New battle breaks out between Airbus and Boeing–in advertising

A new battle has broken out between Airbus and Boeing, this time with a sharp (and perhaps unprecedented) advertisement by Airbus accusing Boeing of outright lying.

(Click to enlarge.)

We don’t remember ever seeing this direct assault by one of the Big Two OEMs on the other. We certainly recall advertisements in the debate over two engines (Boeing 777) vs four (A340)–but to call the competitor a liar like this? It’s new territory, at least in print.

Airbus has been calling Boeing a liar in conferences for its representations for years.

As regular readers of this column know, we’ve been especially skeptical of Boeing claims, based on conversations we’ve had with airlines that have analyzed the aircraft involved, and in some cases those which operate both fleet types. The neutral arbiters–these customers–universally tell us Boeing claims are exaggerated and that the costs between the two OEM’s narrow-body aircraft are about equal. The costs between the Boeing 747-8I and the A380 are also exaggerated by Boeing, these companies tell us.

Furthermore, we’ve cast doubt on Boeing’s reliance of US DOT Form 41 data (which in itself is distorted and unreliable) and a study in Europe that looks at data from 2006-2009, data that is clearly out of date.

At the same time, we’ve taken Airbus to task over its parameters in concluding the A330-300 is a better airplane economically than the forthcoming 787-9.

At ISTAT Europe in September, an official from Virgin Atlantic publicly challenged Boeing’s Randy Tinseth over economic data Tinseth presented comparing Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Tinseth, according to those present, merely responded that he stood by the numbers.

Bloomberg has this story on the controversy. Reuters has this story.

In a way, the entire fight is silly. No airline or lessor will buy Airbus or Boeing aircraft based on these sort of claims. The airlines run their own economic analysis and the lessors are more concerned about lease rates and residual values. The entire conference and advertising effort is for consumption by uninformed journalists, financiers and aviation geeks. Those who actually understand the nuances tend to dismiss the claims of either manufacturer (as we do) and run our own analysis or rely on the airlines and lessors for impartial information.

The market has spoken. Airbus currently has sold about 1,400-1,500 A320neos to Boeing’s 1,000 737 MAXes. Airbus also, in recent years, has sold more current-generation A320s than Boeing has sold 737NGs. For the Very Large Aircraft, Airbus has an 86% market share of passenger airplanes.

These statistics tell more than anything Airbus or Boeing manipulate.

65 Comments on “New battle breaks out between Airbus and Boeing–in advertising

  1. Regardless of whom you choose to believe, that is one funny picture. I wish we had more of these!

  2. Fine
    What is the fuel consumption gain with such a nex technology nose ? Will boeing MAX finally obsolete the NEO ?
    Airbus shouldn’t give such free aerodynamics state of the art technologies to rivals !

  3. Oh, well – boys will be boys (‘mine’s bigger than yours’), as I’ve already posted elsewhere. If competitors are to compete they must develop inevitably similar products (unless your competing against an A380). Does anyone know an airline that bought an airliner after seeing an ad in a trade mag? Storms and teacups (plus perhaps subsequent legal fees…).

  4. cannot help -but say ,this is fan boy stuff ; the blog piece is not exactly balanced.

  5. Seems like Airbus is getting a bit whiny. Do they want a pacifier? Poow widdle Airbus. Maybe they just need a nappy change in Toulouse.

  6. I don’t understand why the OEMs even advertise at all…I mean it’s not like the Airlines are likely to forget who manufactures airplanes. They’re sort of like Coca-Cola or Pepsi in that regard. This whole thing is silliness.

  7. Sounds like the Sol Alinsky model for disparaging the competition – or or the old comic book ads where the big bully threw sand in johnnys’ eyes and stole his girl ?

    ” Mom always liked you best ”

    Hard day in the kindergarten sandbox !!

  8. “Sleepllees in Seattle”, that is a funny one and the artwork is nicely done 😉

    Yes, this is rather unprecedented. It may be a wise move but it is also double-edged…

  9. Both of the OEMs exagurate their claims on their airplanes, this is nothing new. Yes, the NEO has outsold the MAX, but then again, it was launched nearly a year before the MAX was. The same with the A-380 vs. the B-747-8, the WhaleJet was launched 5 years before the new Jumbo Jet. So, Scott you need to point that out in your numbers.

    But, back on topic. The fact Airbus is now willing to make these new claims in printed advertising says more about the “honesty” of Airbus than the ad does about Boeing. I cannot believe the CEO of EADS/Airbus let his PR dpartment get away with this.

    BTW, if Boeing chooses to use an extended TAS probe on a flight test B-737MAX, that is what it might look like.

    Neither the US, nor the EU want a one airplane OEM in the world. The airline and leasing companies cetainly don’t want to rely on just one OEM, that will be able to dictate deals to its ‘customers’.

    Howard :
    Seems like Airbus is getting a bit whiny. Do they want a pacifier? Poow widdle Airbus. Maybe they just need a nappy change in Toulouse.

    I agree, this is very childest behavior coming from people who want the world to think they are ‘professionals’. Then again, a Hooker is also considered a ‘professional’, in many parts of the world, too.

    • Seems as if the OEMs aren’t the only ones to exaggerate. NEO was first offered in Dec. 2010, the MAX was first offered, before being named, in July of 2011, about 8 months later, not really “almost a year”. Of course it took them another 2 months to get a name and an authourity to offer, after already offering to AA.

      Of course one could also ask the question, Why did Airbus have such a long time to offer such a product without any competition?”

      As for the “honesty” of Airbus with its PR, I am guessing that you believe that Airbus has really overstepped the bounds? Do you believe that AIrbus could get into trouble over this ad? MAybe the CEOs of EADS and Airbus need to intervene directly to clean the mess up.

      On another note, it is nice to see that all of those commitments for the MAX are finally becoming orders. Maybe soon we won’t have to read about “orders and commitments” any more.

      • “Maybe soon we won’t have to read about “orders and commitments” any more.”

        AeroNinja, Go to minute 20:32 of the JL video below. And take a look at the bottom of his slide presentation. Please report back what you find… Ok?

        I don’t know why everyone around here has a problem with the use of the word “Commitments”?

  10. Don Shuper :
    …the fourth rule is: Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules.
    …the fourth rule carries within it the fifth rule: Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon.
    …the sixth rule is: A good tactic is one that your people enjoy.

    Thats what I thought. The American Toolbox of Rhetorics.
    Most popular with the Wingnut faction.
    Effective but for the whole destructive. i.e. you may gain relativ better standing
    but overall values have been reduced significantly. A scavenger culture.

    Airbus’ critique applies but is contraproductive. Beyond another dark age there is no antidote
    for this.

    • If i remember correctly- Airbus A 340? years ago advertised that 4 engines were safer than two crossing the ocean- in attempt to disparage twin engine planes like 767 and the then coming 777.

      That ad did not go over well either

      Maybe airbust should change their PR firm- or simply get adult supervision ??

      • According to the one article Scott linked to, it didn’t go over well with Boeing. Boeing took umbrage to the safety tactic, which apparently Airbus decided to respect and dropped the ads.

      • Probability wise 4 engines still have less chance of full failure than 2 engines.
        What we have today is two engines are under stringently controlled conditioning “save enough” for the task at hand.

  11. That all they lie all the time we are knowing for a long time, just read what the top management said a few years ago and compare with the facts. But in an add, it is the first time I see. A good example of lies is the delays in projects, that they are always saying that everything is on schedule to confirm a new delay a few months later.

  12. We had a good chuckle at this in the office, as we see it it’s hardly a battle but merely a light mannered & intelligent reposte to the various untruths & innaccuracies bantered between these two.

    As stated no carrier is influenced by such campaigns, I can imagine the ad agency receiving the brief for this & going into creative hyperdrive with the resulting imaginative & comical creative, with just a hint of accuracy that the industry knows & understands. Other than the odd comment in the bar after a tiring day on a stand at some trade show it means nothing to the industry, it does though seem to have served it’s purpose here……

    Over recent years industry positions have reversed significantly with Boeing showing signs of desperation, it’s now striving to recover the lost high ground.

      • Uhh if your software burps as in windoze- you get the blue screen of death – and have to reboot

        Ford fiasco with microsquich is a prime example – as are other issues like computer refusing to allow shutoff – even so side of road is handy

        If the software in an airplane blunders- or overrides the human- real death

        Airbus unfortunately has at least two examples of then latter

        Over indian ocean at night – full stall into drink cus first movement by copilot overrides all others

        And a certain airshow in paris .

        So games with ads in the software world are chuckles

        equivalent ads by the two manufactures are on a diffferent level !!

      • Ford’s problematic touch-screen software was developed internally. Microsoft only developed the basic Sync layer (which actually works well).

    • Don, that’s a lot of nonsense. You seem to have totally missed the point and what a low minded and tasteless rant on AF 447. Wow!

      And BTW, it didn’t happen over the Indian Ocean. AF 447 went down in the equatorial waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

      As for the A320 crash in 1988, it occurred at an airshow at the Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport and not at a “certain airshow” in Paris.

      Credibility wise, you might check your facts before posting comments! 😉

      • Oppps my bad on ocean – and I should have said france instead of paris

        But my point still remains – Software foopahs may well destroy data and cause heartburn- thus a lighthearted approach to competitor ads

        But IMO that approach does not apply to aircraft and pee pee contests between the ‘ big boys “

        • Ceeding details doesn’t transform your faulty proposition into truth.
          It just stays wrong.

  13. Boeing uses long haul cabin specifications from the early nineties (40 inch Business, 60 inch First, 7 abreast business) for “typical” seat counts. Not a problem, any choice could work.

    But then Boeing takes Airbus seatcounts based on (60 inch business, 80 inch First, 6 abraest business) and consistently uses per seat comparisons to show their aircraft are more efficient. Without mentioning the different cabin specs. E.g resulting in 469 seats for the 747-8i and 525 seats for the A380. Then Randy has go with seatbased costs comparisons. Misinforming bordering deception IMO. And they have continued doing so for at least 8 yrs.. even increasing the numbers. I was amazed how they continued to get away with it.

    The conclusion I reached some time ago is ” if you can’t convince them, confuse them” a majority of the public will assume both lie and the truth is halfway. Also if the truth isn’t halfway..

    • Who is trying to confuse the masses?

      Boeing doesn’t use their own seat rules for their own products and then use Airbus’ more spacious rules for Airbus products in the same comparison. All aicraft in any Boeing comparison are spec’d at the same comfort level. It is called the “IAC ruleset” and while it is admitedly dated from a comfort standpoint, it results in an FAA certifiable cabin, which is not true for the PR cabin LOPAs Airbus rolls out.

      • It’s all about the quality of presentation & who presents, to have a creditable airline like Virgin Atlantic blatently question a claimed Boeing markeing supremo in front of other invited key accounts questioning suspect performance statistics speaks volumes & is a concern for Boeing.

        Make no mistake such a comment from VA would not have occured without a thread of authenticity the other invited guests would have been equally aware.

          • Boeing’s A340 performance data is accurate. They held several ex-SIA A340’s in inventory for an extended period of time. As the legal owner and operator, Boeing had access to all performance data (and even more interestingly) contractually obligated data and support from Airbus. An akward situation for both sides, but don’t doubt for a minute that Boeing has the A340 performance wrong.

            As for the VS response, I guess I’d be more skeptical than you. As the only non-Boeing 4-holer out there and (until the A380) the only Airbus competitor to the 777 and 747, the A340 has a loyal fan base far larger than the airframe ever earned on its own merits. Look no further than our friend Zeke on for a great example of this blind loyalty to the type. Even after CX publicly quoted a fuel burn gap between the 777 and A340 that was LARGER than Boeing claims, Zeke persisted with trying to argue the Airbus view (that the A340 is slightly lower fuel burn than the 777). Who knows what bias our “BS” friend from VA brings with his comments, but one thing is certain. No operator we more vocally engaged in Airbus’ “4 engines 4 long haul” marketing effort of the A340, actually painting this slogan on the sides of their A340s. The demise of the A340 at the same time as the 777’s unprecedented success stung pretty good for most A340 fans. Perhaps our VA friend is included in this number… Particularly so if he played a role in VA’s decision to fly the A340 over the 777.

      • A professional market participant should have his numbers right. The more puzzling Boeings behaviour in view of your assertion of rationality.
        Except we assume they perceive themselves as being under strong pressure : no tomorrow behaving nicely, so one stop after another is pulled.

  14. keesje :
    CM you can use any seat rules. The ethics issue starts when you use different ones in apples to oranges comparisons without informing the public..

    You’re making my point for me. The chart you have linked shows three aircraft all configured to IAC 3-class rules. Same seat pitch, galley cart ratios, lav ratios, closet ratios, etc. Any other examples of “ethics” issues you’d like me to review?

    • Interesting to see the same silly arguments and “facts” being used in the replies by the supporters of both OEMs as their favorite OEM. Completely ignoring the fact that the airlines speak with the wallet and that all claims are useless. If every OEM would focus on its own product instead of making claims on others life would be much easier. The same applies for the fanboys with there dogma’s.

      • For many, many years, that is the way it was. Aviation was truly a gentlemen’s game. It has really only been in the last 20 years that we have seen the OEM’s referencing each other, even behind closed doors in discussions with airlines.

        Strong personalities have changed this industry (for better or for worse) in recent years – O’Leary, Hazy, Branson, Tinseth, Leahy, Al Bakar, etc. One thing is certain, there’s little chivalry left among the heads of state in this business.

    • CM if you put 467 seats in a 747-8 and 555 in a A380, you are using two different seating rules. The A380 has about 35% more revenue floor space.
      Airbus since then lowered its A380 seat count to 525 because it was no longer realistic. Boeing made it higher, from 450 to 469. And a majority of the press amazingly went along. Next thing is Boeing claimed superior CASM and still does.

      For the MAX they changed the baseline in their comparisons, suddenly stating the 737-8 was superior by 7% over the A320 to start with.

      • Anyway, the graphic only talks a bout “3 class seating” without any reference to metrics. (Which must be different for the individual specimen to make the numbers match. discussed here at the time.) CM is very knowledgeable .. and partisan. An unfortunate combination imho.

    • Let’s have a look on half of the 747-8i fleet:
      8 First/92 Business/262 Economy (Lufthansa)
      and A380
      8 First/98 Business/420 Economy (Lufthansa)

      40 % more seats for A380.
      According to Boeing’s ad the difference is less than 20 %. How many -8 customers ordered 467 seats?

      • Look at all seat configurations of major 747-400 operators like BA, CX, UA and add 30-40 seats for the 8i. No where close to 467. It seems Boeing retained 40 inch business class specs in their own product specs for no other reasons then to create perceptions.

    • Boeing in those yrs totally focussed on ridiculling the A340, never mentioning the A330 (That has the same dimensions and configuration as the 787). Marketing tactic.

  15. Uwe :
    CM is very knowledgeable .. and partisan. An unfortunate combination imho.

    Uhmm, so this comment can have a lot of implications for posters. It seems then, in order to avoid that combination, we must not be knowledgeable. Because few here don’t show a partisan view.

    • I found that quote from Uwe to be laugh out loud funny. It’s a prime example of a pot calling the kettle black, even more funny is that Uwe doesn’t seem to realize he’s the pot. CM at least has skin in the game, Uwe… none, he’s the very definition of a fanboi.

      • That is a fascinating reasoning why one party should bring misinformation to the table and why others should refrain from
        pointing this out. Thank you for the entertainment.

  16. UWE ..”.Ceeding details doesn’t transform your faulty proposition into truth.
    It just stays wrong…”

    HMMM- and my faulty proposition was ??? BTW- I did read the Final report on AF447- and *** asssuming *** you have, I’m sure you can point out where my ‘ proposition’ was wrong..

    In terse form my proposition is/was :
    . . .as to who moves sidearm controller first and holds position overrides the other ..

    • IMU even that is wrong. ( JS commanded is the vector add of JS inputs, only with Override pressed do you have exclusive input .. which didn’t happen on AF447 )

      Anyway your alleged a causal connection for the crash that doesn’t exist. ( and I’ve read the reports to boot.)

  17. Don Shuper :
    Over indian ocean at night – full stall into drink cus first movement by copilot overrides all others
    And a certain airshow in paris .


    At least get *some* of the facts vaguely within a light year of the truth, please!

    Atlantic ocean. Co-pilot initiates stall through *incorrect* input, despite aircraft informing of stall, then maintains incorrect input through rest of stable stall down to the sea. NO FAULT OF THE AIRCRAFT.

    Mulhouse. Pilot incorrectly puts the aircraft into a low-altitude stall with insufficient margin to get out again. Overconfidence in himself and Airbus FBW, not being fully aware of the airfield and the aircraft’s situation & behaviour, then blaming a slow spool-up of the engines do not excuse the fact that HE put himself in that situation. NO FAULT OF THE AIRCRAFT.

    In both cases, your really cannot blame software for those crashes. Similar pilot behaviour would lead to similar consequences in other aircraft.

    • Frustrating accident for everyone. If the co pilot had just fainted everybody would have been fine..

    • Perhaps my wording was not the best- but I did not say it was the fault of the aircraft- but of the software rules built in- and that combined with lack of force feedback on the sidearm controllers was a major contibutor

      As in from a summary in wiki

      The stall warning deactivates by design when the angle of attack measurements are considered invalid and this is the case when the airspeed drops below a certain limit.
      In consequence, the stall warning stopped and came back on several times during the stall; in particular, it came on whenever the pilot pushed forward on the stick and then stopped when he pulled back; this may have confused the pilots.

      ** that is a software issue ***

      as is

      Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions were appropriate, even though they were not,
      The difficulty in recognizing and understanding the implications of a reconfiguration in alternate law with no angle of attack protection.

      And as far as force feedback MY understanding is – on most ALL ( or all including 787/ ) BA aircraft to date- when either pilot or copilot pushes or pulls on control column- the other column moves accordingly. And regardless of software, brute force can override computer controls and possilbly then other pilots movements ??

      In any case- my initial point- although poorly stated- was that missing odd or unplanned inputs or conditions in your gameboy or xbox software may cause your laptop or desktop to lockup or force a reboot- no real harm except to ego results

      Not true in aircraft !!

      Nuff said

      • Well okay, but I’m afraid your premise is still not correct. It’s true that the stall warning cutting in and out could have confused things for AF447… were it not for the fact that it’s quite clear from the voice recordings that they never considered themselves in a stall at all – they never paid the warning any attention.

        Secondary to that is the fact that the stall warning simply can not reliably continue to sound at the almost zero forward airspeed they were in. This is not a software issue at all – it’s a case where the whole philosophy of safe design means that forcing the systems to second-guess if no airspeed means stall (and not sensor failure or some other anomaly) is likely to INCREASE susceptibility to errors due to additional complexity and assumptions. And for what…? The aircraft should NEVER be in that condition in the first place!

        I’ve also read testimony from several pilots who state that it would have been clear to the left seat at least, and probably the captain standing behind as well, what the co-pilot input was. In fact, the voice recording seems to confirm this (too late into the event).

        As regards unplanned inputs causing a reboot… far from it! The Mulhouse case is a good example where the protection *prevented* a much more serious accident since instead of stalling and dropping out of the sky, which was what the pilot was basically attempting to do, the aircraft kept itself just within limits… making as soft a “landing” as possible in the circumstances.

        Ironically both of these incidents highlight cases where automation was doing its best to save the aircraft from what the pilot was doing to it, not the other way round.

        • If the available information hasn’t percolated through to Don you won’t make much of an impact either. Dogma tops facts all the time.

  18. Uwe :
    If the available information hasn’t percolated through to Don you won’t make much of an impact either. Dogma tops facts all the time.

    the BEA is the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority. Its investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improving aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liability.
    BEA investigations are independent, separate and conducted without prejudice to any judicial or administrative action that may be taken to determine blame or liability.
    This report has been translated and published by the BEA to make its reading easier for English-speaking people. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French is the work or reference.
    Update: 27 July 2012PAGE 88 AND ON of 223 page

    regarding certain simulations
    Concerning automatic control and systems, the followin points are of note: ˆ
    The aircraft’s autopilot disconnected in all cases, with no intervention from the crew; ˆIn all cases, the crew regained the use of the autopilot and autothrust; ˆIn twelve cases, the flight control law changed to alternate until the end of the flight. In one case, this transition was temporary;
    The disconnection of the autopilot was accompanied by the disappearance of the associated flight director, and sometimes by the other flight director for a variable period of time. In all the cases studied, the flight directors reappeared during the event. In certain cases, this reappearance was recorded simultaneously with a return to values very close to the two speeds

    In seven cases, an autopilot was re-engaged during the event. In two of these, the re-engagement occurred even though two speeds were consistent with each other, but erroneous;
    The autothrust disconnected in ten cases, leading to the activation of the thrust lock function. In five of these cases, this function remained engaged for more than one minute;
    In two cases, the autothrust did not disconnect and the flight directors did not disappear. The recordings of engine RPM parameters reveal fluctuations in thrust with N1 values of between 48% and 100%.

    page 176 actual analysis

    It would also seem unlikely that the PNF could have determined the PF’s flight path stabilisation targets. It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one and that the conditions of a night flight in IMC make it more difficult to monitor aeroplane attitudes (pitch attitude in particular). In addition, a short time after the autopilot disconnection, the PF’s statement that he had the controls and his reaction to the initial deviations observed (in particular in roll) may have led the PNF to change his action priorities. Identification of the failure appeared to become a priority over control and flight path monitoring. Consequently, he was unaware of the climb.

    . . Moreover, the flight director displays could have prompted him to command a positive pitch angle, of about 12.5¡. This value appears in the stall warning procedure for the take-off phase. It is possible that, even though he did not call it out, the PF had recalled this memorised value and then had clung to this reference without remembering that it was intended for a different flight phase. The conjunction of this remembered value and the flight director displays may have constituted one of the few (and maybe even the only) points of consistency in his general incomprehension of the situation
    Thus, it seems likely that the flight director exerted an influence. The PF could have been tempted to adhere to it without validating the information presented. The concurrence of the information from the FD with the stall warning may have undermined the credibility of the actions to take in response to the warning. ..

    . . . At about 2 h 12, descending though FL 315, the aeroplane’s angle of attack was established around an average value of about 40 degrees. Only an extremely purposeful crew with a good comprehension of the situation could have carried out a manoeuvre that would have made it possible to perhaps recover control of the aeroplane. In fact, the crew had almost completely lost control of the situation.
    Up until the end of the flight, no valid angle of attack value was less than 35°.


    I note that buried in the report is an explanation that the AOA data used by the computer is NOT available to the pilots.

    Alternate 2B law represents a specific case of flight control law reconfiguration. In fact, it occurs when the flight control computers have rejected the three ADR’s. It has the specific characteristic of being associated with the loss of computation and display of the limit speeds. The high and low speed protections that exist in normal law, and sometimes in a reduced manner (high and low speed stability) in alternate law, are lost. There is however no explicit indication, apart from the red SPD LIM flag next to the speed tape (on the ECAM for example), of the level of alternate law that the aeroplane is in. The ECAM message associated with the reconfiguration to alternate law, of whatever type, indicates “PROT LOST”. However, not all of the protections are lost, since the load factor protection remains available, and reduced protections can also exist. The precise identification of the consequences of a reconfiguration in alternate law is thus complicated.

    I’ll leave it to others to decide IF the lack of some significant info as a result of computer programming was a significant factor in the accident

    End of Discussion

    • Glad you’ve read it.

      Don’t know why you quote the bit about similar events. Irrelevant to this discussion.

      Point taken about the PNF not observing the PF inputs – although I think (without going back through the full report) that this quote is about the entry into stall while the PNF was occupied with the initial air speed data loss, not for the several minutes of debate following the stall, which is when pilots discussing this episode said they would have checked to see what PF was doing.

      The 12.5 angle, whether or not inspired by the flight director, was “general incomprehension of the situation” – ie. pilot error… he should have known better.

      Don’t know why you quote that PF put them in an incredibly high stall angle. We know that.

      AOA data is not available in most aircraft. And if they’re ignoring all the other valid data (ALTIMETER!?) they would have ignored AOA as well.

      Don’t know why you quote the specifics about alternate laws and protection levels. They should have known they were in a less protected mode, that’s the important thing.

      • copy/paste is not really connected to reading ( and obviously not understanding 😉

      • Forgot to add that AOA would have just shown an error condition anyway – on any aircraft – since this was so far out of the valid range of airspeed & direction.

  19. Airbus and Boeing are fantastic companies should relate better by sharing their experiences of safety, after all they are carrying friends, family, etc … transporting humans!! Great success for both companies!! And hopefully good understanding of these great presidents parents and families!

  20. Airbus is just jealous. Boeing is not lying about jack. Guess what, Boeing’s 777x had more orders in one day than the a380 in thirteen years. The 777x also beat the a350.

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