Washington State boosts efforts for global supply chain

 Washington State is ratcheting up its efforts to expand its supply chain work beyond Boeing, state and federal officials said in their final Paris Air Show conference call.

 “Don’t underestimate the European companies that want to do business in the US because they want to do business in US dollars,” said US Rep. Rick Larsen, who led the State’s air show delegation, filling in for Gov. Jay Inslee who stayed home to deal with budget issues. “They want to get into Boeing.” Larsen said an experienced workforce is the #1 issue. Companies want “to start today rather than wait for other states. This is one of the distinguishing factors for Washington.”

“We want to go after supply chain for the entire industry,” Inslee said, noting that European suppliers want to come to the US for dollar-based work.

“One of the things that is becoming more and  more apparent to us is we have great opportunities in the entire supply chain,” Inslee said. “Thirty-five percent of jobs [in Washington] are in supply chain. We can be very competitive because of their desire to deal in dollars. We need to make sure we build on that opportunity and this is one reason we want to have the budget to build on training.

“We have to think expansively to think of these opportunities.”

Inslee said that 75% of suppliers here do business with Boeing, 40% work with Airbus, 39% with Bombardier and 25% with Embraer.

“The supply chain has flown under the radar,” Inslee said. “We really haven’t given it enough attention on our economic strategy. This is a supply chain that can service all the manufacturers. We don’t live in a single company world any more. We have to serve all of it.”

Inslee said he’s still working on retaining the Governor’s Office of Aerospace in the yet-to-be written budget. The Democratic version retained and increased funding for the office. The Republican version eliminated funding. There was an impasse in the regular session of the Legislature to agree to a state budget and the special session so far has not seen an agreement. If a budget isn’t approved by July 1, the state government starts shutting down.

Inslee proposed budgets for more workforce training and for transportation improvements to make it easier for goods to ship to Boeing and the supply chain. These, too, are stalled in the budget impasse.

Boeing’s “exodus” from Washington State a tad overblown–so far

Boeing has been eliminating thousands of jobs–union jobs–in Washington State and moving them to other states–non-union states.

Boeing won’t say where it will assemble the 777X. Nor will it say where it will assemble the 787-10.

So, predictably, new hand-wringing has begun among local officials and state politicians that Boeing is leaving the state. An “exodus,” in the headline over an OpEd piece in The Seattle Times by State Sen. Mike Hewitt, a Republican.

There is much in Hewitt’s piece with which we agree. Just yesterday we commented that Washington leaves a lot to be desired in its competitive stance against the Southern States. In May we offered specific ideas of what needs to be done.

The State’s new Aerospace Strategy, unveiled in May, reads more like a history than a forward-looking document. And as a state aerospace strategy, it’s woefully lacking in innovation or looking beyond Boeing to the rest of the aerospace industry. Washington’s supply chain is the No. 2 supplier by company count to Airbus and No. 6 by dollar volume. Yet the Aerospace Strategy doesn’t detail how to increase this business with Airbus, nor does it address the rest of the global business opportunities except in the most general way.

Hewitt is right that there is little to really point to in Washington’s strategy. But Hewitt omits the biggest sin of his own party: the Republican budget proposal eliminates funding for the Governor’s Office on Aerospace, which was created less than a year before.

That was a dumb move, and it hardly supports Hewitt’s decrying the shortcomings of the Democratic governors he is so keen to criticize (with justification, we repeat).

Washington’s Legislature, like Congress, is divided, and we’re at a budget impasse. The Office of Aerospace funding is in the Democratic budget, and the contrasts haven’t been resolved. Hewitt needs to buck his party and put this funding back. (Maybe he’s done so, but he certainly didn’t mention it in his OpEd piece.)

But there’s more in the flaw of Washington’s aerospace strategy.

Read more

Paris Air Show, Day 3: A320, 737 production rates of 50+ seen

Highlights from the show, as we see it:

  • Boeing said the entry-in-service for the 737 MAX will be accelerated from the fourth quarter 2017 to the third quarter. Southwest Airlines of the USA is the first operator. Bloomberg reported this is a six month acceleration, but we believe this is no more than three months at the outside. We had EIS for October 2017. Ascend data base shows the first delivery now for September 2017 and a total of four in 2017, the latter unchanged from when we wrote a story for Flight Global about the order from Southwest.
  • Update on the above item: Boeing has clarified that citing “six” months was a mis-speak; the EIS moves from Q4 to Q3 [along the lines we’ve written–editor].
  • The long-awaited order for Airbus A350s from Air France finally happened.
  • Ryanair firmed up its order for 175 737-800s.
  • Airbus says it’s alerted suppliers about the prospect of boosting A320 production to 50/mo by 2020. Boeing didn’t reveal at the air show (as far as we can tell from news reports) but our Market Intelligence tells us that Boeing has alerted suppliers about the prospect of boosting 737 production to 52/mo by 2019.
  • For all the hoopla of the Embraer E-Jet E2 launch, most of the orders and commitments were for the smallest E-175 E2.

Paris Air Show, Day 2

To us the biggest news coming out of Day 2 was not the launch of the Boeing 787-10–this was widely expected–but the suggestion by Boeing CEO Jim McNerney that he might seek a waiver to the mandatory age 65 retirement to hang around a bit more.

We comment on this in another post.

Otherwise, today was pretty anti-climactic: Airbus won easyJet–this had been reported as likely. Boeing launched the 787-10 with the expected launch customers. Boeing added five sales to the largely dormant 747-8I program. The Wall Street Journal has a somewhat cheeky view of Airbus’ sales targets, with Boeing’s Randy Tinseth predictably churlish.

And it rained and rained and rained. We’re glad we’re in Seattle.

The debate over using DOT Form 41in comparing A320 and 737 costs

Long time readers know that we don’t think much of the veracity of data filed with the US Department of Transportation under Form 41, detailing maintenance and fuel costs. We know from a consultant who helped an airline create its methodology for filing the data that the airline “fudges” the methodology to distort the data for competitive reasons.

Boeing has cited Form 41 data for years in making its comparisons between the 737 and the Airbus A320. A key piece of information Boeing uses is the maintenance cost data, in which Boeing claims the 737 was up to 29% less costly to maintain than the A320. This comparison in particular drives Airbus crazy, and officials say the Form 41 data is “garbage.”

737 v A320 maintenance

Boeing also previously used a study from IATA from 2006-2009, but dropped that in this year’s comparisons at the pre-Paris Air Show briefings.

Boeing also relies on DOT 41 data for fuel comparisons.

737 v A320 fuel

Beverly Wyse, VP and general manager of the 737 NG program, emphasized the reliance on DOT data in the comparisons.

“You don’t just have to believe us,” she said during the briefings. “We know that out there in the market ‘Airbus says,’ ‘Boeing says,’ and it’s hard to find the truth, so wherever we can we’re trying to use independent sources to substantiate the information that we are providing you. This data actually comes from the US department of Transportation Form 41. Depending on the model, and the configuration of the aircraft, the Dash 800 compared to an A320 or the A321 compared to the 900ER, you’ll see between 5% and 8% better fuel efficiency for the 737.”

Wyse credited the 737’s rival with good dispatch reliability, a rare Boeing compliment of the A320. But she claimed the 737 was nonetheless better.

“The A320 and 737 both have incredible reliability. Anything with 99 point something reliability is something to be proud of. The simpler design of the 737 contributes to 20% lower maintenance costs resulting in 67 fewer days out of service,” she says.

Given the reliance on DOT Form 41 data and our open doubts about using this data, we followed up with a series of questions to Boeing. Here is the exchange.

Boeing cites DOT 41 data in claiming the 737NG costs 20%-24% less on maintenance than the A320. First, DOT 41 data is crap. The airlines manipulate the data to mask what their true costs are from competitors. So how does Boeing purport to un-crap it?

DOT F41 data is a good source because it has rigorous reporting processes, contains constant costs in U.S. dollars, and includes reported data by operators who maintain both aircraft fleets, insuring consistent accounting practices.  But it is not the only source of data for our claims.   That goes toward your second question…

Secondly, Bev in one-on-one said, well, Boeing compares maintenance schedules between the 737 and the A320. Which is it? DOT 41 or company manuals?

The Maintenance Schedules or Check Intervals (that is the interval between performing various levels of Checks, typically classifieds as A, C and D-Checks) are obtained from our company manuals and for the A320, from industry publications and conferences. Specific A320 check intervals are periodically announced in Airbus press releases, journals and conference papers. It may be noted that F41 data provides a look at historic data while the Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) provides the check intervals for the future occurrence of check events. The continuous improvements that occur in the Boeing MPD usually result in even lower maintenance costs to airlines than being currently reported in F41 data. Our focus is to enable the airlines to continuously reduce their operating costs including maintenance costs through better product and services.

Third, I know from my own sourcing from within Boeing that to get to 24%, Boeing has compared new 737s to the oldest A320s using the earliest engines. When new-to-new is compared, the delta is 4% in favor of Boeing. Bev responds to this that this is a fleet-wide analysis.

Bev is absolutely correct; we use fleet-wide data in our comparison. There are many differences in the fleets of different airlines, like airplane age and the average stage length (Fhrs/Trip). Both affect maintenance costs. To enable true comparison, maintenance cost is normalized for a common airplane age. Since A320 is usually an older airplane the normalization process actually reduces the A320 costs to bring it to say a level of 737NG airplane age (say 8 years). Without normalization for age, the cost difference would be an additional 4 to 5% to the advantage of 737NG, but we diligently apply our processes while showing the relative cost and remove this fleet age based difference .  Similarly, costs are normalized for stage length and some other factors. All these normalizing processes are approved by the IATA Maintenance Cost Task Force of which both Boeing and Airbus are also members and uniformly used by most of the industry. We compare costs and do modeling in our tools on basis of the normalized costs.

In summary: All maintenance costs are compared on basis of like airplane age. Our multi level data analysis is for “as reported data”, normalized data and data from airlines operating both airplane types. In each case, the airframe costs for the 737NG are lower and on an average 20 percent lower. 

Fourth point: If this is a fleet-wide analysis, how is this possibly fair? The NG didn’t enter service until 10 years after the A320, so maintenance on aging aircraft skews everything.

Maintenance cost data is normalized to the same age level for instances where the airplane ages are different. This is done for each airline and then grouped together. The analysis ensured we were comparing like-aged aircraft not the entire fleet. By that comparison, the 737 has about 20% (+/-) lower airframe maintenance cost than the A320. But consider that there also are a number of other factors …

Five facts that drive lower maintenance cost for the 737:

1. Newer simple value added design

2. Lighter weight, smaller size;

3. Fewer systems

4. Fewer installed components

5. Longer intervals; fewer maintenance visits

Airlines believe and give us credit for our maintenance story. 

If there were truly a 20%-24% maintenance delta, why would anyone buy the A320? It doesn’t all come down to price, you know. The A320ceo evenly splits the market with the 738 but the A321ceo outsells the 739 by a wide margin and the neo widely outsells the MAX.

Maintenance and its cost is only one of the criteria by which airlines judge airplanes, and a relatively small one at that. Airframe Maintenance is usually 4 to 5 percent of cash operating cost. However, maintenance and reliability plays an important role in the operational experience for an airline. Price is an important factor in airline decisions, but you are correct that it doesn’t all come down to that. As you’re aware, for example, there can be political issues, or even funding issues.  As for the division of the single-aisle market, we are very aware of the inroads Airbus has made in its relatively short existence and are very much motivated by that.  Arguably, that’s another reason some airlines opt for one plane or another. So, too, is the ability to deliver an airplane when an airline wants or needs it. The on-time reliability of one model or the other can be a factor (while both companies produce reliable airplanes, Boeing’s 737s have better on-time statistics).  Too, some airlines prefer to stick with airplanes compatible with their installed fleet to reduce maintenance, training and scheduling costs. The choice is very complex.

I note, too, that this year Bev dropped citing the 2006-2009 IATA maintenance data. How come?

IATA data is used extensively within our own internal analysis. However, we acknowledge that there are some issues with IATA data. IATA airlines do not report data consistently over a long period. They may drop out entirely, miss reporting in some years and new airlines may join for a period. The Form 41 (US DoT) data is mandatory to report and usually aligns with the airline’s Annual Reports reported costs. In addition, variation in currency exchange rates becomes come into the picture. Airlines report in their own currency and that is converted to U.S. dollars. Inconsistency of reporting and the additional currency variable frequently clouds the data.

Bev says, though, that what tipped its use in the end in these slides, however, was that the data we had at the time was old.

We asked Airbus for a response to some of these questions. Engaged in the Air Show this week, we have yet to hear back.

It’s official: Boeing launches 787-10 with 102 orders, commitments

Here’s the Boeing press release.

Boeing expects the 787-10 to perhaps be the best selling model of the family over time. With a range of 7,000nm, it will have the ability to do most airline missions; 8,000nm-8,500nm range airplanes (let alone the proposed 9,400nm range of the 777X) is really more than most carriers need. We expect the orders to double by the end of the year.

In other Paris Air Show news, easyJet chose to stay with Airbus for its fleet renewal ordering a combination of 35 A320ceos and 100 neos. This was hard-fought competition. Boeing thought it won the deal on price, and Bombardier was ready to go with its own contract when Airbus came in at the last minute with a low price of its own, blowing both competitors out of the water.

Bombardier: This story explains in part why Bombardier has been challenged in selling the CSeries. The US Scope Clause inhibits sales to regional airlines; and lessors want to see a broader customer base. This is in addition to Airbus under-pricing Bombardier in key campaigns to block sales.

ATR landed an order for up to 90 ATR-72-600s.

Boeing will market the Embraer KC-390 to the Pentagon. After all the Boeing campaign about the Pentagon buying a foreign airplane for a tanker, this really takes the cake.

Paris Air Show Day 1

UBS has this easy-to-read Table of the orders and commitments announced on Day 1 of the Paris Air Show:

UBS Paris 2013 Day 1

The big news, of course, is the launch of the Embraer E-175/190/195 “E2” (second generation). The press release is here.

Embraer Rendering

Airbus scored an unexpected order for the A380: 20 from specialty lessor Doric Leasing, which has financed a number of A380s. We think this is an odd deal, and it must be one that already has some A380 customers lined up.

Tomorrow is expected to be the day Boeing launches the 787-10, so it should be Boeing’s day. We also believe tomorrow will be the day Airbus does a fly by of the A350 XWB. A little tit-for-tat, perhaps.

Odds and Ends: Airbus will “win” the Air Show; AvWeek’s McNerney interview; 747-8 vs 747-400

Airbus will “win” the air show: We did this preview for CNN International.

Jim McNerney Interview: Aviation Week has this long one.

Dominic Gates of The Seattle Times will be blogging from the Paris Air Show. You can follow him here. He has several reports worth reading.

Meantime, he reports that the Boeing 787-10 may be built in South Carolina, not Boeing’s main plant at Everett.

NYC Aviation has an interesting pilot perspective on flying the Boeing 747-400F and the 747-8F.

Figuring seat counts A320 v 737 families

Airbus and Boeing use different seating assumptions when comparing each others’ airplanes. As one of the charts in a previous post shows, Boeing’s assumptions tend to favor Boeing. Airbus assigns more seats to its airplanes than does Boeing and fewer seats to the Boeing airplanes.

Below is a chart of “real” configurations and the average. This data is from Seatguru.com. Several airlines have multiple configurations and we’ve averaged them for purposes of this table.

We were surprised by the low average of the 737-900/900ER but the sampling is small and Turkish skews it. Eliminating Turkish gives an average of 170 seats for the 737-900(ER).

If you eliminate American Airlines for the A321 (102 seats is correct), the A321 average is 189.

A320 A321 737-800 737-900
Airbus Assumption 153 189 157 175
Boeing Assumption 150 183 162 180
              Actual Configurations
1 Aeromexico 160
2 Air China 158 185 163
3 Air New Zealand 169
4 AirAsia 170
5 AirBerlin 210 180
6 AirCanada 146 175
7 Alaska 158 176
8 American 102 154
9 Asiana 143
10 British Air 157 186
11 Delta 150 160
12 Lufthansa 150 190
13 Malaysia 163
14 Ryanair 189
15 SAS 198 186
16 Southwest 175
17 Turkish 143 180 157 151
18 United 141 156 170
19 US Airways 150 187
20 Virgin America 143
Average 152 179 167 166