from the Turkish 737NG crash at AMS. The crew being overloaded with irrelevant and incorrect information by the 737s crew alerting system, iso being helped. And the concerted effort after, to blame the crew, to preserve the systems safety track record.

          Also PR, not answering question because “we have to avoid speculation and wait for the official crash investigation report” (next year) while at the same time putting pressure on local authorities, suggest crew / airline deficiencies in the media and offer victim family members money to keep quiet and let time do its thing.

          Standard operating modus we saw immediately after the LionAir crash.

          Encouraging I see the initiative was (finally) taken to have independent specialists have an look at this system. Apparently low profile, I missed it.

          A genuine safety culture would see a joint effort to replace/upgrade this alert system on all NG’s, MAX aircraft asap. Something Boeing / airlines have been successfully fighting for 30 yrs. Southwest Airlines is keeping quiet here, looking the other way..

          • Turkish FL 1951 wasnt a cacophony of alerts. And as this review shows – dont give that bull#$%^ about ‘concerted effort to blame pilots’. They shouldnt even be flying , even with a 3rd check captain in the cockpit to assist.

            ‘This was an official training flight for Sezer, who had only completed 17 flights since he was hired and had never flown to Amsterdam; therefore, a third pilot was on board to make sure that the other pilots didn’t miss anything under the increased workload.’
            ‘Then as the plane descended further, a landing gear warning went off, because the system believed the plane to be near the ground without its landing gear down. Captain Arisan, apparently familiar with the failure, remarked that the radio altimeter was responsible for the alarm. The crew ignored the warning and continued the approach.’
            Hmmm ignored the warning, as they ‘knew’ about radio altimeter problem
            ‘They were well behind the timeline called for in the standard operating procedures with regard to the altitudes at which the approach and landing checklists should be completed. Technically this was reason to declare a missed approach and go around for another landing attempt, but the pilots never even considered doing so.’
            Hmmm, werent configured properly

            ‘ When landing using an instrument landing system, the computer locks on to a “glide slope” that guides the plane down at the proper angle toward the runway. Normally, pilots will level off and intercept the glide slope from below, but in a slam dunk approach, they drop steeply and intercept it from above, which is considerably more difficult. Air traffic control rules in the Netherlands did not authorize controllers to allow slam dunk approaches, but it was common practice at Schiphol to assign them anyway.’

            Hmmm, irregular glide slope approach requested by crew

            ‘Upon entering retard flare mode, the autothrottle automatically decreased thrust on both engines to idle, and the word “retard” appeared in red on the pilots’ electronic displays.’

            Hmmm warning ignored because they were expecting it under irregular slam dunk approach. Note this is EICAS type warning message not a lit button ,and showed on PFD screen.

            ‘Soon, flight 1951’s speed was well below normal and its angle of attack was abnormally high. Still, no one noticed that anything was wrong, possibly because the pilots were distracted working through the landing checklist (which they should have already completed). It was unusual that during this entire time, no one monitored the airplane’s airspeed or pitch attitude

            Hmmm so many issues of outright negligence from the 3 pilots here
            For more and in a very readable way

          • Contd
            ‘ It was unusual that during this entire time, no one monitored the airplane’s airspeed or pitch attitude — or at least no one recognized that these parameters were abnormal, even though the low airspeed eventually triggered a flashing amber box around the airspeed value on the electronic display.’

            Its again a PFD display not the warning light buttons that some say are confusing . They just ignored a critical electronic display message .

            ‘ By the time it intercepted the glide slope, flight 1951 was in contravention of at least three items required for a stable approach: the landing checklist was not complete by 1,000 feet, the throttle levers were not in the correct position, and the speed was too low. Turkish Airlines operating procedures called for a missed approach to be made if even one of these items was not met. ‘

            However it seems that pilots- all around the world- commonly ignored these parameters and just wanted to land anyway.
            The SOP and Training say one thing but ‘well be right’ approach reduces safety not the plane itself.
            These 3 pilots paid for their cavalier attitudes – even though they knew there was a altimeter problem- with their lives

          • Wonderful how @keesje can make a much stronger point using much less text…

  24. Would it be unhelpful to propose an acronym:
    E-BOT ?

    Also, I enjoyed “incoherent” in one typically-uninformed comment above. Touchy..


  25. Epic post

    ” … *last year* A320 was 40 pm at end of *2020*

    “I hope you can count ….”

  26. Engines, engines, engines — three pieces of misery on Flight Global today:


    CFM: “Turbofan deliveries are Boeing’s ‘number one’ supply constraint”



    GE: “GE Aviation ‘grappling’ with constrained turbofan supply chain”



    PW: “Raytheon continues struggling with labour and supply shortages amid delivery delays”


    • Shifting the focus to better than (the much lowered in the past month) expected FCF ….. (see posts about BA’s no glider discussion above) Another successful PR/IR spinning exercise.

  27. Dizzy Duke says “not a professor”.. who said it was, besides him?



    • Too low ? How many have crashed since
      The plane has been fixed and is safe to fly – according the certification experts – even in China
      Those working, who ever they are, for the CCP United Work front around the world may be spreading disinformation

      • “How many have crashed since [sic]”

        A more relevant question is:
        “How many crashes still to come?”

  28. From the link provided by keesje above:

    “..In the 2009 and Max accidents, for example, the failure of a single sensor caused systems to misfire, with catastrophic results, and Boeing had not provided pilots with information that could have helped them react to the malfunction. The earlier accident “represents such a sentinel event that was never taken seriously,” said Sidney Dekker, an aviation safety expert who was commissioned by the Dutch Safety Board to analyze the crash.

    Dr. Dekker’s study accused Boeing of trying to deflect attention from its own “design shortcomings” and other mistakes with “hardly credible” statements that admonished pilots to be more vigilant, according to a copy reviewed by The Times.

    The study was never made public. The Dutch board backed away from plans to publish it..”


    • More, from the same fine New York Times article:

      “..The muted criticism of Boeing after the 2009 accident fits within a broader pattern, brought to light since the Max tragedies, of the company benefiting from a light-touch approach by safety officials.

      References to Dr. Dekker’s findings in the final report were brief, not clearly written and not sufficiently highlighted, according to multiple aviation safety experts with experience in crash investigations who read both documents.

      One of them, David Woods, a professor at the Ohio State University who has served as a technical adviser to the Federal Aviation Administration, said the Turkish Airlines crash “should have woken everybody up.”

      Some of the parallels between that accident and the more recent ones are particularly noteworthy. Boeing’s design decisions on both the Max and the plane involved in the 2009 crash — the 737 NG, or Next Generation — allowed a powerful computer command to be triggered by a single faulty sensor, even though each plane was equipped with two sensors, as Bloomberg reported last year. In the two Max accidents, a sensor measuring the plane’s angle to the wind prompted a flight control computer to push its nose down after takeoff; on the Turkish Airlines flight, an altitude sensor caused a different computer to cut the plane’s speed just before landing..”

    • The MAX crash dissemination brought to light that the US participants in the AMS investigation had put excessive pressure on Dutch authorities to come to a “pilot error only” finding. ( result : backed away from ..)
      IMHO Boeing designs seem to have a knack to assist the crew in making errors that hurt. ( non intuitive UI, “lopsided, nonsymetric” connection of sensor inputs
      That is the fall out from layering on new features on a limited design ( and breaking basic design paradigms on the way).
      But this also carries over to newer designs apparently. How “clean sheet” was the 777 actually?)

      • Failure to follows the airlines own SOP and do a go around is Boeings fault?

        The ATC allowing a non authorised intercept of the glide path- which has more workload- which was done by the crew even though they knew they had an altimeter problem ( that was known even before TO but wasnt classed as flight critical) is Boeings fault?

        if it was a crash caused by pilots lack of understanding of FBW automation would it be Airbus fault, or a lack of training or SOP from the airline or just simple poor airmanship ?

  29. Bryce said, on July 28, 2022:
    “Wonderful how @keesje can make a much stronger point using much less text…”

    Agreed. Uwe does the same, I think: quiet logic-bombs from both.

  30. Flightglobal reports Airbus is preparing a new cabin option for the A350. Thinning the cabin walls allows up to 30 more seats in the A350-1000. If airlines bite, that could become quite the headache for Boeings 777X-program in terms of seat mile costs.
    I’m surprised they didnt announce that on the airshow.

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