Bombardier woes go beyond CSeries

The news last week that Bombardier reorganized its business units, laid off another 1,800 employees and saw the retirement of Guy Hachey, president and CEO of the aerospace division, was viewed by some media and observers as an indictment of the CSeries program. While it’s certainly true that delays in the program weigh heavily on BBD, the problems don’t stop with CSeries.

Bombardier has 203 firm orders and 310 commitments for CSeries. This delivery stream doesn't include any potential rescheduling as a result of the grounding of the Flight Test fleet from May as a result of the engine incident.

Bombardier has 203 firm orders and 310 commitments for CSeries. This delivery stream doesn’t include any potential rescheduling as a result of the grounding of the Flight Test fleet from May as a result of the engine incident.

Slow sales of the CRJ, Q400 and business jets–as well as program development issues with a new corporate jet–all combined to drag down financial performance and bleed cash. Bombardier doesn’t have the balance sheet strength of Boeing or Airbus, nor strong sales of other airplane family members, to weather the challenges of new airplane development programs.

BBD entered 2014 with shrinking commercial aerospace market shares against its competitors.

The CRJ regional jet, a sector invented by BBD and once the dominate force in the RJ market, is now an also-ran to Embraer. The CRJ-700 is no longer a desirable aircraft as regional airline operations up-gauge to the more economical 90-seat jet and the Embraer E-175’s passenger experience is preferred.

The backlog at December 31 demonstrates BBD’s weaker position compared with Embraer and even the new entrants, Mitsubishi and Sukhoi.

Bombardier is no longer the dominate aircraft supplier in the 70-125 seat sector, eclipsed by Embraer and challenged by Mitsubishi and Sukhoi. Backlog at 12/31/13.

Bombardier is no longer the dominate aircraft supplier in the 70-125 seat sector, eclipsed by Embraer and challenged by Mitsubishi and Sukhoi. Backlog at 12/31/13.


Bombardier has also fallen far behind competitor ATR in the turbo-prop sector. BBD offers only one turbo-prop, the 70-seat Q400, compared with the 50- and 70-seat choices offered by ATR. BBD also faces the industry view that the Q400 is more expensive to buy and more expensive to operate than the competing ATR-72-600. While the Q400 is a more capable hot-and-high airplane with a higher cruising speed, most routes don’t require the high performance. BBD says that if the Q400 is throttled back to the same cruising speed as the ATR-72, operating costs are similar. Nonetheless, BBD has a shrinking market share compared with ATR.

Bombardier has fallen behind rival ATR in turbo-prop sales. Backlog at 12/31/13.

Bombardier has fallen behind rival ATR in turbo-prop sales. Backlog at 12/31/13.


Bombardier this year began offering a high-density version of the Q400, seating 86 passengers, and at the Farnborough Air Show announced a passenger/cargo Combi option in an effort to broaden the appeal of the airplane. So far there haven’t been any takers.

As we have written previously, some of BBD’s problems are of its own making: a mediocre balance sheet that inhibits aggressive deals and financial flexibility; a learning curve necessary to shift its sales mindset from the regional airline industry to understanding major airline calculus; and a stubborn refusal to be more flexible on pricing, just to name a few.

We’ve also previously noted that many CSeries sales were lost due to circumstances beyond its control: very aggressive pricing by Airbus; the need to create a customer base for an entirely new airplane rather than having an established customer base to sell into; target customers disappearing into a merger; and competing against the balance sheets of Airbus and Boeing, just to name a few.

And then there’s the unexpected. BBD struck a deal with Russian interests to sell 100 Q400s and potentially establish an assembly line there. The plan was to firm up the MOU this year. Who could have predicted Russia would seize Crimea and encourage and support Ukraine rebels? Sanctions imposed by the US on Russia were supported by the Canadian government and the Q400 deal stalled as a result; an engine malfunction on the CSeries Flight Test program grounded the fleet in May, which may not return to the air until next month.

The four previous delays in the CSeries program prompted BBD to announce an entry-into-service for the second half of 2015, building in about two months of margin in case something else happened. The engine issue wasn’t expected, and while BBD continues to maintain a 2H2015 EIS is still planned, Ilyushin Finance Co. said last week it shifted its deliveries five months to the right from November 2015 to April 2016. Does this portend an entire program schedule shift, or was this unique to IFC for other reasons? We don’t yet know the answer to this.

BBD’s entire aerospace division and its business aircraft unit are struggling with challenges. These issues are weighing down the company. Bombardier’s woes go beyond CSeries.

35 Comments on “Bombardier woes go beyond CSeries

  1. The Q400 vs ATR table is frightening if you focus on the orders (and not the potential options, LOIs and other wishes)
    They are conceiding about 1 to ten!

  2. Yes, Bombardier is facing difficulties, but its product mix has to be put in proper perspective against competitors:

    First, the Q400 is clearly a step above the ATR 72, both in pricing and performance:

    Bombardier doesn’t need to have 60% of the turboprop market to make money from the Q400.

    The CRJ is a step below the Embraer E-Jets. Everyone that has flown in boths knows that the E-Jet feels like a small mainliner, which is not the case for the CRJ. To keep selling the CRJ, Bombardier has to play the “value” card, which is easier considering this aircraft’s development costs have long been amortized.

    The press is wrongly comparing the CSeries to the smaller Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Both the 737 and 319/320 are bigger and pricier than the Cseries. The CSeries is targeted at the gap between the largest E-Jets and the smallest Boeing/Airbus.

    The 500+ sales and options indicate there is a market in that gap. All Bombardier has to do now is deliver. They unknowwingly bit more than they could chew, but if they can properly manage the CSeries program in the next 18 months, the aircraft will be a money-maker for at least a couple of decades.

    • The press is not “wrongly comparing the CSeries” to the A319NEO and the 737-7MAX. They are direct competitors. There is “no gap” between the largest E-Jets (the E195 E1/E2) and the A319NEO and the 737-7MAX.

      And once you dissect the “500+ sales and options” you will discover that most are very weak (just take a look at the chart). Many “sales” are to airlines that haven’t even started flying or airlines that will most likely not take delivery… like Republic with 40 + 40.

      • OK< if you are going to compare the C-Series to the A319NEO and the 737-700 Max then tell us how many they have sold? The answer is almost zero. No one wants the smallest versions of the Airbus or Boeing planes. They are too heavy. If you are going to bring questionable orders into the mix then you might want to look at some of the "airlines" that have ordered the 737's and the A320's. A lot of those buyers may not make it as well.
        Also, remember the CEO of Airbus's comment that they will not make the same mistake with the C-Series that Boeing made with Airbus. So every time Bombardier approaches a mainline carrier to sell the C-Series Airbus (and Boeing) respond with incredible deals on smaller A320's and 737's.
        Bombardier marketing troubles aside, it is a pretty good airplane.

      • C Series:

        Airbus (particularly) and Boeing have tried to make it a direct competitor it is not.

        Fewer seats, shorter range and a heck of a lot more efficient. Different market.

        There is a segment for it, but they are breaking into a market. While not solid big names, the interest is there and once they get it in service it will do very well.

        For now the big guns will go with what is known and available. Down the road that will change (if it works as advertised and I suspect even better)

        And yes they screwed up the production, but they are in good company (Boeing and Airbus have a well worn path for them to follow)

        Q400: That is an issue. They do need 40%+ of the market to make that work long run, they can’t shut down the assembly line and re-start it. Either they take less money or that s what will happen.

        It doesn’t matter if its superior to the ATR series, what matters is the ATR is more efficient and for most routes they don’t care about the time loss of being slower, altitude capabilities are not needed in most places (India and immediate area are an exception).

        It may be the sales force has not done their job and for sure in Asia. They still need to get the backlog up.

    • “500+ sales and options” look to me as 26 sales and about 360 options, at leeast from this table…

    • Although CSeries Aircraft will have a lower Specific Fuel Consumption (small fuselage, less drag compared with the A320 neo and 737 max families), Bombardier only offers two variants covering from 110 to 159 seats. Airlines prefer fleets to keep training and maintenance cost down as their operations grow. The Single Isle Narrow Body seat range encompasses 100 to 230 seats and Bombardier would certainly compete favourably with the likes of Airbus and Boeing if Bombardier had offerings covering 170 – 230 seats as well.

    • If it weren’t for Justin Bieber, the CRJ would be the worst thing ever to come out of Canada. It is a torture tube. I would support bringing the death penalty back to Canada if they promised to use it on whoever green-lit that project.

      The Q400 is marginally better than a CRJ but still no substitute for a mainline plane. When will airlines figure out that a 17″ seat is not acceptable for a full-service carrier?

      I disagree with TransWorld about the benefits of the ATR vs. the Q400. In places like North America, the major carriers are outsourcing more and more flights to regional affiliates, with smaller mainline planes and regional jets being replaced by more efficient turboprops. With turboprops operating longer and longer segments here, the speed of the Q400 becomes a real necessity. Passengers may not notice or care if a turboprop flight takes 10-15 minutes longer than a competing jet service, but +30 minutes? That’s enough to make people choose another carrier.

      • The CRJ is supposed to be a couple inches wider than it is. As you probably know it is a derivative of the Challenger business jet. The original fuselage of the Challenger was a couple inches wider than it is today. But in the early phase of its development it did not meet its speck for range.

        So while touring the hangar one Saturday night, IIRC there was a discussion between the Chief Engineer and the Programme Manager. They decided then and there to shrink the fuselage by a couple inches in order to save weight so that the aircraft would be able to travel farther.

        Even with its smaller width the Challenger set a new standard at the time for fuselage size in the business jet category. Unfortunately no one foresaw at the time that the Challenger would be made into a regional jet later on. For the concept of a regional jet did not even exists in the late seventies (yes the CRJ is that old!).

        Now a few words about the Q400. In light of what you say about the CRJ, I am surprised that you did not comment on its narrow fuselage width. Especially in comparison to the ATR. Both the CRJ and Q400 suffer from having a narrower fuselage than their respective competitors.

        Bombardier is well aware of those deficiencies and that is why the CSeries fuselage is wider than the competition. Proportionally speaking the CSeries fuselage is much wider than the 737’s. And even the A320 suffers a bit in comparison (centre seat and aisle).

        Passengers will love the CSeries. And they, not the airlines, will make it into a commercial success.

  3. Funny how they put that chart together and completely leave off CS300, so add another 400 orders, option, LOIs and MOUs. Sure not a direct competitor to E190, but in this world of upgauging, surely the option to upgauge from E190 to CS300 will be a tempting one for many airlines on many routes. But for sure they have bit of a heavy development schedule and it will be a while before the new Globals and Cseries start generating revenue. Until then they are eating cash and raising stress on the company. I think the progarms they have in place at transport will pay big dividends in the end.. as will CSeries. Also the CRJ is just a reengine away from being a segment dominator.

    • And what engine in particular do you have in mind that would make the CRJ a “segment dominator”? The CRJ not only needs a larger fan, it also needs a larger fuselage!

    • The CSeries may be good the E2 is more desired.The CRJ may have been good, the E jets are better.

  4. Bombardier did not bit more than it could chew when it launched the CSeries in 2008. Only a few months after the CSeries was introduced at Farnborough the Great Recession hit. This had an immediate impact on the Business Aircraft division. And they could not have anticipated such a sharp decline in CRJ and Q400 sales later on.

    The large business aircraft models, which are more lucrative, kept selling well. The smaller models are now slowly picking up, but the revenues are still below what they were before 2008. That the larger models are selling well and the smaller ones not so well is a scenario that is repeated at the other business aircraft manufacturers.

    Bombardier remains very strong in the business aircraft sector for three reasons:

    1- It has the largest variety of models of all sizes and performances.
    2- It is constantly modernizing its existing models.
    3- It is presently developing state-of-the-art small and large models (Lear 75/85 and Global 7000/8000).

    Unfortunately the scene is drastically different in the commercial aircraft sector:

    1- It has only three models in its portfolio.
    2- Two of them, the CRJ and Q400 have reached their maximum development potentials and cannot keep up with the competition from Embraer and ATR.
    3- It is presently developing a state-of-the-art aircraft in a sector where BBD is a new entrant: main airlines passenger jets.

    Many aerospace companies rely on their military division to balance the commercial aircraft side of the business. But BBD has terminated all its military activities a while ago. Instead it relies on its Transportation division where it remains number one. That is actually what made the launch of the CSeries possible.

    BBD now depends almost entirely on its healthy Transportation division to supply the cash it needs to keep the CSeries going. Only the business aircraft division is also contributing some badly needed cash, while the entire commercial aircraft side of the business continues to be a sinkhole.

    This situation will endure until the first CSeries start to be delivered to their respective customers. This will reestablish the normal cash flow and will offer Bombardier an opportunity to reassess the future of the CRJ and Q400 programmes.

    In 2002 Bombardier realized that it was selling a large number of aircraft at unsustainable low prices. In 2014 they should realize that perhaps they went too far in the other direction by asking unsustainable high prices.

    I have always supported this assertive approach for the CSeries. But I think that in order to make the CRJ and Q400 more attractive they will have to cut down on the few units for which they can still find buyers: it’s the price of obsolescence. 🙁

    • They did bite off more than they could chew… and the poor execution on the CSeries is proof positive.

      • Poor execution on the CSeries?

        There are two obvious problems with the programme. One is related to software issues and the other to the engine. Both come from outside Bombardier. From what I can see as an observer the rest of the programme is very well managed and executed.

        With the CSeries BBD took a big bite indeed, but not one it could not chew. When this new model was launched Bombardier knew that the CRJ was nearing the end of its relevance and the most viable alternative was the development of the CSeries. It was, and still is, a very good call.

        The problem is that the CRJ obsolescence came a little earlier than expected. As for the size of the bite, BBD could have chosen to stay in the same segment as the CRJ, but that segment was already occupied by Embraer, Ilyushin and Mitsubishi. So they decided to aim for the next segment, which was left unoccupied for historical reasons.

        Production of the aircraft is going remarkably well despite a few early problems with their Chinese partner. And with the recently completed assembly building I expect production to run smoothly, with a potential of up to 20 aircraft per month.

        It was the first time that BBD undertook such a major certification programme. They have done quite well so far considering the complexity of the aircraft and the little experience they have. That is because at the planning stage they took measures to minimize bad surprises. That was the idea behind CIASTA.

        But in my opinion they have done one big mistake: They did not take it upon themselves to develop the software of the aircraft.

        • Yes, poor execution on the CSeries. BBD has a well established history of being late on certification. The Q400 EIS was not only late but was also very problematic in initial service with SAS. And CRJ900 and CRJ1000 (derivatives of derivatives) EIS were delayed considerably. Since BBD couldn’t even execute on schedule with derivatives, it was obvious what the results would be with the all-new CSeries… poor execution.

        • A fair assessment Normand but Bombardier did not have the capability to develop the Flight Control Software themselves and in fact, Bombardier had taken an earlier decision (around 2006) to transform itself from being essentially a manufacturer of aircraft, to being a manager of aircraft programs. This transformation had at its core the concept of risk sharing and out sourcing. The idea was to spread the program risk and lower the program cost. Many of us who worked on the technical side of things and who had been in the industry for decades, perceived this approach as being foolhardy. Sadly, time appears to have confirmed our suspicions. Bombardier lost visibility on what her partners and suppliers were up to, largely because real and accurate program status information only flowed back along the chain when solutions to challenges could not be found and there was danger of missing schedules or schedules were missed. Bombardier’s management naively thought that it could foster an air of openness between her and all of her partners and suppliers but she did not truly understand the mix of different business cultures she was challenged in dealing with. An other specific issue was the choice to intentionally utilize a large percentage of young and inexperienced personnel in key positions. This was a policy which was though to better facilitate the cultural transformation required to allow the smooth transition to the new way of doing business. The miscalculation occured in the fact that Bombardier’s partners and suppliers did not all completely buy into the new strategies and many of them instead simply chose to tell Bombardier what she largely wanted or expected to hear until they could no longer do so. Lacking sufficient experience to dissect and read between the lines, it wasn’t easy for those responsible to detect potential issues well in advance based on the information they were being fed.. The real lesson learned is that you require rigourously tested and mature practices and procedures in place to truly reduce risks. You cannot leave it to your partners and suppliers to take responsibility simply because you’ve signed contracts to that end. You need to understand what they are doing almost, if not, as well as they do to truly be operating in an air of equality and openness.

        • @Joe

          Being late in certifying an airplane does necessarily mean “poor execution”.

          During the early phase of certification the CRJ1000 was grounded for nine months because of software issues with the Rudder FBW system. Incidentally, it is the same supplier that produces the software for the entire CSeries FBW system.

          As for the problems with SAS they were related to the landing gear, which is also manufactured by an outside supplier.

          These are the kind of problems that can happen to any aircraft integrator, and indeed they do. Airbus, Boeing and Embraer have all been there. Bombardier is not better than any of them, nor is it any worse.

          If I am not mistaken Airbus and Boeing develop their own FBW software and Embraer now wants to do the same after experiencing similar problems as Bombardier had on the CRJ1000 and CSeries.

        • You keep defending the issues because “they are outside suppliers: They choose those suppliers.

          It is still Bombardiers job to manage those suppliers (the engine seal issue an exception which sounds like a maint screw up.

          On the Q400 the gear issues may have been maintenance problem, but they did not aggressively deal with it either (and then when things got dicey and SAS dropped them they took steps to reduce the maint issue with new less corrosive parts).

          So there is a bit of a history of being laid back. Ok if you are selling junk, but if its a premium high price product, that does not fly. You can have it one way or the other.

          So, yes they may be typical but they also obviously have management issues that should be dealt with (and maybe have been now)

    • Where is the CSeries ? When will they resume flying ? At this rate certification will come after first delivery?

    • Hey Normand. Are you a BBD shill ? Or have I stumbled on their PR site by mistake. Its like a love fest

        • Personal attacks?? Just asking a question Scott. If you interpret it as a personal attack then I’m sorry I even bothered. I thought it was a ” real ” open forum

  5. Scott wrote an excellent analysis around 8 months ago on this battle of 100 seaters. The Eseries is the real competition, and will either put BBD out of business with the gamble on the Cseries, or it will wind up with a larger aircraft in a good niche, if they start delivering reliable aircraft that live up to the high expectations set for them. As with any new widebody Boeing or Airbus design/produce, it is functionally a “bet the company” decision, and BBD certainly can’t back away from the decision or do anything but remain “all in” on the aircraft. I don’t see the 4 abreast 90-seat MRJ really as a direct competitor to this, and regardless of sales comparisons, the SSJ is anything but a safe bet to most western airlines as reflected by it’s order book.

    short quote;

    “The E-Jet is a four abreast design whereas the CSeries seats people five abreast. This stems from their design centers. The E-Jet has an historical design center of 70-110 seats and the CSeries aiming for 100-150 seats. Dimensionally this means E-Jet E2 is longer than the equivalent seated CSeries since it needs more rows to seat the same number of passengers. This design philosophy difference also carries through to the wing (the E2 being 10% smaller than the CSeries wing)

    When more passengers or cargo are transported over longer distances, the CSeries comes into its design window and leaves both the E-Jets behind in efficiency. They both are more economical then the A319neo and 737-7MAX for this segment of the market. CSeries provides more field performance, range and cargo capabilities than the E-Jet E2.”

  6. The problems have largely occured because of loss of focus on product for focus on organization and a single brand. The move to separate business entities will enable a refocus to product and eventual regaining of the top spot for market share in each sector. This I am entirely confident about.

    • This is the first explanation I have seen so far for the recent move to break-up the Aerospace division into three separate units.

      What you say Dave makes sense to me but I will need more details about its implementation before I can understand what is going on. So far we have seen very few details about the plan. Perhaps you know more about this than most of us do. For my part I certainly need more informations before I can make up my mind.

      I am still left with the impression that this not a well thought-out plan but rather a panic reaction to the rapid deterioration of the situation in the aerospace division, which was precipitated by the grounding of the CSeries and the sharp decline in sales of the legacy products like the CRJ and Q400 despite all the efforts that were put into their marketing.

      Normally a corporation would want to unite separate units in order to give it better control and a similar direction. But they seem to be doing the opposite. I strongly believe that Bombardier Aerospace needs a single entity to manage the division, whether it is broken up into three separate units or not.

  7. @ Normand

    BBD was late with the 700, 900 and 1000 and the Q400… .and now the CSeries (and Lear 85, too). That is a track record of poor execution.

    The rudder issue was not the only issue that delyed the CRJ1000 (FYI, the CRJ1000’s rudder ‘control by wire’ system software (Liebherr) is not supplied by the same company as the CSeries FBW software (Parker).

    The SAS landing gear issue developed long after EIS. As mentioned, besides the late EIS, the initial Q400 dispatch realiability was so bad that BBD had a full crew of mechanics stationed in Denmark and a spare aircraft.

    Precisely because BBD “bragged” about how they had taken all the precautions so as not to follow the A380 and 787 delays, it shows how poor the execution on the CSeries has been.

    • The CRJ1000 was indeed designed by Liebherr. I had forgotten that. I stand corrected and I offer an apology to Parker. Even if I had not specifically mentioned any name, I implicated them by wrongly associating the CRJ1000 FBW problem with those experienced on the CSeries. Mea culpa. 🙁

      Joe, you said at the start that the CSeries suffers from “poor execution”. These are your own words. But the only support you offer for your conclusion has nothing to do with the CSeries itself.

      As far as we can tell there seems to be nothing wrong with the design and production is doing very well. It is true that flight testing is progressing much slower than expected, but I don’t see how this is related to “poor execution” on the part of Bombardier. I have not seen any evidence of this so far.

      Except maybe for the fact that an engine is not supposed to be run with its cowlings opened. Of course the cowlings would be kept opened to check for oil leaks, but only when the engine is running at idle. I don’t know what power had been selected when the LP turbine disintegrated but I assume it was above idle. If this is confirmed it is a serious mistake. And it had serious consequences for sure. Had the cowlings been closed there would have been better containment of the engine debris and commensurably less damage to the airframe.

      The slow pace appears to be related to FBW software issues. There certainly has been poor execution there but I don’t think we can blame BBD for that. It is true though that we can blame them for having selected Parker in the first place. And that is what I meant when I wrote earlier that BBD should have taken the FBW software development in house. And if indeed they had done so and had failed, we could then accuse them of poor execution. And of course we would readily blame them for not leaving it with the experts, like Parker!

      BBD has indeed “bragged” about the fact that they had taken all the precautions in order to prevent major delays like we have seen on the 787 and the A380, and I bought into that. So I was terribly disappointed that they had not succeeded despite all the precautions they took.

      This only shows that they are not better than the others. But I am not ready to blame it on poor execution on their part. That would be too easy to do. This simplistic explanation is now routinely brought forward whenever an aircraft manufacturer is experiencing unexpected difficulties.

  8. And don’t just look at future orders. There are a LOT of A319’s and 737-700’s in service, that can cater to the markets for that size airplane, while new aircraft on order tend to drift to the larger end of the scale. Airlines can use new deliveries to up-gauge 320’s to 321’s, freeing up 320’s to up-gauge 319 routes, thereby allowing the 319’s to be used in other markets that the C=series is trying to attract. No operator will add a fleet type when they already have the support system in place for an existing fleet unless the gains in effiency are SO compelling to justify it. Very tough marketing situation for BBD

    • The marketing situation was even tougher for Airbus when they decided to join the major leagues. Bombardier is in a more favourable position than Airbus was at the time, but they will have to be patient and adjust their strategy to deal with the market forces at play as the situation evolves.

      That is what Airbus did and it succeeded in the end after a long spell with practically no orders coming in. But BBD has already more than 500 orders and commitments long before EIS. They should be okay for the next few years. We will see after that if the CSeries will have fulfilled all its promises.

    • But unless you need the capacity … the trip cost on a 737-700 or A319ceo would be much higher than on a CS300. And refurbishing an old aircraft to bring at least its interior up to modern standards isn’t free, either.

  9. @ Dave

    Your post dated July 28 @1:31 PM was an interesting read.

    I just want to specify that the risk sharing partners concept was developed at Bombardier for the Global Express project in the early 90s. BBD has since gained a lot of experience and has developed a high degree of expertise in this area. But as you have explained it still remains a huge challenge even after all those years.

    As to the flight controls software I agree with you that Bombardier does not have the expertise in house. But they have to start somewhere. They are now in a position to evaluate the pros and cons of doing it themselves and prepare for the next programme.

    By giving the contract to an outside supplier they save money but they loose control over its development and are at the mercy of the supplier which may have a conflicting set of priorities because it is developing several systems for various customers simultaneously.

    To get back to the risk sharing partners concept I was under the impression that Bombardier had a substantial contingent of personnel at each location to supervise production and report in real time any schedule drift. But based on what you say this does not appear to work as well as it was designed to do.

    Frankly I am a bit puzzled by what you report. This does not fit at all with the impression I had. Call me naive if you want but I thought that Bombardier had taken all the necessary precautions to prevent the sort of ordeal you are describing.

    I guess a parallel could be made with CIASTA which was designed to prevent the kind of problems the CSeries finds itself in right now. It appears that reality is always more complex than what we find in a Power Point presentation or in a press kit. 😉

  10. Next program? I think they need to finish the current one and buck up the whole organization with the platinum support gold plated product are supposed to have.

    In that regard they are badly in arrears. The Q400 should have had laser focus, not matter who was at fault.

    And you better be able to explain why your 70 million aircraft is worth 20 million more than the other guys more economical aircraft

    I think the Q400 (and the C series) are fine aircraft, ground breaking even, but you still have to sell them. That means EX:PAIN what the advantage are and prove it.

  11. BBD and bad management decisions? Stretching the CRJ instead of a clean sheet offering is what gave Embraer the advantage to leapfrog into a waiting market. The results speak for themselves. The CSeries is too much too late. Even the E2 is outselling it as a paper plane. When your national carrier passes your offering twice, well is may be a wakeup call. I believe the Chinese are hungry for planes or maybe a program.

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