Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 23. Development risks. September 6, 2024
- If a strike occurs, here’s what Boeing can do September 5, 2024
- China banks on C919, but numbers say it still needs Boeing September 2, 2024
- Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 22. High Turbine technologies. August 30, 2024
- The A330 for medium haul or twice the frequency with A321XLR? Part 1 August 29, 2024
Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 15. Compressor efficiency.
By Bjorn Fehrm
July 12, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We do an article series about engine development. The aim is to understand why engine development now has longer timelines than airframe development and carries larger risks of product maturity problems.
To understand why engine development has become a challenging task, we need to understand engine fundamentals and the technologies used for these fundamentals.
We covered the problem areas of a compressor last week. Now, we will discuss how modern compressors can have over 90% conversion efficiency from turbine power to air compression.
Figure 1. The gas turbine cycle and its parts. Source: Rolls-Royce: The Jet Engine.
To what extent can the A321XLR replace the Boeing 757, Part 3
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
July 11, 2024, © Leeham News: We are comparing the Airbus a321XLR to the Boeing 757 to understand to what extent it can replace the 757 on the longer routes it operates for major airlines like United, American, and Delta.
We have looked at the development and operational history of the aircraft, their Apples-to-Apples capacity and range. Now, we use Leeham’s Aircraft Performance and Cost Model (APCM) to compare the operational costs of the aircraft.
Summary:
- The Boeing 757-200 has the same passenger capacity as the A321LR/XLR and a larger cargo capacity.
- Its range can compete with the A321LR but not the XLR. Both beat the 757 on operational economics.
Boeing to plead guilty to new criminal charges related to MAX crisis
By Scott Hamilton
July 8, 2024, © Leeham News: Boeing agreed to plead guilty to new criminal charges related to the 2021 Deferred Prosecution Agreement that the US Department of Justice says the company failed to live up to.
By pleading guilty, Boeing avoids a trial. Some families of the 346 victims of two 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019 already indicated they will object to this new agreement, which must be approved by a federal judge.
Boeing will pay a second fine of $243.6m, new conditions related to safety improvements (including spending at least $455m on new safety protocols) and a special overseer will be appointed to monitor Boeing’s compliance this time.
The second fine is identical to the first one in 2021. However, many—including LNA—view these fines as inadequate.
By comparison, previous DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreements include larger fines for violations that did not include safety violations or deaths.
Embraer’s outlook improves as supply chain stabilizes, near-term availability drives demand
Subscription Required
By Judson Rollins
Introduction
July 8, 2024, © Leeham News: Embraer is on track for a relatively upbeat Farnborough Airshow later this month, having been spared most of the supply chain headwinds plaguing Airbus and Boeing.
It is expected to reveal updates to its E-Jet family at Farnborough, including lower maintenance costs, cabin upgrades, and more.
Source: Embraer.
In May, the Brazilian OEM reaffirmed its target of 72-80 commercial deliveries this year, citing the stabilization of its global supply chain. It doesn’t disclose its commercial production rate. But its peak production reached 96 E-Jets per year pre-COVID.
Embraer’s reported backlog as of March 31 was the highest in company history: 187 E175s, 12 E190-E2s, and 178 E195-E2s. The company has since taken orders for 10 more E190-E2s and 13 E195-E2s, and has delivered approximately 18 E2s overall, according to Planespotters.net.
Most previous-generation E175s are being built for major US airlines subject to pilot “scope clause” or regional airlines operating on their behalf. Scope clause restricts how many aircraft can be flown below a certain number of seats (generally 76-80) or 86,000 lbs MTOW to protect mainline pilots from having their work outsourced to lower-paying regional airlines.
Summary
- E2 delivery slot availability is a key advantage.
- E195-E2 economics favor smaller markets, while the A220 is better suited to longer routes.
Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 14. The compressor problems.
By Bjorn Fehrm
July 5, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We do an article series about engine development. The aim is to understand why engine development now has longer timelines than airframe development and carries larger risks of product maturity problems.
To understand why engine development has become a challenging task, we need to understand engine fundamentals and the technologies used for these fundamentals.
We covered the basics of how a compressor works last week. Now, we look at the challenges in compressor design (there are plenty).
Figure 1. The gas turbine cycle and its parts. Source: Rolls-Royce: The Jet Engine.
To what extent can the A321XLR replace the Boeing 757, Part 2
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
July 4, 2024, © Leeham News: We are comparing the Airbus A321XLR to the Boeing 757 to understand to what extent it can replace the 757 on the longer routes it operates for major airlines like United, American, and Delta.
After Boeing didn’t do the obvious 757 replacement, the NMA and Airbus gradually eked out more range and seats on the A321; the A321LR/XLR is the only game in town to replace the 757, especially as the Boeing 737-10 availability continuously slips to the right.
Summary:
- The A321LR/XLR has the same passenger capacity as the 757-200.
- The 757-200 has the range of the A321LR but can’t match the A321XLR.
Boeing is fighting fire with fire in reacquiring Spirit Aero (Updated)
Subscription required
By Dan Catchpole
Analysis
July 1, 2024, © Leeham News: This is an analysis of Boeing’s reported $4.7 billion purchase Spirit AeroSystems, as Reuters reported Sunday.
First, let’s set the frame.
Boeing seems incapable of doing anything right these days. Even a pre-Farnborough Airshow media briefing by the aerospace giant last week resulted in a reprimand from the National Transportation Safety Board for sharing information about its investigation into the panel blowout on an Alaska Airlines flight on Jan. 5.
The company is bleeding money in its commercial and defense divisions. Boeing could turn around its balance sheet if it could straighten out production for its cash cows—the 737 and 787. Yet somehow, both programs are still struggling.
Boeing’s pissed off the Federal Aviation Administration, the NTSB, key members of Congress, some of its biggest customers, and the Machinists union in Washington and Oregon, among others. Its current CEO is a lame duck who helped create the crises overwhelming the company. Potential successors have said they don’t want the job. Among the front-runners to succeed David Calhoun is BCA’s new CEO Stephanie Pope, who has no production or product development experience and has had few public appearances since she took over BCA in March. There are plenty more problems, but you get the point.
Spirit AeroSystems has been floundering since the COVID-19 pandemic threw the aviation industry into chaos. Since 2020, it has recorded $3.2 billion in net losses, including $617 million posted in the first quarter of this year. Boeing has helped keep the company afloat with financing and price changes.
In short: Boeing is fighting countless fires, and it just bought another one.
Can Boeing fight fire with fire?
Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 13. The compressor.
By Bjorn Fehrm
June 28, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We do an article series about engine development. The aim is to understand why engine development now has longer timelines than airframe development and carries larger risks of product maturity problems.
To understand why engine development has become a challenging task, we need to understand engine fundamentals and the technologies used for these fundamentals.
We have covered the need for the axial speed of the core air to decrease and increase depending on the needs of the core engine’s sections. Now, we will start to look at the different parts of the core in more detail. We start with the compressor.
Figure 1. The gas turbine cycle and its parts. Source: Rolls-Royce: The Jet Engine.
To what extent can the A321XLR replace the Boeing 757, Part 1.
Subscription required
By Bjorn Fehrm
June 27, 2024, © Leeham News: The Airbus A321XLR, the extra-long-range version of the A321neo, will start operational service with IBERIA on the Madrid-Boston trans-Atlantic route later this year. It’s the type of thin, long-range route the Boeing 757 has served to date.
We will use our Aircraft Performance and Cost model (APCM) to examine to what extent the A321XLR can replace the 757 on world routes. What is the difference in capacity and range, and what improvement in operational economics can be expected?
Summary:
- The Boeing 757 was the original MOM/NMA (Middle-Of-the-Market / New-Midmarket-Airplane).
- It had unique characteristics, which Boeing would have followed up with the NMA project.
- Boeing hesitated, and Airbus developed the A321XLR to fill this role. Has it succeeded?
Boeing simply can’t afford a cash deal for Spirit AeroSystems
By Scott Hamilton
Analysis
June 25, 2024, © Leeham News: News that Boeing over the weekend wanted to acquire Spirit AeroSystems through a stock rather than a cash transaction should surprise absolutely nobody.
Anyone following Boeing’s financial performance and weak balance sheet could see this one coming.
Boeing’s financial condition is a mess. Frankly, it’s unfathomable that the credit agencies still rate Boeing as investment grade, albeit at the lowest level.
Boeing’s production rate is a mess and so is its quality control. There is no end in sight. There is not assurance when certifications of the 737-7, 737-10 and 779-9 will occur. Boeing apparently shifted engineers from its X-66A Truss Brace Wing project these programs, things are so bad. This shifts development of a new airplane to the right by at least two years.
When it comes to reacquiring Spirit, Boeing simply can’t afford to pay cash for the company, which at the close of the stock market yesterday had a market cap of $3.8bn+. Essentially, in our view, it’s the same reason Boeing walked away from the Embraer joint venture in April 2020: it could not afford the $4.5bn cash price tag. (The decision by an arbitrator of whether Boeing’s walk was justified is expected within the coming weeks or months.)
Boeing can’t afford to buy Spirit. We’re not sure Boeing can even afford to acquire Spirit in a stock swap. The money required to bring Spirit into shape is unknown, perhaps even to Boeing.
This is a mess that keeps on giving.