Leadership changes required at Boeing, say conference delegates

By Scott Hamilton

Analysis

Special Coverage of the Boeing Crisis

Jan. 26, 2024, © Leeham News: At the first commercial aviation conference following the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 Boeing 737-9 accident on Jan. 5, much of the conversation was about the fallout to Boeing. Spirit AeroSystems was a topic of less conversation, even though the problem with 1282’s door plug appears to have originated with Spirit.

Aviation Week’s supplier conference was supposed to begin with a fireside chat with Boeing’s Ihssane Mounir, the head of Boeing’s commercial supply chain. Unsurprisingly, Mounir canceled the week before as the Alaska accident—in which there were no fatalities and only a few minor injuries—expanded into a full-blown crisis for Boeing.

News that the Federal Aviation Administration dropped the hammer on Boeing by freezing current 737 production rates and killing, for now, expansion of the airplane’s final assembly to the “North Line” in Everett (WA) brought disbelief that Boeing has fallen so far from what was once considered the Gold Standard of American engineering.

And, with contract negotiations beginning in March with its touch-labor union, the IAM 751, aerospace analyst Ron Epstein of Bank of America predicted that 751 has more leverage now than in recent years and Boeing will be in the weaker bargaining position.

David Calhoun, CEO of The Boeing Co.

Other than consultant Richard Aboulafia, a vociferous critic of Boeing CEO David Calhoun, speakers were willing to definitively call for changes in Boeing’s leadership. But in sideline talk, consensus was clear: “leadership” at Boeing headquarters and in Seattle with Commercial Airplanes has to go.

But there was no agreement, or even suggestions, about who should replace Calhoun and Stan Deal, the CEO of Commercial Airplanes.

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Updated: FAA grounds expansion plans for Boeing 737 MAX production, approves path for MAX 9s to resume flights

UPDATING (2)

  • Hundreds of 737s scheduled for delivery this year and in coming years affected by FAA action.
  • IAM shares concerns with Boeing, FAA.

By Dan Catchpole

Special Coverage of the Boeing crisis

The Federal Aviation Administration froze Boeing’s 737 production rate at the current level (31/mo, 372/yr) and for now killed expansion of a 4th line in Everett. Credit: Leeham News.

Jan. 24, 2024 © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration said Wednesday it will not approve a planned expansion of Boeing 737 MAX production. The agency also laid out a path to get MAX 9 airplanes back flying.

The jetliners were grounded on January 6 after a door plug blew out the day before from a two-month-old 737 MAX 9 flown by Alaska Airlines. The FAA investigation found significant quality lapses in the program. Inspection of the MAX 9 fleet found problems in other airplanes.

A few of Alaska’s Boeing 737-9 MAXes parked at SEA-TAC International Airport awaiting return to service. Credit: Brandon Farris Photography.

After grounding the 171 MAX 9 airplanes operated by Alaska (65) and United Airlines (79), the FAA “made clear this aircraft would not go back into service until it was safe,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said Wednesday in a public statement (Emphasis added). “The exhaustive, enhanced review our team completed after several weeks of information gathering gives me and the FAA confidence to proceed to the inspection and maintenance phase.

“However, let me be clear: This won’t be back to business as usual for Boeing. We will not agree to any request from Boeing for an expansion in production or approve additional production lines for the 737 MAX until we are satisfied that the quality control issues uncovered during this process are resolved,” he said.

“The quality assurance issues we have seen are unacceptable,” Whitaker said. “That is why we will have more boots on the ground closely scrutinizing and monitoring production and manufacturing activities.”

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Culture key to latest Boeing MAX crisis: panelists

By Scott Hamilton

Special Coverage of the Boeing crisis

Jan. 24, 2024, © Leeham News: What began as a non-fatal accident with an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9 on Jan. 5 has blown into a full crisis for Boeing. The company was once considered the gold standard of commercial aviation.

Today, 171 737-9s remain grounded in the US by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). There is no end in sight as the FAA and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigate the accident of Flight 1282 in which a door plug (an inactive emergency exit) blew off the 10 week old Alaska MAX 9 on climb out from Portland (OR).

It is the second time the MAX has been grounded. All MAX 8s and MAX 9s were grounded from March 2019 for 21 months. This grounding only affects the MAX 9.

Evidence points to Boeing quality assurance flaws in final assembly. An anonymous Boeing employee posted on LNA a detailed scenario how Boeing failed its own processes in final assembly of the Alaska plane. (His post follows this article.)

The FAA is booting more inspectors on the ground at the 737 Renton factory. On Jan. 24, Boeing shut down the 737 assembly line for a “safety stand down.” CEOs of Alaska and United airlines, the two US carriers with the 171 MAX 9s on the ground, publicly eviscerated Boeing.


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At the first aviation conference following the Alaska incident, the Aviation Week suppliers event, some speakers called for leadership changes at Boeing.

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Pontifications: Boeing turns to US Navy Admiral for second time in MAX crises

Special Coverage of the Boeing crisis

Jan. 23, 2024, © Leeham News: When in trouble, Boeing turned to a retired US Navy Admiral for the second time.

By Scott Hamilton

Last week, CEO David Calhoun announced that Adm. Kirkland Donald was named as special advisor to Calhoun. “Donald and a team of outside experts will conduct a thorough assessment of Boeing’s quality management system for commercial airplanes, including quality programs and practices in Boeing manufacturing facilities and its oversight of commercial supplier quality,” Boeing said in a statement.

It’s the second time Boeing turned to an admiral in connection with 737 MAX crises. In September 2019, the company turned to one of its Board of Directors members, Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, to head a new board-level safety committee to review a plethora of safety items in Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg asked the Board the previous April to establish a Board committee to review Boeing’s safety practices and recommend next steps.

At the time, the MAX had been grounded for six months, with no end in sight. (Another year and two months would pass before the Federal Aviation Administration recertified the MAX.)

Donald and Giambastiani came from the nuclear navy, where safety measures are among the world’s best. Since the creation of the nuclear navy, there have been only two instances where ships were lost—and neither of them was directly related to nuclear power.

The submarine USS Thresher was lost on a test dive in 1963. The submarine USS Scorpion was lost in 1968. The Thresher’s loss was traced to disastrous flooding at a depth from which the sub could not overcome the flooding to surface. The Scorpion’s loss remains controversial to this day. Some believe it was sunk during the Cold War by a Soviet submarine. Others believe a torpedo suffered a “hot run” accident in the torpedo room and blew up before it could be disarmed.

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Certifications of MAX 7 and 10 may take hit from 737-9 grounding

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By Scott Hamilton

Jan. 22, 2024, © Leeham News: The grounding of the Boeing 737-9 MAX is likely to delay certification of the 737-7 and 737-10, customers fear.

At a minimum, certification of the 737-7 is likely to shift by months, customers suggest. Certification of the MAX 7 has been repeatedly shifting. Boeing hoped that certification would be achieved in 2022 or 2023. It’s now 2024. In December, Boeing asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption to safety standards for a deicing of the leading edge of the composite engine nacelle. There already was opposition from some pilot unions to this request. Now, with the Jan. 5 grounding of the MAX 9 due to the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 decompression, some believe this exemption won’t be granted.

Flight testing for the MAX 7 is all but done. Boeing hoped to deliver the first MAX 7s to launch customer Southwest Airlines this year.

Flight testing for the MAX 10 is in its early stages. Certification processes were suspended during the MAX grounding, which ended in November 2020. Testing has been slow since because there are only a few MAX 10s available for testing, and due to the slow certification process for the MAX 7. One MAX 10 customer fears certification will be delayed 6-12 months. This would shift deliveries from early 2025 to later in the year or into 2026.

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Bjorn’ s Corner: New aircraft technologies. Part 46. Maintenance Program

By Bjorn Fehrm

January 19, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We are discussing the different phases of a new airliner program. After covering the Design and Production, we now look at the Operational phase of a new airliner family.

For the operational phase, the airplane must pass scrutiny for Continued Airworthiness. Today, we discuss the biggest item in a regulator’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: the required Maintenance to keep an airliner airworthy.

Figure 1. A typical maintenance program for an airliner. Source: ATR.

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Outlook 2024: Milestone year for alternative energy development

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By Scott Hamilton and Bjorn Fehrm

Jan. 18, 2024, © Leeham News: Twenty twenty four is 10 years after the Sustainable Aircraft discussions started when Airbus flew its battery-powered E-Fan before the world’s OEMs and press in July 2014 at the Farnborough Air Show.

The time that has passed is longer than the normal development time for a new aircraft, and what have the hundreds of projects that started in the wake of the E-Fan achieved? We have one new two-seat trainer, the Pipistrel Velis Electro, in production, but not much else.

 

 

 

 

 

A typical urban air mobility vehicle concept.

There has been no lack of electric airplane project announcements, one more fanciful than the other. Operational ranges and economics that will enable the replacement of the typical regional turboprops have been presented, but the two functional demonstrators we have in the air that go beyond nine seats are hydrogen fuel cell aircraft, not battery-electric or hybrid electric.

We have hybrid five and nine-seat commuters flying in prototypes, and a couple of hybrids will start production during the year. These will reach the market in 2025 or 2026, but how operationally viable these is still not clear. But beyond nine seats, there are only plans, no projects that plan to fly prototypes this year or next.

The one-battery electric project, Eviation Alice, flew once, then packed up, declaring we needed better batteries. It’s clear the job of exchanging the hydrocarbon combustion engine for aircraft is much harder than thought. The problem is that aircraft are supposed to fly for hours, and the energy density of normal fuel is still 50 times higher than for batteries.

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ZeroM, Airbus’ effort to reduce traveled work

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By Scott Hamilton

Jan. 16, 2023, © Leeham News: Traveled work is the bane of any airplane manufacturer’s production line.

“Traveled work” is when parts are unavailable when the plane is in final assembly. To keep production moving, the manufacturer—whether it’s Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, or some other firm—notes the missing item and continues production. The airplane is rolled off the line and the work is finished on the ramp when the part becomes available.

Jurgen Westermeier, Airbus Chief Procurement Officer. Credit: Airbus.

The OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) approach the issue differently. Some prefer the parts to arrive “just in time,” which keeps inventory to a minimum. This reduces cash outflow.

But just in time creates the problem of missing parts. One time, Airbus was assembling A320s, and USB ports failed to arrive while planes were on the assembly line. The ports had to be installed later—traveled work.

Another option is to create an inventory. But to minimize the cash commitment, and the space taken up by inventory, the OEMs limit the supply. Airbus, for example, has a “buffer” of between a few weeks and a few months, depending on the parts.

Airbus also attacks the challenge with a program called ZeroM. LNA met last month with Airbus’ chief procurement officer (CPO), Jurgen Westermeier, on the sidelines of the Aviation Forum in Hamburg. He explained ZeroM and how it works. Below is a transcript of our meeting. It has been edited for clarity and space.

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“Unplanned” removal, installation inspection procedure at Boeing

By the Leeham News Team

Jan. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: It’s not supposed to happen.

The door plug on the Boeing 737-9 MAX isn’t supposed to separate from the airplane in flight, as it did on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 this year.

There is conflicting reporting whether the emergency exit or door plug is opened on the Boeing 737 final assembly line for access to the interior. Examining Google images, two photos show the exit or plug closed while over-wing exits are open. Credit: Unknown.

The investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is in its infancy. Early evidence suggests four bolts intended to prevent the door plug from shifting in its attachment brackets either failed or weren’t installed. Inspections after the 1282 incident by Alaska, and United Airlines found loose bolts in other MAX 9s. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Jan. 6 grounded the 171 MAX 9s operated by the two carriers until inspections and repairs, if needed, are completed.

This photo of a Boeing 737-900ER for Turkish Airlines shows a door plug closed on the 737 final assembly line. The over-wing exits are open. Credit: Unknown.

Boeing CEO David Calhoun, while telling CNBC that he wasn’t pointing fingers, did precisely that. He said Spirit AeroSystems had a “quality escape,” adding that Boeing failed to catch it, so it also had a quality escape.

How could this happen? The NTSB probe will presumably figure this out. Spirit ships the 737-9 fuselages with the door plug installed. Conflicting reporting suggests that Spirit is supposed to install the door plugs in the final, secure condition; or these are shipped with the plugs in place but in a condition that Boeing would later secure. The NTSB will sort this out, too.

Regardless, Boeing should have inspected the door plugs and assured these are in final condition prior to delivery. The Seattle Times reported on Jan. 14 that contrary to other reports, Boeing doesn’t open or remove the door plug when the MAX 9 is in final assembly. A retired Boeing safety employee with assembly line experience says Spirit ships the door plugs in a temporary condition, expecting that Boeing may remove them during final assembly.

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Outlook 2024: Can ATR finally achieve its production target?

By Judson Rollins

Jan. 15, 2024, © Leeham News: For the second year in a row, ATR fell short of its stated production targets.

ATR delivered just 25 new aircraft in 2022 and 35 in 2023. The latter was five short of its stated target. In early 2023, the manufacturer said supply chain and staffing shortages were the two main reasons for its 2022 shortfall. It has not yet discussed what went wrong last year.

At last year’s Paris Air Show, ATR said it wants to deliver 80 aircraft per year by 2026. However, this seems unrealistic given the OEM’s current order book of 176 aircraft, according to recent data viewed by LNA.

ATR STOL test aircraft. Source: v1Images.com.

Summary
  • Turboprop demand forecasts seem questionable.
  • ATR is delaying its timeline for a new eco turboprop.
  • Progress continues on a future STOL variant.

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