Pontifications: Embraer sees E175-E2 orders this year outside US

By Scott Hamilton

Aug. 26, 2019, © Leeham News: My column July 22 entitled Embraer counts on Boeing heft for E2 sales boost raised a few hackles in Sao Jose dos Campos, headquarters of Embraer.

It wasn’t meant to. Rather, slow sales of the E-Jet E2 this year caught the attention of more than a few in the market, so I thought putting some perspective on the issue was worthwhile.

After all, sales of the Bombardier C Series were slow between the announcement of selling 50.01% of the program and consummation of the deal nearly a year later.

Such is the case with E2 sales pending consummation of the Boeing-Embraer joint venture, which has a target date of closing by year end, I wrote.

Slattery takes issue

John Slattery, CEO of Embraer Commercial Aviation and CEO-designate of the JV Boeing Brasil-Commercial, said last week in an interview that E-Jet sales in the last 12 months were outstanding.

They were good. But mostly, they were for the E1.

There were 38 first orders last year for the E2. Through mid-August, Embraer announced firm orders for 27 E2s, all 195 models. (As usual, there were a lot of options and purchase rights in each year, but firm orders are all we’re counting here.) That’s 65 E2s in 19 months. But the E1 still is carrying the day, notably the 175 model that is compliant with US Scope Clause labor contracts.

But Slattery, as recently as the EMB pre-Paris Air Show media days in May, said some airlines were waiting for the Boeing deal to close before making decisions about the E2. He also said once certification for the new E2s was received, orders would pick up—although this has seemed to be the case so far after certification of the E190-E2 or, more recently, the E195-E2.

In our conversation a week ago, Slattery reaffirmed his pre-air show observations, but steadfastly touted the sales record of the last 12 months.

He also expressed confidence that there will be more orders for the E2 by year end, including for the E175-E2, which has no firm orders—but 100 conditional orders from US regional airline Skywest.

E175-E2 status

Embraer has deposits from Skywest, but these conditional orders are contingent upon Scope compliance and contract renewals from its major, partner airlines.

Under accounting rules followed by Embraer, these can’t be listed as firm orders. Slattery notes that Mitsubishi’s orders for 150 MRJ90s (now called the M90 SpaceJet) are also conditional under the accounting standards followed by Embraer, but Mitsubishi’s accounting standards must be different—for the airplanes are still listed as “firm” orders. (MITAC is not a public company and the accounting rules applicable to Embraer don’t apply.)

The E175-E2 and M90 maximum take off weights exceed the 86,000 lb restriction in the US pilot Scope Clauses.

Embraer (and Mitsubishi) counted on Scope relief this year and next, with current pilot contract negotiations. It’s not going to happen, everyone (including the OEMs) concedes. The next opportunities will be in 2023-24. Absent a major economic shakeup in the US airline industry, the consensus is Scope relief may not come even then.

It’s the E175-E2’s non-Scope compliance that causes some in the market to question whether this model will proceed past the prototype that is now in production.

Slattery’s hot Irish temper emerges on this one.

He bristles at the suggestion and says current campaigns outside the US should produce orders this year for this model.

At the same time, he says certification and entry into service (the latter planned for 2021) might be delayed a year due to market conditions. The certification process isn’t a question; any rescheduling will be market-driven, he said.

Those who question the E175-E2 future are, Slattery said, “beyond nonsense.”

“I would be disappointed” if some of the interest in the E175-E2 doesn’t result in orders perhaps by year end, he said.

One-third, one-third, one-third

Slattery believes the three models each will account for about one-third of E2 program sales. Based on E1 sales to date, call it about 500 airplanes per sub-type with the E2, a more even distribution than with the E1 and “Classic” E-Jets, which was weighted more toward the E175/175-E1 and the now-discontinued E170.

 

52 Comments on “Pontifications: Embraer sees E175-E2 orders this year outside US

  1. Scope-clauses is a hard chip. It restrains airlines from buying modern aircrafts. Only MITAC’s Spacejet has a chance, if they will hurry up, and not blew it.

    I agree that E2 sales will speed up after Boeing acquisition – there is a market for not so capable as A220 small jet, and cheaper as well (I suppose). The question only is if Boeing will not draw down Embraer with his attitude, and financial problems (in spe), and will not scare buyers with it.

    • I don’t think so. Southwest fleet is homogenic, and scope-clauses “invention” was for regional fleet, and Southwest doesn’t have such – all 737s.

      Maybe Southwest will buy E195s after Boeing acquisition of Embraer, or in search for a more capable aircraft A220s, or nothing 😉 Most probably for me is the third possibility, then first one in a pursuit of all Boeing fleet.

      • Depends on strategy of course.

        WestJet started out like Southwest but morphed into a conventional airline, now c/w the silliness of zoom/jazz/red or such as Air Canada flipped through.

        WestJet has smaller airplanes than 737, as a strategy of serving smaller places than 737s are suited for. It chose Dash8-400 airliners. But jets would facilitate quick flights to small places further away from hubs.

        The speed difference adds up, for example YZFYRB 727/737 versus L188 Electra.

  2. John Slattery [Edited], denying reality may not be a long term solution for E175-E2.

  3. I can guess majority of E-175 sales were US.

    Ergo, its in trouble and Mitsubishi is the one adjusting its strategy.

    And with the A220-200, the 195 has not only competition but airlines have ability to move up to a large cap aircraft in the same hull.

    E-175 future would be to re-engine with the best SFC non big fan (weight) available.

  4. How much is the E175-E2 overweight as to the scope limits? Would the pilots be open to allow a creep up in weight since the seating number remains the same? Can a compromise be worked out to allow the E175-E2 to be added to the fleets?
    Seems some reasonableness is needed to remedy this small problem.

      • @Scott is that a typo? I thought it was more like 12,000lb over the limit.

        2,000lb is only about 11% of the fuel capacity and it would seem in that case they could simply certify if at 2,000lb less and still have a viable regional aircraft.

        • jbeeko: Scope limit 86k lbs. MTOW for 175E2, MRJ90/M90 88,000lbs.

          Range goes down by limiting to 86k to levels that (as another reader pointed out) works with average 500nm routes but there is no flexibility for medium-to-long-range routes (ie, 1,000nm-2,000nm) to full capabilities of the airplanes.

          For example, Alaska uses the 175E1 between Seattle and Wichita, a distance of 1,437sm (1,248nm). This could not be used under a reduced weight limit for the 175E2. This is just one example.

        • As LNA has said before they could make it Scope compliant with a fuel load for around 900nm . Thats regional enough you would think , but the majors are not interesting only in ‘true regional’ routes anymore, they are frequency fillers between major cities. In a round about way RJ have become what the 737 was before the NG model gave it trans con range, fly from either coast to center of US.

    • What incentives do the mainline pilot’s unions have to allow the regional airlines to fly the heavier aircraft that their members would otherwise have to fly?

      And remember the compromise could come from the airline side. After all there is nothing that prevents the mainline airlines from introducing those modern regional jets into their mainline fleets. They just need to negotiate a pay-scale for those smaller jets. Delta is introducing over 100 aircraft smaller than anything else in their fleet.

      Finally flying smaller jets on the mainline brings in younger pilots and puts them on the company seniority ladder. This may have strategic implications if the pilot shortage materializes.

      • If the seating count is the same, what are the unions worried about? The scope clause was to limit larger RJ’s that could replace mainline flights.

        • They are replacing mainline flights, some existing E175 so called regional flights are between large cities and 3 to 4 hours long. That’s not regional

          • If RJ’s are replacing some routes flown by mainline planes, it might be the market is not strong enough to justify the extra seats.
            I don’t see where much harm would result from raising the weight limit so that the 175-E2 which will eventually replace the E-175 at a future time. Being used for flights over 3 hours still does not mean that all those flights should be flown by mainline planes. If load factors are low with mainline planes, RJ’s are the next step to maintain the route.

          • They can’t just raise limit for only one plane – for legal anticompeticion reasons. They have to open it up significantly to accommodate more manufacturers.

        • The trend toward ever more capable smaller jets is clear. It is not hard to imagine that the next generation of 76 seaters having full transcontinental ranges. If you were a union strategies you may be a bit worried by the notion that the regions could start flying transcon point-to-point routes to the detriment of your members flying hub-to-hub. Given this would you not see this as an opportunity to bring the 76 seaters back into the mainline? Or perhaps trade the weight restriction for a route length restriction?

          • I don’t see RJ’s doing transcons any time soon. It could overload some hub airports and cities that currently receive RJ service might lose some flights for transcon flights. What about raising the weight limit from 86,000 to 90,000 lbs. That would still keep 90 seat and higher RJ’s in the scope limit and I think it’s the 90 seat and above RJ’s that most worry the pilots.
            The landscape of air travel is changing, no more 19-50 seat props and even the 50 seat RJ’s are on the way out.
            Either airlines and pilots move with the changes or be left behind, the new normal is here.

          • @jbeeko
            I don’t see that a “flying cigar” like E2 could do transcon – too claustrophobic – its a big drawback of this old concept. A220 has much more spacious cabin.

            @Steve
            Scope-clauses can not raise a weight limit just a little bit, just to accommodate just E175, because it will raise anticompeticion accusations, it has to be broader change to accommodate more manufacturers. Imo scope-clauses shall disappear totally, I don’t see any public good behinds it – only savings for mainlines, privileges for mainline pilots and outdated aircrafts to buy again. That’s why I like that Delta introduced A220 into mainline to do a part regional job.

          • @Pablo: I’ve flown the E190 E1 between Toronto and Seattle non-stop and with its 2×2 F class-type seating, it’s a whole lot nicer than the A320 and especially the 737 coach class. (Bins are on the E1 leave a lot to be desired, something addressed in the E2.)

            The A220 is a great cabin and great bins, but I would have no problem whatsoever taking an E2 transcon over an A320 or 737, ceo/ceo or NG/MAX. Except it’s a little slower.

          • I know @Scott it is possible, and personally I don’t mind, but my wife yes, and there is lot of people with this “issue”, however is luckily a very mild one. I wasn’t aware even how much there is earlier. She likes flying very much, but if its a flying cigar 2h is really max. dosis, later the discomfort is too big. So imo a flying cigar for transcon is inadequate – too claustrophobic, too crampy, and if some airline would buy it for transcon would increase significantly possibility of failure, which is not good.

            I’m a big fan of narrow-bodies flying transcon, overseas etc. but imo A220 cabin is the reasonable limit for big part of passengers for what it can be accepted, more the once 😉

      • The airlines want it all their way. As mentioned in a previous LNA story
        “As these cabins have evolved into three classes with Domestic First Class, Premium Economy and Economy, the required cabin size for the Scope aircraft has increased.”

        Whats forgotten is the E175-E2 is stretched over the earlier model as the airline space has moved up .. and to stay below Scope weights the range was “only” 950nm …pleease . Most routes are below 1000nm anyway but the airlines want to eat away at the mainline routes.
        Some routes now flown by E175 are El Paso to Seattle or Dallas Portland , both over 4 hours or SFO to Kansas City , 3 hrs
        https://leehamnews.com/2019/06/13/how-mitsubishi-aircraft-morphed-the-mrj70-into-the-m100-spacejet/

        Mitsubishi had the opposite problems, range was good at max weight but the space for ‘ US 3 class’ wasnt.
        As Southwest in US and Easyjet and Ryanair showed in Europe, the plane size isnt the ‘problem’ its the high fares and overheads.

        • “The airlines want it all their way” Might a case of both sides wanting their own way. Pilots fear the encroachment of large RJ’s into mainline routes. Airlines want to better match routes with aircraft to ensure good load factors. I don’t see raising the weight limit a bit to allow 76 seat and below aircraft as a bad thing. As time goes on the existing 76 seat RJ’s will need replacing and with the current limit, it poses a major problem for the airlines. Raising the weight limit too much will allow RJ’s with more than 76 seats and that is a bad thing.
          It will take some give and take but in today’s world, that seems to be a lost art.

      • Exactly. I like Delta thinking – they introduced A220 as a part of a main airline even they are doing part of regional job.

        • New York to mega cities in Texas isn’t regional. They are just frequency fillers.
          Southwest doesn’t have a problem with doing these sort of routes with 737 sized planes. Their secret….low fares. Save the 76 seaters for real smaller towns and cities

          • That’s why I wrote in part – because in the other part A220 is doing mainline job on thinner routes. It’s a good versatile aircraft.

            I don’t think Southwest doesn’t have a problem with thin routes, sometimes even 737-700 is too big and too less economic, I think A220 or even E2-195 it’s an undiscovered opportunity to gain market share & profit for Southwest or Ryanair.

    • the scope clause needs to be restructured into a straight seat count & distance formula. this would meet the Pilot’s needs and benefit the airlines

      • A whole subject of course.

        One consideration is nature of the trips.

        PW was trying to slowly balance the rigor, whereas union seniority rules resulted in:
        – the most experienced pilots flying charters to Mexico out of Toronto for ten days, then have 20 days at home in Vancouver as they’d reached the limit of hours for the month
        – junior pilots had to slog through the rain and snow and mountains of BC for 12 landings and takeoffs a day.

        Not equitable, not the best use of talent as the regional flying is tougher with higher risk.

        (PW crews alternated takeoffs and landings.

        Where the smarts were also needed was into the High Arctic, decisions on fuel reserves at expense of payload, TOD decision to ‘land up there’ if not enough fuel to return to origin from destination (as alternates like YCB may have poor weather at the same time). And more.

        Smarts don’t fully correlate to experience .

        (Witness the Captain who killed himself at YRB by not recognizing that the autopilot had reverted to heading hold during a routine ILS approach he’d flown before, not listening to the F/O who kept telling him their track was off course, compared to the sharp pilot who was the first to Captain PW Hercs with only 5000. hours experience.)

        But having seen things before really helps people smart enough to learn.

        One day at the office I encountered a check pilot in the hallway, he related that he’d been to Seattle the night before with his son in the other seat. He remarked that the trip showed the difference between flying skill and experience, his son and he respectively. The weather was west coast awful for the trip.)

  5. Interestingly 328 Support Services GmbH has announced it will be resuming production of the Dornier Do 328 as the Do 328NEU. SSG is part of Sierra Nevada who are building the Dream Chaser for NASA. The Do 328 NEU will be the stretched version with upgraded avionics and engines. With the Airbus A321XLR, A220 acting to split down the hub and spoke model one would expect opportunities for even smaller aircraft to act as feeders to these new highly capable aircraft.

    • I saw that smart move I think. It is a fast efficient relatively modern design with lots of emphasis on low noise and other elements of cabin comfort.

      I did not notice it was a stretched version SSG was pursuing. But even stretched it is probably under 50 seats. So possibly a replacement for the CRJ-100/200 but nothing bigger.

      • The owner of SSG, the business that now owns the 328 IP is a ‘billionaire Turkish American’ businessman. We have been through this before in 2015 when he announced a deal to development a Turkish regional jet …wait for it ..based on the 328Jet version. A new facility for manufacture is announced ….but nothing.

        This latest project, like the last, probably has zero chance of success. The best plane design, the cutting edge manufacturing centre all need one extra thing. Customers.
        For various reasons the 30 + seater market has gone away for those buying new. Like that other German marvel the VW Kombi, it aint coming back.
        My own view, the 328 deserves another chance , but surely the little forward swept HFB 320 german executive jet did too…but. Made in Germany is nice , but for bulk of the buyers, made in US means more.

        • I think the difference this time is that both the Saxony regional government has come through with 6.6 million subsidy, there is assembly location at Leipzig/Halle airport secured and the Federal German Government has come through with 125 million Euro credit. The area is economically depressed despite plenty of talent as it was in the former communist occupied area and their markets destroyed or gone. Most of the prewar German aviation industry was from here (eg Junkers). They seem to be going for the defunct DASH 8-100 market and maybe the slightly larger ATR42. There just doesn’t seem competition in this area.

          • Saxony regional government likely have zero idea of marketing and production of airliner and would be relying on SNG. A plane of this type is probably beyond SNG as well unless they partner with a larger or experienced group but all the previous knowledge in Dornier and Fairchild -like other small OEM like them is mostly gone. Mitsubishi comes to mind to tie in with their Spacejet models but for all sorts of reasons is unlikely.
            In my country a 3rd tier operator flies Saab340s , Metroliners and even Convair 580s( apparently quite fast) but I see that have added an ATR72. But they clearly are well used aircraft likely with lowish utilisation so new 328s wouldnt be on the radar.

  6. Can see the E175-E2 as a niche aircraft with limited sales.

    When it comes to Southwest, lots of things need to change for them not operating relatively large numbers of MAX-7’s in future. If they want to open new routes and schedules can see that a fleet of 100-200 E190-E2’s could fit their model, don’t think the E195-E2 will fit as its turnaround times on the ground and field performance won’t cut it.

    • Way off the E Jets

      Some factual errors for sensationalism sake.

      Loss of lift and a stall does not mean you crash. Factually its arguably you won’t even get to a stall and then said stall has to occur at pretty low altitude to be non recoverable able.

      I would guess around 100 stalls done in my training and I am here to write about them (and one spin I also recovered from though I will agree it was not graceful)

      And in fact as well the MAX’s did not stall, the very system intended to maintain commonality with the NG killed them.

      A lot of lawyer nattering about setting precedent and all that, while of course they get well paid for a case this gross, guaranteed money. Over here we refer to them as ambulance chasers.

      Do they ever take cases pro brono for someone who will get no representation?

  7. Meanwhile, Der Spiegel published yesterday online for free a version in English of their “monstrosity from Seattle”* article, which appeared in three parts in their German edition on the 2nd of August.

    https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/737-max-boeing-s-crashes-expose-systemic-failings-a-1282869.html

    * https://www.spiegel.de/plus/boeing-737-max-das-ungeheuer-von-seattle-a-6686177b-d189-4b61-85a5-0cde132096f8

    From part 3:

    A former Lufthansa executive, himself a trained aerospace engineer who has decades of experience in reading technical evaluations of aircraft, is convinced that courts could very well determine that the actions taken by the Boeing engineers amount to “gross negligence.” The ex-Lufthansa manager, who has to remain anonymous due to old contractual agreements, says he is convinced that the construction of the 737 Max on the whole is “amateurish.” It is, he says, the culmination of the technical shortfalls that Boeing has essentially been seeking to eliminate since the mid-1990s.

    The repositioning of the engines decisively changed the 737 Max’s flight mechanics relative to all of its predecessors. In extreme flight situations with an especially steep angle of attack (the plane’s position relative to airflow), the turbine cowlings with their flat bottoms create their own aerodynamic lift, not unlike an additional wing. That can lead to the sudden rise of the plane’s nose, making a stall more likely. Should that happen, the plane loses lift and crashes.

    To prevent such a scenario, the Boeing engineers reached deep into their bag of tricks. They knew that such an in-flight behavior was expressly prohibited by FAA regulations, so to ensure approval of the 737 Max, they needed a bit of electronic help. Boeing developed a software program that constantly monitored the angle of attack. As soon as this angle became too risky, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) would automatically lower the plane’s nose without the pilot having to do anything at all. To do so, it doesn’t manipulate the rudder, but the horizontal stabilizer trim, the most forceful control surface on the entire aircraft.

    It was only by way of such string-and-chewing-gum tricks that engineers were able to achieve the stability necessary for safe flight. The FAA was informed of the system early on and accepted it. In hindsight, it is an open question whether they were really aware of all the details of the new software solution. When Boeing first presented the MCAS system to the FAA, the program only activated reluctantly and adjusted the horizontal stabilizer trim by just 0.6 degrees. Later, though, during the development process, Boeing gave the program much more leeway and increased its control over the plane, allowing it to make changes of up to 2.5 degrees. According to information currently available, it looks as though the FAA never approved this much riskier system.

    Because of the several inconsistencies, the former Lufthansa executive believes the company could be facing the retroactive loss of its insurance coverage for the 737 Max. In a statement about the allegations, Boeing wrote: “The FAA considered the final configuration and operating parameters of MCAS during Max certification and concluded that it met all certification and regulatory requirements.”

    • Reply went under wrong byline

      Way off the E Jets

      Some factual errors for sensationalism sake.

      Loss of lift and a stall does not mean you crash. Factually its arguably you won’t even get to a stall and then said stall has to occur at pretty low altitude to be non recoverable able.

      I would guess around 100 stalls done in my training and I am here to write about them (and one spin I also recovered from though I will agree it was not graceful)

      And in fact as well the MAX’s did not stall, the very system intended to maintain commonality with the NG killed them.

      A lot of lawyer nattering about setting precedent and all that, while of course they get well paid for a case this gross, guaranteed money. Over here we refer to them as ambulance chasers.

      Do they ever take cases pro brono for someone who will get no representation?

      And an engineer has what expertise in the legal system?

      As the NG was a safe aircraft and the MAX is not unsafe sans the MCAS I am not at all getting what you point it. And it depends on what courts things land in let alone legal is not the same as fair.

      Legally in the US, Ethiopian and the pilots share blame as they did not follow the procedure as well as violated the speed end. A US court would apportion out the responsibility. No less than 20% and as high as 80% at a guess.

      Indonesia is a separate aspect but legally they to did not follow their in country regulator guidelines.

      Its been hashed over to death at this point.

      Nothing remotely new to add to the pictures.

    • It’s an interesting article though it doesn’t inform of anything Leeham news or Seattle Times has already published more credibly. Interesting thought is that Boeing might loose its insurance coverage. I think the engineers working at Boeing and the Us subcontractors that outsourced to a foreign country should be lawyering up because there is a clear violation of safety standards involved here that involved a duty of care at an individual level. I doubt the people programming the boom gate at a shopping centre car park could have made a system less redundant than MCAS. I suspect we will understand the MCAS disaster on a psychological level as “group think” and also a case of implicit pressure on employees to be on time. I have high regard for Lufthansa Technik and any engineer that has worked there but I find “Der Spiegal” incorrigibly sensationalistic, sanctimonious and politically biased magazine. I read technical German so I’m well aware of they’re behaviour. For instance they misrepresent a Boeing executive as evasive but the reason Boeing doesn’t comment on investigation of the B737 issue is because it is precluded from doing so by the investigating authorities (NTSB). Boeing would be excluded from participating if they commented publicly on an ongoing investigation. Their bias shows also when they couldn’t help but take a swipe at Trump over “deregulation” when the B737 was predominantly certified in the Obama era and when it is in fact the US Congress that funds the FAA not the President and any insufficient budget appropriations must go back nearly a decade.

      • Congratulations on reading technical German, only had school German and did only so so.

        Well put.

        Another factor in Boeing not commenting is that its corporate standard to not do so in cases like this. Wrong or Right, they want to speak with one authority (granted said authority is discernibly muddled)

      • @william

        william: Their bias shows also when they couldn’t help but take a swipe at Trump over “deregulation” when the B737 was predominantly certified in the Obama era and when it is in fact the US Congress that funds the FAA not the President and any insufficient budget appropriations must go back nearly a decade.

        Well, you accuse Der Spiegel of misrepresentation and bias — yet, you manage to misrepresent what they write. BTW, what does one call that type of accusation?

        From Der Spiegel: “Since 2005, the FAA has been permitted to allow Boeing and other companies to delegate their own employees to handle FAA certification checks. The problem, though, is that this system of delegating safety checks doesn’t work in practice.

        Corroborated by this article: http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/boeing-737-max-crashes-highlight-the-high-costs-of-cheap-government.html

        In 2005, the Federal Aviation Authority gave airplane manufacturers the power to cast their own employees as in-house regulators. This policy streamlined the inefficient “revolving door” process by making it possible for Boeing to regulate itself without the hassle of getting its lobbyists appointed to the F.A.A. The George W. Bush-administration argued that such “delegation” would allow the agency to concentrate its scarce resources on the most important safety issues, while also helping America’s aviation giants get new planes to market faster.

        Thus, Der Spiegel didn’t take a swipe at the Trump administration (i.e. by blaming them for the MAX crashes). What was pointed out, however, was that “Trump’s deregulation drive threatens to further accelerate the conflation between regulators and those they are supposed to be regulating” — i.e. this is about the relationship between regulators and industry in general.

        From Der Spiegel:

        President Donald Trump’s deregulation drive threatens to further accelerate the conflation between regulators and those they are supposed to be regulating. Shortly after entering office, Trump signed two pivotal executive orders, number 13,771 and 13,777, which could further undermine the FAA’s independence in that they call for the drastic reduction of regulatory requirements at all government agencies. That could mean that even more of the FAA’s mission will be delegated to the industry. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, passed just a few weeks before the Lion Air crash, follows in the same vein.

        • In order for Boeing to “Self Certify” Boeing must submit to the FAA the specific object they wish to “Self Certify” and the FAA must hand it back to them. It’s not carte blanche for Boeing to do whatever they want. It seems Boeing was very late in submitting documentation and that they treated to many modifications as ‘minor modifications’ that didn’t require as many submissions. Obviously paint colour is minor. I don’t think the FAA was to blame here, boring messed up and didn’t cover their bases.

          If Boeing engineers were one thousandth as accurate and ethical as the editors and journalists of “Der Spiegel” was they’d be in jail.

    • However “Der Spiegel” isn’t known for his journalism quality, I have to say that this article is a some kind of exception – imo, describes well, factual how the things are with Boeing culture and MAX. Nothing really new, what hasn’t been discovered yet, but a good recap.

      • Disagree. There are all sorts of sensational aspects in it and buried some actual information that has been put forward elsewhere in a far more straight forward reporting

        When you skip over 80% of what is being put forth its sensationalism.

        Some of their older work was much better done.

        • MAX case is sensational itself, it’s like a good tech-crime book, but it is for real :/ Some parts are written in novelist way, but it’s for general public, so imo is ok.

          • Its what they do, doesn’t make it any good.

            Dumbing down sensationalism is not a recipe for a technically informed population .

            You can look at what the US has for leadership (total lack there of) to see where that leads.

          • Pablo :
            You are spot on referring to the 737 MAX tragedies (the two crashes and Boeing/FAA subsequent handing of the matters arising from them) as sensational.
            Given the Der Spiegel’s article chronicles the salient facts into an easily readable summary, Transworld’s statements are unwarranted.

  8. Could we see a LEAP-1 (B?) variant on the A220’s in future now that Airbus has taken over the program? The spin offs are many, for example, Southwest will definitely give more than a 2nd look at an A220-500 with 25Klb LEAP power.

    • Why have a lower BPR engine that is heavier? And is it as quiet as the GTF on takeoff ?
      Airbus for a larger A220 may be more interested in the ‘Ultra high BPR’ version that Pratt has been developing. Future models are a better bet with future engines.

  9. “Slattery’s hot Irish temper emerges on this one.” Apparently, Scott is not “woke” out in lib land! LOL Or is it “cool” to stereotype Slattery because he’s a white male?

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