Leeham News and Analysis
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Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 1.
By Bjorn Fehrm
August 1, 2025, ©. Leeham News: Four years ago I did a series about aircraft development together with Henry Tam and Andrew Telesca. Both worked on the Mitsubishi Spacejet program. You can find the series here.
It was about the arduous task of developing and producing a certified aircraft for the FAA Part 23 standard and its EASA equivalent. The idea was to better describe what’s ahead for the many upstarts that wanted to develop 9-seat and 19-seat alternative propulsion aircraft.
Now we do a series about recent ideas on how the long development times for large airliners can be shortened. New projects talk about cutting development calendar time by one-third or more. Is this realistic?
Figure 1. The A350 development schedule from December 2011. Source: Airbus.
Development times
First, it’s a scary long time since a clean-sheet airliner was developed. We will primarily look at the development times for Western projects, as there is little transparency around the development of Russian airliners like the MC-21 and the Chinese COMAC 919 and 929.
The latest clean sheet project in the West is the Bombardier CSeries, later Airbus A220, Figure 2. Bombardier launched it in July 2008 with the first deliveries in July 2016, an eight-year development time to series delivery.
Figure 2. CSeries 100 first flight September 2013. Source: Bombardier.
Before that, we had the Airbus A350, launched in its final form at the Farnborough Airshow in July 2006, with the first delivery in January 2015. It makes for a eight and a half year development time.
For Boeing, the 787 Dreamliner was announced in January 2003 and entered into service in September 2011. It adds up to eight years and eight months.
From the above, we can see that the historical development and certification time for an FAA Part 25 airliner (a more demanding standard than the Part 23 described in the 2021 series) is at least eight years.
The Boeing 787, with its over eight years of development, is an outlier, as much was changed in how the project was set up and managed. Chaos ensued, and we were fortunate to have a very strong Boeing at the time that could right the troubled program.
It has since experienced good sales and deliveries, but the challenging principle of its barrel composite fuselage structure has necessitated Boeing to undertake major rework on the joins of these barrel fuselage sections recently.
Complete fuselage barrels will consequently not be considered for future aircraft, not by Boeing or any other airframer. While they are not unsafe (rather the contrary, the principle has very few joins), it’s a very challenging, and thus expensive, way to produce a composite aircraft.
Recent projects claim shorter times
The above means we have not had a Western major airframe clean sheet project start since 2008! We could list COMAC’s launch of the widebody C929 in 2011. Still, once again, the conditions around this development are clouded in secrecy, and recently, there have been doubts about whether Western technology can be used in the design of the aircraft, causing further delays. Entry into service is now on the other side of 2030.
There are upstarts that have started development of Part 25 clean-sheet airliners. The most prominent are Boom Aerospace and JetZero. We also have numerous new ambitious companies announcing low or no-emission concepts, but with no clarity of resources or financing. We ignore these as there is little chance these will get the five billion dollars necessary to bring these to a serious project.
Both Boom and JetZero propose new types of airliners which doesn’t follow the classical Mach 0.8 tube and wing aircraft that take 100 to 400 passengers in the tube.
Yet they claim their development times for these unconventional airliners will be substantially faster than the eight years minimum we see above.
We will dig into these claims and their background in this Corner series and see what’s behind it all.
Bjorn, this is a great topic so thank you for covering it. I look forward to the rest of the series.
I frequently encounter people who have no idea of the rigors of commercial aircraft certification, even in the engineering fields. It’s a huge cost and time commitment, but it results in significant safety. The conundrum is how to reduce that effort while continuing the gains in safety we’ve witnessed over the last 3 decades.
It truly is mind boggling.
Getting an all digital system would help a great deal.
One aspect (not an issue) is the required documentation (which China refused to adhere to). Incorporation the testing and analysis into a fo9rm that works for the FAA and EASA vs a whole separate submital that addresses the same information would go a long ways.
A lot of submitals is rote but its critical important from the confirmation standpoint.
If you are on the cutting edge then it is also an issue in that forms have not been established for that category.
I am thinking out of auto clave curing being intro9duced.
Airbus had the advantage of going 2nd on a composite build and seeing where Boeing went wrong though they may have gone differently anyway.
Please no adjustments of history: “The first significant use of composite material in a commercial aircraft was by Airbus in 1983 in the rudder of the A300 and A310, and then in 1985 in the vertical tail fin”. They know for a long time, what documentation is required for certification.
I was not trying to ignore Airbus being the first to venture into composites in LCA.
Boeing was not the first to do a pressure structure in composites, that would be Starship.
Boeing was the first to do a LCA structure in composites.
Sweptwings. Don’t get too comfy with your Airbus being first quote.
Here’s the SAE link evaluating the DC-10 Composite flight control surfaces after they had flown for 10 years. It was published in 1986.
https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/861674/
I distinctly remember lots of carbon on the MD80 series as well as the DC10, KC10 and C17. Composite primary structures have been around a long time in many places. If you want to get back to the granddaddy of all fully composite certified aircraft, It’s the Windecker Eagle of 1969 although the German Sailplane industry had the Bolkow Phoebus in serial production before then. Those aircraft weighed more than the early transport category aircraft parts and were probably a lot more difficult to do as they forced the regulators to create the new rules.
https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/861674/
The first significant use of composite material was the 747 with the introduction of fiberglass on control surfaces, rudder and elevator.
Boeing had designed and certificated carbon fiber rudders and elevators on 767 in 1982, well before A300 and A310.
Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas all advanced carbon fiber composites through the NASA ACEE program, which demonstrated carbon fiber on spoilers, aileron, rudder, DC-10 vertical stabilizer, and 737 horizontal stabilizer. Boeing built five (5) 737-200 shipsets which were certificated and placed into service before Airbus built the A320 horizontal and vertical stabilizer. It was this program that actually laid out the certification path for primary structure composites which Airbus followed.
A310 and 767 were contemporaries.
A300 precedes the 767 by about 10 years.
A300 design decisions must have happened around 1969
“787: January 2003 and entered into service in September 2011”
8 years, 9 month actually.
question is how the SonicCruiser prerunner has to be scoped into the timeline.
add that the 788 was a compromised Mk1 sample.
only the 789 had a rash of major issues fixed for good.
The sonic cruiser was conceptual and a starting point of discussion.
@Björn Fehrm, you have a two significant errors in your article!
Error 1: The time between announcement date January 2003 and EIS date September 2011 is 8 years and 8 months! Not 10 years and 8 months! Calculation error!
Error 2: Misleading comparison! With a misleading conclusion!
It took the A350 8 years and 6 months from launching to service entry (July 2006 – January 2015)
It took the C-Series/A220 8 years from launching to servce entry (July 2008 – July 2016)
It took the 787 merely 7 years and 6 months from launching to service entry (April 26, 2004 – October 26, 2011)!!
So the 787, was actually brought into service from launching faster not slower than both the A220 and A350!!
So the development time for the 787 (from launching to service-entry) was actually shorter on the 787, than on both the A220 and A350! Not longer!
Otherwise awesome article and Awesome contributions!!
“So the 787, was actually brought into service from launching faster not slower than both the A220 and A350!!”
And the 787 paid a price for that, didn’t it?
Battery fires come to mind.
Maybe, assuming that 12 months of extra development time could have realistically prevented the battery fires from happening.
However the FAA also failed to identify the battery fire risk on the 787, when the certified both the 787 and its batteries.
Back then, the FAA was in BA’s pocket.
Did the agency meaningfully certify the aircraft, or just rubber-stamp (a lot of) it?
TW
Do you know GS Yuasa has been manufacturing space qualified Li-ion cells for use on satellites and other spacecraft since the early 1990’s? Guess not. The one that has no business in using Li battery in its own product is Boeing which should have done more research. But we all know the management at the time was eager to develop an aircraft with as small budget and as quick as possible. They shouldn’t have taken all the shortcuts.
Yes, the dendrite formation in Li-Ion batteries that caused the thermal runaway, was not fully understood in early chemistries. That issue is massively improved in current battery chemistries.
Its unlikely that either Boeing or FAA would have identified the risk at that time.
If you look at the Li-Ion battery packs used on or around the ISS, even with the improvements, they monitor every cell and every charge cycle, and they take preventive measures for any anomaly in temperature or charge rate. They don’t let a problem even get started. They can’t afford a fire that they can’t put out. Boeing specs and supplies those packs.
That is a bit of a white wash narrative.
On the ISS those cells don’t get pressure cycled multiple times per day. the prismatic form factor aggravates the issue.
The “nailing test” was naive.
The 787 use case demands “fully charged” ASAP. lax control leads to overcharge ( afair: both “nonfire” destructive events happened 20minutes after engines/APU running
The selected LI-* chemistry solution was known to be fickle.
The battery case was a joke.
compare to automotive solutions and how Airbus does it.
Lol, yes, because batteries specified to be launched into space, and in some cases also for re-entry, have lesser certification requirements than airliner batteries. I seriously do not know where you get this stuff.
The NTSB report states that the recommended aviation testing and certification regime for Li-Ion batteries did not exist prior to the 787 battery incidents, but were developed afterwards in response. Neither Boeing nor the FAA had knowledge of the battery internal manufacturing defects, nor could they have known from inspection.
One of the main fallacies employed here is to read the NTSB report as assignment of blame, when that is not the purpose of their recommendations. They truthfully concluded that neither Boeing nor FAA anticipated the impacts of an internal short circuit, that could ignite the battery and spread to other cells.
Since then we have seen dozens of other examples, even for high tech batteries like Tesla that were developed to the newer standards. It still happens, because you cannot fully eliminate the risk of an internal short circuit. That’s why Boeing shrouded the battery so that even if it does occur, it will be contained.
And is why, for the ISS batteries, if a voltage anomaly or temperature increase occurs, the affected cell is isolated and immediately discharged to remove the risk.
Sure, Rob!
I’ve done enough designs for space applications to know a bit about it.
Good engineers investigate the problem domain independent of spoonfed testing regimes.
Uwe, you haven’t refuted the facts or the NTSB report that I cited. You just make disparaging remarks that appear to be based solely on your own opinion. It’s fine to have an opinion, but you shouldn’t represent it as fact.
And for the record, NASA publishes the ISS battery data on the NTRS server, so anyone can see how they manage the batteries, and some of the actual data.
Question is why didn’t BA have a better BMS? Oh BA hadn’t done any research on how dangerous battety thermal runaway can be in aerospace applications and therefore the FAA turned a blind eye. Oops!
Anyone who knows about battery is aware the NCA batteries in some Tesla have higher fire risks. Show me a single battery fire of the Nissan Leaf! It’s a fig leaf to pretend Tesla’s lesser-safe battery is the gold standard.
Bottom line was Boeing tried to short cut the process for setting standards for an all new tech on the Battery.
Driving a nail through a battery to test it is simply stupid.
It also should be noted that the Yuasa plant was filthy when it needed a quasi clean room. Dendrites were known and understood.
Hand beating components into shape is bronze age tech as is the quality you get from it.
Scattering responsibly6 for a system across 4 organizations and 3 continents is not the way to manage a brand new tech.
Thales, Yasa, Security Aviation nor the monitor board build ever had anything to do with each other and never will again.
It should have all been subbed to SAFT who knows what they are doing. Absolutely top nothing operation.
The triumph of opinion over fact:
https://insideevs.com/news/736393/nissan-leaf-battery-fire-recall/
“Nissan said that it is continuing to investigate the issue and that preliminary data shows the lithium-ion batteries in affected vehicles may experience excessive lithium deposits within the battery cells, which can increase the electrical resistance during fast charging sessions and potentially cause a fluctuation in the state of charge.”
A quick web search revealed 3 Nissan Leafs with spontaneous battery fires.
As I noted, this problem continues into the present day, even with major improvements in battery chemistry and technology.
Further it happens with all battery manufacturers, none are immune.
Car batteries are not built to the same standards nor test aircraft batteries are.
Before quality control was instituted, Yuasa was passing 100% of the 787 batteries. Industry standard was 60-70% before the debacle.
Rigid build and test standards were instituted at Yuasa post 787 Battery meltdown. Clean rooms, forms are no longer hammer formed, post build tests including X ray or MRI.
That is all separate from spacing and insulated containers so a battery fire can’t cascade and they are now vented overboard not into the structure.
When you insert new tech, you determine what committee should set the standards (RTC) in this case. Post the debacle they did develop and set standards for those batteries.
Arbitrary driving a nail into a battery is not a test nor a standard.
If it had validity, you would develop a method, what material, how much force and where and what angle to drive said nail into said battery.
The truly biazzre aspect is that the rest of the tech with some refinement worked as intended. Like MCAS 1.0 one aspect was totally messed up.
The fact and the reality remain, that any Li-Ion cell can potentially have an internal short circuit. There is no technology that can assure it won’t happen
This is why NASA has implemented continuous monitoring of every cell. A battery fire at ISS would be catastrophic. Cell isolation and discharge are the only methods to assure safety. But they aren’t practical for most applications, as the battery expense would be enormous.
@Rob:
Not sure what the point you making is?
Boeing outsourced the battery on the 787. It was cutting edge in that application (the A350 pulled back after the debacle but when they did shift it was back to SAFT).
While the A350 pull back was added cautioun, it was under one umb erella in SAFT and that company has not only the Gold standard rep in aircraft batties (Nicad) its the one the vast majority use.
I had the delight to have them in fire system back up batts (Nicad). The big question was, do we need to run the ccyles on those? So I called them. No, these are not standard aircraft Nicad, they are specialty formulated for that service. Keep em topped up and they are good for 20 years. Yippee. No dates, no replacement, no testing, just good.
Boeing chose to go other and they went with Yuasa. Hmmm, guess who Boeing has a lot of links into? The monitor board? Changes made but it was not listed as a failure, just more beefed up in capabilities.
Boeing could not have done worse if they tried. It was the one major tech failure and a horribly bad one as it was capable of taking down a 787.
No you cannot absolute ensure one won’t go bad, but you can put the precautions in place which the RTC made sure they did.
Boeing engineering and R&D is not given the credit they should for the phenomenal success of the CRFP and all its tech that worked.
787 program was a management failure not a tech.
But they did hose the battery end.
Like the MAX blank blowout, incredibly lucky the one major failure did not occur in the air and the other one they landed immediately and not any time to get to an airport.
Boeing wanted to self certify the battery system and they failed horribly in how they went about it.
TW, you are welcome to be as opinionated as you like.
I’m giving you the facts and the truth about Li-Ion batteries, the evidence for which is clear, undeniable, and abundant. There are lithium battery fires every day across the world.
If you want to single out Boeing and insist they are horrible for having one of the earliest applications, before the risk was understood as it is today, that’s your choice. But I don’t think it’s a reasonable or factual conclusion.
My point is that the FAA certified the design, because they too didn’t understand the risk. Afterwards everyone saw the risk and mitigations were developed, as was appropriate. But the risk is only reduced, not eliminated, because it’s impossible to drive it to zero, within the lithium battery technology.
The reason for this is that the battery contains the 3 requirements for fire. It has the fuel, it has the oxidizer, and it has the source of ignition, all built into it. It needs absolutely nothing else to start a fire and burn. Thus there will always be not only the risk of fires, but fires themselves, with that technology.
That is why Boeing turned to containment as the 787 solution.
“TW, you are welcome to be as opinionated as you like.”
That is pretty rich from a commercial spout.
Note: LI use in car batteries preceeded Boeings uptake.
Requirements for car batteries are pretty stringent.
There are millions around!
Airbus introduced cylindrical LI cells from SAFT on the A380 for door emergency actuation ( and emergency lighting? )
A350 was designed for LI but fell back to NICAD to avoid cert issues coming up as fall out from Boeing’s vagaries.
If you look at the A350 battery enclosure you see the link to automotive predecessors ( Mercedes, … for Hybrid designs.
To close: Enough foreign knowledge resource available but Boeing didn’t bother.
How does the Nissan Leaf compare with Tesla with NCA battery in terms of fire risk?
Nissan recalled 24k Leaf made in America between 2028 and 2020.
The fire happened “when an affected EV is connected to a Level 3 fast charger”. Nissan promised to *update its software*.
So tell me what’s the root problem? Bad software or bad batteries?? But our poster here doesn’t care what’s the fact anymore.
OTOH what has Tesla done with its vehicles using fire prone NCA battery? What does Google search tell you?
“There are lithium battery fires every day across the world.”
If Li battery is as dangerous as portraited by our poster here, isn’t it time to ground all 787? Oops! You can’t have your cake and eat it too.
Uwe and Pedro, either you can read or you can’t. If you can’t there is nothing more to be said.
There is evidence of spontaneous lithium battery fires for all manufacturers. None are immune. This is clear even from a basic understanding of the technology.
The fact that Airbus has employed mitigations, and that Nissan has recalls, are both further evidence. So you are arguing against yourselves here, though you may not realize it.
This continuous need to bash Boeing, and claim superiority, is a sickness that has long existed here. But it’s not supported by evidence. And that is where we part ways, and always will.
Rob is a very poor statistician if he’s unwilling — or unable — to consider incidence rates.
But we already knew that.
For other readers: here’s a nice article on the various shortcuts taken by BA when designing the 787 battery:
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2014/9/10/boeings-787-battery-problems-from-the-start
Of note:
“After the two battery failures, the NTSB began to ask if Boeing had done enough testing. During a two-day hearing in April 2013 to investigate the Boston fire, Boeing appeared to concede it had not.”
““In retrospect, I believe we don’t feel that [the nail penetation test] was conservative enough,” said Boeing’s Mike Sinnett at the hearing.
“It also emerged that Boeing had not tested in line with industry guidelines, produced by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and known as DO311.
“The code came out three months after Boeing had certified its battery. Even though Boeing was on the board that drew it up, the company said it did not see a need to apply DO311 to the 787 battery.”
“By May 2014, the NTSB concluded that Boeing had fallen short. Chairman Christopher Hart issued recommendations to the FAA urging them to demand tougher testing of batteries by plane manufacturers like Boeing.”
Pardon my error, I should have included Abalone in the inability to read.
The cited article is based on the NTSB report which has already been posted and discussed here.
As NTSB noted, the current testing and certification regime for lithium batteries did not exist prior to the FAA certification of the 787. If it had it would have been followed. But it was developed afterwards, and in response, as they also noted.
We can read perfectly well, Rob.
But we don’t have selective, rose-colored glasses on when we read (unlike you).
BA was on the board that drew up DO311. It was perfectly aware of what should have been done, but took a shortcut instead. Something doesn’t have to be mandatory in order for it to be prudent.
As you like to say yourself: it’s all in publicly-available documents…so trying to create an alternate reality is futile (except, of course, for those with a vested interest).
Abalone, that wasn’t the conclusion of the NTSB report. So again you are expressing an opinion rather than a fact.
As I noted before, opinions are fine but they shouldn’t be presented as fact. And as also noted, the facts do not support anything more than Boeing and FAA not fully understanding the lithium risk. Which is fully borne out by the evidence, right up to the present day, that the risk still exists.
All the rest is the bashing disease that I referenced earlier. It’s just not necessary, especially in an article that we hopefully could all agree on, which is reducing the burden of certification, without compromising safety.
@Ropb @Abalone and any others: Knock off the personal jabs. These violate Reader Comment Rules.
Hamilton
@Rob:
You generally have valid facts and while I may disagree with some of the interpretation, till the battery posts, not widely divergent.
I have read the NTSB report on the batteries and the remedies that were in it which Boeing adapted in its entirety.
One fact is that when a new tech is introduced, you find one of the aviation committees to develop standards.
In this case the RTC was felt to be the closest match and it was turned over to them (which is where the NTSB got its recommends from)
No one has said there were standards, that is the exact issue. Boeing made its own standards when they should have gone to the RTC in the first place.
That does not mean that the Li Ion batt issues were not understood and measures had been taken to get the best possible results. RTC compiled the best standards and practices.
1. Clean mfg
2. Quality mfg
3. Test the daylights out of what you made to do your best to sort out bad ones.
4. Isolate cells so they can not cascade.
5. Vent the darned thing overboard.
New tech does not mean no knowledge and the Li Ion batts had been out long enough they knew about dendrites as well as the hazards of mfg and how to make reliable Li Ion (not perfect).
None of what I have stated was an opinion. It was findings by the NTSB.
Prior to the 787 melt downs, I had no familiarity with Li Ion. I had worked extensively with LA and one bit with Nicads (I was well informed on Nicad as a brother worked avionics and we talked about batteries all the time).
Factually if you know aviation batteries at all, there is only one mfg that is held in awe and that is SAFT. Its who you go to for the first applications of new tech.
Yuasa did not do aviation batteries, they had not background in it and were grossly ignorant of ramifications (ergo the garbage mfg of them).
Its obvious that Boeing went the cheap route that also was a prop to the Japanese relationships.
Airbus pulled its SAFT batts and put in Nicads until they were confident SAFT had addressed all the NTSB recommends.
You don’t have to be a genius to determine a new tech is only done right under a single mfg and that SAFT would be the choice in Aviation. That is not an opinion, its a fact.
I am sorry to see your take on this. It shows a mind that does not follow facts and adjusts when they are presented but has an agenda.
I have learned a lot from reading your posts and will continue to do so, but now its with a dump truck of salt in doubt.
TW
Do you know GS Yuasa has been manufacturing space qualified Li-ion cells for use on satellites and other spacecraft since the early 1990’s? Guess not. The one that has no business in using Li battery in its own product is Boeing which should have done more research. But we all know the management at the time was eager to develop an aircraft with as small budget and as quick as possible. They shouldn’t have taken all the shortcuts.
If, as you assert, Yuasa doesn’t know crap about manufacturing battery, how come the 787 is the only failure we’re aware of? There should be plenty fires reported. Your one-sided defense of BA is becoming more and more illogical.
Use for space and the use case Boeing introduced
have few commonalities.
* no repeated pressure cycles ( and the prismatic form factor introduces much more “palpation” of the cell than cylindrical ones)
* no charge /discharge at multiple C values
* not stacked in a cheap tin box.
* …
the people who developed the charger had zero experience in that field ( ruined their lab once ) and afaics did not gain much knowledge/competence onwards.
At the center is a long string of semi to unqualified people in the decision chain who either were unable to grasp the issues or happy to push them onwards to the next imbecile.
IMU a gigantic failure in “qualified and good engineering”.
All of which are again opinions with no basis in fact or evidence.
Remember, facts and truth.
Didn’t Airbus opt to use Li batteries that use a different version of chemistry, with less charge density and lower flammability, for the A350?
As stated, Yuasa did make Li Ion batts for space application.
That is not the same service as in aircraft nor were lives at risk. Clealry Yuasa was used to their methods and not having failures and assumed they could do the same (despite others best practices for other applications)
The group of SAFT Nicads I had for a backup power for a Fire Alarm system did not require discharge and re-charge using specific hours in service, specific discharge rate and specific re-charge to avoid memory lines.
SAFT came up with a mix that for that use that was immune to that. Aviation batteries required the service to avoid it.
Nothing wrong with using your setup as a basis for start, but you have to build for and have tests for a specific application.
What Yuasa did was the crudest mfg of Li Ion and for aircraft it did not work.
I don’t know what mix Airbus got from SAFT, there are less volitle Li Ion chemistries though it may reduce output.
The Bottom line is you turn the creation of new tech over to the appropriate committee and adhere to the standards they come up with.
Its why they are there. The long and terrible history in lives lost in Aviation is why.
“All of which are again opinions with no basis in fact or evidence.
Remember, facts and truth.”
@ROB: You are shooting yourself in the foot.
As stated, the reason you have commissions is to come up with standards. That is what was done once the smoke had cleared, via the RTC in this case.
The fact that Li Ion batts catch fire and issues was not new.
Boeing simply did it wrong in this case. They did so much right tech wise this one stands out.
The reality is you are taking some disparate facts and weaving it into a native that is an opinion (nothing wrong with that, but if you are going to put it out it should be supported and its not)
The fact that Li Ion batts did catch fire should have been a red rocket going up (as opposed to a 787 burning up)
Nothing wrong with Boeing looking at the tech and believing it was the best solution for the 787.
What was wrong was to take that tech and not develop standards and take all the precautions they are now.
The RTC did not pull their recommends out of their hat. They based it on best practices for Li Ion to reduce the hazard, then added a common sense separation to stop a cascade and vent it overboard.
No one twisted Boeing arm, Boeing twisted the FAA arm to get self cert of the Li Ion system.
Driving a nail into a battery as a test is no more validated than throwing a maiden (hmmm, no guy?) into a volcano and saying, well it stopped, that is the answer.
You undermine your credibility when you don’t accept the reality of what happened and it was a huge Boeing blunder.
TW, by that logic every battery fire that still occurs is a huge Boeing blunder. And a huge FAA blunder as well.
That’s not a rational conclusion. I agree with the NTSB report that Boeing and FAA failed to fully consider the impact of a short circuit within a cell, that could lead to other cells and create a thermal runaway. They didn’t address that risk and they have since, as the report notes.
But neither had that protocol in place at the time, and I don’t see that it was some glaring omission as you represent. They followed the standard engineering guidance at the time. And even today, that risk is obviously still present. That’s why they used containment as the only option that fully addresses the risk.
I don’t see the need to go beyond what the NTSB concluded, nor the justification for doing so.
But we have the same disagreement on MCAS, so we probably won’t agree on this either.
@Rob:
On the top level, Boeing was the one that undermined the ODA. That was deliberate. You can say saved costs until the cows come home, but that era was a deliberate move to jack up the stock and all the money saved, went into stock buy backs (which managers are the main beneficiary) and dividends.
I don’t know if you feel that is the way to run Boeing, but it is what put Boeing into the dire straights it has fallen to (and hopefully starting to recover)
Boeing elected not to turn over to the RTC the setting of standards for
You will not answer the issue, you keep deflecting. The NTSB did not pull those issues out of their hat, they were from the best standards at the time.
Ditto, the RTC used the same sources. There was more than enough to understand what the BEST odds of creating good battery were.
Cell desperation, better monitoring system, venting overboard were not new. Is it worth it on a car? No. An airplane is not a car, it has a load of passengers and a fire on board is a ctastorphi even (a lot of aircraft have been brought down by fires and a Li Ion is a particularly vicious type of fire (nothing will put it out) and they knew that.
The only change has been other chemistry that is less volatile.
As was noted, Security Aviation had NO, nada, nothing to do with charging batteries not any kind let alone Li Ion. Their mad scientists burne3d the building down with his playing.
Hmm, what part about burning batteries was the two failure that grounded the 787 about? Oh yea, burning batteries.
So Thales uses Security Aviation why? Well they owned it.
Boeing was the one that came up with the nail. Based on nothing other than a fig leaf that it was a test.
The FAA did not blunder as was complicit in not doing their job which would have been to refer to Li Ion standards to the RTC.
Boeing was responsible for the ensuing debacle as it was, we don’t need no stinking standards.
Truly insane. And it bit them and for the public, we can be and the passengers more so, supremely grateful neither was over ocean or land.
You burn as Building down and you can make a case that Li Ion had not risks? Really?
You talk about twisting things, that is in fact what you are doing insisting nothing was there when there was substantial information available on best practices, not what you could get away with for a different application.
You loose complete sight of the reason aviation standards are high is because a failure kills people, its not a car fire you walk away from.
The time fixed, thanks. I deliberately wrote “announced” as this was when preliminary design started in earnest.
@Thomas: Re: 787, Harry Stonecipher actually announced the program in Dec 2003 and it was supposed to have EIS in May 2008. FWIW.
Tells you how unrealistic for BA to boast EIS in 2008! And why people fell for such a ridiculous timeline??
IMHO and calling Rob:
The upcoming GFC was a certainty ( only needed some final “energy release” trigger, .. ) scoped in by Boeing.
Go into the GFC with a full orderbook from customers who would be happy to delay being served …
See Airbus founder.
Sit pretty and deliver at leisure after the upheaval has settled down.
Well Airbus had A330NEO Rev 1 to 4, then gave up for a time and we now have A330NEO Rev 5!
Mirror, mirror, what do you see?
BA once carried more than $30 billion deferred costs and has to wrote-off $10.4 billion deferred production costs.
So? Airbus blew 25 billion on the A380, never made a dime on it, all a write-off.
A solid case is made the A380 was done out of ego not data. Airbus did not have to crash to figure it out, so good for their management in recovery and future.
Boeing did indeed make some massive blunders. It took a close brush with Bankruptcy for Boeing to turn around (or start)
Mirror, mirror how does the two major airframers perform in 1H25?
AB earned €1,231m while I’d be generous and let it be known that the unnamed competitor suffered another loss aftet six consecutive years. Are you sure we are witnessing a turn around? There has been a couple false starts AFAIK.
BTW I recall that in the haste of rushing the 787 to certification:
1. BA incurred at least $4 billion extra costs that they had no choice but to expensed them to R&D
2. Built the “terrible teens” that they are forced to dispose of with great losses.
spending big money on reworking the frames was
forced by wanting to push the incurred cost into the deferred basket.
man years sunk there could have been spent in a more product quality oriented way.
All early builds are terrible teens, that is where the term came from.
Airbus had a major revamp on the A350 after 17 as well.
How many A350 are located in a museum right now?
Hahaha I only heard it when it’s referred to the 787. Where is your source ot just your imagination pulled from thin air?
There is no point of designing a new volume built commercial aircraft if you don’t have a new engine 10-15 % better than the old one it replaces. Hence the aircraft builders must first coordinate with the engine manufacturers and get a somewhat proven engine to put on. That limits new commercial aircraft programs to 787neo (Ultrafan), A350neo (Ultrafan) and A321 successor (RISE). If Airbus demands RISE performance both RR and PWA UHBR engines cannot make it. Maybe Boom Overture can succeed if they find the money to go all the way with both engine and aircraft certification ($6bn+$12bn if lucky). PWA might develop a 40k UHBR engine for the Jetzero Z4 but they need approx $10bn in funding to get certified and cover the loss of the first 200 built. Maybe DoD finds the money and orders it as a stealth tanker? Not the first time the US Congress would throw a life-line to PWA.
The A321neo successor is not limited to RISE: RR has indicated its intention to re-enter the narrowbody engine market with a smaller version of the Ultrafan.
https://www.airdatanews.com/with-the-ultrafan-30-rolls-royce-wants-to-power-narrow-body-jets-again/
+1
Looking forward to this series, as well.
You’ll be receiving a gift voucher from me if the A321neo successor doesn’t have an engine from a purely European OEM.
😉
What if it’s a RR with 10% Kawasaki and/or 10% Mitsubishi components?
@ Julian
That’s still a100% European OEM…it’s just using some parts from reliable supplier countries.
A very different construct to the 50/50 CFM “marriage”.
Engines arent just supplied ‘parts’ from other firms.
They are involved in the development stages and manufacturing of course
MTU is 18% of the Pratt GTF , as it was also 16% of the IAE 2500 and now 4% of the GE9X ( they were previously involved with CF6 and GEnx)
“MTU is a risk-and revenue-sharing partner in the GEnx program with a share of around 6.7 percent” -Quote MTU
Thats how it works as NO engine is ‘purely’ from one OEM, development partners are always included
@Duke:
Does RR have other engine suppliers in their programs?
P&W not only has MTU but it has the same 5 Japanese engine mfgs in the GTF as it has in the IAE group.
Its a different ownership as IAE is a group of more members) like CFM, but the GTF is not but uses the same group.
The V2500 has its developmental issues, they did sort it out to become a good engine. Embraer went with it on the C-390. Interesting commitment for what is the only production of new engines. IAE had to have made a commitment to do so.
I wonder if there will be more effort to put out new centerline aircraft given the new hard line against refreshes of existing product that have unaddressed design deficiencies. The lack of new aircraft is more of a strategic decision that it is easier to fund an improvement to an existing type certificate than start from scratch. How is that working out on the Max 7/10 or the 777X?
I am missing the logic.
The A330NEO went fine as did the A320NEO.
Boeing had huge issues that lead to the documentation requirements that have cascaded into the 777X and MAX delays.
If I had written MCAS 1.0 it would have been cross linked. I won’t claim any further than that but I do know to cross link critical inputs.
That really leaves one serious issue and that of course is inlet anti ice.
There are always some issues. But a revamp is not a given that its a issue in of itself.
Hi Bjorn,
From many of your recent series, one can glean that you’re very interested in climate change and its effects on aviation.
How about a series on the increasingly violent turbulence effects being experienced around the world?
Yesterday’s Delta flight from SLC to AMS was just the most recent example — featuring catering trolleys and persons being flung against the ceiling (multiple times). SIA 321 in May last year was particularly noteworthy, with 1 fatality, 144 injuries, and a devastated cabin interior.
More frequent, more violent, and increasingly without warning.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgy7jx082ro
“Fully Localized MC-21 Undergoes Acceptance Testing Ahead of Maiden Flight”
“Acceptance testing has begun on the prototype MC-21 aircraft bearing tail number 73057 (factory code MC.0013) at the final assembly plant of the Irkutsk Aviation Plant. Formerly registered as RA-73361, this aircraft has undergone comprehensive modifications as part of the import substitution program. Acceptance testing is the final step before factory development trials commence, according to a statement from the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC).
“The modernization program achieved complete replacement of all foreign-made components with Russian equivalents. Aircraft 73057 is the first MC-21 variant equipped with composite wings produced from Russian carbon fiber and resin materials. It is also fitted with PD-14 engines, Russian-made electrical power and hydraulic systems, actuators, an auxiliary power unit (APU), as well as domestically produced flight control computers, active sidestick controls, avionics, landing gear, and other key systems.
“The prototype was preliminarily outfitted with a passenger cabin featuring Russian-made seats and equipment. Additionally, specialists at Irkutsk Aviation Plant employed import-substituted test equipment manufactured in Novosibirsk to validate the hydraulic system.”
“The current plan is to complete acceptance testing and then transfer the aircraft to the flight test center for its maiden flight with its new configuration. After factory development tests at Irkutsk, the aircraft will return to Zhukovsky’s Flight Test and Development Center at Yakovlev PJSC for certification flights of its Russian-made systems. Certification is expected to be completed by late summer 2026.”
https://ruavia.su/fully-localized-mc-21-undergoes-acceptance-testing-ahead-of-maiden-flight/
“Planned Commencement of PD-8 Engine Deliveries Announced by Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade”
“During a government meeting chaired by President Vladimir Putin, Anton Alikhanov, Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, reported that deliveries of the PD-8 engines for the domestically produced Superjet 100 aircraft are scheduled to begin in spring 2026.
“According to Minister Alikhanov, the PD-8 engine, developed for the fully localized version of the Superjet 100, is expected to receive certification by the end of this year. All required certification tests are currently underway, and serial deliveries to production aircraft are set to commence next spring.”
https://ruavia.su/planned-commencement-of-pd-8-engine-deliveries-announced-by-russian-ministry-of-industry-and-trade/
The one that is so heavy the S100 cannot carry any passengers?
Or is that the MC-21?
No, that’s the anecdotal one floating around in the imagination of ultra-conservatives unable to accept that the Russians are getting very serious about their aviation programs 🙈
But, on the subject of overweight: I can imagine that the Russians are having a good laugh at the 777X vs de A350 😅
I follow knowledgeably professionals. You pull opinions out of thin air.
The Russian engines are heavy and they are not nearly as good as the Western engines.
Its not critical in fighters, you just swap engines, cost is not an object. It is in commercial aircraft trying to make money.
The 777X has sold well, has a nice build up of F orders and has not been cancelled by anyone.
So why would the Russian laugh? Pretty weird statement as they have no skin in the game.
“The Russian engines are heavy and they are not nearly as good as the Western engines.”
anything factual or just folklore?
PD14 comes in at ~~2800kg not much different to the LEAP ( ?what is counted into weight numbers?)
Then Trumps Trade Trounces have made performance slightly less important. protection from irrationalities has gained importance.
I have listed the source and then its dismissed as not reliable so will not list it again.
The Russian situation has little if anything to do with Trump and everything to do with the invasion of Ukraine.
Russia in this case has no choice. They never competed as a world engine mfg in commercial, they never learned to build engines to the standards that have been set by RR, GE and PW (MTU, Safran and the Japanese mfgs as some stand alone and or business jets).
Military engines are a different aspect that don’t have to meet time on wing or SFC, they are performance based.
Like the ME-262, the engine did not have to live long, you could make lots of extra engines. The issue was not the short wear life, it was the 25-50 hour running life and the failures that occurred.
If pilot was lucky, he could limp back and they could install another engine. Bad day for the pilot would be a fire or a kaboom taking down the aircraft and the odd of successful bailout (pre ejection seat)
Interesting:
“Currently, according to Rostec figures, 160 SSJ100 aircraft are transporting passengers in Russia. Their dispatch reliability stands at 98%. In 2024, approximately 10 million passengers were carried by ‘Superjets’, accounting for 11% of the total passenger throughput. Next year will see the entry into service of the import-substituted SJ-100 aircraft, which is currently undergoing certification trials.”
https://ruavia.su/flight-economics-how-the-superjet-is-changing-the-game-in-regional-aviation/
***
“The SJ-100 retains the functionality and capabilities of its predecessor – the SSJ100 – but has received several improvements. The basic configuration includes winglets and enlarged landing gear doors, improving aerodynamic performance. In addition, a cockpit with wide-angle displays has been introduced, providing a better informational field.
“There isn’t a single component in the SJ-100 that was used in previous versions of the aircraft. It is a completely new aircraft, Alexander Dolotovsky emphasised. “The aircraft features an indigenised electrical power system, flight control system, display systems, signalling systems, radio communication systems, radio navigation systems. Inertial systems, air data measurement systems, landing gear, landing gear brakes, the main propulsion unit, the auxiliary power unit, the fuel system, the crew oxygen system, and the passenger oxygen system have all been replaced,” he listed.”
https://ruavia.su/superjet-indigenised-nothing-foreign/
I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you!
Its just a development of the existing SSJ 100, so not a big deal
‘Initiated in 2019 under the “SSJ-New” program, the SJ-100 project aimed to replace approximately 40 foreign systems with Russian-made alternatives. This includes critical components such as avionics, landing gear, auxiliary power units, and the PD-8 engines, developed by United Engine Corporation (UEC)’
The flight testing would be as a supplement to the existing Type certificate which has been flying since 2008, so before the A220
The previous engine was a JV with Russia doing the fan & compressor stages while Safran did the hot sections.
I imagine they will have to re engine many of 160 older planes at some stage
As has been discussed in the past, Russian commercial aircraft have limited export success because of the lack of a global support infrastructure. Likewise for China, except that China is quickly building infrastructure throughout the developing world. The COMAC planes will eventually have a decent support network, probably around the time that the aircraft manufacturing capacity becomes mature. They will get there, but it will likely take 25 or more years.Russia will take longer even though their manufacturing is much more mature.
“Complete fuselage barrels will consequently not be considered for future aircraft, not by Boeing or any other airframer. While they are not unsafe (rather the contrary, the principle has very few joins), it’s a very challenging, and thus expensive, way to produce a composite aircraft.”
Panels are the way to go for primary manufacture , then stitched together to make complete fuselage sections. Airbus preferred it too.
While I believe Airbus made the right choice, it was their only choice as well.
They had not put the R&D into a spun barrel that Boeing did.
There will be offset costs in that its less labor intensive.
Airbus did a fantastic job in their sewing work. Bjorn commented long ago it was equal to the Boeing more techy fuselage, so well done to Airbus.
What is annoying was Airbus claiming panels were better because you could replace a panel if it was damaged.
Boeing per Airbus would have to replace a whole barrel section.
That is pure nonsense. You are going to patch the panel just like any other aircraft be it aluminum or the 787.
Per Airbus, if you damage at a seam, you have to replace two panels. No, you are going to come up with a patch.
Boeing more than proved you can do even a huge patch when the Ethiopian ELB batt shorted on the wires/panel and burnt out that section.
“They had not put the R&D into a spun barrel that Boeing did.”
They had and decided not to use it for cylindrical structures.
They use it for (conical) tail sections.
Any amount of effort you but into improved tolerance barrels
will produce even better structure panels.
Wow, you don’t spin a conical.
787 front is hand laid. A350 went with Aluminum as they did not want to try to develop the tech for laying on a complex pressure structure.
You should not I am not saying Airbus was wrong, they were sitting fat dumb and happy until Boeing dropped the 787 on them and then were in shock as they had determined no one could do that.
Then they called it a plastic aircraft.
And then after a lot of herk and jerk they came out with a composite equal (and did a great job)
But they were in no way ready to match a CRFP.
Boeing hosed up the implantation and they sold a lot of A330s during Boeing mess up. You really don’t want to count on your competitor to mess up for you to succeed.
Airbus does create a complete modified cone shape ( its flattened on both sides where the horizontal surfaces attach) from an inner mould to form a ‘barrel”
So TW let your eyes confirm AB do ‘spin a cone’
Heres a tape winding in progress construction photo of the tail cone barrel ( section 19)
https://leehamnews.com/2010/12/07/a350-begins-fuselage-construction-refines-program-management/
Prophetically there’s a quote from 2010
” perhaps it is time to put to bed the idea of accelerating development cycles on major products and just learn to live with the fact that the gestation period for a major civil aircraft program is eight years or longer”
Boeing was also funded by NASA to create the complete barrel Carbon fibre and its tech , conveniently a wide body size.
Airbus had done the A400M wing in CF and various parts of the A300/A330 were in CF long before Boeing.
@Duke:
I stand corrected.
It is not a pressure section.
I don’t think the Boeing method is inherently worse or more expensive. It requires very tight tolerance control over a very large circumference. When that is achieved, it works quite well.
But what we’ve seen at Boeing is a general loss of quality control, which led to the excessive expense. So I wouldn’t chalk that up to the native technology. As always with Boeing, it comes down to execution.
“As always with Boeing, it comes down to execution.”
Not just poor execution — also lots of poor design choices.
Every (current) Boeing program has been — or still is — plagued by shoddy design issues.
@Pedro, you are correct that the initial fuselage join grounding was 8 aircraft and not 2 as I stated. I had misremembered that based on the very first reports of 2 aircraft being involved. But 6 more were subsequently discovered. So I stand corrected.
However I was correct in stating those were the only aircraft that involved a safety of flight issue. The 120 that you reference were not yet delivered and so required rework, because they can only be certified under full compliance. Those are the rules, as I discussed with TW.
For the aircraft in the fleet, the FAA declined to issue an AD because Boeing was able to prove there were no issues related to flight safety or airframe life.
Boeing has said they will consider making repairs to those aircraft as they are inspected throughout their lifetimes. As of yet, no issues have surfaced.
You mentioned facts and truth. Those are the facts, and that is the truth.
Boeing’s manufacturing can’t meet the specs specified by BA’s engineers. I believe auto engineers would confirm with production engineers if the production vehicle can meet the specs they laid out. They don’t design and engineer a vehicle without knowing the end product will meet their specs. They don’t live in a vacuum. But not for Boeing??
There’re deep rooted issues.
Should I laugh or cry?
Of course you already know that issue was temporary, was resolved, all aircraft were corrected, and all current work is compliant. There are more than a thousand aircraft flying.
And of course you also know there wasn’t a safety of flight issue, except for two aircraft where the tolerances stacked, which were grounded and immediately repaired. And that no AD was issued.
And of course you also know that Airbus has had both composite join and surface issues, that required AD’s and inspections. And that Airbus has conducted composite fuselage repairs as well
But I know something too, that you aren’t interested in the facts. So I’m not really surprised here.
I have not seen the cost comparisons.
I do believe the tight tolerance are required for that mfg method to work. But they did achieve them and then lost control of it.
From the outside look, spun is costly on the equipment side for the form, spinning and the huge autoclaves (big and round).
Airbus has to send more on labor to build the ribs and panels and assembly.
Airbus is far less risky.
If Boeing does a new aircraft, we may see.
Its possible they will do a updated aluminum fuselage due to costs and the wing only will be composite (single aisle market type)
Of course everyone here knows how many 787 Boeing has to be grounded due to structural issues: eight. But that’s not* the only aircraft that suffered from structural issues, there were like 120 787 that required “rework”. It’s laughable to say the issue affected only two aircraft.
Fact of the matter is those aren’t the only ones affected, there are others that BA waiting for their customers to find out during inspections.
Where is factand truth?
@Pedro, you are correct that the initial fuselage join grounding was 8 aircraft and not 2 as I stated. I had misremembered that based on the very first reports of 2 aircraft being involved. But 6 more were subsequently discovered. So I stand corrected.
However I was correct in stating those were the only aircraft that involved a safety of flight issue. The 120 that you reference were not yet delivered and so required rework, because they can only be certified under full compliance. Those are the certification rules, as I discussed with TW.
For the aircraft already in the fleet, the FAA declined to issue an AD because Boeing was able to prove there were no issues related to flight safety or airframe life.
Boeing has said they will consider making repairs to those aircraft as they are inspected throughout their lifetimes. As of yet, no issues have surfaced.
You mentioned facts and truth. Those are the facts, and that is the truth.
@Rob.
So the number of “safety of flight” impaired and thus grounded frames is small because the large majority had not been delivered yet. Good Thing (TM)
How many of those would have been deemed safety of flight
critical ( destined to be grounded if delivered?) 50%? all?
A style of argumentation I’d deem Lawyeresk.
That has really no place in engineering.
No, Uwe, you are twisting the facts to suit your narrative again.
As I explained, the 8 aircraft were a safety of flight risk because of the stacking tolerances of two separate issues. Either issue alone did not present a safety issue.
According to Aviation Week, the 120 had only one of the two issues, because the first issue had been addressed in 2019. Therefore only aircraft delivered before that time could have the two issues stacked. And only 8 actually did.
However that didn’t really matter in terms of mitigation, because the method was the same, to split the join and then rejoin the sections, in either case. That also will be the method if future inspections demonstrate a developing problem.
BA kicks the can down the road, pass the buck to its customers. We all know airline customers have a (im)perfect record of inspection: from WN to UA.
Remember, the 787 is one accident away from tossing its reputation into the abyss.
Rob is absolutely correct. The FAA would not sign off on out of certification standards.
Boeing might have elected to have that mfg cert and spec revisited as excessive. Maybe the PR hit was not worth it, regardless they had built and could build to spec and did so there after. There are some of the 120 still to be delivered.
Single tolerance escape will be looked at from now on and if found to be causing stress problems, they will be corrected.
Pedro is wrong in that if the tolerance needs to be corrected, Boeing will pay for it.
“The FAA would not sign off on out of certification standards.”
LMAO Do I have better memory here than many posters?? Am I a “super”man?
How on earth does the FAA know which 787 meets its specs or not?
The FAA gave a 737-9 an AW certificate without bolts securing a door plug. The rest is history as they say.
So what had the FAA done to ensure BA’s production is up to specs back in 2020? Would it have prevented the 737-9 door plug debacle? Now in 2025, are we still stuck in the “everything is fine, nothing to see here” stage?
Forced me to spend a few minutes to dig out an old thread. 😑
How wide-spread and how numerous the issues are shouldn’t be minimized:
‘“Analysis is underway to determine if action is required on the in-service fleet,” she added. “Following an assessment of the manufacturing process, a total of 893 airplanes are believed to be affected.”
That’s the vast majority of the 982 Dreamliners Boeing has delivered.’
900 or more 787 are suffering from the out-of-spec issue, BA tries to pass the buck to MRO inspections. What has BA done to train those MRO workers around to world to equip them the knowhow to spot the difference (“a defect cannot be seen by the human eye”)? No more hour-long video on iPad plz.
Like I said above, any accident would be the end of the program and BA has to write-off twenty plus billion deferred costs and tools. No one is aware it’s playing with Russian roulette?
Rob, this is what I referred to, for the record:
‘Boeing’s process to generate shims was “not validated prior to implementation into the production process” and lacked a quality check to verify the final product “meets the engineering requirements,” according to the FAA memo. “Boeing has acknowledged a process that produces nonconforming products” and is working to change that, the memo adds.’
Of course there were other issues, too many to list each and every one!
https://x.com/dominicgates/status/1303351285010243590?s=20
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-wid … 1607971193
‘Boeing widens dreamliner inspection after finding a 4th quality issue with the 787s after Boeing increased scrutiny on quality control.’
Seattle Times:
‘Boeing is now conducting inspections of all of their fuselage suppliers across the globe. As such, this does not appear to be a case of staff workmanship issues, but instead is being caused by the automated robotic equipment used to fabricate the fuselage barrels.
This defect cannot be seen by the human eye as it is less than the thickness of a human hair.’
Many were hopeful back in 2020 that the ship has turned. Hope springs eternal.
Oh the link should be:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-widens-787-dreamliner-inspections-after-finding-more-assembly-line-defects-11607971193
@Pedro you are re-litigating old issues here and implying they still exist.
As I’ve noted before, if that is your assertion, you need to provide evidence. Since you have provided none, I’ll presume you don’t have any.
There has been extensive discussion here about the change in certification rigor at the FAA. You ignore that in your assertion.
Additionally you post the articles that describe the older problems, but you ignore the articles that describe their resolution.
We all know why you do that, just please be aware it doesn’t really serve as a credible or plausible argument.
Rob
Are you saying the 787 that BA left for the airline customers to find out whether the jet is safe to fly is a non-issue?
Didn’t the FAA issue several AW directives? Like the JAL 123, it’s safe until it wasn’t.
Pedro, this was asked and answered above, by myself and TW.
There were no ADs issued. There were AWL’s issued to reduce the time between inspection. However the composite structures of the 787 already had roughly an 80 year inspection period, based on 500 flight cycles per year, because of the greater resistance to fatigue. The revised guideline reduced that to about 40 years.
This is why Boeing and FAA concluded there wasn’t a meaningful impact on airframe life, or a safety issue.
However it still will be monitored because there is not a history for composite airframes over those time spans, as there is for aluminum construction. So it will need to be confirmed and validated.
If problems are found, Boeing will have the responsibility to conduct repairs, since the aircraft were produced out of spec.
Clearly that’s not what TP said. Haha.
The FAA apparently hasn’t made a final decision, awaiting further data. Let me repeat once again, the BA & 787 is one accident away from early demise. Minimizing BA’s problem is no different than turn a blind to a driver who runs red lights habitually. It’ll only end in sorrow.
“tight tolerance control over a very large circumference”
The use a mandrel , essentially an inner mould which also includes the insets for the CF length wise stringers positioned first
Sounds like a great premise for a series. I enjoyed working with you on the last one and look forward to reading this one!
Hi Andrew,
Why not join me on this one as well? Mail me!
Look at this golden oldie that I found, from 2022:
Air Current: “Boeing 737 MAX 10 certification testing to slip into 2023”
https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-development/boeing-737-max-10-certification-testing-to-slip-into-2023/
Three years further and certification is still slipping — now into 2026. And the new nacelle de-icing design *still* isn’t finalized, so 2026 can easily become 2027…
https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-development/unresolved-engine-anti-ice-fix-pushes-737-max-7-10-certifications-2026/
Mind you, we’ve had a regime change in the meantime, so yet another exemption may be forthcoming — would fit nicely into the MAGA world view. After all, the DOJ has become more accommodating toward Boeing, so other agencies may follow…
Quite funny that the Congress did granted BA an extension of exemption for the max 7 & 10 as what the airframer had lobbied. Boing boing.
So, maybe 2030+ EIS for those two aircraft?
Just to clarify, the Congressional extension was recommended by the FAA after several thorough safety reviews. No safety of flight issue was identified for the 737 crew alerting systems.
Again, facts and truth, as you mentioned
Their mantra is congress is always wrong until they make a mistake and agree with them and then of course they are right.
The EICAS was nothing more than a cut and paste excersize.
ALL new aircraft now have EICAS.
If Congress wanted to have EICAS inserted into current build, it would have been started as such and at X point, Boeing would have had to institute that.
Sloppy congressional language and cert for the MAX series was not expected to be part of it.
There is nothing more to EICAS that a program choice. No one can say the top alarm is the important one. Its what they think it will be, but with the complexity of systems and programs, its not a given it is.
Bjorn,
I enjoyed your series several years ago on supersonic aircraft design and particularly the emphasis on the powerplant requirements. Do you believe Boom Technology, Inc. has any chance of commercializing Overture? I would point out that they recently announced that the SLST of the Symphony engine has been raised to 40,000 lbf. This is higher than the wet thrust of the Olympus 593. Assuming a reasonable T/W puts the MTOW above that of Concorde (408,000 lbm). If Overture weighs more than Concorde and carries 20 to 40% few passengers, how is it going to be economical? That is a rhetorical question; it isn’t. XB1 was touted to fly in 2017; it flew in 2025. It demonstrated no meaningful technology relevant to Overture. Okay, maybe synthetic vision? $700M has been invested. The design is dead on arrival. It was dead as soon as they froze the conceptual design. The penalty (in weight and drag) of meeting LTO noise requirements is devastating. The moderate bypass ratio is a killer. The RAM drag drives up the core size and the weight, and the drag penalties escalate. They are going to have serious certification challenges with respect to rotor burst, and the structural integration of that outboard engine is going to be a huge challenge. The supersonic acceleration drag is going to be extremely high. At Overture’s elevated weight, flying Mach cutoff is likely to result in annoying, loud evanescent waves. Any further funding is just good money after bad. Still, I am very curious to hear your thoughts on opportunities to reduce development time. Much respect.
Thanks for that.
The highest thrust for the Concorde Olympus in service was 32,000lb dry 38,050 lbf (169 kN) with reheat
A modified Concorde B with some airframe changes , more fuel and modified Olympus without AB was supposedly for production after the original 17, but of course there were no buyers
The Olympus would have been bigger compressor face, additional turbine stage for more dry thrust and to allow the reheat to be removed .
During supersonic cruise thrust is gained from the variable area intakes, but still needs large takeoff thrust because wing shape isnt good for low speed lift and later to go through the sound barrier
Boom will likely follow the path that Concorde B with no AB had set out. The Wing shape seems very similar but with a low BPR Turbofan
That is one of the most awesome engines of all time.
The knocked it out of the park with that one.
Effective OPR at cruise: 82:1
Industry is still not “there” with turbo fan engines.
Agreed, the Olympus engine was an amazing technological achievement.
@Steve
History is full of examples of supersonic aircraft on paper that never took off.
I highly doubt this aircraft succeeds.
Supersonic is very expensive and low volume. There is absolutely no scale to any production
Yep. What I don’t get is people keep throwing money at it.
Last new aircraft launch? Nov 2013, 777X
– new wings
– new engines, cowlings
– new landing gear
– new cockpit and systems
– fuselage new lenght, holes, windoes, ribs, materials
– new dimensions tail
The FAA agrees (since 2018).
Just to clarify, the 777X certification is an amended type certificate.
The additional scrutiny of certification will be applied to any aircraft requiring certification, until such time as that policy changes.
How many Type certificates does the A30/330/340 have?
Done under the same grandfather clause.
Nothing wrong with doing so, I do think an all new wing justified a new certification but that is an opinion.
Its how you go about it and the FAA was neutered and was letting Boeing do its job.
You won’t see this again because the MAX is the last of the legacy birds.
777 is more recent than the A330 lineage.
The A320 is long in the tooth and has had significant changes and still under the same type.
Any changes should always be fully reviewed and now are.
EASA should never have just handed the FAA a get out of jail free card.
The FAA should scrutinize any EASA action. Brazil, Canada and Japan should review all the above.
Brazil caught MCAS existence and made them put it in the pilot manual.
Sadly they did not drill down and realize how flawed it was
“How many Type certificates does the A300/330/340 have?”
AFAIK three 🙂
* EASA.A.172 Airbus A300, A310 and A300-600
For models:
A300 B4-102 A300 C4-203 A310-203
A300 B4-103 A300 C4-605R variant F A310-203C
A300 B4-120 A300 C4-620 A310-204
A300 B4-203 A300 F4-203 A310-221
A300 B4-220 A300 F4-605R A310-222
A300 B4-2C A300 F4-622R A310-304
A300 B4-601 A310-308 A300 B4-603 A310-322 A300 B4-605R A310-324
A300 B4-620 A310-325 A300 B4-622 A300 B4-622R
* EASA.A.004 – Airbus A330
For models:
A330-201 A330-223F A330-301 A330-743L A330-841 A330-941 A330-202 A330-243F A330-302 A330-203 A330-303 A330-223 A330-321 A330-243 A330-322
A330-323 A330-341 A330-342 A330-343
* EASA.A.015 – Airbus A340
For Models:
A340-211 A340-311 A340-541 A340-642
A340-212 A340-312 A340-542 A340-643
A340-213 A340-313
Hi Rob,
It’s interesting to look back at the FAA’s agreement to Boeing’s 777X certification strategy in 2014, a decision that surprised many at the time. https://www.frequentbusinesstraveler.com/2014/05/faa-to-fast-track-boeing-777x-certification/.
This move by the FAA followed significant pressure from Congress and lobbyists just a few years earlier, which led to the U.S. Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform (ARC). This reform was largely a response to the development challenges of the Boeing 787 and Airbus’s ascendancy in the narrow-body market with their NEO family.
The intent of the ARC was clear: “We are confident the ARC recommendations upon implementation will result in the reduction of certification delays. Furthermore, implementation of the ARC’s recommendations will allow the FAA to conduct type certifications and approvals that support and enable the development of new products and technologies and enhance the global competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry.” You can read the full report here: https://gama.aero/wp-content/uploads/FAA-ACPRR-Report-to-Congress-2012-08.pdf.
The FAA complied with these directives, partly due to congressional threats to withhold future budget re-authorizations. It’s an episode that many involved would prefer not to revisit, as most of the key players are still active in the industry / politics.
However, the landscape drastically changed with the 737 MAX crashes. These tragedies prompted independent specialists to conduct thorough investigations, which also shed light on the parallel 777X development. As a direct result, the FAA regained significant authority and oversight, and the strong proponents and lobbyists for “streamlined” certification reforms largely went quiet.
Here we are in 2025, looking forward, though the internet and AI certainly retain a strong detailed memory of these past developments and all actors.
Prepare to be told that you’re merely presenting opinions and distorted facts, and that publicly-available documentation (without further specification) refutes your assertions…😅
Keesje, I don’t think we disagree here. Boeing lobbied Congress hard to reduce the certification burden, and then messed up that opportunity royally with the MCAS debacle.
And MCAS was not an isolated incident, if you look at the quality control problems that have emerged since.
That was then reversed with new legislation afterwards. The certification burden is now greater than it was even before 2014.
My points have been first, that FAA is responsive to Congress, so the blame for the certification pendulum swinging either way, can’t really be laid on the FAA.
And second, that the pendulum has overshot somewhat, which pendulums are prone to do. But that is acceptable at present because of Boeing’s record. It will be awhile before anyone questions where the pendulum is now. Not even Boeing is questioning it at present.
That’s why I’m looking forward to Bjorn’s series, because I know he will lay out objective criteria that aren’t political and could apply to both FAA and EASA.
As far as the 777X, I think the design was pushed enough that it could have gone either way, amended or new type. But for better or worse, FAA accepted it as an amended type, and that won’t change now.
However the additional scrutiny from the pendulum’s current position, shifts the amended type certification more towards a new type. Which is not the worst thing that could happen, again in view of Boeing’s record.
Of general interest:
“Lockheed, Boeing face supply crunch amid China’s curb on key mineral exports”
“According to Wall Street Journal, these limits are choking the supply chain for parts used in jets, missiles, drones, and even night-vision gear. Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, Leonardo DRS, and other Pentagon suppliers are now rushing to secure non-Chinese sources, but time and options are running out.”
“Some companies are paying five times the regular price. Others are being quoted up to sixty times more. Samarium, for example, which is needed for magnets that can survive the heat of a jet engine, recently hit record offers.”
“On top of all this, Boeing just got hit with a labor strike. More than 3,200 workers walked off the job in St. Louis and Illinois after rejecting a second contract offer. The rejected deal included a $5,000 ratification bonus, a 20% general raise, and better vacation and sick leave. Boeing said it had a contingency plan ready to go and called the offer fair.”
https://www.cryptopolitan.com/lockheed-rtx-boeing-face-supply-crunch-china/
***
Looks like China is holding to a polity of tit-for-tat vis-à-vis US semiconductor export restrictions.
This is rapidly going to affect the bottom line at BDS.
Just to clarify, Kelly Ortberg addressed both these issues in the earnings call .
He said that the defense workers strike is not an existential event for Boeing as the commercial strike was, and they have contingency plans to deal with it, whatever the resolution will be.
Then on the input tariffs issue for the supply chain, Boeing had built in a $500M reserve in their 2025 planning, and they aren’t anywhere close to that yet. They don’t expect to utilize it fully at present. They also are working to negotiate agreements with China, but said it’s something they are watching.
On the output side, they are delivering aircraft to China, including the 737 MAX inventory from before the grounding.
Just to clarify:
– Nobody said the strike is “an existential event”. But it certainly is another headache, and will — by definition — negatively affect earnings at BDS.
– Making a financial reserve so as to cover an expected expense does not magically cure the problem of materials shortages: if/when materials run out, then production stops at US defense firms. The article refers to a time horizon of about a month.
– Boeing isn’t negotiating with China — that’s the job of the White House. Up to now, those negotiations have been without much meaningful outcome. Meanwhile, China is diverting its trade efforts elsewhere — ASEAN, in particular. Trump has overplayed his hand here.
Many Europeans are upset VDL has bowed down to king DJT. America’s short-term gain at the expense of the long-term relationship.
> The US will be the biggest loser from trade ‘wins’
“Meanwhile, citizens in Japan and Europe have seen their governments humbled, which makes mounting political opposition and uncertainty all too likely. […]
Strength through disruption is a self-defeating strategy. Sooner or later, that will become painfully obvious.”
===========
The one who started the weaponization of supply chain got a taste of their own medicine.
“New Trump tariffs: early modelling shows most economies lose – the US more than many”
https://theconversation.com/new-trump-tariffs-early-modelling-shows-most-economies-lose-the-us-more-than-many-262491
Look at the second chart in the link: the US suffers more than most other countries.
The attitude in the EU, Japan and S. Korea is: “don’t rock the boat, let him think he’s won…and then watch him shoot himself in the foot”.
Reality check:
> Remarkable to see how quickly and thoroughly China has imposed its own “military end user” controls on critical mineral sales to the US military.
Two can play the same game
> REEs and magnets like SmCo are more “military end use” than things US controls like semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. They are used in nearly all US missile systems…
> Goldman Sachs notes that the recent 2 month job revisions were the largest outside recessionary times since … 1968.
Goldman expects more large revisions next month.
Moody’s chief economist:
> The economy is on the precipice of recession. That’s the clear takeaway from last week’s economic data dump. Consumer spending has flatlined, construction and manufacturing are contracting, and employment is set to fall. And with inflation on the rise, it is tough for the Fed to come to the rescue.
Unemployment remains low, but that’s only because labor force growth has gone sideways. The foreign-born workforce is shrinking, and labor force participation is declining. Telling is the economy-wide hiring freeze, particularly for recent graduates, and the decline in hours worked.
It’s no mystery why the economy is struggling; blame increasing U.S. tariffs and highly restrictive immigration policy. The tariffs are cutting increasingly deeply into the profits of American companies and the purchasing power of American households. Fewer immigrant workers means a smaller economy.
China’s gain, thanks to Trump’s tariffs.
> Coffee exporters in Brazil and Vietnam are turning to China after U.S. tariffs disrupt trade. This marks a deeper global shift as nations look to China to offset declining U.S. trade ties.
> China has approved 183 new Brazilian coffee companies to export products to the Chinese market .. The measure, a boon to local exporters after US government’s announcement of steep tariffs on Brazilian coffee and other products, took effect on July 30
Airbus also uses program accounting. But in obscure ways , never puts out its program and unit accounting numbers side by side per quarter.
Airbus calls it ‘contract accounting’…in the very fine print. It makes sense why program/contract accounting is used , but not for financial illiterates
https://leehamnews.com/2015/10/12/analysis-airbus-a350-production-and-accounting-strategy/
@ duke
need some more straws to keep afloat?
AFAIK there is a single use case by Airbus
and they have been rather open about the reasoning behind the act.
Duke
Simple: tell me how much BA has kept their spent extra production costs deferred on their balance sheet? How does that compare with AB?
Then we can see clearly who’s in a deeper hole.
Boeing has built up reserves over time and is sourcing materials elsewhere. There is no indication of limits in production at present.
Let’s see what happens before predicting the usual doom and gloom.
Same on the strike, it will be resolved as the prior one was as well. Increased wages and benefits do not necessarily translate directly into losses, that’s the same fallacy as put forth for the KC-46 debate.
Haha I still remember back in June(?), the press was still reporting about progress of the -7/-10 certification. Who feed them with such (false) information? 🙄
“Boeing has built up reserves over time and is sourcing materials elsewhere.”
An example of a complete fantasy, pulled out of thin air without any corroborating evidence (as usual).
***
Regardless of when or how the strike is resolved, it’s going to cause a hit to earnings at BDS.
Basic, high-school commerce teaches that earnings go down when production drops and/or costs go up.
Market price increases will affect everyone. But as a percentage of the cost of the delivered aircraft, they are minor, and are passed along with pricing. Same with the strike.
Again the premise invoked here is false, on both counts. I don’t think either of you guys has ever run a business, you don’t seem to understand fundamental principles.
It seems like your sole purpose here is to inflate every issue so as to claim Boeing cannot survive.
One might think that after years of doing this, with Boeing still here and no signs of going anywhere, that you might reconsider that approach, and your basic premise.
“Market price increases will affect everyone.”
Poor Rob continues to struggle with basic economics.
Just to clarify:
– The strike only affects Boeing output…not “everyone”.
– The increased wages/benefits that will eventually be paid to the striking workers only affects Boeing’s costs — not “everyone”.
If you were referring to rare earths in your convoluted post: Europe is receiving rare earths from China via a special “green channel”.
So this is a US problem.
https://www.rfi.fr/en/business/20250607-beijing-proposes-green-channel-to-export-strategic-minerals-to-eu
🙈
Ok, you are attacking again and if I respond, Scott will be upset. So I’ll drop it here.
I explained the principles and that’s the best I can do. The rest is up to you.
Just to clarify:
No attacking going on — just countering.
And you haven’t “explained” anything at all. You’ve just auto-pushed back (in a confused manner) against a reality that you find unpalatable.
We’re so far removed from manufacturing that few knows what are the impacts of tge tariffs.
Funny
> knife maker who said you dont have to worry about tariffs if you buy american. and then three months later, he realized he imports swedish steel and german equiptment. and even american equiptment manufacturers increased costs by $100k bc they import
> On April 30th, Josh Smith of Montana Knife Company said you won’t have to worry about tariffs if you buy American. Last week, he realized his costs are going up bc he imports equipment and steel. And so do his suppliers. IMO many people aren’t aware of how much they import.
https://x.com/dieworkwear/status/1951851958559703117
Here is a company that actually did what Boeing has been accused of doing, but didn’t. This is what it looks like.
https://electrek.co/2025/08/04/tesla-withheld-data-lied-misdirected-police-plaintiffs-avoid-blame-autopilot-crash/
Tesla only turned over the data when threatened with sanctions by the court for evading discovery. The jury didn’t take kindly to that, they issued a $250M penalty.
Another case where the coverup is worse than the crime. If they had just handed over the data, they would have had a much better outcome..
Who wants to bet that the Tesla software now does federal-grade erasure of the Autopilot files after an accident, so it can’t be recovered by forensics or from metadata?
Repost:
Duke & Rob
Apparently BA has plenty 777-9 flight testing ahead! The truth of the fourth phase of certification. 😁
For the record 👇
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Gxizl3KasAA0wGt?format=jpg&name=large
No one can hide the truth.
End-of-year 2025 certification (according to some), eh? Not gonna happen.
Thanks for the link. 😉
No surprises there 😅
Check out the new LNA article on the DPB increase in Q2 — more kicking the can down the road.
Just to clarify, the noted difference in cost accounting methods is standard and employed by all companies that manage inventory, and especially for products with high capital and investment costs.
Texts on cost accounting specifically reference the aircraft industry as an example where this difference is necessary and important.
The Leeham article does not claim what you are claiming here. The trend it notes is that Boeing is bringing unit cost closer to program cost, which is a sign that the programs are maturing.
But they will never completely converge until the program ends, by definition. And that is still many years in the future. Until then there always will be a difference.
Just to clarify:
Just because something is “standard” (at Boeing) doesn’t mean that it isn’t a form if obfuscation.
That’s why LNA wrote that article: to pierce through the clouds and expose the underlying landscape.
The article clearly shows that the declared loss in Q2 was lower than the actual loss.
No need for Rob to (desperately) create an alternative narrative — Boeing’s tricks are perfectly clear to us.
Just to clarify, there are no “clouds”, Leeham pulled the data from the Boeing financial statement. It’s openly stated and is available to everyone.
There is no obfuscation except within your assertion. Boeing is not hiding anything.
Just to clarify:
The very act of chosing to declare a lower loss figure than the actual loss figure is intrinsic obfuscation.
LNA’s article should be seen by potential investors as clarifying vis-à-vis the company’s true operational finances.
This again is an objectively false statement. Both loss figures are declared in accordance with accounting and required reporting principles.
Wrong again, Rob.
Only one figure is *declared*, as a headline figure.
The other figure has to be *derived*, by poring through the balance sheet.
Again there is no information presented by Leeham that is not found in the quarterly report.
Nor is there any allegation by Leeham of obfuscation on Boeing’s part. That is purely your claim, and it’s without substance or foundation.
“Just to clarify, the noted difference in cost accounting methods is standard and employed by all companies that manage inventory”
Clearly you don’t have a good grasp of the difference between unit cost accounting and program accounting.
Other than American companies, who else adopts program accounting?
“The trend it notes is that Boeing is bringing unit cost closer to program cost, which is a sign that the programs are maturing.”
I’m afraid that’s not what’s in the LNA piece. There’s no observable “trend” to indicate “the programs are maturing”! That’s fiction masquerades as fact.
A line joining two dots doesn’t make a trend, I don’t know where you got this idea.
Rob When was the last time BA succeeded to “match” the unit cost P&L with that under program accounting? I’m old enough to remember BA had to write off $4 billion plus to end the 747-8 program when orders dry up. I doubt that’s what “convergence” means to outsiders.
See this 👇
https://leehamnews.com/2025/02/04/boeing-deferred-production-costs-39bn-since-2019-max-grounding-22bn-for-737/
This is raised in the article:
“Purposefully ambiguous?”
Pedro, it’s already explained above. Also available by a few moments of factual diligence online, or any cost accounting text, as I mentioned.
Your standard tactic here is to substitute false premises, reasoning, and misrepresentation of the facts, but unfortunately it’s quite obvious. This is just another instance. None of that alters the facts, or the truth.
Well certainly the way BA has taken advantage of program accounting isn’t covered in cost accounting. Are you a CPA?
We can see with eyes to know what happened behind the curtain at BA, and don’t need any one-sided “clarification” that paints a false picture.
Your modus operandi after being called out is to sidestep issues raised and attack others without basis.
Rob has it correct
You do not have to approve Boeing accounting, the FTC does.
Boeing uses what has been accepted, right or wrong morally or dubious.
Pedro, if you want to change it, write your congressman.
“You do not have to approve Boeing accounting, the FTC does.”
Oh yeah. Facing “reality” spout out you two, it’s a waste of time to go any further. What the hell is this FTC? What are their responsibilities? My goodness. 😂
Our stable genius strikes again. Alas!
Hi @Sinclair
Correct me if I’m wrong. I can only find info about BA’s unit cost accounting online here:
https://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/2025/q2/Commercial-Airplanes-Unit-Cost-vs-Program.pdf
It’s not* part of the quarterly result filed with the SEC. So I don’t think it should be considered part of BA’s 2Q25 financial reports. Auditors of BA don’t express an opinion on that info and is not part of BA’s audited (annual) financial statements.
“Leeham pulled the data from the Boeing financial statement.”
Nope. See above.
Just to clarify, nothing in Ostrower’s post references a delay in certification. You may be projecting your opinion again.
I know that HIRF testing for the Starliner and Orion capsules takes 1 to 2 months, maybe 3 months if they find an issue and have to retest anything.
I would imagine the 777X will be similar. Most of the testing is on the ground, in facilities that can generate EMF across the entire spectrum.
Then there are high altitude polar flights that expose the aircraft to particle radiation from space. Those flights provide the least protection because the atmosphere and the ozone layer are thinnest there. And earth’s magnetic field lines are directed toward the ground, which channels charged particles from the ionosphere.
“…nothing in Ostrower’s post references a delay in certification”
Just to clarify:
A delay doesn’t have to be *referenced* — it can be implicitly *indicated*.
***
“I would imagine…”
Just to clarify:
Any phrase beginning with those words is, by definition, an opinion rather than a fact.
🙈
This again invokes the negative proof presumption, that a delay will occur unless proven otherwise. That’s a pretty standard part of your claims here. But as noted, it’s not a feature of rational argument.
If you assert a delay, it’s up to you to provide the evidence. Ostrower neither made that assertion nor provided that evidence. You also have not provided evidence. Therefore rationally, you have expressed an opinion.
“If you assert a delay, it’s up to you to provide the evidence. ”
Just to clarify:
Ostrower isn’t “asserting” a delay .
He’s providing information which logically points to an inherent delay.
Though, logic is, of course, wasted on those obsessed with shaping an alternative narrative 🙈
Trump’s “The economy is BOOMING” tweat from last Friday is another such example.
But notably the “logic” is your own, and not Ostrower’s. Nor anyone else’s.
It’s a necessary part of your particular premise, but that also renders it as your opinion.
“But notably the “logic” is your own”
Just to clarify:
The only personal “logic” being applied here is yours.
The rest of us can interpret Ostrower’s article just fine 🥳
Ditto on the attack again. You are welcome to believe whatever you wish, but your wishes are by definition an opinion, and are not rooted in fact. Or truth.
“Ditto on the attack again. ”
Just to clarify:
Picking holes in someone’s fudge arguments doesn’t qualify as an “attack”.
Scott may beg to differ. But it’s up to him, he’s the boss here.
Yes, Mr. Hamilton certainly is the boss here — though you seem to be trying to assume that mantle for yourself.
Nope, Rob is stating a view and being polite about it.
He is not skirting the rules or violating them.
Scott make the rules and enforces them not any of us.
Astronauts sent by the Starliner were stuck in space for nine months. Clearly that’s (not) a good example for the 777-9 and BA’s capability. Oops.
May be BA should have taken more time for testing. Just saying.
Apparently BA sees there’s an urgent need for an additional test aircraft! Makes me wonder why???
If the tests can be done on the ground, surely BA won’t be that silly to start using an additional test aircraft for further tests, right?
Rob, are you still pretending this is the final phase of the certification?
Just to clarify, the Starliner mission was extended for 3 months to allow time to investigate the thruster issues.
And that has no bearing whatsoever on HIRF testing. Which as Ostrower reported, is a standard part of certification testing, for both FAA and EASA. There is no urgency nor anything out of the ordinary here.
Constant misrepresentation of the facts doesn’t really avail your posts or your reputation.
Who “misrepresented” fact here?
> Two NASA astronauts, Sunita Williams and Barry “Butch” Wilmore, spent an unexpected nine months on the International Space Station (ISS) due to issues with the Boeing Starliner spacecraft.
Well the starliner returned after three months without a single astronaut because NASA vetoed it for safety concerns!
It’s getting tired having to fact check and correct not one but two constantly.
Repeat problems of the Starliner clearly reflects badly on Boeing. Whether BA learned its lessons remains to be seen.
I’m not here to paint an unreal rosy picture of BA or trying to deflect and minimize BA’s deficiencies.
for BA is to take its time, don’t rush.
NASA made its technical assessment biassed towards as complete a safety as was/is known to them (yes a Space X capsule could also fail).
Boeing made an assessment that the capsule would return fine. They were right.
If the ride back option had been the Columbia?
NASA went with the Space X of the proven choice, it did not mean no risk. Space is risky and its killed a number of people.
Unfortunately there’s no alternate history. We can’t travel back time, so we’ll never know if the astronauts could be safe by taking the Starliner back. There’s no what-if in reality. NASA could also make bad decisions like the space shuttle had two accidents. Everyone can be Monday quarterback which is meaningless IMO.
“Boeing made an assessment that the capsule would return fine. They were right.”
IMU the return was accompanied by more issues with the thruster system?
A save system requires that backup potential is available and not pre-used just for getting under way.
The argument that astronauts were not stuck because they could use the “lifeboat” anytime is rather ROB debate club stuff.
NASA has made some truly specatuarly stupid decisions in the past.
Not question this was the best decision for the Antraunauts safety. Boeing built the leaky capsule in the first place based on those assesments.
One early NASA decision was to use the booster pack on a Mercury capsule based on a indicator but not an issue with heat shield.
Never had using the booster pack come up, no testing, they just did it. It lead to a good decision making process that latter failed.
Pure oxygen in the capsule, ungh. People died as they did on the two tragic shuttle missions.
With the latest Capsule, its hard to fathom how wrong they have gotten it with all the years of proven systems to go on.
Boeing really should get out of that segment.
“If you assert a delay, it’s up to you to provide the evidence. ”
Just to clarify:
Ostrower isn’t “asserting” a delay .
He’s providing information which logically points to an inherent delay.
Though, logic is, of course, wasted on those obsessed with shaping an alternative narrative 🙈
Trump’s “The economy is BOOMING” tweat from last Friday is another such example.
“Two Boeing 787 models flagged for faulty fittings by FAA; substandard titanium used”
“The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has flagged a new safety concern involving Boeing’s 787 aircraft. The US civil aviation regulator has said that operators of Boeing 787-9 and 787-10 models will have to adopt a new “airworthiness directive (AD)”. The proposal came after multiple reports revealed that several Boeing aircraft could have forward fittings of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) manufactured from substandard materials. ”
“It added, “The titanium material that was possibly used is a Grade 1 or 2 commercially pure unalloyed titanium, which has significantly reduced strength, fatigue and damage tolerance properties compared to the type design Grade 5 Ti-6Al-4V alloy material.””
https://www.financialexpress.com/business/airlines-aviation/two-boeing-787-models-flagged-for-faulty-fittings-by-faa-substandard-titanium-used/3936636/
RAT supplied by HW Aerospace with electrical and control components supplied by GE. Titanium sourced from Spirit, purchased in China.
Counterfeit titanium has been found in both Boeing and Airbus aircraft.
This is yet another quality control issue in the supply chain. Self reported by the manufacturer.
9 aircraft are potentially affected. The Boeing service bulletin was issued in February.
https://simpleflying.com/faa-new-safety-concern-boeing-787-ram-air-turbine-fitting-could-fail/
Link to the AD.
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2025-1361-0001
What the hell is “counterfeit titanium”, they aren’t titanium? Lmao
The posted FAA AD explains. The titanium is sold at a higher grade that what it actually is, with false paperwork.
The billets are tested but usually not before production occurs. That’s standard in the industry.
Did the FAA call it ‘counter titanium’? Where? A quick search of the document you referred to makes no mention of “counterfeit”. Who is hallucinating like AI?
More interesting is whether Spirit, under undue cost pressure from BA, was forced to cheapen out knowingly — sourcing titanium at below market prices.
Really? Were the billets tested individually? I heard it was only discovered after corrosion had taken place.
Jumping on the siltiest of things aren’t you? There is getting to be a serious element of hysterics in your posts.
Counterfeit is an accurate description. A counterfeit bill is made out of paper, its no US Treasury sourced paper.
The grade is titanium is deliberately mis-categorized.
“Counterfeit products are imitations of genuine goods, often of inferior quality, sold under a legitimate brand’s name. ”
We understand English is not your first language but that does not mean you have to yell the sky is falling when you do not understand the colloquial statements.
May be you need a good rest and think clearly.
Since the subject is titanium, a “counterfeit titanium” means a metal that is not* titanium being sold as titanium, which is not* the case.
You can call it faked documentation/falsified documents, but not counterfeit titanium.
The FAA only call it “an incorrect titanium alloy material.” If you disagree, fight with the FAA.
The term is perfectly clear.
The wonder of the English language is its hugely flexible and you can use many different ways to ID the same thing.
The FAA uses a more technically descriptive term, but its the same conclusion. It was titanium and it was deliberate labeled as a grade of titanium that it was not. An inferior grade of Titanium, not a better one.
Counterfeit is a descriptor that as noted, was inferior grade being used to imitate a better grade (or more accurate the specific grade).
“Counterfeit” is a legal term and implies intent to deceive.
repeat Q: where in the handling path did the Ti* stock change its attached property? ( grade 1/2 ?pure? Ti to some higher quality/strength Ti alloy.)
Proper channels like the NYTimes or the CNN say otherwise. They left out false narrative such as “counterfeit”. Why the FAA avoided to use “counterfeit”??
Why have they taken such extra steps? Because the term “counterfeit” is false in this circumstance.
English is “flexible”. No. There has to be precision in the language we use in certain discussions.
You can speak like one who’s learned or like a kindergarten kid. Your choice.
https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/14/business/faa-probe-counterfeit-titanium-boeing-airbus
All these happened because someone imagined they could ban titanium from the largest source?? 🙄
@ Pedro
You-know-who is misrepresenting the content of the AD — which only refers to “ram air turbine (RAT) forward fittings were possibly manufactured with an incorrect titanium alloy material”
“Incorrect” is not the same as “counterfeit”.
No indication of who is to blame — quite possible that a moron at Spirit ordered the wrong grade, seeing as that company has an impressive history of screw-ups. Who knows?
Our commenter is desperate to pre-emptively misform the narrative, since it’s not a good look for BA to be caught up in yet another QC lapse when it’s trying to convince the world that it’s “turning the corner”.
Same sh#t, different day.
🙈
“Counterfeit titanium ..”
Would be interesting to know at which station the stuff morphed from Grade 1/2 to the required Grade 5 alloy.
Yes. Pedro cant accept that ‘via China’ is where the counterfeit Ti alloy occurred
You have access to the paper trail?
( That fake “Russia Gate” stuff comes to mind
a purely “home” invention )
Someone bought the titanium, reselling them as higher grade. Who were the sellers and who were the buyers? Did the buyer buy from qualified sellers?
There’s a lot to dig out, but some would rather settle for an easy narrative. Cope.
India bought Russian oil complying with the US/EU sanctions. Now they are the baddies. I’m not going to fall for such propaganda, sorry.
Oh BTW since I mention it, ‘Trump said he is set to raise tariffs on India further in the next 24 hours in light of its continued purchases of Russian oil, which he said is “fueling the war machine.”‘
Modi is furious, telling people to buy Indian goods. Time for Air India to cancel order?
@ Pedro
As regards India: Trump has just slapped another 25% tariff on the country, bringing the total to 50%.
Modi isn’t impressed.
Trump forgets (or, perhaps, he didn’t know?) that India is an ex-colony, and isn’t going to accept being dictated to.
It also isn’t prepared to accept blatently double standards.
Quite possible that Air India will revisit its ordering strategy as a result of this.
RAT supplied by HW Aerospace with electrical and control components supplied by GE. Titanium sourced from Spirit, purchased in China.
This is yet another quality control issue in the supply chain. Self reported by the manufacturer.
> WH286 777-9 line 1723 was scheduled for a B1 flight at noon [yesterday], canceled due to a mechanical problem.
B1 flight now scheduled for the morning of August 5. WH286 willl be ferried to Marana in mid-August
> WH286 willl be ferried to Marana in mid-August
Looks more like BA is taking its time, “progress” at a measure pace.
Add “two to three months” for HIRF testing and others, certification by the year end?? 🤔
measured*
Everything is fine? There’s nothing to see here? We’ll know who is closer to the truth and who is eager to shape the narrative in the not too distant future.
“… there’s a long, long way to go on 777-9 certification testing.”
May 2024
> During a Lufthansa event, Ritter informed reporters on May 2 that they no longer anticipate receiving the first aircraft in 2025. He mentioned, “We anticipate its arrival for the summer timetable in 2026 at the earliest.”
> Ritter noted that his understanding of Boeing’s present strategy is contingent upon securing TIA approval for the 777-9, which would initiate the official certification flight test campaign, anticipated to occur by March or April at the latest.
This is cool
https://onemileatatime.com/news/alaska-airlines-boeing-787-livery/
And the 737 Original lives on!
https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/nolinor-aviation-adds-an-eighth-boeing-737-200-to-its-fleet-898955583.html
Food for thought while some insists to look at the bright side only. It’s safe until it isn’t. It’s proven in history again and again but some refused to learn.
Deadly Titan Submersible Implosion Was Preventable Disaster, Coast Guard Concludes
> The probe found OceanGate, which was based out of Washington state, did not “ensure” an analysis was done to process the expected cycle of the Titan’s hull; overrelied on a real-time monitoring system to analyze the condition of the carbon fiber hull; and kept using the Titan after a number of incidents that “compromised the integrity of the hull and other critical components of the submersible without properly assessing or inspecting the hull.”
Nothing sunny side about it. Gross stupidity withe a fig leaf.
Nothing engineered about it, they glued some stuff together to go commit suicide.
The amazing thing is that it did not crush immediately.
More details on the newly-modified MC-21…lots of composite use:
“According to Gaidansky, the majority of composite structures in the MC-21-310 concentrate in the detachable wing section. Significant composite content includes panels, spars, internal wing structural framework, and all high-lift devices. Composites also feature in the empennage – vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, and control surfaces – as well as various fairings, including wing-fuselage fairings and flap track fairings. All these components exist as prototype specimens currently undergoing comprehensive testing, including successfully completed static tests.”
https://ruavia.su/mc-21-program-digest-july-2025/
“Boeing 787 Jet Forced to Turn Back After ‘Losing Part of a Wing’”
“Passengers aboard the Boeing 787-9 reported hearing “noticeable vibrations” around half an hour after departing Newark Liberty International Airport in New York for Cape Town in South Africa, aviation news outlet Simple Flying reported Wednesday.
“The captain then informed passengers the plane had “lost part of a wing,” specifically a portion of the rear spoiler. They subsequently turned back toward the mainland, dumping fuel reserves as a precaution before landing at Newark Airport at a “higher-than-normal speed.””
“Simple Flying adds the same United Airlines plane that encountered difficulty on Sunday, and which at less than five years in service remains relatively new, also suffered a fault in its electronic cooling system earlier in July, again prompting a return to Newark Airport after less than an hour into its route to Delhi Indira Gandhi International Airport in India.”
https://www.thedailybeast.com/united-airlines-boeing-jet-forced-to-turn-back-from-atlantic-crossing-after-losing-part-of-a-wing/
Just to clarify, this incident turned out to be an APU inlet door failure. The crew had misdiagnosed it as a either an elevator trim tab or spoiler issue.
Rob is confusing the cited 787 incident with a 737 MAX incident this week involving elevator vibrations:
https://avherald.com/h?article=52b548cf
Not surprising from someone who doesn’t bother posting links 🙈
And that’s being peddled as “clarification”…?
😉
Turns out there was a second vibration incident on the same day. That one was a spoiler panel malfunction.
Reassuring!
Aerodynamics. Vortices form around non-streamlined structures on aircraft, which induce vibration.
Doesn’t matter who made the aircraft, physics doesn’t care. Both of these were maintenance issues.
How inconvenient for your narrative that we’re not getting strings of reports of such incidents from operators of other OEM aircraft…
Lol, false again. From the BEA final report issued last month:
https://avherald.com/h?article=50d51947&opt=0
“During the transition to configuration 1 for landing, when the aerodynamic flow around the leading edge slats was modified, the pilots heard a thud followed by slight vibrations. They continued the approach and landed without further incident. On the ground, an inspection revealed significant damage to the metal composite structure of the trailing edge of slat No. 2 on the right wing. The investigation established that this damage was not the result of a mid-air collision. It was also established that there were pre-existing bonding defects between the upper and lower skins and the honeycomb core. These defects could have weakened the structure.
Actions taken
Airbus recorded three other similar events on the A380 in the following seven months. The manufacturer conducted examinations of the damaged slats, which revealed internal structural defects that may have led to these incidents. Airbus is continuing its analysis to determine the origin of these defects. Pending the findings, an inspection was carried out on all A380s operated by the two affected operators: no similar damage was observed.
Airbus plans to issue two service bulletins in January 2026 to all A380 operators to introduce repetitive inspections during A and C checks to identify potential cracks or de-laminations on a leading edge slat trailing edge.”
As I’ve explained countless times, these issues occur for all commercial aircraft. A brief inspection of the FAA and EASA databases will confirm this. AVHerald also has about even distribution of faults between manufacturers. Any claims to the contrary are unfounded.
Rob posts 4 AB events in seven months on a single model…versus 3 events in just two days and for various models over at BA…
“Physics doesn’t care”…but stochastic physics seems to have a preference for BA…
😅
August 4
> Thousands of Boeing workers who build fighter jets and weapons go on strike
There is always going to be a degree of tension between how much new technology to introduce on a program and the program schedule. With the life cycles of airplanes being 50 years or more, you don’t want to miss out on incorporating technology when it is ready.
Sure you can build something quickly if you constrain yourself to doing what has been done before. But it is a different story when you need to incorporate new technology.
This is where Stonecipher got it wrong on the 787. He thought that he could use the business model of the MD-95/B717 on the 787 Program. But the MD-95 was essentially just putting a new flight deck and engines on the DC-9. No new design in terms of structures or systems. Suppliers just had to copy what someone else had designed. The 787 just needed more time, and I’m speaking from experience having been on the program from day 1 and involved closely in key configuration and supplier decisions.
My own perspective here is that a new airplane needs to be built for rate at the start. That means design for automation. And if that is the way the industry is moving, I don’t see significant reductions in overall program length. Airbus has the lead here in my opinion.