September 6, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”) we discussed the flight control laws which are implemented with classical flight controls compared with the Embraer E-Jet and Airbus A320 FBW systems last week.
Now we describe alternative FBW approaches, analyzing Boeing’s 777/787 system and Airbus’ A220 system.
Posted on September 6, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
August 30, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”) we now discuss the flight control laws which are used for Classical flight controls and FBW systems.
Posted on August 30, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
August 23, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”) we now look at practical implementations after discussing the authority of the flight control system last week.
As before we compare the classical 737 system to the A320 FBW system.
Posted on August 23, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
August 16, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”) we this week discuss the Flight Control System’s authority to execute maneuvers by its different parts and why the authority of these parts is a fundamental parameter when designing the system.
Posted on August 16, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
August 9, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”), we this week turn to the actual Flight control system after covering the infrastructure needs last week. We could see the FBW required a higher redundancy Hydraulic and Electrical infrastructure. Why we will come to.
Now we look at the control principles for classical control systems like the Boeing 737 system and FBW system like the Airbus A320 system.
Posted on August 9, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
July 25, 2019, ©. Leeham News: In our series about classical flight controls (“fly by steel wire”) and Fly-By-Wire (FBW or “fly by electrical wire”) this week we cover the difference in system infrastructure the two controls methods call for.
We will use the Boeing 737 as the classical control example and the Airbus A320 as the FBW example.
Posted on August 2, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
July 25, 2019, ©. Leeham News: Last week’s Corner which dealt with Airbus’ issue with an updated A321neo Fly By Wire (FBW) and how it was unrelated to the issue of the Boeing 737 MAX, gives a good segue to a Corner series about the possibilities of FBW versus classical flight controls when it comes to tuning an airliner’s flight characteristics.
The two different control principles present the designer with very different challenges and possibilities.
Posted on July 26, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
July 19, 2019, ©. Leeham News: The European Aviation Safety Agency EASA has issued an Air Worthiness Directive (AD) to instruct operators of the Airbus A321neo of a Pitch instability issue.
EASA writes “excessive pitch attitude can occur in certain conditions and during specific manoeuvres. This condition, if not corrected, could result in reduced control of the aeroplane.”
We analyze how this is similar or different to the Boeing 737 MAX pitch instability issues.
NOTE 2: We have got a further update from Airbus, see below.
Posted on July 19, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
July 12, 2019, ©. Leeham News: Norwegian Air Shuttles’ (Norwegian) founder and CEO for 17 years, Bjorn Kjos stepped down yesterday. Over the last year the CFO, Board chairman and now the CEO have changed.
This signals a change in strategy for Norwegian. The new management is focused on halting growth and cutting costs. Norwegian must now consolidate itself to profitability.
Posted on July 12, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm
July 05, 2019, ©. Leeham News: It seems more and more likely the 737 MAX grounding will go well beyond six months and it can approach nine months to a year depending on developments in the next months.
The costs to Boeing for the MAX debacle are now approaching the costs of a new aircraft development.
Posted on July 5, 2019 by Bjorn Fehrm