Leeham News and Analysis
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Systems, trades, materials and engines for Boeing’s next airplane
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By Scott Hamilton
Part 3
Bryan Yutko, Boeing’s VP of Product Development. Credit: Leeham News.
April 16, 2026, © Leeham News: As Boeing considers its next new airplane, whatever it is, there is a plethora of issues that must be considered.
Last week’s article outlined a high-level view of Boeing’s future airplane programs. Today, LNA details some specifics that Boeing must consider before launching a new airplane program.
Bryan Yutko, the VP of Product Development at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, declined to address any questions about new airplane development. However, at the retiree meeting of the Pacific Northwest chapter of AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) last month, Yutko discussed some of the issues Boeing faces in the coming years.
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New technology for Boeing’s next new airplane
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By Scott Hamilton
Part 2
Brian Yutko, VP of Product Development for Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Credit: Leeham News.
April 13, 2026, © Leeham News: As Boeing considers its next new airplane, whatever it is, there is a plethora of issues that must be considered.
Last week’s article outlined a high-level view of Boeing’s future airplane programs. Today, LNA details some specifics that Boeing must consider before launching a new airplane program.
Brian Yutko, the VP of Product Development at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, declined to address any questions about new airplane development. However, at the retiree meeting of the Pacific Northwest chapter of AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) last month, Yutko discussed some of the issues Boeing will face in the coming years.
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Boeing’s next airplane will eventually come; what will it be?
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By Scott Hamilton
Part 1
April 9, 2026, © Leeham News: CEO Kelly Ortberg has been clear: there won’t be any new airplane program launched until the airlines are ready, the technology is ready, and Boeing is ready.
Ortberg became CEO of The Boeing Co. on Aug. 8, 2024. One of his first decisions was to kill the research and development of a concept called the X-66A, the moniker for a Transonic Truss Brace Wing (TTBW) single-aisle airliner that could replace the 737 MAX in the coming decade.
However, he said that Boeing, coupled with NASA, would continue to research and develop an advanced wing for a new, highly efficient airplane. NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has a long history of partnering with Boeing to evaluate new aerospace development.
Ortberg’s decision to kill the X-66A demonstrator project reversed a decision by the man he replaced, David Calhoun, who was the TTBW’s leading proponent within Boeing. Calhoun became CEO in January 2020 when his predecessor, Dennis Muilenburg, was fired during the prolonged 737 MAX crisis.
Figure 1. The Boeing-NASA concept X-66A TTBW airplane. Source: NASA.
One of Calhoun’s first decisions was to kill the R&D project of a New Midmarket Airplane (NMA), a twin-aisle design roughly the same dimensions as the Boeing 767-200ER and -300ER. The NMA had been under study since at least 2012. Muilenburg was on the path to seek board approval to launch this program in 2019, when the MAX was grounded by global regulators. Calhoun, the lead director, didn’t support the plane. With Boeing’s cash-cow 737 grounded, Calhoun used the crisis to kill the NMA. Given the billions of dollars in losses Boeing was and would incur, the decision was an obvious one.
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Boeing, once the king of freighters, falls behind Airbus going forward
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By Scott Hamilton and Bjorn Fehrm
April 2, 2026, © Leeham News: Boeing is no longer “freighter king.”
The March 16 order by cargo carrier Atlas Air for 20 A350Fs gives Airbus a 60% market share of orders for the next generation of freighters. Since the dawn of the jet age, Boeing has had a lock on jet airliner freighters. It vanquished Douglas Aircraft Co and its successor, McDonnell Douglas. Airbus had modest success with the new build A300-600F, with about 100 ordered. But Airbus bombed with the new production A330-200F; only 38 were sold.
Figure 1. The backlog of new generation freighter orders gives Airbus a 60% market share. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
However, Airbus now has 101 orders for the A350F. Boeing has just 68 for the competing 777-8F. This is a far cry from the 359 777F Classics, based on the 777-200LR, that have been ordered. There are 47 in the backlog. Production will conclude at the end of next year due to emissions standards that the old generation 777F does not meet. Boeing asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption to build 35 more. It requested a decision by May 1.
Figure 2. Boeing dominated the jet freighter market from the 1960s. The recent, old generation freighter market was still overwhelmingly owned by Boeing. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
Additionally, Boeing sold 288 767-300ERFs. There are 18 in the backlog. Production concludes at the end of next year.
How did Boeing lose its overwhelming dominance in the freighter market? How did Airbus overtake Boeing, as it did in the early 2000s in the passenger airplane arena?
The answers about Boeing rest in a combination of negative fallout from the 737 MAX crisis, a suspension of production of the 787, shifting priorities and Boeing’s inbred arrogance.
For Airbus, the answer lies in the tortoise-and-hare analogy and a willingness to listen to potential customers more than Boeing did in key campaigns.
Boeing’s Starliner history shows safety, quality concerns exist systemically across the company
Editor’s Note: The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) on Feb. 19 released its investigative report of the failures in 2024 of the Boeing Starliner space vehicle. Defects in the Starliner resulted in its crew being housed in the International Space Station for nine months before being returned to earth in a SpaceX capsule.
Boeing Starliner, docked at the International Space Station. Source: Boeing.
The investigation into the failures faulted NASA and Boeing. The 311 page report was triggered by the Starliner incident, and examines the NASA-Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) cultures that led to the Starliner problems. The Boeing Co. is engaged in high profile efforts to change the culture at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA). The Starliner incidents reveal similar cultural and safety issues at BDS that corporate CEO Kelly Ortberg must address.
The NASA report may be downloaded here: nasa-Starliner report 021926
In this Special Report, LNA dissects the NASA study. The shortcomings at BDS are eerily similar to those at BCA.
Special Report
By the Leeham News Team
Three Disasters
Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines
The first Boeing 737-8 delivered, in May 2017, which happened to be to Lion Air. Source: Leeham News.
March 30, 2026, (c) Leeham News: On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610—a Boeing 737 MAX 8—crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 aboard. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a flight control system that Boeing had withheld information about from airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—including its existence and how it works—drove the aircraft into an unrecoverable dive.
The pilots had never been trained on it because Boeing determined that disclosing MCAS would require simulator training, which would make the MAX less competitive against the Airbus A320neo. Southwest Airlines, for example, which ordered hundreds of MAXes, required Boeing to pay $1m per airplane if simulator training was required.
Less than five months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed under virtually identical circumstances. It was another MAX 8 with another MCAS-driven dive. Another 157 people were killed. Combined death toll: 346 passengers and crew, plus one recovery diver in the Lion Air accident. The global fleet was grounded for 21 months.
Congressional investigations revealed what investigators called Boeing’s “culture of concealment” and the FAA’s systematic overreliance on Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) for self-certification. While federal government agencies routinely designate company employees to represent the overseeing agencies, the level of the FAA’s hand-off to Boeing came under withering criticism.
Following the long recovery period, the FAA clamped down on Boeing’s production of the 737 and to a lesser extent (and for different reasons), production of the 787. By late 2022, Boeing executives appeared confident that BCA was on the path to normal operations.
The state of alternative propulsion aircraft? Part 9.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 26, 2026, © Leeham News: In our series on the state of alternative propulsion projects, we are looking at different hydrogen-fueled propulsion systems.
Hydrogen can be processed chemically in a fuel cell to produce electrical power, which is then coupled to an electrical propulsion system, such as in hybrids or battery-electric aircraft. The advantage is that the system eliminates inefficient batteries that kill these systems.
Figure 1. The 100-seat fuel cell airliner is now Airbus’ ZEROe alternative. Source: Airbus.
The other alternative is to burn hydrogen in a gas turbine’s combustor. The advantage is that we keep the high power-to-mass ratio of a gas turbine, but with a heavier, more complicated fuel system, and use a lighter fuel than Jet Fuel/SAF.
We first dive deeper into the fuel cell-based variant.
Commercial Engine OEM: Not for the faint of heart. Or the cash-poor.
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By Karl Sinclair
Updated with March 20, 2026, oil prices.
March 23, 2026, © Leeham News: Airlines and lessors around the world are clamouring for their aircraft, which have been ordered and scheduled for delivery years in advance.
As the Trump Administration begins to cobble together an economic plan to combat rising oil prices due to the Iran war, this is especially true in the narrow-body segment, where fuel-efficient aircraft are badly needed.
The IATA fuel price monitor has jet fuel selling at $197/bbl for the week ending March 20, 2026, which applies more pressure on OEMs to deliver aircraft to customers. This is up from a low of $93 a barrel just five weeks prior.
Source: IATA.
While both aircraft manufacturing behemoths, Airbus (AB) and Boeing (BA), struggled to meet their respective master production schedules, one common thread emerges that affects both in the same manner:
Engine makers cannot keep up, even in the best of times.
Across the globe, all the engine producers face their own supply-chain and technology issues. It does not matter if the producer is North American-based, European, or Asian.
Powerplants are a tricky proposition, even for the most established engine-maker.
This begs the question:
Why doesn’t someone new enter the market and pick up the slack in production? If not someone new, how about a current aviation industry corporation, with an installed engineering base, who can invest and transition into commercial engines?
The state of alternative propulsion aircraft? Part 8.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 19, 2026, © Leeham News: In our series on the state of alternative propulsion projects, we have analysed electric hybrid projects and found that these do not make for an operationally acceptable airliner. They are more expensive in production, thus in purchase, and their operational costs are not lower than the aircraft they shall replace.
Projects analyze hybrids after realizing that battery-electric airliners are too limited in range. But soon, the problem areas of hybrids become clear. The studies then swing to hydrogen propulsion systems.
Figure 1. The Airbus ZEROe hydrogen-fueled concepts for a future airliner. Source: Airbus.
These have new technical challenges but produce aircraft with operationally acceptable range. We now examine the various concepts for hydrogen-fueled propulsion and outline their challenges and capabilities.
Change Incorporation, Configuration Control, and the High Cost of Getting It Wrong
Editor’s note: Boeing spent years doing rework on the 737 MAX and the 787 after the former’s grounding following two fatal crashes and the latter’s production flaws. “Shadow factories” began the 737’s rework after the 21-month grounding was terminated in November 2020. The last of 450 airplanes was delivered in 2025. Deliveries of the 787 were suspended in October 2020; 110 aircraft needed rework. The last of this inventory was cleared in 2025. This work is also known as “Change Incorporation.” Thirty-five 737 MAX 7s and 10s have been built and await certification, which idepends on design changes that must be retrofitted once the Federal Aviation Administration signs off. Change incorporation took 3-4 months for the 787s and was measured in months for the 737s.
More than 30 777-9s have been built while this program awaits FAA certification. This, too, will require Change Incorporation. Boeing has not revealed what changes the FAA will require, although revised flight control software is known to be one element. Nor has Boeing revealed how long Change Incorporation for the 777-9s will take.
LNA’s news team explains what Change Incorporation is, how it is undertaken, and the implications for the 777-9s in inventory.
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By the Leeham News Team
March 18, 2026, © Leeham News: In the commercial aviation industry, building aircraft before the type certificate is formally issued is not unusual. It is an economic necessity.
Undelivered Boeing 777-9s (among other aircraft) are lined up in open-air storage in this undated 2025 Google Earth photo of Paine Field, Everett (WA). The 777s are the “green” airplanes, though more are also painted in other colors.
Launching a production line months or years before final regulatory approval allows manufacturers to meet early delivery commitments, recoup development investment more quickly, and maintain customer relationships. But this strategy carries a profound and often underestimated technical liability: when the approved design specification continues to evolve through flight test, the already-built airframes must be brought into conformance with the final certified configuration. This is the essence of the Change Incorporation process.
The Boeing 777X program offers the most current illustration of this challenge. As of early 2026, Boeing has assembled more than 30 777-9 airframes, all built to early-production standards, while the aircraft’s type certificate is still in progress.
At the same time, the January 2024 in-flight separation of a door plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282—an event traceable directly to failures in Boeing’s parts removal and reinstallation process—has thrown the Change Incorporation process into the spotlight.
These two stories are connected by a single systemic thread: the consequences of inadequate configuration discipline in a complex, multi-stakeholder manufacturing environment.
Air Lease merger this year creates new lessor powerhouse
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By Karl Sinclair
March 16, 2026, © Leeham News: Aircraft lessor giant Air Lease Corporation (ALC) of Los Angeles (CA) closed the books on 2025 and reported record figures.
In early 2026, the company will cease to exist. The Sumitomo Corporation, SMBC Aviation Capital, Apollo, and Brookfield funds are expected to acquire Air Lease Corporation for $7.4bn in the early part of this year and rebrand it the Sumisho Air Lease Corporation (SALC). SALC will be a new powerhouse lessor that Airbus, Boeing, and the engine makers will be dealing with.
According to ALC, Air Lease Class A common stockholders will receive $65 in cash for each share of Class A common stock of Air Lease held immediately prior to the effective time of the merger.
SMBC will then service most of Sumisho Air Lease Corp.’s fleet, significantly expanding its service portfolio.
Thus, the world’s second-largest commercial aircraft lessor will be born, as the third and fourth largest lessors merge (by fleet size in the 2025 Airfinance Global annual lessors analysis), second only to Aercap of Dublin (IR).
Source: Airfinance Global 2025 Annual Lessor Report.