Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 25. June 6, 2025
- New RISE powerplant benefits from decades of GE research and development June 5, 2025
- Engine makers emphasizing durability, reliability June 4, 2025
- Boeing CEO: Lessons learned are key to certification of 737-7/10 and 777X June 2, 2025
- Digital twin is a key to JetZero’s hopes for Blended Wing Body entry June 2, 2025
Embraer goes for growth after ‘solid’ 2023
Subscription required
By Tom Batchelor
March 18, 2023, © Leeham News
A strengthening order backlog and an uptick in deliveries helped Embraer turn a profit last year.
In a call with investors as the company outlined its 2023 earnings results, Francisco Gomes Neto, president and CEO of Embraer, said commercial activity had “intensified” over the last 12 months, with “solid demand” across its markets.
Unsurprisingly, Embraer has felt the effects of supply chain delays buffeting the entire industry (though it said not as acutely as in 2022). The company still managed to deliver a total of 181 jets, up from 160 in 2022.
Of those, 64 were commercial aircraft, 115 were executive jets (74 light and 41 medium, helped by the strong performance of the Phenom 300) and two were military C-390s. E2 family deliveries more than doubled year-on-year, from 19 to 39 in 2023.
The recent firm order from American Airlines for 90 E175s, with purchase rights for 43 additional jets, had resulted in a “great start to 2024”, Neto added.
Revenues totaled $1.975bn in the fourth quarter and $5.269bn across 2023, which was 16% higher than in 2022 but at the lower end of the guidance range for the year.
In 2023 as a whole, the company reported adjusted EBIT of $350m, with adjusted EBIT and EBITDA margins of 6.6% and 10.7%. Adjusted EBIT stood at $181.7m in 4Q23, with adjusted EBIT and EBITDA margins of 9.2% and 12.8%, respectively.
Looking ahead to 2024, Embraer said total company revenues would sit in the $6 to $6.4bn range, with an adjusted EBIT margin of between 6.5% and 7.5%.
When does a larger airliner pay off? Part 2
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
March 14, 2024, © Leeham News: We are doing an article series about what drove the cross-over from Airbus A319 to A320 and then to A321. We start with the ceo range to understand at what passenger numbers did a route support the A319 versus the A320 and A321.
The same change in airliner size happened for the Boeing 737, but we will limit the investigation to the Airbus range as the modern variants, 737 MAX 7 and 10, are not yet in service.
We will use our Airliner Performance and Cost Model (APCM) to model typical sectors and see at what load factors the economics favor a switch.
Figure 1. The Airbus A320ceo with it’s characteristic wing fences. Source: Airbus.
Summary:
- We develop the Passenger Mile Costs for the different A320ceo variants, A319, A320 and A321.
- Then, we gradually lower the number of passengers transported on the A320 and A321 until we have the same Passenger Mile Costs for all variants. This shows how many more passengers a route must support to motivate a switch to a larger model.
Airbus and Boeing need each other for healthy supply chain
Subscription required
By Dan Catchpole
March 11, 2024, © Leeham News: In the public arena, Boeing is flailing. It’s the subject of public rebukes by government officials, a new criminal investigation by the US Department of Justice, and a seemingly endless stream of scathing headlines.
However, executives at its European counterpart, Airbus, are not celebrating Boeing’s struggles.
“Airbus needs Boeing,” said Joe Marcheschi, director of flying parts procurement services for Airbus Americas. “Disruption, and turmoil in the supply chain hurts Airbus, too.”
The industry’s supply chain depends in large part on the two aerospace giants—which means, indirectly, Boeing and Airbus need each other.
Instability at the airplane makers may in some sense have furthered this interdependence by prompting many suppliers dependent on one OEM to diversify by supplying both companies and by looking outside commercial aerospace.
Summary:
- Suppliers’ efforts to diversify beyond one OEM have deepened interdependence.
- Labor, materials are among biggest supply chain challenges.
- Airbus supporting suppliers to solve bottlenecks.
When does a larger airliner pay off
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
March 7, 2024, © Leeham News: Over the last decades, the choice of domestic market airliners has gone from the typical 120-seater to today 200 seats or more. We will look into what drives these decisions and where the cross-over points are from, say, an Airbus A319 to A320 and then to A321. We will limit the investigation to the Airbus range as the Boeing 737 MAX range has still not their MAX 7 and MAX 10 in service.
We will use our Airliner Performance and Cost Model (APCM) to model typical sectors and investigate what load factors favor a switch.
Summary:
- The typical domestic cabins have gone from 120 to 150 seats to now 200 seats or above.
- As airliner types grow, their trip costs increase. At what load factors can you motivate an A321 instead of an A320?
Machinists want new Boeing contract ensuring work for decades to come
Subscription required
By Dan Catchpole
Updated 2:35 p.m., March 4, 2024
The IAM 741 began promoting a strike fund for 2024 Boeing contract negotiations in 2019. Source: IAM 751.
March 1, 2024 © Leeham News: When representatives from Boeing and the Seattle-area machinists union start formal negotiations on Friday, the context will be a world apart from when they bargained the existing contract 10 years ago. Back then, Boeing management had a new airplane program (777X) as leverage and exploited an internal fight in the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers to push through a concession-laden contract.
Now, Boeing is battered after years of self-inflicted crises, a pandemic and problem-riddled supply chain, and, after decades of defeats, labor has scored major victories around the country, especially in aerospace.
Head of District Lodge 751 Jon Holden told Leeham News & Analysis during a recent interview that he is determined to get back what was taken from the roughly 31,000 members he represents in the Puget Sound area.
The union wants better work-life balance, better pay and retirement benefits, and guarantees that will keep it healthy for years to come.
Given its ongoing struggles, Boeing can little afford to alienate the union representing the vast majority of people assembling its commercial jetliners, industry analysts say.
However, Boeing management and the IAM have had a rocky relationship since workers at the company organized in 1935. In the past 20 years, company leadership has taken a hard line against organized labor and repeatedly pushed for concessions despite banking substantial profits and spending billions on share buybacks.
Summary
- Unions are resurgent in tight labor market
- Analysts: Boeing can’t afford a labor unrest
- Talks breakdown between SPEEA, Boeing over Tech and Safety Pilots contract
- Boeing firefighters reject latest offer
Boeing’s program accounting reduce future profits
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
February 29, 2024, © Leeham News: Boeing published the results for 2023 on the 1st of February. It reported a loss of $2.2bn, compared with a loss of $5.0bn for 2022.
Experienced industry analysts know these results do not reflect the company’s state, neither for 2023 nor for 2022. The reason is Boeing uses so-called program accounting for the production costs of its Commercial Aircraft programs. Based on Boeing data, the loss for 2023 would have been at least $3bn higher using classical accounting methods.
The program accounting idea is to average the high initial cost per produced unit of a new aircraft program with the lower production costs of units later in the program. Thus it smooths the reported profits for a new aircraft program.
It has recently been used to “smooth” reported results of troubled aircraft programs, like the 737 MAX. The drawback is that once the troubles are gone, the negative effects on the company’s future profits are not. We will use the 737 MAX troubles to show the effect of this variant of program accounting.
Picture of a 737 MAX production experiencing problems. Source; Boeing and Leeham Co.
Summary:
- Boeing increased the 737 Max deferred production cost pushed to future payment by 730% between the end of 2018 and the end of 2023.
- The result of this way of using program accounting to reduce what is shown today is that future profits of the 737 MAX program will be reduced by almost a billion dollars per year during the next 10 years.
Carrots and sticks needed to achieve sustainability goals, says Airbus
Subscription Required
By Tom Batchelor
February 22, 2024, © Leeham News: The sustainability challenge is redefining the aerospace industry in all sorts of ways.
An Airbus A350-1000 is refuelled with a 35% blend of SAF prior to its participation at the 2024 Singapore Airshow’s flying display. Credit: Airbus
For Airbus, which spent €3.2bn on research and development last year, that comes in the form of clean-sheet designs for hydrogen-powered aircraft that promise to reduce in-flight carbon emissions to zero. The European planemaker’s ambition is to bring to market the world’s first such commercial aircraft by 2035.
But Airbus is also working on a successor to the A320 family, referred to as the “next-generation single-aisle” aircraft. At the company’s full-year briefing on February 15, more details were revealed about the aircraft, including confirmation that it would run entirely on Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF).
“We’re working on technology to develop the next short-to-medium range aircraft before the end of the next decade, which will be capable of flying up to 100% SAF,” Julie Kitcher, Airbus’ chief sustainability officer, told LNA in Toulouse. “It will be much more fuel efficient, but also feature a new wing design and new materials; we’re working on a lifecycle approach to this aircraft.” Read more
Airbus’s orders at risk
Subscription Required
By Judson Rollins
Introduction
Feb. 19, 2023, © Leeham News: After last week’s release of Airbus’s 2023 financial results, we undertake our annual analysis of at-risk deals on the OEM’s books.
Airbus has outstanding orders from airlines where there is a material probability that some won’t translate into deliveries. Most resulted from airlines with financial difficulties, but some were related to contractual disputes. When deliveries are delayed beyond a set period, usually 12 months, the customer can cancel orders if the delays are unexcused. Boeing flags such orders as subject to an ASC 606 accounting rule adjustment.
Unlike Boeing, Airbus isn’t subject to the ASC 606 accounting standard, so it only discloses the nominal value of its total adjusted order book in its annual report – but not at-risk orders by program.
LNA analyzed Airbus’s order books in July 2020, November 2020, August 2021, February 2022, August 2022, and December 2022 to identify at-risk orders and develop an apples-to-apples comparison. The above links explain our methodology.
Summary
- Airbus is more prone to country- and carrier-specific risks than geopolitical.
- Order risk threatens to push Airbus’s market share even higher.
- Airbus single-aisle order risk is mainly driven by low-cost carrier exposure.
- Widebody order risk is a mix of long-deferred orders and regional problems.
Ryanair, Southwest, United take biggest hit from FAA cap on 737 MAX production
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 16, 2024, © Leeham News: When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) put a freeze on Boeing 737 production rates at the currently approved 38/mo level, LNA revealed that hundreds of orders will face delivery delays. Boeing faces even greater delays than the 38/mo production level suggests, however.
As LNA reported, and confirmed by several aerospace analysts, Boeing’s true production rate for the 737 was 31 per month and even lower—as little as around 20 per month in some periods. The balance of deliveries came from its large inventory of 737 MAXes built during the first nine months of the 21-month grounding of the aircraft.
With Boeing’s full year 2023 delivery data now available, LNA looked at 2024 deliveries that were planned before the Jan. 5 Alaska Airlines 737-9 MAX emergency door plug blew off Flight 1282 on climb out from Portland (OR).
The incident was characterized as an accident due to the nature of the event and damage to the airplane. Nobody died and there were only minor injuries. The decompression at about 16,000 ft. damaged the door surround at row 26 on the left side. The door plug separated from the airplane and was found in a wooded area a few days later. There was damage throughout the 737’s cabin and the cockpit door was ripped off its mountings.
The pilots landed the airplane a few minutes later in Portland.
Production rates below Boeing’s claim, low supplier confidence
Subscription Required
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may have told Boeing it won’t allow product rate increases on the 737 MAX lines, or the addition of the North Line at Everett (WA) until it’s satisfied production quality is under control.
But as LNA first wrote upon this news, Boeing’s production is well below the currently approved 38 per month. We pointed out that Boeing was consistently struggling last year to roll 31 MAXes out of the factory—and often, the number was substantially below 31.
Sometimes the number of newly produced 737s was less than 20 a month, reports one consultant who tracks the production.
Technically, the FAA can’t stop Boeing from producing more 737s than the 38 per month cap. It doesn’t have this authority, reports Aviation Week. But the FAA is the responsible party for issuing individual aircraft airworthy certificates as the 737s are ready for delivery to airlines and lessors. And, according to AvWeek, the FAA won’t issue more than 38 certificates a month.
The FAA suspended Boeing’s so-called ticketing authority for the MAX before the airplane was recertified following the 21 month grounding beginning in March 2019. This suspension was extended to the 787 when production and quality control problems were discovered at the Charleston (SC) assembly plant.
Several aerospace analysts following Boeing pointed out that Boeing hasn’t produced 38 MAXes a month and, like LNA reported, it’s struggled to meet even the previously advertised rate of 31/mo.
Figure 1. Cirium plotted the actual new production deliveries vs the advertised production rates for Airbus and Boeing single-aisle aircraft.
The consultancy Cirium charted the actual deliveries by Boeing (and by Airbus) for their respective single-aisle aircraft.