Special Coverage of the Boeing crisis
Jan. 23, 2024, © Leeham News: When in trouble, Boeing turned to a retired US Navy Admiral for the second time.
Last week, CEO David Calhoun announced that Adm. Kirkland Donald was named as special advisor to Calhoun. “Donald and a team of outside experts will conduct a thorough assessment of Boeing’s quality management system for commercial airplanes, including quality programs and practices in Boeing manufacturing facilities and its oversight of commercial supplier quality,” Boeing said in a statement.
It’s the second time Boeing turned to an admiral in connection with 737 MAX crises. In September 2019, the company turned to one of its Board of Directors members, Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, to head a new board-level safety committee to review a plethora of safety items in Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg asked the Board the previous April to establish a Board committee to review Boeing’s safety practices and recommend next steps.
At the time, the MAX had been grounded for six months, with no end in sight. (Another year and two months would pass before the Federal Aviation Administration recertified the MAX.)
Donald and Giambastiani came from the nuclear navy, where safety measures are among the world’s best. Since the creation of the nuclear navy, there have been only two instances where ships were lost—and neither of them was directly related to nuclear power.
The submarine USS Thresher was lost on a test dive in 1963. The submarine USS Scorpion was lost in 1968. The Thresher’s loss was traced to disastrous flooding at a depth from which the sub could not overcome the flooding to surface. The Scorpion’s loss remains controversial to this day. Some believe it was sunk during the Cold War by a Soviet submarine. Others believe a torpedo suffered a “hot run” accident in the torpedo room and blew up before it could be disarmed.
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By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 22, 2024, © Leeham News: The grounding of the Boeing 737-9 MAX is likely to delay certification of the 737-7 and 737-10, customers fear.
At a minimum, certification of the 737-7 is likely to shift by months, customers suggest. Certification of the MAX 7 has been repeatedly shifting. Boeing hoped that certification would be achieved in 2022 or 2023. It’s now 2024. In December, Boeing asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption to safety standards for a deicing of the leading edge of the composite engine nacelle. There already was opposition from some pilot unions to this request. Now, with the Jan. 5 grounding of the MAX 9 due to the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 decompression, some believe this exemption won’t be granted.
Flight testing for the MAX 7 is all but done. Boeing hoped to deliver the first MAX 7s to launch customer Southwest Airlines this year.
Flight testing for the MAX 10 is in its early stages. Certification processes were suspended during the MAX grounding, which ended in November 2020. Testing has been slow since because there are only a few MAX 10s available for testing, and due to the slow certification process for the MAX 7. One MAX 10 customer fears certification will be delayed 6-12 months. This would shift deliveries from early 2025 to later in the year or into 2026.
By the Leeham News Team
Jan. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: It’s not supposed to happen.
The door plug on the Boeing 737-9 MAX isn’t supposed to separate from the airplane in flight, as it did on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 this year.
There is conflicting reporting whether the emergency exit or door plug is opened on the Boeing 737 final assembly line for access to the interior. Examining Google images, two photos show the exit or plug closed while over-wing exits are open. Credit: Unknown.
The investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is in its infancy. Early evidence suggests four bolts intended to prevent the door plug from shifting in its attachment brackets either failed or weren’t installed. Inspections after the 1282 incident by Alaska, and United Airlines found loose bolts in other MAX 9s. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Jan. 6 grounded the 171 MAX 9s operated by the two carriers until inspections and repairs, if needed, are completed.
This photo of a Boeing 737-900ER for Turkish Airlines shows a door plug closed on the 737 final assembly line. The over-wing exits are open. Credit: Unknown.
Boeing CEO David Calhoun, while telling CNBC that he wasn’t pointing fingers, did precisely that. He said Spirit AeroSystems had a “quality escape,” adding that Boeing failed to catch it, so it also had a quality escape.
How could this happen? The NTSB probe will presumably figure this out. Spirit ships the 737-9 fuselages with the door plug installed. Conflicting reporting suggests that Spirit is supposed to install the door plugs in the final, secure condition; or these are shipped with the plugs in place but in a condition that Boeing would later secure. The NTSB will sort this out, too.
Regardless, Boeing should have inspected the door plugs and assured these are in final condition prior to delivery. The Seattle Times reported on Jan. 14 that contrary to other reports, Boeing doesn’t open or remove the door plug when the MAX 9 is in final assembly. A retired Boeing safety employee with assembly line experience says Spirit ships the door plugs in a temporary condition, expecting that Boeing may remove them during final assembly.
By the Leeham News Team
Jan. 12, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration today announced it is boosting its oversight of Boeing production and manufacturing on the 737-9 MAX.
The FAA’s been overseeing Boeing deliveries of the MAX since recertifying the airplane in November 2020. Following the discovery of production issues of the 787 in October 2020 that resulted in Boeing suspending delivery for more than a year, the FAA also assumed certification by an FAA official.
With today’s announcement, the FAA said it will add “new and significant actions to immediately increase oversight” to audit the MAX 9 production line and its suppliers to “evaluate Boeng’s compliance with its approved quality procedures.
The FAA also will increase monitoring of MAX 9 in-service events and assess the safety risks of delegated authority. The full announcement is below.
Update: The Federal Aviation Administration today notified Boeing it is under investigation for potentially failing to ensure the door plug was properly installed.
By Scott Hamilton
Jan. 11, 2024, © Leeham News: Alaska Airlines Flight 1282’s (AS 1282) decompression last Friday on a Boeing 737-9 MAX understandably brought new focus and doubts about the MAX program.
The MAX was grounded by the Federal Aviation Administration for 21 months after the March 2019 crash of an Ethiopian Airlines 737-8 MAX. This followed an October 2018 crash of a Lion Air MAX 8 under similar flight conditions. The two accidents were traced to the root cause of a mis-designed Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS.
Note: This data is based on October 2023 information. Full year 2023 data is not available at this writing.
When a door plug for an inactive emergency exit blew out of AS 1282 at 16,000 ft minutes after departure from Portland (OR), it meant trouble for Boeing and confidence in the MAX. Fortunately, no fatalities and only a few minor injuries resulted from the decompression. The flight returned to Portland and landed safely.
Alaska grounded its fleet of 65 MAX 9s within hours. United Airlines followed the next day. It has more MAX 9s—79—than any other airline. Shortly after United’s action, the FAA made it mandatory: the MAX 9s would remain grounded until inspections and fixes, if required, could be completed. A few other international airlines followed suit.
But as information emerged through Tuesday of this week, it became clear that this story is not a “MAX” story. It’s a story about quality assurance at Boeing or Spirit AeroSystems, the maker of the 737 fuselages and the plug door.
By the Leeham News Team
Analysis
Jan. 8, 2024, © Leeham News: Following in the footsteps of the 737 rudder bolt omission inspection just last month, we have the Jan. 5 incident on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 in which an emergency exit plug door blew off the airplane at 16,500 ft. This may indicate another quality assurance failure at either Boeing or Spirit AeroSystems.
The door plug design used on the Boeing 737-900/900ER, 737-8-200 and 737-9. Credit: Boeing, via the National Transportation Safety Board.
We don’t know if this is a Boeing problem, a Spirit problem, a bolt manufacturer problem, or an Alaska Airlines problem. It’s way too soon in the investigation to draw conclusions. Certainly, because it’s Boeing’s name on the airplane, and especially given the MAX history, people are jumping to the conclusion that Boeing screwed up again. While this may ultimately prove true, LNA is not at all prepared to conclude today that this is the case.
Illustration of the bolt locations securing the Boeing 737-9 door plug to the airframe. Credit: Capt. Chris Brady.
The flight left Portland (OR) for Ontario (CA) about 4:30pm. Six minutes later, as the two-month-old Boeing 737 MAX 9 was climbing through 16,500 ft to cruising altitude, the inactive emergency exit plug door, aft of the wing on the left side of the plane, separated from the aircraft. Decompression followed, with an emergency descent and landing back at Portland. There were no serious injuries.
The area where the door plug and cell phones fell from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. Credit: Google Earth, NTSB.
Boeing and Spirit have been plagued in recent years by quality “escapes.” Inspection and quality assurance may be the culprit again. The official investigation will take some time. The rapid issuance of the Emergency AD Note mandating only a one time inspection is a logical response to something having been misassembled, with the fix being to verify it is assembled per drawing. Whether this is another piece of poor workmanship not being caught by inspection remains to be seen.
The following analysis was compiled by LNA’s news team.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
January 8, 2024, © Leeham News: Embraer was hit by a double whammy before and during COVID. The non-closure of the merger of Boeing’s and Embraer’s Commercial Aircraft Divisions and the halving of its E-Jet deliveries during COVID. The year that passed marked the recovery from the extra cost and effort of the non-merger and an increase in E-Jet deliveries and orders.
It was also a progress year for the EVE eVTOL venture, with Embraer finalizing design and starting prototype production. Despite the EVE lagging behind other programs by about a year, the customers believe it’s one the most viable programs. Eve doubles the preorders of the nearest competitors.
The past year will also be seen as the break-trough year for the KC-390, Embraer’s bet to replace the venerable Lockheed-Martin C-130 military airlifter. The customer list went from three to five, with more country air forces in serious negotiations for the KC-390.
By Dan Catchpole
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Jan. 4, 2024 © Leeham News: Boeing’s priorities in 2024 are clear: get the job done on time and without drama, and don’t cause any scandals. In short, it needs a boring year. However, to do that, the aerospace giant has to overcome several obstacles.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes has to increase production rate goals, sign a new labor contract and help suppliers along. That means going against Boeing management’s cultural predilection for extracting concessions from unions and contractors.
Defense is a mess, and there’s little reason to think it will improve much this year. Several fixed-cost programs are bleeding money. Boeing is competing for three major United States Department of Defense programs, but it is not favored to win any of them. This year, leadership is expected to focus on controlling costs.
A new position of executive vice president and chief operating officer for The Boeing Co. was created last month. Stephanie Pope, previously CEO of Boeing Global Services, was named to fill this slot. She’s an unknown to some customers and hasn’t run a company approaching the size of Boeing. She’ll have to prove herself in this new position of greater responsibilities than she’s ever had.
Jan. 2, 2024, (c) Leeham News: Editor’s Note: With the ground collision (Jan. 2, 2024, Tokyo time) of a Japan Air Lines Airbus A350 and its destruction by fire, we’re reposting this article from March 2009. It was then that Boeing was in early production of the 787 and the Federal Aviation Administration was studying what Special Conditions to require in the event of a fire on a composite passenger airliner. The 787 was the first all-composite airliner and how composite of this scale would react in a fire was then mostly known. The only all-composite, large airplane fire had been that of the B-2 Stealth bomber.
Video via Times of London.
LNA spoke with airport fire officials about preparing for a composite airliner fire and we discussed the challenges the US Air Force had in putting out the B-2 fire. Fires occurred on two 787s after entry into service: a JAL aircraft that was parked at the Boston airport after a flight from Tokyo and an Ethiopian 787 parked in London. The JAL fire was traced to a battery. Airport firefighters faced challenges in putting out the fire. The airplane was heavily damaged but repaired. The Ethiopian 787 fire was traced to pinched wires creating a short at the emergency transmitter locator in the top of the fuselage. The plane was heavily damaged but repaired. The JAL A350 is the first hull loss of a composite airliner and the first by fire.
Investigators will learn all kinds of lessons from the A350 accident.
All passengers and crew on the A350 escaped. The five crew on the Japanese Coast Guard airplane involved in the collision died.
The March article is below.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
December 21, 2023, © Leeham News: We are looking at a re-engine of the 767, a move that Boeing is considering to avoid a production stop after 2027. The present 767 engines don’t pass emission regulations introduced by the FAA, EASA, and other regulators for production and delivery beyond 2027.
We looked at what airframe modifications are necessary to house more efficient engines last week; now, we use our Aircraft Performance and Cost model to look at the economics of the original 767 versus a re-engined one.