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By Bjorn Fehrm
July 4, 2024, © Leeham News: We are comparing the Airbus A321XLR to the Boeing 757 to understand to what extent it can replace the 757 on the longer routes it operates for major airlines like United, American, and Delta.
After Boeing didn’t do the obvious 757 replacement, the NMA and Airbus gradually eked out more range and seats on the A321; the A321LR/XLR is the only game in town to replace the 757, especially as the Boeing 737-10 availability continuously slips to the right.
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By Dan Catchpole
Analysis
July 1, 2024, © Leeham News: This is an analysis of Boeing’s reported $4.7 billion purchase Spirit AeroSystems, as Reuters reported Sunday.
First, let’s set the frame.
Boeing seems incapable of doing anything right these days. Even a pre-Farnborough Airshow media briefing by the aerospace giant last week resulted in a reprimand from the National Transportation Safety Board for sharing information about its investigation into the panel blowout on an Alaska Airlines flight on Jan. 5.
The company is bleeding money in its commercial and defense divisions. Boeing could turn around its balance sheet if it could straighten out production for its cash cows—the 737 and 787. Yet somehow, both programs are still struggling.
Boeing’s pissed off the Federal Aviation Administration, the NTSB, key members of Congress, some of its biggest customers, and the Machinists union in Washington and Oregon, among others. Its current CEO is a lame duck who helped create the crises overwhelming the company. Potential successors have said they don’t want the job. Among the front-runners to succeed David Calhoun is BCA’s new CEO Stephanie Pope, who has no production or product development experience and has had few public appearances since she took over BCA in March. There are plenty more problems, but you get the point.
Spirit AeroSystems has been floundering since the COVID-19 pandemic threw the aviation industry into chaos. Since 2020, it has recorded $3.2 billion in net losses, including $617 million posted in the first quarter of this year. Boeing has helped keep the company afloat with financing and price changes.
In short: Boeing is fighting countless fires, and it just bought another one.
Can Boeing fight fire with fire?
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By Bjorn Fehrm
June 27, 2024, © Leeham News: The Airbus A321XLR, the extra-long-range version of the A321neo, will start operational service with IBERIA on the Madrid-Boston trans-Atlantic route later this year. It’s the type of thin, long-range route the Boeing 757 has served to date.
We will use our Aircraft Performance and Cost model (APCM) to examine to what extent the A321XLR can replace the 757 on world routes. What is the difference in capacity and range, and what improvement in operational economics can be expected?
Bjorn Fehrm
June 24, 2024, © Leeham News: Airbus issued a press release today where it lowered guidance for 2024.
The release highlighted two areas as the drivers for the update:
As a result, Airbus has decided to update the 2024 guidance ahead of its 1H2024 results release, which is on 30 July:
Airbus adds the usual caveats to the guidance:
The Company assumes no additional disruptions to the world economy, air traffic, the supply chain, the Company’s internal operations, and its ability to deliver products and services. The Company’s 2024 guidance is before M&A.
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By Judson Rollins
June 17, 2024, ©. Leeham News: Estimating airplane delivery rates isn’t much more than a guessing game nowadays.
While many headlines point fingers at beleaguered Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems, aviation’s production woes are much more complex. Even in 2024, the labor shortage legacy of COVID-19 and raw material shortages exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine war loom large over the industry.
Airbus struggles to deliver airplanes on time, and engine makers also see their deliveries constrained by supply chain issues.
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By Scott Hamilton
June 10, 2024, © Leeham News: Delivery delays of widebody airplanes are causing disruptions in freighter conversion plans as feedstock is retained for passenger operations.
Demand for passenger airplanes also is slowing Airbus’ plans for the A350 freighter, according to market intelligence.
Softening of the cargo market since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic also impacts the immediate need for converting airliners to freighters, sources say.
Although Boeing’s delays with the 787 and 777X get most of the blame, Airbus also gets some credit for the A350 program. Already, say potential cargo airplane buyers, the A350 freighter is looking at a delay beyond the 2026 entry into service (EIS) date. Uncertainties among Middle Eastern carriers Etihad and Emirates over the A350-1000 Rolls-Royce engine durability are also causing officials to rethink retaining Boeing 777-200LRs and 777-300ERs in service.
Certification of the IAI Bedek 777-300ER freighter conversion program is taking longer than expected. The reason: the negative halo effect dating to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification crisis with the Boeing 737 MAX.
It took Boeing 21 months to recertify the MAX after its grounding began in March 2019. The MAX 7 and MAX 10 still aren’t certified and aren’t expected to be until sometime next year.
Certification of the 777X, also affected by the negative halo effect of the MAX crisis, isn’t certified. EIS was intended to be in 1Q2020. Boeing has yet to receive Type Inspection Authorization (TIA) from the FAA, one of the final steps required before certification. Boeing officially hopes certification will occur next year. But quietly some within Boeing now don’t think TIA will come until 1Q2025. Emirates and Lufthansa Airlines, the first scheduled operators of the airplane, openly say they don’t expect deliveries until 2026.
The upshot: feedstock of the 777-300ERs for conversion companies is drying up.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
June 6, 2024, © Leeham News: We do an article series about the all-important cabin and its seating for an airliner. We have looked at different narrowbody cabins and how the seating differs widely depending on the market and customer segments the aircraft addresses.
This week, we focus on why widebody aircraft have relatively low seat counts compared with single-aisle aircraft, like the A321neo.
We use the cabin generator in our Aircraft Performance and Cost Model (APCM) to configure widebody cabins and compare these with the narrowbody equivalents.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
May 30, 2024, © Leeham News: We will do an article series about the all-important cabin and its seating for an airliner. The cabin layout and its comfort are the most important part of an airliner for the passenger. For an airline it’s its face to the customer.
We will look at the different types of cabins used and how these use the airliner’s real estate, what the cost is, and what the weight is. With the weight, we can also predict how different cabins affect the aircraft’s performance.
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By Scott Hamilton
May 27, 2024, © Leeham News: A flurry of orders by China’s Big Three airlines finally began to balance announced deals for the COMAC C-919 mainline jet.
Until the recent orders from Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern, the vast number of the announced transactions were concentrated among Chinese lessors. The imbalance was not a good thing.
Airbus and Boeing prefer speculative orders by lessors amounting to 25% to perhaps 35% of the order book. (Lessors in recent decades often accounted for 40% to 50% of the in-service fleet, but the differences were from sale/leasebacks of orders originally placed by airlines.)
Boeing and Airbus have different views toward lessors. Airbus, especially under then-Chief Commercial Officer John Leahy, viewed lessors as an extension of the Airbus marketing arm. Lessors broadened Airbus’ market penetration, especially during the early years of the A320’s entry into service.
On the other hand, Boeing viewed lessors as a necessary evil, preferring to deal with a select few rather than a large number. Both viewed lessors to some degree as competitors to direct sales.
Before the Big Three orders, COMAC’s tally was around 760+ for the C919. More than 70% of the announced orders were for Chinese lessors. No lessor outside China was a customer and only Indonesia’s Trans Nusa (partly owned by Chinese lessor CALC) was a customer outside China.
Following the Big Three orders, about 46% of the orders are from airlines—a much better mix than before but still overweighted with lessors.
With Airbus’ A320 family sold out into the 2030 decade and Boeing’s MAX production and delivery schedules in disarray, what alternatives do customers have to the Big Two OEMs? COMAC is the most likely, but the challenges are immense.
COMAC’s challenges
COMAC has big challenges ahead if it wants to become a major global player in commercial aviation.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
May 23, 2024, © Leeham News: We will do an article series about the all-important cabin and its seating for an airliner. The cabin layout and its comfort are the most important parts of an airliner for the passenger.
Most of the time, the traveler doesn’t know what type of aircraft he is flying on, but he will have a clear understanding of the cabin and whether it meets his expectations.
The cabin is where the airline can expose its branding and set the flight experience for the passenger. It’s thus an area that is updated to new cabin concepts for the fleet more often today than 10 years ago, especially for mainline carriers.
The cabin is also important in evaluating airliners, as the characteristics of the aircraft (fuel consumption, operational costs) are evaluated per seat. OEMs have become experts in maximizing the seating of their aircraft to gain an advantage during an evaluation. Sometimes, in a non-transparent way. We will explain the typical tricks and how to guarantee an apples-to-apples comparison when evaluating airliners.