Pontifications: MAX market share holding steady, so far

By Scott Hamilton

July 29, 2019, Leeham News: Despite threats and fears of cancellations for the Boeing 737 MAX following two fatal accidents of virtually brand new -8 MAXes, few order cancellations directly attributable to the crashes have occurred.

So far, there isn’t a discernible shift to Airbus, either, data shows.

Swapping orders

Garuda Indonesia Airlines officials said after the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes that it would cancel an order for nearly 49 MAX 8s. Although news emerged that the airline was swapping 8 MAXes for 10 MAXes and Boeing 787s, the OEM’s website (as of June 30) still shows the 49 airplanes ordered by the carrier.

Boeing’s website does show a loss of 85 orders due to “contractual changes,” 49 orders lost net of cancellations and conversions and another 131 subtracted for ASC 606 accounting rules. The latter relates to orders with questionable credits, as explained here. Boeing also offers this explanation on its website: ASC 606 “imposes additional criteria for recognizing contracted backlog with customers beyond the existence of a firm contract to deliver.”

India’s Jet Airways, which ceased operation months ago, had 125 MAX orders. These are still shown on Boeing’s website.

The number of MAX cancellations, swaps and ASC 606 deductions amounts to fewer than 200 airplanes out of a backlog of some 4,500.

Paris Air Show

The Paris Air Show ended with no firm orders for the MAX but a Letter of Intent for 200 was announced by International Airline Group, the parent of British Airways, Iberia, Aer Lingus and two other carriers.

Airbus ended the show with several hundred A320neo and A220 orders and commitments. Not all have been booked into firm orders.

The Airbus and Boeing websites track only firm orders. Accordingly, the information today is based on firm orders, not including Options, LOIs and MOUs.

Market share

When LNA analyzed the market shares last year, Airbus had 57% of the A320neo-737 MAX order race. This remains true in this examination.

When the A220 and, on a pro forma basis, the Embraer E190/195-E2 are included in the Airbus and Boeing single-aisle market share analysis, and the Irkut MC-21 and COMAC C919 firm orders are included, Boeing’s market share drops to 39.6% of the 100-220 seat sector. Airbus drops to 55.8%. Irkut and COMAC capture 4.6%.

This, too, is largely unchanged from last year’s analysis.

Effect still to come?

The underlying question remains, however: will Boeing begin to lose market share for its most profitable airliner?

Cancelling orders can be costly. If the planes are grounded for a year, aerospace analysts believe customers can cancel contracts with little or no penalty, but LNA hasn’t confirmed this. Order swaps and compensation are more likely.

But will new campaigns trend toward Airbus?

Buckingham Research Group thinks so.

In a July 11 research note, the aerospace analyst wrote:

Boeing’s flight control system design philosophy could drive share loss. The Airbus flight control system gives the autopilot far more authority over aircraft functions versus BA. BA’s system puts more control in the hands of the pilot – hence Boeing aircraft are considered a “pilot’s airplane”. For developing world airlines, the Airbus system might be better suited and more attractive as pilot skills in the developing world may not be on par with those of the developed world. The long-term impact to the MAX brand may be that developing world customers prefer the A320neo vs. the MAX. If we’re correct, a key metric to watch after the MAX returns to service will be orders and option conversions for the MAX 8 vs. the A320neo.

 LNA has confirmed that key players in the industry agree with the thesis that the A320 may be the better airplane for the developing world.

155 Comments on “Pontifications: MAX market share holding steady, so far

  1. I didn’t think you could buy a MAX any more, what about the sales of the B737-8200?

    • @Sowerbob: An 8200 is a MAX, of course. It’s all name gaming.

        • You can still buy an NG I believe (or they are making them as part of the run out and shift over)

          Take a bit to shift the mix though.

          Happy campers those that took the last NG!

  2. This really is not surprising.

    With the delivery horizon for A320 frames further out than for 737 ..

    .. there is no short term solution available
    and decisions further out can as well wait for how the 737MAX issues will settle. Maybe the horse will sing and Boeing conjures up a fresh replacement for the MAX deliverable just after 2020 🙂

    • Better not define that too precisely, so you can in- and exclude airlines at will as it is appropriate.

  3. Hmmm, I thought that when it was shown that test pilots weren’t able to reliably recover from the Ethiopian crash situation in simulators, we’d moved on from the idea that white people make better pilots.

    • I think the assumption that 3rd world pilots are not as good on average is probably perfectly true given the accident rate there but it’s also overrated. .if the MAX was such a piece of rubbish it needed a USN trained pilot to deal with one alpha sensor failure diving the aircraft into the grind near vertical then it’s a rubbish product. I don’t believe it was ever proven that the Ethiopian case was irrecoverable? The Ethiopian pilots didn’t follow the Runaway Stabliser Trim procedure correctly because they missed one step did not switch of auto throttle and flew on with the over speed warning clacker sounding. One lion air crew due to a jump seat pilot did follow the procedure and recover. I do understand they were startled. I do understand the manual trim wheel backup is a piece of unwieldy rubbish that shouldn’t have been certified needs the backup trim motor in the console restored (other in jackscrew) Ethiopian is one of Africas most trusted airlines and with modern MAXs and 20 A350 on order and many western employees to bring in global expertise clearly shows they are above average.

      • I do think you need to read the Ethiopian preliminary crash report more carefully.

        The autopilot was engaged at 05.39.22 and disengaged 05.039.55 and never engaged again. They tried the trim runaway procedure after disengaging the autopilot

        Equally the over speed clacker sounded at 05.42.20 after they had tried the runaway trim stabiliser procedure. By the time the clacker sounded they were already dead for the procedure didn’t work.

        This then comes to the flight before the Lion Air crash. The left alpha vane was replaced after the flight. This means we don’t know whether the original left alpha vane only had minor issues or intermittent issues. For all we know MCAS disengaged because the left alpha vane readings returned to normal. This allowed a standard recovery to occur.

        If regard to the Lion Air crash, MCAS remained engaged and forced the airplane into a steep unrecoverable dive.

        No, can’t agree

        • I suspect you’ve misread auto-throttle with auto-pilot. They are two separate devices. Auto-throttle has two modes either providing constant thrust (for take off which in ET302 case was 94%) or auto-speed which regulates a constant speed. In the case of ET302 the autopilot was disengaged, possibly due to crew action or possibly due to the autopilot detecting faults in air data. Auto-throttle remained at 94% for the entire flight and lead to the aircraft getting to red line speed with the speed warning clacker sounding. With autopilot engaged MCAS does not activate. With flaps down MCAS does not activate. (Thus it is tragic that Boeing did not provide alerts for MCAS or alpha sensor disagreement since simply keeping flaps down would have inhibited MCAS). The young 1st officer, the one with under 300 hours actually correctly identified the runaway stabiliser procedure fairly quickly given the startle factor and lack of MCAS upset alerts. Unfortunately, probably due to the crew workload and the startle factor (and lack of simulator training) they missed one step of the procedure in which Boeing notes that auto throttle or anything that creates speed issues should be turned of. My view is that some advanced pilots could have saved the aircraft (one lion air crew with a 3rd jump seat pilot clearly did) but ordinary pilots could not. It’s clear that Boeings MCAS was very poorly implemented piece of automation and that Boeings backup trim system is unrealistic.

          You might be interested in this B777 pilots take on the preliminary accident report:

          This is the B737NG stab procedure which should also be viewed.

          As he is a professional airline pilot I am glad he takes an keen interest in these accident reports.

          • @William

            “My view is that some advanced pilots could have saved the aircraft”

            I disagree. After ET crash has been made an experiment in simulator by pilots who had, after MCAS bomb blew out and after Boeing started to blame the pilots, fully awareness how things going on, and what to exactly do, at much higher altitude then ET was and they almost crashed.

            We have to wait for an investigation report of ET crash, but I have my thoughts on that on that suppose error of not disconecting auto-throttle – Addis Abbeba is an airport high placed on 2.334 m.a.s.l. – so air is thinner so more trust is necessary, it was a hot day – so air was thinner and even more trust was necessary, pilots new that MAX has pitch stability issues and if you deduct trust the plane will even more pitch down. The situation is not so unidimensional as many would like to see it, its so easy to blame pilots for an error.

      • “The Ethiopian pilots didn’t follow the Runaway Stabliser Trim procedure correctly because they missed one step did not switch of auto throttle and flew on with the over speed warning clacker sounding//”

        Suggest look closely at data released so far

        At < 5000 AGL, with nosedown trim and on a hot day – and knowing that reducing throttle results in a pitch DOWN and all sorts of bells- whistles, clackers, and pull up warnings – to expect a pilot to pull throttle back with a large load is maybe great for Micro squish simulators, and training simulators where a crash results in a ' discussion ' – is IMHO as a SLF a bit much. Especially when not aware of a repeat performance of MCAS secret system.
        This fubar MCAS mess is 99 percent BA problem- and NG pilots have been lucky they never had to use Manual trim, or even knew of the useless rollercoaster method .

  4. Hello Scott,
    as usual, thanks.
    The T&Cs to get out of contracts apart, didn’t I read sometime ago from you that most A320ceo customers already converted to A320neo but there is still a wave of NG operators to make a decision on MAX or Neos? How solid is BCA’s customer binding?
    Big headaches for NG fleet managers and hard time for the BCA sales team to convince them? Any hint, how the world for the BCA sales force looks like at this moment? Behaviour of airlines & lessors is rather a “Wait & See” what happens with MAX’s RTS and PAX acceptance? Or upcoming orders are for deliveries in the next decade and until then, basically not of relevance anyway for decision making because one way or the other, fleet manager think the tainted brand would be back to business as usual?
    And… Besides the public announcement of Airbus, something different going on behind the scene and prospects thereof?

    • In theory Boeing could deliver paper derated 787-9’s with much lower Engine Thrust and MTOW to 737MAX customers (for similar routes as the 737MAX could do) and let them lease them for double 737MAX rates until the 737MAX is recertified (to save on residual values). Some Airlines might fit a nice biz class front cabin, like Mint XXL. Then as they are returned, redo the cabin and restore MTOW and Engine thrust and let the leasing companies bid on them. Some Airlines might like to keep them as they are and fly them on domestic trunk routes like a DC-10-10 from the 2000’s. (JetBlue, AA, UAL….) the present 787 operators could swap out their 787 engines getting EGT limited on their “normal” 787’s and do 1-2 years on service on these “domestic” 787’s until they are ready for the $6M/ea shop visits. They will not be labeled 787Re (as Airbus would have) but something more like 787Eco+.

    • @jean-luc: About 35% of the NG fleet has yet to be replaced. These certainly could become neos, but they also could be MAXes. LOIs and MOUs could bne abandoned, but contracts are harder to do so.

    • Boeing, the company itself, is suffering from a runaway stabilizer.

  5. A thunderstorm for Boeing is still about to come. Boeing is really hard trying to screw it up more (eg. obstructing pilots simulator training or not testing enough computer chip). 2020 will be decisive, Boeing downward spiral started with “genius” new system of 787 development.

    A320 with full FBW offers better protections that B737, that’s why Airbus is ahead. I don’t share a belief that “1500-cessna-like-flight-hours” makes US pilots superior.

    • Hello Pablo,

      Re: “I don’t share a belief that “1500-cessna-like-flight-hours” makes US pilots superior.”

      Where did you get the idea that “1500-cessna-like-flight-hours” comes anywhere close to qualifying you for a job flying Boeing 737’s for any reputable US scheduled airlines? The US majors all require a MINIMUM of 1000 hours fixed wing turbine time, and to have a realistic chance of being hired, a lot those hours need to be in a two pilot multi engine turbine transport aircraft, or a jet fighter or attack aircraft. One thousand five hundred hours in a Cessna turboprop or piston won’t get you hired by the majors. Someone with 1,500 hours in a two pilot multi engine Cessna executive jet, operated by a reputable charter operator, might have a pretty good chance of getting hired, but I don’t think this type of experience that was implied by your comment

      See below for MINIMUM flight experience requirements of some US majors.

      Minimum of 1,500 hours of total documented flight time.
      Minimum of 1,000 hours of fixed wing turboprop or turbofan time.
      90% of the flight time logged in powered lift category aircraft (e.g. AV-8B, F-35B, and V-22) will be credited to the Delta Air Lines 1,000 hour fixed wing turboprop/turbofan requirement.


      1500 hours total fixed-wing time as pilot-in-command (PIC) or second-in-command (SIC) in a multi-engine turbo-prop aircraft, jet aircraft or combination thereof with GTOW 12,500 or greater. A minimum of 1000 hours total fixed-wing PIC time in a multi-engine turbo prop aircraft, jet aircraft or combination thereof in aircraft with GTOW 12,500 or greater is preferred.


      – 2,500 hours total or 1,500 hours turbine total
      – 1,000 hours PIC turbine preferred


      Minimum of 1,000 hours of fixed-wing turbine time


      Don’t confuse minimum FAA requirements, or minimum regional airline requirements (pretty close to the same thing), with minimum requirements at a reputable US scheduled airline that operates Boeing 737’s or A320’s (far, far higher).

      Skywest (One of the more reputable regionals – flies only regional jets)
      Flight Experience: 1,500 hours – total time (200 hours – cross country, 100 hours – night, 25 hours – multi engine, 75 hours – instrument)


      • @AP Robert

        And in US Air Force after 300 hours pilots are ready to fly a jet fighters.

        Quality or quantity? Both start with Q 😉

        Those “1500-cessna-like-flight-hours” is a hyperbole. Pilots un US are trying to gain flight hours by any means – as flight instructors or on skydiving planes in perfect weather. Imho it’s not a quality training it’s gaining “paper” flight hours. They just have to reach this paper level before they even start to develop abilities as an airline pilot.

        • Hello Pablo,

          Chesly Sullenberger, the retired US Airways pilot who safely landed an A320 on the Hudson River in New York after both engines failed due to bird strikes, disagrees with you about the importance of the 1,500 hour requirement for US ATP’s. Below are some excerpts from testimony he gave in 2015 to the US Congress opposing attempts to water down the 1,500 requirement. See the link to Captian Sullenberger’s website after the excerpts for a full transcript of his testimony.

          “I saw the birds just 100 seconds after takeoff, about two seconds before we hit them. We were traveling at 316 feet per second, and there was not enough time or distance to maneuver a jet airliner away from them. When they struck and damaged both engines, we had just 208 seconds to do something we had never trained for, and get it right the first time.

          The fact that we landed a commercial airliner on the Hudson River with no engines and no fatalities was not a miracle, however. It was the result of teamwork, skill, in-depth knowledge, and the kind of judgment that comes only from experience.

          As a result of all of this, I deeply understand what is at stake in questions of aviation safety; and I am uniquely qualified to talk about what works, what doesn’t, and why it is so important that we get these rules right. The traveling public, whose lives we literally hold in our hands, deserves and expects nothing less.

          I appear before you today knowing that the airline industry has their lobbyists and trade associations, but the traveling public does not. I consider it my professional responsibility and my personal duty to be an advocate for the safety of all air travelers. And as you consider the FAA Reauthorization Bill, I want to say it is critical that you maintain the requirement that newly hired commercial pilots—at both major and regional airlines—have an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate and a minimum of 1,500 hours of flight experience, as Congress has mandated in Public Law. Public safety absolutely demands it.”

          “Let me tell you why we cannot have pilots with less than the required experience flying passengers. Pilots with less than the required experience may only have seen one cycle of the seasons of the year as a pilot —one season of thunderstorms, one winter of ice and snow. He or she may never have had a plane de-iced before, may never have landed with a gusty crosswind exceeding 30 knots, and may never have had to land on a rainy night when the glare off a wet surface makes it difficult to tell exactly where you are. And if they received all their flight training in a warm dry climate, they may never even have flown in a cloud before! I would not want my family members in a plane operated by someone with as little experience as that, and I don’t think you would either. ”

          “I can tell you that US Airways Flight 1549 would have had a very different ending had my First Officer Jeff Skiles been a less experienced pilot. Like me, Jeff had more than 20,000 hours of flying experience when we lost the engines on that flight. His extensive experience is what enabled him to intuitively know what he needed to do in that emergency, when the work load and time pressure were so extreme that we did not have time to talk about what had just happened and what we needed to do about it, or for me to direct his every action. If he were a relatively inexperienced pilot, we could not have had the same outcome and people likely would have died. Experience is what made the difference between death for some and life for all.

          Recent events have also made tragically clear why it is so important that newly hired pilots have a minimum of 1,500 hours of flying experience. The First Officer on the Germanwings flight that crashed in the Alps last month had only about 600 hours of flying time. Under existing standards, he would not have qualified as an Air Carrier pilot in the United States and would not have been in a position to accomplish his dark and heinous act. By requiring more experience there is an opportunity to evaluate a prospective candidate over time and in many cases among several employers.

          The point is this: Any reduction in today’s standard reduces the time a pilot can be observed as a competent, reliable, and trustworthy person before being entrusted with the controls of a commercial airliner full of passengers. With a 1,500-hour standard, employers are able to know more about new pilots, able to have more people screening and observing them over a longer period of time, and able to make a more informed decision about whether they have proven themselves worthy of the public’s trust.

          When I served as a check airman (an instructor responsible for evaluating pilots) sometimes their performance would be just at the threshold of acceptable. In those cases, I would ask myself this question: When he or she is in the 14th hour of his or her duty day, flying at night in bad weather into an airport he or she has never seen before, would I want my family on that airplane? If the answer was yes, then he or she met the standard. If the answer was no, he or she did not. Those are the kinds of judgments that can only be made when there is adequate time to observe someone in an operational environment. And that is the kind of judgment that Congress made in mandating the ATP with 1500 hours.”


          I make no claim to be anything other than an observer of the opinions of those with enough professional pilot experience pilot experience to be qualified to have an opinion on such things. I think most reading this will know that Captain Sullenberger retired from US Airways with 20,000 plus hours of flight experience, and rose to the rank of Captain in the US Air Force where he was an F-4D Phantom II pilot, flight leader, and instructor, BEFORE commencing his airline flying career as a co-pilot. Perhaps you could share with us the ratings and hours of pilot in command time on which you are basing your opinion that a few hundred hours of flight time is adequate for someone assuming the role of the junior pilot on a two pilot scheduled airliner.

          P.S.: At the time of the miracle on the Hudson (experience and training based non-miracle according to Sullenberger), there was no checklist or procedure for “no power landing after both engines flameout due to birdstrikes”, nor was there a button on the autopilot for “auto-landing after loss of both engines”. Sullenberger and his co-pilot had to figure it out on the fly based on basic airmanship, or die along with their passengers.

          • @AP Robert

            And how about a fact that US jet fighter pilots with “only” 300 flight hours are ready to fly & fight?

            “only” 300 hours to fly a modern jet fighter vs. “big” 1500 hours to apply as a “tru airline” pilot

          • In the absence of a means of assessing quality of hours, Sullenberger is falling back onto the only option available; if the quantity is large enough, hopefully enough of those hours will have been quality to make it count.

          • Sully is Just another guy trying to keep competition out of the industry be creating entry barriers. There is no proof that anything more than 250 hours makes any significant difference. If you can get it in 250 you won’t get it in 1500 because pilot just doesn’t have the IQ. The whole sorry 1500 hours requirement was caused my congresses moral cowardice in dealing with the true cause of the Colgan Air 3407 crash where pilot ignored stick shaker and stick shaker was not low hours (both had thousands of hours anyway) but lack of fatigue policy in regional airlines. A FBW system with flight envelope protection would have worked as well.

          • Hello Pablo,

            Re:”“only” 300 hours to fly a modern jet fighter vs. “big” 1500 hours to apply as a “tru airline” pilot”

            That is the opinion of former US Air Force F-4D Phantom II pilot, Captain, flight leader, and instructor Sullenberger. Compile a good record in several years of flying single seat fighters over the desert or ocean, in the tight command and control structure of the military, and then, and only then, you will be eligible to be considered for a position flying several hundred members of the general public, who have not volunteered to fly high accident rate fighters, in and out of densely populated areas.

            You have not yet answered my question about your professional pilot flight experience and ratings. Could you share this information with us?

          • No power A320 water landing with two 20,000 hour pilots at the controls. All lived.


            No power 767-200ER water landing with an Ethiopian Airlines crew at the controls. Of the 175 people on board, 125 died. In fairness to the Ethiopian crew, they had the additional non-trivial complication of arguing with the hi-jackers in the cockpit.


            No power 767-200 landing on land with an Air Canada crew at the controls (pilot 15,000 hours flight time, co-pilot 7,000 hours flight time). All lived.


            No power 737-200 landing on land with an Ethiopian Airlines crew at the controls. Of the 104 people on board, 35 died.


            To anyone who is thinking that the sample size is too small to be statistically significant, I agree, but perhaps at least food for thought?

          • @William, Darth Vader

            I think opinion of William is closer to the truth then Darth, and both are correct.

            @Robert AP
            I haven’t seen your question, anyway, I prefer quality of argument then any personal prejudice.

            I see that you admire Sully, but his wrong in this matter, imho of course. Why? Because piloting a modern jet fighter is more complicated then an airliner, don’t you agree? and after 300 hours an US Air Force pilots are ready to fly one, don’t they? by international rules you can get a MPL license (Multi Crew Pilot License) which allows to be for real a co-pilot like FO in an normal airliner after 250 hours, don’t you? I don’t think that US Air Force or ICAO are a bunch of incompetent fools, maybe they are not always bright 😉 , but they aren’t fools.
            e.g. https://baaflightschool.com/2018/04/23/multi-crew-pilot-licence-what-do-we-know/

            Quality not quantity – let don’t judge book by its cover – in both ways.

          • Sullenberger testified that MCAS would have probably got him.Europe is safely operating with pilots with a fraction of the hours required in the US. Whenever there’s a crash the media will highlight anyone who is relatively new to the job, they have to start somewhere and whether they are properly trained or not is usually the deciding factor. There are only so many ex US forces pilots available.

          • What’s the minimum hour requirements for a large transport aircraft designer or FAA examiner? From the recent NYTimes article, it appears that the FAA engineers who were reviewing the 737-MAX flight control systems weren’t that seasoned. Maybe they need to up the requirements there?

      • The focus on the major airlines is misguided. The key datum for us passengers is how qualified the regional pilots need to be. The planes may be smaller but they are flying into the same airports, in the same weather. They fly more cycles per day and often on older, less capable equipment.

        For example the Delta Connections pool consists of about 450 CRJs and EJets. It should be as safe flying on those as on the Delta mainline.

      • Only US has a large pool of ex military pilots who can have 15 yrs or so flying time including those flying cargo and tankers or large bombers

  6. The fact is an airline get’s far more of an airplane with the A320 than with a 737. So, yes, the A320 is far more efficient, far more stable and far better equipped than a 737 for a small price premium.

    Prior to the 737 MAX, I always thought of the 737 as a Model T Ford. It worked but it was nothing to write home about. The 737 MAX doesn’t work.

    Bottom line. We all know it. Airlines have nowhere to go.

    But choice is coming. My own view, the first half of the next decade. Specfically, Boeing’s market share will be ~30% or less of the narrowbody market before we get through the first half of the next decade. That assumes Boeing will get away with a software fix, which as everbody knows I don’t think should happen.

    I’m not sure the emotive words of Buckingham Research will go down well outside of America. I’m not sure they will go down well inside of America.

    • Wow, and all the reports are that on any given day one is slightly better than the other and the next day slightly worse.

      Damn that pesky datga.

      • I don’t think Boeing need the kind of support that Buckingham Research is offering or the kind of support you are offering.

        Boeing have wonderful history of engineering excellence. They need to copy their history.

        With regard to the 737 MAX they have cut corners everywhere to the point that it is unsafe.

        The numbers tell the truth. If Airbus could make 100 A320s a month they would sell them. If they could make 120 a month they would sell them. And so on. The only reason Boeing are selling the 737 is Airbus can’t produce enough A320s.

        Boeing need to own up, man up and return to their history of engineering excellence.

      • I’ll go further because I’m fed up of the “wows”.

        Airbus can now produce 20 widebodies a month. A position they haven’t been in before. Equallu, the A321XLR will take great chunks out of the widebody market. So expect Airbus to dominate the widebody market early next decade.

        But the A321 is also the new standard with regard to narrowbodies. So next decade the A321 backlog will exceed the A320 backlog by a long way,

        Then we come to China/Russia, particurly China. By the end of the next decade they will at least 20% of the market. That will come out of Boeing’s share of the market, not Airbus’ share of the market unless Boeing get their act together.

        Boeing don’t have an answer to any of the above. Not looking good for Boeing.

    • @Pablo,

      Jeez…your diatribes are completely tiring. We get it: you don’t like Boeing, everything they make is crap compared to your dear Airbus, and everything Airbus makes defies the laws of physics. We get it. Oh, and you want Boeing to go bankrupt and be liquidated at the earliest time possible.

      Now please move on…..

      • @Neutron73

        I’m critic towards Boeing like I’m critic toward Airbus, if Airbus will screw up like Boeing did with tje MAX you will hear it from me also.

        If you would like to share some arguments with us I’ll be pleased to hear them and if they are wrong you will hear it, if right – also.

        But please don’t exacerbate.

      • You should read what Phillip is saying rather than ‘guessitimating’

        ‘Boeing have wonderful history of engineering excellence. They need to copy their history”

        Another american industry used to lead the world- you have probably forgotten them but GM , Ford and Chrysler went down the path Boeing ‘could be heading’ long ago, and yet Aviation is far more technical ( and regulated) than automobiles so requires a special mindset to screw it up in the way the Max was.

        • Some industries in the US stagnate as they do not improve their Products fast enough, In 1963 the Plymouth Valiant and Mercedes were almost equal. The Mercedes improved over the years while the Plymouth did not and was finally obsolete. Tesla Model S might get into the same trap as the Germans/Japanese start making corresponding models and renew them much faster while to US hesitate to invest in hundres of improvemnets every 3 years. Those investments pulls Money from dividents but also makes the Product faster/cheaper to make and gives customers new features/performance for the same $. Tesla I assume also make improvements but might be too fucused on software/batteries and less on quality and noice.

          • Really ?
            “In 1963 the Plymouth Valiant and Mercedes were almost equal.”

            Plymouth was the low cost brand of Chrysler and even in 1963 the top Chrysler models werent a match for Mercedes, more a match for Ford of Germany.
            VW is a better example of a brand that moved up the value chain since the 1960s. Toyota did the same.
            Those companies had a ‘fortress home market’ while the US did not.
            Even now the way VAT works means that German companies get a rebate to the value of VAT for every car exported to say US. US companies have to pay that VAT as a form of import tax upon landing in Germany. ( of course they had their own subsidiaries)
            Im not sure about this but isnt passenger planes VAT exempt when imported in the EU. Boeing would never compete if they had to pay VAT on every plane for an EU airline, while European airlines have the VAT payment chain to offset most of that cost from a plane made in EU.

  7. IAG won’t go through with the MAX order, I just cannot see it. We have seen how the LOIs turn out, eg. LOI for 60 737MAX by Qatar Airways, now gone.

    On the other hand it is too soon to see any shift in the market share yet but you can be sure Airbus will try to accommodate requests as far as their production capacity allows.

  8. Any sense on how long airlines could forego new aircraft if they end up cancelling their MAX orders? At current fuel prices and with suitable hedging, if cancellations do come early 2020, could the NG fleets they were intended to replace physically survive 1 year, 2? 3? 4? 5? 10? And do so at a low enough cost to not jeopardise the airlines?

    Also, are there sufficient NGs of sufficient standard parked up that could be re-activated to provide fleet size growth absent MAX (assuming they are sufficienty economical to operate)?

    Finally, any sense on how long it would take to fix the rudder cable issue if the authorities deem this a requirement for return to service?

    • The main option is if Mitsubishi would buy the MC-21 program from the Russians and refine its payload/range/economics and set up a new assembly lines in Japan, China and Vietnam. Now Russia is stuck not being allowed to buy Japanese carbon fiber but have to qualify its own and I guess other parts as well. The Japanese could avoid all those problems and Russia wants cash mainly to buy German machining equipment.

      • I still maintain the MC21 jet is the answer to Boeing’s single isle problem. Like Airbus did with the CS program I suggest being buy into the Russian program with a majority stake and focus on making the Westernized model compatible withe 787 cockpit and flight ergonomics. I think $4 billion and 30 months of work should bring Boeing a new single isle aircraft that has growth potential to take on the A321 variants. Also the acquisition gives Boeing access to low part suppliers in Russia, New technologies such as out off autoclave curing methods, and a low cost assembly line in Russia to add to its USA assembly lines. What’s there not to like? This approach is cheaper than a from scratch new design.

        • I doubt Boeing would touch it as every part had to be redesigned per Boeing standards/spec’s and supplier quality systems has to be per Boeing spec so is all software. I doubt Boeing would get US export licences to Russia for all those key standards and quality procedures that are more or less the same for military Aircrafts and missiles.
          I could see Irkut and its supplier be “another Witchita” sending naked circular fuselages made mainly of carbon and titanium to a new Boeing FAL somewhere in the World to be suffed with western hardware and software and have Boeing made carbon wings and naceles attached.

  9. So what about the reports the FAA management buried their engineering staff’s concerns over UERF and the 737 rudder cables?

    Could be quite a bit of mileage in this yet if any of the other regulators decide it must be fixed prior to a return to service.

  10. I find the “A32*neo better plane for developing world” argument a bit nonsensical, to be honest. For various reasons.

    1) The argument a bit weird in the context of the current crisis of confidence in the MAX, because nothing in the supposed “pilots’ plane” positioning has changed versus the A320 family since the A320 was introduced 30 years ago. Also it’s worth remembering the MAX is grounded because of problems with the plane itself (and associated training, obviously). It should also be noted that – at this point – various North American and European pilots have flown through a simulation of the original MCAS behaviour as seen in the JT and ET flights, and the consensus appears to be that, even knowing what was coming, pilots found it (near-)impossible to retain control of the plane.
    2) I’ve actually heard and read the exact opposite quite a few times before, whereby the 737 is better suited for the developing world because it isn’t as technologically advanced, i.e. it’s easier to fly, maintain and train for. Cheaper, too. This particularly tallies up with market share in Africa, as it happens. Airbus has sold all of 10 A32*neo in Africa, and there are fewer than 150 A32*ceo operating in Africa today. In contrast to this, Boeing has in or around 70% market share on the continent both in the existing fleets and in the NEO vs MAX competition. Very similar story in big developing countries like Indonesia.
    3) The opposite of Buckingham’s argument doesn’t really compute: “For developed world airlines, the Boeing system might be better suited and more attractive as pilot skills in the developed world are genereally considered better than those of the developing world.” My point being: How is a plane with the characteristics described by Buckingham not also more attractive in the developed world?

    In short: Bringing this argument up now sounds a bit like a case of “hey, it makes us in the developed world feel a bit better about flying 737s”. Also sounds like another repetition of the “yeah, but we have more blue-chip customers” argument, i.e. an excuse (read: spin) that’s supposed to detract from the fact that the ~60:40 market share has been there from the very beginning in pretty much every market – and doesn’t really surprise anyone with any knowledge of the industry.

    • @anfromme

      Good points, especially I like no. 3 – “yeah, A320 is for stupid, yeah, B737 is for real airlines / pilots, yeah, if you fly 737 you are a man ! =more developed” – I don’t like this nonsense narrative.

    • IMHO the cargo/luggage loading on the B737 makes it more suited for emerging markets and low infra destinations than the A320.

      • Some say that only about half the A320s? Use the containers method for baggage anyway. So it’s not so cut and dried as it might look. It’s nearly 2020 in Asia and Africa, not 1955 as far as airport infrastructure goes.

        • Good point!

          I guess the main decider to use it would be if they regularly have cargo (I mean other than bagage) and how high wages are (because the container system is more efficient per worker).

  11. Similar to The Dude, BA will “abide”. Amazing, the amount of ungrounded anti-BA hate spewed on this website’s Comments section. Oh well, “haters gonna hate”. Will agree BA should remove the Jet Airways 125 order. How is that a possibly completable order? Hello, BA CFO and/or CPAs? Scott?

    • Go check out the comments sections in the Seattle Times. One would have to assume that Boeing are vigorously supported in their home town, bringing jobs and wealth to the people. You’d be surprised and you might reconsider your opinion. But who knows, in these times of fake news, MAGA and ostrichism…

    • Airbus did the same with orders by bankrupt airline Skymark. The airline was finally bought by ANA and ANA therefor now owns a few A380.

  12. The less than stellar accident record of the A300/A310 is often attributed to its early success in 3rd world nations exposing it to relatively poor operational conditions. One might expect that with the A320 series as well if they do sell well there. I watch plenty of the Flight Chanel on YouTube and 3rd world accidents are different to first world.

  13. “If the planes are grounded for a year, aerospace analysts believe customers can cancel contracts with little or no penalty…”

    This is probably the most important information to understand the non-activity from airlines. They have to wait for that date to be met before they cancel their 737MAX orders free of charge. This also explains why Boeing is so eager to get the MAX back in the air.

    The closer we get to that line the more requests Airbus will receive for the A220 and A320. Under the assumption that suppliers like CfM, Spirit and many others would be able to switch production, it boils down to the question of speeding up production at the FALs. But maybe the wing production is the most difficult one…

    But of course there is also a good chance that the growth rate of air traffic will slow down. That could also hurt the 737 quite badly.

    But whatever the scenario, I just can’t see how sticking to the model T should be the best strategy. A more modern, safer and more efficient airplane is now needed at Boeing, otherwise they will end up with more or less a one-plane airliner product line – which of reminds me of McDonnell Douglas.

    • So that’s six months to allow Airbus time to realise that Boeing’s problems are really serious, six months for them to do anything about it. That’s plenty of time I should think to have at least the outline of a plan with all major suppliers to increase the rate again. If airlines do come knocking in that year timeframe, there’s a chance that Airbus will have something plausible to tell them about timescales.

      A new plane is needed at Boeing now. Arguably it was needed 25 years ago, but they didn’t do it. Twenty-five years of strategic paralysis; they’ve forgotten how to think about their situation clearly. Doesn’t bode well.

      Re the A220; there’s got to come a point at which Boeing-heavy airlines like Southwestern cave in. If MAX continues to be grounded, buying any aircraft made by any manufacturer which have a certificate to fly will become a business imperitive; you can’t have market share if all your planes are grounded. Deciding when to quit on the MAX will be tough. Boeing will only ever give out short term RTS estimates; they’ll never admit to it being a long way off. The siren call of “in a couple of months” will always be hard to resist. What I don’t know is whether a regulator would eventually call it off…

      As things stands, I bet that an airline such as Southwestern could have had an A220 in service by now, had they asked back in March. Just one or two, perhaps supplied with pilots and maintenance too, but that’d be something Airbus would bend over backwards to accomodate I’m sure. Afterall, they’ve done something similar before…

  14. Scott, where do you think all these key players got the idea that the A320 neo is more suitable for developing countries?I suspect that it comes from Boeings clever dick PR guys like Loren Thompson.If so they had better stop it, because logically they saying that their aircraft is unsuitable for use in such countries and they would have to hand back their deposits.Also its not an argument that will serve them well in court.
    Imagine the political pressure if they can’t achieve RTS by March.

    • Well said. My thoughts precisely. Loren Thompson’s school of creative excuses that are so stupid that you just wonder! I don’t think Boeing need that kind of support.

  15. There are increasing signals that the global economy is heading for a correction. Not necessarily a significant recession, though that could happen. But growth in the US is largely driven by a temporary and costly chasm in outlays over inflows.
    Business investment is flat, margins are tightening.
    Globally, things look okay but not robust.
    I’m not sure how much the macro situation matters, but we may see few successful sales campaigns for any of the major aircraft lines and models for a time.
    Glancing at the hed of the paywalled piece above this, the 787 could face a difficult period ahead. As may the A350.

    • I think it would be fair to assume that some sort of correction to the market will occur given the massive growth in recent years. The keys to this have been the holy trinity of:

      1 cheap or free money
      2 High fuel costs
      3 Increase in global demand to fly

      So the question is which gives first? Possibly the latter, airlines have had rocking capacity figures but I can see them slowing, a small global recession will see to that. My jaundiced view is too many orders are speculative or precautionary and given they will occur far into the future must be considered as subject to change regardless of MOU/LOI/ firm status

      • @Sowerbob

        I would add no. 4 – change in aircraft capacity demand – such aircrafts as A321XLR, or A220 with higher MTOW=longer range, with economics of a fully crowded widebody are slowly but surely changing the game.

  16. How likely is a production shut down of the 737 MAX?

    I listened to (part) of Boeing’s earnings call, and Dominic Gates (Seattle Times) put attention on the RTS schedule not being in line (being way to positive) with achieved schedules of past certifications.

    • @Julian

      It depends of the circumstances – if MAX won’t be allowed to fly anymore… an obvious output :/

      But during period of bodging of MAX – I don’t think the production will be ceased completely, however I think they significantly decrease a production rate, maybe a half, maybe more. All is speculative for now – nobody knows nothing for sure.

      • Keep in mind they could shift back to NG – not overnight but all the stuff is still in place.

        Not a solution but a holding action.

        • “Shift back to the NG…the stuff is all in place..”
          You have forgotten the most important part..it’s called CFM56. I don’t think those can be easily restarted in place of Leap-B.
          It’s taken years to tool up for the new Leap engines- they are more cousins than siblings. My take is that they won’t be going back on the engine production lines.

          • I don’t think the engine should be the largest obstacle, as CfM should have no issues in increasing production. I searched the CfM website and could find no information that the production is stopped.

            What might cause some headache is that the NG has the same (or similar) issue with the CPU and speed trim system as the MAX.

            Still, it might be the only option for Boeing to keep the production line open.

          • Reality means the CFM production has almost stopped. What new plane uses it apart from USN P-8. And thats at a very low rate. Of course parts production would continue., but that has been the same over the last decades of production. Do new spare parts go without ? ( Safran is moving CFM parts to India)

            Waving magic wands doesnt ‘ bring things back to life’ without significant investment. Leap production in both France and US is ramping up to over 2000 per year
            Its a dreamland to even consider NG coming back, as you never even looked into the CFM shows you have no understanding of the issues.
            Another issue is the airlines paying for significant fuel reductions
            and increased range in their Max orders, what about that . Answer is the Max problems WILL be fixed , I can bet on it .

      • Boeing is recertifying the 737MAX so they are redoing most forms, tests and reports as they are incorporating changes and then redo some reports and tests.
        The interesting is how far along they are and how many of those changes are incorporated for new built Aircraft being produced now (most likely none as FAA would have problems letting SB’s be approved before recertification), All those modifications approved as part of the recertification has to be incorporated into the newly built ones and the parked ones to be of a certified Aircraft configuration.

    • I think the only case that might warrant a production shutdown is a need for hardware rework. Storage is not the problem as there are hundreds of remote airports with ramp space available to take airplanes to be stored for a relatively small fee. The issue is that reworking already built or delivered airplanes in case of certain hardware changes might be challenging and more time consuming vs. installing the newly designed parts in the appropriate stage of the production. If a software fix can be made acceptable, I doubt we would see a line shutdown.

  17. Mr Phillip we all have our favorite OEM. Tell me if the three most important criteria for airlines the A320 is better than 737. Longevity, reliability, fuel burn and range. Don’t tell me about A320lr because that is a flying fuel tank. 90% of all narrow body aircraft range are 1500 miles and 97% are 2500.

    • I’ve replied to TransWorld, who offered a similar view to you. Please read that reply.

  18. Benjamin Katz twitter feed saying @Leary from Ryanair “CEO said he was told by Boeing on *Friday* that they’d only be submitting their fixes for the Max to regulators in October. That’s a month later than Boeing told investors on *Wednesday*. Still waiting for clarity. 2/2

    • That isn’t all he said. In the news story I heard, he had to be “bleeped!”

      • Many things that O’Leary says shall be bleeped, even if he is not swearing 😉

  19. Boeing is still a bigger aerospace and more diverse company than Airbus and people in this forum think they will disappear. If Boeing launch a new narrow body the a320 rewing will not be able to compete and Airbus will have to follow with their own.

    • It would depend on what Boeing went with.

      Something that blew the socks off like TBW, maybe.

      Otherwise, yes a new A320 wing would compete.

      Boeing did not even do a new wing for the MAX, and its full up competitive with the A320 (Phillip aside)

      That tells you how little advance aerodynamics are in this day and age. Improvement on fuel burn is all engines.

      • ” Boeing did not even do a new wing for the MAX, and its full up competitive with the A320 (Phillip aside) ”

        The ONLY thing thast saved the NG wing was the addition of winglets OVER the objections of the MDC aero whizzes who claimed ( falsley) the MDC trailing edge inboard ‘ wedge’ added to the DC-10/11 would fix all.

        The winglets were first allowed sold on BBJ simply becasue no executive wanted a plain jane looking 737 jet- sort of like chrome hubcaps. Over many objections and arguments, Boeing finally ran some flight tests and managed to sell some to a german airlInes .. the rest is history

        MDC people- managers strike again and again and again..

        here is the ” official ‘ story -I know /knew the real story in the year 2000m and saw some of the flight test data/curves ;))


        The most noticeable feature to appear on 737s since 2000 are winglets. These are wing tip extensions which reduce lift induced drag and provide some extra lift. They have been credited to Dr Louis Gratzer formerly Chief of Aerodynamics at Boeing and now with Aviation Partners Boeing (APB) but the original winglet design was by NASA Langley aeronautical engineer Richard Whitcomb during the 1973 oil crisis. They were first flown on a 737-800 in June 1998 as a testbed for use on the BBJ. They are now available as a standard production line option for all NGs with the exception of the -600 series. They are also available as a retrofit from APB. They are 8ft 2in tall and about 4 feet wide at the base, narrowing to approximately two feet at the tip and add almost 5 feet to the total wingspan. The winglet for the Classic is slightly shorter at 7ft tall. Most 737NGs now have winglets and all MAX’s will be built with winglets.
        There are 4 different types of winglets available for the 737 as follows:
        • 737-200 Mini-Winglets
        • 737 Classic/NG Blended Winglets
        • 737 NG Split Scimitar Winglets
        • 737 MAX Advanced Technology Winglets
        The latest APB development, was split-scimitar winglets introduced in early 2014 for the 737 NG

        • @Bubba

          The NG wing came well before the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger. And the winglet studies began before the merger, approximately 1995-1996.

          You have no idea what you are talking about.

          • Boeing 737 Winglets – The Boeing 737 Technical Site
            They were first flown on a 737-800 in June 1998 as a testbed for use on the BBJ. They are now available as a standard production line option for all NGs with the …
            My point was that the NG wing by 1998 or so was NOT a ‘ winner’ and biucu $$$ had been expended. After the merger- MDC whizz claimed the inboard trailing edge ‘ wedge” was touted as a fix. It wasn’t. The ‘ wedge’ was used on DC-10/11 becaus the asero design was such that it didnot meet range- load guarantees and in long range flights wound up with several empty seats for which MDC ‘ paid’ for.

            The first ‘ winglets ‘ were actually used on Gulfstream- but many in Boeing aero were adamant that they would not work on 737 due to ‘ issues’ with structural loading

            Anyhow my point was that after the merger- the MDC types thate were infused in Boeing management screwed things up – and its still going on

            History of Advanced Winglet Technology | Aviation Partners
            It began with Blended Winglets™ for the Gulfstream II in the early 1990s, … was onboard, and Blended Winglets quickly became standard equipment on the BBJ.

            Sorry for the thread drift ..

          • Fuel price increases in the 2000s made the advantages of winglets from marginal to must have apparent. The rise of LCC had an impact too.
            It’s not always only about what’s on the plane that moves the buyers.

      • “Boeing did not even do a new wing for the MAX, and its full up competitive with the A320 (Phillip aside)”

        That new wing happened back for the NG. Boeing and Airbus both put on new engines this time. What exactly is your point ?

        • What a minute? I told someone on this VERY SAME WEBSITE that the NG had a new wing, yet some poster went ON AND ON about how the NG didn’t have a “new wing”, even though I provided articles and documentation to prove it. Yet the poster (I’m not going to name names in case I get it wrong) INSISTED…nope, no new wing; same as classic just a little different.


          • Formally launched in 1993, the 737NG is an upgrade of the preceding 737 Classic models featuring a redesigned wing that is larger in area, with a wider wingspan, and greater fuel capacity.

            But the NG wing did not provide the expected/claimed increase in efficiency.

            The first NG to roll out was a −700, on December 8, 1996. This aircraft, the 2,843rd 737 built, first flew on February 9, 1997 with pilots Mike Hewett and Ken Higgins. The prototype −800 rolled out on June 30, 1997 and first flew on July 31, 1997, piloted by Jim McRoberts and again by Hewett. The smallest of the new variants, the −600 series, is identical in size to the −500, launching in December 1997 with an initial flight occurring January 22, 1998; it was granted FAA certification on August 18, 1998.[8][12]


            MDC aero whizzes wanted to ‘ fix’ some of the efficiency problems with a blunt inboard trailing edge configuration. Results were minimal to nonexistant. As a result of sales of BBJ with winglets and an order by a german airline with winglets which provided real life data on fuel savings, etc, later models of the NG incorporated them as an option..

            And the rest is history.

            But winglets do not fix all, thus the raked tips came into being as being better for some flight profiles..

    • @Daveo,

      There are some higher order considerations to take account of. Boeing clearly haven’t got a reliable way of developing and certifying aircraft at the moment. Airbus do. There’s a good chance that if Boeing pull the development trigger, Airbus’s response would beat them into service.

      Boeing are indeed a multi-faceted business. But if they keep losing money big time (MAX stays on the ground, and / or 777X has trouble entering service) there’ll come a point when the commercial aircraft division’s woes start pulling cash out of the other business units, threatening them. That’s really, really bad for shareholders. Divesting themselves of the commercial aircraft division might become a necessity. I hope not, but from what we’ve seen of how Boeing are running themselves of late, I can’t see a fast way out of their troubles.

    • @Daveo

      Maybe Boeing is bigger, I don’t really care, but is it better??? Maybe “bigger” is starting now to fade in the past?

      If Boeing launch a new… IF. It didn’t, it choosed a cheap, fast, flawed and bad way to go with MAX. I wish it wouldn’t. I wish to see a better designed that 787 and better produced than 787 a Boeing’s NSA, to challenge A320neo. But Airbus can sleep calmly – Boeing itself is a biggest threat for Boeing.

      • As always what is left out of this analysis is the customers. Has Boeing’s Board of Directors become overly risk-averse about launching large-scale projects for new commercial airliners? I would say so. Has MDC management had the same corrosive affect on Boeing that it has had everywhere in the Midwest I have observed MCD expatriates being hired? I’ll let Boeing employees speak on that.

        But in the case of the NSA/737MAX decision was the Boeing BoD wrong to be cautious? That is a far more difficult question to answer. Certainly Boeing could have designed and built a 2010s-technology NSA that would have been x% more efficient than the A320 and in some sense ‘better’. It would have been newer, shinier and more modern than the 737 family without a doubt. It would also without a doubt had a much higher list price than the 737NG or proposed 737MAX, and would have come with training and maintenance system costs for buyers invested in the 737.

        What did the customers tell Boeing? All the evidence we have from outside is that they told Boeing if you build an NSA we might well buy it – after we bid it against the A320. And now Airbus would have been in the better position with the legacy 320 design, lower production costs, established maintenance and training systems, etc. Or you can rev the 737NG again and as long as it is still cheaper than the A320, mostly common to the NG, and doesn’t have huge training or maintenance costs we’ll buy it.

        So – taking all those factors into account, not just the preference for the new – what would you have advised the Boeing BoD to do?

        • @sPh

          Of course “legacy” model vs. “new” has lots of pros and cons for customers. It’s very probably that if airline had a previous generation aircraft will be prone to continue with that aircraft’s line. On paper it has its advantages.

          Problem is that 737 because of the 1960s design choices was not suitable for next generation engines – I agree with early Boeing’s assessment, but they in a “neo shock” decided otherwise and made it far more worse with rush, pressure, cutting corners etc. Recognition of 737’s design limitations should be a hard no-go for Boeing management, but Boeing slept over NSA decision before NEO, customers wanted…. and rest is a sad history.

        • @sPh, I would have told the Boeing BoD directors that again the golden rule of the ago of industrialization applies: “innovate or die”.

          Apparently that was not discussed or thought of and we are now heading for a funeral. Be it the MAX or the entire company.

          • A funeral with fireworks.

            These problems will be handled by further trade sanctions and otherwise entangling the competition.

            Current impression is that the US will even go to war to get away with “not innovating” in a meaningful way.
            A full stream of “Kellyanne Conway” simulacrums is not innovation.

          • “innovate or die” applies to the leading edge of the product space, or an entirely new design in an established category which has order-of-magnitude (10x, 100x) benefits over existing products. The B-737 and A320 are commodity products in established categories. There hasn’t been an order of magnitude improvement in narrowbody commodity transport in 40 years despite every major manufacturer’s R&D groups working to come up with one. The 320 and 737 fall into the BCG “cash cow” category, and investing huge amounts of cash _into_ the product line that is supposed to be _generating_ cash is also a route to eventual bankruptcy.

  20. I don’t care who makes the aircraft, I want pilots who are able to fly the thing without the autopilot sitting up front. The lasting issue here is a lack of a global standard for training.

    And there is no way a person with 250 hours TT should be sitting in the right seat of a jetliner. It might be doable to some type of a low standard but it’s not smart.

    • @Bob

      And what about a pilots with only 300 flight hours??? Like those who fly a modern jet fighters in US Air Force. They are a good pilots? Or shall never be allowed to seat in a cockpit?

      Airbus or Boeing and regulators sets standards for flying their aircrafts – planing a simulator training – different scenarios and different procedures, or giving “1 hour iPad game and telling pilots that’s all you need to know about a new aircraft model”.

    • True.
      If you base it on the “learn by doing” setup pervasive in the US.
      Others do carefully crafted schooling upfront. Makes a difference.

      At the core there is a pronounced avoidance of up front investment in the US … and actually for near anything.

      • It’s worth to add as a complement to earlier arguments that according to international rules you can gain a MPL license (Multi-Crew Pilot Licence) with 250 flight hours and be capable to fly an airliner as FO (of course not for US airline because oh 1500h requirement). Doesn’t has to be anymore traditional PPL-CPL-ATPL long route. MPL is a condensed specialised training system similar to 300 flight hours to fly a jet fighter in US Air Force.

  21. O’Leary helpfully suggests that Boeing and the FAA need to get their poo together .
    No pressure…

    • But O’Leary also said that Airbus are using very aggressive pricing. If true, Airbus are going after Boeing, but they will need to increase production to do that. But then it may not be true. O’Leary may be looking for another discount.

      The coming year to going to be interesting

    • Like Boeing needed a prod.

      FAA, well he has a business to run. Far from the first time safety took last place to politics.

      And he can’t get a deal from Airbus!

    • O’Leary is saying many things… mostly because these suits very well to his politics.

      If he would wanted Airbus, he would already bought one for Ryanair. Instead he bought cheaper MAXs.

      So really… no pressure.

      • Ryanair also owns Lauda which operates A320 and has several more on order. So O’Leary already has Airbus on order.

        • Yes it is. Ludamotion has different history than Ryanair itself.

        • Maybe Lauda could do with some A321XLR’s, they could reach many destinations on the US East Coast and Canada from basis in Germany? Even Vienna to Toronto at 3700Nm for example will be plausible with an XLR with reasonable (200 pax?) seat density.

          Don’t think Ryanair will do Transcon in their 737-8200’s.

          • I don’t think that Ryanair or Laudamotion will fly transcon. Not theirs market. But JetBlue will be flying transcon with A321LR and XLR.

  22. “The Ethiopian pilots didn’t follow the Runaway Stabliser Trim procedure correctly because they missed one step did not switch of auto throttle and flew on with the over speed warning clacker sounding//”

    Suggest look closely at data released so far

    At < 5000 AGL, with nosedown trim and on a hot day – and knowing that reducing throttle results in a pitch DOWN and all sorts of bells- whistles, clackers, and pull up warnings – to expect a pilot to pull throttle back with a large load is maybe great for Micro squish simulators, and training simulators where a crash results in a ' discussion ' – is IMHO as a SLF a bit much. Especially when not aware of a repeat performance of MCAS secret system.
    This fubar MCAS mess is 99 percent BA problem- and NG pilots have been lucky they never had to use Manual trim, or even knew of the useless rollercoaster method .

  23. What seems to be missing from this thread and others is the issue of a outdated manual trim Wheel affecting NG versions.

    even if we assume it was marginal on NG-, the MAX reduced the diameter ( and thus the torque provided by say 20 lbs force on the handle ) making the MAX evden more vunerable to out of trim conditions.

    IF ( big IF ) NG gets to get a ” pass” by whatever argument and approval by ALL agencies, IMHO the minimum for NG will be a bit of actual sim time and review and/or change of procedures
    For most ALL NG ( round number 7000 in service ).

    OK who pays, how many sims available, and in wah order of priority, etc.

    And that is on top of MAX rework of software AND possibly hardware and removal from storage of maybe 1000 MAX ..

    Not too much mention from Boeing on this issue

    • If you read the comments you will see I have brought it up repeatedly

      And its not that its outdated, if it worked no issue.

      But it can speed lock up and if the motor freezes breaking the motor/gear clutch free is virtually impossible.

      • Since aero loads increase as the square of the airspeed ( in simple terms ) then doubling the speed from 120 to 240 kts will increase aero loads by a factor of 4. The yo yo game was deleted a few decades ago from all manuals, etc and is useless below maybe 5K to 8 K AGL. True for all since ( including ) the classic. To keep it simple – a properly geared – battery powered ‘ drill motor ” concept may wll be neded on NG and on MAX .. That is NOT trivial…

        • I love the cordless drill solution,most of the bits required can be be bought at screwfix!Simply gearing it up will at least get it moving but the pilots would still have to do the same amount of work, so they would take longer and be just as knackered

          • I’ve tried to ‘ simplify” my suggestion ( and that of a few others ) re the drill motor which unfortunately lets people assume to go to ace hardware and pick up a unit to put in flight bag… NOPE

            At the risk of overstatement and sounding like a complete design discussion, I will try to expand a little.

            1) use a custom gear train mounted on a battery powered motor SIMILAR to a hand held drill motor.
            2) attach it under cockpit floor to drive one or both of the Trim wheel casble pullys, in such a fashion as to alllow override and both directions
            3) Using å typical portable- hand held battery LIKE that used to start your car and stoed in the glove compartment,connect it thru suitable switching to the Trim ” cutout ” switches ( maybe a 3 way switch ?? )
            4) Set up with a ‘ trickle’ charger or similar or make system part of a check list/maintence list to be checked every week or 100 hours.

            AS I recall in an early version of the manual, Boeing said that using BOTH pilots would not break the Trim wheel cable system .

            For example – Planetary gearing of 100 to one in small ( 2-3 inch diameter ) package is common and been used for decades. Airmotors which run at 20,000 pm and are geared down to 100 – 200 rpm are in use every day in the Boeing factory.

    • It has been brought up. If my memory serves me correctly, manual trim as the same problem as it does on the MAX. If I remember right one of the simulations used a NG simulator not a MAX simulator when tests were carried out on runaway trim stabiliser

  24. How difficult would it be for Airbus to use Boeing’s 737 assembly line to build 320neos?
    Boeing would get much needed revenue for leasing out their facilities. Boeing would have more time to get things done correctly on the 737-MAX. Their workers would be busy building planes. Airbus woulcn’t have to invest in new plant and equipment to meet production schedules. They could deliver more airplanes, quicker. And the airlines would be happy to get new airplanes into their fleet sooner. The suppliers would be happy to be working again. Everyone wins. How feasible is it to reconfigure Boeing’s assembly line to build Airbus Aircraft?

    • I’ve idled away some hours pondering the possibility of Boeing going bust and Airbus moving in. About the only genuinely useful asset to Airbus would be the buildings and a portion of the shop floor workers. I think they’d be better off building more at Mobile, running their own training programmes.

  25. It takes time for cancellations to work out. Just like ordering.

    You need to find alternative fleet solutions, negotiate financial terms. Be sure you want to cancel instead of e g. defer or convert.

    Boeing will do it’s utmost to prevent outright cancellations, to prevent others following the example, market confidence, stockvalue taking a hit.

    Do I think airlines are in the process of taking a good look at their fleet options? Yes. Does it show in the backlogs already? No. Does it show in new orders? Yes. Whatever supports your assertions..

  26. I think a year is too long. So I think airlines are close to being able to cancel contracts without penalty.

    But where do they go. I’m sure the leasing guys are happy. Equally airlines will fly their airplanes longer, taking the maintenance on the chin. The we come to the desert. Are airplanes being removed from storage? That would be good to know!

  27. Boeing obviously has to do studies looking to the future more than 6 months out, in order to make plans for future planes. But, the single aisle 737 has been their bread and butter for years, and the same looks to be true in the future.
    Asia looks to be where the large percentage growth will be. No surprise there, but the single aisle market is huge. No one is really mentioning the Chinese C919 as a competitor for Boeing. Always mentioned is Airbus. Why not? Their taking the vendor list from Boeing, and inviting them to China to build airplanes. Rather than slapping a “made by Boeing” sticker on the side of the jet, they’re slapping a “made by China” sticker. If Boeing doesn’t fix the 737-MAX issue correctly, who’s to say a C919 might be built safer than a 737-MAX? BTW, is the C919 more Boeing in control system “personality”, or Airbus “personality”?

    • I mention the C919. I think it’s half the reason why Boeing are in trouble. The other half is Airbus.

      • The C919 will still be struggling to finish certification and then build more than token numbers when the Max issues are history.
        For some reason aviation is really hard for them. Maybe the huge constellation of suppliers we take for granted in the west is missing, I just dont know why even pedestrian projects become dead ends.

      • See Ethiopian Airlines are looking at the C919.

        Must be noted that China ploughed big money into the new Addis Abba terminal.

    • @Bubba

      “aero loads increase as the square of the airspeed (in simple terms)”

      Glad you also have an understanding. This word “linear” been popping up too often for my liking.

      Ignore the abuse. Your input is valuable. Boeing need educated support, not blind support.

      • This comment should be a reply to Richard, it should be elsewhere.

  28. Ufff, very hypothetical.

    I don’t think ever Airbus would like to share his production know-how with Boeing, an Boeing would like to allow to his fierce competition to enter to his FAL. And there are also a quality issues.

    Not possible for “political” reasons, very difficult technically, very poor economics. Airbus shall open another FAL if necessary.

    • Actually there is very little real proprietary stuff obvious on the final assembly line. A lot of the tooling concepts, installation equipment, hand tools, special installation tools etc are identical in Both ‘ factories ‘. The vendors are the same for the majoity of equipment. Things like automatic riveters, fasteners, metal forming, wiring connectors, etc etc are common between both.
      While design details are initially not public, after production starts, the results are available.
      One of the most common digital design systems used in aserospace is ‘ CATIA’- was developepd by a French firm, and used extensively by Boeing starting in the 80’s for 767, 777, etc

      Dassault Systèmes
      Initial release:1977
      Operating system:Windows, Unix (server)

    • Good catch. Airbus immediate future is the A220 and A321, both will be further developed

      • Airbus has a great future secured when they got the C-Series under their tent, and Boeing, being…..something (not good) decided to pass. That was a big mistake, and costly, too.

        The E2 series is nice but it isn’t an C-series (A220). Way to fall asleep at the wheel, Muilenberg. That plane will turn out to be a cash cow for Airbus. Great move on their part.

  29. Bombardier were hopeful of making big sales, so presumably there is the capacity for a ramp up of the supply chain. This is the only place I can see much slack to take the place of cancelled MAX and displaced NEOs.
    P&W really needs to get their act together, this is a big break for the C series and the GTF.

      • Absurd Nonsense. If Boeing could weather the problems and costs ( ‘almost’ an order of magnitude greater than Max) of the 787 then they can come through this as well.
        Most of the backlog/grounded is Max 8 versions, no way an A220-300 can take those planes , with nearly 40 extra seats, on.
        The FT story is what is called in the media as a ‘beatup’ where dire consequences are forecast, and yet have the bare faced cheek to later write ‘ Disaster averted’

        • No,no!It will only take a few C series sales to ruin the viability of the MAX 7 and threaten the entire existence of the US indusury.Boeing said that themselves a couple of years ago so it must be true. I’m amazed no one else remembers.

        • I agree with Grubbie. Boeing don’t have an answer to the A220 or A321. Airbus will do an A220-500. In my view the launch will be next year. They will also do an A322 if Boeing launch the NMA. They may do it anyway.

          Then we come to RR Ultrafan. Airbus will launch the Ultrafan. We are told it will be on the A350. My view is that it will also be on the A321/A322. This will give a range of over 5000nm for both varients

          Add the C919 into the mix, the walls are closing in on the 737 MAX even without the problems that caused it to be grounded.

          • Fully agree, I only disagree regarding the Ultrafan for single aisle planes. For all I know it is designed for twin-aisle aircraft. I doubt it can be scaled down that much and still be competitive with the PW1000G. I would rather see a somewhat larger variant of the latter, now that P&W are through the steepest part of their learning curve.

          • Gundolf

            We will see.

            RR are claiming a > 70:1 pressure ratio as well as every thing else they are claiming. It needs to be true. But if it is, it’s at least 10% less SFC than PW and CFM. But it needs to be true.

            We will see.

            Airbus cooperation on UltraFan suggests they may be convinced!

          • American and UAL have ~200 A319’s between them as well as 150 A320’s. B737-8’s could replace (some) A320’s but I can see a big opportunity for the A220-300/(-500) here.

            Their main competitors (DAL & Jetblue) have a total of 120 A223’s on order and could also be interested in A220-500’s.

        • A 12 frame* stretch (= 240″) of the A220-300 (A220-500) would provide enough room for an additional 8 rows of seats with a pitch of 30″.

          I would not be surprised if an airline, such as Southwest Airlines, would approach Airbus with the intent of ordering, say, 300 units of a stretched A220-300, the A220-500 would be launched without delay.

          *20″ window frame spacing.

          • @OV-099

            If I were Airbus I wouldn’t do A220-500 for 300 units of, but for 500 units – yes! 😉

          • If you get about 700 or so A220s flying worldwide, there will probably be quite the demand for a stretch. I would think initially it would be closer to five rows; and maybe a few 50 – 100 seat orders would start the ball rolling, but time will tell…

          • At 38.7m the A220-300 is already slightly longer than an A320. I can see an A220-500 to be a modest stretch of say 4 seat rows (20 pax) that should give 165 seats in a one class (31″/32″) layout.

            This will keep things simple and low cost with minimal changes required for wing, landing gear, engines, etc. at the expense of ~500Nm in range which should be around 2500-2800Nm and good for most applications.

            This could give an aircraft with ~5% (?) better seat mile cost than the 223 which will make it highly competitive.

            But for Southwest to introduce another aircraft and engine type, NOPE.

          • Thats right the seat range for A220-300 is 2 class 120-150 , but Southwest is of course 1 class so could be looking at ‘almost 160’ ?

        • Is everyone forgetting that Boeing is at least half way thru developing a 737 replacement on the back of the NMA development.

          Their lack of for- sight and ignoring of what the market has been screaming for has been painful for years.

          But if current management would let the NMA get finished – oh if!!!

          • Maybe I am reading things incorrectly but is wondering if AB is not working on a “large” single aisle NSA and therefore not interested in a new TA NMA?

            Seating for around 240 with range ~5000Nm, fuselage, and other components, could be used in replacing the current A32X family in future. The 40-44m meter folding wingtip wing currently being developed most likely for such an aircraft.

            The A322 could see the light as a modest stretch (15-20 seats) of the A321, MTOW 97T, 321XLR wing/LG updates, range 3500-3800Nm. There is always the question of an 35Klb engine. This will be the final burial of the MAX10 and another bite out of the lower end of the shorter haul NMA market

  30. How old were the pilots in the ill fated Ethiopian flight?

    • It has been rumored about it few months ago, then had been denied. Will see if it’s true.

  31. Boeing is making a change to the software …
    But, it seems like a very aggressive schedule. Even just to make the change, never mind testing the change out, and verifying it. I’m glad I’m not a programmer working under the tight deadline. I’m going to be VERY interested in if they reconfigure the stab cutout switches back to the way they were, so you can actually regain manual electric control of the stabilizer.

    • That was my thought. The AirBus schedule to fix the issue with pitch response, which seems like a very small change in comparison, is not scheduled to be complete till Q3 2020. Perhaps because any safety concern is addressed by limiting the CG range so AB feels it can fit the fix into a regular upgrade cycle?

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *