Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Teamsters, Boeing have a new contract April 29, 2025
- Boeing wants to remarket China’s airplanes. It’s costly and time consuming. April 28, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 19. April 25, 2025
- How good is the C929? Part 2. April 24, 2025
- Boeing First Quarter Results Update: China is 10% of the backlog, with 500 in “Unidentified” April 24, 2025
Aboulafia calls for “regime change now” at Boeing
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 6, 2024, © Leeham News: With hundreds of new 737 MAXes facing delays due to the Federal Aviation Administration’s freeze on production rates, how much compensation will Boeing owe airlines and lessors?
It’s a question that’s unanswered at this time. And much depends on whether the delays are “excusable” or “inexcusable” in Boeing’s contracts.
Excusable delays are things outside of Boeing’s control, such as Acts of God, War, pandemics, etc. Inexcusable delays are things within Boeing’s control. However, there could be legal maneuvering as to just what this means. Is grounding by the Federal Aviation Administration—something outside Boeing’s control—an excusable or inexcusable delay if the grounding is caused by something within Boeing’s control?
Are problems within Boeing’s supply chain outside of its control but which delays deliveries by Boeing excusable or inexcusable delays? Contract language (which LNA has not seen) may address this.
Lawyers will argue over the contract’s meaning. But what is undisputed is that Boeing faces yet another mess with its long-troubled 737 MAX line.
Over the weekend, Reuters reported that once again supplier Spirit AeroSystems found mis-drilled holes in 737 fuselages. Boeing confirmed the Reuters report and issued a long statement from Stan Deal, the CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, that 50 undelivered 737s may be affected. Deliveries will be delayed on these aircraft while inspections and repairs, if needed, are conducted. Deal’s message is at the end of this article.
At the Jan. 24-25 Aviation Week suppliers conference outside Los Angeles, consultant Richard Aboulafia called for “regime change” in Boeing’s leadership.
Pontifications: It’s been five years since Boeing’s last normal year. Five more to go.
Feb. 6, 2024, © Leeham News: Think about it.
The last normal year for The Boeing Co. was 2018—five long years ago.
By Scott Hamilton
At best, we think the next normal year may be 2028. Another five long years. And that’s if nothing else goes wrong within Boeing’s control. This is a big IF, given Boeing’s penchant for self-inflicted wounds in recent years.
It used to be that Boeing was considered the gold standard of aerospace engineering and production. This badge of honor went away with the 787, beginning in 2003—21 long years ago. The 787 was an engineering marvel. But it was an execution and production snafu of historic proportions.
The benign neglect by the executive C Suite at the group level and the Board of Directors of Boeing Commercial Airplanes is a corporate scandal of epic proportions. It so mimics what happened to the Douglas Aircraft Co. (DAC) by the benign neglect of its parent, the McDonnell Douglas Corp. (MDC) that it’s scary.
2018 was the last normal year The Boeing Co. has had. The 737 MAX was grounded in March 2019 and Boeing hasn’t recovered yet. Source: The Boeing Co.
The McDonnell Co. acquired DAC in 1967 in an arranged marriage by the government as DAC was on the brink of bankruptcy. In 1967, Boeing and DAC were the US duopoly that Boeing today shares with Airbus. The latter was formed in 1970 and delivered its first airplane in 1974.
By the time Boeing and MDC merged in 1997, DAC’s global share was down to 7%. Airbus and Boeing gained share as MDC starved DAC for development of new airliners.
Today, Boeing’s backlog share in the single-aisle sector is between 35% and 38%, depending on the measuring point and whether China’s COMAC, Russia’s United Aircraft Corp., and Embraer’s E195-E2 are included in the numbers. Some believe Boeing is headed for a 30% share. Some believe Boeing has designed its last all-new airliner.
Skeptics about Boeing’s 737 production rate
By Scott Hamilton
Feb. 5, 2024, © Leeham News: The Federal Aviation Administration froze Boeing’s production rate of the 737 MAX at its current level.
But just what is this rate?
Boeing says it’s 38 airplane per month. Last year, it was common knowledge that Boeing struggled to consistently maintain a rate of 31/mo. Supply chain issues and voluntary “pauses” by Boeing during final assembly impacted the rate. LNA used the latter number to illustrate how many scheduled 737 deliveries will be affected by the FAA’s freeze. Hundreds of MAXes contracted for delivery will be delayed this year and next, and likely beyond, depending on how long the freeze remains in place.
But there was plenty of skepticism about Boeing’s announced rate cap of 38 per month expressed at last week’s Aviation Week suppliers conference in California.
Boeing’s orders and deferred production costs: a deeper look
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By Judson Rollins
Introduction
Feb. 5, 2023, © Leeham News: After last week’s release of the 2023 annual report for Boeing, we undertake our annual analysis of at-risk deals on the OEM’s books.
This year, we also look at Boeing’s deferred production costs in light of the well-documented commercial aircraft production issues. During the company’s earnings call, Boeing CEO David Calhoun and CFO Brian West discussed plans to close its “shadow factories” or rework facilities for the 737 MAX and 787. Calhoun said, “In our shadow factories, we put more hours into those airplanes than we do to produce [them] in the first place.”
These growing rework costs appear to be classified as deferred production costs to keep them from affecting Boeing’s announced profits. We explain below.
Summary
- Program accounting hides ballooning program costs.
- War and geopolitical tensions increase regional risks.
- Certification delays to the 737-7 and -10 significantly increase Boeing’s MAX order risk.
- The 787 order book is relatively healthy despite geopolitical and customer risks.
- 777 & 777X orders are weighed down by geopolitical issues and a soft cargo market.
Bjorn’ s Corner: New aircraft technologies. Part 47. MSG-3 Maintenance
By Bjorn Fehrm
February 2, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We are discussing the different phases of a new airliner program. After covering the Design and Production, we now look at the Operational phase of a new airliner family.
For the operational phase, the airplane must pass scrutiny for Continued Airworthiness. The biggest item in a regulator’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness is the required Maintenance program to keep an airliner airworthy. We started last week with how maintenance went from ad-hoc to a Hard Timed maintenance program in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Figure 1. The maintenance manual for the Boeing 747. Source: Boeing.
Re-engining the Boeing 767, Part 4
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By Bjorn Fehrm
February 1, 2024, © Leeham News: We have been looking at a re-engine of the 767, a move that Boeing is considering to avoid a production stop after 2027. The present 767 engines don’t pass emission regulations introduced by the FAA, EASA, and other regulators for production and delivery beyond 2027.
We used our Aircraft Performance and Cost model to look at the economics of the original 767 Freighter versus a re-engined one before Christmas. Now, we install a passenger long-range cabin and look at the per-passenger mile economics of a re-engined 767-300ER versus the original version.
Summary:
- New, more environmentally friendly engines would give the 767-passenger version better fuel economics.
- The higher the engine maintenance costs of the new engines make the Cash Operating Costs difference between the existing 767-300ER and the new version small.
Boeing records loss in 2023, but better than expected results; no guidance for 2024
By Dan Catchpole
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Jan. 31, 2024 © Leeham News: Boeing posted a $5.8B loss in 2023, a substantial improvement over the previous year’s $11B loss. Boeing Commercial Airplanes even posted a $41M profit in the fourth quarter–the first profitable quarter since the beginning of 2019.
However, any progress made last year was erased on Jan. 5, when a door plug blew out on a two-month-old 737-9 MAX at 16,000 feet over Portland. An empty passenger seat was ripped, but nobody died and physical injuries were light on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.
In an earnings report conference call with financial analysts, Boeing CEO David Calhoun said definitively that the accident was Boeing’s fault and that steps are being taken to ensure it never happens again.
Calhoun’s statements echoed similar declarations he made after taking over in 2019 as chief executive amid the MAX crisis following two fatal crashes.
Those crashes put the 737 program under global scrutiny.
“I’m still trying to get my head around how we got here,” Bank of America financial analyst Ron Epstein said during the call. After the two crashes, “wasn’t the 737 line, like the most scrutinized production line in the world? So, what happened to get to where we got today?”
Summary
- Boeing withdraws exemption request for 737-7
- Vague guidance for 2024
- More mea culpas
FCF: The Double-Edged Sword (an accounting primer)
By the Leeham News Team
Analysis
Jan. 30, 2024, © Leeham News: Boeing reports its year-end 2023 earnings tomorrow. Historically, Free Cash Flow (FCF) is a key metric officers like to promote, and aerospace analysts focus on.
Before the 2019 grounding of the 737 MAX, Boeing returned 100% of FCF to shareholders via stock buybacks and dividends. Both returns were suspended by the end of 2019. Boeing set a goal in November 2022 of $10bn in FCF by 2025/2026, with the implication that shareholders will begin seeing a return then.
Free Cash Flow is generally understood to be the cash that flows into a company, less the cash outflows to pay for Operations and Capital Expenditures (Capex). It is the money that the company has available to repay its creditors or pay dividends and repurchase stock. It is also used to determine the financial health of an entity.
In the financial community, they are the buzzwords that investors love to hear.
Why is this relevant, especially for Boeing?
Culture change needed at Boeing; labor contract talks begin in March and could lead the way
A Leeham News Editorial
Jan. 29, 2024, © Leeham News: If Boeing is to emerge from its latest crisis unscathed, it will need to commit to a culture change. That’s the consensus of industry watchers, and it’s one that we whole-heartedly endorse.
CEO Dave Calhoun will have a chance to show his commitment to that change starting in March, when Boeing Commercial Airplanes top management sits down with the bargaining team for its largest touch-labor union, IAM District 751.
For 20 years, Boeing has prosecuted a scorched-earth fight against its unions, in the name of cost-cutting. It has outsourced work all over the globe. It has built a whole new campus in union-hostile South Carolina, primarily to escape the “hostage” situation it faced before, with all of BCA’s deliveries at the mercy of one unionized labor force.
But while Boeing has won every battle in this long labor war, the result has not been a strategic victory. Instead, in 2024, the company finds itself badly trailing Airbus in both orders and deliveries, with little chance of catching up in the near term. This is in large part due to a series of high-profile self-inflicted failures, of which the near catastrophe on Alaska Flight 1282 on Jan. 5 is just the latest.
Boeing needs a top-to-bottom change of culture, and it can start by rebuilding its relationship with its touch-labor union.
- This year’s talks are the first in a decade.
- Boeing has zero leverage.
- Dropping union animus may be too much to ask.
Instead of progress, Boeing must deal with new crisis of Alaska Flight 1282 on Wednesday’s earnings call
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By Scott Hamilton and Judson Rollins
Jan. 29, 2024, © Leeham News: Twenty-twenty-four will be a crucial year for Boeing.
A door plug blew off a Boeing 737-9 MAX Jan. 5. The company must deal with the fallout on its 2023 year-end earnings call Wednesday. Credit: Capt. Chris Brady.
An unexpected twist is the crisis from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, in which a door plug blew off a 737-9 MAX at 16,000 ft. Nobody died, and injuries were light. But the MAX 9 fleet was grounded in the US by the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA launched a formal investigation into the “quality escape” that is believed to have led to the accident. Last week, the FAA put a freeze on current production rates of the 737 and, for now, killed Boeing’s plans to add a line at its Everett (WA) plant.
Beyond dealing with the 1282 aftermath, Boeing hopes this year to clear its inventory of 737 MAXes and the 787. Clearing the inventories brings cash and some profits. But will this move to the right while Boeing is under even more scrutiny by the FAA?
Boeing planned to be positioned for 2025 to pay down debt incurred during the MAX grounding and the COVID-19 pandemic. Progress toward free cash flow targets of $10bn per year by 2025/26 was forecast at its Nov. 2, 2022, investors day. This is almost certainly inoperative.