Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
New technology for Boeing’s next new airplane
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By Scott Hamilton
Part 2
Brian Yutko, VP of Product Development for Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Credit: Leeham News.
April 13, 2026, © Leeham News: As Boeing considers its next new airplane, whatever it is, there is a plethora of issues that must be considered.
Last week’s article outlined a high-level view of Boeing’s future airplane programs. Today, LNA details some specifics that Boeing must consider before launching a new airplane program.
Brian Yutko, the VP of Product Development at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, declined to address any questions about new airplane development. However, at the retiree meeting of the Pacific Northwest chapter of AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) last month, Yutko discussed some of the issues Boeing will face in the coming years.
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Bjorn’s Corner: Blended Wing Body Airliners. Part 5
By Bjorn Fehrm
April 10, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We have started a series of articles on the Blended Wing Body (BWB) as a potentially more efficient design for passenger-carrying airliners than the classical Tube-And-Wing (TAW) configuration.
In last week’s article, we discussed how the wingspan is an important factor in an airliner’s takeoff performance. The induced drag is about 85-90% of the drag at the critical V2 point after rotation, where regulations require that a twin-engined airliner be able to fly on one engine with a climb rate of 2.4%.
We now go through the entire mission for a BWB airliner and compare its drag characteristics with those of a classical Tube-And-Wing (TAW) design.
Figure 1. The JetZero Z4 BWB. Source: JetZero.
Boeing’s next airplane will eventually come; what will it be?
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By Scott Hamilton
Part 1
April 9, 2026, © Leeham News: CEO Kelly Ortberg has been clear: there won’t be any new airplane program launched until the airlines are ready, the technology is ready, and Boeing is ready.
Ortberg became CEO of The Boeing Co. on Aug. 8, 2024. One of his first decisions was to kill the research and development of a concept called the X-66A, the moniker for a Transonic Truss Brace Wing (TTBW) single-aisle airliner that could replace the 737 MAX in the coming decade.
However, he said that Boeing, coupled with NASA, would continue to research and develop an advanced wing for a new, highly efficient airplane. NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has a long history of partnering with Boeing to evaluate new aerospace development.
Ortberg’s decision to kill the X-66A demonstrator project reversed a decision by the man he replaced, David Calhoun, who was the TTBW’s leading proponent within Boeing. Calhoun became CEO in January 2020 when his predecessor, Dennis Muilenburg, was fired during the prolonged 737 MAX crisis.
Figure 1. The Boeing-NASA concept X-66A TTBW airplane. Source: NASA.
One of Calhoun’s first decisions was to kill the R&D project of a New Midmarket Airplane (NMA), a twin-aisle design roughly the same dimensions as the Boeing 767-200ER and -300ER. The NMA had been under study since at least 2012. Muilenburg was on the path to seek board approval to launch this program in 2019, when the MAX was grounded by global regulators. Calhoun, the lead director, didn’t support the plane. With Boeing’s cash-cow 737 grounded, Calhoun used the crisis to kill the NMA. Given the billions of dollars in losses Boeing was and would incur, the decision was an obvious one.
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Boeing’s 30-year march to its next new airplane
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By Scott Hamilton
Background
April 6, 2026, © Leeham News: Depending on what starting point you want to choose, it will be up to 30 years between brand new, clean sheet airplane designs at The Boeing Co.
Boeing announced its 787 program in December 2003, with a formal launch the following spring. The entry-into-service goal for the 787 was May 2008. Boeing planned to design a replacement for the aging 737 platform after the 787 entered service. A new design for replacing the 777 was supposed to come after that.
The 787’s EIS date came and went as design and production problems added up to 3 ½ years of delay.
With cost overruns, deferred production, and deferred tooling costs totaling more than $50bn, plus several billion more dollars written off for research and development and abnormal production costs, the 787 still has more than $14bn in deferred costs to recover.
Delays and cost overruns hurt the 747-8 program. The 2019 21-month grounding of the 737 MAX resulted in billions more in charges. The January 2024 door plug blowout on a new Alaska Airlines 737-9 hurt recovery. Scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continues to this day. Production rates for the 737 and 787 are well below those that predate the MAX grounding. Certification of the 737-7, 737-10, and 777X remains a hope, not a reality, so far.
A plethora of losses, charges, and delays in defense and space programs added to the losses. Boeing’s long-term debt in 2018, its last normal year, was over $10bn. Today, it’s over $54bn, with big repayments coming soon.
Boeing’s next new airplane program remains years away.
What will Boeing’s next new airplane be? We have a pretty good idea. A new series beginning Thursday explores this question. Credit: Leeham News.
Boeing, once the king of freighters, falls behind Airbus going forward
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By Scott Hamilton and Bjorn Fehrm
April 2, 2026, © Leeham News: Boeing is no longer “freighter king.”
The March 16 order by cargo carrier Atlas Air for 20 A350Fs gives Airbus a 60% market share of orders for the next generation of freighters. Since the dawn of the jet age, Boeing has had a lock on jet airliner freighters. It vanquished Douglas Aircraft Co and its successor, McDonnell Douglas. Airbus had modest success with the new build A300-600F, with about 100 ordered. But Airbus bombed with the new production A330-200F; only 38 were sold.
Figure 1. The backlog of new generation freighter orders gives Airbus a 60% market share. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
However, Airbus now has 101 orders for the A350F. Boeing has just 68 for the competing 777-8F. This is a far cry from the 359 777F Classics, based on the 777-200LR, that have been ordered. There are 47 in the backlog. Production will conclude at the end of next year due to emissions standards that the old generation 777F does not meet. Boeing asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption to build 35 more. It requested a decision by May 1.
Figure 2. Boeing dominated the jet freighter market from the 1960s. The recent, old generation freighter market was still overwhelmingly owned by Boeing. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
Additionally, Boeing sold 288 767-300ERFs. There are 18 in the backlog. Production concludes at the end of next year.
How did Boeing lose its overwhelming dominance in the freighter market? How did Airbus overtake Boeing, as it did in the early 2000s in the passenger airplane arena?
The answers about Boeing rest in a combination of negative fallout from the 737 MAX crisis, a suspension of production of the 787, shifting priorities and Boeing’s inbred arrogance.
For Airbus, the answer lies in the tortoise-and-hare analogy and a willingness to listen to potential customers more than Boeing did in key campaigns.
Boeing’s Starliner history shows safety, quality concerns exist systemically across the company
Editor’s Note: The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) on Feb. 19 released its investigative report of the failures in 2024 of the Boeing Starliner space vehicle. Defects in the Starliner resulted in its crew being housed in the International Space Station for nine months before being returned to earth in a SpaceX capsule.
Boeing Starliner, docked at the International Space Station. Source: Boeing.
The investigation into the failures faulted NASA and Boeing. The 311 page report was triggered by the Starliner incident, and examines the NASA-Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) cultures that led to the Starliner problems. The Boeing Co. is engaged in high profile efforts to change the culture at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA). The Starliner incidents reveal similar cultural and safety issues at BDS that corporate CEO Kelly Ortberg must address.
The NASA report may be downloaded here: nasa-Starliner report 021926
In this Special Report, LNA dissects the NASA study. The shortcomings at BDS are eerily similar to those at BCA.
Special Report
By the Leeham News Team
Three Disasters
Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines
The first Boeing 737-8 delivered, in May 2017, which happened to be to Lion Air. Source: Leeham News.
March 30, 2026, (c) Leeham News: On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610—a Boeing 737 MAX 8—crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 aboard. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a flight control system that Boeing had withheld information about from airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—including its existence and how it works—drove the aircraft into an unrecoverable dive.
The pilots had never been trained on it because Boeing determined that disclosing MCAS would require simulator training, which would make the MAX less competitive against the Airbus A320neo. Southwest Airlines, for example, which ordered hundreds of MAXes, required Boeing to pay $1m per airplane if simulator training was required.
Less than five months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed under virtually identical circumstances. It was another MAX 8 with another MCAS-driven dive. Another 157 people were killed. Combined death toll: 346 passengers and crew, plus one recovery diver in the Lion Air accident. The global fleet was grounded for 21 months.
Congressional investigations revealed what investigators called Boeing’s “culture of concealment” and the FAA’s systematic overreliance on Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) for self-certification. While federal government agencies routinely designate company employees to represent the overseeing agencies, the level of the FAA’s hand-off to Boeing came under withering criticism.
Following the long recovery period, the FAA clamped down on Boeing’s production of the 737 and to a lesser extent (and for different reasons), production of the 787. By late 2022, Boeing executives appeared confident that BCA was on the path to normal operations.
Fuel prices up sharply, but not sustained at record levels–yet
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By Scott Hamilton and Karl Sinclair
March 28, 2026, © Leeham News: Oil prices skyrocketed this month with the beginning of the 2026 Iran War.
Yet, as sharply as prices spiked, they are not yet a record relative to inflation-adjusted prices since the 1973-1974 OPEC-inspired oil embargo and other regional or global events, an analysis by LNA shows.
West Texas Intermediate Crude oil prices topped $100/bbl. Brent crude briefly hit $197/bbl on March 20. On March 27, Brent topped $100.
Some airlines worldwide hedged fuel against dramatic price hikes. Our detailed analysis is below.
There are dire predictions that the prices could reach $170 or even $200/bbl if the Iran War continues. Bombing of Iran by the United States and Israel began on Feb. 26. Shortly after, tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz all but ceased. Twenty percent of the world’s oil transits through this bottleneck. Some countries, such as Japan and China, obtain more than 90% of their oil via the Strait.
More than 300 tankers are trapped. Some were attacked by Iran. Hundreds of ships of all kinds are blocked on both sides of the 35-mile-wide Strait.
Figure 1. Source: About 750 ships were trapped at the peak. Iran is allowing limited traffic through. Seatrade-Maritime magazine.
The price of oil is being whipsawed as President Donald Trump mixes messages about the war’s progress, sometimes within minutes. Sometimes the war is “won,” but more troops and ships are being sent to the region. Trump threatened to increase bombing, attack Iran’s power stations, invade an island, and then take it back. Allies are needed to reopen the Strait, and then they are not.
Change Incorporation, Configuration Control, and the High Cost of Getting It Wrong
Editor’s note: Boeing spent years doing rework on the 737 MAX and the 787 after the former’s grounding following two fatal crashes and the latter’s production flaws. “Shadow factories” began the 737’s rework after the 21-month grounding was terminated in November 2020. The last of 450 airplanes was delivered in 2025. Deliveries of the 787 were suspended in October 2020; 110 aircraft needed rework. The last of this inventory was cleared in 2025. This work is also known as “Change Incorporation.” Thirty-five 737 MAX 7s and 10s have been built and await certification, which idepends on design changes that must be retrofitted once the Federal Aviation Administration signs off. Change incorporation took 3-4 months for the 787s and was measured in months for the 737s.
More than 30 777-9s have been built while this program awaits FAA certification. This, too, will require Change Incorporation. Boeing has not revealed what changes the FAA will require, although revised flight control software is known to be one element. Nor has Boeing revealed how long Change Incorporation for the 777-9s will take.
LNA’s news team explains what Change Incorporation is, how it is undertaken, and the implications for the 777-9s in inventory.
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By the Leeham News Team
March 18, 2026, © Leeham News: In the commercial aviation industry, building aircraft before the type certificate is formally issued is not unusual. It is an economic necessity.
Undelivered Boeing 777-9s (among other aircraft) are lined up in open-air storage in this undated 2025 Google Earth photo of Paine Field, Everett (WA). The 777s are the “green” airplanes, though more are also painted in other colors.
Launching a production line months or years before final regulatory approval allows manufacturers to meet early delivery commitments, recoup development investment more quickly, and maintain customer relationships. But this strategy carries a profound and often underestimated technical liability: when the approved design specification continues to evolve through flight test, the already-built airframes must be brought into conformance with the final certified configuration. This is the essence of the Change Incorporation process.
The Boeing 777X program offers the most current illustration of this challenge. As of early 2026, Boeing has assembled more than 30 777-9 airframes, all built to early-production standards, while the aircraft’s type certificate is still in progress.
At the same time, the January 2024 in-flight separation of a door plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282—an event traceable directly to failures in Boeing’s parts removal and reinstallation process—has thrown the Change Incorporation process into the spotlight.
These two stories are connected by a single systemic thread: the consequences of inadequate configuration discipline in a complex, multi-stakeholder manufacturing environment.
Boeing says 1Q deliveries will be lower than forecast, but will catch up later
By Scott Hamilton
Jay Malave, EVP and CFO of The Boeing Co. Credit: Boeing.
March 17, 2026, © Leeham News: Boeing’s deliveries in the first quarter may be lower than originally forecast, but will catch up throughout the remainder of this year, the company’s chief financial officer said today.
Jay Malave said that a quality defect on the 737 line affected about 25 airplanes. The defect was spotted by Boeing and involves scratched wiring traced to a miscalibrated machine at a Boeing facility.
“We’ve got about a population of about 25 aircraft that are impacted by that, so they’ll have to undergo some level of rework,” Malave said. “You’re talking around three days of rework, so not a significant amount. We have resumed deliveries as of last week. The impact here is really one of timing.
“We’ll see about 10 aircraft we were expecting to deliver around 120 737s in the first quarter, so we’ll slip about 10 of those deliveries into the second quarter. [The impact is] fairly limited in the grand scheme of things.”
Deliveries of the 787 will be slower and lower than hoped due to the timing of certification for premium-class interiors.
Iran war threatens Boeing in more ways than just airliner orders
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Editor’s note: When LNA is asked about the progress of Boeing’s recovery, we always express a caveat before answering: It depends on events outside Boeing’s control. The Iran war is just such an event.
By the Leeham News Team
March 17, 2026, © Leeham News: The paradox at the heart of modern commercial aviation is that the materials engineered to insulate airlines from oil price volatility are themselves creatures of the petrochemical complex.
Boeing’s 777X and 787 programs, with their heavy use of composites, face high risks of disruptions and costs due to the Iran War. Source: Boeing.
Carbon fiber composites reduce fuel burn by 20% over legacy aluminum airframes. Yet the polyacrylonitrile precursor fiber, the epoxy matrix resins, the autoclave energy—the entire manufacturing stack—runs on oil. When the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed on Feb. 28, it did not merely threaten jet fuel supply chains. It aimed directly at the raw material foundation of Boeing’s two most consequential programs: the 787 Dreamliner and the 777X.
Airbus faces similar challenges for the A350. A major Boeing composites supplier, Toray Industries, is used in secondary structures, and the impact is far smaller. US-based Hexcel is a major composites supplier to Airbus through its European operations.
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