Pontifications: Supply chain melt down to get worse, says manufacturer

By Scott Hamilton

Sept. 3, 2018, © Leeham News: There is more evidence the aerospace supply chain is in meltdown—and it’s going to get worse, a manufacturer tells LNC.

The OEM requested anonymity to speak frankly.

As aerospace analysts gather this week in Seattle for their annual investors day at Boeing, based on the research notes I see, there’s little indication they recognize the magnitude of the evolving problems with the supply chain.

Although the focus recently has been on Boeing and analysts will visit Boeing Wednesday, the issues affect all the OEMs.

I wrote about this 30 days ago. Since then, another Boeing supplier last month acknowledged late deliveries of key parts, reports the Puget Sound Business Journal.

This was followed by a Bloomberg report that Lufthansa Airlines continues to have shortages from Pratt & Whitney for the GTF engines powering the A320neo.

Since then, I’ve had my own additional conversations with the supply chain. The production ramp ups that already have been announced and those being contemplated are in peril and all manufacturers are being affected.

Airplanes stacking up

There have been many stories about the airplanes stacking up around Airbus’ Hamburg and Toulouse production sites. The A320neo engine issues are widely known.

The problems over at Boeing also have become known. A flurry of stories about an increasing number of 737s fill just about every space at Renton Airport. A week ago, there were 49 in various states, according to the reliable plane spotter Chris Edwards. There were 35 MAXes, including 17 without engines. There were 14 NGs.

A good number of these were in active pre-flight preparation.

I don’t have an update of the number of 737s at Boeing Field.

The back-up goes beyond the lack of CFM LEAP-1B engines, I’m told. The MAXes and NGs also increasingly are victims of traveled work due to parts shortages on the assembly lines.

Identifying the supply chain

One aerospace analyst, Cai Von Rumohr of Cowen & Co., singled out thyssenkrupp’s TMX Aerospace subsidiary in a recent note as contributing to the 737 backup. (thyssenkrupp’s name is with a small “t.”)

The Puget Sound Business Journal first reported these problems last month. TMX exclusively supplies Boeing with parts and raw materials. Cowen believes the problems TMX had are largely resolved. But even before the Farnborough Air Show, I was hearing otherwise. When I interviewed the company at the air show, officials clammed up, referring all questions related to Boeing to Boeing. Boeing historically goes into a bunker on stories like this.

Nor am I convinced that thyssenkrupp isn’t having bigger problems that are trickling down to TMX.

Disgruntled institutional shareholders have moved against the company, causing upheaval in the executive ranks. (Just ask Airbus about this kind of impact.)

The chairman and the CEO both resigned in August. A power struggled is underway, Reuters reports. One shareholder is questioning thyssenkrupp’s underlying strategy. The stock price is off a third since 2011 and the company issued a profit warning for the coming quarter. An investor is seeking a second seat on the board, and news reports refer to a “crisis-ridden” company, a “leadership vacuum” and the need for a “strategic review.”

There’s even talk of breaking up the company, though how serious this is remains unclear. The Krupp foundation rejects talk of a break-up, but at the same time interim officers say nothing is “sacrosanct.”

Across the 7-Series

When aerospace analysts meet with Boeing this week, they need to drill down not just on thyssenkrupp’s own specific turmoil, given its importance to Boeing, including the problems outlined above. They need to drill down on the overall supply chain, materials and the impact on the rest of the 7-Series.

The Puget Sound Business Journal has done some leading edge reporting about the emerging supply chain issue, and LNC has written about this as well. But based on my conversations, these stories and Cowen’s report are only the tip of the iceberg.

The impact of Russian sanctions, notably on titanium, has been on my radar screen for quite some time. Not only does Boeing need titanium for its airplanes (as do Airbus, Bombardier and Embraer for theirs), the engine makers need it as well.

As the 737 becomes the visible photo op for the supply chain issues, overlooked is the impact on the other 7-Series.

I’ve been hearing for months that more traveled work than usual has been occurring with the 777 Classic, as airplanes emerge from the factory with more unfinished work than usual. I’m beginning to pick up indications work may be backing up on 787s are well, though this information is very sketchy.

The blog All Things 787, which is pretty well informed, wrote Aug. 23, “Over the last couple of months the number of 787s delivered from Boeing’s North Charleston facility has shrunk compared to previous months and the effect has been an increasingly crowded flight line.

“I have heard that there are seat supply issues but it may be more than that or engine issues with Rolls Royce Trent 1000 powerplants.  Boeing has been having supply chain issues and it’s not just the 787 program but the other major commercial aircraft programs (737 and 777) that are effected,” the blog wrote.

These are all questions for the analysts to pose to Boeing this week.

Pressure on increasing production rates

More to the point, I’m hearing the supply chain issues may be slowing the announced production rate increased on the 737 and 787 lines.

The 737 rate was supposed to go to 52/mo this year. Two weeks ago Boeing green-lighted the increase, LNC is told. This move certainly suggests Boeing is confident the supply chain issues are resolved, or at least are manageable.

The rate is supposed to go to 57/mo next July.

The 787 rate is supposed to go to 14/mo next year. Suppliers are telling me they are doubtful.

All is fine—right up until it isn’t

Analysts and media who cover Boeing have a saying: Boeing says everything is fine right up until the point that it isn’t. One needs to look no farther than Boeing officials claiming all was well in the 787 program on roll-out and right up until the point the next delay was announced, or the two years it took for officials to acknowledge the production rate on the 777 would have to be reduced or there were “bridge” challenges.

(To be fair, this was mostly a Jim McNerney approach, but there’s still some of this under Dennis Muilenburg.)

Based on my own conversations with suppliers, the problems for Boeing are anything but resolved.

Parts shortages from engines to the proverbial widgets are growing, not shrinking, based on what I’m told.

Other OEMs

I stress that this is an issue across the entire production system. The airframe and engine OEMs share many of the same suppliers. If one has trouble, sooner or later all are likely to have trouble.

From what I am hearing from suppliers, the meltdown has yet to hit bottom.



43 Comments on “Pontifications: Supply chain melt down to get worse, says manufacturer

  1. RE: Disgruntled institutional shareholders have moved against the company, causing upheaval in the executive ranks. (Just ask Airbus about this kind of impact.)

    “Disgruntled institutional shareholders…”

    Oh, right, you mean the same folks with insatiable greed, arrogance, callousness and unrealistic expectations that companies must kowtow to every quarter that created this insanity for the OEMs by demanding they crank out 50-60 737s or A320 family planes (a great many of which come equipped with engines that still are problematic from one of the three leading engine OEMs, Pratt & Whitney) per month, and 14 787s (again, a great many of which come equipped with engines that are still problematic from another – or two – of the three leading engine OEMs, Rolls Royce), and whom are the same folks largely behind the destruction of anything remotely resembling dignity, respect and humanity for the vast majority of passengers who fly the desperately few remaining nominally, or “faux”, “competeting” (don’t forget to make “capacity discipline” the most important objective, “wink, wink”) cartelized airlines and their oligopolist-business models?

    Oh, please – cry me a river!

    These institutional shareholders, and the “Analyst”-bullies who ruthlessly make unreasonable demands on these companies’ leaders to fatten margins relentlessly have no one to blame but themselves.

    But, of course, they’ll never take a good, long look in the mirror and admit their part in having created these supply-chain problems for the aerospace OEMs, or in the wholesale destruction of the guest “experience” at our airlines – heaven to bits they ever take responsibilty for ANYTHING!

    Oh, no – of course not!

    Instead they’ll just demand the scalps of management who felt pressured to accede to the institutional shareholders’ and “Analyst”-bullies’ demands for self-preservation hoping that by a wing and a prayer everything will go perfectly and they’ll somehow, and as if by black magic, make exceptionally complicated equipment and machines that fly at hundreds of miles per hour, miles above the ground, carrying hundreds of passengers, several tons of fuel and cargo, too, work perfectly at production rates where the natural resources required for the materials is scarce, the labor for engineering and manufacturing must be highly educated, trained and/or skilled is also required, and the money it takes to bring all of this together is measured in increments defined as hundreds of millions per unit, and tens of billions for development.

    What could possibly go wrong with all that?

    • Well the 737 manager has his scalp scalped, he is going to go spend more time with his family.

      The 777x guy is taking over, he won’t get to spend any time with his family.

      • Well GE and PW are having ramp up issues and some smaller tech glitches.

        RR would be the one that scares me with an engine they didn’t understand until recently.

        • Think some engineers at RR understood what risks MHI took on the T1000 C-package and quickly moved to a blisk design on the TXWB & T1000-TEN. With lots of Japanese business for RR some RR stress engineers were not allowed to kill the MHI IPC design forcing them to lose face and tell them do it again and do it right this time. Too much business and prestige was at stake.

          • That’s quite interesting. Richard Feynman had a great saying, “PR cannot be allowed to rule, as Mother Nature cannot be fooled” or something like that.

            Saving face, making economies, management convenience is the enemy of success and profits, something that management teams all over should accept, not ignore.

            I wonder if RR are passing on the costs to MHI…

          • Interesting that a Japanese supplier is at the centre of the 787 glitch, yet again. Echoes of the GS Yuasa battery meltdown?

          • That assumes information is correct.

            I don’t believe RR has that tight a tie up if any with MHI.

            Their relationship was through V2500.

            They may be a supplier but RR is not going to let someone have their core (pun intended) business.

          • Claes, do you have any source talking about MHI being responsible for the IPC design?

            All I can find is that MHI is responsible for the combustor module and LPT manufacture. I stand corrected if this is true.

    • We can attribute investor expectations to the influence of the major tech companies. With those a small amount of investment has turned into huge returns very fast. If an institution’s own investment doesn’t look as productive as that, the investment manager is getting it in the neck from their boss. And so they turn the screws on the companies they’ve accidentally gone and invested in, like Boeing.

      There is a large social problem arising from this short termist view of investment that is now rife across all markets. Useful, slow burning work that employs a lot of people and takes a long time to realise good profits is barely given the time of day any more by investors. Ultimately this risks putting a lot of people out of work (arguably across the USA this has already happened).

      If this isn’t an argument for government intervention in the markets, I don’t know what is. I know the USA has a long standing tenaciously held view along the lines of “the market will provide”, but working out whether that is correct or not is something better done in advance of a major economic blowout than after / during. The way things are going in the USA, unchecked you’ll end up with Google, Apple and Facebook emloying a few thousand staff, and literally everything else is service industry for that. The US economy cannot get there without grave social consequences.

      Europe isn’t quite so driven by a profit motive – especially in continental Europe – and all the global tech companies are in the USA anyway; the money doesn’t have anywhere else to go.

      I’m convinced that if Boeing could attract the level of investment that is currently being ploughed in self-driving cars they’d have a 737 replacement, a proper replacement for the 777, and an NMA for good measure. I think that at the moment investors are ploughing their cash into anything big tech AI or self driving expecting large returns, and nothing else excites them. Ten year NMA programmes at Boeing? Yawn.

      Well a fool and their money are soon parted. There are very good reasons to expect that self driving cars is going to turn out to be a complete waste of money, dead duck market no hoper. None of it is anywhere close to working (not to the standard that would actually sell, i.e. good enough to drive one home from the boozer), and really they’re all just repeating the same old ideas without any real prospect of regulatory or market success. One of the fundamental problems is that they can’t even write down what “success” actually is, other than vague “it mustn’t crash” terms.

      Effectively what’s happened is that a load of techies who should know better are taking a load of investors (who don’t) for a big, enthusiastic, powerpoint strewn, demo video enriched ride. But there’s nothing real at the end of it, not in the long term. The self driving car business is riven with startups that are designed specifically to be bought out, not to actually develop a working product.

      Likewise the social media and search companies like Google, Facebook are beginning to feel the heat of regulatory interest all over the globe, including in the USA. They’re making big money now, but if they’re broken up and regulated, (as will have to happen to avoid the economic GoogleBookalypse) there’s no money in the business anymore.

      In short, all over the tech industry is brewing up into one almighty big bubble, and when it bursts a lot of investors are going to get very badly burned.

      And when they recover, they will likely go running back to the good old staples such as heavy / advanced engineering, making high value tangible items that people actually wants to buy. Ten year NMA development programme? Yes please.

      • All they have to do is shift the money to a program from stock buy back. They don’t need anyone’s investment other than their own.

        • Also agree “110%” & also “spot, spot” on!


          These stock buybacks have gotten out of control and are being badly abused.

          If anything, we’d be better off returning to the pre-1980s era when stock buybacks were outlawed.

          They’re destroying a vast swath of industries and companies by robbing them of vital capital to invest in R&D, innovation, plus human resources.

          It’s time for this vehicle that’s nothing more than an wholesale transfer of wealth to be reigned in, or eliminated altogether.

          We cannot possibly be competitive in the future if we’re taking precious resources out of companies instead of investing in their, and our country’s, future.

  2. Regarding: “I don’t have an update of the number of 737s at Boeing Field.”

    See below for the disposition of non-delivered 737’s on 9-1-18 per my counts down the various columns of a printout I made of Chris Edwards’s test flights per day spreadsheet at the following link.


    What would be a normal number of 737’s to be parked somewhere for first flight preparation or undergoing flight testing? Looking back to previous years on the old deliveries tab at the link above, it seems that the typical time from first flight to delivery for a commercial 737 has been about 15 days. Allowing no additional time for pre-flight prep after leaving the FAL, one then would expect the number of non–delivered aircraft to be about half the monthly production rate, i.e. 25 aircraft for a production rate of 50 aircraft per month. If one allows an additional 1 to 15 days for pre-flight prep and testing, then the expected number of non-delivered aircraft would be somewhere between one-half the monthly production rate and the monthly production rate, i.e. between 25 and 50 aircraft for a production rate of 50 aircraft per month.

    Renton – Commercial FAL: 32
    Renton – P-8A FAL: 3
    Renton – Flightline – First Flight Completed: 3 (Test aircraft awaiting re-work, 1 MAX 8 and 2 MAX 9).
    Renton – Flightline – Have not yet flown: 48
    Boeing Field – Delivered – P-8A: 1
    Boeing Field – Delivered – Storage (Commercial): 4
    Boeing Field – Delivered (Commercial): 4
    Boeing Field – Ready for Delivery (Commercial): 4
    Boeing Field – Certification Testing in Progress: 2 (MAX 7 test aircraft)
    Boeing Field – Production Flight Testing in Progress: 18
    Portland Painting: 1
    Spokane – Painting: 2
    Victorville: Painting: 1

    Totals by Airport
    Renton: 86
    Renton Excluding FAL’s: 51
    Boeing Field (Seattle): 33
    Portland: 1
    Spokane: 2
    Victorville: 1
    Total all airports excluding FAL’s: 88
    Total all airports excluding FAL, test, delivered and ready for delivery aircraft: 70

    • @AP, as usual, does a pretty good analysis. I received an email Friday that indicated 64 undelivered 737s in Renton and Seattle. The column was actually written 10 days ago, in advance of a trip.

    • July and August 2018 Boeing 737 first flights and deliveries according to my counts down the columns of Chris Edwards’s spreadsheets at the link I gave above. Includes some first flights and deliveries from the “old deliveries’ spreadsheet (for line numbers 7023 and prior as of the moment I am writing this). If these figures are correct or close to it, then in August Boeing was able to complete more first flights, and more deliveries, in than it did in July.

      July: 32 (Boeing’s official number was 29).
      August: 43
      August/July = 43/32 = 1.34, i.e. 34 percent increase.

      First Flights
      July: 34
      August: 52
      August / July = 52/34 = 1.59, i.e. 59 percent increase.

      • Delivery and first flight breakdown by family, from counting down the columns of the same source I referenced above.

        July: 33* (Boeing’s official number was 29): (NG: 19, MAX: 14)
        August: 43: (NG: 20, P-8A: 2, MAX: 21)
        August/July = 43/33* = 1.30, i.e. 30 percent increase.

        First Flights
        July: 35**: (NG: 23, MAX: 12)
        August: 52: (NG: 27, P-8A: 3, MAX: 22)
        August / July = 52/35** = 1.49, i.e. 49 percent increase.

        * I got 33 July deliveries instead of 32 when I recounted.
        ** I got 35 July first flights instead of 34 when I recounted.

  3. Scott: You are supposed to have the day off, dang Boeing.

    I do have to disagree Boeing is not doing nothing.

    As noted previously, the 737 manger is retiring for that infamous need to “spend more time with his family”. (hopefully they want him around)

    Being replaced by the 777x manager (who continues his other day job and won’t get to spend any time with his family.

    Well the workers are all cowereded so I guess they have to start blaming managers. Someone has to be thrown under the bus.

    Maybe they should have a we can’t make rate price escalation clause into the purchase contract. Then we get 5 million more for a 737, 10 for a 767, 20 for a 777.

    • And apologies for odd posts.

      My posts don’t show until some time after, and the edit function no longer works as I seem exist in an in between state.

      • Clear out all your cookies, plus make more space by clearing all old downloaded data/web pages.
        Some browsers allow you to delete all cookies from a particular domain which might be quicker

        • Thank you, done on a regular basis. Different machines as well as different browsers.

  4. Show me a Boeing supplier who is causing FAL delays or not meeting Boeing’s price reduction targets, and whose sub-assembly or part could be produced by Embraer in Brazil. and I’ll show you a Boeing supplier whose work will likely in the future be being done by Embraer in Brazil.

    • Well we have Spirit. Now supply 52 fuselages a month from Brazil would be interesting.

      Then there is P&W, not late on Embraer but late on Airbus.

      Maybe its harder than it looks?

      Or maybe Boeings vauanted management has such a thin bench they can’t keep up with things?

      Or possibly you can only cut things so long?

    • Interesting on the 787, I have no idea what Vulcanization in a jet engine is.

      Back in the day it was a hot patch on a tire tube.

      • Hello TransWorld,

        Regarding: ” I have no idea what Vulcanization in a jet engine is”.

        Me too. At least as it applies to metal (?) blades. In my undergraduate chemistry and engineering classes, and in the ensuing 30 plus years, I never heard “vulcanization” used to describe anything other than modifying the properties of polymeric materials, such as common tire materials polyisoprene or styrene-butadiene rubber, by introducing additional cross linking.

        “Vulcanization or vulcanisation is a chemical process for converting polymers into more durable materials by introducing crosslinks. A well known example is sulfur vulcanization whereby organic polymers are crosslinked with chains of sulfur. By forming cross-links (bridges) between individual polymer chains, vulcanization dramatically affects the mechanical properties of a polymer.”


    • Very little of Embraers jets are made in Brazil- its a common fallacy to think that. In fact major parts are made by Triumph Structures in Everett.
      From .airframer.com for the E170 series airframe structures alone.

      AERnnova Fuselage Sections: Rear fuselage & pressure bulkhead; Empennages: Horizontal & vertical empennages, including rudders & elevators
      Aero Vodochody Aerospace a.s. Aircraft Doors: Door subassembly units including hinges & inner structure (Latecoere)
      Daher Fuselage Sections: Rear fuselage
      Ducommun AeroStructures, Inc. Fuselage Sections: Fuselage & door skins
      FACC AG Wing Spoilers: Wing spoilers & ailerons, wing tip, flap track fairings (E2)
      Kawasaki Aerospace Fuselage Sections: Forward fuselage; Wings: Main wing fixed trailing edge; centre wing & control surfaces
      Korean Air Aerospace Division Fuselage Sections: Fuselage
      Latecoere Aircraft Doors: Upper deck passenger doors; bulk cargo door; service & emergency exit doors (including E2); Nose Cones: Lower nose section; Fuselage Sections: Barrel sections
      Assembly of pressure bulkhead (for Aernnova)
      Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics OH Radomes:
      Sonaca SA Wings: Wing leading edge slats; wing skin panels; Fuselage Sections: Fuselage panels & subassemblies including keel beam
      Triumph Aerospace Structures – – Arlington Fuselage Sections: Centre fuselage section III, rear fuselage section; Empennages: Rudder & elevator
      Triumph Structures – Everett Wings: Wing skins

      Its completely without foundation that Embraer makes most of its planes in Brazil. They are largely FAL .
      Nor could it do the same for Boeing.

      • Hello dukeofurl,

        The 6-13-15 AINonline article at the link below, reports that Embraer’s E-2 program has many non-Brazilian suppliers, as you suggested, but isn’t consistent, by my reading, with your assertion that: “Its completely without foundation that Embraer makes most of its planes in Brazil. They are largely FAL .”

        Here are two excerpts from this article that seem to me to contradict your assertion.

        “Responsible not only for systems integration and final assembly but also for fabrication of a high proportion of the airplane’s structural components, Embraer builds the E2’s wings, some 75-percent of the fuselage and the landing gear.”

        “Affonso also said that Embraer decided to “verticalize” its structural supply base, taking responsibility for the forward fuselage section 1 and center fuselage 3 from Latecoere, for example.”


  5. – – – – – – Analysts and media who cover Boeing have a saying: Boeing says everything is fine right up until the point that it isn’t. One needs to look no farther than Boeing officials claiming all was well in the 787 program on roll-out and right up until the point the next delay was announced, or the two years it took for officials to acknowledge the production rate on the 777 would have to be reduced or there were “bridge” challenges. – – – – –

    Counterpoint: what would be the benefit to a large complex organization to being transparent about current or, more critically, potentially approaching problems? The example of Control Data Corporation (CDC), essentially out of business twelve months after information about future plans leaked, has to weigh on the mind of every executive and senior manager at such a firm.

    • I think what it begs the question is if they are BS public, they also look to be BS ing themselves.

      Suddenly its an issue. Suddenly move made to can manager.

      Where were they before this?

    • I think there is a middle line between cover up and full openness. Boeing have played the media excessively in my opinion, they use aggressive language to frame the argument and attempt to move the share price. In simple terms they are guilty of passing opinion for fact far too often. I think it would be fair to say that no one really believes anything coming out of Chicago because of the level of spin.

      I will be vilified for saying it but Airbus have been more straightforward in their communication in the main although they also have their moments.

  6. On something slightly different, was wondering when Delta will receive its first CS100/A220-100?

    Looks like the current production rate is ~2 aircraft/month, with current orders this is an ~18 year backlog. Was wondering when AB will start moving on this, will potential PW engine supply issues start playing a role in hampering a rapid increase in production rate?

    • As we are seeing, you can’t turn it on a dime and its going to take time.

      Rush it and you have a mess.

  7. Would you trust Rolls Royce to produce an engine in the sort of volume that CFM and P&W are having so much difficulty with.Consolidation is inevitable.
    Replacing the 737/A320 is going to be potentially life threatening. Boeing needs a split strategy, Airbus has only managed a minor split with the A200 unless they develop a larger variant.

    • Think it must be borne in mind that CFM is currently producing 4 types of engines for the single aisles.

      CFM56-5B / -7B for the 320CEO’s and 737-NG’s, then also LEAP-A’s for the 320NEO’s and LEAP-B’s for the 737MAX’es.

      When the CEO/NG backlogs have been cleared things should improve by only producing LEAP-A’s and -B’s, but this could be another 18 months to 2 years. Therefore any significant ramp-up in A320/737 production realistically only somewhere in 2020 also considering that PW still have technical issues with the PW1100G’s to sort out?

      • Maybe the answer is to go back to CFM56 and not the Leap!

        PW can supply V2500s!!!!!

      • There was a report on RR that Vulcanization fan blades was part of the problem.

        We used to Vulcanize tire tubes (hot patch) but never heard it used in ref to jet engines.

  8. I don’t think it is too much to suggest that both major OEM have been strategically asleep at the wheel. They have been building order books for a number of years. The sort of production volumes worldwide are unprecedented. As such the supply chain should have been a primary concern.

    As an example I find the fact that the A350 programme is still struggling 3+ years on to find acceptable seating to fill its aircraft, a prosaic item in the wider scheme of things.

    Further is anyone surprised that both Leap and GTF are having teething issues both in design and ramp up, the concerns were openly discussed a couple of years ago.

    So many tier 2/3 suppliers are relatively small, they don’t necessarily have the capital strength to invest heavily in investment over a short timescale. They are being buffeted by the more aggressive pricing demands from up the chain, why take substantial risk when the rewards appear to be diminishing.

    • “They are being buffeted by the more aggressive pricing demands from up the chain, why take substantial risk when the rewards appear to be diminishing.”
      I couldn’t agree more wit this statement. The threats of vertical integration in the face of an unprecedented ramp only exacerbate the issue. Do the air framers really expect to have 100% OTD and quality AND take all the margin?

  9. At play may be what I believe is an adaption of the so called ISO9000 standards (mandated by Boeing) Tier 1 do, others meet it but not certified. Now all have to be certified.

    The best description I read of ISO was it was a plot by Europeans (who came up with it) to destroy the American Economy.

    Having been through ISO9000 I have to agree.

    While its touted to maintain a quality of control, all it does is maintain a quality of paperwork shuffling.

    The bizarre assumption being if your paperwork is perfect so is your quality of product.

    You can have perfect paperwork while you crank out a perfectly garbage product.

    Suddenly everyone had to conform. Equipment that was only used as a general conditions, had to meet its so called specifications. If not it had to be re-caliberted (costly) or replaced (and then tested again the next year)

    An example is in Infrared heat detecting device that specs said 2 deg accuracy.

    Most of the time all you want to know is grossly how hot is that exhaust (hundreds of degrees) or that heating line (200 degrees not uncommon max) etc.

    This does not count what is called effecivity. Ie how reflective a surface is your dot is on , which has to be a specif surface.

    Different surface you have to have a new cal surface value to calibrate to.

    And who cares? We arn’t making fan blades for a jet engine. If you are then you will calibrate those processes anyway as its critical to product (mandatory)

    So throw another wrench in the works for no gain.

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