Recovery of the flight recorders from Air France 447, an Airbus A330-200 that crashed into the Atlantic two years ago, appears to have quickly identified the events that led to the crash–and contrary to all those who claimed the vertical tail fell off or the A330 is a deathtrap, it appears the pilots simply weren’t trained properly to handle the events.
The Wall Street Journal has this detailed account of what investigators have found.
Lest anyone now charge that the failure to fly through the frozen pitot tube situation is exclusively an Airbus problem, Flight Global’s David Kaminsky-Morrow posted a link to a National Transportation Safety Report from 19– in which a crew stalled an airplane after the pitot tubes froze up and crashed, killing all aboard.
The aircraft? A Boeing 727-200.
The point: accidents like these often happen across OEM lines. And the actions of Airbus-haters was pretty disgusting.
While we were gone, the WTO issued its ruling on the Airbus case, which was appealed by both sides.
There’s been plenty post-ruling analyses written already, and since we’re nearly a week later, we’re not going to add much to it except to point you to Aspire Aviation’s analysis and say this: Both sides won some and both sides lost some in this case. The USTR failed to achieve its top goal, and that is to have the WTO rule launch aid illegal, so blocking aid to Airbus to make the A350 XWB was a failure.
Flightblogger has a very good take on how both sides “spin” the final appeal report. The Wall Street Journal has a balanced view on who won and who didn’t.
This is a major defeat for the US–and for Boeing.
Two news items caught our eye this morning.
The first was the financial reporting for EADS today. Although EADS reported a small loss on foreign exchange and financing costs, the company increased its cash position. This came under criticism in Germany for the bailout of the A400M program.
Update, May 11: UBS had Boeing’s Mike Bair, the head of the 737 future program, for presentations yesterday and issued its report. Much of the UBS report is similar to the Credit Suisse and Buckingham information captured below; here’s some of the new stuff.
Our comment on the last point: Bair is wrong, of course: United and Frontier were two 737 customers to defect and Air Berlin also bought A320s; we believe there were more but don’t recall specifically.
Original Post:
In what is the clearest picture yet of Boeing’s intentions for program development, Boeing Capital Corp. officials met May 3 with aerospace analysts and financial types in one of BCC’s periodic meetings. What emerged from the meeting is a clear understanding of Boeing’s current thinking for the current 737 line and the New Airplane, which for this report we will identify as the 7X7.
This report is based on conversations with participants of the meeting, subsequent analyst reports that were issued and presentations to the group by Boeing.
We’re still on hiatus, but we could not resist this piece of art from the Wall Street Journal illustrating Steven Udvar-Hazy’s return to the public stock market today for his Air Lease Corp.

The Wall Street Journal article is, at the moment, for paid subscribers only but here is an LA Times article that gives some background.
Separately, Aspire Aviation has a good analysis of the COMAC C919 and its competitive threat to Boeing and Airbus.
Due do a number of special projects with near-term deadlines, this column will be a hiatus for a while. In the meantime, please see our affiliate, AirInsight, for commentary and news.
Here’s the last of three stories on the Boeing 737, the A320neo and the new Boeing airplane.
Here’s an article we did on changing messaging at Boeing about the 737 and the A320neo.
| Date: | 11/04/2011 10:07 |
| Source: | Commercial Aviation Online |
| Location: | Seattle |
| By: | Scott Hamilton |
Boeing’s messaging on the 737 against the Airbus A320neo has changed subtly in recent weeks. Does this signal a slight shift in Boeing’s intentions whether to proceed with a new airplane in the 737/757 class?
Boeing dismisses the business case for the A320neo, until recently saying the 737-800NG has only a 2-3% cash operating cost deficit today versus the projected NEO economics. By the time the A320neo entered service what was originally announced as Spring 2016, Boeing officials were confident that they could improve the economics of the 737-800 by at least that amount, retaining a fleet advantage of one engine type and a lighter airplane.
But Boeing’s message has shifted slightly.