Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Ultimately, Congress is responsible for mess at FAA, Boeing, Spirit, et al
Editor’s note: Mondays are ordinarily paywall days. Because of the nature of this topic, today’s article is a freewall post.
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
The Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 MAX that was involved in the Jan. 5, 2024, accident. The door plug for this emergency exit blew off the airplane during climb out from the Portland (OR) airport. Nobody died and injuries were minor.
Feb. 26, 2024, © Leeham News: There’s no getting around the culpability of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Spirit AeroSystems in the current 737 MAX mess. Nor was there any doubt about the culpability of the FAA and Boeing in the first MAX crisis in 2018-2019.
But let’s face it: Ultimately, Congress is where the buck stops. Because Congress for decades failed to appropriate the bucks needed for the FAA to do its job without overreliance on Boeing or Spirit.
Shifting oversight responsibilities and diminishing the FAA’s role may well have been the result of effective lobbying by Boeing and others in the aerospace industry. Congress could have rejected changes to laws governing the FAA’s oversight authority in favor of Boeing and other aerospace companies.
So, it’s Congress, once again, that is ultimately culpable.
Let’s not be naïve. There is no way Congress or Members of Congress will step up to assume responsibility for the mess the US commercial aviation industry sees itself in today.
Part 2: Reconstituting Boeing’s ODA system
By the Leeham News Team
Analysis
Feb. 21, 2024, © Leeham News: In part one, LNA looked at the Organization Designation Authorization, more commonly known as the ODA, what it is, and why it is so important to industry.
The ODA is an organization that is granted the privilege to operate as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on selected work package types. ODAs are composed of “unit members,” the FAA term for people doing ODA work.
Boeing and many other aerospace companies in the US use ODAs. Airbus uses similar people under a different designation issued by EASA, Europe’s regulator. Boeing’s ODA authority was restricted by the FAA in the aftermath of the 737 MAX crisis that led to the 21-month grounding of the global fleet.
The FAA is reconsidering Boeing’s ODA authority.
There are two types of unit members: Designees and others who do ODA work without formal FAA signature authority.
Credit: Federal Aviation Administration.
An example of how a Type Certification (TC) ODA organization uses these two different talent pools can be seen through the Certification process where detailed analysis done by the group is approved (signed off) by an ODA unit member who is a Designee. The FAA suspended Boeing’s “ticketing authority” for the 737 and 787 following the MAX crisis and quality concerns on the 787 production line. Ticketing authority is one ODA mission.
Make the fix on Boeing 737-9 door plug fail-safe
By the Leeham News Team
Commentary
Four missing bolts were the reason the emergency exit door plug separated from a Boeing 737-9. The inspections-and-repair edict from the FAA may not be enough for a fail-safe fix. Credit: NTSB.
Feb. 20, 2024, © Leeham News: Four missing bolts on an emergency exit door plug leg to the in-flight decompression of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 of this year.
It’s not yet clear why the four locking bolts were not installed in the incident aircraft, a Boeing 737-9.
Information revealed to date by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) discovered that Boeing removed the door plug in an unplanned process when some defects were discovered with some rivets. When Boeing line workers reinstalled the plug, for reasons as yet unknown, the four retaining bolts were not reinstalled. The bolts became separated from the plug during the removal. So far as is known, the four bolts never have been found in the factory. The NTSB’s investigation continues.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the MAX 9s for three weeks while inspection and repair procedures were prepared, approved, and implemented. Inspections were expanded to the MAX 9’s predecessor, the 737-900ER, which had the same door plug. No grounding was required of the -900ER.
Although the processes solved the concerns over all MAX 9s produced to date, the question arises whether the procedures are sufficiently fail-safe going forward.
The inspection of the fleet to verify the correct installation of the lock bolts appears to leave a gap for future production, unplanned plug removals, and reinstallation.
Ryanair, Southwest, United take biggest hit from FAA cap on 737 MAX production
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 16, 2024, © Leeham News: When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) put a freeze on Boeing 737 production rates at the currently approved 38/mo level, LNA revealed that hundreds of orders will face delivery delays. Boeing faces even greater delays than the 38/mo production level suggests, however.
As LNA reported, and confirmed by several aerospace analysts, Boeing’s true production rate for the 737 was 31 per month and even lower—as little as around 20 per month in some periods. The balance of deliveries came from its large inventory of 737 MAXes built during the first nine months of the 21-month grounding of the aircraft.
With Boeing’s full year 2023 delivery data now available, LNA looked at 2024 deliveries that were planned before the Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines 737-9 MAX emergency door plug blew off Flight 1282 on climb out from Portland (OR).
The incident was characterized as an accident due to the nature of the event and damage to the airplane. Nobody died and there were only minor injuries. The decompression at about 16,000 ft. damaged the door surround at row 26 on the left side. The door plug separated from the airplane and was found in a wooded area a few days later. There was damage throughout the 737’s cabin and the cockpit door was ripped off its mountings.
The pilots landed the airplane a few minutes later in Portland.
Production rates below Boeing’s claim, low supplier confidence
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By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may have told Boeing it won’t allow product rate increases on the 737 MAX lines, or the addition of the North Line at Everett (WA) until it’s satisfied production quality is under control.
But as LNA first wrote upon this news, Boeing’s production is well below the currently approved 38 per month. We pointed out that Boeing was consistently struggling last year to roll 31 MAXes out of the factory—and often, the number was substantially below 31.
Sometimes the number of newly produced 737s was less than 20 a month, reports one consultant who tracks the production.
Technically, the FAA can’t stop Boeing from producing more 737s than the 38 per month cap. It doesn’t have this authority, reports Aviation Week. But the FAA is the responsible party for issuing individual aircraft airworthy certificates as the 737s are ready for delivery to airlines and lessors. And, according to AvWeek, the FAA won’t issue more than 38 certificates a month.
The FAA suspended Boeing’s so-called ticketing authority for the MAX before the airplane was recertified following the 21 month grounding beginning in March 2019. This suspension was extended to the 787 when production and quality control problems were discovered at the Charleston (SC) assembly plant.
Several aerospace analysts following Boeing pointed out that Boeing hasn’t produced 38 MAXes a month and, like LNA reported, it’s struggled to meet even the previously advertised rate of 31/mo.
Figure 1. Cirium plotted the actual new production deliveries vs the advertised production rates for Airbus and Boeing single-aisle aircraft.
The consultancy Cirium charted the actual deliveries by Boeing (and by Airbus) for their respective single-aisle aircraft.
What is an ODA and why is it critical to understand it
By the Leeham News Team
Feb. 14, 2024, © Leeham News: In Congressional hearings last week, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said the agency will retain an outside organization to review whether its oversight of Boeing needs to alter how this is done.
Administrator Mike Whittaker, who has only been on the job a few months, said the FAA may want to change its Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) process that oversees Boeing.
ODA Unit Members (Designees) are Boeing employees who report to the FAA. But for years, highlighted by the first 737 MAX crisis in 2018-19, complaints suggested Boeing exerted undue influence on its Designees to get what it wanted in the development, production, and oversight of its 7-Series airplanes.
Because of that crisis combined with multiple issues with the 787 production facility in Charleston (SC), Boeing’s ODA was suspended.
The FAA also has a problem: Boeing’s ODA was suspended. Congress has a problem: The FAA and Boeing appear to operate too closely together and have lost public trust.
What is an ODA and why does the FAA need to delegate work back to the companies being monitored using Designees? LNA takes a deep dive analysis into the ODA problems at Boeing and what can be done to restore confidence in Boeing, the FAA, Congress, and the flying public. This is the first of two articles.
Airbus should tread carefully
- Airbus announces is 2023 earnings on Feb. 15.
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By the Leeham News Team
Analysis
Feb. 12, 2024, © Leeham News: United Airlines has reportedly been looking to Airbus to replace the Boeing 737 Max 10s that Boeing is having difficulty delivering, due to the Alaska Airlines accident and the resulting delays in certification to the Max 7, Max 10 & 777X programs. Airbus has been searching for ways to recover/create slots to take on a premium customer and poach them from Boeing.
A320 production rates are headed towards 75 a month in the 2025/2026 time frame, with Airbus confident that its supply chain can meet the demand and will commit to the rate for the long term. These are record production numbers with the previous high-water mark reached in 2019 with 863 total deliveries: 642 of those from the A320neo family, or 54 a month. The A220 program is also headed for an increased production rate of 14 a month at about the same time.
However, Airbus has its own kinks to work out, along with concerns outside its control:
- Geared Turbofan (GTF) on wing engine issues from supplier Pratt Whitney.
- The A220 & A330Neo lines aren’t selling as well as they’d like to
- 2024 US presidential election could really upend the apple cart.
- Another Max accident would be a bad thing, even for Airbus (more below).
There has been speculation and calls for Airbus to push the envelope even more, reaching 90 a month to offset the Boeing shortcomings.
75 & 14 a month are already huge goals and pushing suppliers to go past those targets might compromise quality. People will cut corners when they are greedy. Besides, a little scarcity when you are the top dog isn’t the worst thing; Boeing isn’t coming to the party with anything new in the near future.
2023 Boeing Financial Results: $41m earned at BCA–(or was it?)
- Airbus 2023 earnings are announced on Feb. 15.
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By the Leeham News Team
Feb. 9, 2023, © Leeham News: On January 31, Boeing released its year end results for the fiscal year and despite the entire company ending up in the red, analysts and investors alike pointed to the bright spot at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA). Positive margins and earnings of $41 million. Some good news finally, after five years of less than stellar results.
Boeing has been beset by problems since its last profitable year in 2018:
- Two 737 MAX crashes and subsequent grounding, leading to a buildup in inventory.
- 787 delivery stoppage and a further build-up in inventory, with a $3.5bn write-off.
- 777X certification delay and a $6.5bn write-off.
- Numerous and costly production missteps.
The slide continued into 2024 when a 737 Max 9 door plug blew out during an Alaska Airlines flight, leading to increased scrutiny by regulators and further delays to the Max 7 and Max 10 certification process.
With the earnings release, there was some good news amongst the rubble; BCA was finally beginning to turn things around in the right direction, posting positive margins and a gain of $41 million. Not earth-shaking, but a small measurable baby step towards profitability.
Boeing to Suppliers: FAA audit of 737 could change production schedule, but stick to plan for now
[Ed. note: The headline and top of this story have been reworded for clarity.]
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By Dan Catchpole
Boeing’s Ihssane Mounir talks to suppliers at the 2024 Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance conference.
Feb. 8, 2024 © Leeham News: The head of the Boeing Commercial Airplanes supply chain told suppliers to keep making parts for the 737 MAX at the existing production schedule while the Federal Aviation Administration scrutinizes Boeing’s production of the single-aisle jetliner. He added that the production pace could be affected by the FAA’s audit results, which are expected in March.
“I would ask all of you to bear with us,” BCA senior vice president of Global Supply Chain and Fabrication Ihssane Mounir said at an aerospace supplier conference on Wednesday. “Let us get through this process with the FAA, the audit process, and see what the findings are and how we mitigate those findings…and what it’s going to take to get back to the production rates as we forecasted them before.”
The current schedule has the 737 production lines going to 42 airplanes per month starting this month. However, in the wake of a door plug panel blowing out of a two-month-old 737 MAX 9 flown by Alaska Airlines, the FAA on Jan. 24, told Boeing it could not increase the production rate past 38 airplanes per month. The planemaker already had been struggling to deliver that many MAXes each month.
Mounir said quality and safety trump every other concern and that Boeing and its suppliers have to get back to basics when it comes to ensuring quality. For the time being, he told suppliers, “If you have an issue, please call, and we’ll work with you.”
Summary
- Mounir: Quality trumps everything else
- Boeing urges suppliers to voice concerns
NTSB confirms door plug bolts were missing on Boeing 737-9 MAX
By the Leeham News Team
Feb. 7, 2024, © Leeham News: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) yesterday issued its preliminary report on the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 structural failure on Jan. 5 this year. (A link to the report is below.)
The emergency exit door plug separated from the two-month-old Boeing 737-9 MAX due to faulty installation, the National Transportation Safety Board confirmed.
A door plug on an emergency exit on a two-month-old Boeing 737-9 MAX blew off the airplane as it passed more than 16,000 ft shortly after takeoff from Portland (OR). Nobody was killed and only a few injuries occurred. The flight crew made an emergency landing in Portland a few minutes later.
Within days, the focus for the incident landed on Spirit AeroSystems, which makes the fuselages and installed the door plug, and on Boeing, which completed final assembly at its Renton (WA) 737 plant. Quality assurance, or “quality escape” in aviation jargon, was suggested to be issues at Spirit and Boeing.
LNA’s Bjorn Fehrm quickly concluded that four bolts meant to hold the door plug in position after installation were missing. The bolts are designed to prevent the plug from moving upward off flanges that hold the plug in place in the fuselage opening.
The NTSB’s investigation confirmed that these four bolts were missing after Boeing removed and reinstalled the plug to fix a quality escape from Spirit affecting the plug. Boeing employees failed to reinstall the plug.
Removing the plug is not a standard final assembly procedure. It’s called an “unplanned removal.” There is a specified procedure to reinstall an unplanned removal. It appears that Boeing failed to follow its own procedures.
LNA on Jan. 15 detailed the procedures for unplanned removals and reinstallation.
Related articles
- Unplanned removal, installation procedures at Boeing
- 737 incidents prompt new scrutiny at Boeing
- Alaska 1282 isn’t a “MAX” story, it’s a quality assurance issue at Boeing and Spirit