787-3, “737-10” no replacement for 757

Feb. 25, 2015. c. Leeham Co. When Boeing CEO Jim McNerney last year suggested that a replacement for the 757 could be based on the 787 or the 737 MAX, the statement conjured up visions of resurrecting the 787-3 (the short-range version of the 787-8) or further developing the 737-9 into a larger “737-10.”

We were skeptical then and remain so now.

The idea of a 787-3 resurfacing into a 4,500nm airplane to replace the 757 is a dog that just won’t hunt. As Nico Buchholz, the fleet manager for Lufthansa Group, told us, the 787-3 is just “too much airplane.”

We couldn’t agree more, and the idea of a “787 Lite” is a simplistic suggestion that doesn’t fully think through all the issues.

The development of a “737-10—“ a stretched, new-winged, taller, higher-capacity 737-9 is a quaint idea with problems of its own. It needs a larger engine than the CFM LEAP-1B and as described here becomes, essentially, a three-quarters new airplane. What’s the point?

Boeing’s blithe dismissal of the market potential of the Airbus A321LR misses the point—publicly. Our Market Intelligence indicates that internally, Boeing hardly misses the point.

Public focus by Boeing, and some industry observers, on the 40-60 757s that ply the Atlantic today ignores the market potential Airbus sees for the A321LR: expanding similar operations from Europe to northern Africa; Australia to South Asia; and the southern United States to all the major cities in South America. While we don’t go so far as to say the projection of 1,000 A321LRs by Airbus COO-Customers John Leahy is “laughable,” as suggested by Boeing’s VP of Marketing Randy Tinseth, we agree that this figure seems unrealistically high. More realistic is the projection that Kiran Rao, EVP of Marketing and Strategy for Airbus, told us when we revealed the A321LR program in a world exclusive Oct. 21 last year that the market was 200-400.

Even this projection is hardly the point. We believe—and we think Boeing recognizes—that the real danger to Boeing is not the 40-60 757s flying the Atlantic or even the 200-400 potential sales of the A321LR. Rather, we believe that the A321LR’s danger to Boeing is the ability to becoming the sales leader for the standard A321neo and A320neo for airlines that either haven’t ordered Airbus or which have held back for a variety of reasons.

For example, United Airlines has ordered the 737 MAX, including 100 MAX 9s, but it hasn’t ordered any A320neo Family members. All Airbuses in the fleet today are from Legacy United, not the merged UAL with its Boeing-centric management. United is a large user of 757Ws across the Atlantic. Should UAL elect to order the A321LR, does anyone really believe United will stop with a small sub-fleet of perhaps 10-25 A321LRs? We believe it would be a certainty United would add more A321neos and perhaps A320neos to the order for volume.

Likewise, Delta Air Lines is another prime target for the A321LR. Its management, from Legacy Northwest Airlines, knows the A320 Family well. NWA was a large purchaser. Legacy Delta, on the other hand, was an exclusive Boeing customer. The merged Delta has ordered the 737NG and A321ceo, with more NGs favored than ceos. But it hasn’t ordered any MAXes or NEOs at all. Another carrier with 757Ws flying the Atlantic, if Delta ordered the A321LR, it’s a certainty it, too, wouldn’t stop with a small sub-fleet. The A321LR would pave the way for a companion or follow-on order for more A321neos and/or A320neos.

Transactions such as these are the real danger to Boeing.

As for the prospect of a 737-10, it is, of course, technically feasible and our Market Intelligence confirms that Boeing is studying this possibility—just as Boeing continues to study a clean-sheet replacement for the 757 and 737 families in single-aisle or new light twin configurations. Boeing is being Boeing and exploring a wide variety of possibilities is what Boeing does. But the 737-10 would be band-aid solution to a much larger problem: Boeing has lost market share to Airbus in the single aisle sector. Market perception, as reflected in an audience poll at last September’s ISTAT European conference, now gives Airbus the edge in competitive single-aisle aircraft. Sales of the neo vs MAX give Airbus the solid lead, particularly at the high end of the sector.

A 737-10, with a new wing, near gear, a new engine, structural changes and most likely system upgrades, would require billions of dollars worth of investments—and quite possibly new certification from regulators. Entry into service, at best, would likely be the early 2020s, just before the launch of the new, clean sheet airplane with a target EIS of the 2030 date McNerney mentioned last year.

We have been reporting for a year that our Market Intelligence indicates Boeing will probably launch its next new airplane program around 2018 with an EIS of around 2025. This was reaffirmed earlier this month.

Our scenario is being refined to focus on what we are calling the “225/5000 Sector.” These figures represent a 225 seat, 5,000nm airplane which more broadly is the 200-240 seat, 4,500nm-5,000nm market. This Sector, by our definition, includes replacement of the 737-9, the 757 but also the somewhat larger market previously represented by the Airbus A300/A310s and Boeing 767-200ERs. The 787-8, with its 7,500nm range, is too much airplane for many of these markets.

As we reported last October, Boeing is looking at a simultaneous development of a new single aisle airplane and a new light twin, just as it did with the 757/767. We believe this is the route that will ultimately be chosen. We also believe, as with the 757-767, the twin aisle will be the first launched (around 2018), followed by the single aisle (around 2020). This protects the 737 MAX investment to some degree but begins to address the gap in Boeing’s product line.

We don’t assume the airplanes will be composite.

This scenario depends entirely on McNerney’s retirement, assumed to be in 2016, followed by a CEO who will have a different view for the future than McNerney.

We’re focusing on the 225/5000 Sector in a series of special reports this week and next, looking at a broader sector than “just” the 757 replacement. We’ve been reporting for up to two years on these issues, including saying that the 757 replacement has to include replacing the under-performing 737-9. As we’ve further assessed the market, it’s become clear to us that even this view must be expanded.

It’s gratifying to see others reach conclusions this week virtually parroting those we’ve reached during the past two years. But the key is to look toward the future, not the past.

39 Comments on “787-3, “737-10” no replacement for 757

  1. Produce the 757/767 with De-Tuned GenX power on the 767 line or revamp the 737 with a Modular wing with Severely De-Rated Gen X or updated CF56 with large-fan and thrust output.

    Either reasonable option will run Boeing 5-10 Billion. Being that current Operators love the 767/757 range and capabilities…………. either a revamped (new wing 737) or revamped 767 would keep Boeing competitive for decades and allow Carriers an affordable alternative to their specific needs for this (reduced annual- Passenger/Freight Load) specific market. Don’t forget; Air Canada was regularly using a 767 for the Vancouver to Tokyo Route until the recent 787 was instituted.

    • They loved the 767 so much that when the A330 got into its stride 767 sales more or less dried up, and they loved the 757 so much that no-one was buying it by the time the line closed. Both have had their day, get over it!

      • You might note that the 767 killed the A300/310, and the 767 sold 1000 examples and is still being produced in freighter version.

        Yes the A330 then in turn knocked the 767 off its perch (maybe not if better development route and a new wing and engines but..)

        The A330 was the move up in size we see.

        while a decent seller, it did not really go major (1000 plus built) until Boeings screw up on the 787.

        A good bird in the hand is better than one you can’t get.

        It not as simplistic as stated.

  2. Five years ago I suggested a more radical 737 upgrade. The most important mod being a new inner wing/wingbox to house a taller main landing gear and a new nose with taller nose gear too, to facilitate a bigger, better engine and improve rotation angle.


    What radical 737 upgrades assume however, is taht the fuselage is OK. Which it is not. It’s crampy for passenger, can take no containers and is fifties technology. Not something for the next 25 years.

    “Our Market Intelligence indicates that internally, Boeing hardly misses the point.”
    That is good to hear. Reading what Tinseth and McNerney communicate, “happy with where we sit” “Airbus just catching up” “need time to fully understand the airlines” sometimes makes me wonder if they lost touch with reality.

    Re A321, for many airlines the trade off will be if they want to NEO, LR or both. Has to do with future network flexibility, rest value (cargo conversion potential) and pice/ operating costs. If the latter two differ just a few percent, probably more A321LR’s then NEO’s will be sold.

    In my opinion the advertised range of 4000NM for the A321LR is on the low side for airlines like UA.

    3.5k, 4.0k and 4.5k NM ranges from ORD.

  3. Boeing have mismaneuvered into a corner. Strategy errors cost money and takes new top management blood to look through the haze and recover control. The question we may put to Chicago is “Is there a Pilot in this aircraft ?”

    The NSA + NLT binomial avenue takes 10 years from go-ahead + 12-15 G$ spending. It will take us into the post-2025 timeline. Immediately upon ATO, it will impact negatively upon MAX sales, because the immediate market perception will be “the MAX’es are obsolete !”

    Not that we didn’t know this, it was quite obvious, the MAX is obsolete in-the-egg ! But to hear the same message coming from the top in Chicago, that’s an entirely new story !

    ATO for NSA+NLT means preponderance for A32X NEO in the years up till EIS of the new Boeing airplanes. MAX sales will drop from 45 % to under 30 % of the feeder market. The delivery machine of Airbus for A32X NEO will spin at high RPM, reaching 65+ units/month.
    Meanwhile, Boeing worker employment will suffer chaos.

    Wouldn’t it be better for Boeing to patch the hole in the 757R tyre, by re-establishing sine die 787-3 as a high priority, with a drastic structural liposuction, scaled-up MAX engines, a new wing, smaller landing gears etc etc and ramp up drastically the 787 FAL throughput to come up with a re-optimised 4500-5000 nm 787-3 by 2019-20 ?

    • The massive liposurgeon on the 787 is maybe easier on a carbon aircraft than chem milling a alu alloy version. Moving from tape laying to large ply placing before the autoclave can be part of massive cost reduction and speedup. Making a composite aircraft can be much slower and more expensive than stamping/rolling out alu sections and using the automtic drilling and riveting robots. A regular pneumatic system and IDGs might be cheaper than the massive 787 electrical system and its Ham Sundstrand boxes and sufficient for 5000nm aircraft

    • This whole MoM debate is about the best break-point in terms of PAX between single- and twin-aisles.

      At around the 200-240 PAX mark, moving from single- to twin-aisle virtually doubles the list price and the fuel consumption, imposes a 50% more numerous crew and uses Code D Landing Gates in place of Code C.

      But, particularly on short, high-frequency stages, the time to load and unload PAX significantly increases turnaround times. Also, on longer stages, there is a perception that PAX prefer twin-aisles.

      To solve the first issue, what is to prevent airframers offering [and airports equipping to service] single-aisles with THREE exit doors – one midway down the cabin?

  4. Good piece. It would be interesting to read the comparative paths both A and B go through toward an all new product launch. Of course it involves internal studies, board buy off, early discussions with airlines, and then finally approval to finally offer a product to customers and public launch, but the coordination with suppliers, subcontractors (including engines and probably wings/”pre stuffed” fuselage sections etc.) must be a lengthy and drawn out process (based on 787 anyway, and A350 took just as long in development).

    The more I think about that process, and McNerney still being CEO, the more I wonder if his presence for another two years precludes a real/effective 2018 launch anyway. And if that conclusion is correct, could indicate why a “band aid” type of radical mod is still a plausible/favored outcome.

  5. “It would be interesting to read the comparative paths both A and B go through toward an all new product launch.”

    Yes, Leeham could also take a shot on Airbus 130-260 seat strategy 2020-2030, assuming introduction of a Boeing 7320 NSA by 2024, similar in size to the A320 but using new technology to make it 5-10% more efficient.

    IMO it very much depends if Boeing goes for an NLT too.
    Despite talk of the a 2-for the price of 1.5, two fuselages, two wings, two engines & certification programs means 2 aircraft= 2 x 10 Billion to me. No free rides.

    If they go for a big NSA covering up to 240 seats / 4000NM, that makes a lot of sense. However, it keeps the door open for Airbus to launch a smaller / lighter up to 200 seats, 2500 NM and 10% lighter/more fuel efficient platform a few years later. To grab most of the market.

    That’s why you don’t want to be a first mover.

    Airbus responds on Boeings A330 killer was bumping up production / lowering price while taking don’ts from the 787 project and developing a slightly larger, better platform taking out the 772/3 in the process.

    Boeing must avoid something similar happening to the 737/NSA.

    • Airbus would probably love for Boeing to give top priority to a 220-240 passenger, two aisle, 4000-5000 nm., .85 mach airplane to be launched in 2018 for 2025 service — especially if Boeing schedules their 737 MAX successor/ A320neo-beater for service a year or two later.

      Airbus could launch a new light weight, 200+ passenger (and not much cargo), two aisle, ~ 2000 nm (not 3000-3500), ~ .75 mach (not .8) airplane for 2024-2025 service — for the vastly large domestic passenger markets (domestic US, “domestic” Europe, “domestic” E. Asia).

      It would have passenger growth beyond and continuous improvement. This is the airplane class which would save global airline fleets by far the most gallons of fossil fuel and tons of CO2 emissions over the following 20 years — to help avoid excessive climate change (this century’s #1 problem). This class would also save by far the most tons of Nox emissions, decibels of noise and dollars of operating costs.

      Question: what will be airlines #1 focus by the end of this decade? Answer: reducing their fleet’s CO2 generation — getting the most bang for the buck.

      Seems to me that this is the airplane that Boeing should build first — and concentrate its talent and resources — for 2024-2025 service. Let the 4000-5000 nm , .85 airplane follow by a few years — if this is the best way to reduce airline fleet CO2 generation (which I doubt)

  6. How much to stretch the 737-7 or A320 a few meters to offer more optimal sizes on the low end?

    • I’ve been promoting an A320.5 for a decade so won’t now :\ It passed my mind on the -7. There’s a 6 meters/rows difference with the 737-8.
      If the -7 doesn’t sell & Boeing wants to escape the CS300 it might be considered.

      • Yes, the time for the A320.5, the 737-7.5, and A380-900 is now.
        History says don’t wait too long. In retrospect, to seize the opportunity, the stretches needed to happen earlier.
        747, 1985 not 2010
        757, 1990, and 5m for starters.
        767-400, 1994
        777, 6m stretch in 2005, not 2020 by which point the 777-8 was a redundant size by the A350.

  7. The (not so much) long distance A321 is a intent to cover up the fact that Airbus is not confident that the A330neo will not reach the data as offered

    Conversely, itis another fact that there is other high PAX relatively state of the art short distance aircraft. Thst finally ANA has not completed the aquistion of the already ordered B787-3 was due to their particular needs, which cannot be extrapolated to the market generally.

    And if the B787-3 were a new Aircraft the argument that at the present stage Boeing does not wish to developpe such would be understandable
    , but it is really an extension of th B787 serie with a lot work already done during the long period the Japanese Order was still in the books!

    By continuimg doing so Boeing would have a complete offering from the B787-3 to B787-10, completed by the also state of the art and quite compatible B777X and even the B747-8i (and F!)

    But obviously, Boeing is refusung to tell Scott its intentions regarding both (as he says!( its real assessment of the A321, much less regarding the B787-3!!

    • “But obviously, Boeing is refusing to tell Scott its intentions regarding both (as he says!) its real assessment of the A321, much less regarding the B787-3!!”

      Not entirely true. We wrote last October about Boeing’s product development studies in an interview with Boeing.

    • Thst finally ANA has not completed the aquistion of the already ordered B787-3 was due to their particular needs

      Not really. Boeing cancelled that variant at the time, after much speculation that they would, as ANA and JAL had already converted their orders to 787-8 and -9. Nobody has really asked for the 787-3 since, so it seems Boeing made the right call there.

  8. Maybe it’s just me, maybe it’s the fact that it’s 10:40pm here and I’m getting tired, but I just don’t buy core pieces of this. It’s a bit like the supposed NSA launch (that then turned into MAX) a few years ago all over again. It just doesn’t make sense to me.

    I do agree that the main threat to Boeing isn’t the A321LR as such, but the kind of package deals and follow-on orders it enables. Thing is: How this actually plays out remains to be seen and I think the danger shouldn’t be overstated, either.
    Based on that, I’d say yes the A321LR is a challenge to Boeing, and a tough one, but I don’t think it warrants an overreaction on Boeing’s part, either.

    What Leeham is suggesting here – NLT launch 2018 and NSA launch around 2020, definitely seems like an overreaction to the A321LR.

    Keep in mind:
    • MAX is losing out to NEO but is still selling at completely unprecedented levels, with completely unprecedented production rates planned. It’s actually doing OK. True, Boeing will be stuck with a ~40% share, but that’s of a ginormous (technical term) market.
    • Launching two programmes within two or three years of each other doesn’t mean launching (and paying) 1.5 programmes these days. It’s two programmes, and effectively running them side-by-side is a huge risk, and it’s Boeing’s single most important project (737 replacement) exposed to it. This isn’t just the 757/767 repeated.
    • Timing. The NLT will still be in early (expensive) development when NSA is launched. At that point, in ~2020, the 777X is only ramping up, 787 is still in forward loss, so the brunt of NLT and NSA has to be borne by MAX, which only EISed 3 years ago, and which is effectively made obsolete by the NSA launch. Useful production life of MAX would be limited to about 10 years, of which maybe 6 at full production rates. Seems crazy.
    • As both Boeing and Airbus have repeatedly stated, engine technology is going to be key for the next generation planes succeeding the 737 and A320. Yes, launching an NLT first in 2018 protects MAX (somewhat), but it also locks the type in with not that much of an advance in engine technology over NEO and MAX, making the NLT potentially easy prey (or a candidate for upgrades very early on) when NSA and Airbus’ A320 successor are launched.

    I’m unconvinced that all of these risks are justified in the face of the A321LR. Not at the moment, anyway. If in two years’ time, MAX is down to 20% market share with cancellations all over the shop, all thanks to the capabilities of the A321LR and its package-deal-enabling properties, I’ll change my mind.
    Absent that happening, I stick with my (boring) prediction that Boeing is quite content with 40% of a huge market. Thus, Airbus and Boeing will both launch their 737/A320 replacements (probably led by Boeing) in or around the early 2020s with an EIS in or around 2030. Even that gives MAX a production life of only about 15 years, the shortest of any 737 revision I believe.

    Sure, as an enthusiast, I’d like to see a new light twin developed rather than just the next gen single aisle planes. I’m not holding my breath, though.

    • The 737-Max isn’t a long-term solution and just sitting and waiting never played out well for any of the big Airplane Manufactures.

      IMO Leeham has it on the Point and there is now alternative. Yes, it’s a total of 20$ but the only Logical and long-term step. They may wait a Little longer between the NLT and the NSA.

      But anything else won’t play out. To build a NSA from 200 Pax 2000 nm Optimum to 260 Pax 5000 nm won’t work in any way, especially if you start with the big one.

      The NLT with high-load intra-Asia capacities allows BOEING not only to hit the A321LR – that’s the smallest part – but to kill all up to a 787-8 which will vanish anyway including really big pressure to the A330neo.

      The 737-8max will do fine at least until 2025 when the NSA starts to become reality. Wait 10 years is just not working and never will. Like MD11, A340-500/600, A350 V1 and so one.

      It may be uncomfortable to pay the big bill but’s the only way.

  9. Well written and its what I have thought for some time.

    Interesting on the composites take, not a full given but I would think the light twin.

    Also spot on in ignoring what the A321 can do for new markets, if a 787 can open them up then an A321LR can do the same in its segments.

  10. Agreed with all of keesje comments. I’d add that looking at the “two for the price of 1.5” dovetails w the issue of product launch process analysis/chronology. In Boeing’s case in particular the niche(s) seem to have to be below 788 and I’d guesstimate there would not be a simultaneous public launch of the two member family (nor was this done or even wholly planned for the 757 and 767).

    My best uneducated guess is that no full program sequence details will be be unveiled without forcing the competitor to commit to a specific set of counter product(s) and, perhaps uniquely this time, engine/supply chain partners.

  11. Focusing on one thing, offering a better new aircraft than the 737-9 or A321, 200 pass. for 1 to 4 hour flights that fits in a 36m gate. What’s that look like? What’s the most efficient system for baggage considering transfers, containers or loose. Did United use containers on their A320s?

  12. I think Leeham is right in that currently the market from 140-225 is served by a single aircraft. There seems to be two major segments though. One, is under 1500 miles that requires short turnover and multiple segments in a day. The second is a larger medium legged higher performance plane of say 200-250 seats.

    I would bet that the NLT can be optimized for this with a significant advantage over the 321 neo and the NSA can be optimized for this with a significant advantage over the 320 neo.

    My guess would be a fuselage system that is common to both (6/7), with wings that are optimized to specific engines designed for the two different missions.

  13. Why would the US taxpayers subsidize a bank for low interest loans for foreign carriers and not US carriers. That is ludicrous in nature. Rename it the aircraft bank and give low interest loans on all US assembled aircraft. Either that or the US airlines need to set up a leasing company in the Cayman Islands for all their aircraft purchases.

  14. I think early next decade, maybe earlier, Airbus will launch a new aircraft for customers serving city pairs between 4000 and 8000 km with 200-300 passengers in 2-3 class configurations. Key markets will be intra Asia, EMEA, Americas and Transatlantic.


    Positioned between the smaller A322 and A350-900, it replaces the A300, A310, 767, A330 and 787-8 on medium haul flights. Later in the decade Airbus will focus on the ART project (Advanced Regional Transport) to replace the A320 series.


    Message: the assumption Airbus will wait & see is based on nothing. If they see a market, they move. Again.

  15. Ten billions and more ? What kind of new technologies Boeing and Airbus will be able to develop with the NSA and NLT in 2020-2025 ? A plastic fuselage ? More electrical functions ?And what would these new technologies will be very superior to the Bombardier CSeries ? For what type of benefit ? P & W has already announced that it was a more fuel savings of over 15 % with its Pure Power over the next ten years, so .. I hardly believe in more efficient aircraft for A & B with rotors or not…

  16. It would be interesting to know how far an A321 with folding wing tips could fly.

    Would it be possible to feed the Leeham-calculator with sufficient data?

    • John Leahy has already dissed the 777X folding wing tip, so that’s the best indication, that’s what Airbus will eventually do!

  17. Could they re-wing a 787-3? It wouldn’t be the most elegant solution, but is it a practical one?

  18. Boeing’s problem is the big gap in capacity and range between the Max 8 and 788 (discounting the marginal Max 9). Absent something new from B the A 321 and potential A 322 own this realm.

    While the A 320 series aircraft are a bit more comfortable than the 737, the fact is that the 3 + 3 single aisle aircraft is is not a great place to spend 1 to 7 or 8 hours.

    The economics may not allow it but a 2+2+2 twin aisle, even with 737 width seats would be so much more comfortable it would (IMHO) be a real game changer. No middle seats. 4 out of every 6 seats are aisle seats and the others are window seats! First/business class can be 1+2+1, all aisle seats! Also 1+1+1 for a fancy first class. EIS in mid 2020s

    This plane, with fuselage length(s) to seat high 100s to mid 200s and a wing to allow real 4000 (or more?) nm range, would replace the Max 9 and be far more desirable (to the passengers!) than the A 321/322 and nibble at the A-330 200 neo market). But it would not replace the Max8 , where the great bulk of the 737 sales are, and which competes well with the A-320 neo.

    The Max 8 replacement then would (and could) wait until the end of the 2020s and could be a new single aisle or (hopefully?) the 2+2+2 fuselage with a smaller wing.

    • To go slighly bigger at 7-abreast, but stay narrower than the 767 and only take LD3-45 will make it much more economically and also allow it to fit better into the existing “gap” between the A231 and the 787-8 (-9 eventually).
      There would also be less danger to get to much pressure from an A322 because that plan will be more capable. Higher intra-Asia travel too. The only donside is to not really build much pressure on the A321, but something has to give. I expect them so take this road IF (!) the build a new LTA.

    • Quote/ a 2+2+2 twin aisle, even with 737 width seats would be so much more comfortable /Unquote

      The 737-class double seat is 40.0″ wide, so your 2+2+2 cabin measures 0.6″ x 2 (sidewall clearances) + 40.0 x 3 + 19″ x 2 (aisles) = 159.2″ … the C919 measures 153.5″ ie, staggering the double-seats we save 3 x 2″ (armrest separators) and 159.2 – 6 = 153.2″ < 153.5".

      Conclusion : COMAC can offer Thompson-staggered C919 in the 2+2+2 configuration @ 737 seat normative for the cushion width (17"). Alternatively, 1+3+2 and 1+4+1 would also fit …

  19. The tactical question in the next generation feeder issue is WHO SHOOTS FIRST ? We have 73X NG vs A32X ceo today. Soon we’ll have MAX vs NEO. Then comes what, when, by whom ??? He of A or B who shoots first, comes out in the light into the collimateur (cross-hairs), an easy target for nº 2 to come up with a corrective, improved, better adjusted shot …

    It is for this reason URGENT to move forward cautiously ! For the 757R problematique, the danger is that Boeing might be tempted to play out into the open field too early, getting caught revealing its next generation feeder strategy before Airbus, vulnerable to being out-designed by its competitor.

    What Boeing needs to do is GAIN TIME, ie PATCH the leak to A321 sine die, without shooting a shot into their own foot by cutting the grass under the MLG of the 737 MAX.

    Of the three available patch-jobs (767 MAX revival, 787-3 super-Lite MAX or 757 MAX retrofit useful life extension) all of which do not interfere with the MAX, only 787-3 offers LD3 cargo handling, whilst 757 retrofitting would be the cheapest solution (D-check + cabin refurbish + MAX retrofit + winglets + tweaks = 25 – 45 M$ pending scope) to buy another 8 to 12 years economic life extension. Personally I’d discard the 767 revival (LD2 ?) as I have discarded up-front the 737-10 approach on budgetary premises … Concerning the 787-3, there is evidently a question of FAL arbitration between 783, 788 and 789 : which of the three would give best chances to quickly resorb the gigantic 787 cost-bubble ?

  20. After the A350 and A320/A330 NEO version entered full production later this decade, Airbus can focus on the middel of the market.

    To fill the gab between a A322 and the A350-900 a dedicated platform would probably be 2-3-2 with 18 inch wide seats and extra wide aisle.

    8 Abreast would make it a widebody, less suitable for efficient medium range operations.

    The A360 would probably be 2-3-2 building on A350 composites panel technology while keeping intact cockpit commonality with the A320 family.


    Service entry somewhere in the 2020s giving airlines a choice between GTF and RR 40-50 klbs engines.

  21. While I do not agree with Hazy on a lot (or more accurately I think he analyses purely from his perspective and not what is good for the Industry which is fine but if you manage to drive the industry (Airbus and Boeing) into destruction what have you got left? i.e. he dissed what may prove to be a very successful A330 upgrade to force Airbus into an expensive and yet to be seen success for the A350


    • Without the A350 Airbus widebody strategy would be in dire straits. The A330neo/A350Mk1 just won’t do the job against a 787. No need for Boeing to even do the 777x. That’s ridiculous.

      Yes, clean sheets are very very expensive today but their is just no alternative at a certain point of a frame (747, A340, 767). Anyway both A&B are making money. It’s just that they like to cash-in like 80% of surplus to the stakeholders.

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  23. Its bad luck that the 757 reached the end of the line without a step change in available engines are we are seeing today. Would the GTF is about 10K shy of powering the 757, but I suppose that is how far fuel efficiency and airplane construction has come.

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