Leeham News and Analysis
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Part 1: Workforce Shortage Stunting Industry Growth, Costing Billions
Summary:
- This two-part series outlines the threat posed by workforce shortages to the future growth of aviation and aerospace, since industry-wide costs of workforce shortages are unquantified. Estimates suggest the industry is leaving tens of billions on the table as a result
- Technology alone cannot solve the problem as the workforce changes
- Current industry efforts to address the workforce are fragmented and, to elevate aviation/aerospace pathways and careers, must be coordinated with organizations delivering educational and career programs
- The solution is a collaborative, professionally managed Early-Learning-to-Career Pipeline leveraging existing programs and alliances to guide youth to aviation/aerospace careers
- Industry must pivot from relying on government to investing in organizing the army and educational and career assets we already have.
- Success requires industry-wide proactive collaboration, cultural change, and investment.
By Kathryn Creedy
May 5, 2026, © Leeham News: Not one of the numerous studies from every aviation/aerospace policy organization has quantified the costs of not addressing our workforce shortages at an industry-wide level, although concerns are rising at the academic level. And there is little effort in developing a unified career pipeline guiding the kids we are already inspiring into our careers, as other industries have long been doing.
Only a few estimates exist on the cost of workforce shortages:
- Aeronautical Repair Station Association (ARSA): Perhaps ~$14bn for the maintenance industry.
- Boston Consulting Group (BCG): Unavailable aircraft and MRO inefficiencies cost the industry $27bn annually.
- McKinsey & Co: Cost of Attrition for one medium-sized company is ~$300m–$330m
- International Air Transport Assn. (IATA)The additional cost borne by the airline industry from the supply chain was over $11bn in fuel and maintenance.
Aviation and aerospace policy groups in Washington, in their rush to convince policy leaders about the importance of their multi-billion-dollar impact on the economy, might be missing the forest for the trees in not quantifying the costs.
Raisbeck Aviation High School in Seattle is privately funded. Students study to become aerospace engineers. Credit: Raisbeck Aviation High School.
It is clear that the aviation, aerospace, and defense industries contribute billions to the economy, but two important facts are missing.
The total talent forecast for all segments of the industry and the cost of failing to meet workforce needs.
All studies cite rising compensation, higher maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) and manufacturing costs, and the costs associated with delays in returning aircraft from maintenance and in delivering new aircraft off the production line. But none quantifies how much those rising costs are.
Nor are they calculating the cost to safety, despite rising concerns over the loss of seasoned aviators and aviation maintenance technicians, and the resulting “juniority” on the flight deck and in the maintenance bay. Exacerbating our shortages is the training pipeline with a shortage of instructors, professors, and teachers.
Bjorn’s Corner: Blended Wing Body Airliners. Part 8
By Bjorn Fehrm
May 1, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We are making a series of articles on the Blended Wing Body (BWB) as a potentially more efficient design for passenger-carrying airliners than the classical Tube-And-Wing (TAW) configuration.
In the seventh article last week, we discussed the structural difference between a BWB and a Tube-And-Wing aircraft. The classical aircraft has divided the cabin pressure problem, causing cyclic pressure stress on the cabin enclosure, by enclosing the cabin in an optimal closed-tube configuration, and the wings’ aerodynamic stresses from gusts, hard landings, and the possible engine-out case are managed by a one-piece wingbox from tip to tip of the wing. These loads differ in character and therefore use different structural concepts in tube and wing aircraft.
The BWB mixes these loads, where the cabin shape, being a wide and long box-like compartment, complicates the structural concepts, where fatigue-sensitive bending loads from the cabin pressure are hard to avoid. It’s not made easier by the wing loads being absorbed by the same structure.
Figure 1. The JetZero Z4 BWB. Source: JetZero.
Now we look at some BWB passenger-compartment challenges compared with TAW solutions.
Bjorn’s Corner: Blended Wing Body Airliners. Part 7
By Bjorn Fehrm
April 24, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We are making a series of articles on the Blended Wing Body (BWB) as a potentially more efficient design for passenger-carrying airliners than the classical Tube-And-Wing (TAW) configuration.
In the sixth article last week, we discussed how the drag characteristics of the BWB and a high optimal cruise altitude have consequences for the choice of engines. The thrust lapse due to altitude is higher than for Tube-And-Wing aircraft that fly about 10,000ft lower. The JetZero Z4, therefore, needs engines adapted for high climbs and cruise conditions.
This requires engines with higher specific thrust, which means lower Bypass Ratios (BPRs). This runs counter to the development trend of modern engines, which reduce specific thrust in each generation to improve propulsive efficiency and thus lower fuel burn.
Figure 1. The JetZero Z4 BWB. Source: JetZero.
Now we look at the challenges in the structure domain for a BWB. At first glance, it should be a lighter structure than a Tube-And-Wing aircraft, as it does away with the fuselage and empennage. In reality, it’s more complicated than that.
Bjorn’s Corner: Blended Wing Body Airliners. Part 4
By Bjorn Fehrm
April 3, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We have started a series of articles on the Blended Wing Body (BWB) as a potentially more efficient design for passenger-carrying airliners than the classical Tube And Wing (TAW) configuration.
In the third article last week, we saw that the large wing surface area of a Blended Wing Body does not come from cruise-phase requirements; it comes from the lift needed in the landing phase, where BWBs lack flaps to increase wing lift. It needs a large wing area to compensate.
Now we will see that the wingspan is not sized by cruise requirements but by takeoff requirements.
Figure 1. The JetZero Z4 BWB. Source: JetZero.
Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 30. Wrap-up.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam
March 6, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We started the series on developing a new airliner in the 14 CFR Part 25 class (i.e., not a commuter-class aircraft) on August 1st 2025. The objective was to write a series about such development with people I knew that has “been there, done that”?
Here is how the series started:
Four years ago, I did a series on aircraft development with Henry Tam and Andrew Telesca, both part of the canceled Mitsubishi SpaceJet program. The series was about the arduous task of developing and producing a certified aircraft for the FAA Part 23 standard and its EASA equivalent. The idea was to better describe what’s ahead for the many upstarts that wanted to develop green aircraft and VTOLs. Now we will do a series about recent ideas on how the long development times for large airliners can be shortened. New projects talks about cutting the development time by one-third. Is this realistic?
Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 29. AI and the Program Plan.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam.
February 27, 2026, ©. Leeham News: Last week, we looked at the development timeline for Part 25 airliner programs to reach Entry Into Service (EIS) after launch, Figure 1.
We can see that development times have doubled from the 1960s to the 1980s, compared with development since the year 2000.
The main change is the complexity of the aircraft, both in terms of highly optimized structures using new materials and avionics/flight control systems with many software code lines that require extensive verification.
We concluded that modern toolchains, with the capability to produce so-called Digital Twins, helped avoid further slip in development times, but they could not reduce them. The question then remains, can the employment of AI change this?
Figure 1. The development times for airliners over the years. Source: Leeham Co.
Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 28. Development times.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam
February 20, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We have, since August 2025, gone through an FAA CFR 14 Part 25 development project of an airliner in the 200-seat class. The aim was to identify the activities required for such a project and the regulatory actions needed to achieve Type Certification (TC) and Production Certification (OC) for the aircraft.
The program followed the time plan in Figure 1, which indicated that it would take about seven years from the start of conceptual design to deliver the first aircraft and enter service (EIS). At each phase, we assessed whether modern support techniques, such as AI, could help with development and certification and whether they would accelerate the program plan.
Figure 1. A typical Program Plan for a smooth-running Part 25 airliner development. Source: Leeham Co.
We now summarize the findings and incorporate additional modern support, such as Digital Twin support, to assess the overall impact of today’s technologies on the program plan timeline in Figure 1. Read more
Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 27. Where Speed-Up gets Tough.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam.
February 13, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We are summarizing how modern tools, processes, and AI can help reduce the time required to develop a clean-sheet 200-seat replacement for the Airbus A321neo and the Boeing 737 MAX 10.
We discussed some ideas in the last article on how current AI can support development. We could see it helping reduce the time spent on templating documents and on designing and verifying simple parts, such as mounting brackets for pipes and cables.
To address the more challenging parts where AI struggles to assist, we need to understand why development programs now take longer than in the past and what can be done to shorten the timeline.
Outlook 2026: The state of the major eVTOL projects
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By Bjorn Fehrm
February 9, 2026, © Leeham News: The eVTOL market saw a sobering 2025 after two of its high flyers, Lilium and Volocopter, both ceased operations in 2024. The remains of Volocopter were bought by Diamond Aircraft, which now markets a stripped-down VoloCity as a Light Sports eVTOL.
Further players ceased in 2025, with Hyundai’s Supernal halting further development, as did Airbus with its CityAirbus. Textron halted Nexus development, then shuttered the division, and Overair ceased operations after Hanwa stopped investing.
We have one VTOL that received local Chinese Type Certification in 2023, and one in 2024. EHang got the Type Certificate in 2023, Production Certificate in 2024, and Air Operator Certificate (AOC) in 2025. The drone multicopter looking Ehang EH216-S (Figure 1) was cleared to operate tourist flights in China. The other Chinese project was AutoFlight’s Prosperity five-seater, which achieved Chinese Type Certification in 2024.
Figure 1. The only certified eVTOL, the EHang EH216-S. Source: EHang.
The almost euphoric enthusiasm over eVTOLs that existed before COVID, where car manufacturers got involved as this could be the thing that took over personal transport for crowded cities, has now calmed down, as the operational use of the current generation of eVTOLs is 10 to 15-minute missions in fair weather, replacing helicopter services from the airport to the city centre.
The original story was different as early developers like Joby Aviation painted with a broad brush. There were statements about 150nm trips, 200 kts speeds, and unbeatable economics, with batteries that lasted 10,000 flights. What investors and pundits didn’t understand was that these were unrelated statements about physical limits: there was no AND between them.
Bjorn’s Corner: Faster aircraft development. Part 26. AI speeds up processes.
By Bjorn Fehrm and Henry Tam
February 6, 2026, ©. Leeham News: We have completed a detailed, step-by-step analysis of the certification requirements a Part 25 Air Transport airliner in the 200-seat segment must meet.
In our series, we have seen work that could benefit from an AI agent, and other work where we conclude it will be difficult.
We begin this week by outlining areas where we expect AI to reduce the number of work hours required to complete a task. We will attribute these AI-driven work-hour reductions to the appropriate areas of the aircraft Program Plan in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A generic new Part 25 airliner development plan. Source: Leeham Co. Click to see better.