Breaking News: Tom Gentile, the CEO of Spirit, is out. He’s been replaced by Pat Shanahan, a Spirit Board member, on an interim basis while the search for a permanent CEO is underway. Shanahan is a former Boeing executive and former deputy secretary of the US Department of Defense. This story will be updated.
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By the Leeham News Team
Oct. 2, 2023, © Leeham News: Boeing is in another bad spot with a major contractor and the depth of the problems is quickly becoming apparent. Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita has been seriously underperforming with inspection escape after inspection escape seriously hampering Boeing’s ramp-up of the 737 rate.
Spirit isn’t making money on Boeing 737s and 787s. Boeing is charging Spirit for rework, and a glance through Spirit’s second-quarter earnings report was full of items where they did not have a firm handle on their losses and future exposures attributable to operations with Boeing.
Spirit’s repeated quality and production problems led to speculation that Boeing might buy Spirit, to bring direct control over the Wichita (KS) plant back in-house. Spirit was once “Boeing Wichita.” It was sold on orders of then-Boeing CEO Harry Stonecipher. The resulting spin-off, Spirit, remained Boeing’s supplier for all the commercial airplanes then in production. Nose sections were supplied for all but the 737. Spirit produced the entire 737 fuselage and does to this day. Boeing has a workforce in place at Spirit to help sort out the problems.
At the Paris Air Show, Boeing shot down the speculation, saying purchasing Spirit wasn’t going to happen. Since then, more quality control and production issues emerged on the 737. Two-thirds of the 737s in inventory and an unknown of aircraft in service or new production models are affected.
Speculation over the possibility of Boeing purchasing Spirit continued. Doing so would not be simple, even if Boeing was so inclined.
LNA takes a deep dive into the issues.
September 29, 2023, ©. Leeham News: We are discussing the Detailed design phase of an airliner development program. We have talked about program management methods, development techniques, and tools for Detailed design.
But there is one area that is more important than even the aircraft aerodynamic, structural, and systems design for a new Heart-Of-The-Market aircraft: how to produce it in higher volumes and at lower cost than before.
Editor’s Note: As Airbus and Boeing consider new airplanes, their current generation aircraft are plagued with technical issues. The engines on the A320neo and 737 MAX families continue to have problems years after entry into service. The Boeing 787, which had ground-breaking technology when it was designed, has production issues. Flight testing early on revealed technical problems with the engine on the 777X, prompting the president of Emirates Airline to publicly suggest he won’t accept delivery until the engines are fully “mature.”
Aviation Week’s Check 6 podcast last week examined Boeing’s path toward a new airplane. Boeing CEO David Calhoun insists on waiting for new technology. But “new technology,” while in theory is a great idea, the phrase also scares people. LNA reported on this in March 2020. We’re reposting this article from then.
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By Scott Hamilton
March 16, 2020, © Leeham News: “I can tell you from our perspective, we’re kind of sick and tired of new, new technology. It’s not proven to be the home run.”
This blunt assessment comes from the chief executive officer of the big aircraft lessor, Avolon.
Domhnal Slattery, the CEO, was giving his critique of whether Boeing should launch a new airplane once the 737 MAX crisis is over. (Update: Since this interview, Slattery retired from Avolon.)
Boeing was on a path to decide whether to launch the New Midmarket Airplane when the MAX was grounded one year ago this month.
Airbus was waiting for Boeing to move before deciding how to respond.
Sept. 19, 2023, © Leeham News: It’s September 2023, one year ahead of the expirations of the current labor contracts between Boeing and its touch labor union, IAM 751. (The contract with the engineers union, SPEEA, expires in 2026.)
The IAM district, whose members assemble all Boeing airplanes in Washington State, fired a warning shot across Boeing’s bow last week. It wasn’t the first.
751 urged its members to begin saving money in anticipation of a strike in September 2024. That was three years ago.
The strike fund information appeared in the 751’s March 2020 newsletter, Aero Mechanic. The same issue had commentary about the new pandemic. At that point, nobody thought the pandemic would last two years.
Boeing was already in trouble then. The 737 MAX had been grounded since March 2019. There was no end in sight when the grounding would end. Suspension of the 787 deliveries, for what became 20 months, was still another half-year away.
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By Bryan Corliss
Sept. 11, 2023, © Leeham News: Negative cash flow in the quarters ahead. Ongoing issues with the supply chain. OEMs struggling to meet high airline demand as Tier 1s wrestle with quality issues. New technology wearing out faster than the old systems it replaced.
The No. 1 takeaway from last week’s Jefferies Financial Group Industrials Conference presentations is that the aerospace industry is still a few years away from being in a stable state capable of meeting the demands of customers and shareholders alike.
“We know our customers really do want to make more,” said Howmet CEO John Plant, whose company casts fasteners and engine components for Tier 1s and OEMs. “The question becomes when can we achieve these improved rates?”
Plant went on to say that he believes both Airbus and Boeing will hit their goals for increased widebody production; Airbus at 9/mo on the A350, Boeing at 10/mo for the 787.
The question, he said, is whether the OEMs will hit those rates in 2025 or 2026.
Executives from Boeing, Spirit AeroSystems and Howmet all presented at the conference, and all agreed that there’s reason to be optimistic, given the strong demand from airlines for more planes.
The issue, as Plant put it, is the industry’s ability to meet that demand. “We haven’t seen the real benefits of increased aerospace production.”
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By Scott Hamilton
Sept. 4, 2023, © Leeham News: As people try to figure out when Boeing is going to launch a new airplane, confusion continues over semantics and doubts continue over willingness.
The semantics revolves around the words “launch” and “introduce.”
Brian West, the CFO of The Boeing Co., appears at an investors conference Sept. 7 hosted by Jefferies, an investment bank. The event will be webcast; a link is available on the Boeing website. Perhaps West can clarify the timeline, but here is what’s happened recently.
David Calhoun, the CEO of The Boeing Co., said during Boeing’s investors’ day event on Nov. 2 last year that Boeing will “introduce” a new airplane by the middle of the next decade. LNA at that time asked corporate communications if by “introduce” Calhoun meant entry-into-service or a program launch. Corp Com replied that Calhoun meant EIS.
Last month, at another investors conference, a lower level Boeing official said Boeing would “launch” its next airplane by the middle of the next decade. If this is what the official meant, “launching” the next airplane by mid-next decade would represent a major shift. LNA figured the official was mixing words and asked Corp Com for clarity. A spokesman replied, go with Calhoun’s November statement. So, for the moment, let’s take this at face value.
Then there are the skeptics.
Aug. 29, 2023, © Leeham News: It’s déjà vu all over again.
Last March, I wrote a piece entitled One Step Forward, Two Steps Back discussing Boeing’s efforts to climb out of the very deep hole dug by the 737 MAX grounding, suspension of 787 deliveries and the pandemic.
I noted that for every step forward, something seems to happen to set it back two steps. (A Boeing official suggested the piece should have been two steps forward, one step back, but the underlying point is made.)
The backward steps seem out of Boeing’s control. But it’s Boeing’s name on the side of the airplane and its Boeing that delivers airplanes to the customers. It’s Boeing with whom customers are frustrated.
The latest step backwards that delays deliveries again of the 737 MAX comes from Spirit AeroSystems. Misdrilled holes for the aft pressure bulkhead are blamed this time. The full extent of the flaw, with impacts, number of planes affected, etc., is still being assessed at this writing. Spirit says a supplier is responsible for this issue.
This follows a previous setback when Spirit found that one of its suppliers provided parts that failed to meet specifications which attached the vertical tail to the fuselage of the 737.
These flaws, revealed within months of each other, negatively impact the delivery of new production 737s and delivery of some of the more than 200 MAXes that remain in inventory due to the 2019 21-month grounding of the MAX.
Before that, Spirit’s quality control on the 787 nose section it builds for Boeing was found to have flaws. Deliveries were suspended for nearly 20 months. Eventually, Boeing had 110 newly built 787s in inventory that require rework. The inventory won’t be cleared until the end of next year.
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By Scott Hamilton
Aug. 28, 2023, © Leeham News: The order in February by Air India for 190 737 MAXes involves a backstory involving China that until now hasn’t been told. A subsequent sale by a Chinese lessor of all 737 MAX orders to a Middle Eastern lessor further reduces Boeing’s exposure to China.
The Air India was finalized at the June Paris Air Show. When Boeing announced its second quarter financial results the following month, the MAX inventory accumulated during the 21 month grounding of the type was reduced by 55 aircraft. These 55 MAXes were part of the inventory of 140 737s that were built for Chinese airlines and lessors.
Subsequently, the Chinese lessor CALC announced a deal to sell its entire MAX backlog of 54 to the Emirates lessor, DAE. Purchase rights to some 50 more MAXes were also transferred to DAE. This transaction left CALC with no 737s on its order books.
In its 2022 annual report, the most recent CALC financial statements available, the lessor wrote, “As at 31 December 2022, CALC had 226 aircraft on its orderbook, including 131 Airbus, 66 Boeing and 29 COMAC aircraft.”
Aug. 22, 2023, © Leeham News: We have a follow up to our Aug. 9 post about Boeing revealing the sub-type orders for the first time for the 737 MAX and 777X.
Boeing every month updates its website data for gross orders, cancellations and orders classified under an accounting rule called ASC 606. ASC 606 means orders are “iffy” for contractual or financial reasons with the customer.
The difference between gross orders and net orders represents cancellations, for whatever reason. The airline or lessor may have decided to cancel outright. Some orders might have been swapped within the family (for example, from a 737-8 to a 737-10). Some orders may have been swapped (cancelled) between models—for example, from the MAX to the 787. Boeing’s cumulative statistics haven’t revealed the difference between gross and net orders—until now.
ASC 606-classified order adjustments are excluded from the gross/net tally, Boeing tells me. In other words, for purposes of the tallies, the ASC 606 orders remain included in the gross numbers. They’re still orders at this stage, even if iffy. Airbus, operating under European accounting rules, doesn’t have to identify its iffy orders; LNA has made its best estimate for years of Airbus “iffy” orders, however, in an effort to level the publicly reported playing field. There are times when discussing orders and backlogs that we ignore Boeing’s ASC 606 classification when comparing with the Airbus orders.
With this as background, let’s get to the follow up to the Aug. 9 post.