Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 28. June 27, 2025
- Parent agency, FAA often at odds as politics outweighs safety June 26, 2025
- Electric Flight and the Ugly Duckling June 25, 2025
- Engine makers tout “Plan A” but have “Plan B” backups in R&D June 23, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 27. June 20, 2025
787 fuel burn, GEnx and how it relates to LEAP-1B
787 fuel burn: Aviation Week has this story about the early fuel burn results for the Boeing 787 beating expectations (which admittedly were tamped down because of the program difficulties). Some of this has been reported before. What caught our eye was the detail about the GEnx engine. Why? Because the CFM LEAP-1B derives much of its technology from the GEnx, including the higher temperatures fleetingly referenced in the AvWeek piece.
CFM is relying on high temperatures to achieve the fuel burn required by Boeing’s 737 MAX. This is hotly debated (pun intended) between CFM and Pratt & Whitney in the competition between the LEAP and the PW GTF.
CFM advocates that its hotter-running engine, equipped with advanced technology ceramics and other advanced materials, gives it the advantage over PW’s Geared Turbo Fan technology. PW argues that the hotter CFM engine will require more maintenance. Engineers that we ask generally agree that the hotter temperature approach will be a challenge for long-term maintenance but fall back on CFM’s sterling reputation of reliability as a measure of comfort. At the same time, these same engineers–who have no connection to either CFM or PW–like the GTF technology but want to see it proved in service.
Steven Udvar-Hazy said it best. It will be five to seven years after the engines are in service before the industry knows the reliability and performance of either engine’s advanced technology.
Odds and Ends: MAX EIS dates; McNerney on business climate; A320 Tianjin plant only breaks even
MAX EIS dates: Aviation Week has this story that lists the planned MAX EIS dates: 737-8, 2017 (we previously reported 4Q2017); 737-9 in 2018 and 737-7 in 2019. AvWeek also reported the bypass ratio for the LEAP-1B is 8.5:1.
Eulogy for the 747-400: Bloomberg has this interesting piece about the current status of the Boeing 747-400.
McNerney on US business climate: Boeing CEO Jim McNerney has these comments on the US business climate.
Airbus Tianjin plant only breaks even: so says this report in Aviation Week.
US Air’s 1549 A320 now in museum: It’s a tribute to the flight crew and to aviation safety.
American Icon: Saving Ford and Alan Mulally
We just finished the new book, American Icon: Alan Mulally and the Fight to Save Ford Motor Company. It is well worth reading.
There’s very little about Mulally and his time at Boeing, though there are lots of references. The most extensive discussion is Chapter 3, The Man on the White Horse, in which Ford CEO William Clay Ford Jr. approaches Mulally to leave Boeing and the process Ford–and Mulally–went through for his decision-making.
Part of the process was the interaction between Mulally and Boeing CEO Jim McNerney–and McNerney doesn’t come off looking too good. This may not be particularly surprising, since the story is told from Ford’s and Mulally’s viewpoint and is not a deep look into the Boeing side of things. But this examination is nonetheless interesting. This is a big omission, but the machinations reported are insightful.
But the main event–the crisis Ford was facing when Mulally joined, and how he built a team to deal with it–is fascinating reading. It makes you wonder how different things might have been on the troubled 787 program had Mulally been here as things went south, with his applied management tactics that were very different than the atmosphere widely discussed among employees once Mulally left. This atmosphere, employees said, punished bad news rather than rewarded honesty and candor, and Mulally’s successor, Scott Carson, simply didn’t have the technical background to cope with the 787’s growing challenges.
The author, Bryce C. Hoffman, was the automotive reporter for the Detroit News. He gives a candid look at some of Mulally’s errors, but by-and-large this is a story in which Hoffman paints a picture in which Mulally can do little wrong.
Is he a fawning story-teller or do the results speak for themselves, driving the story to its constant pat-on-the-back approach to Boeing’s refugee? We think largely a results-story. At the end, Hoffman gives credit to those who also had a hand in saving Ford, but almost as an after-thought–except for Bill Ford himself, who realized he didn’t have the depth or experience to do the job himself and set aside his ego and family legacy to bring in Mulally.
UBS estimates MAX break-even at 200
UBS Securities issued this note today:
Boeing is accounting for its 737 NG (Next Generation) program over a large number of aircraft with roughly 2,200 remaining in its block as of Q1, reflecting production into 2016 at planned rates. Across its block, we estimate Boeing is booking margins on 737 NG around 20% on a pre-R&D basis. With the launch of its re-engined model, the 737 MAX, Boeing will need to either account for MAX as part of its existing 737 accounting block or create a separate block. We think Boeing is most likely to add 737 MAX to its existing 737 NG block given fairly limited design changes on the MAX relative to the NG that wouldn’t appear tojustify a separate accounting block.
We expect initial MAX production to come through at lower margins than Boeing is currently booking on NG, diluting BCA (Commercial Airplanes) margins. The inclusion of lower margin initial MAX production in the 737 block will also negatively impact EPS relative to expectations as Boeing will need to book a lower average (program) margin on its current 737 deliveries. We expect MAX costs to improve at a fairly rapid pace with our assumed breakeven program quantity at 200 implying that unit margins approach 737 NG type levels near the end of our assumed 1,000 unit accounting quantity (two years of production).
737 MAX vs A320 neo: The debate continues
Here’s the next round in the continuing debate.
Bernstein Research published this chart detailing how Airbus and Boeing differ on the performance improvements they predict.
There is, of course, no way to know who is correct until the airplanes enter service.
We hear the A320 sharklets are performing better than advertised (Aviation Week actually reported this a while back as well). If the figure we’re hearing proves correct, the neo and MAX should have parity.
787 surge line delayed by rework; 787-9 to use this line in 2013; 787-10 launch all but certain
Boeing is delaying activating the 787 surge line in Everett (WA), while rework on the first 65 787s continues. Steve Trimble of Flight Global has this report. Meanwhile, Bernstein Research, in a note issued today, says the surge line will be where the 787-9 is produced and that the launch of the 787-10 is a near-certainty:
Boeing management described development work on the 787-9 as being ahead of plan at this stage. The 787-9 will go into production in 2013 on the surge line, where change incorporation is being done today on earlier airplanes. First delivery for the 787-9 is planned for early 2014. At this stage, Boeing also sounds optimistic about the 787-10. We have seen the 787-10 as a natural derivative, given the size of the wing.
But, success involves getting weight down sufficiently on the 787-9. Boeing appears optimistic on this
point, but we will wait to see progress. We are conservatively assuming first 787-9 delivery in late 2014. Although Boeing does not intend to announce a 787-10 launch until it is farther along on the 787-8, it appears that a launch is all but certain at this stage.
Bernstein also expects Boeing to deliver 595 aircraft this year vs 581 for Airbus, returning Boeing to the top spot as the world’s #1 airplane maker. With the 787 and 747-8 now being delivered, Bernstein forecasts Boeing will remain #1 through 2016, the outside of Bernstein’s current forecast.
Odds and Ends: 787 fuel savings at ANA; Airbus will benefit from Boeing
ANA 787s: Market Watch quotes an ANA official saying the Boeing 787-8 is saving 21% in fuel over eh previous airplanes. The article didn’t ID the previous planes, but they were the Boeing 767-300ER. Note, too, that the initial 787-8s are heavy and with Rolls-Royce engines that don’t initially meet specs.
Airbus to benefit from Boeing: The latter is closing its Wichita operations. The former will likely hire some of Boeing’s soon-to-be-out-of-work engineers. Here’s the article. Note that former Kansas Sen. Sam Brownback, who is now governor, was present garbed in Airbus colors. This is the same Brownback who couldn’t diss Airbus enough during the EADS-Boeing tanker competition. Now Airbus seems to be Brownback’s best friend.
China-EU showdown over ETS: China continues to refuse to comply with the European Union’s demand that carbon emissions information be provided. China, which already refused to firm up orders for 45 Airbus A330s, threatened to impound European airplanes if the EU retaliates against China’s refusal to comply.
Air Lease Corp to order MAX: Steve Udvar-Hazy, CEO of the lessor, plans to order the 737 MAX within the next few weeks. Boeing wants to firm up orders from ALC, CIT Aerospace, ILFC, GECAS and Aviation Capital Group by or at the Farnborough Air Show.
Odds and Ends: Price vs Price in Indian contest; China theat; 787 financial impact on Boeing
Price vs Price: More on the price war between Airbus and Boeing in the A320 v 737 contest. Dominic Gates of The Seattle Times has this analysis of hot contest to win an order from India’s Jet Airways, hitherto an exclusive Boeing customer. He takes a larger look at the troubled Indian airline industry.
Finalizing Orders: Norwegian Air Shuttle finalized its order for 100 Airbus A320neos, breaking Boeing’s monopoly here. NAS was also a launch customer of the 737 MAX.
China threat: Maybe, maybe not. Jim Albaugh, CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, cites China as the biggest emerging threat to Boeing and Airbus. Reuters, in Beijing for the IATA AGM, has this article saying, not so fast. The article takes a close look at the ARJ-21, China’s first effort at a modern jet. Although this is a regional jet and not competitive with Airbus or Boeing, it’s a “makee-learn” effort that leads the way to the Comac C919, which is directly competitive with the A320 and 737 class. Implications of the ARJ-21 are also discussed in the article.
LionAir and the 787: Confirming news reports this week, LionAir announced it has committed to the Boeing 787, agreeing to buy five. We’re told these are from the so-called “terrible teens,” those early 787s that required an enormous amount of rework and which were rejected by the original customers. Transaero and Rwanda Air are said to also be taking some of these early aircraft.
EADS Bank: More information on the reports EADS is considering getting a banking license.
Boeing economics and the 787: Jon Ostrower at The Wall Street Journal has an excellent piece today talking about the milestone of 787 #66 and the implications for cost reduction. Unfortunately, the full article is available only for paid subscribers. Contained within the article is this key data:
The losses don’t show up on Boeing’s bottom line, because accounting rules let the company spread the Dreamliner’s costs over years—effectively booking earnings now from future Dreamliners that it expects to produce more profitably. With previous models, Boeing initially spread its costs over 400 planes, but with the Dreamliner it is distributing the costs over 1,100 planes—a number it says reflects unprecedented demand. Boeing already has 854 Dreamliner orders from 57 customers.
Boeing reported that first-quarter profit at its Commercial Airplanes division more than doubled to $1.08 billion from a year earlier. But the company acknowledges that accounting for the costs of each individual plane would have resulted in a first-quarter loss of $138 million—a drop UBS analyst David Strauss says is almost entirely attributable to the Dreamliner.
The Dreamliner’s drain on cash is balanced by strong sales of the profitable single-aisle 737 and long-range 777 models. And analysts estimate Boeing is reducing the losses per Dreamliner by about $10 million each quarter. But maintaining the pace of cost reduction gets harder as the simplest problems are solved. Meanwhile, Boeing aims to increase production of Dreamliners to 10 per month at the end of 2013, up from 3.5 per month today—meaning the losses per plane will be magnified, but will also be tempered by the decreasing cost of each jet.
Some analysts believe Boeing’s target for cost reduction on the Dreamliner could be too optimistic. Mr. Strauss of UBS says the company appears to be assuming it can reduce its cost 50% faster than it did with the 777. If instead the pace of cost reduction matches the 777, says one of UBS’s models, the estimated $20 billion hole could double.