The decision by British Airways to exit the dedicated freighter business by returning three Boeing 747-8Fs to ACMI operator Atlas Air demonstrates the continued weakness of the global air freight market.
Boeing is counting on the global freight market to improve this year, and with it, sales of the 747-8F. We’re not so sanguine.
Even if the global freight market improves, we are skeptical that Boeing will see much in the way of orders to boost this faltering program. There remain a large number of 747-400Fs in the desert that can be recalled to service at a cost a lot less than a new-build 747-8F will cost. Likewise, there are still a fair number of 747-400 passenger aircraft in service and in storage ready for conversion.
We recognize that the 747-8F is more fuel efficient and maintenance is less than the 744s, but the much higher capital cost demands high utilization and risks greater financial impacts if the airplane has to be parked during a downturn.
Boeing’s 777F is smaller, less costly and uses less fuel than the 747-8F. While it also carries less, it can be argued that the 777F is “right-sizing” aircraft for the changing market conditions. But Boeing is struggling even with this model. The company sold just one nine 777Fs since late 2011.
Boeing plans a 777-8F, but this will not enter service until well after the 747-8 program is likely terminated.
Airbus hasn’t had much success for its new-build A330-200F. Some customers proved to be unable to take delivery, while another—Intrepid Aviation—changed its entire order of 20 for the passenger version and up-gauging these to the A330-300 in almost all cases. The cost-benefit analysis by some concluded the price of the new-build A330F was too high for the benefit gained through economic efficiencies and payload. Airbus announced a small sale at the Dubai Air Show, but otherwise has seen a steady decline in the backlog over and above deliveries.
Aside from the continued economic weakness and a surplus of available used equipment, the belly cargo-carrying capability of the Boeing 777-300ER and the Airbus A330 enables shippers to take advantage of these aircraft for many flights. Interestingly, when Boeing prepared to ship all the equipment and repair components around the global for its 787 battery repairs, it used belly-freight capacity, not dedicated main-deck freighters.
The proliferation of 777s, A330s and the forthcoming A350 and the 777X may well further spell the demise of the 747-8F as nothing more than a niche aircraft based largely on sales already completed. We certainly expect to see a few more sales, but nothing consequential.
Airbus announced 1,619 gross orders for 2013–1,503 net orders–and a backlog of 5,559 aircraft. The company delivered 626 aircraft for the year. It ended the year with 51% of the market vs. Boeing.
Boeing won the delivery race but came in second in orders.
CEO Fabrice Bregier said that 10 years ago Airbus delivered only half the aircraft it did in 2013.
Bregier, at the annual press conference, says “re-engining [the A330] is always an option, but not only option,” reports Reuters. “[Airbus COO-Customers John] Leahy says Airbus could eventually add 1-2 rows to A350-800.”
Aviation Week reports the A350-800 EIS could be moved back a couple of years, also reporting it could be enlarged by two rows.
Bregier says A320 production could increase, reports say from the press conference. (We report in our e-mail distribution today what the production rates will be over the next few years–this will be published on this website next Monday.)
With the increasing possibility that Airbus will defer or even drop the A350-800, the case for an A330neo becomes much stronger. Absent the A358, Airbus has no effective competition to the Boeing 787-8. The current A330, which we will call the A330 Classic, is a very good airplane but it is not as fuel efficient as the 788. The Airbus argument that the A330 Classic is competitive is based on the most favorable of assumptions and rests in part on the key capital cost assumption and moderate fuel prices.
In a story on Friday Reuters confirmed our December 23 e-newsletter report (which subsequently was published at Leeham News and Comment December 29) that Airbus is seriously considering an A330neo. This certainly clears the air on this score.
Source: Airbus
Airbus argues that the lower capital cost offsets the higher operating costs of its A330s vs Boeing’s 787-8 and forthcoming 787-9.
The following table includes Airbus’ assumption as well as 2013 lease rates reported by the appraisal firm Collateral Verifications (CV). Airbus assumes a higher lease rate for the 787-8 than CV reports. CV does not yet have an estimated lease rate for the 787-9.
Current Market Value is the price an airplane can be expected to sell for in today’s environment. Current Base Value is the theoretical price in a stable supply-and-demand market.
We really hoped we were done with this story, but the saga of the IAM 751 Boeing 777X contract vote lives on.
The critics of the election’s timing note that several thousand members of 751 were on vacation on January 3. Absentee voting was allowed for the first time in IAM history, but according to media reports, about 2,700 members did not vote in this election who voted in the November 13 election. The 777X contract was rejected then by a 67%-33% margin.
If these 2,700 members voted in the January 3 election, about 72% of these would have had to vote “Reject” to overcome the 51% “Accept” result. This is 5 percentage points greater than the November 13 Reject vote. We’re not persuaded this would have occurred.
We were involved in local suburban and state legislative elections from 1998 through 2011. In the suburb where we live, voter turnout in presidential years routinely was 85%. We analyzed voting results and voting trends in all but the 2011 election. In no case did absentee votes alter the initial reported outcome by more than 1%. Those on the losing end hoped that absentee ballots would make up the difference. We always calculated what percentage of votes would be required to overcome a deficit. Super-majority percentages were beyond reach.
It is based on this experience, and the percentages achieved in the November 13 and January 3 votes, that leads us to conclude that even if the “missing” 2,700 members had cast votes, the required percentage to win–72%–was impossible to achieve.
We believe the contract still would have been accepted.