By the Leeham News Team
July 14, 2021, © Leeham News: Six months into 2021, Boeing is delivering 737 MAXes, clearing MAX inventory, and taking orders.
Airbus isn’t matching Boeing orders for the A320 family, so far. But as the industry struggles to return to normal, it’s worth taking a six month look at how Airbus and Boeing compare.
In terms of total backlog, Airbus has a 62% market share vs. Boeing’s 38% share.
This includes all single- and twin-aisle aircraft. It also includes freighters—a Boeing exclusive right now—and air force tankers, where Boeing also has an advantage.
Airbus has a 65% share of the single-aisle backlog vs Boeing’s 35% share. Airbus includes the A220 and A320 families.
Boeing has a slim lead in the wide-body sector, boosted by its exclusive backlog in freighters and the larger backlog for the KC-46A tanker vs the A330 MRTT: 52% to 48%.
Boeing’s backlog is adjusted for the accounting rule ASC 606, which eliminates orders no longer considered firm but which aren’t canceled. Airbus doesn’t publish the European equivalent of iffy orders, so the market share is somewhat skewed. Regardless, it isn’t an encouraging picture for Boeing.
Thirty years ago, Boeing held a 60% market share over its competitors, McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus. Today, there is no McDonnell Douglas and Airbus has the 60%+ lead over Boeing.
The reversal of fortune for Boeing is stunning when one thinks about it. And the slide long pre-dates the 737 MAX crisis, which hasn’t helped Boeing’s position in the market.
Boeing CEO David Calhoun says he can’t make up lost ground that’s tied to the MAX grounding. He hopes to return to parity going forward, though.
But Boeing lost market share to Airbus before the grounding. The A321neo, especially the LR and XLR models, provided a boost to Airbus that Boeing can’t match with the 737-9 or 737-10.
A new airplane that offers a step change is needed for Boeing. Simply reinventing a 757 won’t bring Boeing’s glory days back.
FlyDubai, the low cost carrier that has a close relationship with Emirates Airline, canceled 65 orders for the Boeing 737 MAX last month.
Boeing recorded, as expected, the order for 200 737 MAXes from United Airlines in June 2021. However, the OEM also recorded the cancellation of 65 737 MAXes from flyDubai. The below table details Boeing’s gross orders during June 2021:
ICBC and Jackson square effectively took over five orders from BOC Aviation during the month.
Boeing increased its tally of ASC 606 orders on the 737 program from 723 to 772 (an increase of 49) and from 48 to 55 on the 787 program.
The cumulative delivery delay on (certain) Dreamliners must at this stage be approaching (or at) a point where the ordering party can cancel without penalty. That possibility may become increasingly tempting, in view of the expected projected malaise in longhaul aviation.
Mass use has already been made of this mechanism in the case of the MAX.
If you reach 63% market share you dominate. Hence Boeing must act. A plane flying higher, further, faster and cheaper. Hence both purchase price, operating and maintenance cost shold drop while being a very reliable aircraft. Not that easy making a Mercedes S-class cheaper and more reliable than a Toyota..
You are no doubt correct however Airbus and Boeing have an interest in maintaining a duopoly and not killing of their great rival which will only be replaced by an ambitious Chinese or Russian one stepping into the void. Furthermore I think the US Government will step in if Boeing becomes truly unviable or side lined. I would suspect the same from the EU for Airbus.
The US would indeed, its not just the commercial sector Boeing defense is half the company (probably more now)
What form step in would take? But I do not believe it would come to that.
Boeing is solvent as a whole.
How can BA be ‘solvent’ with increasing negative cash flow every quarter
Time to let it go … the Boeing company.
They are not interested to build good planes.
Time to say goodbye and bury them, it will be a better world.
No need to help BA die, they are committing suicide, long and slow
The MAX/MCAS problem combined with COVID was almost a black swan event. Then delays in B777-X program and B787 production have added to that. However MAX customers in a way benefit from MCAS issues because the delays help them delay payment to Boeing. The same with B777-X and B787. Boeings customers may weather the storm better than Airbuses.
Let’s see if Southwest can survive if anything happens to the MAX after its 737NG are all retired!
The Max problem was entirely predictable and the result of cheap poor design and execution
Covid ditto – over the past twenty years many such and similar viruses have emerged: this is not haphazard nature but the entirely predictable result of the poorly designed and executed human intrusion and disturbance of the habitats
BA is , as it were, the industrial virus of incompetence
When BA dies, LUV as the other usual suspects will clone necessary production/maintenance out to China
What do you think lawyers are for, in those 600 page contracts are laid out contingency plans for when BA goers belly up
Covid was actually a blessing for Boeing.
Just imagine the market 2 years from now with extensive growth, while Boeing couldn’t deliver any max or any 87 due to the known problems.
De facto, the Max grounding was half as bad, as all the customers didn’t need the planes.
Same for the 87.
And it hold even true for the B777x delays, the customers are not even mad about the delays, they are happy. The last they want now, is a 400 pax WB aircraft.
Might be a bad overall sign, but Covid made the delays less bad for the customers.
One could also argue that CoViD was/ is a curse for Boeing:
The mechanism of cancellation:
Because of groundings and certification delays, the MAX (and soon the 777X) can be cancelled without penalty; the same may soon apply to some 787s, because of ongoing production delays.
The reason for cancellation:
CoViD has decimated the aviation industry, and it continues to do so. Many airlines are re-examining earlier orders. In the case of Boeing, the above-mentioned mechanism allows an order to be dumped without penalty. This has occurred extensively in the past 2 years: the MAX backlog has suffered about 1300 cancellations/deletions (2019 -183; 2020 – 641; 2021 H1 – 469).
The delay in 777X EIS means that CoViD-impacted weak carriers such as Cathay and Etihad can soon nix their entire orders without penalty. The same, of course, applies to the exasperated Tim Clark, and other carriers.
You are right – covid, as a general principle, kills off the very old and feeble and already sick
BA has been sick with all kinds of illnesses afflictions and corruptions (in the old English as well as the new)
One may also speak of climate change as a related stress which impelled airlines to re think operations in largely the same direction as the elements you describe as resulting from covid
Covid gave BA the coup de grâce
The B737 MAX 8 and above is a pretty competitive and economical product that will get a passenger to his or her destination at an attractive price. It will sell.
All said and done MCAS will be forgotten in a year. MCAS has been fixed and I’m sure there will be no more major issues.
The thinking processes within the Boeing MAX design team and management that drove it to install MCAS without cross checking the alpha vane sensors is where Boeing has to look at itself.
To an extent customer pressure drove them to these decisions.
I can imagine a time in 15-20 years where Airbus has limited itself to maintain a type rating under the same pressure.
> Furthermore I think the US Government will step in if Boeing becomes truly unviable or side lined. I would suspect the same from the EU for Airbus. <
Isn't there a name- from the 1930s, IIRC- for that kind of arrangement?
Lots of Airbus are assembled in the US with lots of US content, so PWA is pretty happy with the staus quo. Still the US will not tolerate Boeing being a new GM and Airbus like BMW and MB being the biggest vehicle exporters from the US.
Recent sales figures show that Toyota outsells GM etc etc in the US as else and everywhere
Not long the day AB outsells BA in the US as everywhere
The following US carriers are all-Airbus: JetBlue, Frontier, Spirit, Allegiant (Virgin America was also).
American was/is Airbus’s largest A321 customer worldwide.
Delta’s widebody fleet is moving toward all-Airbus (it’s still retiring 767s).
Breeze has a large fleet of Airbus A220s on order, and is currently all-Embraer.
Certainly a significant slice of the cake.
Thanks for your information on AB in US
Toyota over took GM for many of the same reasons AB is overtaking BA
GM plus other US carmakers cancelled their semi conductor contracts with Asian suppliers at pandemic outset
Toyota did not, plus had a safety net 6/9mnth supply in stock
18 months later GM/Ford etc can not afford to make cars, their few remaining chips go in into ‘trucks’
The drought is set to continue awhile
This reminds of the short sighted cost cutting stupidity supply chain ignorance, BA
Remember when BA wanted to try & copy some of Toyota’s manufacturing techniques but kept on falling on their face, Press Release after Press Release celebrated the more than perfect systems they had installed…. and the Toyota people they had stolen
This type of across the board organisational ignorance is typical across US industry, GM, Intel, BA and so on
Only GM has’nt killed people, yet
Not @Claes but@ Bryce, pardon pardon
It’s a long time in the future when historians will be able to discuss 1930s attempts attempts at the harmonization of capital, labor and through government and a controlled media and the parallels with today.
At present Airbus strategy will be clouded more by the competition from recently delivered aircraft and distress sales from failed airlines as opposed to Boeing. Given the turmoil of the past year they will be more focused on costs and cash flow than anything else. It must be strange sitting in Toulouse to see the continuing and many ways in which your only competitor can shoot themselves in the foot. By biting the bullet on the A380 product strategy looks pretty solid, the only question mark is the A330neo but as a thorn it works effectively to puncture profits on the B787. Single aisle is dominated and the A350 looks increasingly strong as orders of B777x seem to be evaporating. The most pertinent issue to me is that AB seem to have focused on maintaining margin as opposed to BA who are willing to sell at any cost. That is some reversal of fortune
Airbus has its problems but they are relatively normal.
The biggest question is what do they do about the A320/A220?
At some point they have to move to the A220 as the replacement and that would be a major revenue hit the way A220 got structured by BBD and Airbus inherited the contracts (for whatever the term was) and the nature of who makes what on it.
For now it works as a lower end replacement for A319 etc and its a good time to get the program organized at lower rates and still be selling all you make.
I got to see an A220 in person, the pictures do not do it justice, its a beautiful aircraft (not a has to but it sure looks good and a lot bigger than the pictures).
> Hence Boeing must act. A plane flying higher, further, faster and cheaper. Hence both purchase price, operating and maintenance cost shold drop while being a very reliable aircraft. <
Can what you've described be done? If so, *what variable has to give* to make it possible; and what company is in a position to
Market share is indeed everything. And Airbus have been gaining it for the past 30 years, whilst Boeing has been steadily losing it.
Boeing has been disguising this slide backwards by pointing to increased profits as the overall market grew. But now there’s been a big hiccup in the operation and the profits have vanished, attention turns to market share to see what profit potential there is.
And, there isn’t much.
The only sector where Boeing has it all is air freighters. Airbus are talking about moving into that sector. Everyone expects that if they do, Boeing’s products will probably be found sorely wanting.
And it’s already too, too late to preserve dominance in that sector; Airbus can do a conversion on A350, A330neo for very little effort and quickly, and they’d probably sell pretty well. In contrast, Boeing needs years to develop a whole new aircraft (as well as a proper 737 replacement), and they don’t exhibit many signs of having got the cash to do it.
Presumably we don’t know what the mix is for the cancelled MAX orders for FlyDubai? 8’s, 9s or 10s?
Boeing is definitely not in pole position at the moment. Time for BA to return to being a company that makes airplanes, or does it remain a financial instrument to be milked until the basic products reach end of life?
Maybe it’s time for a moonshot product to get them back on top, I don’t think anything less will do.
Flydubai had 250 MAX on order, they cancelled 65 so still have 185 on order with about a dozen delivered.
I think of those huge orders as pie in the Sky (United or Delta etc would be exceptions to that)
I suspect the 737-900 Lion is selling to Delta are out of warranty now and that (at least was) Ryanair model to buy new, sell when the warranty was expired.
Its likely short term there are positions for selling those 65 if things keep picking up.
FlyDubai is a LCC but owned by the same guy that owns Emirates and its gold all Boeing customer and a monster in the region. I remember while Emirates was putting 4 x A380 into Moscow Domodedovo airport everyday FlyDubai was putting as many B737-800 into some of other 2 Moscow airports.
Emirates is now owned by a person, its owned by the Dubai.
FlyDubai is also owned by Dubai but as I understand it, no link between them management wise.
And yes, I remember in desperation Airbus was putting an A380 into Glasgow. That was writing on the wall of sending too big an aircraft into too small a market. Nice ride but……
No disagreement loosing 65 orders is not good from a Blue Chip government (grin) but that may also reflect an adjustment in reality of what the market is vs any MAX issues.
Certainly they have the leverage to order more and get better discounts.
I was referring to Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum also the president of Dubai.
The chair of FlyDubai is Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, who is also the chairman of the Emirates group.
Folks with Al Maktoum seem to run the show.
Hmmm, not sure you can characterize it as one rich guy when its one guy controlling the operation with state resources rather than his own bucks.
Of course there is cross connection but not at the Airline level itself. Government coordination (or objectives)
ASC606 does matter though as Airbus has some really dodgy orders on books. For example is anybody seriously expecting Air Asia X to take all those 330 neos ?
@Ankhar: We agree. We’re just saying Airbus doesn’t break out the dicey orders like Boeing does–there isn’t an ASC606 equivalent in Europe. LNA has made estimates of ASC606 in the past, however, precisely on point. We plan to do so in the near future, but we put it behind the paywall.
I don’t worry about the A330neo. Airbus didn’t give them away for nothing, Boeing did (Hawaiian). At that time Boeing saved money on QC and we see the results now. Now the 787 should be more expensive and with more issues likely to come (we are at recent issue #5) the 787 should be less interesting for airlines and who would order 787 if Boeing can’t deliver.
At rate 2 the A330neo can be produced for some time even without AirAsiaX. If the 787 gets more expensive and Boeing can’t deliver, A330neo has a good spot and then many A330ceo need to be replaced.
With the latest (yesterday) delay on the 787, CNBC guys were saying, one more problem at Boeing and the Street will want Calhoun to be replaced. They might become a takeover target at some point… Amazing what happened in the last 25 years there. Atrocious…
Analysts / fund managers Jim Cramer and Jim Lebenthal were clearly agitated and exasperated by the situation. Wall Street is the only “friend” that BA has left, so it would want to sit up and pay attention.
I have been thinking the same thing as well. You are the guy who got us into this mess (or at least the one left) and we think despite our extension you are not the one to get us out of it.
Ironic by doing what Wall Streets loves they kill the Golden Goose.
Airbus has an upper hand in its negotiation with customers, unlike BA’s many customers who can walk pain-free.
Here’s a WSJ article related to this point:
“Airbus Soars Past Boeing by Showing Little Mercy to Struggling Customers:
— The aircraft giant established itself ahead of its longtime rival by making airlines honor contracts, despite the pandemic”
Here is another quote from the WSJ article you gave a link.
“Mr. Faury’s strategy is a break from past downturns. Airbus, under previous leadership, has traditionally been more willing to give its best customers flexibility on orders. Across industries, suppliers, landlords, even tax authorities all deployed a similar soft touch to accommodate the pandemic’s economic hit.
Airbus’s rigid approach carries big risks, and some Airbus executives privately worry it threatens long-term relationships with carriers just as demand starts to return.
Willie Walsh, who stepped down as chief executive of International Consolidated Airlines Group SA at the end of last year, asked for a moratorium on Airbus deliveries to the owner of British Airways during the early days of the pandemic, according to people familiar with the matter.
When he was turned down, he repeatedly cited the “old Airbus,” they said. In the downturn triggered by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Mr. Walsh was head of Ireland’s Aer Lingus, and Airbus then offered the airline significantly more flexibility with orders.
“I was disappointed with the early response,” said Mr. Walsh in an interview. “Too often people fell back on ‘I have a contract, you’re bound by the contract.’ ” A spokeswoman for IAG declined to comment.”
I have my doubts that forcing deliveries down the throats of financially distressed airlines who have no current need for them will in turn out in the long term turn out to have been a good strategy. Clearly the past management of Airbus thought flexibility was a better strategy. People have memories and some people hold grudges. When placing large orders in the future, will the memory that Airbus was inflexible about deferring deliveries in a deep downturn make customers more or less likely to sign with Airbus?
Thank you, none of this occurs in a static situation.
While Airbus might regret flexible short term long term it means something to both clients and stability of the company.
But like taking the Aerostructures back when they could not sell them, that too can change back and forth.
While a manager re-making the company to show his brilliance is more a US thing, its not exclusive.
For some reason I’m not getting a “reply” box on AP Robert’s post so hopefully this one will appear close enough to make sense!
Perhaps Airbus’s “unhelpful” response to Willie Walsh stemmed to some greater or lesser degree to his decision to sign a LoI for 200 maxes just before the pandemic without giving Airbus the contract to tender? Sometimes you reap what you sow!
No, you maintain your business standards (if you have them).
Transactions are not personnel, each side should respect the other sides position.
Airbus has a reputation for being a steady supplier and I would value that if I was buying.
Clearly there is a tension in buying (best deal for your Airline) vs aircraft mfg that wants to make as much money as possible in a extremely difficult arena.
Despite Delta moving away from Boeing, Boeing sold 100 x 737-900 to them. That was good for Boeing and its the reality that you never know when you may get an opening and you maintain your professionalism if for no other reason than its bad business not to.
BA is also capable of giving its customers the cold shoulder. For example:
– Airlines such as Air NZ and Norwegian that suffered greatly from the 787 Trent issue got little to no help from BA. In particular, BA refused to divert any new-build engines to alleviate the long groundings at such airlines — even though such diversion would have meant only small delays to the production line (nominally, 2-3 days per engine pair). In contrast, AB was much more helpful toward airlines that were impacted by the PW GTF problems on the A320 neo.
– BA is refusing to refund certain deposits to Norwegian — which has had to take it to court to secure refunds.
– We’ve seen recently that Tim Clark (Emirates) was complaining that he hasn’t been given any performance data on the 777X’s engines, even though such data has been available for more than a year now. That’s not very customer-friendly, is it?
Airbus didn’t use low price to draw in speculative orders. Boeing is desperate to fill in production slots. It reaps what it sows.
-> “It’s almost impossible” for Boeing to catch up, said Sash Tusa, a London-based analyst at Agency Partners. “The reason why Airbus can negotiate tough is precisely because there’s no competition.”
That’s why Airbus can negotiate from a position of strength. Airbus is willing to negotiate with its customers, in exchange for more deals, deferral charges etc. It’s not as bleak as being painted in American press.
– Airbus’ sales teams went “plane by plane, airline by airline, customer by customer, to see what the backlog was, and what their contract with Airbus was,”
– Mr. Faury said in most cases, Airbus has been able to find common ground with customers seeking to defer or cancel orders, while insisting they honor their contracts.
“We have tried with each and every customer, and they were all in different situations, to reach out to them, to sit down, to understand what were their main drivers and their main priorities, and try to explain as good as we could our own constraints,” he said.
As a result, all of the aircraft built by Airbus over the past year have either already been sold and are waiting for their owners to collect, or are in “extremely advanced stages of negotiation,” Chief Commercial Officer Christian Sherer told reporters in a briefing update in June.
– Every change Lufthansa proposed, Airbus asked for something in return, either an earlier delivery of another model, a new order, deferral payments, or a little of all three, the people said.
What happened to IAG’s shocking order of 200 737 MAX (seems more like a publicity stunt now)??
“or are in “extremely advanced stages of negotiation,”
is that what they call ‘refuse to take delivery and pay’ now
I suspect that the MoU for those 200 IAG MAXs will never be firmed up.
It’s interesting (see the Motley Fool link that I posted below) that the bonanza of MAX orders in the first half of 2021 has been almost completely negated by MAX cancellations (and/or ASC606 deletions) in the same timeframe — leaving a net gain of just 52 planes. Also, just three customers — Southwest, United and Ryanair — now account for 30% of the remaining MAX backlog of 3334 units.
Willie Walsh wanted to be a big boy but doesn’t have the big boy pants. With that LoI IAG can’t be a good Airbus customer. For sure all-Airbus costomers should come first.
Beside that, most airlines could negotiate deliveries, but of course not for free. Foolish if Walsh thought he could get it for free.
Greedy Walsh is gone. IAG needs Airbus more than Airbus needs IAG.
Compare with the heavy burden of debt BA incurred during the grounding of the MAX / 787 delivery sstoppage and 100+ 737 MAX white tail that BA has to dispose of at fire-sale price, Airbus’s problem looks much more manageable. Hahahaha …
And the pendulum swings. Airbus seems to be talking the way Boeing did just a few short years ago. Cycles and memories are long in this industry.
That was an intriguing article. I clearly remember Airbus popping many workers on to furlough and slowing production. Narrow body is coming back but I do not think the frames are being forced on people. I am rom New Zealand and Air NZ has taken no narrow bodies from Airbus for some time.
How Boeing gave Norwegian the shaft:
Norwegian Air Shuttle said June 30 it canceled orders for 92 Boeing 737 MAXes and five 787s.
The *orders still appear on Boeing’s Unfilled Orders website*, which is updated monthly.
In a lawsuit filed June 20 in Cook County Circuit Court (Chicago), NAS claimed breach of contract for failure to deliver the MAXes due to grounding. It claims breach of contract for failure to delivery 787s due to the long-running issues with the Rolls-Royce engines.
NAS also wants to return its 18 737-8s that were delivered but which have been grounded since March 2019 in the wake of two fatal MAX accidents with Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines.
Norwegian filed claims for “in excess of $1bn.” It seeks court authority to rescind contracts for 110 MAX aircraft (including ones already delivered) and an unspecified number of 787s, including some already delivered.
Many posters seem to have short memories.
Remember that forced Buy of A380 ( ANA )
There is a difference of a customer in dire straits
vs a customer who wants to nix an order for getting el cheapo from the competition.
Why should Airbus float Boeing?
Re: “For example is anybody seriously expecting Air Asia X to take all those 330 neos ?”
Air Asia X in its own restructuring plan, which has yet to be approved by creditors, doesn’t seriously expect to take all of those 330 neo’s. See the excerpts below from the the 6-7-21 AirInsight story at the link after the excerpts.
“The Covid-crisis caused an abrupt end to the carrier’s ambitions as its long-haul markets collapsed. Air Asia X hasn’t operated since last year, with only two of its 22 A330-200s active.”
“AAX hopes to begin operating with two aircraft in selected markets when the situation allows and to gradually resume flights to all destinations.” In 2023, the active fleet should be at seventeen.”
“The position of the lessors is crucial. Without their support to waive almost the entire debt of RM 64.15 billion, Air Asia X will be unable to re-launch. ”
“But the business plan includes the proposal to replace most A330-300s with fifteen A330-900s between 2027 and 2032. This is part of negotiations with Airbus and Rolls-Royce, supplier of the Trent 7000 that’s the exclusive powerplant on the A330neo. If the 2019 agreement is revised to just fifteen and we include the two A330-900s already delivered to Thai Air Asia X in August 2019, it would mean Airbus is set to lose 61 A330-900s from its backlog which currently stands at 260. That’s a major setback for the A330neo, which has struggled to meet the success of the A330ceo-family of 1.479 versus 331.”
What lessor in their right mind currently not getting paid by Air Asia X for their leased aircraft would let them take delivery of additional leased aircraft? I think the 28 Iran Air orders would also be removed from the firm order list under ASC606. Without Air Asia X’s 76 yet to be delivered 330neo orders or Iran Air’s 28 orders the current 330neo backlog of 260 stated in the AirInsight article would be reduced to 260-76-28 =156. I wonder if lessors CIT and ALC have customers lined up for their orders of 25 and 23 330neo’s, respectively, who would be able to make lease payments?
Air Asia always was a pie in the sky and kick the order down the road operation.
Covd just put an end to kicking the orders down the runway
I’ll fit it in here: British Airways – on Wikipedia, updated to February, list no MAXes on order.
Strictly speaking, that’s correct: it was a “Letter of Intent” for 200 MAXs, rather than an actual order. It gave Boeing a bit of positive PR (for about an hour, until analysts realized the difference), and essentially cost IAG nothing — apart from putting a dent in its relationship with Airbus.
I’m confused, is the ex BA commander of planes, not, the same guy as the ex Qantas we are the world commander of vx, or vice versa?
Because either or both are now PR ing a failed attempt at IATA vx distribution somewhere
I think you may be confusing Willie Walsh (ex-IAG, now IATA) with Alan Joyce (CEO of Qantas).
Joyce proclaimed a few months ago that Qantas should/would only carry vaccinated passengers (well, that worked out well for him), and Walsh was recently bitching about the minimal effect that incoming air passengers have on infection rates in any given country (which seems to be a valid point, as long as they’re not carrying a new variant into virginal territory). They’re both Dubliners, and they do bear a certain facial resemblance to one another. Joyce speaks with a very flat Dublin accent, Walsh much less so.
Walsh was at the helm of IAG when it announced the LoI for the 200 MAXs.
Those Irish went everywhere and looks like still are; I’ll have a look down here….
Thanks for sorting out this identity crisis
The arguments presented by both are equally sterile, or in fact not – because the bug and bug variant travels in the human, and most of the human travel is by air
So maybe, or maybe not, people do not get infected in massive quantities in the planes, but so what – all the bug needs is for his one human to get through: given that there are umpteen quadrillon bugs and still quite a few humans…
The new l’o’down in Syd was one bloke coming in by air
vx passports etc etc can never provide 100% nor get close
As the Doc I quoted before said, human has to upgrade his health and adapt to and accommodate the bug, rather than trying in vain to kill
In general you’ll find that communicable deseases
tend to lose the killing vector.
By adaption on both sides.
Killing the host does not bring success in propagation 🙂
The bug carefully has adapted with greater success to the human, than vice versa
So, probably, all his killings have resulted from the un natural feebleness of the human host, in comparison with the hosts the bug was used to
This un natural feebleness has lead the bug to misjudge, so kill, but in his defence one might argue that many of those who died were very much on their last legs
There are some who say that vx interventions, besides being merely palliative, actively stimulate reactions from the virus to develope stronger and more lethal variants
In a parallel fashion to a human, who might get more violent than usual if he is attacked
Certainly the human has to adapt, but he is very much more limited in his field of adaptaction than is the bug
For example the age old human defence of healthy immunisation systems formed by close living in sync natural pathogens is unavailable to others than those who still live this life
Or very low density occupation of terrain, and minimal interference with pre existing natural systems, ditto (the invention of agriculture (also known as the invention of fast food) has, in this and other respects, been called disastrous, pretty much all crossover viruses have come from ‘domesticated’ animals)
‘Social’ distancing is not going to cut it as mimicry of a whole way of life which is well adapted to the inconvenience of certain natural systems
Au contraire – if one can admit it – human industrial existence is paradise for a pathogen, a feasting ground well worth the price of some low level collateral damage
@Ankhar: Simple. You can add back 918 unfilled order Boeing removes due to ASC606.
OTOH BA continues to build 777X that EIS is delayed by multiple years, still has around 400 737 MAX (correct me if I’m wrong) waiting to be delivered, 80 plus 787 lying around. All the above have to be taken into account when determining the “true” outstanding orders to be built.
Don’t want to be a naysayer, basher, but I’m afraid that in terms of margin, profitability and investment power, it’s worse than 60-40. The 737-7 and KC46 profitability info we get, 777x development cost and 787/A330NEO price competition do make numbers look rosy to me. A is selling thousands A321 at premiums, Scheerer looks way too self confident. https://airinsight.com/in-conversation-with-airbus-coo-christian-scherer/ Boeing accounting blocks & free cash flow don’t hide these realities.
Adding to this already heavy burden, there is a distinct possibility or probability that B will have to go and repair “many” 787s in fleet usage worldwide for the recently revealed flaw affecting the cockpit bulkhead.
That is likely to be a very costly proposition…
It really depends on how critical the gaps are. If not deemed time critical they can scatter it over time after having developed as efficient a fix as possible.
We still have to see. The fuselage shims are the same except those that had the dual combo of out of spec and wrong shims.
Have it done on a schedule aligned with the maint activities is the usual MO.
Short term its another major revenue hit as they have to fix the ones not transferred yet.
As noted previously Spirit is having to re-do front gear image that was not done right.
How they managed to let that all go wrong is astonishing.
Here is a quote from the FAA. That could change of course.
“Although it did not deem it a flight safety issue, the agency said it would review data to determine whether similar modifications should be made to in-service 787s.”
I think the write-up on the 787 should say they are slowing down for a few weeks which is not a rate cut.
What will be affected is the delivery of the built ones and Boeing is going to want to get that resolved as soon as possible as that is revenue return they badly need.
They should be able to correct the in production issue fairly quickly and may well have it in hand already, but you have the lag involved.
The T-7A was much like that. As soon as the story hit, the wing rock had been resolved.
Next the USAF changed their delay time line as the original was based on older status assessment and they did not bother to get an update (typical USAF Generals)
there is another thing. Boeing started with QC 10 years after EIS. But the 787 certification must have a QC part.
Now Boeing wants to do it with an algorythm and the FAA needs to aprove this, which should be a change of the original certification. There are many more things to think about than only the 5 fuselage issues.
Not a clue what you are trying to convey.
Part of the 787 issue is that they did not confirm the computer generated shim sizes. That is both stupid and equally is not QC (more than one way to get to a QC end).
Clearly the 787 like any aircraft is many systems inside a fuselage. As likely there will be issues down the road as there are with all aircraft.
If you are going to valid assess it you have to address the known ones and not speculate on unknowns. Or you can speculate endlessly and detract from any meaning of a post.
Or just a Boeing bash to bash Boeing vs an informed discussion on the issues.
I doubt anyone who follows the development since the grounding of eight B787 due to structural deficiency (which has dragged on for ten months) with a cool head not affected by emotion or investment interest would think it will be resolved in a matter of weeks.
I read it somewhere with the new nose issue.
Boeing isn’t allowed to deliver 787 for some time now because they changed the QC. There must be a QC part in the original certification and Boeing is restricted to use this certified QC process. Now Boeing wants to use an algorythm process to detect quality issues. The FAA is checking this new process now and Calhoun hopes that the FAA doesn’t need a full year to approve this, which is a change of the original 787 certification.
That Boeing isn’t allowed to deliver 787 now has nothing to do with the nose issue, otherwise all in service 787 would need to be checked for the nose issue too. Boeing itself doesn’t want to deliver 787 without fixed nose issue.
But at the moment Boeing can’t deliver 787 anyway because the FAA needs to approve the new QC process which is a change from the old process (even Boeing never did it before, till they started with QC 10 years after EIS).
This process is part of the certification, you can’t produce aircraft without QC.
That Boeing produced 787 aircarts for 10 years wasn’t allowed, the FAA just didn’t know that there was no QC in place. We know how that happened, Boeing self-certified it and then used undue pressure and fired the QC staff.
Did you get this now and really understand this.
Think about that most 787 in service were produced and delivered without following the certification.
For sure I won’t fly 787 aircarts.
I wonder what other regulators will do with this. To believe that these 5 fuselage issues are all issues is wishful thinking.
How about a fine, 787 aircarts are flying around the world without following the certification.
If I drive my car with uncertified parts I will not only be fined, police will take my car out of the streets.
In highly regulated industries such as pharmaceuticals and aerospace there is normally a protocol for documenting any deviations from the standard operating procedure – it’s called change control documentation and is a fundamental part of QC and certification. On the ace of it, it’s application at Boeing seems to be poorly understood and applied.
I expect that the FAA will not allow Boeing’s new algorythm QC, because, as it often happens, too many corners are cut. Calhoun might expect this too since he already mentioned year end.
It seems Boeing is trying to save money in the production process and wants to replace QC engineers with software. The only thing that has changed, the FAA stopped 787 deliveries.
How long could this take. The FAA might start with checking the original 787 QC certification documents for the first time. If this is a Boeing self-cert, could the FAA even accept the original self-cert?
More 787 orders will be cancelled, at least to negotiate a new price. How much could this aircart be worth for.
Maybe Boeing could convert 787 whitetails to freighters to compete against the A350F. Bjorn already started to bash the A350F based on assumptions, paving the way for a 787P2F.
Welcome to the new episode of The Dreamliner …
Quite correct: such protocols should, of course, also have been in force at BA.
No wonder Congress is now investigating manufacturing processes at BA.
While I fully concur anything Boeing does as far as correct 787 shim issues (or any other) regardless of what form it takes has to be proven.
Boeing has more than a algorithm problem and the FAA has or had gross deficiency in monitoring Boeing.
What only those involved know is if this is getting corrected.
What any mechanic can tell you is a repair confirms itself over time.
There have been many cases where what was thought the issue was not. Often QC that the part is bad and will fail again. Or its another part that is inducing the failure on the first part.
Nothing I have written says Boeing or the FAA get a free pass. They do not. It has to be proven out and the fix process looks to be playing out exactly that way. Planes will not be delivered until its corrected and they will continue to look at the data to see if or at what time scale the rest are inspected or done or at what line number it started.
You will recall that RR was given a pass on the Trent 1000 as they ran algorithms that just proved it could not fail any sooner than it was. It then proceeded to fail much sooner. They had two or three iterations of that program that were wrong.
Boeing nor RR should get any consideration until a parallel QC system has proven their approach acualy is correct and you maintain a cross QC check using any of the methods available.
To quote a famous president, Trust but Verify and easy on the trust part.
“I think the write-up on the 787 should say they are slowing down for a few weeks which is not a rate cut.”
From the Seattle Times:
“A [Boeing] spokesperson said the decision to cut the production rate is *only partly due to diversion of resources to deal with the new manufacturing problem. Another factor is the lack of interest from long-haul airlines in taking 787 deliveries because of the continued steep drop-off in international air travel.*”
“The FAA has not yet approved Boeing’s inspection process for the previously discovered fuselage flaws. The agency is demanding analytical data on Boeing’s proposal that it not inspect every airplane, but instead inspect a select sample of the planes.”
“These inspections are laborious, requiring mechanics to take apart some of the interior sidewalls to see the joins. Until FAA verifies that the proposed sampling protocol is acceptable, Boeing cannot deliver any of the jets”.
“The new flaw adds one more thing to be inspected and will lengthen the FAA approval process.”
Thanks for that very informative info from the Seattle Times 👍
See my post about whataboutism below
“””Boeing’s proposal that it not inspect every airplane, but instead inspect a select sample of the planes”””
How can this go through.
I thought Boeing has the data of each 787 because before they grounded only eight 787 with shim and surface issues.
Why should any regulator certify this step to less quality because Boeing is too cheap. Is this aviation or is Boeing producing garden tools.
Why even fixing the nose when they don’t inspect every 787.
Things didn’t change, Boeing is trying to cut corners everywhere.
This is how everything was handled in the past, especially with the self-certs, cutting corners everywhere.
Is anyone taking them serious.
If these QC inspections are laborious, don’t choose this design … hahaha Boeing, are they amateurs or in kindergarden.
Boeing doesn’t want to fix each 787 up to specs, they only want to get away with it, blame the pilots.
Of course Calhoun the GE boy cutting corners.
I wonder when Boeing is reaching solid ground and starts to improve.
Another two pieces from the Seattle Times
– Boeing overhauls quality controls: more high-tech tracking but fewer inspectors Jan 20, 2019
‘ Boeing envisions a new streamlined production system that builds every component and performs every task without defects from the get-go — “built right first time” — so there’s no need for every last detail to be inspected afterward.
The model is the high-volume auto-manufacturing industry, and at Boeing the transformation is spearheaded by former auto executive Gonzalez-Beltran. He joined Boeing Commercial Airplanes just over 18 months ago and has quickly accelerated implementation of the new plan. ‘
‘ On the production line tour, Boeing eagerly showed off new technology capabilities that play into its quality transformation.
Working underneath a 787 wing, mechanic Zabel slipped a thin electronic ribbon into the small gaps between the body of the aircraft and the thick metal plates that lock the fuselage to the wing. The ribbon measures the gap at the location of each of 120 bolts; based on Zabel’s measurements, Boeing fabricates precise shims to fill each one.
This used to be a more painstaking, time-consuming process, where Zabel inserted a “feeler gauge” and by trial and error determined how many thin layers of metal it took to plug each gap, then wrote down in a ledger the gap measurement at each bolt.
Now Zabel doesn’t need to write anything. The new tool connects with Boeing’s computer system via Bluetooth, automatically recording each measurement and sending the data to the shop that fabricates the shims. ‘
‘ Previously, to ensure each locking plate was secure at every point, a quality inspector would have checked Zabel’s work. When the tool was introduced those inspections continued until Boeing data showed the work was now producing few defects.
“When we first went to this system, (the quality inspectors) checked every airplane,” said Zabel. “But it’s now a proven process, so they only check periodically.”
The introduction of sampling instead of comprehensive inspections of every job is a key part of Gonzalez-Beltran’s changes.
“Instead of checking 100 percent, they will check once every 100 parts or every 1,000 parts,” he said. ‘
‘Boeing cannot move forward with such a radical shift in its manufacturing processes without the approval of the FAA.
One item in the “talking points” document says Boeing is working with the FAA “to help them understand that these changes will not jeopardize our quality, but will in fact lead to higher levels of quality.” ‘
‘ At the December union meeting, several inspectors spoke of being pressed by managers not to write up nonconforming parts or to write “pickups” for rejected parts. Instead they were urged to have defects fixed, without a record.
A violation of manufacturing procedures documented by the FAA last month offers evidence of that practice.’
‘ Two current Boeing quality inspectors who approached The Times independently of the union, and spoke without company authorization on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs, said they’re deeply worried about the changes.
The first said dropping quality inspections “is absolutely a safety issue.”
He said the supposed drop in defects used to justify reducing inspections is the result of factory managers creating “a bullying environment,” pressing inspectors to sign off on work. It’s driven by the need to keep production humming — despite what he sees as multiple instances of “poor workmanship and hidden defects.”
“They’ve sold the FAA a rotten bill of goods,” the inspector said.
The second inspector said he too doubts Boeing’s data because many older, more experienced mechanics left Boeing in the past couple of years and have been replaced with new young hires, many with almost no experience.
“I’ve seen the attitude within the ranks of the younger employees. It’s more complacent,” he said. “I’d expect more defects, not fewer.”
And he said engineering staff can override an inspector’s defect report “if it doesn’t affect fit, form or function,” so some inspectors decide it’s not worth the time and effort to write everything up.
“The defect has not gone away,” the second inspector said. “It’s just stopped being documented.”
Both inspectors cited standard safety checks that have already been dropped in some areas.
Checks that holes have been drilled precisely and accurately are no longer done. Mechanics can close up areas of the airplane without an inspector taking a final look.
And inspectors no longer check the bolts on a holding fixture used to lift large fuselage panels by crane — a safety measure added more than a decade ago when a bolt gave way and the crane almost dropped a panel onto those below. ‘
– Shortingcoming in Boeing quality-control audit draws scruntiny from inspectors, FAA Feb 1, 2019
Thanks so much Pedro,
“””Instead of checking 100 percent, they will check once every 100 parts or every 1,000 parts”””
hahaha … that made me laugh.
Nobody is forcing Boeing to produce at a high rate. If they can’t do it fast, they should take their time and work slow.
If the QC inspections are laborious because the inner sidewalls need to be opened, then Boeing should do the QC inspections BEFORE installing the sidewalls LOL
Of course Boeing crapped its bed with producing and delivering 787 without QC. Now when doing open heart surgery it takes of course much more time. Boeing needs to swallow it, no new certification should help them fixing their cheating mistakes with reduced quality.
Boeing wants to reach specs 100% with low quality inspections hahaha
Nobody is forcing Boeing to repair those aircarts, Boeing can throw them in the bin and produce new ones.
Lufthansa should pay 1/1000 only too for the aircarts.
Calhoun, did he really apply for a 1/1000 inspection freedom 🙂
Who would not agree that the fuselage joints need to be 100% according to the specs, because the load was calculated only with the specs tolerance.
If the tolerance is not met, the calculated MZFW needs to be reduced, it’s that simple. Reduce the MZFW to 80% and the 787 is useless.
The joints need to be inspected 100%, not 1%, not 0.1%. Till it’s not proven that the joints are 100% within the tolerance, reduce the MZFW to 80% to be on the safety side. I know, airlines would ground their 787 then because they are useless.
If Boeing don’t want to follow regulations they should leave aviation. 10 years without QC is a crime. Put some people in jail and set the tone. Start with Calhoun, asking for 1% inspection. How many more people need to die.
Sadly those who do not know how QC is achieved can read into a first person account its flawed.
Reality is one of the aspects of QC is to do exactly what they did, after you have proven your process is worked, verified and cross checked to a bench mark.
Clearly Boeing failed in execution but the method used is a common QC.
“””the method used is a common QC”””
Maybe for your water boilers but not in aviation and that’s why QC needs to be certified and Boeing can’t use other methods. Especially for the fuselage joints, if only 1% would be checked there might be a whole joint unchecked.
I wonder about the original QC method which was certified and if it had a value in the load calculations.
“””Reality is one of the aspects of QC is to do exactly what they did, after you have proven your process is worked, verified and cross checked to a bench mark.”””
Where has Boeing proven anything good?
First Boeing didn’t do QC for 10 years. QC is a must in regulations. In these 10 years Boeing has proven that they did QC crimes.
Then after Muilenburg, engineers got loud and 4 fuselage issues became public knowledge. Boeing needed to do open heart surgery and they complained that the original certified QC is so much work. How can the workload be reduced. Boeing applied for a software solution and want to fire more QC engineers LOL
Boeing has not proven that they can produce up to specs. Few 787 are said to be repaired, but I doubt that, the shims got smaller and the gaps got wider.
Few new 787 were produced and deliverred, but these few have proven nothing. It could just be luck because the other hundred 787 couldn’t be deliverred.
Boeing has proven that they do not want to do the work they have to do. Instead of fixing the issues, Boeing is trying to reduce the needed certified workload. Who believes that the original certificated QC was not the bare minimum already.
If the production process is NOT AUTOMATED and instead done by hand, how can inspections be reduced to 1% or even 0.1%, because some days the workers who produce with hands are still drunken from some hours ago and beside that are not really qualified workers.
I really wonder what Dickson will do. Why do I expect garbage 🙂
Charleston and Quality
There were airlines which didn’t take 787 from Charleston. It’s just opposite, QC needs to be increased in Charleston but Boeing wants to reduce it.
Producing a 787 in Charleston takes much longer and reducing QC is the way for Boeing to speed it up. It’s just the opposite, with unqualified workers the speed needs to be reduced.
QC is there to improve quality. Boeing doesn’t care about quality.
See my comment about whatever
“See my post about whataboutism below”
It is proven that Boeing is STILL in the cheating business. They say an issue is no safety problem, then FAA checks and it is of course a safety problem.
It’s unbelievable that Boeing argued in court against the victim families that the MAX was certified, so Boeing must have done everything right LOL
How can Boeing cheat and get away with the 787 mess, if the get certified that they only need to inspect 1%?
I can easily imagine two ways Boeing could use.
1) Each broken clock is right 2 times each day. If Boeing can find these 2 points they can delete 198 points which are out of spec and don’t need to do open heart surgery.
The fuselage barrel has 360 degrees. If Boeing would need to inspect every 2 deg they would need to find 2 points which are within spec. They would need to find only one point within spec because in a barrel the other point within spec is likely 180 deg opposite.
2) Boeing complained that opening the cabin sidewalls is much work. If they would need to inspect only 1%, they would not need to open the cabin sidewalls. They would need to inspect only in the cargo bay, much easier.
In the article with Beltran and Zabel, it was mentioned that management tried to push workers to change the method and don’t document mistakes.
Boeing is still in the cheating business.
Who cares if a 787 will crash in some years.
> Don’t want to be a naysayer, basher, but I’m afraid that in terms of margin, profitability and investment power, it’s worse than 60-40. <
Yes, I see that too. Including DoD stuff (benefitting Boieng) muddies the waters, as well. One of the first steps to getting
out of a bad spot is realizing fully that you're in one.
Yep. Has Boeing begun the process or ? is the question.
A whole lot less public venting by Boeing is the most obvious indicator something has changed.
It may not have to do with attitude change but someone deciding they were looking stupid going public (and or detracting).
Another aspect is the findings seem to be coming from Boeing engineers, then passed onto the FAA (and the ODA or the Boeing engineers should be doing exactly that)
Either the engineers are being allowed to do their job or management has told them to go through the 787 and clean up deficiency once and for all.
Unfortunately we are trying to read the tea leaves from the side lines and only over time will we see or some of or variations of the story gets told.
The problem as always with Boeing is their obscurity and child like lack of transparency about what they are ‘doing’
Teachers Pet- always mucky trouble, always let off by teacher, benefit of the doubt
If, really in reality, there had been any extensive serious reform in company culture, manufacture, in inspection engineering and oversight, this would be manifest, not obscure
Reflected inevitably in worker morale, ADs, client satisfaction, BA public statements, filter through to analysts
Not, the opposite of, what we are given – the idiotic comments from Chair Hal Little Blue Book We are more perfect than the one thousand perfections
It’s when you see, we see, comments like this that we know the situation is getting worse not better
Toyota does not issue PReleases extolling the Virtues of Heaven
As far as I can understand, “net zero” means 1990 levels of emissions for the aviation industry.
Has anyone done the maths for the level of traffic possible with the current fleet? You would think that governments would be thinking about how aviation grows back after the pandemic, but I have always believed that they don’t really care so we’ll be back to maximum growth.
Grubbie, this post seems to be completely out-of-place here. Did you accidently post it to the wrong article?
I ask because the EU published its far-reaching “Green Deal” environmental plans today, and your post seems to be touching on that subject — but the article above doesn’t.
I think that it’s relevant. If governments are serious about meeting these targets then they would be constraining demand for new airliners. Even more to the point, they would be trying to prevent older less efficient parked up airliners ever flying again, particularly governments with a strong interest in building new jets.
OK, thanks for clarifying the context of your original comment.
Thanks Scott for the overarching view!
The A320neo family truly & surely has been the game changer and piece de resistance in Airbus’ narrow-body market showing in the 21st century. It has effectively propelled the European plane-maker’s market dominance over Boeing given the fact that it took the A320ceo family almost 3 decades to get to 8000+ orders position (from the early 1980s to early 2010s), whereas, the A320neo family has taken almost just a decade (from its launch in Dec 2010 to 2020) to get to the relatively same level from an order intake perspective!
Aviation’s longest super cycle had a lot to do with the same. However, having truly niche products in the portfolio; like the A321neo-LR & XLR, with a definite head start & clear overmatch over competition, at precisely the right moment in time, i.e., in a favorable market cycle; has truly given Airbus an almost unassailable lead over its arch-rival in the narrow-body market and has effectively taken it to market dominance.
This one clearly has been about Airbus’ proactive strategic orientation vs. Boeing’s typical reactivity in the narrow body market which is ruling the roost now and unfortunately for Boeing, things are likely to stay that way at least over near term…
Good reference below for those looking to dig further on the fabled Aviation arch-rivalry from a longitudinal, strategy perspective:-
I don’t buy into the A320 as Airbus brilliance. It was well done and it was a major change. But those Airbus countries had been trying to come up with a single aisle competitor for a long time.
When they designed it, it was a generation ahead of what Boeing was building. Boeing handi capped itself by sticking with the 737 that was a non pylon mount (and it never was intended as what its become – it was a low end airframe and other shiny projects got the new build)
So Airbus cold see that pylon on wing was the way to go and executed it well.
The other advantage was Boeing arrogance in assuming they had the market locked. The A300 sold relatively low numbers and convinced them and the 767 seemed to confirm dominance as did the 757.
Its over time Airbus build up the A320 from ok sales to a success and then Boeing got hammered with the A330 as the next advance and again ignored single aisle (big planes are flashier)
I will add in, the A321 was a logical move but also worked out really well and continues to be the future for that end even if they replace the A320 with the A220 (or up-gauge the A320 to a MAX-8/9 area)
Yes. Its totally baffling why Boeing waited to the very end to announce the Max 10, its direct A321 competitor. It should have been the first Max model announced and the whole series should have had the undercarriage changes for that version ‘built in. Look at all the conversions they got from Max 9 orders, so they couldnt say ‘the airlines didnt want it’.
Other issues can come and go but leaving that gap in the market since 1994 ( mainly because the 757 was in production, but the A321 was shorter range then), has to go down as mega marketing mistake.
With the benefit of hindsight, every layman can believe he’s a genius.
> Yes. Its totally baffling why Boeing waited to the very end to announce the Max 10, its direct A321 competitor. <
Agreed. (I won't mention single-sensor MCAS again, because it would not be a nice thing to do.)
Airbus planes have crashed when their 3 sensors got their ‘voting’ mixed up.
Thats not the answer in itself as we know Airbus fix for the ‘3 sensor confusion’ situation is turn off the automated modes and fly manually …hahahaha
lets see what happens when the A321XLR does when it gets certified is is told goalposts have moved and finds that the 3rd sensor is now required to be a artificial driven system….
@ Bill 7
It wasn’t not just the reliance on a single sensor that caused MCAS to be a historic example of shoddy engineering: it was also the fact that it was given infinite overriding authority, despite copious prior evidence that the employed type of sensor is very prone to malfunction. It was also programmed to enact larger pitch corrections than what the FAA had been told by BA.
To add insult to injury: BA ensured that MCAS wasn’t labeled as a safety-critical system — which basically allowed it to slip through the FAA net without more scrutiny.
So, as you can see, this fiasco wasn’t just about sub-standard engineering, but it also had a dose of subterfuge.
> I don’t buy into the A320 as Airbus brilliance. It was well done and it was a major change. <
It didn't need to be- competence-plus was adequate from Airbus, since their competition was doing close-to-nothing.
They did re-wing the NG (and it's a nice wing), but that was
a long time ago..
Can Boeing step up? Not seeing clear signs of that so far;
talk [talk, talk] of an NMA /NBA family seems to be no more
Show us, don't tell us mcBoeing.
Boeing doesn’t have the money for a new plane.
– It had a pool of about $25B of borrowed cash last year, but that number is being rapidly eroded by ongoing cashburn ($3.7B in Q1 alone).
– There’s insignificant revenue being generated: 787s aren’t being delivered at all, and MAXs are being delivered at a much lower rate than initially hoped. Low production rates cause higher unit production costs. The MAX 10 and 777X won’t be delivered for at least another 2 years (nominally), if the 777X goes ahead at all.
– Going back to the markets for more loans will result in a downgrade to junk status, which will cause an increase in debt servicing costs, and also trigger an automatic exodus by certain investment/hedge funds.
Boeing issue is its not just one new aircraft that turns the corner.
This has been building for 30 years and you don’t just grab back the market which now gets Boeing under the same issue Airbus was.
When both built about equal numbers of single aisle, it was limited by production. Boeing took itself out of that with the MAX tragedy.
Monetary wise Boeing was winning with the wide body better returns, but they shot themselves in the foot on the 777X and the 787 issues while they will be overcome are not going to be viewed well. The 767 is going to take a long time to get a return on the tanker contract and a few here and there for FedEx but it sure is not going to make big bucks.
Its going to have some influence on people buying decisions between a 787 and A330NEO.
The imbalance is locked in for the next 20 years.
The 787 has never been in a positive money making position. It’s just Boeing’s use of program accounting which allowed them to book a profit on the program, in any given quarter – which carrying a $35 billion anchor.
After 1000 units they’ve got it down to somewhere in the $18 billion range, but with a lower production rate (higher fixed costs allocated over a number of units) and inventory sitting on the ramp undelivered (interest expense), their margins are shrinking by the day.
Delays in delivering aircraft only cost BA money.
I understand that.
But in that world, cash positive means they make more money than it cost to build, ergo its revenue stream if its being delivered.
Point is, it is costing Boeing money
They may never pay the program investment costs back but the more they do the less the loss.
This is the kind of on going screw up that can cost a CEO his jobn.
From investor site The Motley Fool:
“Boeing’s Struggles Continue Despite Big 737 MAX Order”
“…Looking at the first half of the year, the story is similar. Despite booking 505 gross orders for the 737 MAX, Boeing’s 737 MAX backlog has increased by just 52 units year to date.”
Boeing’s two big challenges remain
First, despite bagging another big order, Boeing has made very little progress in rebuilding its 737 MAX backlog this year. Moreover, its customer concentration has grown enormously. United Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and Ryanair now account for nearly 30% of the 3,334 737s on order. That could hurt its profitability, as large, established airlines generally negotiate lower pricing on jet purchases.
Second, the ongoing Dreamliner production problems are hindering Boeing’s efforts to rebuild its reputation. Until the company demonstrates that it can build the 787 reliably and deliver it to customers on time, few airlines will be willing to place new orders for Boeing’s top-selling wide-body model. That will force Boeing to keep production well below pre-pandemic levels for many years to come.
In short, while Boeing has won a few big orders this year, they won’t do much to get the company’s earnings and cash flow back to the highs of 2018 — or anywhere close. That will keep Boeing stock grounded for the foreseeable future.”
OK, thanks for clarifying the context of your original comment.
Boeing’s chairman spoke recently of becoming “even more perfect”. I don’t think that kind of language befits that company’s
there’s always Uncle Sugar, of course- until there isn’t.
Here is a copy of my comment in another thread that drew attention to Chairman Cal’s extremist language
Please note he fears the 787 groundings could continue for a year or so
BA cash flow, apart from semper fidelis DoD, must be down to approx zero,cash burn up from 3.2B per quarter to….?
“More Good News – More Perfect than Perfect
Re the 787 recent breakdowns, some may have missed Chairman HAL’s eulogies of BA’s manufacturing skills, which have passed over into the Sublime
Last month at a conference, the company’s chief executive Dave Calhoun said the 787s were “performing beautifully”.
However, he said “the FAA rightfully wants to know more about the analytics and process controls that we put in place, which are different than the ones that we had previously, so that we could be more perfect”.
Mr Calhoun said he hoped the FAA’s review of Boeing’s approach was “measured in months and not longer than the calendar year”.
CC is certainly a very unique Great Chairman in the Sky”
Maybe Mr. Calhoun has not noticed Uncle Sugar is having some issues of his own (the estimable Patrick Lawrence is doing some recent truth-telling, there), or maybe that
CEO is just whistling in the dark until IBGYBG-time.
I do not know, but the intentional hollowing-out of US
industry by the looting, parasite class has been an epic
crime against the American citizenry.
BA/CC has proved itself to one of the most craven of WStreet poodles – the only factor which has prevented an even higher percentage of production or supply chain offshoring to China is the residual influence of the WarCart Lobby
CC use of extremist language ‘more perfect than perfect’ to apply to another epidose of a long line of failures in management and manufacturing systems shows a CEO very far detached from reality, in denial in the vernacular, using the kind of lie which WS applies when they are ‘investing in the future of our great nation’
CC will say, as the last BA factory closes, this workforce was a shining triumph of diversity glory for our great future
Not wishing in any way to ignite political quarreling here: I post this purely in the context of trade against a broader tit-for-tat background.
With headlines like this, one can surmise that BA can forget MAX re-cert in China any time soon. And it can probably also expect a hiatus in widebody orders.
“U.S. Senate passes bill to ban all products from China’s Xinjiang”
Good link, and agree : no mx re cert no more dud 787’s neither
A little financial breakdown on what the 787 stop/start means;
BA uses program accounting to ‘smooth’ out costs incurred on a aircraft over a number of blocks (aircraft ordered). If memory serves, the block is now 1500, with some 500 remaining to be delivered.
Boeing has a balance of ~$18 billion in costs on the 787 program that must be covered by the accounting block, otherwise the program is in the red. It was at a high of some $35 billion in 2016 IIRC, but has since come down.
Here’s the sticky part;
BA has about 100 – 787’s sitting on the tarmac, undelivered. Those airframes have cost them somewhere in the region of $100 million each to produce, or $10 billion.
Time is money and since Boeing spent it’s free cash flow (to the tune of $43 billion since 2013) on stock buybacks and dividends, they now have had to go to market to borrow to cover the shortfalls.
$10 billion, at a very generous 3%, yields a monthly borrowing cost of $25 million – which incidentally is pretty close to the margin that Boeing makes on a 787. Each month that passes by, with unsold inventory sitting there – costs them one aircraft to be made and sold, without any profit margin or reduction to the accounting balance of $18 billion.
Boeing is perilously close to having to take a reach forward loss on the 787, like they on the 777X in Dec 2020 (to the tune of $6.5 billion) as well as the 737 Max – which means that none of their current programs will generate a profit.
They have also come out and said they expect to be able to deliver only 50 of those 787’s in inventory by the end of 2021.
100 – 787’s in inventory
17 – 777X’s in inventory until 2024
300? Max’s sitting in inventory for 2 years
No business wants that much stock sitting on the shelves, for that long.
Once again thanks for putting BA cash flow and sales margins into plain english
‘expect to deliver’ sums up the loss of control over their functions that BA has been festering in for years as if a dotard on death row
It’s my pleasure.
If the $18 billion number is correct and BA have 500 units to clear the balance, they have to book a profit of in the region of $36 million an airframe to break even.
Fixed costs also march on, as time ticks by – so dropping the number produced only works against them. You want your production to turn out as many units as safely possible, in as short amount of time. Each day that goes by is another that you have to pay to keep the lights on, the buildings maintained, the place insured, the taxes paid…every additional expense that goes into running any business.
A very clear summing-up of the situation.
Expanding the misery to a broader context:
– With $60 billion in debt, the present $25 billion in cash is being eroded at an unpleasant rate to cover debt servicing costs (in addition to monthly running costs).
– The MAX backlog is still suffering from significant evaporation due to cancellations / ASC606 deletions.
– Margins on recently sold MAXs are unsustainably low. Now that everyone knows there’s a fire sale at BA, it will be difficult to secure healthier margins on future sales. Moreover, lower production rates mean higher production costs per airframe, which also negatively impacts margin.
– A credit rating downgrade to junk status is still a looming threat. If this occurs, it will increase debt servicing costs further, and will adversely affect the ability to raise further funds.
– The 777X program is circling the drain, and there’s still no sign of (or money for?) a new program.
Luckily, some commenters will now explain to us how this is all mistaken: BA is swimming in cash, it’s sitting on a fortune in inventory, MAX sales are pouring in, there’s no such thing as a “reach-forward loss”, the problems with the 787 are “easily fixed”, and the 777X has a stellar future 🙂
Does BA still have 25B on hand
I understood this total sum was raised over last year in (three?) seperate amounts
But BA has burned cash over the last 12/18 mnths: latest quarter burn was 3.7B, looking to go worse for the rest of 2021
By most standards BA must be considered functionally insolvent, kept alive by DoD injections, but for all intents and purposes a zombie
But you or Frank would better than me be able to calculate the real cash position
I would have thought that the cash on hand was way below the original 25B
@Frank perhaps you have been able to work this out?
As for counting those planes sitting in the fields as assets…..well some of them could be called such, certainly are maybe perhaps, but the run of the usual clients has been through them and got their deals, are there many candidates left?
Airtravel is not going to ‘pick up’ over the next few years, except in China RCEP perhaps – and BA is going nowhere there, especially as you notified of the latest attempted ‘sanctions’
Airtravel is going to pick down international plus domestically in the US as delta (then deltaplusplus) continues to chew through the vx and the pop
The Daily Mail reported today that in England most new covid cases were of people already vxed: well 47% already and delta’s only just started taxy-in down the run way before take off
The Aus and maybe even that LoR country nextdoor have finally started to stir from their slumber as they realise bug will spread they have no vx (hardly) and the vx is not going to stop it either
Sydney in panick lo’down ‘through August’ -Hubris
What is happening in the UK, though, is that infections are ring steeply – mainly due to the delta variant while deaths and hospital admissions remain flat, indicating that the severity of infection has been greatly diminished by the vaccination programme. I think in the UK we have reached the point where Covid 19 has been tamed to the point where it has be3come a “new flu” – we’ll never get rid of it but we can live with it. The new norm will be a n annual Covid 19 booster dose given t the same time as the routine flu jab.
Numbers I’ve seen (they varied a bit from diff. sources):
1) DW reported out of 259 delta variant related deaths in UK, 116 were fully vaccinated according to PHE;
2) 257 delta related deaths in UK
118 fully vaccinated
45 partially vaccinated
At least 60% of the UK has been vaccinated with at least one of the two doses. In England (not counting Wales, Scotland and Nth Ireland) 38 million in England alone out of a population of 56 million have received one dose and 30 million two. About 10% confirmed as having had the disease and About 15% and likely 20% of the population have had COVID-19. Deaths attributed to COVID-19 in the UK about 125,000. Presumably mainly the elderly.
Of the 18 million unvaccinated I would assume 20% have had COVID-19 which means only 14.5 million out of a population of 56 million haven’t had a vaccine or a actual case of COVID. In other words about 75% of English population must have some degree of immunity from either a vaccine or an actual infection or both.
Boeing could have waited and delivered the inventory to get cash and then apply for a new QC process. Did Boeing expect that the FAA would stop deliveries. Before, the FAA didn’t stop deliveries when they were told about the self-change of the lightning protection. Would the FAA stop deliveries now, if they were informed about a change of the lightning protection. Seems Boeing went too far too many times.
Frank gives a good summary , but a reach forward loss isnt ‘perilous’ at all
‘A loss carry forward refers to an accounting technique that applies the current year’s net operating loss (NOL) to future years’ net income to reduce tax liability.’
A loss is still that, just for accounting reasons its spread over future years- no peril. They reduce profits in those years too.
> A loss is still that, just for accounting reasons its spread over future years- no peril. <
The above assumes that the entity will be a viable concern in
future years; and that profits will be available then for the mentioned purpose.
Are those safe assumptions?
Is "Program Accounting" widely used outside the US?
Here is a good (but technical) explanation of program accounting;
Here is the highlighted pitfall for Boeing:
“Program accounting allows a business to record inventory at costs that could exceed the recoverable value of the planes in inventory.”
While the term ‘reach forward loss’ has been bandied about, what actually happened was that Boeing took a one-time charge on the 777X program, which is supposed to be an unusual one off thing, due to unforeseen circumstances.
But the charge is more than just an accounting technique. The number is still there – instead this time it’s moved to the liabilities section of the b/s and is now called something like ‘Loan Payable’ or some such thing, and it comes with a nice monthly interest bill to be paid, until you get rid of it.
Boeing spent that $6.5 billion and had to borrow the cashola from someone to pay for it. Now it’s costing them…$200 million a year? Until they pay it off, because they don’t have the money.
That’s the thing – none of their 3 programs are in a position to produce margins that are going to cover the losses. If they made and sold every single plane they have on order tomorrow. Got paid for them all, according to their contracts, BCA would be in the negative.
777X – down $6.5 billion (and counting)
787 – down $18 billion (and counting)
737 Max – down $20 billion (and counting)
The margins aren’t there to cover some $45 billion.
When will BA’s debt be downgraded to “junk”??
Thanks again for sorting this out
As misused by BA, This accounting technique presents as hazardous and confusing to the outside world
The basis of the accounting program is an intelligent spreading out of costs accounting for heavy up front initiation investments required for a long term industrial project
Such sober accounting left in BA weak heads and hands falls/degenerates into kicking the can down the road
Fools the company too, and the cheerleaders here who want to be fooled
Your précis of the BA cash and program situation is entirely accurate, the company is running on empty
Hence – The pitiful attempts to copy certain Toyota production techniques and sell these as signs BA was running an efficient manufacture, er.. ‘world class’
Hence – the firesale of the Max to the usual suspects, and the upcoming firesale required for the 787
Firesale merely puts a small number of airlines in effective control of BA prices and production, while lowering the values of the planes to other clients, and condemning BA to be a low cost producer with a high cost industrial base
To make up the shortfall BA is in absolute need to borrow cash (no one will step in, no strategic investor available) so entirely dependent on WS, who’s interests are wholly parasitic
This as bad as it gets : a text book illustration of how to destroy a once functional company
Boeing presents its financial numbers in BOTH program and unit accounting methods.
Why cant the stupid get that into their heads as its been mentioned and mentioned over and over…..
Sorry. “Loss carry forward” is a totally different animal from “reach-forward loss” in program accounting. Sigh.
Financial dictionaries say they are the same thing- forward loss is a forward loss…amigo , your chihuahua is all bark and no bite like you all sombrero and no tequila ( no Pedro either)
Of importance to CoViD air traffic recovery:
“Israel is offering a third Pfizer shot amid spiking cases, even as the U.S. says it’s not yet needed”
Evidently, the on-the-ground experience in Israel points to the need for boosters — at least for certain segments of society.
Earlier this week, Israel indicated that the “on-the-ground” efficacy of the Pfizer vaccine was 64% (as regards preventing infection; protection was higher as regards serious illness / hospitalization).
All this points to a slower recovery of air traffic, and perhaps the (partial) abandonment of “vaccine certs”.
This is worse news for BA than for AB, since MAX orders can be canceled without penalty.
As usual out of context
“All this points to a slower recovery of air traffic, and perhaps the (partial) abandonment of “vaccine certs”.
This is worse news for BA than for AB, since MAX orders can be canceled without penalty.”
Missed that bit, did you?
Weird Airbus fan boy silver lining.
It is bad for the industry.
Max cancellations bad for the industry you say
But no actually it’s not, it does no industry no good to be known for such a poor and dangerous product, one smuggled through the regulator with corrupt practice
More important – Mx cancellations are good for keeping passengers alive
Or had you forgotten the reason why the max is cancelled and still un re certed in many countries
You do not have to like AB to dislike BA, you just have like a decent plane
Wall Street Journal:
“Boeing’s CEO Is Trying to Overcome Problems. New Ones Keep Cropping Up.”
@cirium data shows @BoeingAirplanes has delivered 132 #737Max since ungrounding 7 months ago, the majority (61%) to North America where Southwest has highest tally (34). Europe took 20% of deliveries, but just 2 have gone to operators in APAC, where type remains largely grounded
“Thirty years ago, Boeing held a 60% market share over its competitors, McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus. Today, there is no McDonnell Douglas and Airbus has the 60%+ lead over Boeing. The reversal of fortune for Boeing is stunning when one thinks about it.”
Even more stunning when you consider that today’s “Boeing” is really Boeing+MD (or, as some would point out, MD+Boeing). Presumably circa 1990 Boeing+MD had more like a 80% market share over Airbus.
Put that that BA decline looks terminal
Boeings production lines in those late 1990s were in a shambles too. perhaps you have forgotten the shutdown of the FALs in 1997.
The core of that was too many orders and antiquated systems overseeing a vast labour force….oh and bad management.
Seems what was once practised in the east is now widely adopted here. Haha.
– The technique or practice of responding to an accusation or difficult question by making a counteraccusation or raising a different issue
– it is considered a form of the logical fallacy called tu quoque, Latin for “you also”—more like “And so are you!” in contemporary speech. The idea, here, is that a person charged with some offense tries to discredit the accuser by charging them with a similar one or bringing up a different issue altogether—none of which is relevant to the original accusation. It’s basically like blowing a raspberry at someone and saying, “I know you are, but what am I?” Classy, right?
– The term whataboutism dates back to 1978, when it applied to propaganda techniques used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Put like that BA decline looks terminal
It is and self inflicted.
But also keep in mind Boeing got nothing from MD on the commercial side, it was the military side that put Boeing into the defense business again.
And you have the AH-64, FA-18, F15 etc going onto this day returning revenue.
A weird dichotomy of how its all played out, going with MD slash and burn management has done them huge failure on the Commercial side.
Boeing will be lucky to get back to 40%. Revenue wise it may go a bit higher than that if the 787 gets corrected and the 777X succeeds though that is an iffy case.
“But also keep in mind Boeing got nothing from MD on the commercial side, it was the military side that put Boeing into the defense business again.”
Conventional wisdom is that MD “bought” Boeing using Boeing’s money…and I certainly wouldn’t say that MD got nothing from Boeing on the commercial side!
Regardless, there were still 1,000 deliveries of MD commercial aircraft from 1990 onwards (MD-80/90/95/11), and even if Boeing bought a competitor and shut down their existing product lines, as the dominant player they should certainly expect to take most of the ex-competitor’s customers. Otherwise, why are they buying and shutting it down?
All the MD Military assets as Boeing strategy (or MD) was to split into two areas so that one could offset the other.
In that regard it worked.
I know of one other take over that they taken over company had its whole management team moved into control.
In that case (equipment mfg) the dominant company realized the other side had far better management but not the scale.
The resulting company is still doing well. Sadly this is not how its worked out for Boeing commercial.
The legacy parts and support on the Commercial side is also a lucrative sideline. They made a lot of revenue off it and they did make the 717 for a while (156).
If they had not brought in MD management it would have been a very good move.
Short term momentum worked but we see the end result of the slash and burn profit goals.
I have followed the competition between Airbus and the US aircraft manufacturers for a long time. I see it as a competition of cultures and I’ve been interested to see how it plays out over the long run. My interest started when the UK didn’t join the project, and that in itself is a competition of cultures. There is much more to be said about that.
Just one point is that the US is seen as the home of capitalism, but every industry does its best to avoid competition. That is why we see the merger of all the competitive aircraft manufacturers into Boeing McD and them also restricting competition by going single source for engines.
Europe is more the place of co-operation, with many companies having significant parts in Airbus production. Boeing did have multiple suppliers for 787 but apart from the problems that caused, it was more of chief with minions than co-operation. The single source for A350 engines was not the wish of Airbus !
I think we might have got to the present situation sooner were it not for the success of the original 777. I’ve got to say that the idea of being 6 hours from land when half your engines fail still troubles me, but so far it has been a roaring success which Airbus had to copy.
In fact Airbus lead the way with twin engine ops selling A300 in Asia (I acualy flew one back in the 80s from Taiwan to Philippines and was impressed with it)
I sure did not like two engines over all that ocean!
But I don’t know 4 engines has saved anyone and back in the prop days more than one aircraft came down with a runaway prop (I saw a ditching as a kid off Sitka AK as it was mandated to ditch if you could not control the prop and they did successfully) .
UK is part of the Airbus project so am confused by that?
But I agree that the US has corrupted capitalism into a regulatory capture and rather than compete cut back until a disaster strikes (Maconda to the MAX) and it gets reigned back but usually not all the way.
The social science people refer to people believes as Myths and the US is full of those rugged individuals having made themselves a success when in fact it was on the backs of the country and others.
Where it all goes is a concern.
The UK was not involved at Government level, and as I remember refused to join after the experience of Concord(e). Yes, a British company is involved, and the wings are made in UK, but they are a minor partner compared to the Germans and the French.
The issue with A300 versus 777 is ETOPS, where Boeing was successful in getting an extension which allowed Trans Atlantic and even Trans Pacific with only two engines
I get that part but the wings are the single biggest aspect of an aircraft.
I don’t recall what the details were but I believe the UK put equivalent launch air into the factory for the wings.
Germany, France and Spain did directly as well as country specific money.
On a follow up, the UK did “loan” Airbus around 400 million on the A350.
That aside from the support for the UK Wing factory.
Me, I paid a high rate of interest at the time for our house as I was solvent, go figure.
The UK has been part of Airbus from the very beginning, via Hawker Siddeley, their ‘work share’ was the wing design and build – which continues, but not exclusively, to this day (the A320 wing build are farmed out to Asia).
A350 has an exclusive deal for engines with RR, so I dont see how you say Airbus didnt want that.
“FAA orders checks on 9,300 Boeing 737 planes for possible switch failures”
“WASHINGTON, July 15 (Reuters) – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Thursday issued a directive to operators of all Boeing Co (BA.N) 737 series airplanes to conduct inspections to address possible failures of cabin altitude pressure switches.”
p.s. Duke, we know that this is just another “routine AD”, right? However, please do tell us if you find something similar for another OEM on Reuters or FG.
Come on, they got a price on surplus switches from Crazy Louie’s. Profits, man. This is the new way of doing business. Kind of like Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School. It’s amazing what you can get away with when you are immoral and have no oversight… They cut the Humanities requirement for Boeing’s leadership. Obviously, these @#$&s didn’t read Arthur Miller’s All My Son’s…
Here’s more on the switches issue for those who can’t get behind the Reuters paywall. The issue is all over the aviation/general press this morning:
“Reuters reports that Boeing had initially reviewed the issue and its expected failure rate (at an unspecified date), finding that it did not pose a safety issue.
However, the FAA and Boeing, after subsequent investigation and analysis, determined in May that “the failure rate of both switches is much higher than initially estimated, and therefore does pose a safety issue.” For its part, the FAA notes that it does not have enough information to determine the cause of this unexpectedly high failure rate.”
Sadly this is blown out of proportion. AD get sent on these kind of issues all the time.
It affects Airbus (remember the Thales Pitot Tubes?) as well as Boeing and any other mfg.
In no way out of proportion.
The AD stems from revised FAA / BA calculations of the failure probability of a switch pair. The revised calculation — and its different outcome — is very newsworthy. One has to ask why the original calculation yielded a different result, and why the calculation was revisited.
Its a waste of time to deal with Bryce ( Its a shame you maintain your ignorance of how aviation and regulators work as clearly you are a bright person)
Sadly he goes for snotty snap response that is not based in facts. But for others who want to get some understanding of aviation and various preprocess its worth addressing.
Issues like this are often found. The re-inspection on the switches is 2000 hours. All aircrat have various AD on them with time limits as to when they are to be addressed.
Its a matter of data and when the data says you were wrong on longevity, you shorted the failure to a safe timeline. Its a good question why this was not found out sooner.
And example is TBO on engines. In fact that was often 2500 hours though they started sooner in that case and then extended it as the engines proved (if they did) to exceed it (data over time) that it would consistently safely maintain its clearances.
I know of one case where the TBO was 2500 (rough from memory), but they found a oil pump rotor had a flaw in it and the oil pump had to be replaced at something like 1500 hours regardless of the rest of the engine TBO.
The rotor would go longer, but safe was 1500 hours.
At that point you did a TBO and got it all up to equal and you were reset at 2500 hours (to replace the pump rotor you were into the engine all the way and a large part of of the overhaul expense is in tear down and assembly)
The Thales Pitot were proven poor and under service. The issue was it was deemed (per Airbus) we have 3 and you only need one good working one).
So they were replacing one.
Those are the decisions that the AHJ make all the time. Most times they are correct (or get lucky) sometimes they are behind the curve.
Machinery does not know anything about quips. Its a world of its own with a discipline many don’t have the experience with to understand.
I don’t do accounting, that is not a knock, what is a knock is the refusal to educate yourself and learn at lest to some degree.
Frank discusses accounting and does a good job. What he fails to mention is the Program accounting is also a tax dodge.
While Boeing paid tens of billion dividend and share buy back under that sytem, you never pay taxes. either you keep bringing product on line and there is always the write off or in this case you screw up so badly your losses will be there forever and you write them off in blocks.
If its allowed it should be tightly restricted.
@TW: tone it down.
Trying to vent personal frustrations by going on a rant against @Bryce is not going to change the fact that — to date — this AD has been reported/discussed by at least 20 news outlets (listed below). That’s quite some achievement for a “routine AD”. If you wish to believe that this is “much ado about nothing” then that’s your personal choice; the world press thinks differently on the matter.
– ALERT FAA orders operators to inspect more than 9,300 Boeing 737s worldwide *** AIRLIVE.net, 21:17 Fri, 16 Jul
– Boeing 737 to undergo mandatory inspections after safety switch malfunction *** UPI, 20:12 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA mandates inspections of Boeing 737 switches that could pose safety risk *** ABC News, 18:05 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA Orders Inspections of All Boeing 737 Cabin Pressure Sensors After Switch Failures *** NBC Connecticut, 17:53 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA Requires More Tests for Boeing 737s
*** Manufacturing.net, 17:21 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA Warning: Boeing 737 Switches Could Pose Safety Risk
*** Entrepreneur Magazine, 16:17 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA Calls For Boeing 737 Cabin Pressure Switch Inspections
*** Aviation International News, 15:29 Fri, 16 Jul
-All Boeing 737 models to be affected by new FAA directive
*** AeroTime Hub, 11:01 Fri, 16 Jul
– Boeing 737s to be inspected over fears of altitude pressure switches failing in 9,300 planes *** Mail Online, 10:44 Fri, 16 Jul
– Boeing ordered to check 9,000 737s for switch failures
*** City AM, 09:24 Fri, 16 Jul
– Possible Switch Failures Prompt Inspections Of Boeing 737s Worldwide *** Simple Flying, 07:23 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA to require more frequent testing of low cabin pressure warning systems on Boeing 737s *** The Hill, 03:55 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA orders inspections of Boeing 737 cabin air sensors
***American Journal of Transportation, 03:43 Fri, 16 Jul
– US requires more tests for safety switches on Boeing 737s
*** The Olympian, Washington, 03:03 Fri, 16 Jul
– US requires more testing of warning system on Boeing 737s
*** The State, South Carolina, 01:52 Fri, 16 Jul
– F.A.A. tells airlines to inspect Boeing 737 switches that could pose a safety risk. *** The New York Times, 01:41 Fri, 16 Jul
– U.S. FAA orders inspections of Boeing 737 cabin air sensors
*** The Seattle Times, 01:31 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA orders airlines to test pressure switches in all 737s, citing risk of failure *** FlightGlobal, 00:46 Fri, 16 Jul
– U.S. FAA Orders Inspections of all Boeing 737 Cabin Air Sensors
*** BNN Bloomberg, 00:39 Fri, 16 Jul
– FAA orders checks on 9,300 Boeing 737 planes for possible switch failures *** Reuters, 23:22 Thu, 15 Jul
I had been seeing what I thought were far worse, but noted.
Your point of view is correct
There is no point in dismissing all these ADs as routine, if no one else does, i.e. the Press The Industry, Congress etc
There is certainly even less point if Boeing dismisses all these failures as routine – which they do given how many of them there are
Maybe that IS (in capitals) the point – failure at BA IS routine
Yes another routine AD , this is one of latest issued recently like they do every week.
‘The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the auxiliary power unit (APU) aft fuel pump printed circuit board (PCB) varnish had deteriorated”
poor quality varnish …how cheap as is that.
The Man from Qi finds the sky falling in all the most mundane things
Now try to find one where:
– A past calculation was re-visited, for some unknown reason;
– The outcome of the calculation was radically different;
– An AD was issued covering almost 10,000 airframes;
– The world press ran the story.
I’m sure you’ll have managed that within a few hours.
Big questions here:
– Who decided to revisit the calculation, and why?
– Did someone discover past fraud or a short-cut? Did someone get a troubled conscience?
– Has the FAA secretly started a policy of revisiting all such prior calculations? If so, is this based on nervousness?
– Why was the outcome of the calculation so different the second time round?
Just another “routine AD”, of course.
now think about all Boeing self-certs
and that’s why the MAX crashed.
July 14, 2021 said:
“..Airbus planes have crashed when their 3 sensors got their ‘voting’ mixed up.
Thats not the answer in itself as we know Airbus fix for the ‘3 sensor confusion’ situation is turn off the automated modes and fly manually …hahahaha..”
Too bad the MAX pilots did not have the option to turn just
off MCAS.. “you just turn these here trim wheels (both of yuns), then do this, then do that, then do the other.. ”
We all know MCAS was a colossal stuff- but at least the problem has been recognised and solutions found. Thats news from 18 months ago!
Whats Airbus solution for ‘corrupt election between 3 sensors’ then ? Will it still be a primary cause in crashes and the pilots get the blame
‘ In this specific case, this programming logic led to the rejection of the correct value from the one operative AOA sensor, and to the acceptance of the two consistent, but wrong, values from the two inoperative sensors. This resulted in the system’s stall-protection functions responding incorrectly to the stall, making the situation worse, instead of better.’
Many things can be improved, but do you agree that three is better than two, when the MAX two in realitiy are still only ONE, the other turns it only off in certain cases and in one case the MCAS drama can even start again. But Bjorn said the MAX is safe …
I would prefer A320 always and avoid MAX always.
Different aircraft systems, Airbus is FBW which will require a much higher level of backup as there is higher levels of control based on sensor inputs. The result is that 3 sensors of the same type based on the same general location isnt safe enough.
Like I said, EASA should raise the same red flag about A321XLR doing the same old same old failed ‘3 amigos’ sensors when they want a new synthetic AOA for the same size Max 10.
The A350 has already migrated away from the AOA setup used on the A320/A330; don’t jump the gun yet as regards what the A321XLR will have:
“In case of pitot probes, the A350 has three Multi functional probes (MFP) which can measure total pressure, angle of attack and total air temperature. These three MFPs are connected to the three ADIRS. On the left side of the aircraft you also have an extra Angle of attack (AOA) sensor which is used for Load alleviation function (LAF) where the wing spoilers come up to reduce loads on the wings. It uses AOA data to check the wing loads in maneuvering at high angles of attack. This AOA sensor is connected to ADIRS 1 and does not really feed data into it but it uses ADIRS for anti ice function. In A320/ A330 we have three pitot tubes unlike multi functional probes found in A350 and three Angle of attack sensors. All of them are used to provide flight data and are connected to ADIRS 1,2 and 3. Because there are no MFPs you need separate probes for pitot pressure and AOA data.
The other difference is, in A320/ A330 there are TAT probes. Two of them. In A350 there are OAT (Outside air temperature) probes. The MFPs in A350 calculates TAT, so it does not need separate TAT probes. In A320/ A330, the TAT probes also can measure the Static air temperature (SAT) which is OAT. Hence, it does not require OAT probes. Addionally, there are two ice detector sensors on both the A350 and the A320/ A330.
There are extra three sensors on the A350 which are not found in A320/ A330 and they are the side slip angle sensors. They are used to provide side slip angle data for ADIRS to add side slip corrections their calculations.”
No, EASA didn’t say that a 3rd sensor is a must. IIRC two sensors with some additional improvements were enough for them too.
Later FAA gave EASA and Transport Canada free choices of improvements (they made the deal) and both didn’t ask for the moon.
Boeing needed to convince other regulators too and that is easier with a 3rd sensor. But even the future MAX 3 sensor configuration won’t do voting.
Why even all that, LNA said the MAX is safe. But then Boeing could not start the engines of the “most scrutinized plane ever”. That was pure luck that it didn’t happen in flight with an US airline.
The required reliability of a sensor is driven by the consequences of its failure. In one Corner Bjorn an example of a trim-tab that mitigates dutch-roll. This is driven by a single sensor. But but that’s fine since the authority of the trim tab is well below that of the flight controls.
In the case of MCAS a single sensor could drive near unlimited pitch input and ultimately making the aircraft uncontrollable. This should have been caught doing failure analysis but was not.
The primary change Boeing made is to limit the maximum pitch the sensor can drive. That is why three sensors with voting are not mandated.
Don’t you think that reliable AOA readings have other (critical) uses than just in the context of MCAS?
MCAS doesn’t work with the AP on, but the AP needs reliable AOA values.
Sure, 3 voting sensors were not mandated for MCAS.
But there are other systems which still rely on only a single AOA sensor. Before MCAS2.0, the PF could switch to the other pilot with the other AOA sensor to fix the problem. This switching is not possible anymore. For other systems which rely on a single AOA sensor is no switching available now too, so it got even worse for other systems.
I believe that is totally wrong.
Aspects have changed, the two AOA now report to a separate program that in turn disables MCAS 2.0 if they disagree by more the 5%.
There is also a sub set in there of beyond real values that either does the same thing or discounts that AOA.
The core system of swapping to the other side for control is still valid. Each AOA feeds into the same side as its pilot is on and remains a separate feed.
There is also the backup system via a third Pitot and static port that feeds the backup instruments for speed sensing (no AOA).
The absurd thing is I have yet to see anyone list a valid reason for AOA. In fighter jets its a relevant to extreme attitudes that a LCA will never get into (or in the case of total disorientation makes no difference)
AOA is a legacy of so many miltary pilots going into the commercial world they kept asking for it and it was put on (737Classic of NG era I believe)
The 707, 737, 727 did not have it. I don’t know about 747
Reading in depth on the pressure bulkhead, its in the hose section.
That puts the issue as a Spirit one (Boeing is accountable /responsible for it regardless)
But that does put two of the shim issues into Spirit control which makes it interesting that both Boeing and Spirit had the same problems.
Something of a double whammy as Spirit QC failed as did Boeing oversight of what Spirit built.
The core fix is at Spirit in Kansas though Boeing will have to fix however many are deficient in Charleston (and or fly some to Everett for fix)
At the heart as well is two Boeing failures in their own build and ensuring what others build is up to specification (or is meeting the QC)
Yes Spirit, but Spirit built what Boeing designed and it seems it’s not a good design and since Boeing wasn’t interested to put QC in place, it’s an expensive design, sucking the last blood out of Boeing.
Did I read 2 years ago during the MAX grounding, that Spirit had no engineering in place? Then all engineering must have come from Boeing anyway. Then it’s only a Boeing thing and Spirit the slave who works for them.
This match with other things I read. For the 787 Boeing was searching for the cheapest producers, doesn’t matter if those had experience or not, just the cheapest, a slave is good enough, who can be forced to cut prices from time to time.
Unfortunate you can’t separate you dislike for Boeing or its products from .
Boeing will produce a minimum of 1500 x 787 before its all done and more likely 2000.
The 1000 they have delivered mostly kept flying during the deepest cuts for aircraft ops.
Its one grounding was the battery issue and that was a long time ago. None sense, its dispatch rate has been top notch.
Its biggest out of service problem was the RR Trent 1000 engines. Not something Boeing has ANY control over (engines are separately certified by the mfg)
There is no question that Boeing has management problems and those have cascaded into the product line and were fatal on the two MAX crashes.
So dislike away, it does not make it any where near the truth.
What Leon says is consistent with what a high-profile BA whistleblower has said about the 787.
And the 787 recently had a second (limited-number) grounding — aviation history’s first ever grounding due to a manufacturing quality issue.
Boeing delivered a 787 Dreamliner to Turkish Airlines on Friday, the >>first handover of that jet in more than five weeks<<.
However, that plane was issued its airworthiness certificate and cleared for delivery last fall. That was before 787 deliveries were initially halted in October following the discovery of defects at the fuselage joins on some aircraft due to a manufacturing issue.
A Boeing official said Turkish chose to postpone the delivery in order for the verification and inspection activities on the fuselage joins to be completed.
Otherwise, the current stoppage in 787 deliveries remains in place.
“The airplane delivered last week was ticketed for delivery prior to our current pause, and was being held at Boeing at the customer’s request,” Boeing said in a statement. “We continue to work closely with our customers and regulators through the current ticketing delay.”
The Federal Aviation Administration still hasn’t approved a proposal by Boeing to use statistical sampling to inspect for the potential defects at the fuselage joins.
All of sixteen 787s delivered since last October, IIRC- please correct me if I'm wrong.
You really should look at what Spirit makes for Airbus, of course its all Airbus engineers doing the work, it makes so much sense.
This comment proves Leon’s point exactly.
The fact that Spirit is able to make products without issues for other OEMs indeed points to the fault being with the spec/data supplied to Spirit by BA.
When one can’t blame pilots…just blame suppliers instead.
Maybe Airbus QC inspections are more through than Boeing’s?
> Maybe Airbus QC inspections are more through than Boeing’s? <
Or something.. ( I hear you).
The distinction I believe is that Airbus lets its engineers do their jobs and its not a cut cost at all cost approach.
There are a number of ways to achieve a QC goal. The key is you have to prove they work and you have to keep a monitor on the process to ensure it has not gone out of compliance.
Boeing seems to have instituted a shim build system that failed to do confirmation. It may have drifted over time or not worked right at all.
Interesting that Spirit as a totally separate operation, has those same shim issues.
You always question your process and look for ways to confirm its working or test it in other ways to see if it has holes.
An example would be a shim that is specified to be .005 +/- .002.
If you make shims that are .0005, you never come close to the .002
The key is you have to have a process that ensures that the .0005 is maintained.
Statistically you can ensure that and then do spot checks (which seems to be Boeing approach). Nothing wrong with that if you have a proven process (where it seems to have failed)
Or you can test each and every shim and insertions. That is time consuming but you do it if you have to.
Usually its a mix of various QC approach depending on the aspect.
Using people and feelers is also subject to a issue of how well its applied.
Try doing a valve set. You get a range of the gauge won’t go, to the gauges has no resistance. But in between there is a feel of a bit of resistance but not too much. Its done by feel.
In that case valve set has enough latitude the error in the feel is not going to be an issue, the valve set is not that critical.
That is why computer sensing is better as it removes the feel aspect. It has to be done and done right and crank you the right shim sizes which looks to have been Boeing issue.
How that went wrong is a story unto itself.
Modest Irkut ramp-up plans:
“United Aircraft aims for annual production rate of 36 MC-21s by 2025
United Aircraft is aiming to reach an annual production rate of 36 aircraft for the Irkut MC-21 by 2025, and double this figure within the following two years.”
Another interesting article on the continuing 787 manufacturing quality saga:
FG: “New 787 issue casts fresh uncertainty over production rates, deliveries and possible forward loss”
“Boeing’s latest 787 manufacturing issues and associated production cut has raised more uncertainty about the programme, leaving analysts unclear about production rates, the pace of regulatory approval and whether the airframer might take another financial charge against the programme.”
What Boeing *ought to be* saying to the FAA, at present, is “we’ll
do it precisely as instructed by you, the regulators.”
Instead from Boeing it’s a version of “We got this, dudes..”, which is not borne out by the ongoing facts (MAX, KC-46, 787 fuselage/rudder, 777x cert..).
Another commenter here has recently astutely opined that — now that self-cert is no longer an option — BA just doesn’t know the way any more.
> ..now that self-cert is no longer an option — BA just doesn’t know the way any more. <
Seems like a good fit- maybe Boeing will show us otherwise.
Boeing is going to have to prove it but also Spirit is going to have to up their game as well.
> but also Spirit is going to have to up their game as well. <
They seem to be doing an ok job for AB. Evidence to the contrary is welcome.
Spirit builds the front fuselage ‘barrel’ section , but who builds the 787 cockpit bulkhead item ?
These bulkheads , front and rear, are usually from a 3rd supplier
I honestly do not know, but the issue as stated (could be wrong) is the shims not the bulkhead build as that was not cited as out of specification (the rear fuselage had both shim and out of specification)
Yes Spirit builds parts for Airbus and at least no reported issues.
We probably never will get the full story on Boeing or Spirit end, they just will correct it.
The airframe assemblies Spirit does for Airbus are very limited, apart from its just bought plant in Northern Ireland , from Bombardier, which plays a big part in the A220.
“””Boeing will show us”””
The last days, when reading about Boeing problems, I recognized that Boeing said about an issue that it is not a safety problem, then FAA checked and it was a safety problem. I read this not only once, not only twice and about different issues.
It seems Boeing starts always with the view that there is no safety problem. Why can’t Boeing get the right view at the first time, while the world is watching this. Is there anything Boeing can do right at the first time.
KC-46 doesnt have any certification issues – its a military plane
the 777X hasnt been certified yet , any issues are normal in the test flying program which is required by certifiers
Max has been certified in FAA-EASA system after fixing the gross error in the MCAS system
> KC-46 doesnt have any certification issues the 777X hasnt been certified yet , any issues are normal in the test flying program which is required by certifiers Max has been certified in FAA-EASA system <
Indeed. And Asia?
No mention of Boeing's putative cash-cow, so I won't either.
You guys seem to ‘work in unison’ by your coordinated comments, is it the same $%^@ farm ?
If fact the KC-46 has certification issues (or had) as they were running the program under FAA/EASA cert process. The Wing pods had some kind of problem. Not sure about any other aspects.
The A400 did the same EASA certification route.
I have yet to see a reason for doing it that way. Clearly there is some reason but I have yet to see one listed, just that they were.
The military tankers derived from civilian airframes could be plugged into the existing civilian spares, repairs and maintenance system ( which is FAA etc certified as well). This was the reason for going down that route. Drogues and booms are a military only use , so not sure how those items work, but all the other changes to cockpits, extra fuel tanks etc are checked off as compliant
Mx re certed in the small markets, US and EU
Planes are sold at near or below cost
But no re cert in the big markets, Asia, where the money is: looking increasingly unlikely
The KFC not fit for combat warcart is a certified dead duck, the laughing stock of the industry, and one which will cost BA almost as much as the Max, if BA ever gets close to fixing it before BA is shut down
>KC-46 doesnt have any certification issues – its a military plane the 777X hasnt been certified yet , any issues are normal in the test flying program which is required by certifiers <
Not sure what the above means, but pretty sure the 777x
was scheduled for EIS quite awhile back.
Any thoughts on the 787?
There was an engine issue with 777X which delayed the first flight for some time. Covid has delayed ‘everything for everyone’ as well.
I would say Boeing is slowing the certification process down as well for cash flow reasons- they are still building new ones which is eating up cash. FAA is looking deeper than they normally would because Boeing trashed their own reputation. But tell me about any significantly new plane that sails smoothly through certification in the last 15 years
The A350 had a very smooth certification.
“The A350’s maiden flight took place on 14 June 2013 from the Toulouse–Blagnac Airport. Airbus’s chief test pilot said, “it just seemed really happy in the air…all the things we were testing had no major issues at all.”
A350 XWB msn. 2, underwent two-and-a-half weeks of climatic tests in the unique McKinley Climatic Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in May 2014, and was subjected to multiple climatic and humidity settings from a high of 45 °C (113 °F) to as low as −40 °C (−40 °F).
The A350 received type certification from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) on 30 September 2014. On 15 October 2014, EASA approved the A350-900 for ETOPS 370, allowing it to fly more than six hours on one engine and making it the first airliner to be approved for “ETOPS Beyond 180 minutes” before entry into service. Later that month Airbus received regulatory approval for a Common Type Rating for pilot training between the A350 XWB and A330. On 12 November 2014, the A350 received certification from the FAA
For history sake, Airbus made massive changes on the A350 after build 17.
That would be as a result of lessons learned and things changed.
It does not mean the first 17 were bad aircraft, but it was a huge learning curve.
Boeing also had its early teens issues on the 787. Equally new with CRFP .
The -8 was never fully corrected and built to -9/10 specifications.
Assuming the 40% market share for Boeing is real, I would be interested to know how much of that market share was propped up with aggressive pricing. I have a feeling the split might be 2:1 if Boeing were solving for the same sales profits as Airbus
DoU: rob was smoother, but I do like your approach better.
Both two a penny
DoU said to Bill7: “You guys seem to ‘work in unison’ by your coordinated comments, is it the same $%^@ farm ?”
Which “you guys”, Duke? I’m a party of one- as they say-
and work in coordination with no one; nor do I (or will I) receive any compensation for my comments, from any entity.
Just some dude in California paying attention as the financialized Boeing-ship [needlessly] goes down.. it didn’t have to be this way.
‘It did’nt have to be this way’
It was inevitable given the current and recent US conditions of ruling class exploitation
And the structure of capitalism which progresses country to country sucking each dry
The virus is capitalism not nature
> The virus is capitalism not nature <
Something like that, yes. See the dude everyone's either deeply discrediting or studiously ignoring and his comments on "falling rate of profit"..
I have no answers, except hunker down and read Li Po.
Li Po the chinese poet, longing for the motherland still, are you
More conspiracy theories.
You’ve now accused at least 5 people here of being covert Chinese operatives.
It seems to be your standard reaction to opinions that are dissonant with yours.
DoU said to Bill7: >Li Po the chinese poet, longing for the motherland still, are you <
"Oh Dear: a *Chinese* writer!"
commies under the bed I think.. gotta go check.
Don’t worry about this – it’s a distraction
””Oh Dear: a *Chinese* writer!”
commies under the bed I think.. gotta go check.”
not the most brightest statement, but in style:
What did your forebears achieve 1300 years ago in comparisson?
On investor site The Motley Fool:
“Airbus Trounces Boeing on Deliveries Again in June
Despite the 737 MAX’s return to service, Airbus continues to run circles around Boeing.”
“Earlier this month, Airbus reported that it delivered 77 commercial jets in June. That marked its best month of the year, topping the 72 jets it delivered in March.
Additionally, while the best-selling A320 family always accounts for the bulk of Airbus’ deliveries, the company benefited from a healthier mix last month. Airbus delivered 15 wide-body jets in June — 11 A350s, two A330neos, one A330-200, and one A380 — along with five A220s and 57 A320-family jets. By contrast, its 50 deliveries in May included just five wide-bodies.
Airbus’ June deliveries thrashed Boeing’s performance yet again. Boeing delivered 45 jets last month: 35 737s, four 767s, five 777s, and one 787. Weak demand for the 737 MAX and newly discovered defects impacting the roughly 100 undelivered 787s in Boeing’s inventory contributed to the sizable gap in the two aircraft manufacturers’ deliveries.
Sadly, June was a good month by Boeing’s recent standards. The company handed over just 34 commercial jets in April and May combined, mainly due to a long pause in 737 MAX deliveries. And despite the recertification of the 737 MAX in most markets — with the notable exception of China — Boeing delivered only 156 jets in the first half of 2021: barely more than half of Airbus’ total.
After factoring in cancellations and adjustments to its estimates of orders that are unlikely to completed, Boeing recorded 267 net orders in the first half of the year. Airbus’ year-to-date net order total stands at 38 units, having finally reached positive territory for the year thanks to United’s late-June order for 70 A321neos.
However, Boeing’s 2021 order advantage has barely made a dent in its long-running backlog deficit compared to its top rival. Airbus ended June with 6,925 unfilled orders, far ahead of Boeing’s 4,166-unit backlog.
*** In the first quarter, Airbus generated positive free cash flow of 1.2 billion euros ($1.4 billion). Meanwhile, Boeing burned another $3.7 billion.
Given that its commercial jet deliveries increased significantly last quarter compared to Q1, Airbus could post even stronger free cash flow when it reports its earnings. By contrast, Boeing’s slow pace of deliveries dooms it to another quarter of high cash burn. ***”
In reply to a query that you made above, it indeed seems that the figure of $25B for available cash at BA has considerably shrunk: in the first quarter alone, it decreased by $3.7B
For some reason no A220s have been delivered since May…
Regarding so-called “whataboutism”: I distrust those who invoke that term, because it’s an attempt to *allow only one side* to speak.
We all know how that goes.
Remember the days of Free Speech? Ahh, memories..
I think strong free cash flow isn’t of the highest priority. Extracting cash & money for stock buy backs, dividents and bonusses has low priority.
Covid-19 took a heavy toll and it isn’t booked away, money spent, absorbed by increased accounting blocks or other financially engineered window dressing.
Cash flow ain’t for WS; cash flow ….it’s for paying the workers properly, investing in new equipment, saving up to make a new aircart
If a company does not make money (‘free cash flow’) it is a slave to those who do
Gerrard, Free cash flow is what is left after fixed expendures & obligations are paid for.
Boeing consumed free cash flow for years, because investments and debt was pushed out into the future & long term outlooks were great. That works fine, short term.
For sure – but BA cut all expenditures on what they should have been expending on, better workers conditions and pay, better engineering and better factories, a new plane, or two, and took all that money and sent all that money to speculators in Wall Street
So not only was any&all cash flow from sales sent to WS, all the cash they saved from cutting worker’s pay, especially the cash saved by not designing and making a safe and well made aircart but by cutting expenses and making the cheapest plane possible
– was also sent to WS
Which aircart then killed a lot of people
This was not a mistake, this was an inevitable result of their stupidity and greed
You use the word obligation – there is an obligation not to kill people with your cheap ‘n faulty products
@Duke of Url, Gerrard, others: dial it back. I remind you of Reader Comment rules.
Yes: agreed – dissing people as ‘chinese’ is hate speech
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